

## Provisional Index of Factual Issues

### **The Deceased**

1. Background / personal evidence regarding the 52 deceased; their movements on 7 July 2005 prior to the explosions.

### **The explosions and the immediate aftermath**

2. The travel of MSK, Tanweer, Hussain and Lindsay to and within London on the morning of 7 July 2005.
3. Circumstances at each of the four scenes immediately following the explosions.
4. Which of the 52 deceased were killed immediately by the explosions, and which survived for a period of time thereafter.
5. In respect of each of those who were not killed immediately by the explosions, what happened to them; what attention and/or treatment they received; whether there were any failings in the way that they were treated; the circumstances of their death; whether any failings in the emergency response contributed to or were causative of their death. In particular:
  - (a) Whether there were delays in the emergency responders reaching scenes of the explosions and if so the reasons for such delays;
  - (b) Whether the lighting available to the responders on the trains and in the tunnels was adequate, and where it was not whether appropriate steps were taken to improve the lighting;
  - (c) Whether appropriate triage procedures were operated;
  - (d) Whether the individuals in question received medical treatment that was appropriate to their injuries;
  - (e) Whether there were failings with regard to supply of first aid kits and/or other medical equipment on trains and/or in Underground stations;
  - (f) Whether there were failings with regard to the medical equipment and supplies brought to the scenes by the first responders and/or the subsequent provision of such equipment and supplies to each of the scenes;
  - (g) Whether those of the individuals in question who needed to be taken to hospital were removed from the scenes of the explosions and transported to hospital in a timely fashion;
  - (h) Whether there were failings with regard to the difficulties in the operation of telephones and radios below ground and above ground, and whether, having regard to all the circumstances, transport staff and emergency responders took appropriate steps to ensure effective communications during the response, both below ground and above ground;
  - (i) Whether there were failings with regard to the procedures in place for the emergency services urgently to attend scenes of large-scale injuries.

6. Whether a decision ought to have been taken prior to the explosion at Tavistock Square to close some or all of the transport network.

### **Forensic issues regarding the bombs and the bodies of MSK, Tanweer, Hussain and Lindsay**

7. The likely components, manner of construction and mode of operation of the explosive devices.
8. The likely involvement of MSK, Tanweer, Hussain and Lindsay in the development and assembly of the explosive devices.
9. The presence at the scenes of MSK, Tanweer, Hussain and Lindsay, and their proximity to the explosions.

### **Pathology issues**

10. The general nature of injuries typically caused by proximity to explosions.
11. Issues regarding particular injuries sustained by individual deceased.

### **The backgrounds of MSK, Tanweer, Hussain and Lindsay**

12. The lives of the four men prior to 7 July 2005 – upbringing, education, radicalisation, association, overseas travel, expression of extremist beliefs etc.

### **Preventability**

13. Whether there was a failure by West Yorkshire Police properly to investigate and/or assess the fact that MSK had attended a training camp in 2001.
14. Whether there was a failure by West Yorkshire Police and/or the Security Service properly to investigate and/or assess the fact that a car registered to ‘Sidique Khan’ had given a lift to a known extremist in Leeds in April 2003.
15. Whether there were failings on the part of the Security Service and/or the West Yorkshire Police and/or the Metropolitan Police properly to investigate and/or assess the intelligence relating to MSK and Tanweer arising from the Crevice investigation, whether at the time of the events in question or following the Crevice arrests. In particular:
  - a. Whether there was a failure by the Security Service properly to investigate and/or assess the fact that there was telephone contact between Mohammed Qayum Khan and MSK in July 2003.
  - b. Whether there was a failure by the Security Service to investigate and/or to assess the nature of the telephone contact between MSK and Omar Khyam between January and April 2004.
  - c. Whether there was a failure by the Security Service properly to investigate and/or assess the meeting between MSK, Tanweer and Khyam on 2 February 2004.

- d. Whether there was a failure by the Security Service properly to investigate and/or assess that Khan and Tanweer were likely to have been present at Omar Khyam's dinner with the Canadian bomb expert on 21 February 2004.
  - e. Whether there was a failure by the Security Service properly to investigate and/or assess the meeting between MSK, Tanweer and Khyam on 28 February 2004.
  - f. Whether there was a failure by the Security Service and/or the Metropolitan Police Service properly to investigate and/or assess the possible meeting between MSK and Khyam on 21<sup>st</sup> March 2004.
  - g. Whether there was a failure by the Security Service properly to investigate and/or assess the meeting between MSK and Khyam on 23 March 2004 when Khyam was talking in his car about the recent Madrid bombings.
  - h. Whether there were failures by the Security Service and/or the West Yorkshire Police and/or the Metropolitan Police properly to investigate and/or assess factual intelligence that was or could have been obtained from surveillance of the above meetings, including names, addresses and vehicle registration details. In particular:
    - i. Whether, following the Security Service's request on 16 February 2004 to West Yorkshire Police for details of Hasina Patel for the purposes of identifying potential associates of Khyam, there was a failure by West Yorkshire Police properly to investigate and/or assess this link.
    - ii. Whether there was a failure by the Security Service and/or West Yorkshire Police and/or the Metropolitan Police Service properly to investigate and/or assess 99 Stratford Street which was an address linked to the Honda Civic present at the meetings with Khyam on 2 February 2004 and 28 February 2004 and also the address of a storage facility which may have been linked to Khyam.
16. Whether there was a failure by the Security Service to show appropriate photographs of MSK and Mohammed Shakil to "the detainee" and to identify that they had been in Pakistan with the Crevice plotters in 2003.
17. Whether there was a failure by the Security Service and/or West Yorkshire Police properly to investigate and/or assess the information, received in January 2005 that men named "Saddique" and "Imran" had undergone training in Afghanistan, lived in Batley and were extremists.
18. Whether there was a failure by the Security Service and/or West Yorkshire Police properly to investigate and/or assess the further information received in March 2005, namely that "Saddique" had received military training in a mujahideen camp in Pakistan in early 2001.

19. Whether the Security Service ought to have discovered the fact that both MSK and Tanweer had attended extremist training camps in Pakistan in 2004-2005.
20. Whether, in light of the matters set out above:
  - a. the Security Service ought to have assessed that MSK and/or Tanweer were directly involved in or had knowledge of plans for terrorist activity or may have had knowledge of terrorist activity and should therefore have been designated as “essential targets” rather than as “desirable targets”; and/or
  - b. the Security Service ought to have commenced surveillance in relation to MSK and Tanweer and/or ought to have instigated other appropriate investigations.
21. Whether there were any failures of communication between the Security Service and West Yorkshire Police in relation to the gathering and assessment of relevant intelligence relating to MSK and Tanweer.
22. Whether the assessments by the Security Service in relation to MSK and Tanweer were affected by any inadequate record-keeping.
23. Whether any of the above alleged failings contributed to or were causative of the events of 7 July 2005.