

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005

Hearing transcripts - 12 October 2010 - Morning session

1 Tuesday, 12 October 2010

2 (10.00 am)

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith, before we resume your  
4 opening, as you know I've received representations from  
5 the Metropolitan Police Service and some of the families  
6 in relation to publication of footage that I think you  
7 intend to show on the public website.

8 I had hoped that matters would be resolved by  
9 agreement but, as I understand it, that has yet to  
10 happen. So what I propose, subject to further argument  
11 at this stage, is to deal with the matter at  
12 a convenient moment today or tomorrow, but in the  
13 meantime to give permission for a short extract that  
14 I understand the Metropolitan Police has prepared and to  
15 which no exception is taken. That extract can go on to  
16 the public website pending my decision on the rest of  
17 the material.

18 MR KEITH: My Lady, yes, thank you very much. Mr Hill was  
19 good enough to tell us last night that they had finished  
20 compiling a reedited version of the video footage of the  
21 scenes which can be released straightaway as you've  
22 ordered. May I seek an additional ruling, though, at  
23 this stage, which is that Mr Hill in his submissions  
24 last night raised the issue of one particular document,  
25 which was a document to which I made reference yesterday

1 which was, I think, from memory, JB125, but in any event

2 it was the document which showed calculations from --

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: In relation to the bombing?

4 MR KEITH: In relation to the bombing.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Bomb-making.

6 MR KEITH: In fact, it is document CW74 [INQ00010094, page 2 - Not for  
publication],

7 and Mr Hill -- yes, there is the document again --

8 I think would seek a ruling that that document in

9 particular not be released on to the public website for

10 obvious reasons.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Does anybody have any objections to  
12 my ruling in accordance with Mr Hill's submission?

13 Very well, it makes obvious sense not to publish

14 that on the website. Does anybody have any objection to

15 my allowing the short clip to be published subject to

16 a further ruling? I understand that the Secretariat can

17 make arrangements for the footage you will be showing to

18 be shown to representatives from the media so that, if

19 any of them, having seen it, wish to pursue the issue,

20 then we can rule upon it in the light of their

21 representations as well.

22 MR KEITH: Thank you very much indeed.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Right, yes, Mr Keith?

24 Opening statement by MR KEITH (continued)

25 MR KEITH: My Lady, just before the close last night, I had

1 concluded in examination of the time line in relation to  
2 the Aldgate bomb and had just turned to look at Edgware,  
3 but may I go back to Aldgate in order to bring to your  
4 attention two final entries in relation to the time  
5 line? They are at the end of this document, please, and  
6 then please perhaps go back one more page to 09 -- no,  
7 go forward, I'm sorry, to 09.52. It should be page 10,  
8 I think, of 10424. I'm asked to read out the INQ  
9 numbers for the record. This is INQ00010426 [INQ10426-1], [INQ10426-3],  
[INQ10426-9], [INQ10426-10] .

10 If you could go down to 09.52, we can see there an  
11 entry relating to the London Fire Brigade and it's an  
12 entry from the London Fire Brigade MOBIS report from the  
13 incident commander at Aldgate and he reports that there  
14 has been an explosion on a Tube train 150 metres inside  
15 the tunnel, nine persons believed trapped, an unknown  
16 number of casualties brought to surface, brigade  
17 personnel being withdrawn to a safe distance while  
18 assessment being made by explosive officer and MAIAT,  
19 which is a multiaction team.

20 The point of that entry, when read together with the  
21 entry at 10.16 is that there came a time, approximately  
22 around 10.05, when the emergency services established  
23 that all the live casualties had been brought to the  
24 surface and the number of dead in the carriage were  
25 confirmed, and other material which has been made

1 available to us, in particular transcripts of a radio  
2 call from a British Transport Police officer, and also  
3 London Ambulance Service documents, show that the final  
4 evacuation occurred at about 10.05, at which point there  
5 was then a further search of the tunnel for secondary  
6 devices.

7 Turning then, please, to Edgware Road, INQ00010429 [INQ10429-1],  
[INQ10429-2], [INQ10429-3], [INQ10429-4], [INQ10429-5], [INQ10429-6], [INQ10429-  
7] [INQ10429-8],

8 my Lady, the explosion, as I've said, at Edgware Road,  
9 occurred at 08.49.43 give or take some 30 seconds, and  
10 that time we will recall is timed by the point when the  
11 inner rail on the Baker Street Paddington section of the  
12 line tripped.

13 We heard yesterday from the audio transcripts of the  
14 calls to the Network Control Centre of  
15 London Underground a call at 08.53 to the effect that  
16 there had been an explosion at Edgware Road, and we can  
17 see there the time stamp record 08.49.43, the extinction  
18 of the track alive indicators, and then, at 08.52.48,  
19 the reference to the call from the Metropolitan, Circle  
20 and Hammersmith Line duty office manager.

21 Going further down the page, please, to 08.59.17, we  
22 can see there the reference to Mr Gozka, who was the  
23 group station manager Edgware Road, and he calls the  
24 London Underground Network Control Centre and informs  
25 them that a train at Edgware Road has hit a tunnel wall,

1 going towards the Praed Street junction.

2 It may be that that call and the reference to  
3 "Praed Street" provides the genesis for the erroneous  
4 belief subsequently that Praed Street was the location  
5 of the explosion.

6 At 08.59.49, there is a call to the London Fire  
7 Brigade to attend a fire and explosion at Praed Street.

8 As we know, that was some distance from Edgware Road  
9 London Underground station. At 09.00.14 there is then  
10 the mobilisation message which we saw yesterday from the  
11 London Fire Brigade logs for a number of units to attend  
12 that incident.

13 There is then, at 09.01, a reference to the tunnel  
14 wall and we saw that reference yesterday again in the  
15 Transport for London documentation.

16 At 09.02.34 the London Ambulance Service receive the  
17 first call from London Fire Brigade to attend  
18 73 Praed Street close to Paddington station and the  
19 information provided is burns, scalds and an explosion,  
20 and that record can also be found on the CAD  
21 documentation.

22 At 09.03.15 the Network Control Centre itself speaks  
23 to the London Ambulance Service and report that they  
24 want the service to attend Aldgate, Liverpool Street and  
25 Edgware Road.

1 Then, at 09.03.56, Mr Gozka again speaks to the  
2 Network Control Centre and informs them that he can't  
3 get hold of the duty office manager for the Metropolitan  
4 and Circle Line, but he confirms that there is a person  
5 under the train and he states his belief that he thinks  
6 that there is a terrorist incident and he requests  
7 confirmation that the London Ambulance Service and the  
8 Emergency Response Unit are attending.  
9 My Lady, I said something about the difficulties  
10 encountered by the Emergency Response Unit in attending  
11 Edgware Road yesterday.  
12 09.04.21, the London Ambulance Service are again  
13 contacted by London Underground and this is the point at  
14 which they are informed that the precise location of the  
15 explosion is Edgware Metropolitan station,  
16 Chapel Street. Again, there is a reference to the  
17 reports that they have received to the effect that there  
18 was a train into the wall and someone under a train.  
19 The importance of this entry, as I've observed, is  
20 that it shows that there was a delay, therefore, between  
21 the first report and the second report to the London  
22 Ambulance Service and a difference between the reports  
23 in connection with the location of the explosion.  
24 09.04.41, the first Fire Brigade vehicles arrive at  
25 Praed Street, so again they had gone to Praed Street as

1 opposed to Chapel Street.

2 At 09.04.59 the Fire Brigade request the police to  
3 attend, and at 09.05.38 the London Ambulance Service  
4 dispatch a fast-response vehicle, NW34, to Praed Street.

5 At 09.04, Mr Gozka calls the Network Control Centre  
6 to say "Something has gone badly wrong down here" and we  
7 heard that call yesterday.

8 At the bottom of the page, at 09.07.50, there is  
9 a reference there to a further call that we heard played  
10 yesterday and over the page we can see further London  
11 Ambulance Service units arrive, firstly, at 09.09.03,  
12 and then 09.09.39 -- I'm sorry, the first arrives at  
13 Praed Street at 09.09.03 and then an ambulance is  
14 activated to Edgware Road at 09.09.39.

15 If you could scroll down the page, please, we can  
16 see at 09.12.48 a London Ambulance Service ambulance  
17 arrives at Praed Street and then scroll further down the  
18 page, I think perhaps it will be over the page, the  
19 first ambulance arrives at Edgware Road, but not until  
20 09.13.51, and, as I said, that's a consequence of the  
21 fact that the original location was not Edgware Road but  
22 Praed Street.

23 We can see further messages to the London Fire  
24 Brigade, mobilisation messages at 09.13.59, and then, at  
25 09.14, the London Ambulance crew, E205, report to the

1 Central Ambulance Control an explosion on a train with  
2 up to 1,000 casualties and they request as many  
3 ambulances as possible, reporting that there is only one  
4 police car on the scene and no Fire Brigade.  
5 My Lady, that was the extract from the London  
6 Ambulance Service primary incident log that I drew to  
7 your attention yesterday.  
8 Perhaps we could go to the following page. At  
9 09.18.58, the first London Fire Brigade appliance  
10 arrives at the scene. So that's some 23 minutes or so  
11 after the explosion.  
12 There is still a certain amount of confusion at  
13 09.20 or thereabouts, judging from the entry from the  
14 British Transport Police vehicle to the effect that the  
15 form of explosion is not known.  
16 Further fire rescue units arrive at 09.19.12 and  
17 then we can see, at 09.19.25, the entry in relation to  
18 the Code Amber call, which you will recall from the NCC  
19 audio tapes yesterday was the call by London Underground  
20 for all the trains to be suspended and then moved to the  
21 nearest available platform. That preceded, I think,  
22 a Code Red some 20 minutes or so thereafter, which is,  
23 in effect, an order for the evacuation of the entire  
24 system.  
25 At 09.21, an ambulance crew, E202, crewed by

1 Messrs Buck and Chandler, inform the London Ambulance  
2 Service control that they are running out of resources  
3 and they request an equipment vehicle and they say words  
4 to the effect that "It's chaos down here".  
5 A further BTP vehicle calls in at 09.22 and  
6 a further London Fire Brigade appliance arrives at  
7 09.23.  
8 At 09.29, a British Transport Police vehicle calls  
9 in to the Control. They confirm the explosion on the  
10 train and they give details of the location of the train  
11 and they state to the Control that they're finishing off  
12 detrainning what they can, and that is to say that  
13 they're still at that stage engaged in the process of  
14 removing casualties from the train, and the walking  
15 wounded, and they say that they will then go and assess  
16 casualties over, and at around the same time, the London  
17 Ambulance Service report that at least 20 people need  
18 serious treatment, 7 people are trapped on the line,  
19 there are 100 walking wounded, and they need at least  
20 10 more vehicles, and those announcements precede the  
21 declaration of a major incident by the  
22 Metropolitan Police and the London Fire Brigade.  
23 If we could go to the final page, please, of this  
24 time line, we can see that at 10.36, according to the  
25 London Ambulance Service log, the Edgware Road scene was

1 cleared of live casualties, and so, for our purposes,  
2 the important time is from 08.50 until 10.36.  
3 One point I should make in relation to the time line  
4 in relation to the documentation concerning in  
5 particular the London Ambulance Service, my Lady, is  
6 that, after the arrival of the first ambulance at  
7 Edgware Road at 09.13, there is a paucity of reports  
8 from the London Ambulance Service crews on the scene.  
9 There are, in fact, I think, only four more reports  
10 thereafter, for the very obvious reason that the crew,  
11 having arrived and then having gone down to the tunnel,  
12 found themselves unable, one presumes, to be able to get  
13 back to the ambulance and the LAS vehicles for the  
14 purposes of calling in to the control. But the  
15 significance of that point is that we are reliant to  
16 a certain extent on the contemporaneous documentation  
17 from the control rooms. It may not accurately reflect  
18 exactly what was going on in the tunnel here and  
19 elsewhere because of the inability of the emergency  
20 services to dial in.  
21 May we then, please, look at the  
22 King's Cross/Russell Square time line which is  
23 INQ00010430? [INQ10430-1], [INQ10430-2], [INQ10430-3], [INQ10430-4],  
[INQ10430-5], [INQ10430-6], [INQ10430-7], [INQ10430-8], [INQ10430-9]  
24 Lindsay's bomb exploded on or around 08.49.49 as  
25 determined by the circuit break between Holloway Road

1 and Russell Square, and the track alive indicator was  
2 extinguished at 08.50.

3 This time line has been prepared in a way that shows  
4 the events at King's Cross against those at  
5 Russell Square because, as everybody is aware, the  
6 emergency services attended both stations in order to  
7 get to the train which was between them.

8 At 08.50.23, Inspector Mingay, of whom I made  
9 mention yesterday, contacts the British Transport Police  
10 control room from the King's Cross control room to say  
11 that there's been a massive power failure and they are  
12 evacuating the station. He says:

13 "I have no radio comms so you can't contact me.  
14 I reported that channel 2's been out days ago, but  
15 nothing has been done."

16 My Lady, we'll hear in evidence due course that one  
17 of the alternative radio channels, channel 2, operated  
18 by British Transport Police, ceased working around about  
19 this time and that contributed further to the  
20 difficulties that the emergency services had in  
21 communicating both with each other and with their own  
22 controllers.

23 At 08.52.28, the Network Control Centre tell  
24 a caller that there's been an explosion at  
25 Liverpool Street, there may be one at Edgware Road, and

1 there may be one somewhere else, and our assessment of  
2 the material is that that is the first reference to the  
3 possibility of an explosion at  
4 King's Cross/Russell Square, and we heard that call  
5 played yesterday.

6 The news that there had been a tunnel trip in  
7 relation to the Holloway Road/Russell Square section of  
8 the Piccadilly Line doesn't appear to have found its way  
9 to the Network Control Centre until 08.53.15, and we can  
10 see the entry there. Then there is a reference to  
11 Mr Mingay calling the British Transport Police control  
12 room again to report smoke coming out of one of the  
13 Piccadilly Line tunnels.

14 He, in fact, seeks to declare a major incident  
15 because of the number of casualties and we can see that  
16 at 08.58.

17 At 08.59.21, you will recall yesterday from the  
18 audio tapes the segment in which somebody can be heard  
19 in the background saying they want the Fire Brigade in  
20 King's Cross, and that is the first reference to the  
21 Fire Brigade insofar as the Network Control Centre is  
22 concerned and that is consistent with the caller to the  
23 Network Control Centre just a few moments before, who  
24 requests the London Fire Brigade to attend, and we can  
25 see that at 08.58.35.

1 The Fire Brigade in fact were requested by the  
2 Network Control Centre to attend the King's Cross  
3 eastbound Piccadilly Line. At 08.58.16, it's not on  
4 this time line, but it is on the Network Control Centre  
5 schedule that we looked at yesterday, and it's important  
6 that I emphasise that, in relation to that report, the  
7 London Fire Brigade were provided with the details of  
8 King's Cross eastbound Piccadilly Line. In fact, it was  
9 the westbound, but the reference was at least to  
10 King's Cross and to the Piccadilly Line.

11 At 09.02.59, over the page, please, the London Fire  
12 Brigade receive a 999 call from Euston Square, smoke  
13 issuing in the King's Cross tunnels at Euston Square  
14 station.

15 The material -- although this document refers to  
16 Euston Square, the London Fire Brigade have taken the  
17 time to tell us overnight -- and I'm grateful to them --  
18 that, in fact, the reference to Euston Road may not be  
19 correct. They were told to attend King's Cross station  
20 London Underground. So perhaps we can make a mental  
21 note to correct that and this document will be amended  
22 in due course.

23 At any rate, at 09.04.35, the London Fire Brigade  
24 issued an internal mobilisation message for three  
25 appliances to attend Euston Square and one appliance,

1 A242, to King's Cross.

2 At 09.04.39, the London Ambulance Service receive

3 the first 999 call from the British Transport Police

4 reporting a train stuck in the tunnel, smoke inhalation

5 and people on board at King's Cross. There is

6 a variation, my Lady, in relation to the contemporaneous

7 logs insofar as the time of that call is concerned, but

8 we've put there the time of the call as recorded by the

9 London Ambulance Service.

10 One can see from glancing down the page that all

11 these reports refer exclusively to King's Cross as

12 opposed to Russell Square. The right-hand column is, we

13 can still see, blank, for the very simple reason that

14 there were no calls to attend Russell Square, even by,

15 as we can see from the bottom of the page, 09.10.

16 Over the page, please, page 4 of this document, at

17 09.13.06, the London Underground Russell Square

18 supervisor calls British Transport Police and asks them

19 to summon ambulances and, by very dint of the fact that

20 he is the Russell Square supervisor, that call is to

21 Russell Square, but it is the first call insofar as

22 Russell Square is concerned.

23 Around about that time, the first walking wounded

24 had in fact appeared at the Russell Square platform,

25 which is what one presumes triggers the supervisor to

1 call the British Transport Police.

2 Further messages are received by the relevant

3 control rooms at 09.14 and 09.15 in relation to the fact

4 that it's now been treated as a major incident.

5 At 09.15, there is a report to the London Ambulance

6 Service incident room from N361 to the effect that

7 they're on the scene at King's Cross, they have been

8 approached by police shutting off the Euston Road to get

9 the London Ambulance Service crews there. Apparently

10 there are walking wounded coming out of the tunnels.

11 He asks for a couple of ambulances and he gives

12 details about the location of the entrance. The first

13 ambulance is dispatched to King's Cross at 09.16, we can

14 see that at 19 seconds past 9.16.

15 Then at 09.18, the London Ambulance Service received

16 a call requesting ambulances at Russell Square, and the

17 call is to the effect that there are persons injured,

18 facial injuries and 200-plus casualties. I think there

19 must be an error in the time line. The call is from the

20 British Transport Police to the London Ambulance

21 Service, not a call from the London Ambulance Service.

22 The first ambulance, as opposed to a fast-response

23 vehicle, arrives at King's Cross at 09.20.03, and then

24 over the page, perhaps we could scroll further on to

25 09.30.

1 09.30.25 is the first ambulance the -- the first  
2 Fast Response Unit from the London Ambulance Service to  
3 attend the Russell Square scene. So, my Lady, you can  
4 see the delay between the arrival of the ambulances at  
5 King's Cross and the Fast Response Units first to arrive  
6 at Russell Square.

7 Going back to the previous page, page 6, please, at  
8 09.22, there is a message from the  
9 British Transport Police to the police, the  
10 Metropolitan Police, for urgent assistance at  
11 Russell Square. LAS attending, up to 200 injured, but  
12 we can see from the time line that they haven't, in  
13 fact, arrived at that stage. I think that was  
14 a reference to the police noting that they had been  
15 requested to attend.

16 Around about that time, there is a call to the  
17 British Transport Police from the platform phone  
18 referring to serious loss of life, limbs severed, people  
19 are dying.

20 If we could return, then, please, to page 7, which  
21 we looked at briefly a moment or two ago, we can see  
22 then a number of entries in relation to Russell Square  
23 on the right-hand side of the page. There are  
24 references at 09.26 to serious injuries and possible  
25 loss of life.

1 09.30.25, the entry to which I've already made  
2 mention of the first Fast Response Unit arriving at  
3 Russell Square, the first ambulance in Russell Square  
4 arrives at 09.31.

5 Then over the page further Fire Brigade vehicles  
6 arrive at Euston Square, King's Cross, and then, at  
7 09.38, one of the London Ambulance Service officers,  
8 a Mr Ward, declares a major incident and he tells the  
9 control room that there are approximately 50-plus  
10 casualties and approximately 6 to 15 fatalities:  
11 "The train is still between two stations full of  
12 smoke, so we're unable to get full extent on scene at  
13 the moment."

14 At 09.45 -- in fact, actually at 09.40, I apologise,  
15 the Metropolitan Police send a message to the London  
16 Ambulance Service to the effect that there are multiple  
17 casualties, loss of limbs at Russell Square and  
18 King's Cross:  
19 "Send every unit you can. Numerous officers at the  
20 venue. Russell Square of more concern but units to  
21 King's Cross as well. Numbers up to 200 people.  
22 Officer in charge ... is Inspector Asmyth-Miller."  
23 We estimate, my Lady, that around 09.45 the triage  
24 teams were by that stage underground in the tunnels. At  
25 09.46, the helicopter emergency medical technician, or

1 technicians, arrive, and then over the page, more  
2 ambulances, more paramedics arrive.  
3 But at 10.16, the Metropolitan Police receive  
4 a message saying that there are requests for more first  
5 aid kits to be taken to King's Cross as soon as  
6 possible.  
7 There are further messages to the London Fire  
8 Brigade for more pumps at 10.32, "make pumps 12", and at  
9 10.36, the Metropolitan Police call their control room  
10 with a request for more officers to assist with the  
11 evacuation of bodies inside the location.  
12 There is a query in relation to the placing of the  
13 deceased, and where they are to be put at 10.49, and we  
14 estimate, my Lady, that the live casualties were removed  
15 from the train by approximately 11.00, although there  
16 are no contemporaneous documents which serve to  
17 establish that fact.  
18 My Lady, the number 30 bus in Tavistock Square.  
19 The first call to the Metropolitan police is at  
20 09.47.47 when the caller states that there's been an  
21 explosion on a bus at that location, there are people  
22 lying in the road, and the caller states that the London  
23 Ambulance Service are on the scene.  
24 My Lady, very different considerations apply in  
25 relation to Tavistock Square by virtue of the obvious

1 fact that the explosion occurred in full daylight, in  
2 public view in the square and, therefore, the emergency  
3 services became immediately aware of it, but because  
4 there were all number of 999 calls made to them.  
5 At 09.47.47, a police officer calls into the control  
6 room to say there's been an explosion on a bus, and we  
7 can see that, around about the same time, the London  
8 Ambulance Service and the London Fire Brigade receive  
9 their first calls, and the mobilisation messages  
10 internally recorded to the London Fire Brigade units can  
11 be seen at 09.50.  
12 At 09.51, a police officer calls into the control  
13 room to say that the London Ambulance Service are  
14 already on the scene and the evidence will show that  
15 a London ambulance was, in fact, flagged down, I think  
16 on the way to Euston Road, by a police officer in  
17 Tavistock Square.  
18 Over the page, please, and I should have said for  
19 the record -- I apologise -- that this document is  
20 INQ00010432 [INQ10432-1], [INQ10432-2], [INQ10432-3], [INQ10432-4].  
21 A British Transport Police officer calls in at  
22 09.53.07 shortly after the London Fire Brigade unit,  
23 A244 appears, and he says:  
24 "I'm at Tavistock Square with the bus. We're going  
25 to try and move these cordons back. People are still

1 right near the bus and we're not sure about a secondary  
2 device. We'll try and get people off the bus and move  
3 them as far as we can. Looks like multiple dead. Don't  
4 know how many yet. Multiple wounded. I have enough  
5 officers on the scene. Some people still trapped in the  
6 bus which we're attending to. It's a case at the moment  
7 we're just going to push the cordons back as far as we  
8 can and get the injured and dying out."  
9 So there are plain references there to the processes  
10 by which the emergency services attempt to remove the  
11 dead and the dying.  
12 At 09.55.23, the police call in to say that they  
13 need further ambulances and, at 09.57, the first  
14 recorded ambulance attends, that is to say the first  
15 ambulance which had actually been summoned by the London  
16 Ambulance Service itself attends. There had, as I've  
17 said already, been another vehicle flagged down.  
18 My Lady, at 10.00, there is a reference by the  
19 police to an apparent microwave. That entry is inserted  
20 there because it gives an indication of the concerns  
21 that the Security Services had about the possibility of  
22 secondary devices, a very real concern for them, and,  
23 indeed, there was a secondary explosion at  
24 Tavistock Square when a suspect package was destroyed  
25 deliberately by the police.

1 A Fast Response Unit for the London Ambulance  
2 Service attends at 10.03 and a further London Fire  
3 Brigade appliance, A312 arrives at 10.05. So by  
4 contrast to the tunnels, the response in relation to  
5 Tavistock Square is very much faster.  
6 The British Transport Police officer, Mr Dermody,  
7 calls into his control room at 10.22 to provide a quick  
8 situation report and he tells his control room that:  
9 "Most of the people have been removed off the bus.  
10 The dead and dying have been removed into the BMA  
11 [British Medical Association] building. There's  
12 a briefcase on the bus which EXPO are going to check and  
13 then the scene should be fairly clear."  
14 By 10.39, the London Fire Brigade report that:  
15 "All saveable life has been removed from the bus,  
16 four persons confirmed apparently dead on the bus, eight  
17 casualties all suffering from multiple blast injuries  
18 have been removed to the triage centre situation in BMA  
19 building, nine further casualties all suffering from  
20 multiple injuries have also been removed to the triage  
21 centre adjacent to the BMA building, crews assisting  
22 with first aid at the scene, further secondary device  
23 suspected, restrictive zone has now been enlarged."  
24 The contemporaneous record shows that there was then  
25 a controlled explosion on the bus at around about

1 10.42 -- between 10.42 and 10.43, carried out by the  
2 police and, as we'll hear in evidence in due course,  
3 witnesses report that explosion and, of course, it gives  
4 rise to fears of further improvised explosive devices  
5 being detonated by terrorists.

6 The remaining entries on the time line concern  
7 Sam Ly, who was admitted to University College Hospital  
8 A&E at 11.00, and then at 11.05, there is a reference to  
9 the London Fire Brigade reporting that a "Silver"  
10 meeting has been held and we'll hear in due course how  
11 the command structure works, but an important part of it  
12 are the holding of meetings by those concerned with the  
13 tactical and strategic command of each of the scenes,  
14 the Gold and Silver meetings.

15 Could we now, please, look at INQ00010129? [INQ10129-1], [INQ10129-2]  
16 This is a CAD report -- we looked at CAD reports and  
17 what they consist of yesterday. CAD report 2779, the  
18 entry is at 09.47 and we can see the first details of  
19 that first call about ten or so lines further down the  
20 page at 09.47.47:  
21 "Explosion on a bus."  
22 At 09.49.32, London Ambulance Service are stated to  
23 be needed, and the police records show already by 09.50  
24 the extent of the devastation in the bus because we can  
25 see there the reference to many lifeless bodies.

1 I think over the page, please, we can see references  
2 to the possible secondary devices to which I have made  
3 reference, to the request for a dog unit to check the  
4 suspect package, to request for EXPO teams, explosive  
5 officer teams, to attend, and then finally the  
6 reference, at 10.42 and 10.43, to the controlled  
7 explosion being carried out.

8 Could we then, please, look at INQ00010128? [INQ10128-1] In  
9 fact, sorry, could we go back one page? I'm sorry to  
10 change the direction of the Trial Director.

11 If we go to the bottom of the page [INQ10129-1], there is  
12 a reference there to needing a further three ambulances  
13 at 09.55, 09.55.23, and then, if we go back to the last  
14 page of the document that we were looking at, which is  
15 the page that I was really requesting, and you go to the  
16 bottom of the page, we can see there at 11.03, a report  
17 to the effect that the medical staff are nearly out of  
18 supplies, gloves, et cetera. So there is there a short  
19 reference to the difficulties faced by the medical  
20 technicians in dealing with the very large number of  
21 dead and dying.

22 INQ00010128 [INQ10128-1] then, please, this is a different CAD  
23 report, this time it's computer-aided dispatch record  
24 2778. It commences at 09.47.47. We can see there next  
25 to the cursor a caller states explosion on bus at this

1 location, the location is BMA House, Tavistock Square,  
2 people lying in the road, LAS are on the scene and at  
3 09.50.10 there is a reference there to police, and  
4 London Ambulance Service already been on the scene.  
5 INQ00010121 [INQ10121-1], finally, CAD number 2714, this CAD is  
6 entered at 09.38.38. It shows calls at 09.45.39 for all  
7 available units to deploy, and at 09.51 there is  
8 a reference to an entry for a caller saying:  
9 "This explosion is on a bus. Speak to LTB  
10 [London Transport Buses] and tell them to stop all buses  
11 from/into Central London."  
12 My Lady, those CAD reports and the time lines give  
13 necessarily a very rough indication of the main events  
14 for each of these terrible scenes.  
15 It would be premature to draw any firm conclusions  
16 in advance of hearing the evidence itself, and may I say  
17 that nothing that I say should detract or be seen to  
18 detract from the bravery and the determination of the  
19 individual members of the emergency services who  
20 responded.  
21 I should also say that the evidence may establish  
22 that the systems largely worked, but perhaps a number of  
23 preliminary points could be made.  
24 Initially -- and we saw this in particular  
25 yesterday -- it's obvious that there were conflicting

1 reports from the bombsites. This led the Network  
2 Control Centre of the London Underground perhaps to  
3 appreciating -- or not being able to appreciate -- the  
4 overall picture, but it's clear that information was  
5 received by it piecemeal and, as a result, it was not  
6 clear that the power failure and the bangs, the  
7 explosions and the walking wounded, were part of  
8 a single, coordinated attack.  
9 For example, we saw yesterday the London Fire  
10 Brigade log referring to a suspected bomb at Aldgate at  
11 09.03, the City of London Police CAD system reported  
12 a reference to a bomb in the carriage at 09.10 and the  
13 British Transport Police recorded a call at 09.17 which  
14 made express reference to bomb damage.  
15 But London Underground, as the operator of the  
16 network, didn't appear to have reached that conclusion  
17 until after 9.30. But at the same time, it was not  
18 initially clear where the precise locations of what was  
19 going on were. The emergency services were called to  
20 Liverpool Street as well as Aldgate, to Praed Street as  
21 well as subsequently Edgware Road, and Euston Road and  
22 King's Cross as well as subsequently Russell Square.  
23 One reason may be that, because the first three  
24 explosions were underground, there were very few 999  
25 calls received and it seems to us that it's generally

1 from the 999 calls that the emergency services are able  
2 to compare and cross-reference calls to find out what's  
3 happened and where.

4 The contrast with the information received in the  
5 computer-aided dispatch records for Tavistock Square  
6 could not be more stark.

7 The first people to appreciate what had happened  
8 were obviously the survivors and the drivers, yet they  
9 appear to have been unable to communicate directly  
10 either with each other or with the emergency services.

11 In relation to the trains themselves, the PA system  
12 allowing the drivers to speak to the passengers, was,  
13 I think, disabled in every case. Neither the  
14 Circle Line, nor the Piccadilly Line, had, we  
15 understand, at that time, any equipment that allowed the  
16 passengers conversely to speak back to the driver in any  
17 event.

18 In relation to the emergency services, communication  
19 with the line control managers in the London Underground  
20 system did not work on occasion on account of  
21 interruptions and blind spots, and we'll hear evidence  
22 from the driver of the Aldgate train, Timothy Batkin, to  
23 the effect that, although he could hear people screaming  
24 behind him in the train "Help us, help", he could not  
25 respond. The only communication with them was the

1 passenger alarm, which plainly would do very little  
2 indeed.

3 We understand the position now is that talkback  
4 facilities to enable passengers to talk to drivers are  
5 gradually being introduced as trains are upgraded, but  
6 the communication issues go further.

7 Mr Batkin attempted to contact the line controller  
8 using the Mayday Call Sign giving details of the train  
9 and where it was, but he received no reply because his  
10 radio didn't appear to be working.

11 The importance of knowing the exact location of  
12 a bomb is self-evident. By way of analogy, the guidance  
13 for police responding to bombs includes a direction that  
14 the first officers on any scene should inform the  
15 appropriate control room as soon as possible of a number  
16 of matters, one of which is location, exact location of  
17 scene. The "L" in the mnemonic "CHALET" to which we  
18 made reference yesterday, and it's the mnemonic that the  
19 police are encouraged to remember when attending the  
20 scenes of such disasters.

21 The consequence of there not being a direct link  
22 between drivers and passengers and the emergency  
23 services was in relation to Liverpool Street/Aldgate,  
24 King's Cross/Russell Square and  
25 Praed Street/Edgware Road, the London Fire Brigade and

1 the London Ambulance Service were not directed to  
2 exactly the right place.

3 This was an issue that concerned the London Assembly  
4 in the report to which I made reference yesterday, and  
5 they addressed in their recommendations the issue of  
6 whether the emergency plan should be amended so that,  
7 when an incident takes place on a London Underground  
8 train, the emergency services are deployed to the  
9 nearest station on either side.

10 The London Fire Brigade and the London Ambulance  
11 Service responded to that recommendation by observing  
12 that split attendance, where there has been an incident  
13 in a tunnel between the two stations on either side, is  
14 standard practice, but that it's sometimes difficult to  
15 tell in the early stages which line is affected. That,  
16 of course, gives rise to an issue concerning the  
17 importance of accurate information from drivers and  
18 London Underground staff.

19 But a new system for identifying locations has  
20 apparently been agreed and we understand that new driver  
21 communications are in place and, as we'll hear in due  
22 course, I think drivers have now been given portable  
23 hand-held digital radios and a new radio system  
24 generally is being installed across the  
25 London Underground network.

1 The evidence nevertheless tends to suggest that the  
2 emergency services encountered considerable difficulties  
3 in communicating with each other away from the immediate  
4 environment of the stations and away from  
5 Tavistock Square. Of course, at each of the bombsites  
6 themselves, the emergency services could speak orally by  
7 mouth to each other.

8 The London Assembly, in considering these issues,  
9 considered that the communication problem did indeed  
10 affect the triage and dispersal of patients from the  
11 scenes and following the terrible events of 7 July,  
12 a project called "CONNECT" was put in place in the  
13 London Underground system and elsewhere leading to  
14 a rolling out of a new system equipping the emergency  
15 services with what is called a terrestrial, trunked  
16 radio-based digital radio, and that should in theory,  
17 and perhaps in practice, allow staff to communicate  
18 underground and from below ground to surface.

19 We'll be hearing evidence in due course as to how  
20 that system has been installed and how widely.

21 My Lady, it is worthy of note -- and it's a point  
22 that was made in the press, in fact, last night -- that  
23 Sir Desmond Fennell's report to which I made reference  
24 yesterday of April 1989 into the King's Cross fire of  
25 18 November 1987 specifically addressed the inadequacy

1 of the driver/passenger PA system as well as noting that  
2 at that time there was no radio system that could work  
3 underground and he noted in his own report, many years  
4 ago, therefore, that staff had been obliged in the  
5 course of that disaster to use word-of-mouth  
6 communication.

7 It is an issue, my Lady, for you to explore how  
8 effective communications are today and whether or not  
9 that serious failing in the system had been corrected by  
10 the time of 7 July 2005.

11 The next point concerns the delays in getting some  
12 of the emergency services to the carriages. The  
13 discrepancy, or the differences between Aldgate and  
14 Edgware Road, in relation to both of which the Network  
15 Control Centre of the London Underground was informed at  
16 the same time of loud bangs, is particularly noticeable.

17 I say that because, at Aldgate, the first London  
18 Ambulance Service ambulance did not arrive until 09.14  
19 due to having gone to Liverpool Street first at 09.03.

20 The Fire Brigade appliance did arrive at 9.00 am, but  
21 there is no evidence that the firemen initially deployed  
22 straightaway into the tunnel.

23 At Edgware Road, although the first London Fire  
24 Brigade unit arrived at Praed Street at 09.04 -- because  
25 that, as I've observed, is the address from where the

1 999 call came from -- the first call to Edgware Road was  
2 not until 09.07.  
3 Mobilisation for Edgware Road wasn't until 09.13.59,  
4 and thus the first LFB, London Fire Brigade appliances,  
5 did not get to Edgware Road until 09.18. They were  
6 appliances G271 and G331.  
7 The London Ambulance Service first Fast Response  
8 Unit, NW45, arrived at Praed Street at 09.09 but the  
9 first ambulance got to Praed Street at 09.12 and the  
10 first ambulance did not arrive at Edgware Road/Chapel  
11 Street until shortly after that at 09.13. There was  
12 only one LAS unit on scene until 09.17.  
13 At Russell Square, although the first fire engines  
14 arrived at Euston Square at 9.07, the first fire engine  
15 did not arrive at King's Cross until 09.13 where, due to  
16 a difficulty in communications, they were forced to use  
17 runners to pass messages.  
18 No fire engines were sent to Russell Square, no  
19 fault, I emphasise, of the London Fire Brigade, because,  
20 of course, no 999 call had been received from  
21 Russell Square, and we know of course that the bomb was  
22 in the front carriage of the train, the Russell Square  
23 end of the train, and, therefore, the paucity of  
24 emergency vehicles at the Russell Square end had a very  
25 real effect, because it was through the Russell Square

1 platforms that all the passengers at the front of the  
2 train were detained and, of course, it provided the  
3 most readily accessible access to the bombsite.  
4 The first London Ambulance Service Fast Response  
5 Unit, EC45, arrived at King's Cross at 09.14, the first  
6 ambulance at 09.19. But there was no Fast Response Unit  
7 at Russell Square until 09.30. Indeed, the first point  
8 at which the emergency services were even aware of  
9 Russell Square was not until 09.13.06, when the  
10 London Underground staff asked the  
11 British Transport Police to call the London Ambulance  
12 Service.  
13 The evidence seems to suggest that all the emergency  
14 services, other than British Transport Police and City  
15 of London Police, had to rely upon individuals running  
16 back and forth from the trains to the platforms and from  
17 the platforms to the ground level, and we'll hear  
18 evidence from certain firefighters in that regard at the  
19 Aldgate scene.  
20 Furthermore, even the British Transport Police  
21 communications were affected because what is called  
22 a leaky feeder antennae, which is an intimate part of  
23 their communications system, was damaged at the  
24 Russell Square/King's Cross location, so there not even  
25 the British Transport Police had a communication link.

1 A temporary leaky feeder cable was requested at  
2 10.00, but it didn't arrive until 12.00 and it was  
3 installed only after clearance to enter the scene to  
4 install it had been given, and that was not until  
5 9.00 pm.

6 In relation to Russell Square, which is  
7 characterised by a very long spiral staircase, it could  
8 take as long as 15 minutes to walk from the tunnel to  
9 ground level.

10 My Lady, the central issue of course, though, is  
11 whether or not there were delays in the attendance by  
12 the emergency services, whether it would have made  
13 a difference if those few minutes that we've identified  
14 had not been lost.

15 Would it have made a difference if  
16 London Underground staff, as well as the emergency  
17 services, had been able to assist even quicker? The  
18 answer to that question will depend on who exactly was  
19 able to attend the scenes first and on the nature of the  
20 injuries suffered by those who were afflicted by these  
21 bombs. That is the matter which must be explored with  
22 the witnesses who will follow.

23 My Lady, may I now turn, please, to explore the  
24 evidence in relation to the individual deceased in the  
25 three trains and on the number 30 bus?

1 My Lady, this part of my opening will form the most  
2 distressing part of the evidence.

3 In relation to Aldgate, the train was travelling  
4 between 10 and 15 miles an hour. According to the  
5 driver, Mr Batkin, there was a muffled thud and the  
6 train came to a halt very quickly. The bomb was in the  
7 second carriage of the six-carriage train as it  
8 travelled towards Aldgate.

9 My Lady, on the screen we can see there a schematic  
10 diagram of the Aldgate station.

11 Before zooming in, if we could just perhaps look at  
12 the platforms, we can see from the platforms the tracks  
13 coming into the platforms at Aldgate from  
14 Liverpool Street on the left-hand side are the platforms  
15 as we look at them.

16 The right-hand rails diverging away from the main  
17 line are those concerned with, I think, the  
18 Metropolitan & City line to Aldgate East.

19 Towards the top left-hand corner of the diagram can  
20 be seen the train itself, carriages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.  
21 The red highlighted section is the place where it is  
22 estimated the bomb exploded, but of course, although it  
23 was in the second carriage the train moved forward after  
24 the moment of the explosion, which is why the red does  
25 not correspond now with carriage 2.

1 If you could please go to pages 6 and 7 of that INQ  
2 number INQ00010280 [INQ10280-6], [INQ10280-7] we can see at the top of the  
page  
3 the six carriages of the Aldgate train. The second  
4 carriage in the middle with an X marking that place  
5 along the length of carriage 2, where the bomb is  
6 estimated by the evidence to have exploded.  
7 The bottom diagram shows an overhead view of the  
8 second carriage and, again, X marks the approximate  
9 location of the bomb.  
10 The map is marked in such a way, my Lady, that one  
11 can see each seat is given a number and the doors are  
12 also given a number, and this will assist the witnesses  
13 from whom we'll hear in due course in identifying where  
14 exactly they were in that carriage.  
15 Page 8, please [INQ10280-8].  
16 This diagram gives the probable positions of the  
17 passengers in the second carriage at the time of the  
18 explosion. We can see at the bottom of the page a list  
19 of those passengers based on the witness statements that  
20 they've provided and, as you would expect, the names of  
21 those who tragically died in that carriage are  
22 highlighted there.  
23 The map, my Lady, should not be taken as gospel  
24 because, in fact, the evidence may show that one or two  
25 of the survivors were, in fact, seated elsewhere. By

1 way of example, although there is a gentleman called  
2 Mr Bonwick, who is given as sitting in seat 24, and  
3 a gentleman called Mr Duckworth at seat 13, there are  
4 conflicts in the evidence as to where exactly they were  
5 located and so we should bear that in mind when we come  
6 back to this diagram and list in due course.

7 The following page, pages 9 and 10, page 9 first,  
8 gives the approximate location of those who died in  
9 carriage 2. The bomb is marked with a large red cross  
10 and we can see the names of Lee Baisden, Richard Ellery,  
11 Benedetta Ciaccia, Anne Moffat, Fiona Stevenson and  
12 Carrie Taylor there marked.

13 Richard Gray was tragically blown out of the  
14 right-hand side of the second carriage, that's to say  
15 the right-hand side of the carriage if you were standing  
16 in that carriage looking forward in the direction of  
17 travel on the side away from the bomb and on to the  
18 track, so from this diagram away from the location of  
19 the bomb down towards the bottom of the page and through  
20 double door D8.

21 Because the train carried on moving for a short  
22 while, as I've said, his body was found adjacent to  
23 carriages 3 and 4 when the train finally stopped.

24 Could we please go to the next page, page 10, which  
25 shows the position of Mr Gray when he was found.

1 My Lady, I'm about to play extracts from the videos  
2 taken of the Aldgate carriage. It is distressing  
3 insofar as this video, like the videos of the other  
4 bombsites, shows the place where so many people  
5 tragically died, but great care has been taken and the  
6 underlying material has been edited and re-edited to  
7 ensure that we do not see any of the deceased.  
8 The videos, particularly when we come to  
9 Edgware Road, must, however, be again approached with  
10 a certain degree of care because the extracts were taken  
11 from different times. In particular, at Edgware Road,  
12 the films were taken between 7 and 9 July when  
13 particular carriages of the affected trains were moved  
14 successively to allow further video to be taken.  
15 In addition, the video is taken in some places from  
16 different ends of the same train, so one has to follow  
17 quite carefully what it is that one is looking at.  
18 Could you please play the edited scene footage in  
19 relation to Aldgate?  
20 (Video played)  
21 My Lady, as I said yesterday, the general evidence  
22 from the survivors and the rescuers as to the aftermath  
23 of the bombs will largely speak for itself, and I don't  
24 propose to open that evidence in detail, but what  
25 I propose to do now is to highlight just some of the

1 features of the evidence and to say something about each  
2 particular deceased.

3 Before I do so, there are two general points,  
4 however, regarding the response to the explosion at  
5 Aldgate which flow from the actions of Mr Batkin, the  
6 driver of the bombed train to whom I made reference  
7 a few moments ago.

8 First, although it's plain from the  
9 London Underground Network Control recordings that there  
10 was confusion for a little while as to what exactly had  
11 happened, Mr Batkin reported the explosion within  
12 minutes of it occurring. Unable to get a response to  
13 his mayday calls on the radio, he used his mobile  
14 telephone to contact the duty manager at Edgware Road,  
15 Ayo Puddicombe, to inform her that there had been an  
16 explosion on his train.

17 His itemised phone bill indicates that he made this  
18 call at 08.51 and in her statement she refers to  
19 Mr Batkin informing her that there had been an explosion  
20 on his train and that there were injured people and  
21 passengers trying to smash windows to evacuate. She  
22 relayed this conversation to the line controller and in  
23 her statement comments that it was then the line  
24 controller's job to contact the emergency services if  
25 a major incident occurred.

1 So the information did get through.

2 Secondly, the speed at which Mr Batkin began the  
3 evacuation of his train alerted the London Underground  
4 and the British Transport Police staff at Aldgate of the  
5 gravity of the situation.

6 Following his call to Ms Puddicombe, Mr Batkin  
7 immediately evacuated his train, starting first with the  
8 passengers in the front carriage, and then, with the  
9 assistance of London Underground employees,  
10 Mark Williams and Stephen Eldridge, he evacuated the  
11 remaining passengers through the rear of the train to  
12 Aldgate station.

13 Two other London Underground members of staff,  
14 Paul Hawkins and Leslie Drinkwater, took part in the  
15 same human chain.

16 The stream of injured, soot-covered and affected  
17 commuters emerging out of the smoke-filled tunnel  
18 towards platforms 3 and 4 at Aldgate provided the visual  
19 confirmation that a major disaster had occurred.

20 We've already heard Celia Harrison, the station  
21 supervisor at Aldgate, informing the NCC, the Network  
22 Control Centre, at 08.58 that there were passengers  
23 detraining and requesting the London Fire Brigade to  
24 attend.

25 Similarly, I mentioned earlier that Mr Baker, at

1 08.57.42, requested ambulances and sought to declare  
2 a major incident.

3 With Mr Baker, DI Baker, at the scene was also  
4 a detective constable, DC Silvestro, who, on being told  
5 there were people coming out of the tunnel, ran down to  
6 the platform where he saw 10 to 15 people walking out of  
7 the tunnel, he describes, like zombies. He ran into the  
8 tunnel and, on seeing the devastated carriage, shouted  
9 to the London Underground employees behind him to go and  
10 get all the emergency services.

11 So, my Lady, it does appear that at Aldgate, despite  
12 the possible confusion elsewhere, those on the scene  
13 acted promptly to respond and to notify the emergency  
14 services of the horror that had occurred.

15 I now turn to say something about each individual  
16 deceased.

17 Lee Baisden, who worked, in fact, for the London  
18 Fire & Emergency Planning Authority as a finance and  
19 procurement officer, was probably standing very close to  
20 the bomb. We can see his name at number 6, immediately  
21 adjacent to the red cross.

22 The bomb blew a hole in the carriage floor and  
23 Mr Baisden's body was seen by a number of witnesses to  
24 be very near the crater that it left.

25 According to the pathologist, Dr Hunt -- and I don't

1 intend to detail all the injuries -- he had flash and  
2 deep burns over his entire face and neck and the lower  
3 parts of both legs had been amputated.  
4 Steven Desborough, a witness from the sixth  
5 carriage, will recall how, after about ten minutes or  
6 so, he became aware of London Underground staff in  
7 the tunnel outside the carriage, and he will describe  
8 how he walked off the end of the train and down some  
9 steps on to the track. He walked back past the train to  
10 Aldgate and he came across the shattered carriage.  
11 Because he was a first-aider, he called in to see  
12 whether anyone needed any help and a female shouted  
13 back, "Over here". He saw a lady, Gerardine Quaghebeur,  
14 another important witness. She is a consultant  
15 neurologist who had been seated in the middle of the  
16 second carriage. We can see from the middle list of  
17 names that she is at seat 26 and, if we look at the plan  
18 itself, seat 26 is on the same side of carriage 2 as the  
19 bomb, approximately halfway along.  
20 Despite being told to leave the carriage through the  
21 open door down the track by London Underground staff,  
22 she had also, as had Mr Desborough, stayed to help the  
23 injured and the dying.  
24 She asked Mr Desborough to start checking people  
25 out. From his position outside the carriage -- and

1 my Lady, we've seen from the scene footage that the  
2 floor of the carriage is, of course, chest high and,  
3 therefore, he was unable to get in immediately --  
4 Mr Desborough could see some legs which looked as if  
5 they had been detached from a body. The evidence  
6 suggests that that was Mr Baisden.

7 Gerardine Quaghebeur herself was able to see a man  
8 on the floor near the seat of the explosion whose legs  
9 had been blown off. Camilla Wills, a passenger from the  
10 third carriage, who entered the second carriage to help,  
11 saw a lifeless body in the middle of the carriage near  
12 the crater, and Elizabeth Kenworthy, an off-duty police  
13 officer, who came from the fourth carriage to help, saw  
14 the lower part of a male body on the floor and she  
15 thought that he was seriously injured or lifeless.

16 Elizabeth Kenworthy, my Lady, merits further mention  
17 at this stage because she tied a tourniquet consisting  
18 of her corduroy jacket round the legs of a man called  
19 Mr Brown, Andrew Brown, who had, in fact, lost both his  
20 legs in the blast, and she also tied a belt round the  
21 leg belonging to Martine Wright. She held their hands  
22 and she gave them water and comforted them.

23 Steven Jones, a motorcycle paramedic for the London  
24 Ambulance Service, arrived at Aldgate via  
25 Liverpool Street within five or so minutes of being

1 dispatched. He arrived around the time that the first  
2 ambulance, to which I drew your attention a few moments  
3 ago in the time line, had arrived, it was an ambulance  
4 crewed by two London Ambulance staff and we know it  
5 arrived at around 09.14, so Mr Jones arrived around  
6 about the same time.

7 After carrying out triage of casualties coming out  
8 of the station, he and another paramedic, Tony Parnell,  
9 a paramedic from the Fast Response Unit that came from  
10 the Royal London Hospital, went down to the train and,  
11 as they approached the train, Steven Jones saw a body  
12 further up the tracks. From the position of the body we  
13 believe that he saw Richard Gray, and I'll return to the  
14 position concerning Mr Gray in a moment.

15 Mr Jones boarded by the double doors at the end of  
16 the carriage opposite where the bomb had exploded, so  
17 double doors D8, and saw a man on the floor very near  
18 the bombsite. He was face down and he had massive  
19 injuries and, in his view, he was plainly dead.

20 The evidence suggests that this was Mr Baisden.

21 As he was inside the carriage, Mr Jones called out  
22 to Mr Parnell that he thought there were six fatalities  
23 and, to give some idea of the time, this must have been  
24 at about 9.30.

25 Having assessed the situation, Mr Jones, whose job

1 as Bronze Triage -- and I spoke a few moments ago of the  
2 command structure which appoints various members of the  
3 emergency services to act in certain predesignated roles  
4 such as Gold, Silver and Bronze depending on their  
5 tactical, strategic or detailed involvement in  
6 a scene -- his job was not to administer treatment, and  
7 so he returned to the surface where he met the HEMS, the  
8 helicopter doctors, Doctors Lockey and Davies, who were  
9 then arriving.

10 Another paramedic, Mr Craig Cassidy, arrived at  
11 Aldgate at about 09.16 having been flagged down by  
12 a police officer, and he describes how he went down into  
13 the carriage with Steven Jones, although, curiously,  
14 neither Jones nor Mr Parnell refer to him descending  
15 with them to the train in their witness statements, but  
16 it may be they will remember that when they give  
17 evidence.

18 Although this witness went more or less straight  
19 down, by the time he reached the rails, firemen were  
20 already leading wounded and other passengers along the  
21 tracks and out of the station.

22 He saw a couple of firefighters kneeling over what  
23 appeared to be a body on the track covered by a blanket.

24 He was going to go over to assist, but one of the  
25 firefighters indicated that the person was dead and

1 there was nothing that he could do.  
2 That person was Richard Gray. Richard Gray was  
3 married with two children, lived in Ipswich and worked  
4 in London as a tax manager with chartered accountants  
5 FW Smith Riches.

6 There are no witnesses who saw Mr Gray inside the  
7 train or saw how he came to be blown out. A passenger  
8 from the fourth carriage, Carl Davison, from whom we  
9 will hear, saw, when he walked along the train, a man  
10 face down on the track. He checked for his pulse but  
11 found none, and he used his coat to cover Mr Gray.  
12 A police officer also checked for a pulse but found  
13 none.

14 When he returned after looking after another  
15 passenger, he saw that Mr Gray had not moved and so he  
16 understood him to be dead.

17 Mr Pettit, Colin Pettit, a passenger from the front  
18 of the second carriage, also saw Mr Gray. Having walked  
19 to the rear of the carriage and seen a girl with blond  
20 hair, who appeared dead, draped across a man -- and I'll  
21 return to this in a moment, but the evidence suggests  
22 that the girl was Fiona Stevenson and the man a survivor  
23 called Bruce Lait -- he climbed out and he started  
24 walking back to Liverpool Street station reassuring and  
25 helping where he could. He saw a white male lying face

1 down and not moving. He tried to find a pulse but could  
2 not do so.

3 One witness was able to see that Mr Gray had been  
4 wearing a suit, but that it had been blown off him.

5 A BTP, a British Transport Police officer, Mr Hatcher,  
6 also checked for his pulse but found none.

7 Mr Gray was 41.

8 Returning to Mr Cassidy and Mr Baisden, there is an  
9 apparent inconsistency in the evidence that I should  
10 address at this stage. When Mr Cassidy first entered  
11 the carriage, he recollects how he saw a male between  
12 doors D7 and D8 -- we can see D7 and D8 towards the left  
13 of the diagram of the second carriage -- who had lost  
14 both his legs and one arm and had a back and head  
15 injury. He says in his statement:

16 "Although this man was moving, I presumed he was  
17 dead."

18 He then recounts how he saw a fireman talking to the  
19 man, but when he, himself, managed to get to that part  
20 of the carriage, he was dead.

21 Later in his statement, he describes another man on  
22 the floor of the carriage adjacent to seats 15 and 16 --  
23 not I think on this plan but on the previous page; we  
24 can see 15 and 16 being the two seats in the top  
25 left-hand side of the diagram -- who he describes as

1 being fairly big and who was lying on his back. The  
2 body looked fairly intact but the person was deeply  
3 unconscious and he assumed that he had sustained  
4 internal or back injuries that he couldn't see.  
5 He carried out an assessment of this person and  
6 assessed his Glasgow Coma Scale level to be 3.  
7 The person was alive and had a pulse and was  
8 breathing but was unresponsive, but he gave him oxygen  
9 and was in the process of cannulation, that's to say the  
10 process of inserting an intravenous line, in order to  
11 administer fluids and drugs when a doctor from the  
12 helicopter emergency medical service, HEMS, arrived and  
13 took over the treatment.  
14 Although somewhat speculative in advance of hearing  
15 the evidence itself, it may be that the paramedic  
16 confused in his witness statement two men, Mr Baisden  
17 and Mr Ellery, and thought that Mr Baisden was moving  
18 and talking to the firemen, when, in fact, it was  
19 Mr Ellery, to whom I'll return in a moment.  
20 It does seem that Mr Baisden had indeed lost both  
21 legs and no other witnesses saw him move or talk, and,  
22 therefore, it is our assessment that he was unlikely to  
23 have survived the bomb.  
24 There is other evidence from two firemen, London  
25 Fire Brigade firefighters Richards and Walker to suggest

1 that the man who was talking and moving was, in fact,  
2 Mr Richard Ellery.

3 As a postscript, Mr Cassidy reported to his  
4 employers how, after 15 minutes on the train, he and the  
5 other paramedics and firefighters were asked to evacuate  
6 because of the risk of secondary explosives. The  
7 decision was made between them that they should instead  
8 stay.

9 Dr Lockey, a pre-hospital care doctor at the  
10 Royal London arrived at Aldgate at 9.34. He confirmed,  
11 my Lady, the deaths of five people inside the carriage  
12 and asked that an accompanying paramedic perform the  
13 same checks after him.

14 One of them was a male he described as black or  
15 dark-skinned and clearly dead. He was trapped under the  
16 doors of the carriage that had been blown off. That  
17 was, we believe, Mr Lee Baisden. He was 34.

18 Benedetta Ciaccia. The evidence strongly suggests  
19 that Benedetta Ciaccia, who was an IT business analyst  
20 from Italy who worked at Pearson Publishing in the  
21 Strand and was engaged to be married in September 2005,  
22 must have died immediately. Where she fell, a number of  
23 passengers paint a terrible scene of mangled flesh,  
24 debris and metal which had descended from the ceiling.  
25 Sean Jones, a firefighter, saw two or three bodies

1 on the floor between seats, partly covered with sheeting  
2 that had come down from the ceiling. He lifted the  
3 sheeting and it was obvious to him that the persons he  
4 saw there were dead.

5 When Steven Jones, the paramedic, boarded the  
6 carriage with Mr Parnell, he saw in fact three people on  
7 the floor of the carriage, two of whom were obviously  
8 dead. One had very severe head injuries and the  
9 evidence suggests that this was Ms Ciaccia.

10 The post-mortem report showed that she had indeed  
11 very severe head and brain injuries and, given the  
12 nature of those injuries, the forensic pathologist's  
13 opinion is that she would have been instantly  
14 unconscious and dead very rapidly indeed. Nothing  
15 could, in fact, have been done for her.

16 Another paramedic, Alan Treacy arrived at Aldgate  
17 following attendance at Liverpool Street. We believe  
18 that he was dispatched from Liverpool Street to Aldgate  
19 at 9.21 and, therefore, probably arrived at about 9.25.  
20 He recalls going down to the carriage with a London  
21 Ambulance Service officer and that firemen were already  
22 on board.

23 After attending to Carrie Taylor and Richard Ellery,  
24 to both of whom I'll return in a moment, he describes  
25 how he saw two bodies on the floor of the carriage

1 adjacent to seats 20 and 21, and we can see 20 and 21  
2 form two of the four seats diagonally down from the  
3 sight of the bomb.

4 One of the two bodies had been very severely injured  
5 in the head and both were very badly injured, and it was  
6 obvious to him that they were dead, and we believe that  
7 Ms Ciaccia was one of them.

8 In pronouncing life dead in the five people that he  
9 found, Dr Lockey, of whom I have just made mention, came  
10 across three bodies together. They were likely to have  
11 been Ms Ciaccia, Anne Moffat and Fiona Stevenson, who,  
12 as I will explain in a moment, was moved to the floor to  
13 allow Bruce Lait to be freed. Benedetta Ciaccia was 30.  
14 Richard Ellery, of whom I've just made mention.

15 Guy Bonwick was another passenger who was in the bombed  
16 carriage and I mentioned him a moment ago in relation to  
17 where his location was in the carriage.

18 After climbing down out of the train, he went to  
19 help by climbing into the second carriage, by climbing  
20 back in. He saw a man that the evidence suggests is  
21 Richard Ellery who had been in London to attend  
22 a one-day course for his employer, Jessops in Ipswich.

23 He was a young white male approximately 18 to 20. He,  
24 too, had been very close to the bomb.

25 Mr Desborough, to whom I've already made reference,

1 after seeing Mr Baisden, saw a man moving and rolling  
2 around with his head and back towards the door.  
3 He was moaning incoherently and Mr Desborough tried  
4 to help him by stroking his back and telling him to try  
5 to keep still. He was wearing a blue shirt and, from  
6 his location, we suggest that person was Mr Ellery.  
7 Two other passengers, including the police officer  
8 from the fourth carriage, Elizabeth Kenworthy, tried to  
9 talk to him but he did not respond. A police officer,  
10 Mr Kemp, saw him moving around.  
11 It is clear, therefore, my Lady, that Mr Ellery was  
12 still, alive albeit severely injured, when the  
13 firefighters arrived. Several firefighters speak of him  
14 moving but of being unconscious and unresponsive.  
15 Although another firefighter, Neil Walker, believed that  
16 he spoke to a casualty who later died and another  
17 firefighter, Steven Sudbury, speaks of a man whose legs  
18 had been blown off and who was groaning.  
19 It may be that Mr Sudbury has elided his  
20 recollections of Mr Baisden and Mr Ellery.  
21 Kevin Richards, a firefighter with crew F261, saw  
22 Mr Ellery with a priority 1 sign, that is to say a sign  
23 indicating immediate medical treatment required, moving  
24 his eyes and slightly flaying his arms. At some point,  
25 that tag was placed on him by a paramedic to indicate

1 the urgency of the treatment required.

2 As I said a few moments ago, it seems that the  
3 paramedic, Cassidy, gave him first aid and triaged him.  
4 In his statement, he describes someone who was  
5 deeply unconscious and he assumed that they had  
6 sustained internal or back injuries that he couldn't  
7 see. He carried out the assessment of the person and  
8 assessed, as I said, his Glasgow Coma Scale level to  
9 be 3.

10 He was alive, he had a pulse and was breathing, but  
11 was totally unresponsive. But he gave him, as I said,  
12 oxygen and was in the process of cannulation, inserting  
13 an intravenous vein, when a doctor from HEMS arrived,  
14 but he died tragically shortly afterwards. It's likely  
15 that PC Kemp touched him at that point and confirmed  
16 that he had died.

17 When Mr Treacy got into the carriage, he saw a young  
18 male with possibly blond or fair hair on the floor. He  
19 was wearing a blue and white striped shirt. Because  
20 Mr Ellery was young -- he was 21 -- he had blond hair  
21 and a blue shirt, it's likely that the paramedic was  
22 referring to him. He attached an electrocardiograph  
23 machine to his chest but found that he was dead.

24 Richard Ellery was probably one of the five persons  
25 that Dr Lockey pronounced dead as one of them was

1 described by him in his examination of the scene as

2 a youngish white male. He was 21.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Shall we break there, Mr Keith?

4 Quarter to 12, please.

5 (11.30 am)

6 (A short break)

7 (11.45 am)

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Mr Keith?

9 MR KEITH: My Lady, Anne Moffat. I referred a moment ago to

10 the paramedic Steven Jones and how he saw two bodies who

11 were obviously dead in front of what we know to be seats

12 19 and 20 on our carriage seating plan there. One of

13 the two people had very severe head injuries,

14 Benedetta Ciaccia, of whom I've already spoken, and the

15 other had very severe injuries also. The evidence

16 suggests that the other person was Anne Moffat, who was

17 head of marketing and communication for the Girl Guides.

18 She was wearing a green, woollen pullover and that

19 pullover can be seen in the unedited photographs of the

20 carriage, which I am not displaying.

21 As with Benedetta Ciaccia, where Ms Moffat fell,

22 a number of passengers paint a horrifying scene of

23 mangled flesh, torn bodies, debris and metal.

24 Mr Cassidy, the paramedic, states that he saw a pile

25 of people who were clearly dead and who had sustained

1 terrible injuries. Alan Treacy saw Ms Moffat and  
2 thought she was obviously dead. Sean Jones,  
3 a firefighter, saw two or three people on the floor  
4 partly covered with sheeting that had come down from the  
5 ceiling.

6 As I said before, in relation to Ms Ciaccia, he  
7 lifted the sheeting and it was obvious to him that all  
8 the persons he saw thereunder were dead.

9 Anne Moffat was one of the persons in relation to  
10 whom life was certified extinct by Dr Lockey on 7 July  
11 around 10.00 am during the course of that examination.

12 She was 48.

13 Fiona Stevenson, the young solicitor from  
14 Reynolds Dawson who was on the way to Hammersmith  
15 Magistrates' Court, may have survived for a few minutes.

16 When the bomb exploded, it seems that she was blown  
17 across the legs of Bruce Lait who was sitting in seat 21  
18 on our diagram, alongside his dance partner,  
19 Crystal Main.

20 Bruce Lait will recount how he saw a lady with blond  
21 hair across his legs. She was moving every few seconds  
22 and her head moved also. He thought, however, that she  
23 was dead.

24 Crystal Main describes in her statement how she  
25 heard a noise, but that it ceased after a few moments

1 and, therefore, she assumed that the lady had died.  
2 Dr Quaghebeur, however, the lady of whom I spoke  
3 earlier, was able at some point, having been able to  
4 move down the carriage through the debris and the  
5 destruction, to reach across Ms Stevenson's neck and she  
6 felt that she had a pulse. Nevertheless, after about  
7 20 minutes, according to Mr Lait, a paramedic arrived  
8 and he felt her pulse and checked her eyelids but  
9 concluded that she had gone.  
10 The paramedic moved Ms Stevenson off Bruce Lait to  
11 enable him to be freed. It is unclear who that  
12 paramedic was.  
13 When Mr Cassidy entered the doors D6, he saw by  
14 seats 19 and 20 a number of people. He thought from  
15 their terrible injuries that they were clearly dead.  
16 Amongst them was a female with long, blond hair. By  
17 this time, Ms Stevenson had plainly been moved from  
18 where she had initially fallen. She is likely to have  
19 been one of the persons in relation to whom Dr Lockett  
20 pronounced life extinct around 10.00 am the same  
21 morning.  
22 In her post-mortem report, Dr Anscombe found  
23 extensive blast-type injuries to her right-hand side.  
24 In Dr Anscombe's opinion, these would have been  
25 sufficient to cause death through shock and haemorrhage.

1 She was 29.  
2 Carrie Taylor. Carrie Taylor, who had travelled  
3 into London that morning with her mother, as she did  
4 every day on the way to her work organising grants for  
5 young artists for the Royal Society of Arts was standing  
6 in front of Crystal Main. She was blasted by the bomb  
7 backwards through the perspex screen between the  
8 vertical handrail and the wall of the carriage and she  
9 suffered terrible injuries. She may have survived,  
10 however, only for a very short while.  
11 Bruce Lait describes how a slim, blond female who  
12 had fallen on top of Crystal Main had severe head  
13 injuries. He noted that her arms were floppy but she  
14 was still able to scream "Help me" and to kick out.  
15 Gerardine Quaghebeur, who I've already mentioned,  
16 describes Ms Taylor as having spasms which she  
17 attributed to a spinal injury. She noted she had severe  
18 scalp injuries and severe abdominal injury. She tried  
19 to comfort her and she held her head.  
20 Another witness, Benjamin Cotton, saw a lady who we  
21 believe to be Ms Taylor, but he described her as  
22 motionless, but he recalls how a lady doctor tending to  
23 her -- obviously Gerardine Quaghebeur -- shouted "Get me  
24 a medic. This woman has only minutes to live if I don't  
25 get a medic". Gerardine Quaghebeur was assisted by

1 a BTP officer, DC Silvestro, who helped her to keep her  
2 head lifted up.

3 Steve Desborough, who I also mentioned earlier, had  
4 climbed into the carriage to help. He recalls Ms Taylor  
5 as being semi-conscious and trying to speak. He took  
6 over from Gerardine Quaghebeur, holding her up so as to  
7 keep her airway open. He saw her drifting in and out of  
8 consciousness and opening her eyes. He continued to  
9 support her head as she was placed on a stretcher by  
10 paramedics, but shortly afterwards the paramedics told  
11 him that she had died.

12 When he entered, Craig Cassidy, the paramedic, saw  
13 two people in seats 20 and 21, as I've said Bruce Lait  
14 and Crystal Main. He saw that both were conscious but  
15 were being pinned into their seats by a lady who was  
16 lying across them but bent around the pole at the side  
17 of seat 22, the pole which holds the perspex screen up  
18 towards the edge of the Tube.

19 He saw that her head was being supported by  
20 a middle-aged woman who was crouching at the side of  
21 seat 22 by the entrance to the doors D6. He carried out  
22 a check of her pulse and her pupils, but she was dead.  
23 He told the lady that Ms Taylor was dead and that she  
24 ought to leave the train. Colin Pettit also saw  
25 Ms Taylor and thought that she was dead.

1 Alan Treacy's account differs a little. When he  
2 entered the carriage, he saw a young lady in her  
3 early 20s wrapped around one of the handrails. She was  
4 pinning another female passenger into her seat; that  
5 would have been Crystal Main. Mr Treacy says there was  
6 a woman in the carriage helping her. He was told that  
7 she had been verbalising, that is to say she had been  
8 emitting some form of speech a few minutes before, but  
9 his checks revealed that the lady wasn't conscious.  
10 With the help of either another paramedic -- perhaps  
11 Steven Jones -- or some firemen, he couldn't see because  
12 the conditions, my Lady, were pitch black, he gently  
13 removed the lady, who we believe to be Ms Taylor, from  
14 around the pole and later down on to the floor of the  
15 carriage. He attached the electrocardiograph machine  
16 and discovered that she had no heartbeat and was  
17 therefore dead.  
18 Sean Jones, a firefighter, also speaks of  
19 Crystal Main being pinned in by a lady in her early 20s  
20 with dark hair, although both Carrie Taylor and  
21 Fiona Stevenson had blond hair, but he describes how he  
22 lifted the lady off with help from another firefighter,  
23 Lewis Turner. Together, they checked for vital signs,  
24 but could find none, and he recalls how a paramedic --  
25 possibly Mr Treacy -- assessed her as dead.

1 Ms Taylor was taken out of the carriage on an  
2 extension ladder by firefighters and placed down on  
3 ground.  
4 One of the firefighters found a blanket and put it  
5 over her as a mark of respect. She was 24.  
6 My Lady, turning now to Edgware Road.  
7 Like Aldgate, the explosion occurred in the second  
8 carriage of six. The bombed train, train set 216, was  
9 travelling westbound on the inner rail of the  
10 Circle Line from Edgware Road to Paddington and, after  
11 the detonation, came to rest approximately 135 metres  
12 away from Edgware Road station.  
13 Another train, train set 207, was travelling in the  
14 opposite direction from the bombed train on the outer  
15 rail of the Circle Line between Paddington and  
16 Edgware Road.  
17 The physical evidence at the scene indicates that  
18 the two trains were still approaching each other at the  
19 time that the bomb went off, but they came to rest  
20 alongside one another.  
21 This document, which is image INQ00010282, page 7 [INQ10282-7], [INQ10282-  
22 8], [INQ10282-9],  
23 shows the location of the bomb in the train.  
24 The bomb was located in the vicinity, as we can see  
25 from the bottom diagram, of seats 27 and 28, and the  
explosion left a crater that extended into the standing

1 area by the doors D4, the second set of doors from the  
2 left of that carriage.  
3 Jennifer Nicholson was blown out of the right-hand  
4 side of the second carriage, that is to say the  
5 right-hand side if you were facing forward, and her body  
6 was found lying between the two trains.  
7 Could you move forward, please, to the next page?  
8 We can see there the list of the deceased in  
9 relation to Edgware Road, their names are recorded in  
10 red at the bottom of the page, and then, further on one  
11 page, please, we can see the locations.  
12 Jonathan Downey, Laura Webb, Colin Morley,  
13 David Foulkes, Michael Brewster and, as we can see  
14 recorded on the right-hand side, Jennifer Nicholson was  
15 recovered from the tracks next to the train.  
16 Could you please play the video of the scene in  
17 relation to Edgware Road?  
18 (Video played)  
19 My Lady, I should say at this stage that the other  
20 train has been removed at the time of the recording of  
21 this footage.  
22 (Video played)  
23 My Lady, before I say something about each of the  
24 particular deceased at Edgware Road, there are three  
25 features of the response to the bomb there which I'd

1 like to bring to your attention.

2 First, unlike any of the other bomb scenes, the  
3 evidence seems to suggest that all of the deceased died  
4 prior to the arrival of any member of the emergency  
5 services in the bombed carriage. You will recall,  
6 my Lady, by reference to the time line that I set out  
7 earlier this morning that the emergency services began  
8 to arrive at the station, not the carriage, but the  
9 station, from about 9.12.

10 Secondly, we intend to call or read evidence from  
11 around 19 London Underground employees. This is because  
12 a large number of London Underground employees were  
13 based at Edgware Road, as this was an important station  
14 for the Tube's infrastructure.

15 The station, in fact, operates four  
16 London Underground lines, was a terminating point for  
17 the District Line and is a critical junction for the  
18 Circle Line and District and Hammersmith & City lines.  
19 Also the station houses the train operators' depot  
20 which consists of a variety of offices, canteen and  
21 other rooms and the station also includes the group  
22 station manager's office for the Paddington group, which  
23 encompasses the nine stations in west London from  
24 Hammersmith to Edgware Road.

25 As a result, on 7 July 2005, many London Underground

1 employees were at the station and they either heard the  
2 explosion or saw smoke emanating from the tunnel and  
3 were, therefore, amongst the first to respond.  
4 Given that the emergency services did not begin to  
5 arrive until approximately 20 minutes after the  
6 explosion, the London Underground role in evacuating the  
7 trains and in assisting casualties was very significant.  
8 Amongst those from whom we'll hear evidence are  
9 Ray Whitehurst, the driver of the bombed westbound  
10 train, Jeffrey Porter, the driver of the eastbound  
11 train, Simon Blakesly and Paul Thomas, who assisted in  
12 the evacuation of the bombed train, Craig Aylen and  
13 Jerry Kelly, who assisted in the evacuation of the  
14 eastbound train, and Dave Matthews, who the evidence  
15 suggests was the first London Underground employee from  
16 Edgware Road station to enter the bombed carriage.  
17 My Lady, the terrible tragedy at Edgware Road led,  
18 as with the other scenes, to acts of remarkable heroism  
19 and human fortitude. As the bombed westbound train and  
20 eastbound train came to rest alongside one another --  
21 and in the video clip you can see, through the  
22 shattered, bombed side of the train carriage, the  
23 pristine wall of the eastbound train -- the horror of  
24 what had occurred became plain to the occupants of the  
25 other train.

1 At first, they heard cries of anguish and for help,  
2 but, once the smoke began to clear, the devastated  
3 second carriage was in view just inches away in the  
4 tunnel.

5 Without regard for their personal safety, occupants  
6 of the eastbound train, such as Timothy Coulson,  
7 Steve Hucklesby, Lisa Levine, Craig Staniforth and  
8 Peter Zimonjic, unable to open the carriage doors,  
9 exited through a smashed window and clambered across the  
10 tracks to help.

11 We have a photo that shows the bombed carriage with  
12 the other train visible in the background.

13 So, my Lady, one can see just how close they are  
14 together.

15 This is, on the left-hand side, the back of the  
16 bombed train and, on the right, is the front of the  
17 other train coming the other way. The debris on the  
18 side of the tracks is because, of course, the explosion  
19 occurred when the left-hand train was, as we're looking  
20 at it, nearer us. It had of course moved on by the time  
21 the photograph was taken.

22 Joining them in the second carriage were passengers  
23 from other carriages on the bombed train, including from  
24 the first carriage Abigail Briggs, Farid Bourbrook and  
25 Anthony Pantling, from the third carriage

1 Anthony Ferguson, and from the third or fourth carriage  
2 Adrian Heili.

3 These individuals, alongside many occupants of the  
4 bombed carriage from whom we'll hear, assisted the  
5 injured and the dying prior to the arrival of the  
6 emergency services.

7 My Lady, I'll now turn to outline some of the  
8 evidence in relation to each of the deceased.

9 Of the six who died at Edgware Road, there is  
10 evidence to suggest that two of them -- Michael Brewster  
11 and Laura Webb -- survived for a period of time after  
12 the explosion.

13 Michael Brewster. Michael Brewster, who was known  
14 as "Stan" to his friends and his family, was a senior  
15 project engineer for Derbyshire County Council. He had  
16 travelled by train from Derby on 7 July to London to  
17 attend a conference.

18 The bomb blew a hole in the carriage floor in which  
19 Mr Brewster became entangled and trapped with  
20 significant injuries to his lower half. The post-mortem  
21 report reveals that he suffered, amongst other injuries,  
22 vertical amputation of both lower limbs.

23 Mr Brewster survived for a period of time after the  
24 explosion and there was a considerable effort to save,  
25 care and comfort him by his fellow passengers.

1 Jason Rennie and Sandip Meisuria, both passengers in  
2 the bombed carriage, and Farid Bourbrook and  
3 Anthony Pantling, passengers in the first carriage,  
4 refer to seeing a man trapped in a hole in the carriage  
5 floor with his upper torso inside the train.  
6 Their accounts variously refer to the man reaching  
7 his arms out for help, trying to get out of the hole, or  
8 crying out for help.  
9 Together, they tried to pull him out of the crater,  
10 but, due to the extent of the injuries to his lower  
11 limbs, they were unable to do so.  
12 Sandip Meisuria and Anthony Pantling then jumped out  
13 of the train and attempted to reach him from underneath  
14 the carriage. Mr Meisuria was unable to do so, but  
15 Mr Pantling managed to push the man upwards, but he  
16 responded by shouting out in pain and so Mr Pantling  
17 stopped.  
18 Timothy Coulson, a passenger who came from the  
19 eastbound train, refers to the man in the crater as  
20 being semi-conscious. He felt his neck for a pulse and,  
21 although he could feel one, it was not very strong. He,  
22 too, left the train to assist the male from underneath  
23 the carriage. He opened the man's shirt and began chest  
24 compression and he gave him water to try to promote  
25 a choking response. Mr Pantling recalls passing his red

1 necktie, he believes to Mr Coulson, in order that  
2 a tourniquet could be tied around the man's injured  
3 right leg.  
4 Sadly, after 25 to 30 compressions, Mr Coulson  
5 checked again for a pulse, but was unable to find one.  
6 He was sure that the man had therefore died and he  
7 closed his eyes.

8 Michael Brewster was 52.

9 Laura Webb.

10 Laura Webb, the young lady who worked as an accounts  
11 assistant at an advertising agency, was taking the Tube  
12 to her work located near Paddington station. The  
13 evidence suggests that she, too, may have survived for  
14 a short period after the explosion.

15 Elizabeth Owen, a passenger in the bombed carriage,  
16 found herself on the floor of the carriage after the  
17 explosion. She will recall that near to her she saw  
18 a young lady lying on her back who was clearly seriously  
19 injured. The lady was still breathing and Ms Owen tried  
20 to talk to her but she didn't respond. She then  
21 recollects a man trying to help the lady by giving her  
22 mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and heart massage.

23 Stuart Bullen was sitting at the front of the bombed  
24 carriage. After the explosion, he saw a lady, likely to  
25 be Ms Owen, telling everyone that the woman lying down

1 was unconscious and not breathing. In his statement, he  
2 refers to attempts to resuscitate the woman, first by  
3 Ms Owen and then by another man. He also recalls that  
4 instructions on performing CPR, cardiological  
5 assistance, were being shouted by passengers on the  
6 eastbound train.

7 The man who Ms Owen and Mr Bullen referred to was  
8 Steve Hucklesby. He was a passenger on the eastbound  
9 train who ventured into the bombed carriage to assist.  
10 On entering the second carriage, he heard requests  
11 for first aid coming from the front of the carriage. To  
12 make his way there, he had to use the handrails of the  
13 carriage to swing across the debris littering the  
14 carriage floor. There he saw two bodies lying on the  
15 floor. One was a lady whose eyes were open and who had  
16 suffered a head injury. He had administered CPR and  
17 after three rounds of compression and two breath spurts  
18 he realised that resuscitation was not possible.

19 Lisa Levine, a trained nurse who had worked as  
20 a nurse for 17 years, was on the eastbound train. She  
21 was able to see across into the bombed carriage where  
22 she saw a lady lying faceup on the floor. She shouted  
23 the instructions to Mr Hucklesby who was performing the  
24 CPR. She, too, left the eastbound train to provide  
25 assistance and, when she came to the lady upon whom

1 resuscitation had been attempted, she saw tragically  
2 that she had died and there was nothing she could do for  
3 her.

4 Dr Elizabeth Wynne-Evans, who was a specialist  
5 registrar in pathology at the Royal London Hospital, was  
6 hoping to take the Tube from Edgware Road to travel to  
7 work. She was informed that the station was closed due  
8 to an electrical fault, but, on becoming aware of  
9 injured and distressed passengers with burns and cuts  
10 making their way up into the foyer, she remained at  
11 Edgware Road to treat the injured.

12 Brian Corbin, the Line Standards Manager, who I will  
13 say more about later, took Dr Wynne-Evans to the bombed  
14 carriage. She entered the bomb carriage via the  
15 adjoining door from the first carriage and in the area  
16 by the first set of double doors on her left she saw two  
17 bodies; one was female, without visible injuries, but on  
18 examining her, it was plain that the lady was dead.

19 Ms Webb was 29 years of age when she died.

20 Jonathan Downey. Lying close to Laura Webb was  
21 Jonathan Downey. Mr Downey was a married man who worked  
22 for the Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea and on  
23 7 July, as was usual, he commuted to work from  
24 Milton Keynes to London Euston with his wife and they  
25 parted company at London Euston.

1 Mr Downey was one of the four individuals at  
2 Edgware Road about whom there is no evidence to indicate  
3 that they were alive after the explosion. Mr Downey's  
4 post-mortem reveals that he suffered significant  
5 injuries to his head, face and neck, a virtual  
6 amputation of the right ankle and a partial amputation  
7 of the left foot. Many of the witnesses who will be  
8 called to give evidence touching upon Laura Webb also  
9 refer to a male lying close to her whom we believe to be  
10 Mr Downey.

11 Elizabeth Owen refers to seeing another body lying  
12 on the floor which, judging by its size, she believed to  
13 be male. She lifted what she believed was a hood  
14 covering the man's head, but all she could see was  
15 blood. Lisa Levine saw a man lying on the floor close  
16 to the lady upon whom resuscitation had been attempted.  
17 She ran her hand up the back of the man but was unable  
18 to reach as far as his head. She thought from the  
19 extent of the injuries that it was the person  
20 responsible for the bomb, but in fact Khan's body was  
21 blown to pieces and his spine was found under the  
22 carriage.

23 Our assessment is that the body was, in fact, that  
24 of Mr Downey. You will also recall that Steve Hucklesby  
25 saw two bodies lying across the floor. One body was

1 lying diagonally across the standing area, the leg was  
2 severed below the knee and the torso was buried in  
3 debris. Similarly, Dr Wynne-Evans also recollects  
4 seeing a man lying near the deceased female who had both  
5 his legs missing from below the knees.  
6 From the extent of the trauma, she decided that he  
7 was dead.  
8 Paramedic Andrew Meyer with his colleagues  
9 Andrew Hearsum and Jayne Pitkin were dispatched to the  
10 scene from St John's Wood Ambulance Station. The London  
11 Ambulance major incident log, which we saw yesterday and  
12 today, indicates that they were dispatched to  
13 Edgware Road at 09.18.48 and arrived at 09.24.  
14 On arrival, they went down to the platform, boarded  
15 the bombed train and proceeded through the train to the  
16 second carriage.  
17 They moved from the rear to the front of the bombed  
18 carriage checking each person for vital signs.  
19 Mr Meyer recorded a plan, or a map, of what he found  
20 and on that map he marked the position of a deceased  
21 female, Laura Webb, and also the position of a deceased  
22 male wearing a dark suit. The evidence suggests that  
23 the male was Jonathan Downey. He was 34.  
24 David Foulkes. David Foulkes, the young man from  
25 Oldham who worked for The Guardian newspaper travelled

1 to London on 7 July to attend a meeting. A number of  
2 emergency responders describe seeing the body of a young  
3 man matching his description and I intend to refer to  
4 some them now.

5 Police Constable Geoffrey Potter of the  
6 British Transport Police spent approximately one to two  
7 minutes examining each of the deceased in the bombed  
8 carriage. He describes seeing a young male in his 20s  
9 with short, blond hair, a blue checked shirt with  
10 injuries to his lower leg and right side of his head.

11 Fireman Nathan Sinden was part of a fire crew that  
12 was mobilised to attend Edgware Road at 10.08. He  
13 assisted in the removal of casualties. Once the  
14 casualties were clear, he made his way into the bombed  
15 carriage to see whether he could assist. He describes  
16 seeing a dead male with bleached blond hair wearing his  
17 boxer shorts and lying in a foetal position.

18 Paramedic Jeshal Joshi was dispatched to the scene  
19 from St John's Wood Ambulance Station also. The log  
20 indicates that he was dispatched at 09.18 and arrived at  
21 around 09.23.

22 On arrival, he triaged casualties in the foyer  
23 before being asked to assist with casualties on the  
24 train. He, too, entered through the rear of the bombed  
25 train and made his way to the second carriage and to the

1 point of the seat of the explosion.

2 There, he assessed as being dead a male in a suit  
3 aged 25 to 35 years' old who was lying on the floor by  
4 seat 7. The description would suggest this was  
5 Mr Foulkes.

6 Also present in the carriage at the same time as  
7 Mr Joshi was the paramedic Andrew Meyer, to whom I made  
8 reference previously. He also marked on a plan the  
9 location of the persons that he saw and in the vicinity  
10 of seat 7, marked B and C on his plan, were two males  
11 whom he checked for vital signs. Both males were face  
12 down and dead.

13 The evidence suggests that one of those men was  
14 Mr Foulkes and the other one was Colin Morley, to whom  
15 I will turn next. David Foulkes was 22 years of age  
16 when he died.

17 Colin Morley. Colin Morley was a marketing  
18 consultant who was married with three children. On  
19 7 July 2005, he was intending on travelling from his  
20 home in north-west London to a business meeting in  
21 Kensington.

22 It's apparent from Mr Meyer's plan that Mr Morley  
23 lay in close proximity to David Foulkes. This accords  
24 with Police Constable Potter's description, because he  
25 refers to seeing a male lying on the floor of the

1 carriage positioned to the left of David Foulkes. The  
2 male was on his right-hand side facing the bomb crater.  
3 On initial examination, the male's injuries were not  
4 obvious, but closer inspection revealed that the man had  
5 suffered a head injury.

6 Peter Zimonjic, a journalist travelling on the  
7 eastbound train went over to the bomb carriage to  
8 assist. He entered the carriage through doors D5 and  
9 perhaps we could show, please, the plan for Edgware Road  
10 which is INQ00010280 -- no, I'm sorry, that's Aldgate.  
11 It's INQ00010282, page 7 [INQ10282-7], [INQ10282-8], [INQ10282-9], I  
believe.

12 We can see the carriage plan in the bottom of the  
13 page, the doors to which I've made reference are doors  
14 D5, and the reference to seats were seats 7 and 8, which  
15 we can see there on the plan.

16 He saw a man laid down on the floor, his head by  
17 seat 8 and his feet by seat 7. He refers to the man as  
18 being completely still and quiet and, because of this,  
19 he went to assist him first. Mr Zimonjic tried to move  
20 the man on to his back but was unable to do so.

21 Subsequently, Mr Zimonjic published a book  
22 recounting his experience and in the book he, in fact,  
23 indicated himself that he considered the man that he  
24 found to be Mr Morley, and in his book -- and we will  
25 see whether or not the evidence reflects this -- he

1 refers to checking the man for a pulse but was unable to  
2 find one.

3 Colin Morley was 52 years of age when he died.

4 Jennifer Nicholson. Whereas all of the other  
5 deceased were found in the carriage,  
6 Jennifer Nicholson's body lay on the tracks in the  
7 6-foot gap between the two trains. Ms Nicholson lived  
8 in Reading and worked for a publishing company in  
9 Central London. She used the underground to travel to  
10 work, but her usual route would not appear to have  
11 involved taking the Circle Line because, arriving at  
12 Paddington station from Reading, she would normally take  
13 the Bakerloo Line to Oxford Circus and would then take  
14 the Central Line to Tottenham Court Road before walking  
15 the short distance to her office. But on 7 July, there  
16 were delays on the Bakerloo Line which may have  
17 disrupted her route causing her to take another one.

18 Ms Nicholson was blown out of the second carriage by  
19 the force of the bomb which obliterated the doors on  
20 either side. There is no evidence, my Lady, to suggest  
21 that her death was anything other than instantaneous.

22 Among the first to see Ms Nicholson between the two  
23 trains were the first responders from  
24 London Underground. Brian Corbin, who I referred to  
25 earlier, mentioned seeing a female lying between the two

1 trains shortly after the explosion occurred. He left  
2 the tunnel to get medical help and returned with  
3 Dr Wynne-Evans of whom I've already spoken. He recalls  
4 Dr Wynne-Evans shaking the lady's leg without response  
5 before rolling her over.

6 Craig Ayles was one of the London Underground staff  
7 who was first on the scene. He walked between the two  
8 trains where he saw a lady with significant head  
9 injuries. Aware that passengers would be evacuating  
10 from the trains, he decided to cover the body of the  
11 lady with what he believes was a piece of train door.  
12 Similarly, Trevor Rogers, a duty manager at  
13 Edgware Road, refers to seeing a body between the two  
14 trains which was covered with something, but you could  
15 still see the two legs of the lady, or the body, and he  
16 found a small piece of material to cover them with.

17 Firefighters also took steps to preserve  
18 Ms Nicholson's dignity. Mark Nunan, who was a temporary  
19 subofficer at the Chelsea Fire Station was mobilised to  
20 attend an 8 pump fire at King's Cross before being  
21 diverted to Edgware Road. On going down to the track,  
22 he immediately saw a lady lying on her back between the  
23 two trains and he radioed for a salvage sheet to be  
24 brought to cover her up.

25 David Emburey, a station officer at Paddington,

1 attended Praed Street before going to Edgware Road and  
2 he saw a white female lying with her head to the side  
3 and in his statement he comments that we covered her up.  
4 Jennifer Nicholson was 24 years of age.  
5 My Lady, I now turn to Russell Square/King's Cross.  
6 The third bomb exploded on a Piccadilly Line train,  
7 as we've heard, travelling west, southbound, between  
8 King's Cross and Russell Square stations. As I've said,  
9 the evidence is that this bomb exploded at 08.49.48,  
10 within seconds of the explosions at Aldgate and  
11 Edgware Road.  
12 As at Aldgate and Edgware Road, the explosion on the  
13 Piccadilly Line took place towards the front of the  
14 train, although in this case the blast was in the first  
15 carriage rather than in the second.  
16 There are, however, a number of features of the  
17 King's Cross/Russell Square bombsite and the events that  
18 followed the explosion there that are worthy of mention  
19 by way of introduction.  
20 The first and most important point of distinction  
21 lies in the number of people killed. 26 people were  
22 killed in the Piccadilly Line train, double the combined  
23 number of those killed at Aldgate and at Edgware Road.  
24 The large number of fatalities was no doubt due in  
25 part to the fact that the Piccadilly Line train was

1 packed. Raymond Wright, a Tube driver who was  
2 travelling as a passenger in the driver's compartment,  
3 described the train as being full to capacity and  
4 estimated that it was carrying between 1,000 and 1,500  
5 passengers in its six carriages. The passengers  
6 travelling in what he described as crushed conditions.  
7 Julie Gruen, a passenger in the first carriage of  
8 the train, has said in a recent statement that the  
9 carriage was incredibly busy, so much so that she had  
10 never seen so many people in one Tube carriage before.  
11 As I've already mentioned, there had been problems  
12 with the service on the Piccadilly Line earlier in the  
13 morning, and we'll hear evidence from the survivors who  
14 described the platform at King's Cross that morning as  
15 having been full of people, with commuters squeezing  
16 themselves on to the trains. One of those people, as we  
17 know, was Lindsay.  
18 Another factor that distinguished the  
19 King's Cross/Russell Square scene from those of Aldgate  
20 and Edgware Road was the depth and design of the tunnel.  
21 The tunnels of the Piccadilly Line are much deeper than  
22 those of the Circle Line, and they are also much  
23 narrower.  
24 As will be seen from the photographs and the video  
25 footage, in places, the tunnel where the Piccadilly Line

1 train came to a rest was only a little wider than the  
2 train itself. One practical consequence of this was  
3 that, unlike at Aldgate and Edgware Road, the surviving  
4 passengers at this scene were not all evacuated to the  
5 same station.

6 At the other scenes, the passengers who had been at  
7 the far ends of the train, that is to say the back of  
8 the train at Aldgate and the front of the train at  
9 Edgware Road were able to disembark and then make their  
10 way past the bombed carriage, in each case to Aldgate  
11 and Edgware Road stations respectively. But at this  
12 bombsite, by contrast, the passengers on the rear  
13 carriages of the train, numbering perhaps many hundreds,  
14 or even thousands, disembarked from the back of the  
15 train and then walked the relatively short distance back  
16 to King's Cross, but those who were on the far side of  
17 the bomb in the front part of the first carriage,  
18 disembarked from the front of the train and then had no  
19 option but to walk the distance of some 680 metres up  
20 the tunnel to Russell Square.

21 In the same way, first response operations took  
22 place from both King's Cross and Russell Square  
23 stations, spanning either side of the bombsite. First  
24 responders, initially those who were already at the  
25 stations, and then, after that, those who had been

1 called to attend, went to the train from both ends.  
2 Having reached the train, they also evacuated  
3 casualties back to both stations. But, as we will hear  
4 from the evidence, evacuating casualties evacuated to  
5 King's Cross were carried -- sorry, casualties evacuated  
6 were carried through the train and then out and along  
7 a short section of track to the Piccadilly Line  
8 platforms and then finally up the escalators to the  
9 ticket hall and on to the concourse.  
10 Those casualties evacuated to Russell Square, on the  
11 other hand, had to be carried out through the front of  
12 the first carriage by way of the driver's cabin, up  
13 a long section of tunnel to the Russell Square platform  
14 and then either by lift or up the steps to the surface.  
15 My Lady, as I'll explain, four of the deceased with  
16 whom these proceedings are concerned were evacuated from  
17 the Piccadilly Line train whilst still alive.  
18 Lee Harris and Susan Levy were evacuated to  
19 King's Cross and then taken by ambulance to the  
20 Royal London Hospital where they subsequently died.  
21 Samantha Badham was evacuated to King's Cross, but  
22 died before she could be taken to hospital.  
23 Shelley Mather was evacuated from the front of the  
24 train, but died on the tracks before she could be  
25 carried to Russell Square.

1 Before the video is played, may I also refer,  
2 please, to some plans for the purposes of orientation?  
3 This document, INQ00010283 [INQ10283-7], shows on the left-hand  
4 side a schematic diagram of King's Cross station in all  
5 its complexity, but at the bottom of the page we can see  
6 where the Piccadilly Line westbound tunnel in blue  
7 departs from King's Cross and then joins, at the bottom  
8 of the picture, other rails coming elsewhere from the  
9 Circle Line.  
10 The Piccadilly -- sorry, not from the Circle Line,  
11 it's the Piccadilly Line going the other way.  
12 The extract from that diagram can be seen enlarged  
13 on the right-hand side and we can see there the  
14 carriages in the train and, marked in red, the  
15 approximate position of the first carriage, the carriage  
16 which contained the bomb at the point of explosion, and  
17 we'll see in due course also how the point at which the  
18 train came to a halt was adjacent to the point where the  
19 other tracks join the Piccadilly Line southbound.  
20 My Lady, the position was, as I've just explained,  
21 of course only just outside King's Cross station, and  
22 indeed the evidence of Thomas Nairn, the train driver,  
23 is likely to be that he heard and felt the explosion as  
24 he was passing what is known as the six-carriage mark,  
25 that is to say the mark or the point at which, in the

1 tunnel, the train has fully entered that tunnel after  
2 leaving a station. Then naturally, as with the other  
3 trains, the train travelled a short further distance  
4 before coming to a halt.

5 INQ00010283 at page 8 [INQ10283-8], please, shows a closer view  
6 of the train in the -- in its position in the tunnel,  
7 and perhaps I might briefly explain something about the  
8 three different points of entry to the train that were  
9 used during the evacuation of the casualties.

10 First, there is the front of the train, carriage 1  
11 of course at its head. As I've said, it was from this  
12 point that passengers in the front half of the first  
13 carriage were evacuated and led up the tunnel to  
14 Russell Square. Subsequently, the front of the train  
15 was used as the point of access for all those bringing  
16 help who arrived from Russell Square station. Initially  
17 London Underground staff, then BTP, Metropolitan Police  
18 and London Ambulance Service.

19 Then we can see, of course, at carriage 6, the very  
20 rear of the train, nearest the westbound platform, or  
21 southbound platform at King's Cross, the platform, that  
22 is to say, from which the train had just departed.

23 A large number of the passengers were evacuated from  
24 that point, and we'll hear evidence from two of the  
25 first responders who assisted passengers in climbing

1 down from the rear of the train.

2 The third point of entry was halfway up the train,  
3 and, as we can see there, just west of King's Cross  
4 station there's a linking tunnel between the main west  
5 and eastbound Piccadilly Line tunnels. I referred to it  
6 erroneously as the Circle Line a few moments ago. It  
7 is, in fact, the eastbound Piccadilly Line tunnel.

8 After the explosion, the train stopped in the  
9 westbound tunnel next to that opening and the  
10 consequence of that was that the train could be reached,  
11 not only by walking from the westbound platform to the  
12 rear of the train, as one of the witnesses,  
13 Inspector Mingay did, but also by walking from the  
14 eastbound platform up the eastbound tunnel and then up  
15 that link tunnel.

16 The evidence will be that many of the passengers  
17 were evacuated from the train using that route and, in  
18 turn, the emergency services also used that route to  
19 gain access.

20 My Lady, with those words of introduction, may we  
21 now please play the edited video for King's Cross and  
22 Russell Square?

23 (Video played)

24 My Lady, that's a view from the link tunnel.

25 (Video played)

1 26 people were killed on the Piccadilly Line train.  
2 Of that number, 20 were found by the emergency services  
3 inside the first carriage where the bomb had exploded  
4 and six were found at different points on the tracks  
5 having been blown out of the train by the force of the  
6 blast.

7 Some of those in the carriage and on the tracks were  
8 still alive, however, when the emergency services  
9 reached them.

10 Of the 20 deceased who were found by the emergency  
11 services in the first carriage of the train, we have  
12 evidence that at least six of them were alive for  
13 a period after the blast. I'll turn to those  
14 individuals in a few moments, but with regard to the  
15 other 14, there is no evidence that they survived the  
16 explosion.

17 James Adams. James Adams was a single man from  
18 Bretton in Peterborough where he was an active member of  
19 the Baptist Church. He was a mortgage consultant and,  
20 in July 2005, he was working in that capacity for  
21 Deloitte & Touche in their offices in the Strand. On  
22 the morning of 7 July 2005, as on other mornings, he had  
23 travelled by overland train from Peterborough to  
24 King's Cross and had then boarded the westbound  
25 Piccadilly Line Tube at King's Cross underground

1 station:  
2 He was 32.  
3 Ciaran Cassidy was a young, single man who was  
4 living at home in Crouch Hill with his parents and  
5 sister. He had a job working at the stationers Bridge &  
6 Co in Chancery Lane. On that morning, he followed his  
7 normal routine of going to Finsbury Park to catch  
8 a westbound Piccadilly Line train into Central London.  
9 We'll hear the evidence of one of his friends,  
10 Arash Lowni, who met and spoke with him on the platform  
11 that morning. In the statement that he provided to the  
12 police, Mr Lowni states that, when a westbound train did  
13 arrive, he boarded the first carriage and Ciaran the  
14 second carriage. Madam, it is possible that Mr Lowni  
15 was mistaken and, in fact, Mr Cassidy in fact boarded  
16 the first carriage at Finsbury Park. Another  
17 possibility is that he did board the second carriage at  
18 that point, but moved into the first carriage at a later  
19 station.  
20 What the evidence will show, my Lady, is that  
21 Mr Cassidy was in the first carriage of the train, at  
22 least by the time it left King's Cross station, and that  
23 he was killed, therefore, instantaneously in the  
24 explosion that followed. He was 22.  
25 Rachelle Chung For Yuen was a young accountant with

1 the firm Mees Pierson Intertrust. She had been born and  
2 grown up in Mauritius, but had moved to London in 2000.  
3 She married her husband, who was also from Mauritius, in  
4 2004, and lived with him in Mill Hill in north London.  
5 The morning of 7 July, she left her home on foot to walk  
6 to Mill Hill East underground station. Her normal  
7 practice was to travel to work using only the  
8 Northern Line, but on that morning, she must have  
9 decided to change on to the Piccadilly Line, probably at  
10 King's Cross. She was 27.

11 Elizabeth Daplyn lived in Highgate with her  
12 boyfriend. An Oxford graduate, she had a long-standing  
13 desire to work in the arts publishing world, but had  
14 found it difficult to get a permanent job in that field.  
15 In July 2005, she was working as an administrator at  
16 UCL. On the morning of 7 July, she had followed her  
17 normal routine of catching a bus from Archway Road to  
18 Holloway and then a westbound Piccadilly Line Tube  
19 towards Russell Square. She was 26 when she died.

20 Gamze Gunoral was a young actress from Turkey.  
21 In April 2005 she had moved from Istanbul to live with  
22 her uncle and aunt in Totteridge, north London, in order  
23 to spend a year improving her English. She had enrolled  
24 at a language school in Hammersmith and was travelling  
25 there on the morning of 7 July. She was 24.

1 Emily Jenkins was working as a secretary in the City  
2 in July 2005, but had a long-standing desire to train as  
3 a midwife. She had stayed with her boyfriend in  
4 Highbury on the night of 6 July and used the westbound  
5 Piccadilly Line to travel into work on the morning of  
6 7 July. She was 24.

7 Adrian Johnson was a technical and quality manager  
8 for Burberry, a company that his father had also worked  
9 for. He lived in Nottinghamshire with his wife and two  
10 young children and, on the morning of 7 July 2005, he  
11 was travelling in to work in Central London via  
12 King's Cross. He was 37 years' old when he died.

13 Helen Jones was a young accountant who worked at  
14 Phoenix Equity Partners in Central London.

15 In June 2005, she had purchased and moved into her first  
16 flat in Holloway in north London. On the morning of  
17 7 July, she exchanged text messages with her boyfriend  
18 and set off for work travelling westbound on the  
19 Piccadilly Line. She was 28.

20 Michael Matsushita, known as "Minh" was born in  
21 Vietnam brought up by his mother and stepfather in  
22 New York City. He led something of an itinerant life  
23 working, amongst other places, in Australia and  
24 south-east Asia, but in May 2005 he moved to live in  
25 London in order to be with his girlfriend. On the

1 morning of 7 July, he was travelling to work on the  
2 Piccadilly Line on the fourth day of his new job. He  
3 was 37 years' old when he died.

4 James Mayes was a single man who was working in 2005  
5 as an analyst at the Healthcare Commission in Central  
6 London. He lived in a flat in Islington and appears to  
7 have been travelling to work on the westbound  
8 Piccadilly Line that morning having returned the day  
9 before from a trip to Prague. He was 28.

10 Behnaz Mozakka was married with two adult children  
11 and lived in north London. She was a biomedical  
12 scientist at the Great Ormond Street Hospital and was  
13 travelling into work on the morning of 7 July. My Lady,  
14 as with all the deceased to whom I have so far referred,  
15 Behnaz Mozakka's body was found by the first responders  
16 in the front carriage of the Piccadilly Line train.

17 My Lady, you may recall that at the time of the hearing  
18 before you in April this year, she was listed as one of  
19 those deceased in respect of whom we believe there to be  
20 evidence that they had been seen alive after the blast.

21 My Lady, matters have progressed since then, in terms of  
22 the evidence that has come to light, and we no longer  
23 believe that to be the case.

24 It's important that I explain why that is so and the  
25 position is as follows: the King's Cross/Russell Square

1 scene report that was prepared by the  
2 Metropolitan Police in their capacity as your coroner's  
3 officers referred to the evidence of a police officer,  
4 PC Neil Annals who had boarded the bombed train as part  
5 of the emergency response. In his statement, he  
6 describes seeing a female passenger with an amputated  
7 leg who was close to death. The scene report prepared  
8 by the Metropolitan Police suggested that this passenger  
9 may have been Behnaz Mozakka, but since April, as one  
10 would expect, both we and the Metropolitan Police have  
11 looked into the matter more carefully and more deeply,  
12 as we have with many of the deceased.

13 Further enquiries have been made and PC Annals was  
14 reinterviewed at our request. It's now clear that his  
15 evidence is that he saw the injured female passenger in  
16 the second, not the first carriage of the train, and  
17 since, my Lady, there is no evidence that Behnaz Mozakka  
18 was ever anywhere other than in the first carriage, it  
19 no longer appears to be possible that the female  
20 passenger of whom he speaks could have been her.

21 My Lady, it is very unfortunate that the initial  
22 understanding of the evidence by the police has proved,  
23 on further analysis, to be erroneous, because of course  
24 it has only served to increase the pain and distress of  
25 the Mozakka family. But such confusion as has arisen

1 is, I'm afraid, not unexpected, given the scale and  
2 horrific nature of the scene that confronted the  
3 emergency services.

4 As I've said, we do not now believe that we will  
5 hear any evidence of Behnaz Mozakka being alive after  
6 the explosion. We will, however, hear the evidence of  
7 Christine Candy, a witness who saw a lady, who we  
8 believe to be Ms Mozakka, reading a book on the platform  
9 of King's Cross station shortly before the  
10 Piccadilly Line train arrived and they both boarded.  
11 She was 47 years' old when she died.

12 My Lady, is that a convenient moment?

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It is.

14 Mr Keith, it looks as if there may be  
15 representations from the media as to whether or not my  
16 view, as expressed earlier, that the 30-second clip, for  
17 which I understood there was no exception to it being  
18 put on the website, there appear to be possible  
19 objections to it. I think the best course is if I leave  
20 now, Mr Smith can update you and all others who are  
21 interested in this particular matter, and I shall, of  
22 course, return as and when required to do so to make  
23 a decision.

24 But whether or not the media who wish to make  
25 submissions can be represented until the end of the day,

1 I know not.

2 MR KEITH: With my Lady's leave, may we enquire, then, to  
3 see whether or not they would wish an application to be  
4 made at 2.00 to give time for publication, if their  
5 application succeeds, rather than at 4.00 at the close  
6 of proceedings and inform you of where we stand at 1.55?

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly. The only other matter  
8 I wanted to ask is that if anybody finds that an hour is  
9 not sufficient -- obviously we want to keep to a strict  
10 timetable, but I'll certainly consider any  
11 representations if it's found that it is really  
12 difficult to have a proper break or take instructions or  
13 get some kind of sustenance, please let me know.

14 MR KEITH: Thank you.

15 (1.00 pm)

16 (The short adjournment)

17

18