

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005

Hearing transcripts - 25 October 2010 - Morning session

1 Monday, 25 October 2010

2 (10.00 am)

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Mr Keith?

4 MR KEITH: Good morning, my Lady. Mr Hay will read the  
5 first witness statement.

6 MR HAY: My Lady, this is the witness statement of  
7 Simon Wotton, dated 13 September 2005, and it has the  
8 usual statement of truth.

9 Statement of MR SIMON WOTTON read

10 "On the morning of Thursday, 7 July 2005, I had an  
11 appointment at 9.00 am at the House of Fraser store,  
12 situated in Victoria, which necessitated a Tube journey.  
13 I caught the bus to Liverpool Street, where I got off  
14 and entered the Underground Tube station.

15 "I entered the platform to catch a Circle Line Tube  
16 train to Victoria. I waited for about ten minutes  
17 before a Tube train arrived, which I thought was  
18 unusual. I was watching people who appeared to me to be  
19 agitated by this delay. I formed this impression  
20 because I saw many people checking the time on their  
21 wristwatches while I also contemplated being late for my  
22 9.00 am meeting.

23 "When the Tube train arrived, I was aware that quite  
24 a number of people were waiting on the platform for it  
25 and, when it came to rest, I would estimate

1 approximately 50 people got off."

2 May we have up [INQ8387-3]? If we could focus on the  
3 bottom part of the diagram, thank you:

4 "I have been shown a plan of the third carriage of  
5 the Circle Line train and I can confirm that I entered  
6 the carriage via the double doors marked D7. Once  
7 inside, I noticed that there were no available seats and  
8 those standing were not shoulder-to-shoulder. I knew  
9 that I had quite a few stops before Victoria and  
10 therefore moved to a standing position to the right of  
11 seat 18 on the plan next to the double doors marked D8.  
12 I have marked on the plan with an X the standing  
13 position I assumed within the carriage.

14 "The train moved out of the station and I was stood  
15 effectively at the rear of the third carriage.  
16 I started to read my newspaper and was still reading the  
17 front page headlines when, inexplicably, I suddenly  
18 became aware that I was lying on my left side on the  
19 floor of the carriage. I had my legs, hips and backside  
20 on the ground, but my upper body was not in contact with  
21 the floor, as it was propped up and supported by my left  
22 hand and arm.

23 "Initially, I had no consciousness of how I had come  
24 to be on the floor, but I later assumed that I must have  
25 been thrown down by severe disturbances to the train.

1 I was on the ground, facing the direction of travel  
2 towards the front of the train. I was aware of a loud  
3 bang and a flash that became a constant glow.  
4 Initially, because of this flash, I thought that  
5 somebody had let off a distress flare and, in my mind,  
6 I connected this thought with the G8 Summit that was  
7 ongoing.  
8 "I could see that all the other passengers were  
9 either still seated or crouched down within the  
10 carriage, which had become instantly filled with what  
11 I thought was smoke and dust. The smoke appeared grey  
12 in colour and was acrid and smelt of the effect of  
13 electricity arcing. My recollection was that the  
14 internal train lighting was also affected, in that the  
15 intensity was reduced by about half.  
16 "This greatly reduced my visibility, although there  
17 did appear to be some light showing from outside of the  
18 carriage.  
19 "I could still see the glowing, which appeared to be  
20 down the side of the train along the left side, D7 to D1  
21 door side, and I still associated this with a protester  
22 letting off a distress flare. I became aware that the  
23 train was now stationary and that those passengers  
24 within it were quiet, except for a lady. This woman was  
25 kneeling on the ground directly in front and facing

1 seat 17 and was clearly distressed. She was screaming  
2 and praying something to the effect of 'Please, God,  
3 I don't want to die'. I felt like I was in shock and  
4 could not see down the train carriage towards the front,  
5 past the double doors situated at D5.

6 "This was a complete mystery to me and I was aware  
7 that people in the carriage were choking and coughing.  
8 Many were covering their faces with items of clothing.  
9 I felt something collide with the left side of my cheek  
10 but I am uncertain what this was, but in any case did  
11 not sustain any injury. I spoke to a man who was  
12 positioned close to seat 14, who was a white male in his  
13 mid-30s and I believe he was wearing a beige anorak.

14 "We spoke about using the emergency cord to speak to  
15 the train driver, but ascertained that the cord did not  
16 provide this facility. I again spoke with the same male  
17 and asked him to open the window which joined carriage 3  
18 with carriage 4, in order to let some of the smoke out.  
19 During this process, this male also tried to reassure  
20 the lady who continued to scream. This male was able to  
21 pull down the window and open the door with the window  
22 in it. Initially, those within the carriage were very  
23 quiet, but then I could hear moaning, wailing and  
24 shouting, all of which was the noise of very distressed  
25 people. This appeared to resonate from outside of my

1 carriage and from the next carriage up, the second  
2 carriage.

3 "People started to leave my carriage and walk  
4 through to the open doors and into the adjoining fourth  
5 carriage. I followed into this next carriage and stood  
6 by the double doors at D9 and saw that they were  
7 buckled. I looked straight back along the window line  
8 towards the carriage I had just left and could see what  
9 appeared to be embers burning on the wall of the tunnel.  
10 This carriage was also full of smoke, but slightly less  
11 than had been present in my original carriage.

12 "A person came into this carriage asking for anyone  
13 who was a doctor and, as a result, one lady ran through  
14 the carriage into the third carriage. I then became  
15 aware of a male person stood outside of the carriage on  
16 the tracks near to the double doors marked D10.

17 I assumed that this then was a passenger, as he was not  
18 wearing anything to distinguish himself as a railway  
19 official or member of the emergency services. This  
20 person was trying to coax passengers out of the fourth  
21 carriage on to the track area, to which a discussion  
22 ensued amongst the passengers within as to the  
23 possibility of the track still being live.

24 "I witnessed a procession of people entering the  
25 fourth carriage from the third which caused existing

1 passengers within this carriage to make space for them.

2 I could see that the square manhole covers had been  
3 displaced from their original settings on the floor  
4 surface and that the floor surface was also buckled.

5 I then saw the Tube train workers, wearing reflective  
6 jackets and carrying torches, arrived alongside the  
7 train followed by police officers identified by their  
8 uniforms.

9 "Passengers situated near double doors D8 in  
10 carriage 4 tried unsuccessfully to kick the doors open.  
11 These police officers then used a piece of metal as  
12 a crowbar in a vain attempt to prise open these doors,  
13 whilst the railway workers assisted in the same effort  
14 from the same side using their bare hands.

15 "As a result of this further unsuccessful attempt,  
16 we were instructed to leave the train by filing through  
17 the carriages towards the back of the train away from  
18 the original direction of travel. During this process  
19 of moving through the carriages, passengers were  
20 alerting other passengers to the hazards created by the  
21 displaced manhole covers.

22 "I filed along through the carriages as directed  
23 and, upon reaching the back of the train, I saw both  
24 police and railway staff assisting passengers to climb  
25 down off the train and on to the track below. I exited

1 the train at single door marked D1 ..."

2 If we could have [INQ8387-4] up, please, and then the

3 bottom left:

4 "I exited the train at single door marked D1 towards

5 the tunnel wall and then walked around the back of the

6 train towards the doors marked D2. The route walking

7 out along the tunnel towards the front of the train was

8 lined by police officers and railway staff. I walked

9 behind a female who started to take photographs using

10 what I think was a phone camera, as did many other

11 passengers. The female that I was following received

12 instructions from railway staff to stop taking

13 photographs and she initially complied with their

14 request. The lights on the tunnel wall were on, which

15 aided the view of the track, and I could see what

16 appeared to be a human body lying across the tracks in

17 an awkward position. This body was motionless and

18 nobody was attending to it. I was of the opinion that

19 this person was dead.

20 "As I walked along passing to the side of

21 carriage 2, I could see the windows positioned behind

22 seats marked 17 and 18 and 19 to 22 were all missing.

23 The first set of double doors were also missing and

24 there was a large unnatural opening with the metal

25 flapping outwards. This carriage was different from the

1 others as its clean lines had been distorted. It seemed  
2 bulbous in shape and both width and height had been  
3 extended into a curved shape. There seemed to be  
4 a person within this carriage sat at seat 17 or 18 and  
5 a person stood up within the carriage facing the seated  
6 individual. I believe that the person standing did not  
7 receive any response from the seated individual.  
8 I assumed that the seated person had also died.  
9 "I have a recollection of several other bodies lying  
10 on the track. One I decided was a male because I could  
11 see that his legs had become blackened and the foot,  
12 I presumed, was missing. This male was motionless,  
13 unattended and was covered in what looked like  
14 a blanket. I also saw the body of a lady lying on the  
15 tracks, again motionless, but in this case there was  
16 a person leaning over her. I could see her shoulders  
17 and head, but no face, and assumed that she was also  
18 dead.  
19 "I recall looking within the carriage and noticing  
20 that inside looked blackened, as if from smoke damage,  
21 whilst outside of the carriage was still painted but  
22 similarly blackened. As we were walking by these  
23 bodies, the female I had been following started to take  
24 further pictures with her phone camera and this angered  
25 a police officer who made a strong request for her to

1 stop. In view of these traumatic events, I did consider  
2 her actions to be insensitive.  
3 "I could see the lights of Aldgate Tube station  
4 ahead and it gave an indication of how far we had to  
5 walk to the platform. I walked to the station. There  
6 was a ramp leading from the track level up to the  
7 passenger platform itself, which was flanked by police  
8 officers. At no time during the train journey did I  
9 believe that a bomb had caused these events. I firmly  
10 believed that there had either been an electrical  
11 explosion or that a distress flare had been let off. It  
12 was only later, when I returned home, that I learned via  
13 the media that it had been bombed."

14 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call Carl Davison,  
15 please?

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

17 MR CARL DAVISON (affirmed)

18 Questions by MR KEITH

19 MR KEITH: Good morning. Would you give the court your full  
20 name, please?

21 A. Carl Davison.

22 Q. Mr Davison, on Thursday, 7 July, we understand that you  
23 travelled to King's Cross from Stevenage and you had  
24 then, at King's Cross, changed to the Circle Line --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. -- eastbound towards Aldgate. We also understand from  
2 your witness statement to the police that you entered  
3 the fourth carriage via a set of rear doors. Do you  
4 recall that?

5 A. Yes, not the last train -- not the last carriage, but,  
6 yes.

7 Q. The fourth carriage?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. The train pulled out and you describe in your statement  
10 how it came to a shuddering halt. Do you recall a noise  
11 or a thud of any kind?

12 A. Yes, it was, it was -- that's all I can say, it was like  
13 a thud, a thudding noise.

14 Q. After a short while, did you hear some sort of noise  
15 from the adjacent carriages or further down the train?

16 A. Yes, there was people in distress.

17 Q. Did there come a time when you were asked to move down  
18 the train?

19 A. Yes, but that was after injured passengers were ushered  
20 through. They came through, injured passengers started  
21 walking -- helping each other through the carriage, and  
22 we decided to stand back and let them go through first,  
23 and then, after they'd gone through, we filed through  
24 afterwards.

25 Q. Do you have any recollection of the amount of time that

1 elapsed, firstly, before the walking wounded and the  
2 other passengers started to walk through the middle of  
3 your carriage, and then, secondly, before you, yourself,  
4 moved down the carriages?

5 A. I would estimate about 15 minutes, something like that,  
6 15, 20 minutes.

7 Q. Who asked you, if anybody, to move down the train in  
8 order to decamp from it at the back?

9 A. Nobody. As far as I'm aware, nobody asked us to move.  
10 It was just a case of people were filing through, so we  
11 made our way through that way, because we were starting  
12 to -- you know, a few passengers were starting to panic  
13 a little bit.

14 Q. Because of the time that was passing?

15 A. Yes, plus there was a smell coming through the carriage.  
16 People were a little bit worried that it could have been  
17 a fire, thus obviously the smoke. But the smell wasn't  
18 a burning as such, a fire smell. So people were sort of  
19 starting to calm down a bit more, but because the doors  
20 weren't opening, they were getting worried. But it was  
21 actually just people filing through, you know, people  
22 saying that the back doors were open now and people are  
23 coming out the carriages.

24 Q. Did somebody help you off the rear of the train?

25 A. I believe there was somebody, yes, there was somebody.

1 Q. We know that you stepped down from the back of the train  
2 and then you would have turned round, to go back on  
3 yourself, to walk up the track towards Aldgate?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Therefore, you had to walk past the whole of the train  
6 in order to do so?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. I want to ask you, please, about what you saw as you  
9 made that journey back towards Aldgate. I want you to  
10 describe the people in particular that you saw during  
11 that journey.

12 A. Well, as I started making my way back, everyone was  
13 filing along towards the station, I turned and looked at  
14 the train, I could see there -- there and then that the  
15 carriage, where the explosion had taken place, I could  
16 tell that it wasn't just -- it wasn't derailed, it was  
17 actually an explosion, because the roof of the carriage  
18 had come out. If my memory serves me right, the roof of  
19 carriage had come out, and there were people -- there  
20 was a man laying face down on the track, his clothes had  
21 been shredded, I believe -- I don't even believe he had  
22 any clothes on, to be honest with you, apart from his  
23 underwear.

24 There was a lady sitting there with a man -- the man  
25 hadn't been injured, but I believe the lady was injured

1 and he was sitting there with her, comforting her, and  
2 there was another gentleman who had been in the  
3 explosion, because I could tell by his clothes had been  
4 shredded, and he was sitting and just basically rocking  
5 backwards and forwards, he was obviously injured,  
6 disturbed.

7 Q. Right. Looking in detail at each of those three people,  
8 the first person, first of all, was that gentleman  
9 moving at all, as far as you could tell?

10 A. No, he wasn't moving.

11 Q. When you first saw him, was he on his own or was there  
12 another passenger attempting to speak to him or to care  
13 for him?

14 A. He was on his own.

15 Q. Did there come a time when you checked for a pulse?

16 A. I did, yes.

17 Q. Was that then or was that after you had seen that there  
18 were three people and then gone back to the first  
19 person?

20 A. What had happened was I saw the people -- I saw the  
21 gentleman trying to help the three, or sit there talking  
22 to the lady anyway. I put my -- I had a laptop with me,  
23 I just put that into one of the sidings, in the tunnel,  
24 and I just went over and I went to see -- I asked if  
25 I could do anything, and the man said to me "You can

1 help this man", the one that was sitting up. He said  
2 "You can sit with him", and I said "What about this  
3 gentleman?" He said, "Well, I don't think there's any  
4 point".

5 I went to feel for a pulse. Unfortunately, my heart  
6 was racing so badly I don't think I could feel a pulse  
7 anyway, even if I tried.

8 Q. Was that in his wrist or the side of his neck?

9 A. I tried his wrist and I tried the side of the neck.  
10 Then I put my hand towards his face and my hand came  
11 back and it was wet.

12 Q. From blood?

13 A. From blood. So I sat with the -- I put my coat over the  
14 top of this gentleman, who was laying on the floor, in  
15 case it just -- actually, just in case it distressed  
16 other passengers, but also to just cover him slightly,  
17 I didn't put it over his head, but I just covered his  
18 body, and then I sat with the gentleman and tried to  
19 help -- well, just sit with him, basically.

20 Q. Thank you. Before turning to the question of the lady  
21 who was there and the second gentleman, remaining with  
22 the first man, the other man who helped you or the other  
23 man who was present and said you could look at this man,  
24 did it seem to you that he was a passenger?

25 A. He was a passenger, yes.

1 Q. Secondly, did there come a time when a police officer  
2 turned up, and did that police officer also check the  
3 pulse of the first man lying on the tracks?

4 A. I can't remember if he checked the pulse, to be honest  
5 with you. I think he did, I'm sure he did, but as my  
6 memory serves me right, two police officers turned up,  
7 it looked a bit after, and they did -- I mean, as far as  
8 I'm concerned, the response was quite quick, but there  
9 were two -- if memory serves me right, there was the,  
10 like, cyclist policeman.

11 Q. Was that the man in the shorts?

12 A. Yes, I believe so. They came down, and -- because one  
13 of them helped me -- well, one of them helped me carry  
14 this other gentleman, or helped me lift him and move him  
15 towards the edge of the tunnel nearer to the Aldgate  
16 ramp, sorry, to the platform.

17 Q. All right, that second man we now know to be  
18 Mr Philip Duckworth.

19 A. Okay.

20 Q. Were you there when he sat up and showed signs of  
21 movement or, when you appeared, was he already sitting  
22 up?

23 A. When I appeared, he was already sitting up.

24 Q. Do you recall the London Fire Brigade taking him away on  
25 a makeshift stretcher: namely, a ladder?

1 A. Yes, because the -- because what it was, once we moved  
2 him over to the side of the tunnel, I sat -- I went to  
3 lay him down, because he was quite heavy. I went to lay  
4 him down but, as he went back, he started to choke, so  
5 I pulled him back up again, and I actually just -- I let  
6 him rest -- I'm not sounding too caring, but I let him  
7 rest against my legs, and the other police gentleman,  
8 we tried to prise the door open on the carriage where  
9 there had been the explosion, they were trying to prise  
10 it open with a metal door to try to lever it, but there  
11 was no way of getting it open. All that was happening  
12 was forcing the bottom -- because what happened was,  
13 sorry, the Fire Brigade came down and took the gentleman  
14 away. I went over to help the police to try to help  
15 them prise the door, and then --

16 Q. It couldn't be done?

17 A. No, but then the Fire Brigade came down and said,  
18 "Right, can you please leave now?" you know, they tended  
19 to everyone else.

20 Q. Of the emergency services whom you saw, can you tell us  
21 the order in which they appeared to you in the tunnel?

22 A. It was police, the police officers first.

23 Q. Uniform or plainclothes?

24 A. Uniform, and then it was the Fire Brigade.

25 Q. How long would you say that you were with the gentleman

1 who lay against -- you held upright in order to stop him  
2 from choking before he was taken away?

3 A. It was only a matter of minutes. It was only minutes.

4 Q. The third person whom you saw was a lady, whom you  
5 described in your witness statement to the police as  
6 being Afro-Caribbean of appearance and as having a cut  
7 on her right leg. Where was she in relation to the  
8 other two bodies?

9 A. She was -- well, she was with the gentleman -- she was  
10 with the gentleman that was holding her up. He was  
11 sitting with her, talking to her.

12 Q. In relation to the other two persons whom you'd seen  
13 lying on the tracks, one who was face down who had not  
14 moved --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- and the second man, the man who had been able to sit  
17 up and whom you had moved to the side of the tunnel and  
18 who subsequently started choking, was the lady whom you  
19 saw --

20 A. Sorry, she was closest.

21 Q. -- near the vicinity to the other two?

22 A. She was -- yes, if you had the train angled there, she  
23 was sitting -- the gentleman was laying on the track  
24 there, then you had the lady sitting there with the  
25 gentleman that was helping her, and the other gentleman

1 was sitting the opposite side.

2 Q. Perhaps could you have a look at the screen and we'll

3 look at [INQ10280-10].

4 Ignore the writing if you will, please, Mr Davison,

5 but the red carriage shows the location of the second

6 carriage at the moment of the explosion, but it's not

7 the same place that the second carriage eventually came

8 to a halt, because the train moved on after the

9 explosion before coming to a complete halt.

10 A. Right.

11 Q. But you'll see there the red carriage and you will see

12 next to it the blue tracks, the tracks that you walked

13 down to get to Aldgate, which is towards your right on

14 the screen.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Could you just tell us, please, where, roughly, all

17 three persons were whom you saw?

18 A. They were on the first set of tracks.

19 Q. Were they in the middle of the red hatched area or

20 towards one end, and how far away were they from the red

21 carriage?

22 A. If the explosion is where the cross is, I take it, yes?

23 Q. Yes, the rear of the second carriage.

24 A. Right, if the explosion is there, they were -- it must

25 be towards the -- I'd say where the fourth carriage is,

1 towards the middle of the fourth.

2 Q. All right.

3 A. Where the fourth carriage is shown there, I would say  
4 towards the middle of that. Because I know -- no,  
5 towards the end -- sorry, towards --

6 Q. If you can't recollect, don't worry, Mr Davison.

7 A. I can't properly, I can't properly.

8 Q. It's all right.

9 A. I know it wasn't too far away from the carriage that had  
10 the explosion.

11 Q. Were the bodies touching each other? Were they close  
12 enough for the limb of one body to be touching another?

13 A. No, because the gentleman -- no, because the guy that  
14 was laying on his -- face down, he was just laying  
15 there, then a little bit -- just -- it's only, say,  
16 a couple of feet, but then you had the lady sitting up  
17 with the gentleman talking to her. The gentleman was in  
18 the middle. Then the other gentleman was sitting next  
19 to him on the other side --

20 Q. All right.

21 A. -- if memory is serving me right about this.

22 Q. In what state was the lady who had the cut to her leg?

23 A. She seemed to be -- she was talking to the gentleman,  
24 she was talking to the gentleman. She was obviously,  
25 you know, upset, but she was talking to him. She was --

1 you know, he was trying to keep her -- they were having  
2 a little joke. It was just, you know, trying to keep  
3 spirits up maybe, I don't know, or nerves. He was  
4 trying to comfort her, basically.

5 Q. Did you -- were you there when she came to leave the  
6 tracks and be taken away?

7 A. No, we got moved -- we were moved away before --

8 Q. Before she left?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. I think you then retrieved your possessions from the  
11 tunnel, your laptop of which you spoke, and you walked  
12 along the tunnel. Did you see emergency services  
13 arriving on the platform or were they already there when  
14 you got to the platform?

15 A. When we got to the platform, the emergency services were  
16 there.

17 Q. Then did you give your details to the police --

18 A. I gave my details to the police at the top of the  
19 platform and then made my way to work.

20 MR KEITH: Thank you very much, Mr Davison. Will you stay  
21 there because there may be some further questions for  
22 you?

23 MR COLTART: No, thank you.

24 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing, thank you.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Does anybody have any questions?

1 Mr Taylor?

2 In which case, it sounds as if there are no more  
3 questions for you, Mr Davison. I'm sure you didn't want  
4 to relive those scenes, so thank you for coming to help  
5 us and thank you for the help you tried to give the  
6 people on the track, I think at least two of whom lived  
7 and one of whom I'm about to hear from, so there was  
8 some good news came out of it.

9 A. Yes.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

11 A. Okay.

12 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite to you call Thelma Stober,  
13 please?

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mrs Stober, take your time.

15 MRS THELMA STOBER (sworn)

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mrs Stober, we all know you've been  
17 through a huge amount. We don't want to distress you  
18 any more than we have to, so just take your time, take  
19 lots of water and deep breaths and we'll try to get you  
20 through it as quickly as we can. All right?

21 A. Thank you.

22 Questions by MR KEITH

23 MR KEITH: We know that your name is Thelma Stober.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. I want to start on a lighter note, if I may, because,

1 in July of 2005, you were head of legal services or  
2 director of law for the London Development Agency, which  
3 was the Mayor of London's regeneration agency for  
4 London, which was responsible, among other things, for  
5 promoting and supporting new and existing businesses.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Is that right? As a result, you had advised the London  
8 Development Agency Board on the way in which it could  
9 contribute to London's bid for the 2012 Olympic Games.

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. You were also involved in the establishment of  
12 London 2012, which was the company set up to prepare and  
13 submit the bid. Is that right?

14 I think you had also been part of the presentation  
15 to Olympic officials in November of 2004.

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. So 6 July was a joyous occasion?

18 A. Indeed, it was, yes.

19 Q. As a result, it may be that you treated yourself to  
20 a slightly later arrival at work the following morning.

21 A. That's right. In fact, I wasn't going to go to work on  
22 the 7th because, apart from Ken Livingstone, the  
23 Mayor of London, not very many people actually genuinely  
24 believed we were going to win the Olympics, and when we  
25 did, I decided, although I had taken the day off, to

1 actually go to work, and that's the reason why I was  
2 going late because I had to take my son to school.  
3 Q. You arrived, I think, at Moorgate on an overland train.  
4 A. Yes.  
5 Q. And you then changed to the Circle Line?  
6 A. Yes.  
7 Q. You entered what we now know to be the bombed carriage,  
8 the second carriage.  
9 A. Yes.  
10 Q. I just want to ask you, please, if I may, about your  
11 location in that carriage, because where you were is an  
12 important issue.  
13 Could we have, please, on the screen [INQ8343-1]?  
14 Ms Stober, if you look to your right, you'll see  
15 there a photograph. Now, it's quite hard to see, but  
16 this is a photograph that you marked for the police at  
17 the time that you provided them kindly with a witness  
18 statement in July of 2005. We can see your initials in  
19 the bottom right-hand corner, "TPS1", which is -- you  
20 are a lawyer, you know -- the exhibit.  
21 In the middle of that picture, you will see very  
22 faintly, in the right-hand side of the right-hand pole,  
23 a cross and above it "T" for Thelma.  
24 A. Yes.  
25 Q. Now, right at the bottom of the picture, you will see

1 "direction of travel", so this is a photograph marked as  
2 if the camera is towards the rear of the carriage,  
3 because the direction of travel is forward, and so  
4 backwards is the rear of the carriage.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Now, from that photograph, it would seem that you may  
7 have been, according to this, if it's right, not in the  
8 area of the set of doors right at the end of the  
9 carriage, that's off-camera, if you like, between the  
10 end of the bank of seats and the person holding the  
11 camera, nor in the second standing area, next to the  
12 second set of doors, but in the third one, because the  
13 cross would seem to be placed next to the third set of  
14 doors. But we're not sure that that is right, and we  
15 wanted to ask you, please, if you could look at  
16 [INQ10280-8], whether or not you can confirm which set of  
17 doors you were standing next to?

18 To get your bearings, in this diagram the bomb is  
19 located towards the top left-hand corner of the  
20 carriage: namely, the rear of the carriage. The first  
21 set of doors, which we couldn't see on that photograph,  
22 are double doors D8 at the bottom, then D6 and then D4  
23 going from left to right across the bottom of the  
24 diagram.

25 Could you tell us, please, which set of doors you

1 think were next to?

2 A. From my recollection, I remember running for the train.

3 Normally, because Tower Hill is towards the end of the  
4 train, I would go right to the end. But because I saw  
5 the train coming, I ran for it, I recall just getting  
6 into the train from the first set of double doors.

7 Q. Which would be D8 on our plan?

8 A. Yes, that's my recollection.

9 Q. Right. Did you move from there at all, or did you stay  
10 there?

11 A. Well, I -- when I got into the train, I wanted to sit  
12 down on the left, and somebody -- I kind of turned to go  
13 towards the left, where you've got 2 and 4, and somebody  
14 got there before me, so I decided to stand.

15 When we got to Liverpool Street, somebody moved out,  
16 I think it was more 1. I wanted to go and sit down, and  
17 then I changed my mind because Tower Hill was just the  
18 next stop, so I decided to stand.

19 Q. So you remained standing in that area in the vicinity of  
20 double doors D8 --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- at the end of the carriage?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. So may we presume two things, Ms Stober: firstly, that  
25 the photograph that the police have from July 2005 with

1 the "T" and the cross on it, doesn't accurately reflect  
2 where, in fact, you were. You were towards the end of  
3 the carriage rather than in the middle?

4 A. Yes, that's my recollection.

5 Q. Secondly, that this plan, which is just a surmise, it  
6 simply sets out the probable positions of everybody, is  
7 based on their original witness statements --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- to be tested in the light of oral evidence, may  
10 therefore erroneously show you at mark 23?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. You were, in fact, to the left, near double doors D8?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Right. In your statement, you describe how you sent or  
15 were in the process of sending a text just as you got to  
16 Liverpool Street.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. I think that the moment of explosion occurred just at  
19 the moment as you were pressing the "send" button on  
20 your phone?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. What do you recall after that?

23 A. I recall a flash and I thought, well, they usually have  
24 signs on the train to say don't use your phone and  
25 I never do, except on this occasion I was phoning --

1 I was sending a text to say "I'm coming, organise  
2 certain meetings", so there was a flash and a light and  
3 after that, I could hear a continuous buzz and I felt as  
4 if I was circling round for what seemed like an awful  
5 long time, and I could hear this continuous buzz, and  
6 although my eyes were closed, I could see in a strange  
7 sort of way, I could see light, it was light, it's like  
8 closing your eyes in this room but you're aware that  
9 there is light as opposed to darkness.

10 Q. Along with the spinning or circling sensation, did you  
11 have a sensation of falling?

12 A. No, I didn't.

13 Q. Can you recollect whether or not you lost consciousness  
14 for any appreciable length of time?

15 A. I may have done, because the next time -- when I woke  
16 up, I found myself lying on the train tracks, and  
17 I don't know what happened between the spinning and the  
18 buzz and the light, how I got from there to the track.  
19 So I may have -- I must have lost ...

20 Q. Do you recall your first conscious thought having  
21 discovered yourself to be lying down on the tracks?

22 A. Yes. I thought there had been a train crash and my mind  
23 went to the Moorgate train crash which happened several  
24 years ago, and I thought I could see the double doors  
25 had been ripped off where I went through, where I was

1 standing.

2 Q. How could you see that, because they were absent from  
3 the side of the carriage or because they were on the  
4 ground?

5 A. They were absent, some of it was on ground and parts of  
6 it was on my right leg.

7 Q. No doubt you started to explore which parts of your body  
8 were moving and which were injured, and what did you  
9 discover, other than the fact that you were partially  
10 trapped by that debris?

11 A. I could see parts of -- I could see metal stuck on my  
12 left thigh.

13 Q. Take your time. There's a glass of water there in front  
14 of you, if that assists.

15 A. There was blood coming from my left and right foot,  
16 profusely, and there was a hand on my head like this,  
17 and I lifted the hand and it fell, and I thought that  
18 people had died and I could see people on the train  
19 screaming. From the part where the door had been  
20 removed, I could see a few people lying on the floor.

21 Q. Inside the carriage?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Were you able to see to whom the arm, the hand that you  
24 moved, belonged?

25 A. Well, I -- my brain went into gear and I thought, in

1 disasters, it's reasonable or natural for people to look  
2 after those who are alive before they look after the  
3 dead.

4 Q. Of course.

5 A. And I thought of my, son who was 7 years' old and, silly  
6 enough, I thought I wanted to continue my work on the  
7 Olympics, so I tried to see if I could get up so that  
8 people could see I was alive to ask for help, so I tried  
9 to wriggle myself because I was partly close to the  
10 train, I tried to wriggle myself out of the train.

11 I put one hand, my left hand, on the train, and  
12 I dragged myself up, and I put my right hand up, I could  
13 see people coming from the tunnel wearing the orange,  
14 I think it was, and I assumed that they were working  
15 there, and I put my hand up saying "Help me, help me,  
16 I don't want to die".

17 What I didn't do was look round and see if I could  
18 help the man who was lying there. He was lying there  
19 not moving. I assumed he was dead, but I could have  
20 held his hand, and I didn't.

21 Q. If I may say so, there is no evidence to suggest that he  
22 was alive at all and, therefore, if I may say so, there  
23 was nothing at all that you could have done.

24 Witnesses have told us, Ms Stober, about how, as you  
25 rightly and understandably shouted out for help, you

1 were able to appreciate that you were yourself severely  
2 injured to one of your legs?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. It's right, isn't it, that one of your legs was  
5 subsequently the subject of extensive treatment? They  
6 also recall that you were sufficiently able to detect  
7 that I think your back was extremely sore as well and  
8 you were in great pain from that as well. Do you recall  
9 that?

10 A. Yes. So when the two men came to help me, they told me  
11 I should lie down because I may have severe injuries on  
12 my back because I could feel the pain.

13 Q. Now, may I just ask you what you recollect of the people  
14 who came to assist you, because, as you have said,  
15 rightly, the primary obligation is to protect and  
16 safeguard the living?

17 You mention in your statement a man called Tony.

18 Did you ever catch his second name?

19 A. No, I didn't.

20 Q. All right. Was he a man wearing a jacket, was he  
21 wearing some sort of high visibility jacket associated  
22 with the --

23 A. That's right, yes.

24 Q. -- London Underground or emergency services?

25 A. Yes, that was one, yes.

1 Q. Do you recall a man coming up to you who was a train  
2 operator?  
3 A. No, I don't recall that. There was another person  
4 there.  
5 Q. A passenger?  
6 A. Yes.  
7 Q. Was that man a passenger, a man who I think held your  
8 hand for a while --  
9 A. Yes.  
10 Q. -- and you told him that you were extremely cold?  
11 A. Yes.  
12 Q. He found a coat to put over you?  
13 A. That's right, yes.  
14 Q. Right. I think he kept asking you your name  
15 repetitively, but reassuring you in the process, and all  
16 the time you could see Aldgate station to one side of  
17 you?  
18 A. Yes.  
19 Q. Could you tell us, please, how you came to be removed  
20 from the tunnel?  
21 A. I was lying there for what seemed to me like an awful  
22 long time. I was cold and I was thirsty, and I could  
23 see people being moved along on the other side to the  
24 platform and still screaming and shouting on the train,  
25 and I kept asking -- he kept telling me that the

1 emergency services would be here soon, and I kept asking  
2 what time they would be here, because to me it seemed  
3 a long time, and eventually they arrived and they tried  
4 to put a collar on my neck, but had some difficulties  
5 doing so.

6 Q. Because of the position in which you were lying on the  
7 track?

8 A. That's right, yes.

9 Q. Were they able to succeed in applying a collar or not?

10 A. Yes, and he eventually got me on to the stretcher.

11 Q. Do you remember whether it was what we would ordinarily  
12 describe as a proper stretcher, or was it a makeshift  
13 stretcher made from a piece of ladder?

14 A. It seemed quite small, it seemed like a makeshift.

15 Q. No doubt rather uncomfortable as well. Were you then  
16 taken from the tunnel via the platform up to ground  
17 level?

18 A. Yes, that's correct.

19 Q. Then, of course, you were taken to hospital where you  
20 were treated for the injuries that you had sustained?

21 A. Yes, well, I was upstairs for a while and I was given  
22 gas and there was a female doctor who was helping until  
23 I was taken on to the ambulance and taken to the  
24 hospital.

25 Q. By way of postscript, if I may, in your statement you

1 recollect how, on the way to hospital, there was some  
2 discussion between the ambulance staff as to the proper  
3 way to go to hospital?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. I think you assisted in giving some directions, perhaps,  
6 as to how to find the hospital?

7 A. Yes, and I asked one of them how come he's an ambulance  
8 driver and he doesn't know the way to the hospital.

9 Then it was explained to me that it was a disaster. It  
10 was at that point that I actually realised that it had  
11 been a bomb and it had been a sort of major incident.

12 So it was explained to me that they had to bring people  
13 from all over the country and he was not a Londoner and,  
14 therefore, didn't know his way.

15 MR KEITH: Thank you very much. Will you stay there,  
16 though, please, because there may be some further  
17 questions for you?

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, of course. Mr Coltart?

19 MR COLTART: Only one very short matter, if I may.

20 Questions by MR COLTART

21 MR COLTART: Can we get the diagram back up of the Tube  
22 carriage? Thank you.

23 Ms Stober, you've now confirmed for us that, in  
24 fact, you were standing in the area by double doors D8  
25 in the moments before the explosion. Have I understood

1 that properly? Do you see over towards the left-hand  
2 side of the carriage?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. The double doors D8, direction of travel is from left to  
5 right. Do you now have any independent recollection of  
6 the other people standing around you in the moments  
7 before the explosion took place?

8 A. I'm afraid I don't. My whole -- I was aware there were  
9 people around me, but my whole world was the Olympics.  
10 That's what I was focusing on, I was thinking of. So  
11 I was aware there were people around me. I was aware  
12 there were a few -- some of them were men, but in terms  
13 of detail, no, I'm afraid I don't.

14 Q. So there would be no point, by the sounds of it, of me  
15 providing you with a description of someone who was or  
16 might have been in that area, you wouldn't be able to  
17 assist us?

18 A. No, I'm afraid not.

19 MR COLTART: Thank you very much.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Does anybody else have any questions  
21 for Mrs Stober?

22 Mr Taylor?

23 That's it, then, Mrs Stober. Dare I ask, have you  
24 booked a special place at the Olympics? Are you allowed  
25 to do that?

1 A. Indeed I have been offered, yes, and I can't wait.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Well, I hope that you enjoy the  
3 Olympics when they come. Thank you for coming to help  
4 us.

5 A. Thank you.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I appreciate it was probably an  
7 ordeal having to relive what you went through. But if  
8 it is any consolation, I would echo what Mr Keith said,  
9 I am sure there was nothing that you could do.

10 A. Thank you very much.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So thank you for coming along.

12 A. Thank you.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes?

14 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite to you call Melanie O'Dell?

15 My Lady, Mr Suter very kindly has passed a note  
16 suggesting she may well still be in the witness room  
17 downstairs. I don't know how long it takes for somebody  
18 to walk that distance. It may be a minute or two.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Is there a statement we could read?

20 MR KEITH: Yes, by all means. Mr Hay could read the  
21 statement of Louise Whitlock.

22 MR HAY: My Lady, the statement of Louise Whitlock. It's  
23 dated 26 July 2005 and has the usual declaration of  
24 truth. Please can we have up [INQ10280-8], please?

25 My Lady will see number 37, which is believed to be

1 Ms Whitlock's position in the second carriage.  
2 Statement of MS LOUISE WHITLOCK read  
3 "On Thursday, 7 July 2005, I took an overland train  
4 arriving at London Paddington train station at about  
5 8.00. I then made my way to the Underground part of the  
6 station and arrived at the Circle Line eastbound  
7 platform arriving at about 8.10. A District line train  
8 to Edgware Road came along, but I did not take this as  
9 I needed to go to Monument Tube station. I waited for  
10 the next train, which arrived about three minutes later  
11 and was a Circle Line train.  
12 "On arriving at the platform, I turned left and  
13 walked towards where the front of the train would  
14 arrive. As the train arrived, I walked towards the  
15 front of the train and got into the second carriage from  
16 the front of the train. The train was very crowded, so  
17 I stood in the centre section by the opposite double  
18 doors from the side I had entered through. I started to  
19 read a newspaper.  
20 "After Moorgate station, I found that some seats  
21 were free, so I sat down next to the glass compartment  
22 facing towards the side of the train I had entered  
23 through. I stopped reading the newspaper and was aware  
24 of other people in the carriage. I was aware of a white  
25 lady with long, dark hair in her mid-to-late 30s wearing

1 a blue and red anorak, black, three-quarter length  
2 trousers and trainers. She was stood up to the right of  
3 me. I also recall a lady sat opposite me but one seat  
4 to the left. She was white, with straight, long, dark  
5 hair. She was pretty and aged about 21 years. She had  
6 a dark coat, tan-coloured boots and dark tights. I do  
7 not recall whether this girl was still on the Tube when  
8 the explosion occurred.

9 "At Liverpool Street, a number of people got on to  
10 the train. I recall a man who sat to my left. He was  
11 dressed in a suit, but I cannot recall any more about  
12 him.

13 "Suddenly, I heard an extremely loud bang and  
14 a bright flash. I was thrown out of my seat and landed  
15 on the floor. I was aware of glass shattering around  
16 me. The lights in the carriage went out and the train  
17 came to a halt. There was silence for a couple of  
18 minutes, then smoke and soot filled our carriage.

19 "It was thick and very dark to breathe. I was not  
20 sure if there was a fire. The woman I have described in  
21 the anorak was very calm and told people to get down on  
22 the floor where it would be easier to breathe. She also  
23 told us to put our hands over our mouths and noses.

24 I was scared that I was alone, and so a man came from  
25 behind and sat close to me. His name began with A,

1 he was wearing a suit and he was quite young.

2 "Two men were trying to break the glass open in the  
3 double doors and also tried to bash open the bottom of  
4 the doors. They were using their briefcases and the  
5 woman in the anorak was passing implements to try to  
6 assist them. I also recall another man who had cut his  
7 hand and was bleeding. He was wearing a green outdoor  
8 coat. I gave him tissues to stop the bleeding. We  
9 waited for a while and then the smoke began to clear.  
10 The driver then came through his end of the train.  
11 Somebody suggested that we move out of the train through  
12 the front. However, there was a problem with getting  
13 out and we had to turn back.

14 "I was aware of people screaming and people were  
15 saying that there were people further down the train who  
16 were seriously injured. A certain amount of time passed  
17 and somebody said that we could now get off the train as  
18 the electricity had been turned off. We made our way  
19 further down the train nearer to where the explosion had  
20 occurred. There were some doors opened and somebody  
21 helped me out through the doors. I looked to my right  
22 and saw that the metal doors were all mauled. Prior to  
23 getting off the train, I had seen a woman in the third  
24 carriage lying on the seats. She seemed very injured  
25 and somebody said she had a pole in her leg.

1 "When I got off the train, I saw a body lying on the  
2 tracks near the damaged carriage. We walked along the  
3 tunnel to Aldgate Tube station where we were helped by  
4 London Underground staff and the Fire Brigade. I was  
5 then taken to Royal London Hospital for treatment."  
6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think we'll wait a couple of  
7 minutes. Mr Suter is questioning whether I should break  
8 now because the witness isn't here, but if I do break  
9 now, it then makes quite a long session.  
10 MR KEITH: My Lady, I think she was brought up from the  
11 witness room and she is just outside court.  
12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Could ask you her to come in?  
13 MISS MELANIE JANE O'DELL (sworn)  
14 Questions by MR KEITH  
15 MR KEITH: Good morning.  
16 A. Good morning.  
17 Q. Could you give the court your full name, please?  
18 A. Melanie Jane O'Dell.  
19 Q. May I ask, is it Miss O'Dell or Mrs O'Dell?  
20 A. Miss.  
21 Q. Miss O'Dell, I'm obviously going to ask you questions  
22 about 7 July 2005. On that day, I think you travelled  
23 from Maidenhead to Paddington --  
24 A. Yes.  
25 Q. -- and you had first attempted to take the

1 Bakerloo Line?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. You'd got on a Bakerloo Line train --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. -- and you'd gone through Marylebone, and then there was

6 an announcement that there would be a delay and you

7 struggled on to Baker Street --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- but then you changed lines at Baker Street because

10 the train wasn't going to go any further?

11 A. Yes, we were stopped at Marylebone, and then they said,

12 "Oh, you have to change" and I thought "I don't like

13 changing at Baker Street, I always get lost", but

14 I managed to find the Circle Line that day.

15 Q. So you changed on to the Circle Line, and presumably you

16 went eastbound --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- on the Circle Line. You tried to get on one

19 carriage, but the doors were full and so you moved to

20 another carriage and it happened to be the third

21 carriage?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Were you initially standing or --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- did you get a seat?

1 A. I was standing the front of the third carriage, I think  
2 in the middle where you've got two seats, then the doors  
3 and then four seats, by the pole in the middle of the  
4 four seats.

5 Q. After King's Cross, quite a few people got out?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. So you were able to sit down.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. I think after Liverpool Street, you were just leaning  
10 forward to get something out of your bag when there was  
11 a very loud bang.

12 A. I started coughing and leant forward to get some water  
13 out of my laptop bag and, as I leant forward, there was  
14 like a blinding flash and a bang and I just put my head  
15 over -- my hands on my head and kept down, and then  
16 loads of glass -- like small pieces of glass kept flying  
17 in -- at one point it was like somebody was standing  
18 there throwing glass, because it came in pulses, and  
19 I just kept my head down, covered.

20 Q. How far away were you when you were seated in the third  
21 carriage from the second carriage?

22 A. There are two seats by the front of the third carriage,  
23 then the double doors and then a block of four seats and  
24 I was at the end of that block of four seats.

25 Q. Nearest the end or away from the end?

1 A. Away from the front, so six seats from the front of the  
2 train.

3 Q. Once the glass had stopped showering over you, did you  
4 look around the carriage to see whether your fellow  
5 passengers were all right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. What was the general position?

8 A. There were some people who had been standing by the  
9 front of that carriage who were on the floor, so I got  
10 up to see if I could help and to get people to come and  
11 sit down.

12 There was a man, who was the other end of the four  
13 seats from me, who was bleeding quite profusely from his  
14 head and was disoriented. And I helped a man stand up  
15 and come and sit down, and he had a cut above his head.

16 Q. In your statement, you describe how, in fact, in  
17 a couple of instances, you used your compact mirror --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- to give to people so they could see for themselves  
20 that their injuries were not perhaps as severe as they  
21 feared. Was the carriage quite calm?

22 A. Not initially, because it was very smoky and I was  
23 sitting there -- it's weird -- thinking "I'm going to  
24 die", thinking "Don't be so dramatic, you're not going  
25 to die", and then thinking "Yes, I am going to die

1 because I can't breathe". People were panicking. Some  
2 people were trying to open the doors and I was worried  
3 that lines would still be live, and there was myself and  
4 another girl who basically said to everyone "Stay calm.  
5 They will know something has happened. We're not that  
6 far from Aldgate. We're lucky, because Aldgate is an  
7 open station, you know, it's just below ground, we're  
8 not stuck in a deep tunnel anywhere, and we will be able  
9 to get off, and people need to stay calm and need to,  
10 you know, not panic".

11 I was worried that with that amount of people in the  
12 train starting to panic, I was worried what would  
13 happen.

14 Q. Did you take a little time to calm people around you and  
15 to try to impose some modicum of order on the people  
16 around you?

17 A. Yes, I was surprisingly vocal. You never know how  
18 you're going to react in that sort of situation, but  
19 I was -- yes, quite loud.

20 Q. And it worked?

21 A. Yes, there was myself and another girl.

22 Q. There was, I think, we've heard evidence, one man with  
23 a head injury, Mr Henning, Michael Henning, you knew him  
24 as Michael at the time?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Did you take some time to ensure that he was all right  
2 as well?

3 A. Yes, yes, I used -- showed him his injury in my compact  
4 mirror.

5 Q. I think you may have put him in the seat next to you --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- and said "Sit there, it's all right".

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Did there come a time when you were led out of the train  
10 or perhaps you proceeded out of the train on your own  
11 motion?

12 A. That was a weird thing. On reflection, we stayed -- we  
13 waited, we didn't know -- I mean, I was pretty certain  
14 it was a bomb from the off, and I was amazed actually we  
15 waited until we saw a London Transport chap walking  
16 past, and eventually he walked past our carriage and  
17 then came back and told to us walk off through the back  
18 of the train, which we did, and we walked through the  
19 other carriages, and we got to the end of the train and  
20 somebody helped us -- another London Transport man  
21 helped us down the steps.

22 Q. Now, you prepared, in fact, a second witness statement  
23 for the police. You had done one for them long back,  
24 way back in July 2005, but in August 2010, you prepared  
25 another statement, at the request of my Lady in fact,

1 and in that second statement, you state that you left  
2 the train at 09.25. May I ask you how you know that it  
3 was around -- or perhaps precisely -- 09.25 that you  
4 came to leave the carriage?

5 A. Well, I know the bomb went off at ten to, because I had  
6 just checked my watch because I was late for work, so  
7 I was worried about being late for work, and I know, by  
8 the time we got up to Aldgate, it was about 25 to,  
9 because I know I phoned my mother bang on quarter to,  
10 and I phoned my colleague at work.

11 Q. Right, and the ground floor at Aldgate is obviously not  
12 very far away, as you described, from the track?

13 A. No.

14 Q. So that's your estimate, is it, as to how long it had  
15 taken you to walk out of the tunnel --

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. -- and get up to ground level; you must have left the  
18 carriage at 09.25, or thereabouts?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Did you take Mr Henning with you, in fact, towards the  
21 rear of the train as well?

22 A. Yes, he wanted me to hold his hand and he wanted me to  
23 stay -- he asked me to stay with him.

24 Q. And so obviously, because he was injured, you did so?

25 A. Mm, I was concerned there was another passenger

1 called -- whose name was Ross, and I was worried about  
2 him, because he wasn't particularly coherent and he was  
3 quite quiet, and he was -- he had quite a bad -- what  
4 looked to me like a bad head cut.

5 Q. Presumably, he left the carriage along with the rest of  
6 you, did he, or did he stay --

7 A. Somebody else helped him.

8 Q. Could you see him being brought out?

9 A. I didn't see him because he was behind us, but then  
10 I saw him -- when I got to Aldgate eventually, I went  
11 over to Aldgate bus station and got on a double decker  
12 bus, I saw him being helped onto -- into an ambulance.

13 Q. So you knew he had been removed from the train?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Can you recall anything about the journey along the  
16 track from the rear of the train towards the platforms  
17 at Aldgate?

18 A. We came out the back and then we went around towards the  
19 front of the train towards Aldgate, and there were two  
20 bodies on the track that we walked past.

21 Q. Can you tell us now whether you recollect if either of  
22 them was moving?

23 A. Neither of them were moving.

24 Q. Can you recollect whether there was anybody around them  
25 tending to them or giving them treatment or anything

1 like that?

2 A. No, not at that time.

3 Q. Did you look into the carriage as you walked past?

4 A. No, I had seen into the carriage when the bomb first  
5 went off.

6 Q. Through the doors?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Tell us something, if you can, of the effect of the  
9 explosion on the interconnecting doors?

10 A. The door had gone like that in our carriage and like  
11 that in the other carriage, and the floor of our  
12 carriage, I didn't even know there were trapped doors,  
13 had been blown up, and I couldn't see anybody standing,  
14 but, also, when I was sitting down, when the glass was  
15 coming on to me in waves, there were small pieces of  
16 flesh that landed on me and I just, you know, I knew  
17 then that it wasn't going to be a good outcome for some  
18 people in the other carriage.

19 Q. On your way up to the ground floor level in Aldgate, did  
20 you encounter some firemen, firefighters?

21 A. The first lot were on the -- I suppose, the -- not the  
22 platform and not the ticket hall, the bit that goes  
23 between the platform and the ticket hall, the bit where  
24 people wait to see what platform the trains are going  
25 from.

1 Q. We describe it as the mezzanine level.

2 A. Yes, I suppose that's --

3 Q. Can you perhaps look at the screen, Ms O'Dell, at

4 [INQ10280-3]. Do you see there the intermediary level --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- with announcement boards, in fact, and two sets of

7 steps coming down to the platforms --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- and one single big set of steps going up to the

10 ground level? Where were the first group of firemen

11 that you saw?

12 A. On the mezzanine level.

13 Q. What were they doing?

14 A. Standing there, waiting. They weren't doing anything.

15 Q. What about their appearance led you to believe that they

16 were waiting?

17 A. Well, they were dressed in their firemen's suits and

18 helmets, but they weren't -- they weren't waiting to get

19 down -- they weren't by the stairs, they weren't waiting

20 to get down the stairs. They seemed to be congregating,

21 and we sort of asked "Why aren't you going down there?"

22 and they didn't answer, and we walked up to the next

23 level to the ticket office and there were more up there,

24 and we said, you know, "Why aren't you going down there?

25 People are injured and dying down there", and eventually

1 one of them answered and said "Oh, because there may be  
2 a secondary device down there, there may be another  
3 bomb".

4 Q. When you say "we asked them", can you recall whether  
5 this was something that you said or Mr Henning --

6 A. I said.

7 Q. -- who I presume was with you, or both?

8 A. I definitely said. I think Michael said as well.

9 Q. Was there any discussion between you and the  
10 firefighters as to why it had taken so long, in your  
11 opinion, for them to arrive?

12 A. I didn't ask, I didn't ask them. I was surprised,  
13 though, that -- I was surprised that the only people we  
14 saw down on the track were two London Transport men.  
15 I was surprised there was no one on the platform, there  
16 were no police, no firemen. I thought, "Well, if you're  
17 waiting for a device, why is it safe to wait on the  
18 mezzanine level and not on the platform?" and there were  
19 no paramedics until we actually got outside the station  
20 and there were no police in the station at all.

21 Q. There were -- you may not have been aware, however, that  
22 there were plainclothes police officers. Did you see  
23 anybody who looked to you to be in plainclothes?

24 A. I wouldn't have recognised them.

25 Q. You wouldn't have recognised them?

1 A. No, I wouldn't.

2 Q. All right. Did you subsequently write, in fact, to the  
3 London Assembly at the time that it was considering its  
4 own report into the events of 7/7 --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- about your conversation with the firefighters on your  
7 way out of Aldgate?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. I think you were at pains to make the point to the  
10 London Assembly that you weren't wishing to criticise  
11 them and it wouldn't be right to suggest that they gave  
12 the appearance of being unwilling to help --

13 A. No.

14 Q. -- or that they were guilty or felt guilty in any way --

15 A. No.

16 Q. -- but you did emphasise that they did refer expressly  
17 to the possibility of a secondary device --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- and they were, therefore, unable to help rather than  
20 being unwilling to help. Is that the nub of it?

21 A. Yes, absolutely. Although I don't know, at the time  
22 I wondered, and I still wonder, how long do you wait,  
23 how long do you decide it's safe? If there's no one  
24 down there, the London Transport men can't assess  
25 whether there was a bomb, but I was surprised there was

1 nobody from the police that I saw -- there was nobody  
2 walking in normal clothes back along the train, people  
3 were walking in the same direction as myself, walking  
4 out towards Aldgate. If there were plainclothes  
5 policemen, they certainly weren't walking backwards  
6 towards the train.

7 Q. Do you recall members of London Underground staff with  
8 torches shepherding people out of the tunnel on to the  
9 platforms and saying "Follow the voice, follow the  
10 torch, this is the way to go"?

11 A. I recall the one person helping us down the steps.  
12 I don't recall anybody else, but then we were just in  
13 a group of people walking. So I'm not sure I would  
14 have -- I didn't see anybody else from London Transport.

15 Q. Because you were with Mr Henning who had an injury, were  
16 you amongst the first group of people to leave the rear  
17 of the train?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. So do we take it, therefore, that you can't actually say  
20 what the Fire Brigade did thereafter or what emergency  
21 services -- what the emergency services did after you  
22 had left the Aldgate mezzanine?

23 A. No, not at all, not at all.

24 Q. You were, I think, treated at the Royal London?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. May I ask you this: in your evidence to the  
2 London Assembly you were full of praise for the way in  
3 which you were looked after there?

4 A. Hugely organised, the way they triaged, the minute you  
5 walked in, to which line you went in, where you went,  
6 where you were allocated, how quickly we were seen.

7 Q. You were seen by, I think, two doctors?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. There was a very efficient production line where, once  
10 you were seen by the doctors and by a nurse, you were  
11 then shepherded to the canteen where a police officer  
12 was waiting to take a statement from you or certainly  
13 take details from you?

14 A. Well, we were sent to the canteen to give our name and  
15 address and to get a cup of tea, but there wasn't any  
16 order there, you literally had to walk up to somebody,  
17 a policeman and say "Are you a policeman? Would you  
18 like my name and address?" There wasn't any structure  
19 there to get people to -- you could easily have walked  
20 out and not said anything, but I thought, "Well, this is  
21 a major incident, somebody may want to talk to me about  
22 this", and I'm a lawyer, so, you know, evidence is  
23 important. So I wanted to give my name and address to  
24 somebody if they did want to contact me.

25 Q. Were you, in fact, seen at home, your own home --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- that very Sunday morning --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- two days later.

5 A. Yes. A detective from Clapham came down.

6 MR KEITH: Thank you very much, Ms O'Dell. Would you stay

7 there? There may be some further questions for you.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

9 Questions by MR COLTART

10 MR COLTART: Only this, if I may. You told us the first

11 time you saw a paramedic was when you walked out through

12 the ticket hall area. Is that right?

13 A. Yes, out into the street.

14 Q. Where were the paramedics when you first saw them? Were

15 they in the ticket hall area, or is this now on the

16 pavement outside --

17 A. Just outside, because I had -- I was still with Michael,

18 and the paramedic came up to us and said "I'll take

19 him", and sat him down just at the edge of the ticket

20 hall by the street.

21 Q. Are you able to give us an impression of the number of

22 paramedics who were present when you first came out with

23 Michael at that point?

24 A. There was one female paramedic and there might have been

25 more. There wasn't a whole -- in the way there had been

1 two groups of firemen that I had seen, there wasn't  
2 a whole load of paramedics waiting to go anywhere that  
3 I could see. I saw one lady who came up to us, there  
4 might have been others, but ...

5 Q. In terms of ambulances, again, doing the best you can,  
6 were you conscious of ambulances and, if so, how many?

7 A. I can't recall. I know I saw one, maybe two, in the bus  
8 station, as you walk into the bus station on the  
9 right-hand side. I don't recall -- I can't recall if  
10 there was anyone right outside the station.

11 MR COLTART: Thank you.

12 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing, thank you.

13 MS SHEFF: No, thank you.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Mr Taylor? Would you like to go  
15 to that microphone?

16 As you may know, Ms O'Dell, Mr Taylor isn't  
17 represented, so he's asking questions about the sad  
18 death of his daughter.

19 Mr Taylor?

20 Questions by MR TAYLOR

21 MR TAYLOR: Good morning. As you will appreciate, I think  
22 the time line is quite difficult to follow here, and I'm  
23 just trying to get my head round this. We know for  
24 certain that the bomb exploded at, say, 8.50, basically.  
25 You've just said that you thought you were evacuated at

1 9.25, so that's 35 minutes; yes?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. How long would you say it took to evacuate from the  
4 carriage to the platform?

5 A. I would say about ten minutes.

6 Q. So --

7 A. I know with absolute certainty that I called my mum at  
8 9.45.

9 Q. 9.45?

10 A. Yes, and, before then, once we got out, Michael asked me  
11 to call his girlfriend on his phone, which I did  
12 briefly, and then I called my mother and then I called  
13 my office.

14 Q. So that's 35 minutes plus a possible ten more minutes?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Is that ten more minutes when you first of all met the  
17 Fire Brigade?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. How many more minutes before you actually left there and  
20 went to -- and you saw the first paramedics?

21 A. Seconds, because the paramedic was right on the street  
22 outside Aldgate station, so I would say probably  
23 a minute from seeing the second sort of set of firemen  
24 to getting out into the street.

25 Q. When you first met the Fire Brigade, I know you asked

1 why they weren't going down there and they said  
2 a secondary device, possibly.  
3 A. Yes.  
4 Q. Was there any talk about the rails still being live?  
5 A. No.  
6 Q. None at all? Nobody asked you about that?  
7 A. Pardon?  
8 Q. Nobody asked you about that?  
9 A. No.  
10 MR TAYLOR: Okay, thank you.  
11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Taylor. Any more  
12 questions?  
13 Thank you very much, Ms O'Dell. It looks as if  
14 there aren't any more questions. I'm sure your  
15 instincts were correct and your attempts to prevent  
16 panic would have aided significantly the successful  
17 evacuation of the walking wounded and the other  
18 survivors, so thank you for all that you tried to do.  
19 Can I say to you, as I've said to a number of  
20 survivors, but I'm not repeating every time, I know  
21 Mr Henning is here and he heard me say it, if, when you  
22 leave here, there are any other thoughts you have about  
23 lines of enquiry you think I should pursue or questions  
24 that you feel should have been asked and weren't, please  
25 don't hesitate to email the team and let me know so that

1 I can ask people to find out if there's more we can  
2 discover.  
3 A. Okay.  
4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So thank you very much for coming  
5 along to help us.  
6 A. Thank you.  
7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right, I shall return in 15 minutes.  
8 (11.15 am)  
9 (A short break)  
10 (11.30 am)  
11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith, I've been informed that  
12 Mr Coltart's microphone wasn't on when he asked his  
13 question, but as the question appeared on the transcript  
14 and he didn't elicit any further information in the  
15 answer, I don't think it makes any difference.  
16 MR COLTART: I am sorry, and I vow to improve on my  
17 microphone skills. I will ensure it's switched on in  
18 future.  
19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: As you now have one that's working,  
20 Mr Coltart ...  
21 MR COLTART: I have no more excuses.  
22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.  
23 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite to you call Timothy Batkin?  
24 MR TIMOTHY JAMES BATKIN (affirmed)  
25 Questions by MR KEITH

1 MR KEITH: Good morning. Could you give the court your full  
2 name, please?  
3 A. My name is Timothy James Batkin.  
4 Q. Mr Batkin, the microphone in front of you will relay  
5 your evidence to an annex where press and members of the  
6 public are able to hear the evidence, but in fact it  
7 won't amplify your voice for those of us in the  
8 courtroom, so if you could keep your voice up, we will  
9 all be very obliged.  
10 A. Okay.  
11 Q. Certainly in July 2005, you had been a train operator  
12 for some 12 months.  
13 A. Approximately, yes.  
14 Q. Were you employed on the Hammersmith & City and  
15 Circle Lines?  
16 A. Yes, I was.  
17 Q. Is that because they share similarity in train stock or  
18 track or route?  
19 A. It's just the way that the -- I know most lines are just  
20 one single line, it's just a peculiarity of the Circle  
21 and Hammersmith & City Line that they put the two  
22 together and the drivers are familiar with both routes.  
23 Q. That morning, Thursday, 7 July, you were due to pick up  
24 your train at Edgware Road.  
25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Around about 8.30?

2 A. Approximately, yes.

3 Q. Was the system then that you would arrive a few minutes  
4 early and you would replace a driver who had brought the  
5 train into the station, you would check the cab and the  
6 train and then you would drive it off yourself?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. Was it an eastbound Circle Line train, set number 204?

9 A. Yes, it was.

10 Q. Was it very busy, do you recall?

11 A. I do remember it being very busy.

12 Q. When you boarded the cab or the train, was there any  
13 kind of handover procedure, or is it just a question of  
14 going into the cab, checking to make sure that the key  
15 is in place, and then driving off?

16 A. Well, normally, if there are any problems on the line or  
17 station closures, then the driver that I relieved would  
18 have told me that information, but on that morning, he  
19 didn't mention anything.

20 Q. I appreciate that events before the bomb may have passed  
21 into the mists of time in your recollection, but do you  
22 recollect anything about the journey from Edgware Road  
23 to Liverpool Street?

24 A. No, not really, only that it was -- it was particularly  
25 busy, I don't know if there might well have been

1 a cancelled train in front of me or something like that,  
2 but I don't normally work the early shift, I prefer to  
3 work the late shift, so it was unusual for me to be  
4 working a morning shift. But it did seem particularly  
5 busy.

6 Q. Do you recall, for example, whether you used the PA  
7 announcement system on the train before  
8 Liverpool Street?

9 A. I don't recall.

10 Q. At any rate, you stopped at Liverpool Street and then,  
11 once everybody had disembarked and embarked, you  
12 proceeded towards Aldgate?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Tell us, please, Mr Batkin, something about the speed  
15 restrictions, if any, between Liverpool Street and  
16 Aldgate?

17 A. Well, there's a speed restriction a few hundred yards  
18 east of Liverpool Street station. There's a fairly  
19 complicated junction where trains can be either routed  
20 towards Aldgate East and on to the District Line, trains  
21 can also be routed into platforms 1, 2 and 3 at Aldgate  
22 station. And the speed restriction is just -- is in  
23 place so that the drivers check their speed to go over  
24 what's a bumpy bit of track, but it's quite common for  
25 a reduced speed to be in place on the line.

1 Q. Do you recall what the speed restriction was then?  
2 A. It was -- I don't -- I believe it was 15 miles an hour  
3 for the platform that I was going into.  
4 Q. Tell us what happened next.  
5 A. Somewhere around the location of signal OB2 --  
6 Q. Just pause there. Could we have on the screen INQ10280,  
7 please, page 6 [INQ10280-6]?  
8 You'll see there, Mr Batkin, towards the bottom of  
9 the page, Aldgate station, the junction where the track  
10 separates just before Aldgate station to go to  
11 Aldgate East, and the location of the train. Where is  
12 OB2, if it's on this plan?  
13 A. I would say it's around about carriage 1, but I can't be  
14 certain.  
15 Q. All right.  
16 A. But it's more or less in that area.  
17 Q. So you reached the location of that signal, and then  
18 what happened?  
19 A. There was a -- it felt like a -- it felt and sounded  
20 like a loud thud.  
21 Q. Could you feel it through the body of the train?  
22 A. Yes, and through my body. It was -- it felt like  
23 a powerful thud. It didn't appear to me at the time to  
24 be particularly loud, but that's just how I remember it  
25 happening.

1 Q. Did the train come to a halt?

2 A. It did.

3 Q. Can you say whether you braked the train, ie you braked

4 the train manually, or whether or not the train came to

5 a halt of its own accord, perhaps through the

6 application of emergency brakes?

7 A. I can't be certain which happened.

8 Q. At that time, was there a system on the train which

9 would bring about the automatic application of brakes in

10 the event that a passenger triggers an alarm?

11 A. There was, there was. The passenger alarm was sounding

12 and that would apply a maximum EP brake application,

13 which would, at that speed, have stopped the train

14 fairly quickly.

15 Q. Just pausing there, then, please. The passenger alarm

16 was sounding. Is that a bell or an alarm inside the

17 driver's cab?

18 A. It is, yes.

19 Q. That indicates that someone has pulled the emergency

20 handle somewhere in the carriages?

21 A. That's right.

22 Q. It automatically has the effect of applying the brakes?

23 A. It does, yes.

24 Q. When you say "EP", do you mean electropneumatic brakes?

25 A. That is right, yes.

1 Q. If the alarm sounded, does that suggest to you,  
2 therefore, that the emergency brakes had been  
3 automatically applied because of the alarm?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Do you recall how much further the train travelled after  
6 the thud before it came to a complete halt?

7 A. I'm afraid I don't, no.

8 Q. When the train had stopped, could you hear a noise from  
9 behind you? Could you hear people?

10 A. I don't know how long after, but I remember people  
11 crying out for help.

12 Q. Did you have to mute or dim the passenger alarm in order  
13 to be able to hear the noise behind you?

14 A. I'm not sure whether I had to -- I know I remembered  
15 muting the alarm, which just lowers the volume of the  
16 alarm in the driver's cab, but I don't recall whether  
17 I needed to mute that alarm in order to hear the people  
18 crying for help.

19 Q. What was the next thing that you did?

20 A. I can't be certain, but I think I attempted to make  
21 a mayday call using the train radio.

22 Q. What was it about the way in which the train had come to  
23 a halt that led you to want to make a mayday call?

24 A. Well, the passengers on the train that I could hear  
25 crying for help, it was a chilling, haunting cry for

1 help, something that, you know, still makes my blood run  
2 cold when I think about hearing it, and it just made me  
3 think that a problem with the train is not  
4 necessarily -- you know, shouldn't be my priority,  
5 I should maybe start thinking about what's happening to  
6 the people that need help on the train.

7 Q. So you immediately determined that you needed to make  
8 a mayday call, and did you try to use your radio?

9 A. The train radio, yes.

10 Q. What is the train radio?

11 A. The train radio allows a driver and a line controller  
12 to -- well, it allows information to flow between train  
13 driver and line controller.

14 Q. Is that radio part of the equipment in the driver's  
15 cabin?

16 A. It is, yes.

17 Q. It's not a handheld device; it's part of the train?

18 A. At the time, it was part of the train. There's a new  
19 system in place now.

20 Q. We'll come to that a bit later, if we may, Mr Batkin.

21 Could you tell us something about the radio that was  
22 then in place in the train? Did it work on that  
23 occasion?

24 A. It didn't appear to work, no.

25 Q. You were obviously still in a tunnel. At that time in

1 2005, did the driver cabin radio customarily work in  
2 tunnels?

3 A. There were points where it didn't work entirely  
4 satisfactorily. There were known dead spots in the  
5 reception. They would normally be -- at the station  
6 before the dead spot, there would be an indicator board  
7 that would let the driver know that there may well not  
8 be radio reception in the section ahead.

9 Q. You were accustomed to driving this route, because you  
10 were an experienced train operator. From your  
11 recollection, did you recall then that there was a black  
12 spot in the tunnel section between Liverpool Street and  
13 Aldgate?

14 A. No, I didn't.

15 Q. Had there been any indication on a board at  
16 Liverpool Street that there was a black spot ahead?

17 A. I can't be certain.

18 Q. Does the radio connect you just to the line controller  
19 or is it a general net that will allow you to speak to  
20 other people?

21 A. No, just solely between the train driver and the line  
22 controller.

23 Q. How many channels is it? Is it just one channel or are  
24 there more?

25 A. No, there were three channels which you would adjust on

1 the train, depending on what part of the network you  
2 were on. They were at predetermined stations.

3 Q. Do you recall that morning using the radio to speak to  
4 the line controller on that set, set 204, at any earlier  
5 stage in your route?

6 A. No, I don't think I did.

7 Q. Can we have, please, on the screen [TFL568-12]?

8 This is part of the manual concerning the role of  
9 London Underground employees, Mr Batkin. The page  
10 that's appeared on the screen concerns that of, amongst  
11 others, train operators, 4c.4.2.8. At 3.5.15.1, the  
12 manual states the train operators are responsible,  
13 amongst other things, for:

14 "Bringing trains into service by hand signals, shunt  
15 signals, train operator boards or the train radio and,  
16 in the event of the radio failing to provide  
17 a confidence tone, they are responsible for requesting  
18 a radio test from the line controller ..."

19 In 2005, was there a system in place whereby you  
20 could test your radio at any stage in your route to  
21 check that it was working, so that, in the event of an  
22 incident or emergency, you could rely upon it?

23 A. Well, you could contact the line controller and ask him  
24 to attempt to contact you on the train radio.

25 Q. Has that ever happened?

1 A. I don't think I ever asked for that to happen, no.

2 Q. You were no doubt extremely concerned that, having  
3 determined that you needed to make a mayday call, your  
4 radio, which is your primary means of communication with  
5 the line controller, wasn't working. So what did you  
6 do?

7 A. I think at this point I had the cab door between the  
8 driver's cab and the passenger saloon open.

9 I then remember asking the passengers that were  
10 right behind the driver's cab whether anybody had  
11 a mobile phone signal on their phone.

12 Q. Before you did that, did you open your cab door and see  
13 whether or not you could use the telephone tunnel  
14 network?

15 A. No, I didn't.

16 Q. Did you at any stage try to use the wires that travel  
17 along the inside of the tunnel to make a call?

18 A. No, I only used those to try to discharge traction  
19 current.

20 Q. Was that before or after you asked whether anybody had  
21 a mobile phone signal?

22 A. I can't be certain.

23 Q. All right. Let's just look for a moment, then, please,  
24 at that system, the tunnel telephone system.

25 Is the position, Mr Batkin, that there are two

1 copper wires travelling along the inside of the tunnel  
2 wall and, if you pinch them together, it has the effect  
3 of shorting out power to that section of the traction  
4 current?

5 A. That's right, yes.

6 Q. Can you also use those two wires to apply a telephone  
7 handset?

8 A. Yes, you can.

9 Q. Was there a telephone handset in your cab?

10 A. I don't know if there was one, there should have been  
11 one located in a toolbox in the driver's cab, in  
12 a sealed bag. But I don't know whether there was one  
13 for certain.

14 Q. But we may presume that you didn't use a telephone  
15 handset to use the copper wires to try to call?

16 A. I didn't.

17 Q. If you do apply a telephone handset, presumably it's  
18 a question of tying together the wires from the handset  
19 on to the copper wires in the tunnel wall to make the  
20 connection?

21 A. That's right. That's correct.

22 Q. Who do you speak to if you then use that handset?

23 A. That goes through to the line controller.

24 Q. So the same person?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Could we please have [TFL13-1] on the screen.  
2 The top right-hand corner of the page you will see  
3 the heading "Switching traction current off in an  
4 emergency" and then, further down the page at 1.1:  
5 "When it is necessary to switch traction current off  
6 in an emergency in a tunnel or sub-surface section ...  
7 the tunnel telephone wires must be used to switch  
8 current off, using document Eb207 in the reference  
9 manual."

10 Is that the protocol that you followed, you  
11 attempted to rub the two wires together on the side of  
12 the tunnel wall to ensure that there was no -- to ensure  
13 that the current would then trip and switch off in that  
14 section?

15 A. That's correct, yes.

16 Q. 1.3 on that page, it says:

17 "If the train operator cannot communicate with the  
18 line controller by tunnel telephone (this might be  
19 because the tunnel telephone is out of commission or the  
20 handset is not working), he must use train radio to ask  
21 the line controller to switch traction current off, and  
22 tell him:

23 "His name and grade.

24 "The line and train number ...

25 "Direction ...

1 "Location of the train ... any other relevant  
2 location factors [and]  
3 "The reason for the request."  
4 This document appears to indicate that train  
5 operators are expected to use the tunnel telephone  
6 first, and then, if that doesn't work, to use the radio.  
7 Can you recollect, Mr Batkin, why you might not have  
8 sought to use the telephone handset?  
9 A. I don't recollect why I didn't do that, no.  
10 Q. At any rate, having asked any passengers whether there  
11 was a mobile signal on their phones, did you discover  
12 that you had a signal on your own phone?  
13 A. Yes, I did.  
14 Q. Who did you call with your own phone?  
15 A. I called the duty manager trains at Edgware Road depot.  
16 Q. That's not the same person as the line controller?  
17 A. No.  
18 Q. Is that person your line manager?  
19 A. Yes, it's like a shift manager for train crew.  
20 Q. Was that person at the time a lady called  
21 Ayo Puddicombe?  
22 A. It was, yes.  
23 Q. You helpfully provided, Mr Batkin, an extract from your  
24 Orange telephone bill, [INQ9800-2], and we can see at  
25 08.51 on 7 July "Inner London. Talk. Talk Time.

1 0:03:25."

2 Is that the call that you made to Ayo Puddicombe,  
3 your Edgware Road duty manager?

4 A. Yes, it is.

5 Q. Where is she located, do you know? Where is her office?

6 A. That would have been at Edgware Road station.

7 Q. Do you recall what you told her in the course --

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Just before you go to what you told  
9 her, was the reason for calling her because you happened  
10 to have her number as one of your contacts?

11 A. Well, it was a number that I use routinely, so  
12 I remembered it. It wasn't -- I didn't have it  
13 programmed into my phone. It was just a number that  
14 I was familiar with using.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So you thought "I've got to ring  
16 someone" and that was a number you could remember?

17 A. Yes.

18 MR KEITH: Can you tell us what you recall of your  
19 conversation with her and, in particular, what you told  
20 her about what had happened?

21 A. I remember her answering the phone, I told her who  
22 I was, where I was, and that I was on train 204 and the  
23 location of the train. I don't recall the exact  
24 conversation, but I basically told her that there had  
25 been some sort of explosion on board the train, there

1 were passengers on the track, and that I needed  
2 confirmation that traction current had been discharged.  
3 Q. Dealing with those points in turn, in relation to your  
4 location, can you recall whether or not you simply said,  
5 "I'm between Liverpool Street and Aldgate", or whether  
6 you were able to be more precise and indicate, for  
7 example, that you were actually just outside Aldgate  
8 station?

9 A. No, I don't recall. I really don't remember.

10 Q. Could we have on the screen, please, [TFL7-20]?

11 This isn't, in fact, a plan or a protocol that  
12 applies to you, Mr Batkin, because it's an extract from  
13 the Aldgate station emergency plan and it's therefore  
14 designed for station managers and station supervisors  
15 and the like, but it has some helpful descriptions of  
16 what sort of information might be required by the police  
17 in the event of an emergency arising from a bomb threat  
18 or security alert.

19 In the middle of the page:

20 "The following information will be required by the  
21 police:

22 "What ...

23 "Where ...

24 "When ...

25 "Why ...

1 "Who ..."

2 In relation to "where" there's a reference to  
3 precise location. Do you recall whether, in 2005, you  
4 had received any sort of protocol or training as to what  
5 sort of information you should or would be expected to  
6 give your line controller in the event of what you  
7 described to us was a possible bomb or explosion?

8 A. No, I don't, but as precise information as I could give,  
9 I suppose, would be the best answer I could give there.

10 Q. How did you -- you've told us that you told her that  
11 there had basically been some sort of explosion on board  
12 the train. What was it about the thud and the screams  
13 from the passengers that led you to believe that it was  
14 an explosion?

15 A. I couldn't tell you that.

16 Q. Are you sure that you brought to her attention the fact  
17 that it wasn't simply a train incident or that there had  
18 been some sort of accident, but that it was related to  
19 an explosion?

20 A. I'm fairly sure I used the word "explosion".

21 Q. Did she give you confirmation that the current was  
22 switched off as you'd asked?

23 A. She did, yes.

24 Q. How was it that you knew to tell her that there were  
25 passengers walking along the track? Could you see them

1 out of your driver's cab, for example?

2 A. Yes, there were a number of passengers that had managed  
3 to get off the train and walk up the narrow space  
4 between the tunnel wall and the front of the train  
5 towards Aldgate.

6 Q. Did you tell them to stop whilst you were on the mobile  
7 phone?

8 A. I got them to -- I asked them to stop because, at that  
9 stage, I hadn't had the confirmation that the traction  
10 current had been discharged.

11 Q. We've heard evidence, Mr Batkin, so that you know, from  
12 a passenger who recalls how, quite properly, as you were  
13 speaking to the lady we now know to be Ayo Puddicombe,  
14 you saw passengers coming along and you said "Stop"  
15 because you had not, by that stage, ascertained that the  
16 traction current was off.

17 What did you expect her to do? What were you asking  
18 her to do?

19 A. I was asking her to contact the line controller and he  
20 would have been able to confirm to her that the traction  
21 current had been discharged in the section that I was  
22 in.

23 Q. Were you able to tell from her answer, or the way in  
24 which she answered, in relation to whether the traction  
25 current was off, that she had actually made contact with

1 the line controller and spoken to him?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Could you hear their conversation in the background or  
4 did she call you back?

5 A. I didn't hear the conversation. I remember her asking  
6 me for my mobile phone number. I asked her if she could  
7 contact the line controller on another line. Although  
8 I did have signal on my mobile phone, bearing in mind  
9 it's underground, it's not -- you don't get the best  
10 coverage down there. So I wanted to keep the line open,  
11 should there -- in case there were any problems  
12 reconnecting when she was going to call me back with  
13 confirmation that the current had been discharged.

14 Q. Subsequently, did you ever look at your mobile phone and  
15 see whether or not anybody from London Underground, but  
16 in particular Ayo Puddicombe, your duty manager  
17 Edgware Road, or the line controller had tried to call  
18 you back but had been unable to get a signal on your end  
19 of the phone line?

20 A. I'm sorry, could you repeat that?

21 Q. Yes, did you look at your mobile phone later and see  
22 whether there had been any missed calls from anybody  
23 trying to contact you around that time in order to speak  
24 to you --

25 A. No.

1 Q. -- in connection with your job as the train driver?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Did you also ask her to announce a Code Red?

4 A. I did.

5 Q. Could we please have on the screen [TFL24-1]?

6 Paragraph 2.1:

7 "When you need to stop all trains on a line

8 immediately you must:

9 "Broadcast on the train radio an 'urgent Code Red'  
10 message.

11 "If possible try to tell train operators and station  
12 staff the nature of the emergency."

13 That is a direction formulated for the benefit of  
14 the line controller, but does it accurately reflect what  
15 a Code Red is: namely, it's a request to have all trains  
16 in the area stopped?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Why did you ask for that, Mr Batkin?

19 A. In case any trains that were being driven within  
20 a different traction current section, if they crossed  
21 over from one section to another, it could liven up the  
22 traction current rails in the section where my train was  
23 and where there were passengers on the track.

24 Q. Did you tell Ayo Puddicombe that, because passengers had  
25 already started to leave the train -- you'd seen them by

1 that stage -- and because you were near Aldgate, that  
2 your intention was that you would detrain them, that is  
3 to say get the passengers off the train and, in fact,  
4 get them to go to Aldgate?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Could we have on the screen [TFL43-1] and [TFL43-2]? This  
7 is a document concerning detrainment of passengers. It  
8 gives a list at 1.1, the circumstances in which  
9 passengers must be detrained. I don't think they need  
10 to detain us. If you go over the page to page 2 at  
11 paragraph 2.5, at that time was the standard instruction  
12 that:

13 "When detraining passengers, staff must walk  
14 passengers forward whenever possible, and carry working  
15 handlamps during darkness and in tunnels."

16 Do you know, Mr Batkin, what the rationale is of  
17 insisting that passengers must walk forward from a train  
18 when detraining?

19 A. Well, to use the stationary train as protection for  
20 people on the tracks.

21 Q. Is that why you then put in place a system whereby  
22 people came out of the back of the train and walked  
23 forward along the tracks to Aldgate?

24 A. I don't know. I just thought it was the appropriate  
25 thing to do at the time, given that I'd raised the alarm

1 and said that I was going to detrain the passengers  
2 towards Aldgate. I think it might well have caused some  
3 confusion, had I decided to remove the people from the  
4 train and send them back the other way towards  
5 Liverpool Street.

6 Q. When detraining passengers, would you ordinarily expect  
7 to tell passengers through the PA system that you were  
8 about to detrain the train?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Do you recall whether or not you tried to use the PA  
11 system on this occasion to spread that message?

12 A. I believe I did, but it didn't seem to work.

13 Q. If you use the PA system to speak to the train  
14 generally, can you hear an echo of it in the first  
15 carriage, or do you hear it directly in your own cab as  
16 well?

17 A. No, you can hear an echo of it, depending on how loud  
18 you speak. But I had the cab door open so you would  
19 generally get some feedback and I couldn't hear  
20 anything.

21 Q. So did you conclude that the PA system was out of order?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Is there some further step that you must take when  
24 detraining passengers concerned with putting  
25 short-circuiting devices on the track?

1 A. There is, yes.

2 Q. Could we have a look at [TFL44-1], paragraph 2.1:

3 "If, because of fire, fusing or dense smoke,

4 passengers must be detrained ... before the line

5 controller can give permission, the train operator must:

6 "Secure the train.

7 "Switch off traction current [you did that]

8 "Put down short-circuiting devices.

9 "Conduct passengers from the train as required to

10 protect them ..."

11 Which you did by ensuring they walked forward.

12 Can you recall whether you put down short-circuiting

13 devices?

14 A. I didn't put down short-circuiting devices, no.

15 Q. Can you tell us why you didn't?

16 A. No, is the short answer. I don't know why I didn't put

17 down short-circuiting devices. You would normally put

18 down one at each end of the train before you commence

19 detraining, but there were people already on the track.

20 Q. To be fair to you, Mr Batkin, and it's important that we

21 are, you obviously were confronted with an

22 extraordinarily difficult set of circumstances.

23 Passengers were already on the track, and you had

24 already received confirmation, hadn't you, from your

25 line manager that the traction current was off?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Were you initially aware of the nature of the injuries,  
3 if any, suffered by the passengers on your train?

4 A. No.

5 Q. When did you first become aware of the extent and nature  
6 of the explosion that you had deduced had occurred?

7 A. I think it was when the first passengers who made their  
8 way towards the front of the train between the train and  
9 the tunnel wall, when they reached me, I could see that  
10 they were -- their faces were blackened with soot and  
11 dirt and bloodied and their clothes were torn and  
12 shredded.

13 Q. Did you, in order to start detrain passengers, corral  
14 people from the first carriage and bring them forward  
15 through the cab at the front of the train so that they  
16 could go off that end of the train and go straight to  
17 Aldgate?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Then, once you had detrained them from the first  
20 carriage, did you then have to walk right to the back of  
21 the train by going down the track --

22 A. I did, yes.

23 Q. -- so that you could then detrain people from the rear  
24 of the train, and did you see the second carriage as you  
25 walked past?

1 A. I did, yes.

2 Q. Did you reach any conclusions as to what might have  
3 occurred on your train when you walked past the second  
4 carriage?

5 A. I don't remember thinking about what could have caused  
6 it. I was just thinking that I need to detrain the  
7 passengers on the train, still on the train, from the  
8 rear. I didn't really stop to consider what might have  
9 caused it, no.

10 Q. It seems to be agreed, Mr Batkin, that the tunnel lights  
11 had come on by this stage. Do you recall there being  
12 any kind of lighting in the tunnel?

13 A. I don't remember, no.

14 Q. Could you see inside the second carriage as you walked  
15 past?

16 A. No, I didn't -- I just had a look through one set of  
17 doors. I couldn't see an awful lot in there. It seemed  
18 very dark and still.

19 Q. Did you recall anybody on the tracks adjacent to the  
20 train?

21 A. Yes, I did. There were three people on the tracks.

22 Q. Can you tell us something, please, of what you recollect  
23 in relation to those three people?

24 A. There were two men, I believe, who both appeared to be  
25 unconscious, and nearby was a lady who was conscious.

1 As I walked down towards her, she saw me coming and she  
2 asked me to -- she asked me for help, she said "Please  
3 help me, I'm dying".

4 Q. Were you able to see any particular injuries suffered by  
5 those three people at that stage?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Did your priority remain the detraining from the train?

8 A. That was my priority at the time yes.

9 Q. So did you carry on to the rear of the train?

10 A. I did.

11 Q. Did you see any sort of flames or anything to indicate  
12 that there might be a fire on the train or in the  
13 tunnel?

14 A. No, nothing whatsoever.

15 Q. When you got to the back of the train, was there anybody  
16 else from London Underground there?

17 A. I don't know. There was a member of staff there.  
18 I don't know if I got there before him. His name was  
19 Mark Williamson and I believe he was a driver of the  
20 Metropolitan Line train that had just departed Aldgate  
21 station before the bomb exploded.

22 Q. Might he be Mark Williams?

23 A. Mark Williams, I'm sorry, yes.

24 Q. So you think you may have met him somewhere in the  
25 tunnel?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Next to your train?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Together, did you help people to climb out of the back  
5 of the train in order to be able to walk down the tracks  
6 to Aldgate?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Where did the ladder come from?

9 A. The ladder is secured in each driver's cab by means of  
10 straps and once you remove that from its mounting you  
11 unfold it and clip it on to the coupler face of the  
12 train and that acts as a ladder for people to more  
13 easily leave the train and get down to the track level.

14 Q. I should have asked, did you put a similar ladder at the  
15 front of the train when you were detraining from the  
16 first carriage?

17 A. No, I didn't.

18 Q. Was it not necessary at that end or why was that?

19 A. I don't know. I had -- the cab door to the passenger  
20 saloon was open. There were people anxious to get out  
21 and they are fairly cumbersome pieces of equipment to  
22 unfold and I just decided that I would assist people to  
23 get out through the side of the train through the  
24 driver's side door down on to track level.

25 I know it was more difficult. It might well have

1 taken longer to detrain the first carriage that way.

2 But, no, I didn't use the detrainment ladder.

3 Q. When you were at the rear of the train detraining, with  
4 your colleague, passengers down the ladder, how did you  
5 encourage them to come forward from carriages 3, 4, 5  
6 and 6 towards the rear of the train?

7 A. As I was walking along at track level towards the rear  
8 of the train, I remember calling to the people inside  
9 the carriages as I went down past each set of doors that  
10 we were going to detrain everybody into the tunnel and  
11 that they should walk towards the rear of the train as  
12 soon as they could.

13 Q. So, if I may say so, showing great presence of mind. As  
14 you walked down the train, you were endeavouring to  
15 encourage them to do that which you would then -- you  
16 knew would you have to do when you got to the end of the  
17 train, which is to get them off the end?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. You assisted them out, no doubt, where they needed  
20 assistance, yourself and your colleague?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And you presumably calmed people as they came down, told  
23 them everything would be all right, and gently and  
24 calmly ushered them back the other way towards Aldgate?

25 A. That's right, yes.

1 Q. How long did that process take, Mr Batkin, can you  
2 recall?

3 A. No, I can't. The only indication of time that I have  
4 would be to look at my phone record from that day.

5 I remember speaking to my girlfriend and I believe  
6 I made that call at 9.43 when I exited the -- when  
7 I left the scene and made my way up to Aldgate station.

8 Q. On the assumption that it didn't take very long to walk  
9 straight from the train to ground floor level, maybe  
10 a matter of minutes, can we therefore presume that you  
11 were at the rear of the train until shortly before that  
12 time?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Whilst you were there helping people to get off the  
15 train, did other members of the emergency services  
16 arrive?

17 A. I didn't notice anybody else on the track, emergency  
18 service, until I was walking myself towards Aldgate  
19 station.

20 Q. Was that once you had ensured that everybody who could  
21 walk off the back of the train had walked off the back  
22 of the train?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. How could you tell that the carriages were empty and  
25 there was no one else still to detrain?

1 A. There were some staff on the track, I'm not sure whether  
2 they were Fire Brigade or emergency response, the  
3 London Underground emergency response team. I heard one  
4 of them say that everybody who's able to get off the  
5 train themselves is off.

6 Q. Can you recall whether that person was wearing a uniform  
7 of any type?

8 A. I don't remember now. I do remember at the time  
9 thinking it was possibly a member of the emergency  
10 response team.

11 Q. The London Underground ERU?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. As you walked past the carriage towards Aldgate  
14 yourself, did you stop to help somebody off the train  
15 who was required to be taken off the train alongside  
16 carriage 2 as opposed to the end?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Was that a young lady who I think had -- was one of the  
19 last people to be taken off carriage 2?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Did you ever catch her name or recall who it was?

22 A. No, I don't.

23 Q. You then, I think, went upstairs to the station  
24 supervisor's office. Is that the office belonging to,  
25 or then belonging to Celia Harrison?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Did you then make yourself known to her as being the  
3 driver of the train?

4 A. I did, yes.

5 Q. No doubt you gave her an account of what you could  
6 recollect of what had happened in the tunnel?

7 A. That's right, yes.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Was that before or after you had made  
9 your call to your girlfriend?

10 A. I'm afraid I can't be certain.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Don't worry.

12 MR KEITH: May I take the opportunity, Mr Batkin, just to  
13 ask you for a moment or two about other equipment on the  
14 train? You told us about the ladders. Presumably there  
15 was one at each end or one in each driver's cab or  
16 thereabouts.

17 What about other medical equipment? In 2005, was  
18 any other equipment customarily kept in the driver's cab  
19 of the Circle Line trains?

20 A. Yes, there's -- there are other pieces of equipment.  
21 There's, like, a makeshift stretcher, pieces of  
22 equipment, stretcher bars that are normally put under  
23 the detraining ladder, ice scraper for winter times,  
24 detonators which you could put on the track in different  
25 situations. Fire extinguishers. There's -- I'm trying

1 to think if there's anything else. That's all I can  
2 think of at the moment.

3 Q. Finally, may I ask you this: as a train operator, did  
4 you, yourself, receive, in 2005, any sort of first aid  
5 training?

6 A. No, none at all.

7 Q. What was it that led you to conclude that your priority  
8 had to be and had to remain the detraining of passengers  
9 as opposed to, for example, going into carriage 2 to see  
10 whether you could tend to the people inside or tending  
11 to the people you saw on the track?

12 A. It just seemed to me to be the right thing to do at the  
13 time. Nothing more than that. I don't know if I was  
14 blinkered in any way, but it just seemed to be the best  
15 thing that I could do.

16 MR KEITH: Mr Batkin, thank you. If I may say so, the right  
17 thing is always the best thing to do. There will be  
18 some other questions for you.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

20 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

21 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Batkin, I'd like to ask you some questions  
22 about the chronology of what you now recall of this  
23 incident. Your statement was, I think, taken about  
24 a week afterwards.

25 A. I think it was exactly one week afterwards.

1 Q. 14 July?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. When you recounted to us this morning hearing the  
4 screams, can you help: were they people within the train  
5 or was it somebody who may have been blown out of the  
6 train?

7 A. I couldn't differentiate between the two.

8 Q. You've described to us that, as far as you were  
9 concerned, when you managed to get through to the  
10 manager, Ms Puddicombe, you were of the opinion that it  
11 was a bomb or an explosion?

12 A. I think I mentioned explosion when -- in that  
13 conversation with her, yes.

14 Q. It was your suggestion to her, "Look, keep the line open  
15 between you and I so that whatever the information is  
16 can be passed back much more easily without the chance  
17 of losing the signal"?

18 A. Yes, as we were underground, I thought there could well  
19 be a chance that I couldn't reconnect my phone to the  
20 telephone network.

21 Q. We know from your records that that was 3 minutes and  
22 25 seconds. All right? And we have that as 8.51.

23 A. Okay.

24 Q. So from that time, right at -- we have determined at  
25 somewhere, 8.49 to 8.51, was the explosion itself, so

1 from that time, as far as you were concerned, that's  
2 what you thought it was?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. You then explained that a Code Red should be put into  
5 effect and, unlike Mr Keith, I'm not going to ask you to  
6 look at all those documents.

7 Did I understand that what you were explaining was  
8 that the purpose of that is to stop all trains running  
9 in case another train activated the rail that you were  
10 actually on?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Because, by that stage, you are told that the traction  
13 current is off and, in fact, you'd seen passengers on  
14 the line itself.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. When you go to the rear of the train to, as it were,  
17 organise the remaining carriages, the carriages further  
18 back than carriage 1, for passengers to come off, you  
19 went past carriage 2.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Were you aware of anybody having gone past carriage 2  
22 before you, going towards the rear?

23 A. No, as far as I'm aware, I was the first person to walk  
24 down the length of the train.

25 Q. Because what you had done is to get carriage 1 off

1 through your cab, realised you couldn't get anybody else  
2 off that way, so then walked up the side of the train?

3 A. That's right, yes.

4 Q. Do I understand it right, Mr Batkin, you're walking on  
5 the -- what I call the rail side of the train rather  
6 than the wall side?

7 A. That's right, yes.

8 Q. Although you see the obvious devastation to carriage 2,  
9 you don't see anybody from outside trying to get in?

10 A. No, no.

11 Q. May I make it absolutely plain, Mr Batkin, none of these  
12 questions are in any way intended to be critical of you,  
13 I'm sure you understand that.

14 A. Thank you, yes.

15 Q. What I'm trying to understand is: was anybody ahead of  
16 you, or was anybody trying to get into carriage 2 before  
17 you went past?

18 A. Not to my knowledge, no.

19 Q. We've heard various references -- and we're going to  
20 hear evidence today and tomorrow of different personnel  
21 who put on different high visibility jackets, both  
22 police officers and other Underground staff. You didn't  
23 have any jacket on, did you?

24 A. Just a regular issue London Underground high visibility  
25 jacket.

1 Q. Is that the orange jacket?

2 A. That's right, yes.

3 Q. So you would have been wearing -- so if anybody sees  
4 somebody walking up the train, that could well be you in  
5 your high visibility jacket?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Thank you. The people that were then -- the passengers  
8 that were coming off at the rear, you and Mr Williams,  
9 there was nobody getting on to the train?

10 A. From the rear?

11 Q. Yes.

12 A. No.

13 Q. Again, as far as timings, I think you've just told  
14 her Ladyship that it was at 9.43 you called your  
15 girlfriend?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. From the time that you've actually left the train to the  
18 platform and then going upstairs, did you stop at all  
19 before you made that call?

20 A. No, I don't recall whether I went straight up to the  
21 supervisor's office and then spoke to my girlfriend  
22 after, or whether it was the other way round.

23 Q. Before that call, or before you've gone to the  
24 supervisor's office, the emergency response team had in  
25 fact said that everybody's now out that's able to be

1 taken out?

2 A. Yes.

3 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Batkin, thank you very much.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any further questions? Yes, Ms Boyd?

5 Questions by MS BOYD

6 MS BOYD: Mr Batkin, can I ask you a couple of questions on  
7 behalf of the London Fire Brigade? In particular,  
8 can I ask you about how you put the power off  
9 immediately following the explosion?

10 You say that you pinched and rubbed the copper  
11 telephone wires together to short the power?

12 A. That's right, yes.

13 Q. You go on to say that you were anxious to confirm with  
14 the line controller that the power was switched off?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Is that because, when you short it in that way, the  
17 power will come back on again in about 7 to 8 minutes  
18 unless you have confirmed to control that you want it  
19 off?

20 A. That's correct, yes.

21 Q. You've also referred in your evidence to the fact that  
22 the live tracks are divided into sections and you can  
23 have a position whereby your train straddles two  
24 sections and, when the power is isolated on a specific  
25 piece of track, it's possible that the train can bridge

1 it and reenergise the power on the other side?

2 A. That's correct, yes.

3 Q. Hence you issuing or asking for a Code Red to be issued?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. So the fact that the current traction appears to be off

6 at, say, the entrance of Aldgate station, it doesn't

7 necessarily mean that the power is off behind the train

8 if it happens to be straddling two different sections?

9 A. That's right.

10 Q. Unless, of course, that person knows that a Code Red has

11 been issued and the whole power between the stations has

12 been isolated?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Is that why -- I don't know if you're aware -- that

15 normally emergency responders would expect to be -- to

16 ask for the traction to be confirmed to be off between

17 stations so that there's no possibility of one section

18 being on and one section being off?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Finally, Mr Batkin, are you able to give us an idea of

21 the number of passengers that you detrained that

22 morning?

23 A. I'm afraid I can't.

24 Q. I think Mr Drinkwater estimates in his statement that

25 there were about 500. Does that sound about right to

1 you?

2 A. I couldn't give an opinion on that.

3 MS BOYD: So be it. Thank you very much, Mr Batkin.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Ms Barton?

5 Questions by MS BARTON

6 MS BARTON: Just a couple of questions, if I may, please.

7 You were involved in evacuating passengers from the rear  
8 of the train. Can I ask you this: at the time that you  
9 were evacuating passengers, was there a stage where you  
10 were joined by a London Underground station supervisor  
11 in a high visibility vest, a Mr Falayi?

12 A. I'm aware that there were some other people who were  
13 assisting with the detrainment from the Liverpool Street  
14 end of the train, but I don't know who they were.

15 Q. Do you remember seeing a black male in  
16 a London Underground high visibility vest?

17 A. I don't, no.

18 Q. Do you remember seeing a male in cycling shorts wearing  
19 a yellow high visibility vest?

20 A. I don't, no.

21 MS BARTON: Thank you.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: We have some questions from Ms Canby.

23 Questions by MS CANBY

24 MS CANBY: Mr Batkin, I have some questions to ask you on  
25 behalf of Transport for London and Tube Lines, who at

1 the time were the employees of the Emergency Response  
2 Unit that you've referred to. Can we start by exploring  
3 in a little more detail the line controller whom you've  
4 referred to?

5 At the time, you were driving a Circle Line train  
6 and for that part of the Circle Line the line controller  
7 would be the Metropolitan line controller. Is that  
8 right?

9 A. That's right, yes.

10 Q. In July 2005, the Metropolitan line controller was a man  
11 called Paul Marks. Do you know that to be right?

12 A. Yes, I do, yes.

13 Q. He was based at Baker Street, I think.

14 A. That's right, yes.

15 Q. Can we look at the type of train that you were driving  
16 on the day? The type of train that you were driving is  
17 known as a C stock train, isn't it?

18 A. That's right, yes.

19 Q. If we could have on the screen document [INQ10280-7],  
20 please?

21 If we could look at the long diagram of the full  
22 train at the top of that page, we can see from this  
23 diagram that there are, on a C stock train, three  
24 driver's cabs?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. There's one at the very front in the first carriage.  
2 There's one between carriages 4 and 5. Is that correct,  
3 Mr Batkin?  
4 A. Yes.  
5 Q. And there's one at the rear at the end of the sixth  
6 carriage?  
7 A. That's correct, yes.  
8 Q. We can see there that it's the six car train C69 or 77  
9 and that's where the name C stock comes from, is that  
10 right?  
11 A. That's right.  
12 Q. All train operators have three different keys. Is that  
13 correct, Mr Batkin?  
14 A. Yes.  
15 Q. The first a J door key, and that's used to access door  
16 isolating locks from inside a carriage. So if you need  
17 to open doors inside a carriage, you can use your J door  
18 key?  
19 A. That's right.  
20 Q. You also have a control key and the control key turns  
21 the power on in the driver's cab.  
22 A. It does.  
23 Q. Then a selector key, which is also sometimes known as  
24 a reverser key, and that opens the lock on the cab door,  
25 so it's that door that allows you entrance into the

1 driver's cab?

2 A. That's right, yes.

3 Q. On the outside of each train carriage, about halfway  
4 along, there is a butterfly cock which is also sometimes  
5 referred to as a butterfly valve.

6 A. That's right, yes.

7 Q. That's an emergency door release system --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- and that can be used to open the carriage doors from  
10 the outside.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. You turn the valve clockwise, that releases air and then  
13 the doors open.

14 A. One set of doors per carriage.

15 Q. Per carriage?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Generally, the doors are not designed to be opened by  
18 passengers. Is that right?

19 A. That's right, yes.

20 Q. So, when you do have to evacuate a train, the principal  
21 method of evacuating a train is either from the front or  
22 the rear coordinated by train staff?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. The reason why you don't allow passengers to come out  
25 from the side doors is because they could potentially

1 put themselves at more risk because of danger of either  
2 electrocution or being hit by a train coming in the  
3 other direction?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. We've also heard some of the passengers refer to manhole  
6 covers in the carriage floors. Now, these are large  
7 rectangular covers, aren't they, and that's what can be  
8 used to give access to the undercarriage of the train?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Can we talk briefly about emergency lighting, please,  
11 Mr Batkin? Emergency lighting comes on automatically in  
12 a tunnel as soon as traction current is lost. Is that  
13 correct?

14 A. That's correct, yes.

15 Q. Emergency lighting in the carriage also comes on  
16 automatically as soon as traction current is lost?

17 A. It does.

18 Q. Emergency carriage lighting is about 20 per cent of  
19 everyday carriage lighting?

20 A. It is. It's -- one set of -- one lighting tube over the  
21 first door of a carriage and then the next set of doors,  
22 there will be a lighting tube that's illuminated on the  
23 other side of the train, and then back to the original  
24 side for the last set of doors.

25 Q. That emergency lighting that comes on is battery

1 powered?

2 A. It is.

3 Q. The battery is found towards the rear of the carriage in  
4 each carriage?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. The cables are in the floor?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. So it's possible, given that we know where the bomb was,  
9 that that battery power was damaged by the explosion?

10 A. It could well have been.

11 Q. In your driver's cab, you have separate lights inside  
12 the cab. Now, most drivers prefer not to have those on,  
13 is that right, when you're actually driving?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. It's a bit like driving a car at night?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. But if you want to turn the lights on and off in  
18 a driver's cab, you have a switch that enables you to do  
19 that.

20 A. That's right, yes.

21 Q. But there is no switch in the cab to turn on and off the  
22 emergency lighting in the carriage, is that right?

23 A. That's correct. It's -- carriage lights are either on  
24 or off. There's no way that you can select emergency  
25 lights.

1 Q. Yes. As a train operator, you have a driver's bag which  
2 you take with you on to the train, and that would  
3 contain your orange, high visibility London Underground  
4 vest and a torch.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Did you have your driver's bag with you on that day?

7 A. I did, yes.

8 Q. Moving into the cab itself, in the driver's cab you have  
9 one door to your left, one door to your right and then  
10 there's an emergency door in the middle of the front of  
11 the cab.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. In each driver's cab, you've also told us there's  
14 a ladder. We know that there were three driver's cabs  
15 on this train, so were there three ladders on this  
16 train?

17 A. There should have been three ladders on the train, yes.

18 Q. You were also asked about emergency equipment on the  
19 train and you've told us about some of the emergency  
20 equipment. Is that stored in the door pod which is in  
21 the door between the cab and the carriage?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. In that pod, you have one red flag, five shoe paddles  
24 which are to lift the shoes off the rails, one ice  
25 scraper you've already told us about, two emergency

1 ladder stretcher bars and that's where you would also  
2 find one short-circuiting device.  
3 A. Yes.  
4 Q. Each cab has a pod, so again, you would have three sets  
5 of that emergency equipment on this train.  
6 A. That's right, yes.  
7 Q. You've talked a little bit about your radio that you  
8 have in your cab. Does that actually look like  
9 a telephone handset and that's directly in front of you  
10 a little bit to your right-hand side?  
11 A. The new radio -- the new train radio, the CONNECT  
12 system, that's --  
13 Q. That's more like a mobile phone?  
14 A. Yes.  
15 Q. Yes. But back in 2005, what's referred to as the radio  
16 which gives you contact between you and the line  
17 controller, it actually looked like a telephone.  
18 A. No, there was -- that was just a push button on the --  
19 in front of the driver, and there was a microphone  
20 around the driver's head height. You would just hold  
21 the button down and speak normally to speak to the line  
22 controller at that time.  
23 Q. You've referred to trying to use the mayday procedure.  
24 Was there in your cab a large green sticker in the  
25 middle outlining and reminding you what the mayday

1 procedure was?

2 A. I don't know if there was one. There's one in most  
3 train cabs, if not all.

4 Q. Yes, and that just reminds you that you should, in the  
5 case of an emergency, contact your line controller, give  
6 your train number, location and direction, nature of the  
7 emergency and the action required in relation to  
8 confirmation that the traction current was off?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. As soon as you lose traction current, a blue light on  
11 your control panel switches off. Is that right?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Can you remember when you were first aware that that  
14 blue light switched off?

15 A. No, I'm afraid I don't recall whether the traction  
16 current went off as a result of me operating the tunnel  
17 telephone wires or whether it was a consequence of the  
18 explosion.

19 Q. We've already heard evidence from Mr Porter from the  
20 power control room and he's told us that the traction  
21 current had come off as a result of the explosion. Can  
22 we just move to the morning of 7 July before the  
23 explosion itself?

24 You were asked by Mr Keith whether or not you  
25 remembered using your PA at all before the explosion

1     itself, and you said that you couldn't remember now.

2     Just to help you, Mr Batkin, when you gave your  
3     statement to the police about a week after the bombings,  
4     you told the police that you remembered making a PA  
5     announcement at Liverpool Street station.

6     A. I'm sorry, I thought he asked me if I'd used it before  
7     Liverpool Street, but I do remember using the PA at  
8     Liverpool Street station.

9     Q. Yes, telling passengers that they were on a Circle Line  
10    train and it was going to Tower Hill?

11    A. Yes.

12    Q. Could you hear that at that stage it was working?

13    A. Yes.

14    Q. We've seen from trackernet that it looks likely that  
15    your train left Liverpool Street at about 8.48, and you  
16    told us that, after leaving Liverpool Street, you passed  
17    a signal designated as OB2, and that's about 200 yards  
18    from Aldgate station.

19    A. Yes.

20    Q. Do you know whether's a signal phone at signal OB2?

21    A. There would have been a signal phone there, or there is  
22    a signal phone there.

23    Q. There is a signal phone there. Signal phones are --  
24    have a white and black sticker on them to indicate that  
25    they're signal phones?

1 A. That's right.

2 Q. Was it a signal phone that was high up, so you would  
3 only be able to reach it from your driver's cab, or was  
4 it one lower down that you could reach from the track?

5 A. No, it's down at track level, so I'd have to -- to use  
6 it, I'd have to get down to track level to use that  
7 signal telephone.

8 Q. As you approached Aldgate, you complied with the 15-mile  
9 per hour speed restriction --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- and you were on the outer rail?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. We know, again from the evidence that we've heard from  
14 the power control room, that the explosion happens at  
15 8.49 and you attempted to contact your line controller  
16 and you received no reply on that radio to the line  
17 controller.

18 Again, Mr Keith asked you whether or not it had been  
19 working prior to the explosion and you said you couldn't  
20 remember, but to help with your recollection, when you  
21 gave your statement to the police, you told them that it  
22 had been working prior to the explosion.

23 A. Okay.

24 Q. Before you make your telephone call to Ayo Puddicombe,  
25 is it before you make that call that you pinched the

1 tunnel telephone wires together?

2 A. I'm not sure, I'm not sure whether I made that phone  
3 call and then stopped the people walking along the side  
4 of the train or whether that -- the people walking along  
5 the side of the train prompted me to make that phone  
6 call, I don't know.

7 Q. Let's see if I can help you with the chronology,  
8 Mr Batkin. We know from your mobile phone bill that the  
9 call that you made to Ayo Puddicombe was at 8.51 and  
10 that it lasted 3 minutes and 25 seconds. We can tell  
11 from the information from the power control room that  
12 a TT call, a tunnel telephone call, was received on the  
13 outer rail at 8.50.18. Is it possible that that is when  
14 you rubbed the two wires together at 08.50, so one  
15 minute after the explosion?

16 A. It's possible, yes.

17 Q. You've been asked some questions about traction current  
18 sections and, by you rubbing the telephone wires  
19 together, we've heard that you discharged the traction  
20 current. Now, as I've already indicated to you, in fact  
21 we know that the traction current has been turned off at  
22 08.49 because of the bomb. Are you aware of what the  
23 traction current section is in that area?

24 A. Yes, I believe it's from Moorgate round to Tower Hill.

25 Q. Yes, so by you rubbing those tunnel telephone wires

1 together and, in fact, by the explosion beforehand, as  
2 a result of that there was no current on the Circle Line  
3 from Aldgate station to Liverpool Street station and  
4 from Liverpool Street station to Moorgate. Is that  
5 right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Around about that time you say that outside your cab you  
8 can hear passengers in the tunnel between the train and  
9 the tunnel wall and it seems that it's around about that  
10 time that you then make your call to Ayo Puddicombe at  
11 08.51. You tell her that there's been a bomb or an  
12 explosion. We see from your mobile phone bill that the  
13 phone call lasted 3 minutes and 25 seconds, so by 08.54  
14 had you received confirmation from her that the traction  
15 current was switched off?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. You also told her that you had injured passengers on  
18 your train and on the track, didn't you?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. As you start to walk back towards the rear of the train,  
21 you pass the second carriage and you can see that there  
22 is extreme damage to those doors on the second carriage.  
23 You could see that there was damage such that you  
24 weren't going to be able to assist passengers  
25 disembarking through that carriage and, as you passed

1 the second carriage, you could see that one of the doors  
2 had almost completely blown off --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- and there was twisted metal and broken glass. As you  
5 are walking along the side of the train, are all of the  
6 other doors to the carriages closed?

7 A. I can't remember now, so I would have to look at my  
8 statement. If that's what my statement says, then I'm  
9 sure that's correct.

10 Q. Certainly, Mr Batkin, that's what you told the police,  
11 that, as you were walking past all of the doors, they  
12 remained closed. You then go to the rear of the train  
13 and you gain entry to the rear driver's cab using your  
14 keys and you assist with Mr Williams in evacuating  
15 people from the rear of the carriage.

16 Did you tell people not to walk on the track  
17 itself -- on the rail, I should say?

18 A. Yes, I think I was telling people that they should walk  
19 on the ballast, the track ballast. It gives the best  
20 footing. The rails are slippery and --

21 Q. And the sleepers can be slippery as well?

22 A. The sleepers can be slippery as well, yes.

23 Q. As you're coming from where your train was into Aldgate  
24 train station, there are a number of switch and  
25 crossings, aren't there?

1 A. There are.

2 Q. So the passengers would have to be very careful as well  
3 not to fall on those parts of the rail?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Finally this, Mr Batkin: you said that towards the end  
6 you heard a male, whom you believe to be a member of the  
7 Emergency Response Unit, getting on the train and saying  
8 "Everybody who is coming out is out". What was it about  
9 him that made you think he was a member of the Emergency  
10 Response Unit?

11 A. High visibility clothing. I'm not certain it was  
12 a member of the emergency response team, but at the time  
13 that's what I labelled that person as.

14 Q. Because the evidence from the Emergency Response Unit  
15 seems to be that they didn't arrive until a little bit  
16 later, when all the living casualties had actually been  
17 removed from the train.

18 A. In which case it must have been Fire Brigade, then.

19 MS CANBY: Thank you, Mr Batkin. I don't have any further  
20 questions.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Mr Taylor?

22 Questions by MR TAYLOR

23 MR TAYLOR: Mr Batkin, good morning. How long have you  
24 worked for London Underground?

25 A. Around about ten years now.

1 Q. So that would be five years previous to 2005?  
2 A. Yes.  
3 Q. So you've had five years of experience. When you joined  
4 London Underground, did you join as a train driver  
5 straightaway?  
6 A. No, I didn't.  
7 Q. How long had you been a train driver before 2005?  
8 A. Approximately one year.  
9 Q. So to become a train driver, you must have undergone  
10 a certain amount of training?  
11 A. Yes.  
12 Q. Was that extensive training?  
13 A. It was, it was around about five and a half to six  
14 months.  
15 Q. Five and a half to six months, that's quite extensive.  
16 As a part of that training, was it generally hands-on  
17 training, physical training or --  
18 A. No, very little of it.  
19 Q. So it was reading through documentation and sitting in  
20 classrooms and things like that?  
21 A. Yes, learning procedures and going through them in  
22 a classroom.  
23 Q. As a part of those procedures, there must have been  
24 a lot of documentation that you had to read through and  
25 you had to sign off, probably?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Reams and reams of documentation?

3 A. Yes, a lot of paper.

4 Q. You are required to sign the documentation after, to say

5 that you fully understand, and, you know?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Okay. A part of that documentation, would it have been

8 to do with radios? Would you have been taught how to

9 use a radio?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Would that have been through documentation or through

12 the physical use of a radio?

13 A. Both. You would go through it in the classroom and,

14 when it came to the practical part of the course, the

15 train handling, then, during the course of that

16 training, you would become familiar with how you use the

17 train radio in practice.

18 Q. And, of course, training with using different parts of

19 your kit, as you said, your ladders, how to use the

20 devices to turn the -- switch the power off?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. First aid training. Were you ever offered any first aid

23 training?

24 A. No, I believe it was the policy not to offer first aid

25 training to train drivers.

1 Q. Can you shed any light on that? Why would that be?

2 A. I imagine it was something to do with having them  
3 station-based and, where possible, to get people who  
4 need medical assistance off the train so that the driver  
5 is then able to keep the service running, keep the train  
6 service running.

7 Q. Would you know if any other London Underground employees  
8 were encouraged to undertake first aid training?

9 A. I don't know at all.

10 Q. As a part of your kit held in the cab, would there have  
11 been a first aid bag?

12 A. There would have been, yes.

13 Q. That would be a general first aid bag with just general  
14 supplies in it, I assume?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Were you ever shown that when you did your training?

17 A. I would have been shown the -- where it's located behind  
18 a sealed door in the cab, but not the contents.

19 Q. You're not a first aider so you may not know this. Do  
20 you know what a defibrillation unit is?

21 A. Yes, it's used to try to restart a heart that's stopped.

22 Q. Yes, that's correct. Obviously you didn't carry one of  
23 those in the cab with you?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Are you aware that any are positioned on stations?

1 A. No, I'm not.

2 Q. Let's turn to the call that you made to your controller  
3 at Edgware Road, I think -- at Edgware Road, is it?

4 A. The duty manager?

5 Q. The duty manager. When you first spoke to them, did you  
6 tell them in what way the train was moving?

7 A. I'm not sure. I'm not sure. The train number was 204  
8 which normally would mean it would be an outer rail  
9 train travelling east, but not always. In times of  
10 disruption, they may well turn trains short and they  
11 would come back west, but normally, outer rail circles  
12 would be travelling in one direction.

13 Q. I see, so they would know, if you gave them the number  
14 of that train, they should know basically which way that  
15 train was travelling?

16 A. Yes, I would imagine so, because if they are -- during  
17 times of disruption and they alter the train's  
18 destination and reverse it somewhere, then I'm sure the  
19 duty manager would have been aware of which trains are  
20 running in different paths that they normally would  
21 take.

22 Q. I'm a layman here, and I know nothing about  
23 London Underground and that control room. Do you know  
24 about that control room? Do they have a board up to  
25 show you a diagram of which way the trains are running?

1 A. There's one there now. I'm not sure there was one there  
2 at the time. The tracknet system is up in the line  
3 controller's office.

4 Q. Finally, when you evacuated the train, when you actually  
5 left the train and you went back up on to the station,  
6 at any time did anybody ask you if the power was off?

7 A. One passenger, I remember one passenger asked me.  
8 I think I was repeating myself to everyone that came off  
9 the back of the train saying something along the lines  
10 of "Please step on the ballast, avoid the rails, the  
11 traction current is switched off, it's just that they  
12 are slippery", and I do remember one passenger --

13 I think he was a little bit aggressive, but I think he  
14 wanted to know my name, he said "How am I certain that  
15 the traction current is switched off here, how do I know  
16 that I'm safe walking along the tracks?"

17 Q. What did you say to him?

18 A. I think I put my own foot on one of the traction current  
19 rails to indicate to him that the traction current was  
20 off.

21 Q. You physically put your foot on a rail and you proved to  
22 him that there was no --

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Did anybody from the emergency services ask you about  
25 this?

1 A. No.

2 Q. Did anybody, when you reached the station, ask you  
3 about -- or mention -- was there any mention about  
4 a secondary device?

5 A. No.

6 MR TAYLOR: Okay, thank you.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Taylor. Any other  
8 questions?

9 Mr Batkin, whatever criticisms are made of the  
10 system or anybody else, you personally obviously acted  
11 with, as Mr Keith said, great presence of mind and  
12 courage to make sure that all your passengers who could  
13 walk did get off that train and I'm sure they are all  
14 extremely grateful to you. Thank you for coming along  
15 to help us.

16 A. Thank you.

17 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I add in response to the question  
18 that you posed as to whether or not Mr Batkin made the  
19 phone call before speaking to Celia Harrison, assuming  
20 that he wasn't detained for more than five minutes with  
21 Ms Harrison, her own notes appear to indicate that she  
22 spoke to Mr Batkin at 09.40, so if his recollection is  
23 that he called his girlfriend at 09.43 or thereabouts,  
24 it may be that he spoke to Ms Harrison first, if he is  
25 troubled by his own recollection of that event.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much. Thank you,  
2 Mr Batkin, you're free to go.

3 A. Thank you.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: What is the position, Mr Keith? Do  
5 you wish to call another witness?

6 MR KEITH: My Lady, we might be able to conclude the reading  
7 of one further statement. It is a fairly short  
8 statement, if that is acceptable.

9 MR HAY: My Lady, this is the statement of Ayo Puddicombe  
10 dated 3 May 2006. It has the usual declaration of  
11 truth.

12 Statement of MS AYO PUDDICOMBE read

13 "I have worked for London Underground  
14 since March 1998 and, since 2001, have been a duty  
15 station manager at Edgware Road. Each shift has two  
16 duty managers - one is office-based and deals with  
17 staffing of trains and covers any unexpected absences to  
18 keep the service running - the other manager is the  
19 incident shift, who basically responds to problems on  
20 the network.

21 "On 7 July 2005, I was the desk duty station manager  
22 working an early turn, which is 7.00 to 3.00. Shortly  
23 before 9.00, I took a telephone call from Vicky Martin.  
24 She was a train driver calling me from platform 1. She  
25 said: 'Did you hear that? There has been an explosion,

1 I can see the end of 216 in the tunnel'. 216 was  
2 a Circle Line train travelling east."  
3 My Lady, pausing there, that obviously refers to the  
4 bombed train at Edgware Road:  
5 "I had not heard anything but contacted the line  
6 controller, Ron, who was based at Baker Street. I don't  
7 know his surname, but he is now working for the Network  
8 Control Centre at 55 Broadway. I told Ron what Vicky  
9 had reported - then I also telephoned my colleague,  
10 Michael Brough, who is the incident duty manager and  
11 asked him to go down and have a look.  
12 "Almost immediately, my phone rang again. It was  
13 Tim Batkin, the driver of train 204, which was at  
14 Aldgate on the Circle Line travelling east towards  
15 Tower Hill. He was using his mobile phone and he said  
16 there had been an explosion on his train and that there  
17 were injured people and passengers trying to smash  
18 windows to get off the train. He sounded quite calm in  
19 the circumstances and also said that his train was  
20 packed with passengers.  
21 "I immediately called Ron back and reported my  
22 conversation with Tim. As Tim had said people were  
23 trying to get off the train, I asked Ron to ensure that  
24 the power to the track was turned off. It is the line  
25 controller's job to contact the emergency services

1 should a major incident occur, so I am assuming that Ron  
2 made those calls. I do not know how."  
3 My Lady, just pausing there, Ron referred to, we  
4 have made enquiries, is Ron Ryband and, for the benefit  
5 of the transcript, that's R-Y-B-A-N-D. Contrary to  
6 Ms Puddicombe's statement, he is not the line controller  
7 but the line information assistant in the  
8 Met/Circle/Hammersmith Line control room. He reports  
9 directly to the line controller, Mr Paul Marks. We have  
10 asked for a statement to be obtained from him, but he is  
11 presently on annual leave:  
12 "The other drivers were made aware, but they all ran  
13 from the canteen and restrooms down on to the platform.  
14 I remained in my office answering the phone, which was  
15 ringing nonstop, gathering first aid kits and water, and  
16 looked after traumatised drivers when they came back  
17 upstairs. The driver of 216, Ray Whitehurst, came up  
18 and I looked after him and some of the passengers who  
19 were brought up.  
20 "I do not know any of their names. Some had  
21 bleeding faces and I helped tend to them. After about  
22 two hours, we were evacuated to Edgware House where  
23 things were being coordinated. I did a roll call for  
24 the drivers. I had their relatives ringing constantly  
25 and I had to account for trains.

1 "Eventually we were evacuated from Edgware House and  
2 had to go to Baker Street, where we worked from for the  
3 follow week. I finished work just before 8.00 that  
4 evening and was at work at Baker Street at 7.00 the next  
5 morning."

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. 2.00, please.

7 (12.55 pm)

8 (The short adjournment)

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