

15 (2.05 pm)

16 MR KEITH: My Lady, I have one more questions question, if I  
17 may, despite having said that I had no more questions.

18 It is this, Mr Jones: you've described how you  
19 called out the number of fatalities from inside the  
20 carriage to Mr Parnell who was waiting outside the  
21 carriage and we've heard his evidence to the effect, as  
22 my Lady reminded us, that you called out there were six  
23 fatalities.

24 You've gone on to describe how you think you may  
25 have applied a P1 priority card to the man at A, the man

1 on the floor inside the double doors D8. May we take it  
2 that if you did apply a P1 priority card, that person  
3 could not have been amongst the number of dead that you  
4 called out from inside the carriage?

5 A. That's correct, sir.

6 Q. Because you wouldn't, of course, have numbered him in  
7 that number if he was alive and meriting a P1 card?

8 A. I don't remember, as I said, how many patients I said  
9 were dead. That was Mr Parnell's statement. But that's  
10 correct about the P1.

11 MR KEITH: Thank you.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

13 Questions by MR COLTART

14 MR COLTART: Mr Jones, I represent the young man who was at  
15 position A on your plan on that carriage. I'd like to  
16 ask you a few questions. To assist you with that, I'm  
17 not going to refer you, or at least not much, to your  
18 witness statement which was made some months after  
19 7 July 2005, but to a document which I think you  
20 probably completed quite shortly after the event. Can  
21 we get back up on our screen, please, [LAS19-2]?

22 As we understand matters, in the immediate aftermath  
23 of 7/7, the London Ambulance Service put in place  
24 a comprehensive debrief programme and sent out proforma  
25 questionnaires to all the staff who had been involved.

1 Do you recall receiving and completing such a document?

2 A. I don't, sir, but that clearly is mine.

3 Q. Just so that there isn't any doubt about it, is that  
4 your handwriting, you see "Steve Jones" at the top of  
5 the page there?

6 A. I can't be sure that's my handwriting, sir, but I'm sure  
7 that is my statement.

8 Q. Yes. It certainly appears to be. If at any stage when  
9 we're going through it you think it's not, then stop me,  
10 and we might look at something else instead.

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. I'm not going to take you through the first few lines  
13 because they deal with your arrival at Aldgate and we've  
14 covered that fairly comprehensively. But I want to see  
15 if we can shine some light on some of the matters which  
16 you raised this morning. If we start at the sentence  
17 about halfway down that page which reads:

18 "We made our way ..."

19 Do you have that, just over halfway down:

20 "We made our way ..."

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. I'm just going to go through the next few lines with  
23 you, if I may, and ask a question or two.

24 "We made our way after confirming with the fire  
25 officer in charge that the scene was safe. On

1 approaching trackside, power was confirmed as being off  
2 by London Underground staff.

3 "On arrival at the train, we got into the train with  
4 the assistance of the London Fire Brigade ladders.  
5 Using torchlight, we asked those who were able to walk  
6 to make their way topside and seek assistance from  
7 medical staff waiting.

8 "Once this was done, we triaged patients. Two or  
9 three patients were removed from the train using London  
10 Fire Brigade ladders as carrying aids, leaving five live  
11 patients needing removing."

12 Just pausing there, did one of those five patients  
13 who needed to be moved include the young man at A who's  
14 been given the priority 1 sign?

15 A. I would assume so, sir.

16 Q. "Prior to this, I had requested a BTP officer to go  
17 topside ..."

18 Can you recall now any idea who that BTP officer  
19 might have been?

20 A. No, not at all, sir.

21 Q. "... and get five ambulance crews. This was a wrong  
22 decision on my part as this delayed extrication."

23 Just pausing there, can I say these are your words,  
24 not mine, I'm not seeking to imply any criticism of your  
25 actions; okay? We're just trying to get to the bottom

1 of what went on:

2 "This was a wrong decision on my part as this  
3 delayed extrication. On realising this failing, I left  
4 LFB/BTP and an LAS crew treating and went topside to  
5 inform Silver I did not require London Ambulance Service  
6 but only five scoops ..."

7 Stretchers, I think you told us this morning?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. "... so that the London Fire Brigade could carry  
10 patients to triage point and a HEMS or basic doctor for  
11 pain relief for those who may be delayed in  
12 extrication."

13 So this was very much the priority, it seems, from  
14 your note at the time, getting stretchers to the  
15 carriage in order that the remaining casualties can be  
16 evacuated?

17 A. That's correct, sir, that's what I meant by the mistake.  
18 I changed my priority. I initially asked for five  
19 crews, then realised that was -- I actually needed  
20 stretchers, rather than crews. We had enough crews  
21 below ground.

22 Q. You make reference in your note to there being an LAS  
23 crew treating, but is it now your recollection that, in  
24 fact, there was already more than one crew treating, or  
25 was it just the one?

1 A. I don't remember, sir.

2 Q. Okay. If we go back to your note, then, top of this  
3 next page that we're on [LAS19-3] :

4 "The EEV ..."

5 Which I think you told us is the emergency equipment  
6 vehicle.

7 "... had just arrived and asked the T/L ..."

8 Can you recall now what that stands for?

9 A. Team leader, sir.

10 Q. Team leader. Did he drive the EEV, was he in charge of  
11 it?

12 A. On that day, sir.

13 Q. "... if he had scoops on board. He confirmed this ..."

14 So in other words, there were stretchers in that  
15 vehicle.

16 A. Mm-hmm.

17 Q. "... and attempted to open the back of the EEV, but  
18 could not."

19 Then you've written:

20 "This seemed to be due to lack of training."

21 Can you recall now what prompted you to make that  
22 observation?

23 A. Because he wasn't able to open the back of the vehicle  
24 or the side of it, whatever way.

25 Q. "Further to this, the location of the scoops in the EEV

1 were unknown."

2 So in other words, did it become clear to you that,  
3 even if he was able to get access to the vehicle, he  
4 might not know where to find the stretchers?

5 A. That's correct, sir.

6 Q. "Therefore I looked and located five Furley beds."

7 Help us, what's a Furley bed?

8 A. They're foldaway stretchers, sir, they're collapsible.  
9 When you pull them apart, they turn into like a camp  
10 bed, if you like.

11 Q. Right. I see. Where would you find a Furley bed?

12 A. On? I'm sorry, sir?

13 Q. In other words, from where did you manage to locate  
14 these five Furley beds?

15 A. They were in the vehicle. They were somewhere in the  
16 vehicle, I can't remember --

17 Q. In the same vehicle, the emergency equipment --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. So someone did manage to open the doors, did they?

20 A. I opened the doors.

21 Q. Oh, you opened the doors, right. Once in there, you  
22 were able to find these stretchers?

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. You took them back to the train?

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Can you remember, what was it about

1 the doors that was the problem?

2 A. I can't, my Lady. I remember there was a problem but,  
3 today, I can't remember exactly.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You wouldn't normally need training  
5 to open a door.

6 A. No. I agree, my Lady.

7 MR COLTART: Are you able to tell us how long it took to get  
8 the vehicle open?

9 A. I would be speculating, sir, I couldn't give an amount  
10 of time. It was -- it probably felt longer than what it  
11 actually was. Maybe a minute, two minutes.

12 Q. You went back to the train:  
13 "The HEMS doctor was now at the train side and was  
14 retriaging and organising extrication."  
15 Now, say if you can't remember, but do you know what  
16 the condition was of the man at position A by the time  
17 you went back and the doctor had arrived?

18 A. Could you ask the question again, please?

19 Q. Yes, of course. In relation to the man at position A  
20 that you'd marked on your plan, by the time you got back  
21 to the train with your five stretchers, can you tell us  
22 what was his condition by the time you got back?

23 A. By the time I got back, I didn't get back on to the  
24 train. From getting the stretchers to going back to the  
25 train would have been quite easily ten minutes from

1 carrying them, two stretchers at a time. So it was  
2 easily ten minutes into it. So I didn't get back on to  
3 the train to treat.

4 Q. Just pausing there, when you say "two stretchers at  
5 a time", do we take it you had to make several trips up  
6 and down or did you have someone to assist you?

7 A. No, sir, they're quite light, you can carry one in each  
8 arm.

9 Q. Yes, but you had five, didn't you?

10 A. Not by myself, sir.

11 Q. I see, so you had someone to help you?

12 A. In my statement, there was two other people.

13 Q. I see. Fine.

14 "When all known live patients were removed, the HEMS  
15 doctor pronounced life extinct the seven patients  
16 left..."

17 You make reference there of going to Russell Square  
18 and I'll come back to that at the end, if I may,  
19 briefly.

20 Then under "Key decisions made":

21 "Communications: advise early as possible what we  
22 required on scene.

23 "Triage: identify who could be helped and in what  
24 order."

25 Then:

1 "Lessons identified - improvements:

2 "On a personal level, I learnt from previous majors  
3 where one of the first units on scene not to take any  
4 ambulance aid equipment with me so I could not be drawn  
5 into treating patients."

6 You've explained to us today why that might be  
7 important.

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. Without wishing you to relive any other horrors, can you  
10 just tell us what other major incidents you had attended  
11 in the past?

12 A. Prior to that was the Soho bomb, where I was second on  
13 scene, where I was drawn into treating a patient when  
14 I should have been doing a different role.

15 Q. Were you aware, from your own experience, of any  
16 difficulties experienced in the immediate aftermath of  
17 that bombing, which were replicated --

18 A. Sorry, sir, could you ask again?

19 Q. Yes, of course. Were there, as far as you were  
20 concerned, any lessons to be learned from the Soho  
21 bombing which appeared to replicate themselves in the  
22 7/7 bombing?

23 A. As in equipment or?

24 Q. Anything, communications, equipment?

25 A. One of the recommendations from the Soho bomb was

1 that -- a review of the major incident plan, crews would  
2 have extra training.

3 Q. Extra training in how to deal and respond to major  
4 incidents?

5 A. For first responders, sir, yes.

6 Q. Did you go on that -- on any extra training as a result  
7 of that?

8 A. No, sir.

9 Q. You didn't yourself?

10 A. No, sir.

11 Q. Just while we're dealing with this particular issue, in  
12 fact, can we get up, please, document [LAS71-2]? If we  
13 could just enlarge the top half of it for the time  
14 being, I think this is a separate form which you  
15 completed in relation to your attendance at  
16 Russell Square.

17 A. This is the first time I've seen it, sir, sorry.

18 Q. Again, just to satisfy ourselves, as far as we can, that  
19 this is your form, it's headed:

20 "Major incident debrief form.  
21 "Name: Position: Steve Jones, Motorcycle Recovery  
22 Unit, paramedic."

23 A. Motorcycle Response Unit, sir.

24 Q. Forgive me, "Response Unit, paramedic":  
25 "Incident role: Bronze triage at Aldgate. Bronze

1 safety (last 30 minutes) at Russell Square."

2 As we go through it -- and we can do it quite  
3 briefly -- we can see that you give some information  
4 about what you did both at Aldgate and, in fact, at  
5 Russell Square.

6 But each of these debrief forms contained a series  
7 of questions at the beginning, and I just want to ask  
8 you about a few of these, because it appears, if you  
9 look at the documents on the screen, that you've  
10 highlighted which is the appropriate answer "Yes" or  
11 "No" to the various questions which have been posed.  
12 Do you have any recollection of filling out this  
13 form?

14 A. I don't remember a lot of the forms I filled out, sir.

15 Q. Let's hook at some of these questions and what your  
16 answers to them were:

17 "Do you have the LAS major incident action cards?"

18 You appear to have answered "No" in relation to  
19 that.

20 A. I think it's the other way round, sir.

21 Q. Oh, I see, so the fainter -- that would explain some of  
22 the answers which appear further down, in particular:

23 "Were you able to communicate effectively with Gold  
24 control?"

25 To which I thought you had answered "Yes", which

1 might have been surprising. Forgive me. In that case,  
2 can we go through it and you assist us with the way in  
3 which you answered them?  
4 A. Yes, sir.  
5 Q. So, yes, did you have the major incident action cards.  
6 "Have you attended an LAS major incident training  
7 session?  
8 "Yes."  
9 You've put "PP course". Are you able to assist us  
10 with what that might be?  
11 A. That's a post-proficiency course, sir.  
12 Q. Right. You had the triage cards. You'd been trained on  
13 the triage cards. Despatched by Mr White at MRU.  
14 You had the incident radio channel on your main set  
15 and on your handset. Did you experience difficulties  
16 yourself during the day with your radio equipment?  
17 A. At what stage, sir?  
18 Q. When you were above ground, either at the outset or  
19 en route to Russell Square, or even once at  
20 Russell Square?  
21 A. No, sir, not while I was en route to either of the  
22 calls.  
23 Q. So you had no difficulty en route to Aldgate -- from  
24 Aldgate to Russell Square with communicating with  
25 Central Ambulance Control?

1 A. No, sir. I was initially triaged -- or sent to  
2 Liverpool Street and I vaguely remember speaking to  
3 Control over the main set, which is on the motorbike.  
4 I think, while I was on the ground, I think all of the  
5 communications I had were via mobile phone. I don't  
6 actually remember using the handset that I had.

7 Q. Did you experience any -- was this an LAS mobile phone?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. Did you experience any difficulties with the operation  
10 of your mobile phone?

11 A. No, sir.

12 Q. None at all?

13 A. No, sir, not above ground, sir.

14 Q. Did you have any discussions with Jonathan Edmonson  
15 above ground at Aldgate?

16 A. Yes, I did, sir.

17 Q. Did he mention to you the very significant difficulties  
18 he was experiencing with his mobile phone?

19 A. I remember him -- there's -- is it ACCLC or --

20 Q. Yes.

21 A. I remember him mentioning that he'd requested that to be  
22 turned on or turned off, and he'd had it refused, he was  
23 quite annoyed about that.

24 Q. He was presumably quite annoyed about it because, in his  
25 view, he urgently needed it to be able to communicate by

1 mobile phone?

2 A. I would assume so, sir, I don't know much about that.

3 Q. But you, yourself, didn't appear to suffer from the same  
4 difficulties?

5 A. I don't believe so, sir. When I first arrived, I made  
6 the call to Control. How many times after that via  
7 mobile phone, I can't recollect.

8 Q. Okay. Just going back to this form, you were briefed by  
9 a police or an LAS officer at the scene. "Not  
10 applicable" about waiting at the RVP or parking. Not  
11 likely to be a problem for you, of course, on your  
12 motorbike.

13 A. No, sir.

14 Q. Then your brief summary of what happened at Aldgate.  
15 I'm going to ask you, with my Lady's leave, if I may,  
16 just one question about Russell Square, because  
17 I suspect you're probably not coming back to deal with  
18 Russell Square in due course.

19 Do you see the last significant paragraph on the  
20 page about halfway down:

21 "Russell Square. Treatment of one patient,  
22 a priority 1, at the request of Silver until first  
23 ambulance crew on scene. Reported to Silver various  
24 communication-gathering duties as a runner. Bronze  
25 safety last 30 minutes of incident."

1 Do we understand from that that, by the time you had  
2 completed your duties at Aldgate and got to  
3 Russell Square, there were still no ambulances at  
4 Russell Square?

5 A. I'd been to Tavistock Square before that as well, sir.

6 Q. So you'd been to Tavistock Square first and, by  
7 definition, the explosion had already happened at  
8 Tavistock Square?

9 A. I only assessed one patient at Tavistock Square, which  
10 was a P3. I didn't actually go near the bus.

11 Q. Just pause there for a moment. I'm not going to stop  
12 you from saying anything that you want to, but I just  
13 want to get a sequence of events, if we can.

14 We know that the bomb on the bus went off at 9.50.

15 Do you know how long after that time it was, roughly  
16 speaking, that you arrived at Tavistock Square?

17 A. No, I don't, sir.

18 Q. But in any event you arrived post the explosion, you  
19 treated one priority 3 casualty?

20 A. Who had been moved to the hotel. I think, from what  
21 I can recollect, the scene was clear by the time  
22 I arrived there.

23 Q. Right. So the scene was clear at the bus. You treated  
24 someone in a hotel, and from there you made your way to  
25 Russell Square by bike, by motorbike?

1 A. I was asked to attend myself and another motorcyclist to  
2 go to Russell Square, sir.

3 Q. By the time you arrived at Russell Square, having done  
4 those various tasks, are we right in thinking that there  
5 was still no ambulance on the scene at the time that you  
6 arrived?

7 A. That's correct, sir.

8 MR KEITH: I'm sorry to rise to my feet. We're not, of  
9 course, concerned yet with the detail of  
10 Russell Square/King's Cross. I'm concerned that an  
11 impression may be given, I'm sure inadvertently, that  
12 there was a failing in relation to the supply of  
13 ambulances at Russell Square.

14 Certainly, because of the way in which ambulances  
15 were directed, ambulances did not go to Russell Square  
16 for a considerable time, but I think it's important that  
17 I remind everybody that the deceased came out of the  
18 tunnel at King's Cross rather than Russell Square and  
19 that is a relevant factor to any assessment of whether  
20 or not there was a failing at Russell Square.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I know you appreciate it, Mr Coltart,  
22 it is one of the problems, when we do these things out  
23 of turn, I'm afraid things do get reported. As I say,  
24 not deliberately, but they do get reported in a way that  
25 may not be fair. I do understand why you're asking it;

1 you don't want to ask the witness to come back  
2 unnecessarily.

3 MR COLTART: No, and I thought I was faithfully asking him  
4 only about things in relation to which he had direct  
5 experience, but I take my learned friend's point  
6 entirely. We will deal with Russell Square and  
7 King's Cross properly, of course, in December, and I'm  
8 sure that those who are observing the proceedings have  
9 taken Mr Keith's comments on board and I endorse them.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Coltart.

11 MR COLTART: Just going back, though, briefly to your  
12 document, you reported to Silver various  
13 communication-gathering duties and you've written  
14 "runner". Just help us with this: where were you  
15 a runner to and from?

16 A. I believe that was relating to Russell Square --

17 Q. Yes.

18 A. -- where I went to trackside and back up and give an  
19 instant report what's going on below ground for that.

20 So I believe that's to do with Russell Square rather  
21 than Aldgate, sir.

22 Q. No, forgive me, we may be at cross-purposes.

23 I appreciate that. I just wanted to know where you had  
24 run to and from at Russell Square.

25 A. Oh, sorry, sir. From topside, I either used the stairs

1 or the lift -- I can't remember -- to go trackside,  
2 where I liaised with some fire officers there to see if  
3 there was any more patients below ground. We had quite  
4 a lot above ground, which was confirmed, there was no  
5 more below ground. So I've reported back to Silver that  
6 was the case.

7 Q. Thank you. I just want to ask you one more question,  
8 which I hope won't lead me into further difficulties.  
9 Did you attend the debrief at Millwall at the end of  
10 that day?

11 A. I did, sir.

12 Q. I just want to ask you about one observation, because  
13 it's not entirely clear to us at the moment who made it;  
14 all right? So if we could have perhaps document [LAS71-2]  
15 back up. Forgive me, that isn't the correct reference.

16 [LAS377-2], I'm told. Thank you very much, Mr Hay.

17 Now, about halfway down that page -- could we just  
18 enlarge it a bit, thank you -- do you see there's  
19 a reference to:

20 "Motorcycle Response Units/Cycle Response Units - no  
21 equipment for moving people out - some people died  
22 because of that. Tom Lynch suggested the use of  
23 stretcher bags for MRUs and CRUs - 'Solo Midget'."

24 Firstly, can you remember this observation being  
25 made at the debrief?

1 A. Not at all, sir.

2 Q. Can you assist us with -- do you know Tom Lynch?

3 A. I do, sir.

4 Q. Do you happen to know which site he attended on that

5 day?

6 A. I don't, sir.

7 Q. You don't recall ever having any discussion with him

8 about this topic?

9 A. Previous to -- oh, sorry, as in -- what topic are you

10 talking about, sir?

11 Q. The topic about the possibility of Motorcycle or Cycle

12 Response Units having carrying equipment, stretchers?

13 A. Yes, sir, it was within the year before the event, Tom

14 got some equipment, some small carry bags, they were

15 like foldaway stretchers which were so big.

16 Q. Is that a Solo Midget?

17 A. I believe so, sir. I didn't know the name of it.

18 Q. So this is a small, pack-away stretcher which

19 a motorcycle paramedic or cyclist can take with them?

20 A. Yes, sir, in the event of a major incident. Obviously,

21 we wouldn't be carrying patients by ourselves. It would

22 be a last resort.

23 Q. Yes.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, I didn't follow who got them

25 or how or ...?

1 A. Sorry, my Lady. Tom Lynch is in charge of the pushbike  
2 unit and he sourced -- he thought there was a need for  
3 them, whether they be placed on an emergency equipment  
4 vehicle or possibly kept in the top box of one of the  
5 bikes as a last resort stretcher; obviously a scoop or  
6 a normal stretcher would be preferable.

7 MR COLTART: I think you mentioned this was an idea he had  
8 come up with the year before, was it?

9 A. Certainly within the year, sir. I couldn't give an  
10 actual date on it.

11 Q. Just so we're clear, the year before 7 July or the year  
12 after?

13 A. No, no, it would have been the year before.

14 Q. The year before, this was an idea he had promoted before  
15 the event in question?

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 MR COLTART: Thank you very much.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

19 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

20 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Jones, I don't think you were in court when  
21 Mr Parnell gave evidence.

22 A. No, I wasn't, sir.

23 Q. Can I just remind you or tell you, in fact, something  
24 that he told her Ladyship?

25 When he arrived at Aldgate, he believes it was

1 a British Transport Police officer who informed him  
2 there may well be the possibility of four fatalities and  
3 six or seven priority 1 cases down underground.

4 Now, first of all, did you know that?

5 A. No, sir.

6 Q. If you had been told that by Mr Parnell before going  
7 down, would it have affected what you did?

8 A. No, sir.

9 Q. You've explained to us that you deliberately -- you made  
10 a conscious decision not to take down a medical kit.

11 A. I was already carrying kit. I had two bags which had  
12 triage cards in them. But, no, I deliberately didn't  
13 take any medical equipment: one, because it would defer  
14 me from doing my duty, but, secondly, I'd have to carry  
15 it as well, sir.

16 Q. I think we saw earlier this morning one of the triage  
17 bags, I think the gentleman in the second row is about  
18 to -- the priority bags. That's the sort of size, isn't  
19 it?

20 A. I had two or three of those, sir.

21 Q. So was it that you simply couldn't carry any more, or  
22 was it just you decided not to take it because that may  
23 deflect you from your principal role as triage?

24 A. It would deflect me from my principal role, which would  
25 be the main reason, but, secondly, I'd have to take

1 quite a substantial amount of equipment down as well as  
2 that and I wouldn't be using it, I wasn't there to do  
3 that job.

4 Q. But her Ladyship asked you a question before lunch. You  
5 had triaged those people in the second carriage --

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. -- and you were then waiting for somebody to come behind  
8 to administer aid?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. Nobody followed you?

11 A. There was, sir.

12 Q. Who do you recall being there at that stage?

13 A. In my statement, there is three names in my statement.

14 As for anyone else that was there, I don't recall, sir.

15 They are the three names I gave.

16 Q. Alan Treacy is one of the names.

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. We're going to hear from him later this afternoon,  
19 I think he's here today already. If, in fact, he says  
20 he only came down after the HEMS team, that must be well  
21 after the time you're talking about, mustn't it?

22 A. The time I'm talking about, sir?

23 Q. Yes. You're saying that you go down, you prioritise,  
24 you triage and, at that stage, you think that Mr Treacy  
25 is one of those down there?

1 A. No, I didn't say that, sir. I said there was a number  
2 of crews down there. I remember Mr Treacy when I moved  
3 carriage, sir. That's the only time I saw him.

4 Q. Because if, in fact, you'd had medical supplies, you,  
5 yourself, having done the triage, could have moved on to  
6 giving aid, couldn't you?

7 A. Once I'd reported back to Silver, sir, yes.

8 Q. Was it not Mr Parnell's job, as Bronze medic, to report  
9 back to Silver?

10 A. It was, sir. But there was -- we got separated. It  
11 seemed a long time to me. There was confusion. So  
12 that's what I done.

13 Q. That's why you went topside as well, after Mr Parnell?

14 A. No, sir. Your colleague asked me earlier. I initially  
15 sent a report saying that I needed crews. I went  
16 topside because that was what I actually -- the runner  
17 had already left. So rather than try and find another  
18 runner, take someone away from treatment, I went topside  
19 myself to say what I actually needed is stretchers.

20 Q. Again, if this helps you, Mr Parnell's evidence was that  
21 he had gone topside and spoken with Ken Murphy.

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. Do you know Ken Murphy?

24 A. I do, sir.

25 Q. Because what he was trying to do was to get four or five

1 teams to go down, and he said that's exactly what  
2 happened. He went up there because there weren't  
3 sufficient medical teams underground. That's why he  
4 went up and that's why he organised four or five teams  
5 to go down.

6 Does that accord with your recollection, or do you  
7 think there were already sufficient teams down there?

8 A. There were already teams down there, sir.

9 Q. Because, in answer to one of her Ladyship's questions,  
10 what Mr Parnell said was, in organising these teams,  
11 there was a delay of some three or four minutes before  
12 they could be gathered together, and Mr Parnell's  
13 account was that he had gone down with them. So these  
14 teams were gathered together deliberately and gone down  
15 with him. You don't recall that?

16 A. The only -- I don't recall anything regarding that, sir.  
17 In my statement, it states that I went -- I got the  
18 stretchers with Ken Murphy and I went and took the  
19 stretchers down. So we've probably crossed in between.

20 Q. Again, Mr Parnell's account in his statement was that  
21 the HEMS doctors -- Dr Lockey, we know, went down. They  
22 only went down after these additional teams were  
23 gathered together. You don't remember seeing the HEMS  
24 doctors before that, do you?

25 A. Sorry, could you say that again, please, sir?

1 Q. Yes. Mr Parnell's account is going upstairs, seeing  
2 Murphy, organising for four or five teams, gathering the  
3 paramedics and their crew mates together, Mr Parnell  
4 leads them back down to the carriage. Mr Parnell's  
5 recollection is that it's after those crews are taken  
6 down by him that the HEMS team follow him down.

7 A. That could be correct, sir, because in my statement  
8 I met the HEMS team at topside. So that would mean the  
9 medical teams were left on the train while I went  
10 topside to get the stretchers. So there would have been  
11 ambulance crews on the train and I met the HEMS team  
12 topside. That would make sense. If that's what  
13 Mr Parnell said.

14 Q. That's a matter for her Ladyship, but I think that's  
15 where we got to with Mr Parnell.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm not sure it was. I thought what  
17 we had with Mr Parnell was: if any ambulance crews were  
18 left in the carriage, it was Mr Craig only.

19 MR SAUNDERS: Forgive me, my Lady, exactly, that's the very  
20 point I'm trying to make.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: But not ambulance "crews" left in the  
22 carriage.

23 MR SAUNDERS: So be it, my Lady, yes.

24 What I'm trying to assist the officer with here is  
25 Mr Parnell's evidence of being topside, arranging for

1 those four to five crews because there was nobody  
2 downstairs, save he did say, as your Ladyship says,  
3 there may have been one other person downstairs.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: But I think that there still seems to  
5 be quite a distinction, does there not, between what  
6 this witness is remembering and what Mr Parnell  
7 remembered?

8 MR SAUNDERS: Very much so, my Lady.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: That's why I asked about people  
10 following behind to pursue the priorities.

11 MR SAUNDERS: Yes. I don't know whether it assists. What  
12 I've tried to do, Mr Jones, is to explain to you what  
13 another officer has said, to see if that helps you,  
14 whether or not you think you may be mistaken as to how  
15 many ambulance personnel were downstairs when you went  
16 topside.

17 A. From what you've just told me, if Mr Parnell had brought  
18 five teams -- five teams to the train?

19 Q. Four to five is what he said, he couldn't remember  
20 specifics.

21 A. When they arrived at the train, they would be the crews  
22 that I saw before going topside, when I met the HEMS  
23 team.

24 Q. Right, well, Mr Parnell is topside and he recalls, as  
25 he's organising with Murphy the four to five crews, you

1 coming topside. Mr Parnell has you topside, the same  
2 time as him, and he's only come up to get the crews that  
3 are needed downstairs. Does that help you?

4 A. No, not at all, sir.

5 Q. Do you actually understand what I'm putting to you?

6 A. I understand what you're saying, sir, but I don't  
7 remember.

8 MR SAUNDERS: My Lady, I'm not sure we're going to progress  
9 matters.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: No. In a sense, what it comes to is  
11 this, Mr Jones: Mr Parnell said that you and he were the  
12 only paramedics in carriage 2 or near carriage 2. He  
13 goes upstairs, up topside, to try to get help, and then  
14 you come up saying, "Where are the personnel we need?"  
15 But that's not what you remember?

16 A. My Lady, I don't remember a lot of things regarding  
17 that. I'm sorry.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: No, don't -- I appreciate it's a very  
19 long time ago, and I don't think you made your statement  
20 until December of 2005. So it's perfectly  
21 understandable, but you will appreciate I'm just trying  
22 with Mr Saunders' help to get to the bottom of what the  
23 evidence is.

24 MR SAUNDERS: In fact, can I deal with another matter?

25 You've described in the body of your statement again the

1 fact that you had to move some bodies.

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. I appreciate this must be very distressing for you.

4 I represent the interests of the family of

5 Fiona Stevenson and I'd like your help in this: we have

6 heard evidence from a man called Bruce Lait. Mr Lait,

7 we understand, is seated -- if we could have [INQ10280-8] ,

8 please. Have you seen this before, Mr Jones?

9 A. Yes, I have, sir.

10 Q. If you see on the bottom, so the platform is on the

11 right to Aldgate, that's the direction of travel going

12 to the right. So the rear of the carriage is on the

13 left-hand side of this plan.

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. D6 is the second from last door. We know that Mr Lait

16 was seated at position 18. Can you see --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- the row of four seats just to the left of D6?

19 A. Yes, sir.

20 Q. Now, because he is coloured green, that means he's male.

21 Next to him on his right, at your position 20, is his

22 partner, dance partner, Crystal Main.

23 In your statement, the statement that I have, you

24 have a man seated in seat 22, which I think is our

25 second plan, I'm afraid I don't have the number. It's

1 the one with the names. Thank you very much.

2 So should we take it that this is the plan you were  
3 using?

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. As I've just pointed out to you on the previous one, and  
6 we can put them side by side, if that would help you, or  
7 one above the other, we believe that at seat 22 was  
8 a female, not a male.

9 A. Quite possibly, sir.

10 Q. There was, as I've just described to you, a male next to  
11 Ms Main at seat 21. Mr Lait's evidence was that  
12 Fiona Stevenson, we believe it to be, was across his  
13 lap. But on Ms Main's lap was a young lady called  
14 Carrie Taylor. She's the lady that's been variously  
15 described as around the pole --

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. -- wrapped around the pole. You obviously go on in this  
18 part of your statement to describe a lady, a young girl,  
19 wrapped around the pole beside the seat. But you  
20 describe her as being on a male, not a female.

21 Could there in fact have been, when you were there,  
22 two ladies across both these passengers' laps?

23 A. Quite possibly, sir. I'd have to refer to my statement  
24 and I don't remember.

25 Q. I'm not sure that will help you, Mr Jones. I'm not

1 trying to keep the statement from you. In the  
2 statement, as I say, you recall a man being in 22 when  
3 we believe on all the evidence it's a female in 22.  
4 What I'm trying to get at are these two things the  
5 Stevensons want to know: whether, when you were there,  
6 Fiona was still across Mr Lait, and who it was that  
7 moved her.

8 A. I can't answer that, sir. I don't know.

9 Q. Because we know that she's moved off Bruce Lait's lap  
10 for him to be able to leave the carriage. Do you follow  
11 that?

12 A. I do, sir. I think you're referring to my statement  
13 about the patient we moved so that somebody could get  
14 up, but I don't believe it was your client, sir.

15 Q. Exactly. It may well be that that's the mistake, that  
16 it's the female at 22, not the male, because in fairness  
17 to you, Mr Jones, you go on to say:

18 "This man said that, if we could move the girl, he  
19 would be able to get off the train, so I do not think he  
20 was too badly injured."

21 That's why I ask you, if it is the man that's saying  
22 it to you, it could be Fiona. Do you see?

23 A. From my recollection, sir, it was a different patient  
24 I was talking about.

25 Q. In fairness, Mr Jones, and your recollection is right,

1 you have mentioned the person that we believe to be  
2 Carrie Taylor because of her position with the pole.

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. That's the effect of your description. It's just  
5 a mistake. But you do recall having to move some  
6 bodies, but I think it's in front, don't you, it's at  
7 position C on the diagram you used, which is in between  
8 the four banks of seats?

9 A. I'm sorry, sir, I'd have to see the other --

10 Q. Yes, we can find that for you, I'm sure. Thank you very  
11 much indeed. So what you believe, the people that you  
12 may have had to move were at C on the diagram you've  
13 marked?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. Now, it may well be -- and one of the reasons I ask  
16 you -- that that's where Fiona Stevenson was eventually  
17 recovered from?

18 A. Mm-hmm.

19 Q. I simply wanted to know whether you can recall whether  
20 you had anything to do with that?

21 A. I'm sorry, sir, I can't help you there.

22 Q. Thank you for your efforts on that, Mr Jones.

23 You've described again that, at the very end of this  
24 procedure, you and Craig Cassidy come through the  
25 carriages. Do you check any of those who are left who

1 have already been checked by at least Dr Lockey, by  
2 yourself and, in Fiona's case, by Dr Quaghebeur, for  
3 vital signs on that final walk-through?

4 A. That's exactly what we did do, sir. That had already  
5 been done, and it was done again by myself and  
6 Craig Cassidy.

7 Q. So we know -- you won't have heard this evidence, I'm  
8 sure -- Dr Quaghebeur said that she checked Fiona for  
9 the pulse in her neck, found nothing. Dr Lockey has  
10 checked. You've already checked when you're triaging  
11 and prioritising, because you know how many have passed  
12 away by then, and then there's a final occasion when you  
13 walk back through with Mr Cassidy?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 MR SAUNDERS: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Jones.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?

17 Questions by MS SHEFF

18 MS SHEFF: I just would like some clarification, please,  
19 Mr Jones, of that last matter, the verification of  
20 death, because what you said earlier was "All people  
21 were checked by me and verified as dead".

22 You said:

23 "I do not specifically recollect checking the bodies  
24 at C."

25 Can we have that plan back?

1 A. I'm sorry, ma'am, I don't understand the question.

2 Q. Do you remember checking all the bodies yourself to

3 verify death, or can you not remember whether you

4 checked the bodies at C or not?

5 A. All the bodies were checked, ma'am.

6 Q. By you personally?

7 A. Yes, ma'am.

8 Q. So do you have that recollection now, independently?

9 A. Not each individual patient, ma'am.

10 Q. Not each individual?

11 A. No, ma'am. It's five years ago, and I don't remember an

12 awful lot of what went on that day, ma'am.

13 Q. Right, but are you assuming, then, that you would have

14 gone and checked each individual fatality for you to be

15 able to announce that there were six fatalities, so you

16 checked at least six people?

17 A. Yes, ma'am.

18 Q. Right. Would one of those also have been the gentleman

19 at B, the male on the floor with his face down who had

20 massive injuries and was dead?

21 A. Yes, ma'am, all the patients who were left on the train

22 were checked by myself, Mr Lockey and Craig Cassidy.

23 Q. Yes. Was that checking done immediately that you saw

24 them on the train or before you finally left the

25 carriage and made the pronouncement of the number of

1 fatalities?

2 A. I'm not sure --

3 Q. Did you do it straightaway, as soon as you saw those

4 people?

5 A. Yes, ma'am. That was part of triaging, ma'am.

6 Q. Right. The people that you had to move at C, in order

7 to allow the man underneath, who was alive, to be

8 triaged by you, how were they arranged before you had to

9 move them? Can you remember? Were they all on top of

10 each other?

11 A. I'm sorry, ma'am, what patient, what people are you

12 talking about?

13 Q. C.

14 A. I don't remember.

15 Q. You remember you said moving two to three people at C to

16 do triage to the man on the floor of the carriage who

17 was alive?

18 A. Yes, ma'am.

19 Q. Before you moved them, can you remember what position

20 they were in?

21 A. They were all on top of each other, ma'am.

22 Q. On top of each other, yes. That included, did it,

23 someone who had very severe head injuries. Was that

24 a woman?

25 A. From my statement, I believe that was the case, ma'am.

1 I don't remember at all. But if my statement states  
2 that, that is correct.

3 MS SHEFF: Thank you very much.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Ms Sheff. Any questions?  
5 Yes, Ms Ormond-Walsh?

6 Questions by MS ORMOND-WALSH

7 MS ORMOND-WALSH: Just one question, if I may. I'm acting  
8 for the HEMS doctors.

9 A. Yes, ma'am.

10 Q. In relation to Dr Lockey's evidence, he's going to say  
11 that he confirmed death in five people, not seven. Were  
12 you aware of that?

13 A. No, ma'am, I don't know how many.

14 Q. In any event, do you have the capacity in your job to  
15 pronounce life extinct by yourself?

16 A. Yes, ma'am, if a crew believe they are dead through  
17 injuries, yes, ma'am.

18 Q. Is it possible that at least one of the bodies was  
19 actually placed outside of the carriage at the time  
20 Dr Lockey was in the carriage?

21 A. That's quite possible, ma'am. I don't remember, but  
22 that is quite possible.

23 MS ORMOND-WALSH: Thank you very much.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Yes, Mr Taylor?

25 Questions by MR TAYLOR

1 MR TAYLOR: Good afternoon, Mr Jones. I just want to refer  
2 you back to the young lady, Carrie Taylor.

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. That's my daughter. Now, when you saw Carrie first of  
5 all, was there a young man with her supporting her head?

6 A. I can't honestly remember, sir.

7 Q. Because we've heard that there was  
8 a Mr Steven Desborough --

9 A. I'm sorry, sir, I can't hear.

10 Q. We've heard that there was a Mr Steven Desborough with  
11 her for quite some time and he was basically supporting  
12 her. You can't remember Mr Desborough being with her?

13 A. No, sir. There was a lot of people there, sir. He may  
14 well have been there, sir, but --

15 Q. He was a civilian, he was in civilian's clothes, he  
16 wasn't a member of the emergency services. And you say  
17 you didn't see Dr Quaghebeur?

18 A. I'm sorry, sir?

19 Q. Dr Quaghebeur?

20 A. I didn't see him?

21 Q. Her, it's a lady.

22 A. Her, sorry. I couldn't say, sir. I've never met or  
23 seen the woman.

24 Q. You didn't see her in the carriage itself?

25 A. No, no, that's not what I said, sir. They may have been

1 there. There was lots of people there. But I couldn't  
2 individually say who these people were.

3 Q. Okay. When Carrie was actually taken out -- first of  
4 all, before we do that, did you take note of any  
5 injuries that Carrie had?

6 A. From memory, sir, she had -- she was wrapped round the  
7 pole. Injury-wise, I can't -- I couldn't honestly say,  
8 sir.

9 Q. Blood?

10 A. I ...

11 Q. You can't remember?

12 A. I'm speculating, sir. It would be wrong of me to do so.

13 Q. It was dark, it was very difficult, I can understand  
14 that.

15 Now, you say you saw Carrie actually taken out of  
16 the carriage.

17 A. No, sir. I saw her and I helped move her on to -- from  
18 where she was, but actually moving from the train,  
19 I didn't see that, sir.

20 Q. Just remind me, then, when she was moved from the pole,  
21 where did she go to from there?

22 A. She went to the floor on a makeshift stretcher which was  
23 a ladder onto the floor, if on the plan, on the second  
24 doors, in the middle.

25 Q. By door 6? Would that be by door 6?

1 A. Sorry, sir, yes, sir.

2 Q. So she was --

3 A. Between doors 5 and 6 in the middle.

4 Q. So the stretcher was laid on the floor, or the makeshift

5 stretcher was laid on the floor, and then Carrie was

6 removed from the pole by you or by --

7 A. Myself and Alan Treacy. From my statement -- up until

8 reading my statement, I couldn't remember who it was,

9 but that would be certainly one of the people. There

10 was a number of us doing this, sir.

11 Q. Right, so the Fire Brigade weren't involved in actually

12 removing --

13 A. Sorry, sir, I think there were fire officers there.

14 Well, there was fire officers there who were assisting

15 us doing that.

16 Q. They helped you; yes?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. They put her on -- you never actually saw Carrie taken

19 from the floor out of the carriage?

20 A. No. Sorry, sir.

21 Q. Okay. Just basically clear this up business with the

22 EEV. You said that you actually opened the door to

23 the --

24 A. Yes, sir.

25 Q. What sort of mechanism? Is it a key and a lock and

1 a handle?

2 A. I've never opened it since, sir. I couldn't tell you.

3 I don't think it was -- I think it was -- I would assume

4 like the back of a lorry with a metal clasp over the top

5 of a handle, but I've never driven the vehicle, I've

6 never opened it.

7 Q. It's a very large vehicle, is it?

8 A. It's -- I believe it's three tonnes.

9 Q. Three tonnes, carrying the equipment; yes?

10 A. Yes, sir.

11 MR TAYLOR: Thank you very much.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Taylor. Any other

13 questions?

14 Thank you very much, Mr Jones, for coming along to

15 tell us what happened. I'm sorry we had to ask you to

16 go over it all over again. Thank you very much.

17 MR KEITH: My Lady, there are three witnesses scheduled for

18 this afternoon. We're a little bit behind. There are

19 two witnesses Craig Cassidy and Alan Treacy, both of the

20 London Ambulance Service, and David Lockey, the HEMS

21 doctor. It seems that we would be unlikely to conclude

22 all three witnesses and there is a difficulty with

23 David Lockey coming back tomorrow. So may I, with your

24 permission, call him next, so that he is at least

25 concluded?

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly, thank you.

2 MR KEITH: Dr Lockey, please.

3 DR DAVID JOHN LOCKEY (affirmed)

4 Questions by MR KEITH

5 MR KEITH: Dr Lockey -- I'm sorry, could you give the court  
6 your full name, please?

7 A. David John Lockey.

8 Q. Doctor, if you could keep your voice up in court, we  
9 would be greatly obliged, because it's quite a large  
10 courtroom, and it's hard to hear witnesses unless you  
11 speak loudly.

12 A. Okay.

13 Q. Are you a registered medical practitioner?

14 A. I am indeed.

15 Q. Could you give the court, please, your qualifications?

16 A. MB, BS, FRCA, FIMC, RCSEd.

17 Q. At the time of the making of your statement to the  
18 police in January 2006, were you employed as  
19 a pre-hospital care doctor at the Royal London?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. Was that the job that you were carrying out also in July  
22 of 2005?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Is the position this: that in the United Kingdom,  
25 pre-hospital care by way of ambulance response is

1 provided by paramedics and technicians?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Does that include the provision of paramedics and  
4 technicians through helicopters and fast response cars?

5 A. It varies in different parts of the country. In London,  
6 the HEMS service has been established for some twenty  
7 years, that's unusual, and that's becoming the norm in  
8 other parts of the country.

9 Q. Are technicians and paramedics attached to the  
10 Helicopter Emergency Medical Service trained differently  
11 to other paramedics or not?

12 A. We take experienced paramedics that go through  
13 a selection process, and then they're trained  
14 specifically for the role as flight paramedics, but they  
15 retain their attachment to the London Ambulance Service.

16 Q. But like other paramedics, they are trained to deal with  
17 all sorts of trauma procedures?

18 A. The trauma that they would see during their HEMS  
19 attachment is a great deal more than they would see in  
20 their normal practice, yes.

21 Q. That's a question of experience rather than training, is  
22 it not?

23 A. Yes. We give them a short training and, after about  
24 a month, they are assessed to see whether they've taken  
25 on board that training before they fly alone with

1 a doctor.

2 Q. Are they permitted, thereafter, to act as medical  
3 incident officers at the scenes of incidents?

4 A. No.

5 Q. They're not trained to do that?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Who would generally act as a medical incident officer,  
8 then?

9 A. A doctor.

10 Q. A doctor?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. You are such a doctor?

13 A. I am indeed.

14 Q. Let me ask you a little bit about your experience, if I  
15 may. May we presume that over the years you've carried  
16 out a number of training exercises with other emergency  
17 services?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. May we also presume that in the course of being a HEMS  
20 doctor, you've carried out trauma processes and you've  
21 attended the scenes of train crashes, train incidents  
22 and deaths and casualties concerning trains?

23 A. That's correct. I've worked for London HEMS since 1996  
24 on and off.

25 Q. On 7 July, were you travelling with a colleague,

1 Dr Gareth Davies, when you received a message from  
2 Central Ambulance Control?  
3 A. Yes.  
4 Q. What was that message?  
5 A. He took the call and, looking at the message log, the  
6 call appeared to be from one of the pilots on the  
7 helipad. Shortly after that, we received another call  
8 from the flight paramedic who sits at London  
9 Ambulance Control headquarters.  
10 Q. The helipad is at the Royal London?  
11 A. Correct.  
12 Q. Is there normally a meeting of HEMS doctors or  
13 paramedics at that time in the morning?  
14 A. No. There would be -- the duty crew for the day would  
15 be there. On this particular occasion, which is usually  
16 the first Thursday of the month now, on that particular  
17 day, we were having our monthly clinical governance  
18 meeting, which would involve a greater than normal  
19 number of doctors and paramedics.  
20 Q. Did you attend that meeting at all?  
21 A. I was on my way to attend that meeting. I had already  
22 attended an earlier meeting at 7.00 and was making my  
23 way across London back to the Royal London.  
24 Q. Right. As a result of the messages, did you go to  
25 Aldgate?

1 A. We were not on duty and we weren't equipped to be on  
2 duty. London HEMS is run by a charity and what we do is  
3 we have one doctor and one paramedic available 24 hours  
4 a day to attend predominantly trauma incidents, but  
5 obviously we're also available for major incidents. So  
6 the messages that were coming through at that point were  
7 relatively unclear, so we continued the short journey to  
8 the Royal London to equip ourselves and then we were  
9 dispatched.

10 Q. Did you continue to the Royal London because you knew  
11 you would be dispatched or you knew you would ask to be  
12 dispatched?

13 A. We continued to the London because that's where we were  
14 going and because we knew that, if we were to go to an  
15 incident, we would require equipment.

16 Q. Do you recall what time you left the Royal London,  
17 having finished your journey to the Royal London, to go  
18 to Aldgate?

19 A. Referring to my statement, if we arrived at 09.34 at  
20 Aldgate, I would imagine that we left the helipad of the  
21 Royal London around 8 minutes before. Somewhere around  
22 there.

23 Q. Let me ask you about how it is that, when you made your  
24 statement, you were able to recollect that it was about  
25 9.34. Did you have a log of any type from the incident?

1 A. I think we've been to enough incidents to know that the  
2 times are going to be questioned later and that's  
3 something that we needed to record.

4 Q. All right. Could we have on the screen, please,  
5 [BARTS16-1]?

6 Dr Gareth Davies prepared a report on the London  
7 bombings. I just want this page, please. He, of  
8 course, was the doctor who was with you. At the bottom  
9 of the page he set out some times. He contacted the  
10 HEMS desk at 09.12. At 09.16 he received a text from  
11 LAS. At 09.18 he received a pager message "Major  
12 incident declared ... - please contact helipad"?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Does that accord with your recollection?

15 A. I don't know exactly what he was saying on the phone.  
16 It does, although, looking at the message log, the times  
17 of LAS declaring a major incident appear to be either  
18 9.18 or 9.24.

19 Q. Well, there were a number of declarations.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. In fact, there was an earlier purported declaration from  
22 Mr Edmonson, and then a declaration by a witness we  
23 heard this morning.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Then a subsequent declaration at 09.24. So, yes,

1 doctor, you're right in that regard.

2 Over the page [BARTS16-2], we see just at the bottom of the  
3 screen:

4 "Dr Lockey and I left the hospital at approximately  
5 09.28 and made our way to Aldgate by land", because you  
6 were in a car of course, and:

7 "We arrived on scene at approximately 09.30."

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Does that seem to you to be about right?

10 A. It may be a few minutes either way, and also, I suppose,  
11 the scene arrival time may have been the time of the  
12 vehicle arriving on scene or may be at the point where  
13 we made contact with the personnel at the surface.

14 Q. When you arrived at Aldgate, do you recall who was  
15 there?

16 A. I recall there were a large number of vehicles.

17 I remember we parked the vehicle and then went to where  
18 people were clustered and tried to get an idea of what  
19 was going on.

20 Q. His report, Dr Davies' report, makes mention of  
21 Mr Edmonson being there.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Do you recollect that?

24 A. I can't say I would recognise him.

25 Q. And an AIO, obviously some officer of some sort.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. What is AIO the acronym for?

3 A. The ambulance incident officer would be the officer in  
4 charge of all the ambulance resources at the scene and  
5 would normally be shadowed by the MIO, once one was  
6 established, so they would work around together.

7 Q. Do you recollect that Dr Davies, your colleague,  
8 declared himself to be the MIO, the medical incident  
9 officer?

10 A. I suspect he would have done.

11 Q. Why does protocol demand that somebody do that?

12 A. Basically, the first ambulance to arrive would be the  
13 AIO until taken over by someone more senior. The first  
14 doctor on scene would be the MIO, unless another one  
15 came later who was more experienced.

16 So although we're not specifically part of the  
17 statutory response in the LESLP plan, normally, when we  
18 arrive at an incident, if we're dispatched to an  
19 incident where people may have trauma, so we would be  
20 dispatched in our normal way, the HEMS doctor would be  
21 the MIO until someone more senior arrived, if, indeed,  
22 they did.

23 Q. On this occasion, that was Dr Davies.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Were you party to any of his attempts to communicate

1 with Central Ambulance Control? Did you, yourself, try  
2 to use a radio or to communicate with any of your  
3 emergency personnel, colleagues?  
4 A. No, what I was basically -- I was closely linked to him.  
5 We were walking around at the scene trying to establish  
6 what the infrastructure was and he made some attempts to  
7 communicate.  
8 Q. His report, which I won't take you to, makes reference  
9 to the fact that, although on his mobile phone he could  
10 get a good signal --  
11 A. Yes.  
12 Q. -- it was extremely hard to get a dial tone to be able  
13 to call through to the Royal London --  
14 A. Yes.  
15 Q. -- to make arrangements for the identification of the  
16 hospital to which casualties would be sent?  
17 A. Yes.  
18 Q. Were you, at the time, aware of those difficulties?  
19 A. I didn't try to make any phone calls until I had been  
20 down to the train and come back up again, and then  
21 I could make no further calls.  
22 Q. Dealing then with what you recollect from going down to  
23 the tunnel, you went down with Dr Davies or not?  
24 A. Yes.  
25 Q. What was the purpose of you both going down?

1 A. Well, we recognised that the actual scene was actually  
2 some distance, and not in communication with the  
3 surface, so our plan was that we would go and find out  
4 exactly what was happening, and then, if it was as we  
5 thought it might be -- in other words, that there were  
6 crews there, there were casualties there, and there were  
7 fatalities there -- one of us would remain on as the  
8 forward medical incident officer and one of us would  
9 withdraw to the surface and carry on with the command  
10 and control.

11 Q. By this stage, though, doctor, was it not apparent to  
12 you that paramedics had got there before you?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Presumably, all the necessary emergency personnel who  
15 were there needed to carry out first aid, the cutting of  
16 passengers out of the wreckage and so on, would already  
17 be there?

18 A. Not necessarily, no.

19 Q. Not necessarily. Were you aware of how many people had  
20 got there before you?

21 A. No.

22 Q. So when you got down to the tunnel, did you appreciate  
23 that there were paramedics and London Fire Brigade  
24 personnel there?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. What stage had things reached in the carriage when you  
2 got there?

3 A. We moved fairly rapidly to the inner cordon, which was  
4 the ticket office of the Tube. We found some senior  
5 fire officers there, and they briefed us on what they  
6 thought the scene safety issues were. They told us that  
7 they didn't think there was a CBRN threat, but they felt  
8 that the secondary device situation was still a high  
9 risk, that it would take some time to establish that  
10 there wasn't a risk, that we should proceed, if we  
11 wished to take that risk. But they did tell us that  
12 there were survivors still in the tunnel and there were  
13 crews working down there. So we moved straight down to  
14 the platform.

15 When we arrived on the platform, we didn't see  
16 anyone between the top of the stairs and the platform.  
17 There was a -- someone from the Fire Brigade standing at  
18 the end of the platform. He directed us along the  
19 rails, so we walked the short distance to the train.  
20 When we got to the train, there was -- I think it  
21 was a white helmeted fire officer, so a senior fire  
22 officer, whom we communicated with. I remember Mr Jones  
23 and Mr Cassidy were there.

24 Q. Inside the carriage or outside the carriage?

25 A. I think Mr Cassidy was inside the train dealing with one

1 of the casualties, and I presume, from the evidence that  
2 I've just heard, that Mr Jones had just come back down  
3 from the surface. I know Mr Jones well because I've  
4 worked with him before.

5 Q. Just pausing there, from Dr Davies' report, we know you  
6 arrived at the scene about 9.30. From what you've said,  
7 there was some discussion with colleagues and Ambulance  
8 Service officers at ground level. Can you give us some  
9 idea of what time you think you might have reached the  
10 train? How long after your arrival at Aldgate was it?

11 A. Six minutes, something like that.

12 Q. So did you speak to Messrs Jones and Cassidy?

13 A. I'm just thinking now. If it was 34 when we arrived,  
14 I was certainly -- I think in my statement I was  
15 attending patients at 44, 45. So around that time.  
16 Yes, I did speak to them.

17 Q. What was it decided that you should do?

18 A. Well, I decided what I was going to do. Basically,  
19 I made a rapid assessment of the carriage and the scene,  
20 spoke to Mr Jones. I established fairly quickly there  
21 were three survivors still remaining in the carriage,  
22 and I was told that the other patients had died.  
23 I did a rapid retriage, which took seconds, and  
24 established that, of the three patients, one of them  
25 seemed to be -- they were all priority 1 casualties,

1 they all had life-threatening injuries, but it was clear  
2 that one of the patients, who I think was already being  
3 moved around at that point, which was, I think, a female  
4 on the far side of the carriage, was the priority  
5 patient. So she was removed first. Then I had a short  
6 discussion about the other two patients who were both  
7 speaking.

8 There was a question that one of them was trapped by  
9 her shattered limb to some debris.

10 So I basically decided that the priority was to  
11 remove them all as quickly as possible and I didn't  
12 really see any huge obstruction to doing that. So  
13 I spoke to a senior fire officer and I told him that  
14 I would have the patients out in quite a short time,  
15 probably five or ten minutes, and that I would like  
16 three stretchers and appropriate fire staff to carry  
17 them.

18 Q. Thank you very much. I just want to take you back  
19 a little bit and just break it up into stages. When you  
20 arrived, had you ascertained that there were three live  
21 casualties? We take it from the fact that the remainder  
22 of the people on the carriage were dead, that all the  
23 other live casualties had been removed by the time you  
24 arrived.

25 A. That's my assumption and I don't recall seeing any other

1 lives casualties on the way down coming up.

2 Q. Therefore, the only people with whom you were concerned  
3 in terms of the provision of medical treatment and  
4 triaging were the three casualties at the end?

5 A. Yes. My job was to establish the number of casualties,  
6 the severity of injuries, whether they required any  
7 treatment on scene as opposed to moving them to the  
8 surface, and ensuring that the patients I was told were  
9 dead were dead.

10 Q. We will shortly be coming to the evidence of a witness  
11 who reports how, having applied an oxygen mask and  
12 having cannulated one of the casualties, he hands over  
13 the casualty to somebody he believes was a HEMS doctor.  
14 But in truth, the position is that you were only  
15 concerned with the three living casualties at the end of  
16 the carriage. In fact, we know them to be Kira Mason,  
17 Andrew Brown and Martine Wright, the three at the rear  
18 of the carriage. You weren't involved with the care of  
19 anybody who subsequently died?

20 A. I believe that to be true. I've had some difficulty  
21 establishing exactly which patients were which, because  
22 obviously there were patients already at the entrance to  
23 the station and, also, patients that went back to my own  
24 hospital would have been mixed with patients from other  
25 incidents.

1 Q. We understand, but I mean, in the train itself, you  
2 weren't concerned with anybody in particular who, whilst  
3 you were in the tunnel, you then appreciated had died.  
4 All the dead had died by the time you arrived?

5 A. That's what I understood and that's what I was told,  
6 yes.

7 Q. Do you recall there being any bodies on the tracks?

8 A. That's something which I've been looking at a lot when  
9 I've looked at the statements. You will see in my  
10 statement I don't actually mention anyone on the tracks.

11 Q. Well, you recall that there were -- you were informed by  
12 a fire officer there were two bodies in the tunnel.

13 A. Yes, I apologise.

14 Q. You didn't certify them as being dead?

15 A. I did not certify them being dead, but Dr Davies does  
16 say that he saw one of the patients on the way from the  
17 station to -- from the platform to the train. But  
18 I didn't see that patient.

19 Q. Just jumping ahead, you were concerned with certifying  
20 death in relation to five casualties. Do you know or  
21 recollect why it was that you didn't certify death in  
22 relation to all the casualties?

23 A. I was informed quite clearly that there was no question  
24 of the other patient being deceased. I took from that  
25 that the injuries were incompatible with life, and

1 I didn't see the patient.

2 Q. I'm sorry, I don't follow you, this is in relation to --

3 A. The patient on the tracks, that's correct.

4 Q. You were told?

5 A. I was told by a senior fire officer and a paramedic --

6 Q. That they were dead?

7 A. That they were dead and I did not need to see them.

8 Q. Right. Given that your role, one of your roles, was to

9 certify death --

10 A. Pronounce life extinct.

11 Q. -- was that not to some extent an abrogation of your

12 function, because you have a role to certify death that

13 the firemen do not?

14 A. As we've heard, paramedics can indeed confirm death,

15 but, yes, in retrospect, I probably would go and see

16 them now, but I didn't.

17 Q. Could we please have on the screen [INQ8390-1]? In

18 relation to those persons whom you did certify as being

19 dead, that is to say in relation to whom life was

20 extinct, can we deal, please, with the five persons whom

21 you've marked there on the map. Do you recognise the

22 plan?

23 A. I do.

24 Q. In relation to A?

25 A. That's the patient who was alive, who was the first

1 patient who came out of the carriage after I got there.

2 Q. Do you recollect that that was the patient with injuries  
3 to the -- the loss of a left hand and severe injuries to  
4 the left lower leg, Kira Mason?

5 A. I have -- yes, I think so. I can't recollect exactly  
6 what her injuries were.

7 Q. All right. B, do you recollect who B was?

8 A. Not exactly, no. I know that --

9 Q. You say in your statement "a youngish male".

10 A. Yes, I think my understanding of it is that A is where  
11 a semi-conscious female, which is the first one that  
12 came out, was. C, or certainly towards the left-hand  
13 side of that carriage were the two remaining survivors,  
14 both of which who had severe limb injuries, both of whom  
15 were speaking, and then the deceased were -- one was  
16 underneath the doors at -- just in front of X, and the  
17 others were distributed sort of B, D and E along the  
18 carriage.

19 Q. In fact, Doctor, it may be that your recollection is  
20 a little faulty there, because in your statement, B you  
21 describe as "a youngish male", a white-skinned male, one  
22 of the persons whom you certify as being life extinct.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. C you thought was a black or dark-skinned male, clearly  
25 dead and trapped under the doors of the carriage that

1 had been blown off.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. We've heard evidence that it may well be that the  
4 appearance was conditioned by the presence of soot and  
5 dirt and debris from the explosion. At D, you describe  
6 three further bodies. Do you recollect anything more of  
7 those persons?

8 A. No. I --

9 Q. One of them had very severe head injuries, you recollect  
10 in your statement.

11 A. Yes, I do recall seeing some with severe head injuries.  
12 Basically, what happened is that, after the live  
13 casualties were removed, someone made a comment that one  
14 of the patients had been seen to move some time before  
15 I arrived, before they had died, so I was fully aware of  
16 the fact that I needed to be extremely sure that all the  
17 patients were, indeed, deceased on the carriage and,  
18 basically, what I did then was I made my way down the  
19 carriage all the way to the other end, pronouncing life  
20 extinct as I went. I then repeated the process coming  
21 back and then I asked Mr Jones and Mr Cassidy to do the  
22 same independent of myself.

23 Q. So the final position, then, is this: there was one  
24 deceased person at C, a deceased person at B in the  
25 doors of D8, three persons deceased at D, but in your

1 statement you were unsure as to whether or not that  
2 position was slightly to the right, as we look at it on  
3 the carriage, and further along, and therefore you  
4 marked them as D or E, but in truth there were three  
5 people. Do you recollect?

6 A. I'm obviously influenced by my own statement. What  
7 I can recollect is that the live patients were to the  
8 left of doors D8. The patient at A I'm sure about and  
9 I know that the -- that there was one body under the  
10 doors near the X, and I remember that the others were an  
11 uncertain distance moving off to the right. That's all  
12 I remember.

13 Q. And no life was pronounced extinct by you in relation to  
14 the two deceased outside the carriage?

15 A. My understanding of the two deceased outside the  
16 carriage is that possibly one of them was in the  
17 carriage and removed to the rails.

18 Q. That's quite correct, Carrie Taylor.

19 A. Then the other one I think was on the other side of the  
20 train further down the tunnel.

21 Q. No, but had been blown out of the train and had remained  
22 on the tracks thereafter?

23 A. Yes.

24 MR KEITH: All right. Doctor, thank you very much. Will  
25 you stay there? There may be some further questions for

1 you.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

3 Questions by MR COLTART

4 MR COLTART: Only a few questions, Doctor, if I may. Can we  
5 just have your plan back up on the screen, please, we  
6 were looking at a second ago?

7 I represent the interests of the young man who was  
8 eventually found at point B on your plan.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Can you recall now whether you saw any medical treatment  
11 being applied to that young man when you first arrived  
12 at the carriage?

13 A. I think that Mr Cassidy was dealing with one of the  
14 patients that I knew to be alive further along the  
15 carriage, right at the end, sort of between 16 and 17.

16 I don't recall -- I didn't actually think there was  
17 anyone else in the carriage at that point.

18 Q. When you say no one else, do you mean no other paramedic  
19 in the carriage?

20 A. No other rescuers.

21 Q. No other rescuers?

22 A. No. I think there were people moving in and out.

23 Mr Cassidy was standing there dealing with one of the  
24 patients, and I think there were fire personnel getting  
25 on and off the train, and I think Mr Jones then got into

1 the carriage at around the same time that I did, having  
2 been -- obviously been there before.

3 Q. Are you able to say whether the young man at B was, in  
4 fact, already dead by the time you arrived or whether he  
5 might have died whilst you were there?

6 A. I was told that he was deceased when I arrived.

7 Q. Right. Just pausing there for a moment, can you  
8 remember who told you that?

9 A. I was -- no, I can't. I presume it was Mr Jones or  
10 Mr Cassidy. They were the only two paramedics that  
11 I actually knew there, and I have seen in their  
12 statements that they've said they've approximated when  
13 he died, or one of them has.

14 Q. When you say you've seen in their statements, at what  
15 stage have you seen their witness statements?

16 A. I saw their witness statements, I don't know, some time  
17 ago. One of them.

18 Q. I'm not suggesting there's anything improper about this,  
19 but I just want to get to the bottom of it. In what  
20 circumstances were you sent copies of their witness  
21 statements?

22 A. I wasn't. I saw it because I spoke to them.

23 Q. Right. You saw it because you spoke to them. Did you,  
24 at that point, or indeed at any other point, have any  
25 discussion with them about what had happened to the

1 young man at point B?

2 A. No. We've discussed the whole incident, obviously --

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. -- at times, because they work in the same organisation  
5 as I do.

6 Q. So this is Mr Jones and Mr Cassidy?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. What was Mr Jones' assessment of the incident as a whole  
9 in your discussions with him?

10 A. I think similar to the evidence that he's just given.  
11 However, I don't think anyone would ever say that any  
12 major incident has gone perfectly, but I thought that  
13 the part of the major incident that I saw, in terms of  
14 after I went underground at Aldgate, actually, in terms  
15 of the time that we were down there, the time to clear  
16 the scene and what we did, although I accept the fact  
17 that there wasn't a great deal of medical intervention  
18 to perform, actually went relatively smoothly from that  
19 point on.

20 Q. Did you actually read Mr Jones' witness statement?

21 A. I mean, I didn't read it in detail.

22 Q. Was it obvious to you, from reading the statement, or  
23 from your discussions with him, there had been a severe  
24 shortage of stretchers at the scene?

25 A. I have seen that in several places and I've read the

1 transcripts of the evidence before I attended today, and  
2 I've seen that mentioned before.

3 My own -- obviously, I thought about that and my own  
4 perspective on that is that I asked the senior fire  
5 officer -- I told him that we would need three  
6 stretchers quite soon, and, when the patients were  
7 moved, they were there.

8 Q. Last issue. In relation to Mr Parnell, he is  
9 a colleague of yours as well.

10 A. He works -- at the time, he was working on our Physician  
11 Response Unit, which is slightly different. The  
12 organisation I'm -- that I've told you about before, the  
13 24-hour trauma cover is separate from the unit that he's  
14 working on. He works on a car which basically goes to  
15 medical things rather than trauma things around the  
16 London area, whereas we go to trauma incidents in the  
17 whole London area.

18 Q. I can short-circuit this. Have you ever had any  
19 discussions with Mr Parnell about the treatment of the  
20 young man at point B on your plan?

21 A. I have to say I don't recall Mr Parnell being there.

22 Q. He was at your debrief at the Royal London Hospital  
23 afterwards. Do you recall him being there, for example?

24 A. There were a large number of people there. I know  
25 I went to a debrief and I've seen the notes from it, but

1 I can't remember exactly who was there, no.

2 MR COLTART: Thank you very much.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

4 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing, thank you, my Lady.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?

6 Questions by MS SHEFF

7 MS SHEFF: Dr Lockey, the one body under the doors that you

8 saw near X, that's the one that you've also marked at

9 point C. That's the same body, is it, that you're

10 talking about?

11 A. Yes, I think so.

12 Q. Can I just repeat that? I just want to clarify that,

13 when you describe seeing a body under the doors near X,

14 that's the one that you've marked on as C on your plan.

15 A. Yes, I think so.

16 Q. In your witness statement, you described that body as

17 a black or dark-skinned male of Somali appearance.

18 A. That is not the statement that I wrote. That was

19 a statement that a police officer wrote for me, although

20 I obviously agreed it afterwards, and I wouldn't

21 describe anyone as coming from a particular country.

22 However, in the discussion, he asked me about the

23 colour of the man's skin and whether I thought he was

24 Asian or whatever, and that's how we got to someone of

25 slightly more North African appearance than perhaps

1 Asian appearance. But it was not something that I would  
2 have stated myself, if I'd written the statement.

3 Q. Okay, so thinking about that now, can I ask you this:  
4 have you previously seen victims of explosions with  
5 blast injuries?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. You are aware, are you, that those close to the site of  
8 the explosion can very often suffer very severe burns  
9 and even charring of the skin --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- which can turn the skin black.

12 A. I work in a Burns Unit as well.

13 Q. Yes, indeed. So you might not have been aware, then,  
14 that this particular male who --

15 A. Was white?

16 Q. -- was white, he was, in fact, Lee Baisden, whose family  
17 I represent, and at his post-mortem he was found to have  
18 flash and deep burn injuries over his body.

19 Would that have been consistent, therefore, with the  
20 appearance of somebody with black skin?

21 A. I believe not.

22 Q. So are you suggesting that this could have been somebody  
23 who was of black skinned appearance, originally black --

24 A. Yes, I felt that that was the case, and I recall seeing  
25 a head underneath the window of a door, the door had

1    been blown on to it, and I may have been mistaken, but  
2    I didn't feel that that patient was white and I am used  
3    to seeing patients with blast injuries.

4    Q. So that was the impression that you had?

5    A. Yes.

6    Q. I suggest that you were mistaken about that. The X  
7    actually does mark the site of the explosion and the  
8    fact that the body was so close to that explosion does  
9    indicate, we believe, that the body received those  
10   injuries from the charring of the skin as a result and  
11   that Lee Baisden was that man who was close to the  
12   original site of the injury.

13   You don't take that view, I suspect?

14   A. I can't be certain either way. I have thought about it  
15   since and I came back to my original conclusion.

16   Q. It was, however, a scene of total carnage and body parts  
17   were all over the place, and it must have been quite  
18   traumatic just taking in the scene when you first saw  
19   it. So is there a possibility that you are mistaken  
20   about that?

21   A. There is a possibility.

22   MS SHEFF: Thank you very much.

23   LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Ms Canby?

24   Questions by MS CANBY

25   MS CANBY: Dr Lockey, just one matter on behalf of Transport

1 for London. You wrote an article for the Journal of  
2 Emergency Medicine, I think, at the end of July 2005,  
3 with some of your colleagues?

4 A. Resuscitation, yes.

5 Q. Yes. In that, you said that the electrical current was  
6 confirmed as switched off by the time you arrived --

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. -- and that most smoke had cleared on arrival.

9 Can you remember who it was who confirmed to you  
10 that the electrical current had been switched off?

11 A. I think it was as we went through the inner cordon at  
12 the beginning of the -- where the ticket barrier is, the  
13 senior fire officer told us that -- he gave us an update  
14 of what the hazards were. He told us that, as I've said  
15 before, the CBRN state was probably okay, the secondary  
16 devices were not clear, and that the current was  
17 confirmed as off.

18 MS CANBY: Thank you very much.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Simcock?

20 Questions by MS SIMCOCK

21 MS SIMCOCK: Thank you, my Lady. Doctor, when you first  
22 went down to the train and boarded the carriage, you've  
23 mentioned two paramedics whom you knew who were there,  
24 Craig Cassidy and Steve Jones. Do you remember in  
25 a statement of 17 January 2006 saying that there were

1 other ambulance personnel present on the train when you  
2 got there?

3 A. No, I don't remember. As I say, when I got on to the --  
4 to D8, I went up the ladder and looked to the left. He  
5 was the only one that I recall being there. But I know  
6 that there were other people who were getting on and off  
7 the carriage at the time I arrived.

8 Q. In January of 2006, when you were giving a statement, if  
9 your recollection then was that ambulance personnel were  
10 present, is that likely to be more accurate than your  
11 recollection now?

12 A. I would imagine so.

13 MS SIMCOCK: I'm grateful.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Ormond-Walsh?

15 Questions by MS ORMOND-WALSH

16 MS ORMOND-WALSH: Dr Lockey, there's a potential for a bit  
17 of confusion in relation to the management structure  
18 between the London Ambulance Service and how it fits in  
19 with the HEMS service?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Can you help us with who employs whom, please?

22 A. Yes, the London Ambulance is a charity and basically  
23 employs doctors via --

24 Q. Yes, the HEMS service is a charity.

25 A. The HEMS service, yes. Via the Royal London Hospital

1 and paramedics are seconded for a period of, I believe  
2 it's nine months now, from the London Ambulance Service  
3 to work with us, and we always have -- one of the  
4 seconded paramedics will be sitting at an  
5 Ambulance Control filtering calls for us to go to,  
6 around four a day, from around 4,000, 3,000 or 4,000  
7 calls taken in a 24-hour period, and one paramedic and  
8 one doctor are available 24 hours a day with  
9 a consultant on call for telephone advice.

10 Q. Is it right that the only people in the HEMS service  
11 that are employed by the Barts and the London NHS Trust  
12 are the doctors, is that right?

13 A. By Barts and the London, yes. The only medical people.

14 Q. You've mentioned something called a statutory first  
15 response and the LESLP plan.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Tell us more about that and why you mentioned it,  
18 please.

19 A. I think to put it in context, I mean, the doctors that  
20 work for us are all fairly passionate about trauma and  
21 they would be very -- they'd want to be first on scene  
22 at any of these incidents, and what normally happens is  
23 London HEMS has been involved in pretty much most of the  
24 major incidents in the last 20 years in London.  
25 Usually, the mechanism for that is that, because

1 it's felt by the dispatcher, by our dispatcher, that  
2 there are likely to be patients with traumatic injury,  
3 we're dispatched directly there and are there before  
4 a main incident is declared, usually. In the LESLP  
5 plan, the HEMS service is something that can be called  
6 on but only after consultation of the emergency  
7 services.

8 So in other words, the Ambulance Service at a higher  
9 level needs to actually decide whether it's appropriate  
10 for us to go to an incident and which incident it should  
11 be.

12 Q. Thank you. Going back with your evidence to the day in  
13 question and when you were on the carriage, do you know  
14 how long it took to get the casualties that were  
15 seriously injured out of the carriage?

16 A. I believe it was 7 minutes. That involved -- the first  
17 patient, as I've said, was already being mobilised with  
18 some fire personnel. The other two patients, whom  
19 I spoke to briefly, one of them was tangled up with some  
20 debris, which I untangled personally, and then moved  
21 them out as soon as the stretchers arrived. So it was  
22 about -- around 7 minutes.

23 Q. Why would you have stopped a paramedic from putting  
24 a drip into a patient before she was moved?

25 A. We were aware of the possibility that the scene was

1 unsafe. Certainly our experience, from talking to other  
2 colleagues in the Madrid bombings, where there were ten  
3 different devices, I believe, on four trains, led us to  
4 believe that we should try to clear the patients away  
5 from the potential danger as soon as possible. I didn't  
6 feel that taking the time to cannulate someone was  
7 actually going to change their outcome in any way.  
8 So I felt that interventions would be much better  
9 performed a few minutes later, at the surface, in good  
10 lighting conditions, where an infrastructure was forming  
11 up rapidly.

12 Q. You haven't been here to hear the evidence, but there  
13 has been some talk of defibrillators. What part would  
14 they play in relation to any casualties in this sort of  
15 an incident?

16 A. All London Ambulance Service vehicles have got  
17 defibrillators on, and our fast response cars and our  
18 helicopter have defibrillators. However, we hardly,  
19 hardly ever use them. Patients that have cardiac arrest  
20 from trauma are virtually never in a rhythm where  
21 a defibrillator would be useful.

22 So when they have a cardiac arrest, it's usually not  
23 one which would be amenable to being shocked. So it  
24 wouldn't be my first piece of equipment that I would  
25 take with me.

1 Q. Last question, Dr Lockey. Are you aware of any delay at  
2 all in relation to the HEMS service from the moment that  
3 the HEMS service were aware that there was one or more  
4 incidents?

5 A. I think we can only go when we know what we're going to  
6 and where it is. We want to be on the scene and treat  
7 people as soon as possible. That's really the principle  
8 of our service.

9 There was a short delay in establishing exactly what  
10 was going on. There were apparently seven or eight  
11 incidents going on initially, and it would have been  
12 a disaster for us to give our -- put all our limited  
13 resources to an incident where there wasn't actually an  
14 incident going on. So I think what we did was we got  
15 our teams together. We were lucky, as we've heard,  
16 there was a meeting on, so we could actually send teams  
17 to every single incident. We got that ready, and then,  
18 as soon as we knew that there was -- that there were  
19 definite fatalities or serious injuries at Aldgate, we  
20 moved there as soon as possible, and I estimate that to  
21 be around 9.20.

22 MS ORMOND-WALSH: Thank you very much, Dr Lockey.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any more questions?

24 Doctor, just one from me about the charity that runs  
25 HEMS. It sounds an admirable organisation. How come

1 it's been set up?

2 A. Why was it set up? It was set up following a Royal  
3 College of Surgeons report talking about poor trauma  
4 care in the UK back in 1988, and it was set up to try to  
5 sort that problem out and provide advanced medical care  
6 at the scene of incidents, because we recognised that  
7 there are some interventions that can make a difference  
8 if you perform them well, and also it enables us to  
9 triage patients to appropriate hospitals.

10 In the last year, there are now three trauma centres  
11 working in London out of the 30 or 40 emergency  
12 departments that there are, but for many years now we've  
13 been assessing patients on scene, doing interventions  
14 and taking them to the place that we think will treat  
15 them the best.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Several times now I've heard the  
17 question of "in the UK". Does that mean that there was  
18 a time when our response to trauma victims in the UK  
19 wasn't as good as other countries?

20 A. It depends which other countries. I think it's fair to  
21 say that having doctors in pre-hospital care has been  
22 controversial over the years. The training that  
23 paramedics and the skill base the paramedics have does  
24 vary in different countries. In most Western European  
25 countries, medical pre-hospital care is much more

1 established than it is here, although it's becoming much  
2 more established here and is due to become  
3 a sub-specialty in its own right in the next year or so.  
4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much, Doctor.  
5 A. Thank you, my Lady.  
6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right, what do you want to do now,  
7 Mr Keith? Do you want to complete another witness or  
8 would you rather break? What do people want to do?  
9 MR KEITH: My Lady, if your court staff can bear it, I must  
10 say I think it would be preferable if we could complete  
11 Mr Cassidy, lest we find ourselves with too great  
12 a backlog tomorrow to be able to accommodate.  
13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You can see the faces; I can't,  
14 Mr Keith.  
15 MR KEITH: If I could perhaps say that neither of them are  
16 laughing or smiling in any way. So I think all I can do  
17 is apologise to them for the extra burden that will  
18 bring to bear on them and invite you to continue, if  
19 they feel they can.  
20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Would just a couple of minutes' break  
21 help?  
22 MR KEITH: I think that would, my Lady.  
23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: We'll have a five-minute break and  
24 then we'll try to complete the witness.  
25 (3.40 pm)

1 (A short break)  
2 (3.45 pm)  
3 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call Craig Cassidy?  
4 MR CRAIG CASSIDY (affirmed)  
5 Questions by MR KEITH  
6 MR KEITH: Is your name Mr Craig Cassidy?  
7 A. Yes.  
8 Q. Mr Cassidy I have been aware that you have been in court  
9 waiting, or certainly in the court building, waiting  
10 since 12.00. I'm sorry we haven't got to you before  
11 now.  
12 In July of 2005, were you attached to the Poplar  
13 ambulance station in E1?  
14 A. Yes.  
15 Q. Were you a paramedic there?  
16 A. Yes.  
17 Q. On 7 July, were you assigned to a fast response car?  
18 A. Yes.  
19 Q. Was it what is known as a single-crewed car; that is to  
20 say there's one of you?  
21 A. Yes.  
22 Q. Was it, I think, a Vauxhall Zafira?  
23 A. Yes.  
24 Q. Was your call sign EC, Echo Charlie, 46?  
25 A. Yes.

1 Q. What were you wearing?  
2 A. Standard uniform.  
3 Q. Which is?  
4 A. Dark green trousers, green shirt.  
5 Q. So a green uniform. Were you wearing any sort of tabard  
6 on top or reflective jacket?  
7 A. I had a jacket with me.  
8 Q. Were you wearing it?  
9 A. I wore it when I went down to the scene, yes.  
10 Q. What colour is that?  
11 A. A high-vis, green colour.  
12 Q. So you were green all over?  
13 A. Yes.  
14 Q. I think you were actually en route to a call in  
15 Liverpool Street because of a call that a man had  
16 collapsed in an office when you were flagged down by  
17 a police officer outside Aldgate?  
18 A. I believe it was a police officer, yes.  
19 Q. At any rate, the London Ambulance Service material shows  
20 that you arrived at 09.16. Could we have [LAS4-2],  
21 please?  
22 "EC46, first fast response on scene, 09.16, Aldgate  
23 Underground station, running call."  
24 Was that -- does that phrase "running call" mean  
25 because you were flagged down?

1 A. Yes, it does.

2 Q. No doubt you were told when you arrived that there had  
3 been an incident in the tunnel?

4 A. The officer told me -- at that time, I was told it was  
5 possibly a train crash.

6 Q. When you got to the front of the station, was it  
7 apparent that there were a large number of people, some  
8 injured, some not?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Were they being attended to by any paramedics, as far as  
11 you could see?

12 A. There was one paramedic on the pavement to my right-hand  
13 side dealing with the patients.

14 Q. Did you recognise him or her?

15 A. I did recognise him, yes, but I didn't know his name.

16 Q. Do you now know his name?

17 A. I did, but I've forgotten it, sorry.

18 Q. That's all right. You parked opposite and you walked  
19 across to help. Is that right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Were you just about to speak to the paramedic and to  
22 offer your help when a police officer said to you, "Are  
23 you ready to go down?"

24 A. I tapped the paramedic on the shoulder to show that  
25 I was there and, at that moment, I turned to my left,

1 another paramedic arrived, and again, I'm not sure if  
2 it's a police officer or a fire officer, but appeared at  
3 the gates to the station and said "Are we ready to go to  
4 the train?"

5 Q. Was the other paramedic who had arrived at that point  
6 a man you knew to be Steve, Steve Jones?

7 A. I later learned that his name was Steve, yes.

8 Q. Certainly in your witness statement of November 2005, it  
9 refers to that paramedic as being a motorcycle paramedic  
10 as being Steve?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. You must have found out between July 2005  
13 and November 2005?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. We know from Mr Jones that he went down or he recalls  
16 that he went down with another man called David or  
17 Tony Parnell. Do you know Mr Parnell?

18 A. I know Tony Parnell, yes.

19 Q. Do you recall him being there when you went down to the  
20 track?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Is that a question of being sure that he wasn't there or  
23 not being sure whether he was there or not?

24 A. In my memory, he was not there. I only saw him when  
25 I left the event later.

1 Q. What, when you left Aldgate altogether?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. On the way down, were you told something about the  
4 nature of the incident and the risks, whether the power  
5 was off, whether it was a bomb and so on?

6 A. I went down with a crew of firefighters. On the way  
7 down, I asked if the power was off as we carried on  
8 walking, so that didn't hold us up. Another firefighter  
9 came running up the stairs towards us and told us they  
10 believed it was an explosion.

11 Q. As you neared the bombed carriage -- I'm not going to  
12 ask you about the appearance of the carriage, we've  
13 heard a great deal of evidence about the effects of the  
14 bomb in it -- did you see what appeared to be a person  
15 lying on the track adjacent to the carriage?

16 A. I saw a -- possibly a person, but there's some people  
17 crouching over a red blanket about 100 yards further  
18 down.

19 Q. But from the way they were crouching down, obviously  
20 doing something to the person or attending to them, and  
21 the existence of a blanket, it was plain to you that  
22 there was a person there?

23 A. I assumed it was a person, yes.

24 Q. Did you consider going across and helping and seeing  
25 whether you could help the firefighters?

1 A. I considered it, but they indicated to me quite clearly  
2 that the patient was dead.

3 Q. Could we have, please, on the screen [INQ8379-1] ? Do you  
4 recognise this as a map or a plan that you marked in  
5 relation to what you recall of 7/7?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Do you remember which door you entered the carriage by?

8 A. Door 6 and door 5. Sorry, yes, door 6 and door 5.

9 Q. So the second set of doors along?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Did you go into the carriage with anybody else; for  
12 example, Steve Jones or any of the other paramedics who  
13 may or may not have been there?

14 A. In my memory, I recall going into the carriage with  
15 Steve Jones.

16 Q. Did you go on board at the same time as he did?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. When you went inside, were there members of the  
19 Fire Brigade already there?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Where did you and Mr Jones respectively go?

22 A. We had a quick, very quick, conversation at that  
23 position there about the patients to our left-hand side,  
24 quickly made the choice that Steve would take care of  
25 that end, and I got back out of the train and went

1 further down to come in nearer the explosion sites.

2 Q. Did you go in through D8?

3 A. No, I couldn't get in through D8 because of the  
4 condition of the metal there. We came in through the  
5 next carriage along.

6 Q. You were the paramedic who went in via carriage 3  
7 through a glass window?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Up a ladder through a glass window that had been smashed  
10 and was open --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- and then through the interconnecting door?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Right. What was the purpose of you entering the  
15 carriage? I apologise for asking what may seem to be  
16 a very obvious question. Were you there to triage?  
17 Were you there to gather information for a sit rep, or  
18 were you there to provide first aid?

19 A. It was kind of a combination of all three, but my main  
20 job there was to enable extrication of the patients  
21 rapidly.

22 Q. What did you understand to be Mr Jones' role?

23 A. Mr Jones, at that point, was back at D6 and D5 dealing  
24 with the patients at that end.

25 Q. But in terms of whether or not he was able to provide

1 first aid, did you understand whether or not he was in  
2 a position to do so?  
3 A. I assume he was in a position to do so.  
4 Q. On the way down, was there ever a discussion between  
5 you, during which he said, "Look, I'll do triage, I will  
6 assess. I've got no first aid with me, but I've got  
7 a triage pack, and then I'll go back upstairs and tell  
8 our colleagues and make a sit rep" or, to the contrary,  
9 "I can provide first aid", was there any discussion of  
10 that sort?  
11 A. I don't recall any conversation along those lines.  
12 Q. What equipment did you have with you?  
13 A. I had the three pieces of equipment I always take, which  
14 is my portable defibrillator, my oxygen and airway bag  
15 and my paramedic bag.  
16 Q. When you entered the carriage, according to your  
17 statement, the first thing you noticed was by seats 19  
18 and 20, where you've marked "A", a number of bodies.  
19 A. Yes.  
20 Q. Can you recollect, without looking to your statement for  
21 the moment, anything about what you saw at A?  
22 A. It appeared to be a pile of three or four bodies kind of  
23 sitting on the floor all leaning against each other.  
24 Q. Were they dead?  
25 A. They assumed to be dead, yes.

1 Q. In your statement, you say these people were clearly  
2 dead. What was it that led to you that view?

3 A. The injuries, they all seemed to have -- appeared to  
4 have significant injuries at that point.

5 Q. Was there any particular person in the vicinity of A  
6 whom you remember from their physical description,  
7 either their hair or their clothing?

8 A. I think in my statement I mention, I think, there was  
9 a youngish female with long blond hair. That's the only  
10 person I can recall clearly.

11 Q. Was there any movement from anybody in that vicinity?

12 A. No, none at all.

13 Q. Were you able to get close enough to be able to check  
14 for signs of life?

15 A. I could have at that point, but we'd already decided  
16 that Steve was going to take care of that end and I was  
17 going to the other end immediately.

18 Q. By "other end", do you mean 15, 16, 17, 18 where the D  
19 is?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. The rear of the carriage?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Before you went to the rear, however, did you also see,  
24 at seats 20 and 21, a male and a female who were  
25 conscious but in relation to whom you were unable to

1 assess whether they had any injuries?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Could you see anybody else lying across them?

4 A. Yes, there was a young female lying across their laps.

5 Q. Can you say anything of her description?

6 A. I just remember her being a young female on her back

7 kind of twisted across their laps and around the pole,

8 kind of twisted in two directions around.

9 Q. You describe in your statement how her head was

10 supported by a lady who was crouching at the side of

11 seat 22.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. We now know her to be Dr Gerardine Quaghebeur. Can you

14 tell us anything about the state of the young lady? Was

15 she moving, for example, or was she verbalising?

16 A. No, she was completely still.

17 Q. Were you able to carry out a check for life?

18 A. I done a quick primary survey, yes.

19 Q. What does that mean?

20 A. I checked her airway was open, and I checked for

21 a pulse.

22 Q. Did you use any other sort of aid in order to ascertain

23 whether or not she was alive or dead; for example, an

24 ECG?

25 A. No, I did not.

1 Q. Did you speak to the lady who we now know to be an  
2 off-duty doctor about what she should do or whether she  
3 should remain near the young lady whom she was  
4 supporting?

5 A. I advised her it would be the best thing for her to  
6 leave.

7 Q. Why was that?

8 A. For her own safety. The patient she was supporting was  
9 obviously dead to me. For her own safety, it was best  
10 that she left.

11 Q. Do you recollect whether there was any -- whether there  
12 were any firemen or firefighters near you at that time?

13 A. Not at that point. I recall other firefighters at the  
14 other end of the carriage in between, like, the 17, 18,  
15 16, 15 area, I could see a bunch of firefighters at that  
16 end of the train.

17 Q. You've mentioned Mr Jones and how you divided up your  
18 areas of responsibility. Was this young lady within his  
19 sphere of operations, insofar as she was towards --  
20 further along the carriage rather than the rear where  
21 you had said you would go?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Do you know whether Mr Jones went to test for signs of  
24 life as well?

25 A. I do not, no.

1 Q. Do you recall where he was when you were next to the  
2 young lady?

3 A. Within a foot or two of me. He was in the same vicinity  
4 as me.

5 Q. Do you know what he was doing then?

6 A. No, I cannot recall.

7 Q. Between D7 and D8, we can see that you've marked the  
8 plan with a C. Can you tell us, please, about what you  
9 recollect of C?

10 A. C was a -- looked like a young male to myself. When  
11 I got in at D6 and D5, I looked down, I could see  
12 a young male there with a fireman crouching down or  
13 kneeling beside him.

14 Q. Can you describe C for us, anything other than the fact  
15 that he was young?

16 A. A young male and I believe he had curly or slightly  
17 curly, blondish hair.

18 Q. What sort of injuries did he seem to you to have?

19 A. From my recollection I think he had traumatic  
20 amputations of both legs, one arm, I think he had  
21 a significant back injury and a significant injury to  
22 the back of his head.

23 Q. Now, we've heard evidence, Mr Cassidy, of a man,  
24 Mr Lee Baisden, who had lost both his legs and there's  
25 no evidence to suggest that he moved or survived the

1 explosion, and also evidence of a young man,  
2 Richard Ellery, who witnesses have reported was moving  
3 to a certain extent and may indeed even at one stage  
4 have been talking, insofar as he was able to provide his  
5 name.

6 Is it possible that you have perhaps confused two  
7 bodies, two people, in the area between D7 and D8, one  
8 who had lost both his legs, who was not moving at all,  
9 and another whom you subsequently treated?

10 A. Yes, it could be possible.

11 Q. Did you treat somebody in that area?

12 A. I treated a patient marked as D, there was a patient to  
13 my left-hand side and two patients on seats 17 and 18,  
14 and I also obviously assessed the patient that was on  
15 the floor, the one with the amputations.

16 Q. The person with the amputations, can you recollect any  
17 more about him?

18 A. In what way? In description? Physical description?

19 Q. He had lost both his legs. Was he moving at all?

20 A. When I climbed into D6 and D5, I looked -- obviously we  
21 quickly checked that area. I looked down the train to  
22 see what had happened down that end. The male that was  
23 on the floor made -- I would describe it as making  
24 a movement and then ceased to move.

25 Q. Was he obscured in any way by debris or covered by

1 debris?

2 A. Not that I can recall.

3 Q. D, the person you treated, what treatment did you give?

4 A. Very basic. After doing a primary survey, just applied  
5 an oxygen mask.

6 Q. Is it possible that D, whom you gave oxygen to, was in  
7 fact in the locality of the double door D8 as opposed to  
8 near 15 and 16, that is to say further towards the  
9 middle of the standing area?

10 A. Yes, possibly further, possibly, to where the --

11 I presume X is the spot of the explosion, possibly he's  
12 more adjacent to that, so a little bit further of --  
13 possibly more in front of 15 than the X.

14 Q. It sounds again an obvious question, forgive me, why did  
15 you apply an oxygen mask?

16 A. Out of the three patients that I was dealing with, he  
17 appeared to be the most serious patient I was dealing  
18 with at that point. I had one oxygen bottle, so  
19 therefore, I applied the oxygen mask to that patient.

20 Q. What do you recall of his injuries?

21 A. I do not recall any injuries. I just remember he was  
22 wearing, in my recollection, dark clothing, and was not  
23 conscious but was breathing.

24 Q. Did he have a priority triage card on him?

25 A. I don't recall that, no.

1 Q. Was it your sense that you were the first paramedic to  
2 have approached him?  
3 A. Yes.  
4 Q. Having given him oxygen, did you also cannulate him?  
5 A. I was about to when the HEMS doctor arrived.  
6 Q. Can you describe the HEMS doctor for us?  
7 A. Male, late 40s.  
8 Q. Was he the same doctor who we've just --  
9 A. Yes, I knew him by sight.  
10 Q. Is it, therefore, your recollection that the person to  
11 whom you gave oxygen and who you were about to cannulate  
12 was alive at the moment that the HEMS doctor arrived?  
13 A. Yes, I would say so.  
14 Q. Did you discuss with the HEMS doctor the patient to whom  
15 you'd given oxygen?  
16 A. We had a very quick discussion about the patient I had  
17 in front of me, and it was literally a case of the  
18 patient on my left-hand side, GCS3, which shows he's  
19 deeply unconscious, two patients to my right with  
20 amputations. So we deemed the one on the left to be the  
21 most serious case, and then I handed care over to the  
22 HEMS doctor.  
23 Q. Did you see what happened after that?  
24 A. No, I turned my attention to the -- well, the patient  
25 that we immediately with the fire crew arranged for that

1 patient to be extricated, and I turned my attention to  
2 the patients in 17 and 18.

3 Q. Do you know what happened to that patient thereafter?

4 A. I just vaguely recall him being extricated.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, is that the one -- do you mean  
6 by "I vaguely recall his being extricated", the patient  
7 at 17 or 18 or do you mean the one that you'd handed  
8 over?

9 A. The patient I'd handed over, my Lady.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, I thought you did.

11 MR KEITH: The one at D?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. You see, we've heard evidence of a young man,  
14 Richard Ellery, as possibly being given an oxygen mask,  
15 and of being assessed by a paramedic but subsequently  
16 dying.

17 So is there anything you can help us with as to  
18 whether or not patient D, whom you gave oxygen to,  
19 appeared to be perhaps conscious and appeared not to be  
20 perhaps as severely injured as some of the others in the  
21 carriage?

22 A. The patient I think you're referring to is the one that  
23 I could see no obvious injuries on. He's the one I put  
24 an oxygen mask on. The other patient is C, the one with  
25 the amputations, he had had a mask, an oxygen mask

1 attached to him by a fire crew.

2 Q. But from your evidence, although he may have been moving  
3 when you first saw him, there was no question of  
4 consciousness or movement thereafter?

5 A. He was obviously dead.

6 Q. At the end of the carriage, there were a number of other  
7 severely injured casualties who were then subsequently  
8 removed, were they not?

9 A. Do you mean by door 6 and door 5?

10 Q. By seats 16 and 15 and 17 and 18. Seats 16 and 15 and  
11 seats 17 and 18.

12 A. Yes, the two patients to the right-hand side were  
13 subsequently extricated.

14 Q. In seat 18, was there a male who had lost part of his  
15 lower leg?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Were you able to see that something had been tied around  
18 his leg?

19 A. I think I recall it as being a jacket or a jumper or  
20 something like that.

21 Q. In your expertise as a paramedic, did the application of  
22 a jacket -- if that's what it was -- seem to meet the  
23 needs of the moment until he could be removed?

24 A. Yes, he was conscious and breathing, so that seemed okay  
25 at the moment.

1 Q. Were you able to see whether or not the application of  
2 that jacket appeared to have stemmed the loss of blood  
3 from his lower leg?

4 A. It appeared to have, yes.

5 Q. Next to him in seat 17, was there a lady who also had  
6 had something tied around one of her lower limbs, a belt  
7 to stem the blood?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Again, did the application of a belt appear to you to  
10 have stabilised her position to the extent that she  
11 could be removed?

12 A. There was no obvious -- what you'd class as  
13 a catastrophic haemorrhage at that point, so she wasn't  
14 bleeding massively at that point.

15 Q. Could we have, please, on the screen [LAS94-3]?  
16 Do you recognise that writing?

17 A. It does appear to be my writing.

18 Q. It does indeed. I think this is a note that you made  
19 some time after 7 July, perhaps as part of a major  
20 incident debrief form.

21 At the top of the page, you'll see it says:

22 "Triaged patients in carriage alongside other  
23 paramedic."

24 We presume that that's, therefore, a reference to  
25 Steven Jones?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. I note that you don't say "paramedics". Do you  
3 recollect whether or not there were other paramedics  
4 present in the carriage other than you and Mr Jones?

5 A. No.

6 Q. "Gave aid where necessary whilst organising removal of  
7 live patients.

8 "HEMS doctor arrived approximately 20 minutes  
9 later."

10 20 minutes later after what?

11 A. I assume after I had arrived on scene.

12 Q. Do we take it, therefore, that although he arrived  
13 20 minutes after you arrived on the scene, he had been  
14 present as you've told us when you handed over the care  
15 of the patient whom you've described?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. "The last live patients were triaged and removed."

18 Were you there when they were all removed from the  
19 rear of the carriage?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Do you recall there being an evacuation call?

22 A. I do.

23 Q. What did that consist of?

24 A. A person -- I'm not sure if it's a fire crew or police  
25 officer -- appeared outside the train, shouted in that

1 we should evacuate, they believed there could be  
2 a secondary device.

3 Q. Did you leave?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Who were you looking after at that stage, do you recall?

6 A. The two patients to my right-hand side, and the other  
7 patient, I believe, the one on the floor to my left-hand  
8 side, was still there.

9 Q. Despite the evacuation call, did you decide to stay and  
10 look after those casualties?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Did you also carry out a process whereby you went  
13 through the carriage and confirmed that a number of  
14 people in the train had died in relation to you  
15 pronouncing life extinct?

16 A. Once the train had been emptied, I went through the  
17 carriage with Dr Lockey and double-checked every patient  
18 that was left on board.

19 Q. Do you recall a paramedic called Alan Treacy?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Finally, in your notes in your debrief, you make  
22 reference to the fact that you were surprised that no  
23 one had come to the carriage and checked whether you had  
24 enough medical equipment whilst you were there.

25 A. Mm-hmm.

1 Q. Can you tell us, please, something about that.

2 A. In my recollection, because it's obviously the first and  
3 the largest major incident I'd ever been exposed to,  
4 I expected the area outside the train or inside the  
5 train to be quickly flooded with other crews and  
6 equipment.

7 Q. But that didn't happen here?

8 A. Not in my recollection, no.

9 Q. Lastly, I'm grateful to Mr Hay, one final question,  
10 you've made reference to the fact that patient C had an  
11 oxygen mask from the Fire Brigade.

12 How do you know that it was a Fire Brigade oxygen  
13 mask?

14 A. Because, as I said, when I arrived, I looked down the  
15 train and could I see a fire officer kneeling down  
16 beside him applying the oxygen mask.

17 MR KEITH: Thank you very much. Will you stay there? There  
18 may be some further questions for you.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Cassidy, just before anybody else  
20 asks you questions, do you ever recall a time when you  
21 seemed to be the only paramedic left in the carriage?

22 A. No, because, once I left the far end of the carriage to  
23 come down to the point of explosion, I concentrated  
24 solely on that area of the train, so I wasn't looking  
25 around myself at all.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So you didn't know whether there were  
2 paramedics, firemen, whatever?  
3 A. Sorry, I have no recollection.  
4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: No, don't apologise. Mr Coltart?  
5 Questions by MR COLTART  
6 MR COLTART: Just one short matter, if I may. Can we have  
7 Mr Cassidy's plan back up, please, on the screen?  
8 Mr Cassidy, I represent the interests of  
9 Richard Ellery, who is the young man that we've been  
10 discussing. I'm just going to try again to see whether  
11 we can confirm in your mind whether you had any dealings  
12 with him or not.  
13 When he was -- once he had died, he was positioned  
14 right in the doorway of double doors D8 and he was in  
15 the recovery position with his back facing out into the  
16 tunnel.  
17 A. I do not recall that.  
18 Q. Do you think he is the same person, a different person,  
19 or can you not say in relation to the person that you've  
20 marked at point C on your plan?  
21 A. The person I very strongly recall being at point C is  
22 the person with the traumatic amputations of the legs  
23 and arm.  
24 Q. So he was the person who had the Fire Brigade oxygen  
25 mask over his face?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Not someone lying right in the doorway of double doors  
3 D8?

4 A. Well, the patient -- he could have been slightly  
5 further, more down towards D8 rather than exactly in the  
6 middle of the carriage.

7 Q. I think you've probably in a sense already answered this  
8 next question, but the person that you've described  
9 being at point D, again is that different from someone  
10 who might have been lying in the recovery position right  
11 in the doorway at D8?

12 A. Yes.

13 MR COLTART: Thank you very much.

14 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

15 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Cassidy, in your statement, you relate to  
16 yourself and "Motorcycle Steve"?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. We've all taken him to be Steve Jones, the gentleman who  
19 gave evidence over the luncheon adjournment.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. You say this:

22 "I asked Steve if he was ready to go to the train.

23 He said 'Yes' so we both collected our medical  
24 equipment."

25 Is it your recollection that Mr Jones had with him

1 his medical equipment?

2 A. To be honest, I would say I -- in my memory, I can't  
3 state categorically, but I would assume that he would  
4 have taken the equipment down with him.

5 Q. Did you hear Mr Jones give evidence?

6 A. No.

7 Q. He suggested that all he had with him were two triage  
8 packs. But your recollection is equipment similar to  
9 yours?

10 A. As I say, it may have been equipment similar to myself.  
11 I cannot recall exactly.

12 Q. You have described, at a position at about seats 19 and  
13 20, a number of bodies.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Your position A. One of them you believe was a young  
16 lady, "youngish", I think you said, is the way you  
17 described her, a youngish female, long, blond hair.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. I am representing the family of Fiona Stevenson who is  
20 or was a young lady who had longish, blond hair. We  
21 have already heard evidence from Mr Lait who was sat in  
22 seat number 21. Mr Lait described a person we all  
23 believe to be Fiona Stevenson across his lap. At some  
24 point, he says that a paramedic came up and checked her  
25 pulse, was satisfied she'd passed away and then she was

1 moved.

2 I would just like to ask on behalf of the family  
3 whether you can recall ever moving someone in about that  
4 position?

5 A. Not at all.

6 Q. Do you remember -- and this is obviously before you've  
7 moved to the end of the carriage, so before you've gone  
8 up and administered aid as best you can -- checking  
9 anybody's vital signs?

10 A. Not at that point, no. I left that in the  
11 responsibility of Steve.

12 Q. So if it's anybody, as far as you can help, it would be  
13 Mr Jones?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Because you say not at that point, because at the end  
16 your recollection is you're with Dr Lockey. Mr Jones  
17 thought he was with you on the final sweep through the  
18 carriage. Do you remember doing it twice, once with  
19 Mr Lockey and once with --

20 A. No, only doing it once with Dr Lockey.

21 Q. -- Mr Jones. Whoever you were with, have we understood  
22 it right in this way: that it was done as a pair for  
23 both of the pair to check that there were no signs of  
24 life?

25 A. Yes, every patient was checked twice.

1 Q. If it was Dr Lockey, we know from what he has told us  
2 there were five individuals who were left on the  
3 carriage, each of those five were checked and life was  
4 extinct with all five?

5 A. I cannot recall the exact number we checked.

6 Q. But however many it was, you and he both checked, no  
7 signs of life on 7 July?

8 A. Correct.

9 MR SAUNDERS: I won't press that other matter. Thank you  
10 very much, Mr Cassidy.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?

12 Questions by MS SHEFF

13 MS SHEFF: Could we just have your plan back up? Thank you.  
14 I'm just going to ask you about your C diagram. The  
15 person that you describe at C you say had an oxygen mask  
16 over him.

17 A. Yes, that had been applied by the fire crew.

18 Q. So he wasn't immediately dead when you came into the  
19 carriage?

20 A. I came in at D5 and D6, saw him making movements and  
21 then stop.

22 Q. He, also, was not covered in any debris?

23 A. Not to my knowledge.

24 MS SHEFF: No. Thank you, that's all I have to ask.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Ms Boyd?

1 Questions by MS BOYD

2 MS BOYD: Mr Cassidy, just arising out of that last  
3 question, dealing with C, do you think the person you've  
4 got at C could have been a young lady called Kira Mason,  
5 who was given an oxygen mask, and close by her --

6 A. In my memory, it was a young male.

7 Q. We understand from the evidence there was a hole caused  
8 by the explosion and that Kira Mason was very close to  
9 the man whose legs had been severed.

10 A. There was a hole there, yes, but I only recall one  
11 patient lying on the floor there.

12 Q. And not two?

13 A. No, not two, just one.

14 MS BOYD: Thank you.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions?

16 Thank you very much, Mr Cassidy. Those are all the  
17 questions we have for you. Yet again, you are a very  
18 brave and determined officer. You went down to that  
19 train as soon as you arrived and you stayed there until  
20 there was no one left to help, even when the call to  
21 evacuate came. So thank you very much for your  
22 determination and for your courage.

23 A. Thank you.

24 MR KEITH: My Lady, there remains Mr Alan Treacy. He may be  
25 in court. Perhaps I can offer him the first slot

1 tomorrow morning. But that may be a convenient point  
2 for today.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly.

4 Mr Keith, just so that everybody knows, tomorrow  
5 morning at 10.00 I shall give my ruling as far as the  
6 closed hearing and the RIPA material arguments are  
7 concerned.

8 MR KEITH: My Lady, yes. May I just say that, during the  
9 course of the day, Mr Coltart kindly has advanced some  
10 further written submissions on the question of consent.

11 Mr Patrick O'Connor has done likewise, and

12 Mr Andrew O'Connor and myself have filed further written  
13 submissions in response. I don't invite you to hear any  
14 oral further submissions on that point, but they are  
15 there for your consideration in advance of tomorrow.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I will not be able to deal with those  
17 submissions before I give my ruling, but I'll try not to  
18 preempt any further argument in the course of my ruling.

19 MR KEITH: My Lady, thank you.

20 (4.20 pm)

21 (The inquests adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)

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