

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005

Hearing transcripts - 17 November 2010 - Morning session

1 Wednesday, 17 November 2010

2 (10.00 am)

3 MR KEITH: Good morning, my Lady. As prefaced last night,
4 Mr Porter is the next witness and Mr Hay will call him
5 with my Lady's leave.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

7 MR HAY: My Lady, may I invite to you call Jeffrey Porter,
8 please.

9 MR JEFFREY PORTER (affirmed)

10 Questions by MR HAY

11 MR HAY: Mr Porter, can you give your full name to the
12 court, please?

13 A. Yes, my name is Jeffrey William Porter.

14 Q. Mr Porter, may I first apologise for the fact that we
15 paged you yesterday and, unfortunately, weren't able to
16 hear your evidence.

17 On 7 July 2005, you were a train operator?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. You were a train operator on the Hammersmith, City and
20 Circle Line?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. How long had you been a train operator for?

23 A. For, at that time, for 16 -- 15, 16 years.

24 Q. You started work early that morning, on the early shift?

25 A. That's correct.

1 Q. I think you had completed two and a half circuits of the
2 Circle Line?

3 A. That's correct, I'd come out of Barking and gone round
4 the Circle, sort of in a semi-circle, and then done --
5 nearly completed two circles after that.

6 Q. During that morning, had you used your train radio at
7 all?

8 A. I don't recollect using it, no.

9 Q. You got to Paddington, and you were travelling
10 eastbound. You moved off from Paddington and you were
11 approaching Edgware Road station. What do you recall as
12 you were approaching Edgware Road station?

13 A. I recall, as I was approaching Edgware Road station,
14 I -- I had been quite a while at Paddington because it
15 was very busy, I believe the Bakerloo Line had problems
16 so there were more passengers there than there normally
17 would, I glanced up at the digital clock at Paddington
18 and it was 8.47 or 8.48, we were a couple of minutes
19 early because it had been quite a clear morning on the
20 Circle Line, there had been no holdups or anything.

21 As I approached the signal protecting Praed Street
22 junction, it was red and, as I approached it, it
23 cleared, but I didn't regain the -- they'd just put a
24 20-mile an hour speed limit there, but I didn't speed up
25 to that, because the -- there's a speed control, the

1 signal is the next signal, so I remained at about
2 15 miles an hour, sort of coasted across the junction.
3 As I passed that signal, which is just after
4 Praed Street junction, I saw the next signal was red,
5 which protects the platforms, and the two eastbound
6 platforms I could see both had trains in, including the
7 platform I was expecting to go in, so I started to
8 slow --

9 Q. Just pause there. The two eastbound platforms, are they
10 platforms --

11 A. Platforms 1 and 2 --

12 Q. -- 1 and 2?

13 A. -- were both occupied and, as I proceeded a little bit
14 further, I could see platform 3 was also occupied, so
15 there was no platform that I could get into at
16 Edgware Road, so I just began slowing the train slowly;
17 down, ready to stop at the signal that protects the
18 three platforms.

19 So I was probably drifting along at about 10 --
20 between 5 and 10 miles an hour, gradually slowing down.

21 Q. Did you then see the westbound train coming towards you?

22 A. As I was probably about -- probably about 20, 30 feet
23 short of the signal, I saw a train leave -- I don't
24 think I actually saw it leave platform 4, but I saw it
25 come round the corner from platform 4, and the driver

1 had the cab light on, so I recognised it was
2 Mr Whitehurst who you saw yesterday.

3 Q. So you could actually see him as he went past?

4 A. The drivers having the cab light, it's a matter of
5 personal preference, really. I always drive with the
6 cab light out, because I prefer it, I find I can see the
7 road ahead better and it suits me. Some people like to
8 have the light on, I think they get lonely by
9 themselves, I think that's the reason they do it. But
10 it's a matter of personal preference, it's no -- there's
11 no sorts of rules or regulations about it in particular.

12 Q. When the westbound train went past you, what then
13 happened?

14 A. As I was -- I was continuing to slow down, he was
15 probably going at about 15 miles an hour, he seemed to
16 be moving quite quickly. I saw the driver pass me, and
17 I was gazing, as I was slowing down, gazing idly into
18 the carriages of the train because it was the only
19 really source of light in the area and of entertainment,
20 and in the second -- the second car, I could see a sort
21 of -- it looked like an orange bubble, and it seemed to
22 go into slow motion, and there was an orange ball in
23 that car which gradually seemed to expand and get bigger
24 and bigger. It's like a street performer, there's huge
25 bubbles, it was like that, it gradually got bigger and

1 bigger, and at the moment it seemed to reach its largest
2 extent and it seemed to be towards the rear of that
3 carriage, which I think would have been the second
4 carriage, as it reached its maximum sort of extent, it
5 suddenly went completely dark and sort of times -- the
6 slow motion of time seemed to stop, and time speeded up
7 to real-time again.

8 Everything went completely dark and I heard a noise
9 that sound like a huge whooshing of wind and screaming,
10 and the only sound I can ever -- that's anything like
11 it -- I know the gentleman from Canada mentioned
12 Indiana Jones yesterday -- is in the film Indiana Jones
13 and the Raiders of the Lost Ark where the Nazis opened
14 the Ark of the Covenant and all the terrible things fly
15 out, that was exactly the sound it made in that film,
16 a rushing of wind and screaming.

17 Q. What happened to your driver's cab?

18 A. That happened a little while afterwards. What happened,
19 it went completely dark, and in that dark, I could hear
20 the sound of the train on the adjacent track braking and
21 moving, and I had a very, very real sense of the
22 physicality of that train, the weight and the noise of
23 it, and I tensed in my driver's position expecting
24 a collision, and as the train had almost stopped,
25 something hit my windscreen and shattered it.

1 I don't know what that was, it didn't sound like
2 a metallic object. It sounded like a soft object that
3 hit it with a thump and completely shattered my
4 windscreen.

5 Q. Did your train come to an immediate stop?

6 A. As soon as it went dark, I made an emergency brake
7 application, because I was about 10 feet short of a very
8 important red signal, and as soon as I couldn't see it
9 anymore, I did not want that train to be moving at all,
10 so the train stopped immediately because I was only, by
11 that time, doing 5 or 6 miles an hour.

12 Q. If we could have up on screen, please, [INQ10282-10],
13 Mr Porter, this is a plan of the two trains in the
14 tunnel. Your train would be the train at the top --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- and the westbound train would be the train at the
17 bottom. You can see there your train, the front of it,
18 came to rest by approximately the end of the fourth
19 carriage of the westbound train.

20 A. Yes, that would be --

21 Q. Does that seem correct to you?

22 A. That seems correct. Actually, I don't know if the court
23 is aware, on the BBC website, a passenger on my train
24 actually videoed with his camera that morning, and you
25 can actually see the -- on that day, things like the

1 positions of the trains, where they stopped, the
2 lighting, how dark it was, things like that. I don't
3 know if you're aware of that video at all, because
4 I know the BBC said on the day that they gave it to the
5 police for their enquiries, but it's still on the BBC
6 website now.

7 Q. Thank you. Your train had come to a stop. What could
8 you then hear?

9 A. When I first -- I go back to the picture here for
10 a moment, because it says that's -- the position in red
11 is where the train was when the explosion occurred, but
12 I would think from my own experience of the events, and
13 having seen those lights in the carriage, that it may
14 well have been slightly further east than where it's
15 shown in that picture.

16 And there's a couple of things, both the light that
17 I saw, because obviously the car would have had to have
18 been in my vision for me to be able to see that, and
19 that must have been part of the process of the
20 explosion, that orange light that I saw, and also the
21 debris that was on the track in front of my train --

22 Q. I'm going to come on to the debris on the track, but
23 what do you remember hearing when the train came to
24 a stop?

25 A. When the train came to a stop, it was absolutely silent,

1 absolutely no noise whatsoever, and that told me
2 immediately that the traction current had gone off on
3 both roads, and that was confirmed by the tunnel lights
4 being on and my motor alternator indicator also being
5 out. So I had three firm indications that the
6 electricity had gone completely off the instant that
7 everything came to a stop.

8 Q. What did you think had happened at that point?

9 A. At that moment, I had no idea, absolutely no idea what
10 had happened. As the trains came to a stop, I could see
11 in front of me the two rear carriages of train 216,
12 which had their emergency lights on, and I could see
13 shapes of people moving about. They were totally
14 intact, there was no problem with them at all.

15 It was very, very, very dusty, and I could see the
16 tunnel at Edgware Road in sort of -- it was like through
17 a November mist, through a November fog -- I could see
18 the light of the tunnel, but I couldn't see anything
19 beyond that in the station, because there was so much
20 dust in the air.

21 Q. Did you then try to use your radio to contact the line
22 controller?

23 A. I did try and call the line controller in that moment,
24 even though -- and I think in hindsight, it might be
25 a good thing that I didn't actually reach him, because

1 I would have just been able to tell him the current's
2 gone off, it's very dusty and smoky, I don't know what's
3 happened, which I think may well have -- you know,
4 continued that confusion in his mind about electric
5 problems and those sort of things. But I think
6 Mr Whitehurst may have given a slightly more --
7 a slightly pessimistic impression of the radio
8 yesterday.

9 The problem with it isn't so much that it doesn't
10 work, although there are dead sections and dead spots.
11 The problem is that, when you use it, you get no
12 positive confirmation that the person at the other end
13 has received it, so you've got no idea whether you're
14 talking to yourself, because the radio's not working, or
15 that he's heard you and not responded.

16 Q. That's what I wanted to ask you. When you're trying to
17 use the radio --

18 A. I tried to use it.

19 Q. -- was it not working in the fact that it was totally
20 out, or did you not get a response?

21 A. The problem is I would have absolutely no idea which of
22 those options had occurred, because the radio gave no
23 positive indication that, you know, it had been received
24 and not responded to or it was working or not. It was
25 impossible to tell.

1 Q. When your radio is not working, you can't tell --

2 A. You can't tell.

3 Q. -- what's happening to it. What are your choices at
4 that point? Are they to either use your mobile phone or
5 a signal phone?

6 A. At that time, I had the option of -- I had a mobile
7 phone with me, but there's -- I don't know, I must have
8 a different company from my colleague yesterday, because
9 mine never gets a signal in the tunnel anywhere. But
10 I didn't even think of my mobile phone, because I'm
11 quite -- you know, quite elderly, don't -- so that
12 technology was a bit new in those days, but the problem
13 with the signal phone was I was 10 feet --

14 Q. Mr Porter, sorry, if you could slow down, because,
15 unfortunately, everybody has to try to keep up with you,
16 I've got to try to keep up with you and everyone has got
17 to try to listen. The signal phone?

18 A. The signal phone on OP33, 34, 35, which was the signal
19 in front of me, it was about 10 feet away. I did, as
20 I got out of the train, look at it, and it's about
21 10 feet up in the air, because it's designed to be used
22 from the train cab, and I did one of the most stupid
23 things, I looked at it and thought "No", because unless
24 you had springs on your heels, you wouldn't be able to
25 reach it, it was so high that --

1 Q. So you're not able to reach the signal phone?

2 A. It was impossible to reach that.

3 Q. Did you then open the J door, the door between your cab
4 and the first carriage?

5 A. Actually, if I go back just a moment, while I was in
6 that silent, silent moment of looking at the back of
7 train 216 and the dusty tunnel, I heard somebody shout
8 out, "Help me, help me, please help me" which just added
9 to the confusion. It sounded as if it was outside the
10 train and behind me, and people don't just fall out of
11 trains. So that just added another perplexing element
12 to the very confusing things I'd just seen.

13 But at that exact moment, I had no more time for
14 quiet contemplation because there was a thumping on the
15 J door from the passengers and about 10 people put their
16 heads round the door and asked me am I all right, what's
17 happened, what's going on, and so, you know, demanding
18 that I take charge of the situation as the man with
19 the -- in control sort of thing.

20 Q. So in those circumstances, you can't use your radio?

21 A. Mm-hmm.

22 Q. You cannot use your mobile phone, we know the signal
23 phone was too far for -- too high for you to reach. Is
24 it right that you then opened the M door, the door at
25 the front of your cab?

1 A. That's correct -- I think what I did first was I made
2 a public address announcement saying "An incident has
3 happened, we're looking into it, please remain calm and
4 stay where you are", and obviously the people -- I was
5 looking into the carriage of my train and I could see
6 all the passengers were with handkerchiefs over their
7 faces and everyone's faces were completely soot covered,
8 which was strange. There wasn't actually a smell of
9 smoke as such, but everyone was black, which was another
10 confusing, confusing thing on that day.

11 As -- I said to the passengers, "I've tried to call
12 the controller, I can't get anything". What I did then
13 was I got -- I went to my bag, I got my handlamp and my
14 high visibility vest out and I intended to walk up to
15 Edgware Road platform to call for help there, because
16 I was about --

17 Q. Just pausing you there, may we have up on the screen,
18 please, [INQ10325-1]?

19 This is a photograph which shows the trains later
20 on. Your train is the right train, and the eastbound --
21 the westbound train is on the left. We can see there
22 the door in the middle of your cab. That's the M door,
23 isn't it?

24 A. That's the M door, the front door, yes.

25 Q. When you came out onto the track, what did you see on

1 the track?

2 A. There were debris. Unfortunately, when I --

3 Q. Can we have the photo taken off, please?

4 A. When I got my torch out of my bag, it was completely not
5 functioning, and later that morning, I tried changing
6 the batteries, I changed the bulbs, none of it would
7 work. In the end, I just threw it in the bin and got
8 issued another handlamp because it just didn't work.

9 Q. What do you recall seeing on the track, Mr Porter?

10 A. That meant I couldn't see what was on the track in front
11 of me, which is why I used the M door rather than the
12 two side doors, which are the official doors to use, the
13 M door is an unofficial one, but it was the only door
14 I could be sure of seeing what was at the bottom of
15 the -- where I was walking into.

16 Because, not having known what had happened,
17 I didn't want to walk into an area that I didn't know
18 what was there, but from the M door, because of the
19 tunnel lights and the lights of the other train, I could
20 actually see what was there.

21 About three or four feet in front of where my train
22 had stopped, there was a pile of debris on the track,
23 and they didn't actually look like bits of train, they
24 just looked like bits of grey metal and cardboard that
25 had just been torn up and thrown in a heap. When you

1 look back on it, you think, "Why on earth didn't
2 I think, you know, where did that come from?", but at
3 the time, it just never -- never occurred to me.

4 Q. The tunnel lights were on.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. That indicated to you that the traction current --

7 A. Was off, it was definitely off, because there was no
8 noise, none of the equipment on either of the trains was
9 running, the motor alternators, the compressors. All
10 the equipment that needs the traction wasn't running.
11 I had no motor alternator indication in my cab and no
12 tunnel lights. I mean, that's a pretty sure -- you
13 know, there are three indications there's no
14 electricity, that's pretty certain.

15 Q. I think you decided to make your way towards
16 Edgware Road for assistance?

17 A. I -- I -- yes.

18 Q. How close did you get to the platforms at Edgware Road?

19 A. I got probably five or ten feet away from the tunnel
20 mouth, when I saw two people on the platform and shouted
21 to them.

22 Q. What did you say to them?

23 A. I think I shouted out to them, "Something bad's
24 happened, I think there's somebody under the train. I'm
25 not sure what's happened, we need help", basically,

1 because --

2 Q. The suggestion that somebody may be under the train was

3 part speculation on your part --

4 A. It's part speculation --

5 Q. -- but also you'd heard the person saying "Help me"?

6 A. -- but I'd heard somebody that was obviously -- they

7 didn't sound as if they were in the train, I had no idea

8 where they were, but --

9 Q. Who then came towards you from the platform, do you

10 remember?

11 A. My colleague, Craig Aylen, joined me, who I believe

12 you're having talk to you this afternoon.

13 Q. What did you and Craig Aylen then do?

14 A. We then shifted a couple of pieces of debris off between

15 the running rail and the tunnel wall to make sure there

16 was a clear walkway, and then I said to Craig, "You put

17 the short-circuiting device to make sure the electricity

18 can't be recharged at this end and start sorting out the

19 ladder and I'll walk through the train to the other end

20 and put the short-circuiting device down there", because

21 I knew that, you know, we'd need to detrain.

22 By that time, it was very, very obvious that the

23 train wasn't going to be going anywhere that morning and

24 the best thing we could do would be to prepare to

25 evacuate the train.

1 Q. You put the short-circuiting device down to discharge
2 the current --
3 A. No, it -- it's --
4 Q. -- or is it a circuit breaker?
5 A. -- the current was already discharged, and that was very
6 obvious at that time. What the short-circuiting device
7 does is ensure that, if somebody tries to recharge the
8 electrical current and put it back on again, that it
9 will just take it straight back off. So it's a safety
10 precaution, basically, to make sure, if the electricity
11 is off, as it was, it can't come back on again.
12 Q. Mr Ayles put one down at the front of the train. You
13 intended to go to the rear of the train to put one at
14 the back?
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. You made your way from the first carriage to the -- into
17 the second carriage?
18 A. Mm-hmm.
19 Q. At that point, there's then another driver's cab between
20 the second carriage and the third carriage?
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. When you got into that second driver's cab, what then
23 happened?
24 A. As I was -- I can't remember if I'd actually gone
25 through the J door into the car or not, but I saw my

1 colleague, Dave Matthews, who you're seeing later on,
2 banging on the window of the other train and he shouted
3 out to me, and I could see from his face -- the only
4 word you could describe it would be anguish, because
5 I mean I've known Dave a long time and, you know, it was
6 obvious from his face that something terrible had
7 happened.

8 Q. What did Mr Matthews say to you?

9 A. He said to me, "Jeff, Jeff", he said, "It's really bad
10 over here, there's people dead, there's people dying, we
11 need big, big help".

12 Q. By the fact that he was telling you that, did you infer
13 that he didn't have the radio with him himself that
14 worked?

15 A. I did, and train drivers didn't -- at that time, didn't
16 have individual portable radios, that's a much more
17 modern innovation.

18 Q. Having had that message from Mr Matthews, what did you
19 then try to do?

20 A. I tried to liven up the middle cab. Quite often, on the
21 middle cabs of trains, the depot put them -- because
22 they're not used for driving, they just sort of make up
23 the train, they quite often have bits that don't work in
24 them -- that's why they're there -- or they'll
25 cannibalise things from them.

1 I tried to use the radio in the middle cab and it
2 was obvious immediately that there was no life in it, it
3 wasn't working at all. So I opened the cab door there,
4 because the front two cars were very, very crowded, so
5 I didn't want to push my way back through all those
6 people and take a long time because of the nature of the
7 situation, so --

8 Q. Just pausing there, you said you tried to "liven up the
9 cab" you were in. Did you try to use the radio in that
10 cab?

11 A. I tried to use the radio, but it was immediately obvious
12 that it wasn't working.

13 Q. When you say it wasn't working, was it again no
14 response?

15 A. No, on the radio, when you use it, there's a red light
16 that lights up, that tells you -- it doesn't tell you
17 it's working, but it tells you that it's --

18 Q. That it's got some power?

19 A. That it has some life in it, yes, and there was no red
20 light, it was very obvious that it wasn't, so I opened
21 the cab door then and I ran back along the side of the
22 train. We're very fortunate that Mr Brunel designed his
23 broad gauge, because the tunnels that was there were
24 originally built for the broad gauge trains with 7-foot
25 tracks, that's why there's the extra width at either

1 side.

2 Q. So there's sufficient room for to you walk along between
3 the train and the tunnel wall back towards your driver's
4 cab?

5 A. As I run up the train, those two cars, I noticed that
6 the ballast was completely covered with thick, black,
7 sooty dust, it was very -- I managed to trip over and
8 save myself with my hands and they were completely -- it
9 was black, you know, sooty, very sooty dust, and I think
10 that's because, although -- I mean, most people know
11 this -- the Circle Line had steam traction for the first
12 50 years, there was still steam, old freight trains
13 coming through Edgware Road until well into the 1960s,
14 so that's why there was that thick, black dust that many
15 people have commented upon.

16 Q. Mr Porter, when you got back to your front driver's cab,
17 did you then try to contact the line controller again?

18 A. I did, I contacted the line controller, I gave a mayday
19 call and the controller responded immediately.

20 Q. What did you say to the line controller?

21 A. I think my words were along the lines of, "Train 207 at
22 Edgware Road, there's been an incident on the train next
23 to me. There are American casualties, there are people
24 dead, we need the emergency services here immediately.
25 It's a major incident", something along those lines.

1 Q. Do you remember who the line controller was that you
2 spoke to?

3 A. I don't, because, obviously, you know, they change every
4 day, and we don't really -- we never see them, they're
5 just a disembodied voice.

6 Q. If I said it was either Ron Ryband or Paul Marks, you
7 wouldn't be able to say?

8 A. I have no idea what they look like, to be honest.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: We have no idea why the radio worked
10 this time, whereas it hadn't worked last time?

11 A. No idea. He may well have received my first call.
12 Because the Aldgate incident happened at the same time,
13 he may have been busy and not had time to respond. It's
14 one man answering, you know, 50 trains.

15 That's the problem with that radio system. You
16 couldn't tell whether he'd heard you and was ignoring
17 you, or the radio wasn't working. There was no positive
18 indication to tell you.

19 MR HAY: But, fortunately, on the third occasion --

20 A. The third occasion.

21 Q. -- it managed to work?

22 A. It did work, yes.

23 Q. I know it's difficult. Are you able to say how much
24 time had elapsed between when you first tried to use the
25 radio and when you finally got through?

1 A. I would say probably about 5 minutes. I would have
2 thought they would have had a record of the conversation
3 in the control room, because I know they tape everything
4 and record everything in their logbook there. But
5 I would have guessed at about 5 minutes.

6 Q. Once you'd made that mayday call, did you then return to
7 walk back through the train?

8 A. No, I went back along the side of the train, back to
9 where I'd jumped down from, and jumped back into the
10 train. Part of my idea was --

11 Q. Just pause there. The intention of you going back, that
12 was for you to go back to the rear of the train to put
13 the short-circuiting device?

14 A. But also I was reassuring the passengers walking through
15 and, also, it was giving me an idea of what had actually
16 happened, so I could have a bit more information
17 about --

18 Q. When you got into the third carriage of your train, and
19 you looked across at the westbound train, what do you
20 remember seeing?

21 A. It was in complete darkness, and I'm not sure at what
22 stage it happened. I do recall the people going through
23 the window into the other train to -- who we talked
24 about yesterday, and I remember that they left their
25 rucksacks in my train and asked me to look after them.

1 At a later stage in the morning, I passed those
2 rucksacks over to the other train when my train was
3 empty, so that they -- the police wouldn't walk through
4 and think they were suspect packages or anything.

5 Q. Just so I understand, the people who were on the third
6 carriage, who went across to help in the westbound
7 train, were --

8 A. But I can't remember whether it was on that occasion or
9 a later occasion when I was walking through. It's
10 very --

11 Q. When you walked through the third carriage, I know it's
12 difficult, do you remember seeing if any of the windows
13 were broken in any of the doors?

14 A. The only door I recall being broken was the one that the
15 passengers who had gone across to the other train had
16 gone through and broken.

17 Q. That was when you first went into the carriage?

18 A. To be honest, I couldn't remember that, because it all
19 gets into a bit of a blur after that.

20 Q. When you saw the devastation to the second carriage,
21 what did you think had happened?

22 A. At some stage -- I can't remember if it was then or
23 later on -- I looked into the second car and I saw the
24 hole in the floor, and it was immediately obvious then,
25 because there was no seats, there was no wall to the

1 train, that it was an explosion. There was no other
2 explanation that would have caused that sort of damage.

3 Q. At that point, I think you then continued to the rear to
4 put the short-circuiting device.

5 A. Mm-hmm.

6 Q. Did you ever go back to your original cab and use the
7 radio to say what you had seen in the second carriage?

8 A. I didn't go back. I thought -- I thought by that
9 time -- obviously it's taken quite long -- because the
10 train was extremely full, so it had taken me quite
11 a long time to get back and, by that time, the station
12 supervisor was with my colleague and we were discussing
13 about evacuating the train. So by that time I assumed
14 that, you know, my -- you know, people above me in the
15 hierarchy, you know -- train drivers are quite low in
16 the ranks of people who deal with incidents -- that by
17 that time, the competent people would have taken over
18 and we would be dealing with the controller.

19 I didn't --

20 Q. Pausing you there, who was the station supervisor?

21 A. I don't recall his name.

22 Q. In your statement, you mention seeing Mr Corbin, who was
23 a line standards manager, I believe --

24 A. Mm.

25 Q. -- and also Duty Manager Hickin. Are those the two

1 people you're referring to?

2 A. No, no, they were -- I believe I saw them at the back of
3 the train, the back of the other train, at a later
4 stage.

5 Q. Can I just ask you about the evacuation of the train and
6 detrainment?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. First of all, do you have any feeling for how many
9 people were actually on the train?

10 A. On my train, I would -- it was extremely full, so
11 I would say many hundreds of people, possibly between
12 600 and 800 people.

13 Q. So close to full capacity?

14 A. It was full --

15 Q. Full capacity is about 740, isn't it?

16 A. Yes, it was very, very full.

17 Q. How long did it take to detrain the train?

18 A. It took probably about 40 minutes, I would say, because
19 it was a while, obviously, before could I get everybody
20 off, and I left the train at 10.10, and by that time, it
21 was empty and I'd reported to the various managers.

22 Q. When the train was being detrained, where were you for
23 the majority of that time?

24 A. For the majority of the time I was moving through the
25 train, because we were trying to organise one car at

1 a time to get out, and we were trying to -- as soon as
2 we'd emptied the third car back and moved people down,
3 we tried to keep that car empty. There was a lady from
4 South-West Trains who was assisting me, and we tried to
5 keep the car next to the bombed car empty so that
6 passengers wouldn't have to sit in there and wait while
7 we were detraining the people in front.

8 We were trying to move people out one carriage at
9 a time. As you can imagine, they are very narrow
10 doorways and a very narrow --

11 Q. So it takes time to get people off.

12 A. So it takes a very long time to get -- the last thing we
13 wanted was people panicking and pushing and ...

14 Q. Whilst you were waiting in the third carriage, when was
15 the first time you remember seeing any of the emergency
16 services?

17 A. I've got a recollection later in the morning of seeing
18 a lady on a stretcher, but that would have been very,
19 very late in the day, but I don't remember seeing
20 anybody from the emergency services, because obviously
21 we were concerned with dealing with the people in my
22 train. That was where the focus was, because there were
23 a lot of very -- very, very shocked, very frightened
24 people, so I was, you know, constantly reassuring people
25 and saying, "Don't worry, keep calm, read your paper",

1 you know, "We'll get everybody out soon".

2 So I was -- you know, with 800 people to deal with,
3 and just me and the lady from South-West Trains, you can
4 imagine -- as you can imagine, that kept us pretty much
5 occupied.

6 Q. But there were other London Underground employees at the
7 front of the train?

8 A. There were other London Underground -- and they were
9 helping people, because obviously the important place
10 for people to help assist the passengers is between the
11 train and the station, because there's points, there's
12 all sorts of things lying about in the tunnel, to make
13 sure that people can walk in that area.

14 So within the train, people are quite safe, but once
15 they get out on the track, even with the electricity
16 turned off, it's quite a dangerous environment for
17 people to fall over and hurt themselves.

18 Q. Mr Porter, a final question for you from me: whilst you
19 were in the third carriage, do you recollect whether or
20 not the lighting was at emergency lighting level or was
21 it at full lighting level?

22 A. Would that be in my train?

23 Q. In your train?

24 A. In my train, the emergency lights were on at all times.

25 Once again, the video that's on the BBC website of the

1 guy who's using his camera phone in my carriage, you can
2 see quite clearly that the emergency lights are on in
3 that video and he's got his watch there tapping it at
4 8.50, so it's a pretty good evidence you'd have to say.

5 MR HAY: Mr Porter, thank you very much. No more questions
6 from me, but others may have some.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

8 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

9 MS GALLAGHER: Mr Porter, we heard yesterday from
10 Mr Whitehurst and, in fact, you were here for that. He
11 described paddles which can be used in an emergency to
12 open doors from the inside as well as the door isolating
13 cock.

14 Can you tell us, in your experience, if those
15 paddles are in every driver's cab?

16 A. Those paddles are generally in every driver's cab, yes.

17 Q. When you say "generally in every driver's cab" --

18 A. They are in every driver's cab, yes.

19 Q. So far as you are aware, they're on every train?

20 A. So far as I'm aware. I mean, they're kept in a locked
21 cabinet, so, I mean, it is not the sort of thing you
22 would be checking. That would be the depot staff's job
23 to check that they are there.

24 Q. Of course, but as far as you are aware, they are beside
25 the J door in every carriage?

1 A. They are inside a pod attached to the J door.

2 Q. The next issue I just wanted to ask you about in terms
3 of equipment is the train radio.

4 You obviously heard Mr Whitehurst yesterday
5 indicating that, in his experience, the train radios
6 aren't 100 per cent reliable.

7 Now, from your evidence today, it sounds as if it's
8 difficult for you to say how reliable they are because
9 of the one-way system and the fact that you can't get
10 a response.

11 A. The problem is it works -- the radio system that was in
12 use at that time works on what they call a leaky feeder,
13 so it has a cable that runs all the way round the
14 tunnels. What tends to happen is it gets buried behind
15 other cables. So that prevents the signal from working
16 properly, but just through the natural weight of all the
17 cables on each other. It was really a Stone Age system.

18 Q. Was there any system, Mr Porter, of checking the radio
19 in the morning before you set off for the day?

20 A. That wasn't part of the driver's duties to check the
21 radio.

22 Q. Do you know if your radio had been working earlier that
23 day prior to the explosion?

24 A. I can -- if something had been happening, I would have
25 heard it, but I wouldn't have remarked on it, it's not

1 something that would have -- you know, I would have
2 remembered especially.

3 Q. So you can't particularly recall either way?

4 A. No.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, if I may, what was the radio
6 used for generally?

7 A. The radio is generally used for the line controller to
8 inform people of what's going on and for the -- for
9 drivers -- if -- for instance, if you was stood at
10 a signal for a long time, you'd call a controller to ask
11 him if there was a problem, or if the signal had failed,
12 or what was going on.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry to interrupt.

14 MS GALLAGHER: No problem, thank you. The next issue
15 I wanted to ask you about was the signal phone. You've
16 told us that it was too high.

17 A. Much too high.

18 Q. So it was impossible for you to reach. There's
19 a document which was brought up yesterday which I hope
20 I can call up again. It's [TFL974-1]. You'll have seen
21 this yesterday. It's the green sticker. It should
22 appear on the screen in front of you there.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. So you're familiar with this procedure.

25 A. Oh, yes.

1 Q. Just running through it, it seems from this that you're
2 first told to use the radio and it tells what you to say
3 and so on:
4 "All messages must be repeated to ensure that
5 they're understood", it says about halfway down.
6 Then the fallback option is, if necessary, use the
7 telephone, the tunnel telephone handset, to discharge
8 traction current and speak to the line controller. So
9 that was your understanding.
10 Step 1 is use the radio. Step 2, if necessary, use
11 the tunnel telephone, and then step 3 is your ultimate
12 fallback in extreme emergencies, if unable to make
13 contact with the line controller, put down SCDs?
14 A. The problem with that is we had -- the traction current
15 was discharged already, there was absolutely no need to
16 do that whatsoever.
17 Have a little bit of history on the tunnel
18 telephone, it was -- when I was first working on the
19 trains, when we had drivers and guards, the driver would
20 carry in a wooden box the tunnel telephone with him
21 because radios were quite a new innovation back in the
22 1980s, and the driver would test it every day, pick it
23 up from the station manager's office, take his tunnel
24 telephone out of the wooden box, there was a mockup of
25 the tunnel telephones, he would attach it, it would ring

1 a bell in the station manager's office, he would talk to
2 the station manager to prove that it was working, put it
3 back in the box, he would usually write the road number
4 of where the train was stabled and go and collect it.
5 So he was well aware of the tunnel telephone.
6 When I first came on the Hammersmith & City in
7 1990s, there was still tunnel telephones in wooden
8 boxes, but there was one in every cab, and the depot was
9 responsible for maintaining them. So although the
10 tunnel telephone mockups were still at Barking and
11 Hammersmith, for instance, they didn't actually work and
12 nobody tested anything on them, because the tunnel
13 telephones were in a wooden box in the cabs at the time.
14 In 1992, when the C stocks were refurbished --
15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry to interrupt you, but I think
16 you'll find that counsel will know what questions she
17 wants to ask.
18 MS GALLAGHER: No, of course. It is very helpful to have
19 and indication of the background, Mr Porter.
20 A. In 1992, the tunnel telephone was put in a plastic bag
21 in a locked niche behind the driver with no sign saying
22 it was there, and so most drivers hadn't actually seen
23 a tunnel telephone since 1992, and so it's not the first
24 thing that, you know, would occur to your mind to use.
25 Q. Of course.

1 So, Mr Porter, in your experience, when you look at
2 this document here, this sticker here, with that
3 three-stage process: number 1, train radio; number 2,
4 tunnel telephone; and number 3, putting down the SCDs,
5 are you saying that really the second option there was
6 completely ruled out for you that day?

7 A. Well, it wasn't ruled out so much as the traction
8 current was off already, so we'd already bypassed that
9 piece there and, as I say, the tunnel telephone, which
10 was really an extremely antique system, you wouldn't --
11 it would be the last thing you would think of to use to
12 contact anybody.

13 Q. We heard evidence yesterday from Mr Whitehurst that,
14 even when you can use a signal phone, it's quite
15 difficult for you to be heard at the other end. Is that
16 your experience as well?

17 A. It can be quite hard to be heard, yes.

18 Q. And difficult to make out who you're speaking to?

19 A. On a signal phone you wouldn't know who was at the other
20 end, because obviously, you know, you're not familiar
21 with the staff that might be in that location. So you
22 wouldn't know who they were. It's just a voice.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm getting confused. Mr Whitehurst
24 did manage to use the signal phone, but he was doing
25 that from track level, wasn't he?

1 A. In some places where -- if a train passes a signal at
2 danger, especially in certain locations, the driver has
3 to speak to the signaller to get authority to continue
4 or for the situation to be sorted out, so because it's
5 passed the signal and it's a location where that happens
6 quite frequently, there will be a signal at low level
7 for people to speak to --

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Some of the signal phones are as high
9 as the one that you had your side, but some of them are
10 lower?

11 A. Yes, it's variable.

12 MS GALLAGHER: In questioning yesterday to Mr Whitehurst, it
13 was suggested that it was possible, when he was on the
14 telephone, that the person he was speaking to might have
15 changed, and he may not have realised that.

16 From your experience of signal telephones is it hard
17 enough to make out the person at the other end, so the
18 person you're speaking to could change without you
19 realising it?

20 A. It's entirely possible, entirely possible.

21 Q. Mr Porter, we know from what you've said that, of
22 course, at first you'd no idea whatsoever what had
23 happened, and it's not until you saw the devastation in
24 the bombed carriage that you realised what you were
25 dealing with.

1 Now, that's different to Mr Whitehurst, who, as you
2 heard yesterday, instantly thought that he was dealing
3 with a bomb. So what I'm about to ask you is nothing to
4 do with what you should have done on the day, so please
5 don't take it in that way.

6 Had you, at any stage prior to 7 July 2005, been
7 given any training about what to expect in the event of
8 an explosion?

9 A. None at all, no. I think all the training was focused
10 on suspect packages and bags left behind and those sorts
11 of things, because there had never been a suicide
12 bombing in London, on a British railway before that, so
13 it's not anything anybody would be expecting.

14 Q. You've mentioned earlier, when being questioned by
15 Mr Hay, that you did make an announcement prior to
16 getting your high visibility vest and your handlamp and
17 going on to the tracks through the M door.

18 Could you help us with this: in your witness
19 statement, you described before going onto the tracks
20 calming passengers. Did you actually go into the
21 carriage to do that, or was that from your driver's cab,
22 through the J door?

23 A. From the driver's cab. There were about ten people's
24 heads poking through the door, almost immediately, with
25 a whole series and host of questions about, you know,

1 what's happened, how are you, what's going on.

2 Q. But this was all from the driver's cab, so you were in
3 the driver's cab and then you went straight onto the
4 track?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. You never went into the train?

7 A. No, no, but I could see into the cab, into the car,
8 rather.

9 Q. You've described seeing two people on the platform when
10 you go up towards the platform.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. You've told us that one of those is Craig Ayles.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Did you recognise the other person?

15 A. I didn't, no, he was a member of station staff there.

16 Q. There's evidence which we'll hear from another member of
17 staff, a Michael Brough -- I hope I'm pronouncing his
18 surname correctly -- who's a duty manager. Did you know
19 Mr Brough?

20 A. I do, yes.

21 Q. So it wasn't Mr Brough?

22 A. It wasn't Mr Brough, no.

23 Q. The reason I'm asking you is that Mr Brough in a witness
24 statement -- my Lady, the reference, if you need it, is
25 INQ7449-3 -- in a witness statement which he gave on

1 2 August, so just quite shortly afterwards, he says that
2 he saw:

3 "Jeff Porter, the driver of the eastbound train,
4 number 207 I think it was, told me there was someone
5 under his train, I immediately went back towards the
6 platforms and offered to call emergency services."

7 Do you recall a conversation at any point with
8 a Mr Brough?

9 A. I don't know, but it's entirely possible, because
10 subsequently to 7 July, a number of people said,
11 "I spoke to you" or "I saw you on the day", and I've got
12 absolutely no recollection of seeing them or speaking to
13 them much.

14 Q. You also describe in your witness statement that, before
15 you got to the platform, you met a man, you believe he
16 was a man from train set 216, from the bombed train. He
17 said he was a paramedic and offered to help:

18 "I told him to wait where he was and identify
19 himself to staff when they got to him."

20 Do you recall?

21 A. That I do recall that, yes. He was in the second car
22 from the back of 216, if I remember correctly, and he
23 called out to me and said, "I'm a paramedic, what should
24 I do? How can I help?"

25 As I say, I said to him, "Please wait there,

1 London Underground staff will be coming through the
2 trains". Because of the location at Edgware Road, which
3 is a train crew depot with a large number of train
4 drivers and managers, I knew there would be people
5 coming through that train almost immediately, as there
6 were. In fact, I saw -- I say in my statement I saw
7 people running through that train as I was walking back
8 to my train.

9 Q. Just to clarify, Mr Porter, so he's a passenger who
10 happens to be a paramedic?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. He's not uniformed?

13 A. That's right.

14 Q. Did you at any stage later see that same man again?

15 A. I didn't, no.

16 Q. Do you know if anyone did speak to him and avail
17 themselves of the help which he'd offered?

18 A. I don't know, but I thought it was better for him to
19 identify himself to staff to whom he would be useful
20 rather than have him wondering about aimlessly, you
21 know, and perhaps getting himself into a position where
22 he might put himself at risk.

23 Q. There's just one final thing I just want to ask you
24 about. It's really for completeness because you've
25 already told us that you understood that the traction

1 current was off in any event.

2 Could we have [INQ8578-2] on the screen, please? It's
3 the very bottom item, number 32. Now, this is a note
4 which was made in the evening of the bombing by
5 Ray Whitehurst. You'll see at number 32 he says:

6 "Noted the driver of other train putting down SCD in
7 wrong place and tried to inform him."

8 Then over the page at number 33, he says:

9 "Driver of other train ignored me, rejoined his
10 train and left scene."

11 Do you recall anything like that happening?

12 A. I don't recall seeing Mr Whitehurst at all that day, and
13 the SCD was in entirely the correct position, I don't
14 know what he was going on about.

15 Q. But, of course, in your statement you also say it's
16 Craig Aylen who put down the SCD in any event?

17 A. No, he put down the SCD at the front of the train, I put
18 down the SCD at the rear of the train, and Mr Whitehurst
19 is saying the rear of the train, but I certainly didn't
20 see him. I was -- I don't know where he was.

21 Q. You told us that you recognised Mr Whitehurst because
22 you saw him going past in the cab?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. So if it was you that Mr Whitehurst had seen --

25 A. I would have recognised him, yes.

1 Q. Of course, he doesn't mention you by name there --
2 A. No.
3 Q. -- he just describes the driver.
4 A. He knows very well who I am and I know very well who he
5 is. He's known -- familiarly amongst his colleagues as
6 "Mr Happy", in an ironic sense, so he's very well-known.
7 MS GALLAGHER: I certainly don't think he was Mr Happy on
8 that day, obviously, as you well know, you saw the
9 distressed state that he was in. Mr Porter, thank you
10 very much for your assistance, you've been of great help
11 to us. Thank you.
12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?
13 Questions by MR SAUNDERS
14 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Porter, can I take it fairly slowly so that
15 I can follow your recollection?
16 You've described to her Ladyship the light you see
17 as the train is coming towards you. But is it right
18 that you don't hear anything?
19 A. I didn't hear any explosion or noise of that nature, no.
20 Q. But should we take it -- you've drawn our attention to
21 a plan at page 10, [INQ10282-10], and what you I think were
22 saying to us was, where the red carriage is embossed
23 here, because of your recollection you think the red
24 carriage should be further back?
25 A. Slightly further east, yes, perhaps half a car length --

1 back towards Edgware Road.

2 Q. Back towards the fifth and sixth carriage which is back
3 towards Edgware Road?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. The reason you say that is because you know now the
6 explosion has gone off in the second carriage?

7 A. Mm-hmm.

8 Q. You believe you actually see that happening?

9 A. I think I saw the orange fireball. I know a number of
10 witnesses have described seeing that orange --
11 subsequent to the explosion in that car, and so I must
12 have been -- I saw that in that car. So it must have
13 been within my vision. As you can see from my cab,
14 I would not be able to see it --

15 Q. That's the very point I'm coming to, Mr Porter. So if
16 that -- and you described it as a bubble that gets
17 bigger and bigger. If that has happened, carriage 2
18 must have been in front of your cab?

19 A. Correct, yes.

20 Q. You don't have mirrors on the side?

21 A. No, no, no.

22 Q. So it can't be that, as it's gone past your cab --

23 A. No.

24 Q. -- as a car driver would, you may see something from
25 behind?

1 A. No.

2 Q. It can't be that?

3 A. It wouldn't be possible, no, but I do recall seeing it
4 at the rear of the car towards the back of the car,
5 moving towards the back of the car with the
6 interconnecting door behind it. So it wouldn't have
7 been the explosion, but something after the explosion
8 I suspect.

9 Q. You may not be aware of this, Mr Porter, but some of the
10 witnesses giving evidence to her Ladyship have described
11 that effect of a fire or light coming towards them
12 further towards the rear of carriage 2.

13 A. Mm-hmm.

14 Q. But then you go on to describe that there are a number
15 of things that happen very quickly.

16 A. Mm-hmm.

17 Q. There is obviously the light itself.

18 A. Mm-hmm.

19 Q. But at this stage you are, would it be fair to say,
20 creeping along the track?

21 A. Creeping along, coming to a gentle halt.

22 Q. If there had there hadn't been the explosion, but that
23 you had wanted to stop in an emergency, could you have
24 facilitated that very quickly?

25 A. Very quickly, yes.

1 Q. How far would you have probably travelled once you'd
2 then applied to stop?

3 A. I would have thought not more than 3 or 4 feet, because
4 it was very, very slow and the brakes would act
5 instantaneously.

6 Q. Exactly. So that's the sort of distance it would have
7 taken your train to have stopped that day?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. So what happens is that, having seen this light, this
10 bubble, do you then try to stop immediately?

11 A. As soon as it went dark, because as soon as the bubble
12 reached its largest extent, it just went completely --
13 it's not -- in the sub-surface areas of the railway, as
14 approaching Edgware Road, it's not completely dark
15 because you've got a big tunnel and you've got lots of
16 spaces from where there used to be steam trains in there
17 so the smoke could escape, so at Edgware Road there's --
18 is an open area, so there's light coming in from there,
19 and not bright light, but, you know, enough light to --
20 so that it's not completely dark as it would be in
21 a single-track Tube tunnel deep below the ground.

22 Q. So what is it that makes you want to stop?

23 A. It went completely dark. It went completely -- all
24 visibility vanished.

25 Q. Pause a moment. When you say "It went completely

1 dark" --

2 A. Everything.

3 Q. Your carriage?

4 A. Everything went completely dark. You could no longer

5 see anything, because approaching the signal --

6 Q. Mr Porter, I am going to continually stop you. I know

7 it's very, very difficult, but I do want to make sure

8 that I've covered everything. It's not your fault, it's

9 mine. All right?

10 So it goes completely dark?

11 A. Mm-hmm.

12 Q. And then your automatic reaction is to stop?

13 A. Mm-hmm.

14 Q. Is it at that point you're suddenly aware of your

15 windscreen shattering?

16 A. It was as train 216 came to a halt, which was --

17 surprised me. As you can imagine, timing is completely

18 distorted in the event of those circumstances.

19 Q. Exactly.

20 A. But as train 216 -- I could hear it, but I couldn't see

21 it, because the darkness was so thick that, even though

22 it was adjacent to me, I -- it completely disappeared,

23 but I could hear the brakes applying, I could hear it

24 coming to an emergency stop and, like I say, I tensed,

25 because I had no idea what had happened and what was --

1 what might happen, and it was as train 216 was coming to
2 a stop that whatever hit the windscreen hit it.

3 Q. Is that the point, Mr Porter, at which you say, "Well,
4 I can't really say what it was"?

5 A. Mm.

6 Q. Because for you there is so much going on at the time,
7 presumably you thought there may have been a collision
8 between you and 216?

9 A. That's right. Well, it didn't make any sense at all.

10 Q. Exactly. So everything was unusual --

11 A. Mm-hmm.

12 Q. -- although you were on a line you knew very well?

13 A. I'd already passed that spot two times already that
14 morning. And I probably passed that spot thousands of
15 times over the years.

16 Q. I quite understand. So you can't really help us as to
17 what it is that has taken place at that very moment?

18 A. No, no. It was completely -- outside anything in my
19 experience.

20 Q. Thank you. You've then described for us that the next
21 thing you actually hear is the call for help?

22 A. Mm-hmm.

23 Q. But I think you've explained this already, Mr Porter,
24 that it's a voice that's calling out "Help me, help me"
25 and you believe it's behind you?

1 A. Behind me and underneath me.

2 Q. So we can picture you in your cab. Now, you may or may
3 not have heard evidence that was given to her Ladyship
4 at the beginning of last week from a Mr Biddle --

5 A. Mm-hmm.

6 Q. -- a gentleman who lost both his legs as a result of
7 this bombing?

8 A. I've been following, actually, the inquest online.

9 Q. You have, I'm very grateful for that, because
10 Mr Biddle's evidence is, having been ejected from 216 on
11 the tunnel wall side, he was crying out words very
12 similar to those that you've just explained, and bearing
13 in mind -- I appreciate what you say -- we know that
14 Mr Biddle is between 216 and the tunnel wall, therefore
15 behind you, would that accord with your --

16 A. That would accord, that would be -- that would explain
17 it.

18 Q. Then you've gone on to describe what you've done
19 thereafter, and others have already covered that,
20 including who you may or may not have been with. But
21 I think it's right, Mr Porter, we know -- I represent
22 the family of Jenny Nicholson, who we know was seen on
23 the track in front of you -- you'll actually see on that
24 there -- ahead of your cab. But you never see Jenny at
25 all?

1 A. I never saw her at all, no.

2 Q. We quite understand, you had many, many other things on,
3 but you never saw her --

4 A. I didn't spend much time at that end of the train
5 because I was mainly in -- up and down the train dealing
6 with the passengers. I know that other people did
7 witness --

8 Q. I'm going to come on to that. I'm not going to ask you
9 what others may have said.

10 A. I was quite surprised afterwards, discussing it with the
11 counselling people, that other people had seen and
12 I hadn't, but ...

13 MR SAUNDERS: I think we all understand, Mr Porter, how much
14 you had and were actually trying to deal with that day
15 and I'm grateful for your help. Thank you very much,
16 sir.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Are there any other questions for
18 Mr Porter? Ms Canby?

19 Questions by MS CANBY

20 MS CANBY: Mr Porter, I just have a few questions by way of
21 clarification to ask you on behalf of Transport for
22 London.

23 Mr Hay asked you to give an estimate of how many
24 passengers you think were on your train that day. The
25 estimate that you gave this morning was 600 to 800.

1 Now, you may not recall, but you gave an interview to
2 the BBC News on 11 July 2005, so very soon after the
3 events, and in that interview the estimate of the number
4 of passengers on your train that you gave was about
5 a thousand.

6 A. I think it should have been "up to", because it's -- you
7 know, you don't have a clicker and count people on and
8 off, it's impossible. It was a very busy train.

9 Q. So it's somewhere between 600 and a thousand passengers?

10 A. Somewhere between that, yes.

11 Q. Can we move on, please, Mr Porter, to the passenger
12 announcement that you made, because we have heard some
13 evidence from a number of the passengers from your train
14 who recollect hearing that announcement. They say that
15 you said something along the lines of, "Ladies and
16 gentlemen, please remain calm, do not try to open
17 windows or doors except the doors between carriages. Do
18 not go onto the track". Is that the sort of thing that
19 you said?

20 A. It's quite possible I may have said that.

21 Q. Can you remember how long after the explosion you made
22 that announcement?

23 A. I think it was probably -- I think it was probably
24 before I went out on the tracks, so probably quite soon
25 afterwards, probably within a minute or two.

1 Q. So within a minute or two. We've also heard that there
2 was possibly a second announcement made --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- or it may have been somebody shouting through the
5 carriage.

6 A. I think I made a number of announcements through the
7 course of the morning.

8 Q. The one that I'm concerned with, Mr Porter, is either an
9 announcement or a shouting through asking first aiders
10 to go through to the rear of the train. Did you ever
11 make such an announcement?

12 A. I don't recall making that announcement. That might
13 well have been somebody on the train.

14 Q. We've heard some evidence about -- it seems to be a man,
15 fairly shortly after the explosion, walking through your
16 train wearing a yellow high visibility jacket asking
17 people to remain calm. Do you think that would have
18 been you?

19 A. That was me, I was in an orange jacket. Actually, in
20 the video film that's on the BBC website you can
21 actually see me doing that in my orange jacket.

22 Q. So yours was orange, not yellow?

23 A. Orange, but there was nobody with a yellow -- the only
24 person that had a yellow hi-vi jacket on the train was
25 a very well-known gentleman of the road who travels

1 about a lot on the Underground, who was in the rear car,
2 and he was there on that day, which some charitable
3 person has obviously given him at some time, you know,
4 it's like a road sweeper's jacket, but he was the only
5 person I recall seeing in a yellow jacket on the train
6 that day and he wasn't --

7 Q. How soon after the explosion did you walk all the way
8 through to your train?

9 A. It was very quickly afterwards. Obviously, there was
10 the delay while I came back to the front cab to use the
11 radio to call for the emergency services before I went
12 back. It took me a considerable time to get through the
13 train because, as I say, it was very, very busy and
14 I was constantly having to stop and answer people's
15 questions and talk to people and reassure people.

16 Q. How soon would you have got to a carriage within your
17 train that was adjacent to the bombed carriage?

18 A. It probably would have been within five to ten minutes.

19 Q. Five to ten minutes?

20 A. I would say as a guesstimate.

21 Q. You've told us about Mr Aylen assisting you and we're
22 hearing from him, I think, this afternoon. Did he walk
23 all the way through your train?

24 A. He didn't, no. He remained at the front of the train,
25 because I was obviously concerned that by myself, and

1 with 600 -- 600 to 800 shocked and frightened people
2 that, if there weren't people there to keep an eye on
3 them, they would be evacuating themselves into that very
4 hostile environment before we were ready, and the rules
5 on detraining trains are quite clear: you have to wait
6 for the station supervisor, have everything arranged, so
7 that everything -- so that people aren't released into
8 an environment where they could be at risk.

9 Q. So Mr Ayles was at the front of the train?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. Are you aware of any other London Underground members of
12 staff who would have walked all the way through your
13 train within about 10 to 15 minutes of the explosion?

14 A. I don't recall any, but that's not to say that they
15 weren't there.

16 Q. Can we move on, please, to the mayday call that you make
17 to the line controller. You've told us you can't
18 identify whether or not it was Paul Marks or Ron Ryband,
19 but can you confirm that it would have been the
20 Metropolitan Line controller?

21 A. It would have been the Metropolitan Line controller.

22 Q. You've told us that you said to him that there had been
23 a serious incident, people were injured and dying, and
24 you needed the emergency services.

25 In your police statement, you also said that you

1 informed the line controller of the location of the
2 train. Do you remember doing that?

3 A. I do, yes.

4 Q. You think that that conversation was within five minutes
5 of the explosion?

6 A. I think so, yes. I mean, obviously it's -- time is
7 a little bit hard to judge there, but I would say that,
8 in my best estimate, it would be within five minutes.

9 Q. The final point I'd like to ask you about, Mr Porter, is
10 communication. We've heard a lot of evidence about
11 communication. Can we start, please, with the position
12 in July 2005? Was the position this, Mr Porter: train
13 operators didn't have handheld radios?

14 A. They did not, no.

15 Q. If they needed to make contact, they would have to use
16 the radio that was within the driver's cab?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. The only person that they could contact on that radio is
19 the line controller?

20 A. That's also correct.

21 Q. Can we now move on, then, to what happened
22 post-July 2005 and CONNECT radio was introduced. Could
23 you describe that to us? Does it look like a mobile
24 phone?

25 A. The handheld CONNECT radio does, but there's also

1 a radio in the cab as well, which is separate from the
2 handheld.

3 Q. So you now have, as a train operator, two radios, one
4 portable handheld CONNECT radio --

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. -- and a second cab radio that's also CONNECT in the
7 cab?

8 A. That's correct, yes.

9 Q. The portable handheld radio, there's no difficulty in
10 communicating anywhere on the network, you can be in
11 a tunnel and it works?

12 A. Not to my knowledge. I mean, I know there have been
13 issues with it and it's like any new system introduced,
14 has its fallibilities, but as far as I'm aware.

15 Q. It works in tunnels as far as you're aware?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. You can contact any individual within London Underground
18 on that phone, or the radio?

19 A. Providing you know what their number is, yes.

20 Q. Do you have all of the numbers programmed into the
21 radio?

22 A. You have the line controller's and frequently used
23 numbers are programmed in.

24 Q. So if you needed to contact the line controller now, you
25 would be able to contact him directly on your CONNECT

1 handheld radio?

2 A. Directly, yes.

3 Q. You would also be able to tell that he had heard your
4 message because it's like having a conversation?

5 A. In the -- I'm not sure, because I'm not very familiar
6 with the handheld radios, because we don't use them very
7 much, but in the radios in the cab a message comes up
8 saying "message queued", so you know, even if he'd not
9 responded, that the message is on his machine and
10 that --

11 Q. It's been received?

12 A. It's been received, yes.

13 MS CANBY: Thank you very much, Mr Porter, I don't have any
14 further questions.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Porter?
16 Thank you very much, Mr Porter. Obviously, you did the
17 right thing to keep your hundreds of passengers as calm
18 as possible, and to try to get help to the injured. So
19 thank you for helping them, and thank you for helping
20 me.

21 Mr Keith?

22 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call Suhel Boodi,
23 please?

24 MR SUHEL BOODI (affirmed)

25 Questions by MR KEITH

1 MR KEITH: Could you give the court your full name, please?
2 A. Suhel Boodi.
3 Q. Mr Boodi, thank you for coming. We know, and my Lady
4 knows, because she directed your attendance to court,
5 that you weren't originally asked to come to court and
6 you've come at relatively short notice. So thank you
7 very much.
8 On 7 July, you travelled, we know from your witness
9 statement you gave to the police, from Clacton to
10 Liverpool Street. Then you took a Metropolitan Line to
11 Great Portland Street and then changed on to a westbound
12 Circle Line train. Is that right?
13 A. That's correct.
14 Q. I think you entered that train by going into the first
15 carriage, is that right?
16 A. I believe where the bomb was, that was the carriage
17 behind me, so --
18 Q. The second carriage.
19 A. So --
20 Q. We know that because, as we'll hear in a moment, you
21 walked through from the first carriage to the second
22 carriage after the explosion.
23 A. That's correct.
24 Q. Do you remember anything of the bomb going off and what
25 we now know to have been the explosion?

1 A. I was -- usually what happens, I read my newspaper on
2 the way to work. I was travelling to Kensington High
3 Street, and when I -- I was reading the paper, the next
4 thing I know, there was an explosion. I put the
5 newspaper over my head and it went very dark.

6 Q. Mr Boodi, I'm going to ask you just to keep your voice
7 up a bit. If you would be so kind.

8 A. Sorry.

9 Q. The microphone doesn't amplify your voice. You have to
10 raise your voice so that we can all hear you.

11 You put the newspaper over your head. Was that
12 because you were immediately aware of a shower of glass
13 from the smashed windows?

14 A. I felt the glass from behind.

15 Q. From behind you. You describe in your statement a very
16 eerie silence?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Do you recollect there being quite a passage of time,
19 quite a long period of silence, after the point of the
20 explosion?

21 A. It felt like a very long time, I'm not sure how long it
22 was really. The explosion happened, and the driver
23 said, "Stay calm, we know there's a problem".

24 Q. Pause there. Was that over the tannoy?

25 A. Over the tannoy.

1 Q. Could you actually hear his voice in the first carriage
2 or was it just over the tannoy that you heard it?
3 A. I think it was through the tannoy.
4 Q. Right.
5 A. At the same time, I was hearing screams "Help, help".
6 Q. Could you tell where the screams were coming from?
7 A. It was clearly coming from the carriage, the carriage
8 behind us.
9 Q. The second carriage?
10 A. The second carriage, yes.
11 Q. Was anybody in your carriage injured, as far as you
12 could see?
13 A. After a while, when I got up with -- it was
14 a Mediterranean man, and we walked towards the carriage,
15 there was a lady -- where the door opens, there was
16 a lady sitting there with glass on her face and
17 bleeding.
18 Q. When you say the door opened, between the first and
19 second carriages?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Could you see whether the interconnecting door between
22 the carriages was damaged or buckled or bent in any way?
23 A. It was damaged and me and this other person, we removed
24 the carriage -- the door so that we could get in.
25 Q. Could you try to keep your voice up, please?

1 I appreciate it's very difficult.

2 A. Sorry.

3 Q. Even I am finding it very hard to hear.

4 A. Me and this other person, we tried to remove the door
5 out the way so that we can enter the second carriage.

6 Q. It may seem like an obvious question, but why were you
7 trying to get into the second carriage?

8 A. We heard cries of help. It was instinctive to go and
9 see what was happening and see if there was anything we
10 can do.

11 Q. Thank you. It's important because of what comes next,
12 and I'm trying to establish from you how much time
13 passed before you went into the second carriage, because
14 it's a whole series of events and we need to try to
15 place what you did into that sequence of events.

16 Did it take you a while to get through the
17 interconnecting door to lift off the door to go into the
18 second carriage?

19 A. From getting up when the explosion happened, I reckon
20 there was two to three minutes before we got up and
21 walked towards the connecting door.

22 I wouldn't say it was very heavy. It was badly
23 damaged, so we could go through pretty easily, but we
24 had to move the door, and when we opened -- when we got
25 through to the second carriage, it looked like a war

1 zone.

2 Q. It looked like a war zone?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Keep your voice up, if you can.

5 A. Of course.

6 Q. My question was really trying to focus on how long it

7 took you to get through the doorway which you did by

8 taking the door off the hinges. How long did that take

9 you?

10 A. It didn't take long at all. 30 seconds.

11 Q. Another few minutes or just seconds?

12 A. 30 seconds to a minute.

13 Q. So do we take it from that, Mr Boodi, that you arrived

14 in the second carriage really very soon after the train

15 had come to a halt and, therefore, after the point of

16 the explosion?

17 A. I reckon within five minutes I was in the carriage.

18 Q. In what way did it resemble a war zone?

19 A. I could see blood everywhere, it was dark, the side of

20 the carriage was no longer there, very badly damaged.

21 I saw bodies on the floor, people on the side which

22 looked -- they looked in shock. They were just sitting

23 there doing nothing, and no expression on their face,

24 and I see -- when I went a bit closer, I could see there

25 was a hole on the right-hand side.

1 Q. How far could you see into the carriage when you first
2 entered?

3 A. I could -- a good distance, but it was very dark as
4 well, there was no light.

5 Q. We know that you prepared a plan or, rather, you were
6 given a sketch, a diagram of the carriage and you made
7 some markings on it for the police. Could we have,
8 please, [INQ10811-2] on the screen?

9 Do you recognise that? We know that is yours
10 because your name appears, in fact, right in the middle
11 of it.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. If you could enlarge the bottom right-hand segment, do
14 you recognise your writing or is that the writing of
15 a police officer?

16 A. No, that's my writing.

17 Q. That's your writing. This is the second carriage,
18 Mr Boodi, and the direction of travel you can see right
19 at the bottom. So the front of the carriage is the
20 left-hand side of the page and the back of the carriage
21 is the right-hand side of the page. You entered from
22 the left-hand side of the page, so to speak. Carriage 1
23 would be to the left of this carriage?

24 A. This one, yes.

25 Q. On the plan, you've marked at A -- and it's quite hard

1 to see the "A" but it looks as if the A is in the first
2 standing area between the first set of double doors just
3 as you came into the second carriage -- "Lady I gave
4 mouth-to-mouth to".

5 Was she the first person that you saw, or among the
6 first people that you saw, when you entered the
7 carriage?

8 A. I scanned the second carriage and I saw she looked like
9 she was breathing, she was on her last breaths. I --
10 there was a carriage across where she was. I saw two
11 people banging on the window asking her -- indicating to
12 do something.

13 Q. Could you hear what they were shouting?

14 A. They were making signs.

15 Q. Of what?

16 A. Mouth-to-mouth kind of signs. So I have never done
17 first aid in my life, but I've seen on TV, I tried to
18 give her mouth-to-mouth. When I was breathing into her
19 mouth the blood was coming out of her nose because her
20 nose wasn't -- the -- her full nose wasn't there, it was
21 cut, and I could see the insides of her nose, it was
22 bleeding. Her eyes were bloodshot, but you could see
23 small breaths coming out of her mouth.

24 Q. I need to ask you some more questions about it, because
25 it's of huge importance to the family to know what

1 happened.

2 A. Of course.

3 Q. When you first entered the carriage, was it then that
4 you realised that she was breathing, or did you only
5 realise she was breathing when you started to try to do
6 mouth-to-mouth?

7 A. I went close to her to check if she was breathing with
8 my -- going down to her.

9 Q. How could you tell?

10 A. She was motionless, but you can feel that she was
11 breathing. I was trying my best to give her
12 mouth-to-mouth.

13 Q. Her eyes were bloodshot. Were they moving?

14 A. No.

15 Q. When you tried to give her mouth-to-mouth, did you
16 receive any indication, was there any way in which she
17 exhibited signs of life? Did she respond at all to your
18 attempt?

19 A. She did not respond to any.

20 Q. Was there any movement from her? Did she move any of
21 her limbs or her head? So may we take it, Mr Boodi,
22 that although you tried your very best, it didn't last
23 very long because it was immediately apparent that she
24 was dead?

25 A. That's true.

1 Q. We've heard evidence already, Mr Boodi, of another
2 gentleman who attempted to apply chest compressions and
3 mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, cardiopulmonary
4 resuscitation, and of a lady, Elizabeth Owen, who was
5 next to this young lady at the same time.

6 To try to get the events into sequence, can you tell
7 us, was there anybody else at the end of the carriage
8 near you as you tried to apply mouth-to-mouth
9 resuscitation?

10 A. I was -- while I was doing it, the lady in the other
11 carriage was giving me instructions, showing me how to
12 do it. Not by words but by expressions. After
13 I finished doing that -- I mean, I kept on doing it
14 until somebody else came and took over.

15 Q. Who was the person?

16 A. I've no recollection.

17 Q. Was it the nurse, the lady from the next door train, or
18 was it somebody else?

19 A. To tell you the truth, I can't remember. It was --

20 Q. In your statement to the police, which was
21 dated July 2005, you said the nurse and another woman
22 came into the carriage:

23 "I stopped trying to do mouth-to-mouth and the two
24 nurses took over."

25 That would seem to indicate that they took over from

1 you and you carried on until they arrived.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Is that right or is it possible that somebody else took
4 over in the carriage because it took a while for the
5 nurses perhaps to come round to you?

6 A. To tell you the truth, it's been a very long time.

7 Q. Of course.

8 A. I tried, I tried to give mouth-to-mouth. After that,
9 I wasn't sure if it was the same nurses that came over.

10 Q. Do you recall whether it was a lady who came over or
11 a man?

12 A. I do remember there was one woman. Maybe a man and
13 a woman, I'm not too sure.

14 Q. Did you then look further down the train, further down
15 the carriage, and look more closely at the crater, the
16 hole, of which you've made mention? Could you see
17 somebody in the hole?

18 A. I could see somebody in the hole.

19 Q. Was he moving?

20 A. There was quite a few people around him so there wasn't
21 a clear view of what was happening.

22 Q. Yes. What were they doing, could you see?

23 A. They were talking to him, trying to keep his spirits up,
24 massaging him, his heart, just generally trying to be
25 there for him. I'm not sure how -- what happened to him

1 afterwards.

2 Q. In your statement to the police, you do make mention of
3 the fact that he had massive injuries.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Was that something that you were able to see from where
6 you were in the carriage or something that you realised
7 later?

8 A. When I first went in, I did see it. You can see there
9 was a very big hole in the train and he was at the
10 bottom, and he was in extreme pain and people were
11 coming to help him and you can see his lower half of his
12 body was -- it was very bad.

13 Q. We know from other evidence that the lower half of his
14 body was entangled in the debris and the wreckage and
15 below the level of the carriage floor. Were you able to
16 see that?

17 A. I could see there was -- you could see the track and you
18 can see parts of the train and you can see his body --
19 his lower half of his body entwined in those parts.

20 Q. I understand.

21 Did you stay where you were at the end of the
22 carriage once your attempt to apply resuscitation had
23 failed or did you move back into your own carriage or
24 move further down?

25 A. No, I stayed in that half of the carriage. I had my bag

1 with me. I had drinks with me. I tried to pass that
2 around.

3 Q. Who did you pass them to?

4 A. When I walked into the second carriage, there were two
5 people on the right-hand side in shock, so I started
6 giving them a drink.

7 Q. We know from other evidence that there was another
8 person who passed away lying on the carriage floor in
9 the standing area at that end of the second carriage, at
10 the front end of the second carriage.

11 Did you see any other bodies lying in that area in
12 the near vicinity of the young lady whom you attempted
13 to resuscitate?

14 A. I believe there was a man next to her, close to that
15 woman.

16 Q. On the left or the right, as if you were standing in the
17 doorway between carriage 1 and carriage 2?

18 A. I think it was right in front of --

19 Q. Right in front of the interconnecting door?

20 A. Yes. The lady was on the left-hand side, near the door,
21 and there was a man right in front of her.

22 Q. Was he moving?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Can you help us, please, with any description of the
25 person, whether by reference to their age or clothing or

1 hair?

2 A. To tell you the truth, I can't. I know there was a lot
3 of dust on him. I couldn't see his face that well.

4 Couldn't -- sorry.

5 Q. Was there anything about that person that indicated to
6 you that he was alive?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Were you able to see, notwithstanding the debris and the
9 soot and the dark, anything of the nature of injuries
10 that he had plainly suffered?

11 A. When I looked, I could see there was no life in him, and
12 at the same time I was getting an indication from the
13 other train to help this other lady.

14 I believe I went past the person on the floor, the
15 man, tried to see if he was alive. Clearly he wasn't,
16 because he wasn't moving at all, and I quickly went to
17 the lady to help her.

18 Q. So because you went past him, and you said tried to see
19 if he was alive, you must have satisfied yourself that
20 he wasn't alive?

21 A. True.

22 Q. May we presume, therefore, that you concluded there was
23 nothing that you could have done for him at all?

24 A. That's true.

25 Q. Do you recall there being any other people lying on the

1 floor of the carriage between where you were and the
2 crater, the hole, in which the man whom you've described
3 was located?

4 A. I stayed in that area, that was the only area I was in.
5 I know there was people along the carriage helping each
6 other out, but I didn't get that far.

7 Q. Were those people there when you arrived in the carriage
8 or did they appear subsequently? If you don't know and
9 you can't remember, then please say so.

10 A. That's true, I can't remember.

11 Q. You can't say. Do you recall anybody coming into the
12 carriage from the adjacent train? Did you see people
13 jumping in through the open doors?

14 A. I believe they were trying to break the window from the
15 other train. They were trying to come out of that train
16 to come into our train to help.

17 Q. How do you know?

18 A. Because I could hear them trying to smash the window.

19 Q. Was there anybody in the carriage moving around before
20 you heard the sound of the attempts to smash the window?

21 A. Sorry, could you repeat that?

22 Q. Yes. Recollecting the sound of people to smash the
23 window, before that point, was there anybody moving
24 around the carriage helping the people who were in
25 shock, who were lying motionless or were screaming?

1 A. No.

2 Q. The point at which you heard the attempt to smash the
3 window, was that before or after you tried to
4 resuscitate the young lady on the floor?

5 A. I think it was just after.

6 Q. That attempt to smash the window having failed, did you
7 see how they managed to then get into the carriage?

8 A. I have no idea how they got into the carriage.

9 Q. How long did you stay in the end of the carriage for?

10 A. I stayed in there until the end.

11 Q. When was that?

12 A. I believe when everyone was leaving, around 9.30.

13 Q. How did you get out?

14 A. We were -- we just got onto the track and started
15 walking towards the station.

16 Q. We know from other evidence, Mr Boodi, that
17 London Underground staff opened up the front of the
18 bombed train, the westbound train, and the occupants of
19 the first carriage, about 17 or 18 people in all, were
20 guided out of the end of the train and then back down
21 the tunnel wall towards Edgware, Edgware station.
22 Do you recollect leaving the train with a group of
23 other people, the passengers in the first carriage?

24 A. I did not go back into the first carriage, I stayed in
25 the second carriage. I got off the second carriage to

1 go on to this --

2 Q. How did you get out of the second carriage?

3 A. You could just walk out. The train was in that state
4 that -- I think the door was open already, or it was
5 wrecked in such a way that you could just get out the
6 train.

7 Q. Was that on to the side of the train next to the tunnel
8 wall?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Were there other people with you when you left?

11 A. There were people leaving the scenes.

12 Q. From where?

13 A. From that second carriage, going back to -- trying to go
14 out the station.

15 Q. When you came to the platform at Edgware Road station
16 and then up to ground level, do you recall there being
17 any police or London Ambulance Service or Fire Brigade
18 personnel there?

19 A. I think there were staff just guiding us where to go.

20 Q. That's London Underground staff?

21 A. I think so.

22 Q. Do you remember seeing any firemen, firefighters? Do
23 you remember seeing any London Ambulance Service
24 ambulances?

25 A. To tell you the truth, I can't remember. People in

1 high-vis jackets were there and they were just telling
2 us where to go.

3 Q. They were people in the tunnel helping you towards the
4 platform and then people on the platform telling you to
5 go upstairs?

6 A. There were more people on the station, in the station,
7 but hardly anyone on the tracks.

8 Q. When you got to ground level, what did you do?

9 A. I walked outside. I tried to call my wife, I tried to
10 call my work manager. I spoke to my wife and made my
11 way to the Marks & Spencers.

12 Q. Was that because you were directed to go there?

13 A. That's correct.

14 MR KEITH: Thank you very much, Mr Boodi. Will you stay
15 there, though, because there may be some further
16 questions for you?

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

18 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

19 MS GALLAGHER: Mr Boodi, I represent some the bereaved
20 families. There's also another barrister who represents
21 some of the bereaved families and I suspect we'll both
22 have questions for you. I certainly do.

23 Could I start with a brief question about what you
24 had with you on the day? In your witness statement,
25 which you gave in July 2005, you say you were carrying

1 your lunch in a Reebok's sports bag. Was that
2 a backpack?
3 A. No, it's a sports bag.
4 Q. So a holdall?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. You've told us both in your statement and today about
7 hearing a tannoy message after this eerie silence which
8 felt like a long time, and what you've said in your
9 statement and today is that the message said something
10 along the lines of, "We know what the problem is, stay
11 calm"?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. Could I put up on screen [INQ8578-2], please? Could you
14 just zoom in on number 17?
15 Mr Boodi, that is note which was made by the driver
16 of the bombed train that evening and at number 17 you
17 can see he made a note that he used the PA, the
18 announcement system, to inform passengers that "staff
19 aware and help on the way". Do you remember in the
20 tannoy message any reference to helping being on the
21 way?
22 A. There could have been.
23 Q. You'll see in the next item, number 18, he then says:
24 "Attempt to use mobile phone. No signal. Time on
25 phone shows 8.51 am."

1 Which would suggest the tannoy message was around
2 that time. Now, you've said it was hard to ascertain
3 the time and you've described the eerie silence, feeling
4 like a very long time. Could it have been as little as
5 two minutes, do you think?

6 A. What, for the tannoy?

7 Q. Before you heard the tannoy?

8 A. I reckon it was within a minute or so the tannoy came on
9 to tell us the message.

10 Q. When you go into the bombed carriage, Mr Boodi -- we've
11 seen your diagram, which is very helpful, and just to
12 refresh your memory, could I just put that briefly on
13 screen, [INQ10811-2]?

14 You've been asked where the man was located who you
15 said was in the area of the lady whom you attempted to
16 give mouth-to-mouth to. Now, he's not marked on your
17 graph here, but what you've said is the lady was on the
18 left-hand side near the door, so you've marked it as
19 point A in the doorwell, and you've said the man was
20 right in front of her. So was the man in the middle
21 area? If it's easier, Mr Boodi, I'll get a clearer
22 graph on screen.

23 A. Okay.

24 Q. Could we have [INQ10282-9]?

25 Mr Boodi, ignore the red circles and the marks.

1 They're just best-guess estimations on reading the
2 evidence. So your A, your mark A, for where the lady
3 was is near seat 3, just to get your bearings, in that
4 area of the doorwell. So the man whom you've described
5 lying face down, could you just give us an indication of
6 exactly where he was? (Pause)

7 Would he have been, Mr Boodi, in the centre there,
8 or would he have been closer towards seats 2 and 31? If
9 you can't say, there's no difficulty. If you can't
10 remember.

11 A. I thought the lady was -- is it Laura Webb? I thought
12 she was between 2 and 3.

13 Q. Yes, and the man is in front of her, so more towards the
14 centre of the train?

15 A. I think so.

16 Q. Okay. Now, in your statement, you do make a reference
17 to seeing the man's face. Can we take it from that that
18 there was nothing obscuring his head, his head was
19 visible when you saw him?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. You've described him being covered in dust. Was there
22 any pile of debris or any other item, heavier item,
23 obscuring him?

24 A. Not that I can remember.

25 Q. Do you recall in that area seeing a door that was off

1 its hinges?

2 A. The door was wrecked on that side.

3 Q. Do you know where it was when you came into the
4 carriage?

5 A. I can't remember.

6 Q. Now, both today and in your witness statement, you've
7 suggested that it was about 9.30 before help arrived and
8 you left, so as far as you're aware you were in the
9 bombed carriage for about 35 to 40 minutes.

10 Now, a large part of that time was obviously taken
11 up with the lady whom you've referred to and you may be
12 asked further questions about her, but I represent the
13 family of the man who was in the hole, whom you've
14 described, so I've got some questions about that.

15 Now, in your witness statement, Mr Boodi, you were
16 very clear that you saw two holes, and if I could just
17 have [INQ10282-9] back on screen, you said:

18 "As I looked further back, I saw two holes in the
19 floor of the train and in one of them was a guy who was
20 under the train. You could see the tracks, the hole was
21 so big."

22 Can you just describe where the two holes are that
23 you were describing there in your statement?

24 A. I believe number 29.

25 Q. Is that the larger hole?

1 A. The larger hole.

2 Q. Where the man was. How far did it extend, do you know,
3 how far down?

4 A. Around those areas, 29 to 27.

5 Q. Okay. Then the second hole, was that further away from
6 you or closer to you?

7 A. That was further away from me.

8 Q. Could you give us an indication by seat number of
9 roughly where you think it was?

10 A. I think it was near the middle, between 6, 7, 26 and 27.

11 Q. So in the area between those double doors D3 and D4?

12 A. I think so, yes.

13 Q. It was certainly smaller than the other hole where you
14 saw the man?

15 A. I never went that far, so I wasn't too sure.

16 Q. Just to clarify, you've described seeing the man in the
17 hole and in your statement you describe him as if he's
18 lying on the tracks. Was any part of his body in the
19 train when you saw him?

20 A. There were a lot of -- the train -- there was a big hole
21 and the damage of the train, you can see it going
22 through the person's legs, his legs might -- the lower
23 half of his body might be tangled within the train
24 wreckage.

25 Q. So was he half in and half out of the train?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Rather than lying on the tracks?

3 A. I think so.

4 Q. That's very helpful, thank you. Now, you describe in
5 your statement seeing people massaging his heart and
6 today you've said there were quite a few people round
7 him, so it was difficult to see, and you've told us they
8 were talking to him and trying to keep his spirits up.
9 So as far as you were aware, at that time, from what
10 you observed, he was alive because of people speaking to
11 him?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Did you see anything directly yourself which indicated
14 that he was alive?

15 A. The way that they were speaking to him indicated that he
16 was still alive.

17 Q. The people around him, Mr Boodi, do you recall if any of
18 them were in high visibility vests or uniforms?

19 A. No, I can't remember.

20 Q. Is that, no, you can't recall, or no, they weren't?

21 A. From what I can remember, they were passengers, rather
22 than staff.

23 Q. You've told us in the statement and today that you think
24 it was about 9.30 when you left the train and when
25 people arrived. What you said in your statement was:

1 "It was not until 9.30 that anyone came to help us.
2 People's lives could have been saved if the paramedics
3 had come quicker."
4 So you sounded quite frustrated in your statement.
5 A. Yes, I stand by that.
6 Q. The other thing which you say in your statement is that,
7 when you came up to the station, you say:
8 "There were loads of helpers at the station. I just
9 thought they should be helping people on the train."
10 Again, you sounded quite frustrated in your
11 statement when you said that. Is that an accurate
12 reflection of your current view?
13 A. That's true.
14 Q. One last thing, Mr Boodi. Do you recall at any time
15 when you were on the train seeing any bodies being
16 moved?
17 A. Not that I can remember.
18 MS GALLAGHER: I've nothing further, thank you very much.
19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders, have you had sufficient
20 time to take your instructions?
21 MR SAUNDERS: My Lady, forgive me for getting up as I did,
22 but I thought it may save --
23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Not at all.
24 MR SAUNDERS: -- and I'm very grateful.
25 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

1 MR SAUNDERS: I represent the family of Laura Webb. All
2 right? Forgive me if I put you off, Mr Boodi, when
3 I went to speak with Laura's mother.
4 You obviously know Laura by name now. How did that
5 come about?

6 A. Just when I saw it on the screen.

7 Q. That's the only time? Because, in fact, although your
8 statement was prepared for the police within weeks of
9 this bombing, you are -- and forgive me for saying so --
10 an unexpected witness. We didn't appreciate you were
11 coming. So we've seen a lot of other evidence,
12 Mr Boodi. All right?

13 Please don't think for a moment I'm making any
14 suggestions. All right? I'm simply, on the Webb
15 family's behalf, trying to establish who last saw Laura.
16 All right? I'm very grateful for your help.

17 You've identified seeing the lady in the position
18 that you marked on your plan at A. Can I tell you
19 that's where we all understand Laura was after the
20 bombing?

21 Can you help me with this: you've obviously tended
22 to one lady in carriage number 1. Is that right?

23 A. I was walking past her. She was in shock. We asked if
24 she was okay. She kind of indicated she was okay. But
25 our concern was just to see what's happening in the

1 other carriage.

2 Q. Right.

3 A. In carriage 2 where the bomb happened.

4 Q. You've described the lady you tried giving

5 mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. Not by clothing, but in

6 terms of her face, you've described a quite significant

7 injury to her nose. Now, can I just tell you this:

8 Laura's mum saw her afterwards in the hospital, as did

9 the pathologist, and I've had the chance of looking,

10 because I knew you were coming today, at what Dr Hill

11 has to say, and there doesn't seem to be any reference

12 to any significant injury to Laura's nose.

13 Now, one of the ways in which -- forgive me for

14 going into the detail -- you describe what you do is by

15 seeing this injury. Are you sure, Mr Boodi, that that

16 injury was on Laura's face?

17 A. I believe that her nose was very bloodied and every time

18 I gave her mouth-to-mouth lots of blood was coming out.

19 Q. So could it be this, Mr Boodi -- and again, I'm simply

20 enquiring -- that what you've in fact seen is not an

21 injury to the nose, but simply, as you're breathing in,

22 blood coming from it?

23 A. Yes, at the time if -- the memories I have is her nose

24 being cut open, but if you're saying that that wasn't

25 the case, then maybe ...

1 Q. There's nobody else that appears to have seen any -- and
2 there was -- and I'm not, for obvious reasons, going to
3 go into detail -- there were other injuries but nothing
4 so specific to the nose.

5 A. Okay.

6 Q. All right? Now, you're sure, are you, it was in this
7 position you tried to assist?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Can I tell you why? Her Ladyship has already heard
10 evidence from a witness who was sat on a seat opposite
11 that door that, following the explosion, she is thrown
12 onto the floor, sees Laura and, as it were, takes her by
13 the hand to try to comfort her.

14 Do you remember seeing anybody with the lady you
15 were trying to help that close, so literally holding
16 hands? This woman was unable to get up herself because
17 she had a serious injury to her leg. Do you remember
18 seeing --

19 A. Maybe she did help. I can't remember.

20 Q. I think you describe the two ladies in the carriage
21 across.

22 How did you become aware that they are nurses, do
23 you know?

24 A. Maybe they weren't nurses. Maybe they just knew first
25 aid, so ...

1 Q. Please don't let me suggest that they weren't, because
2 one of them, we've heard evidence on a videolink,
3 Lisa Levine, she was a nurse and so was another witness
4 we heard from yesterday that was read, Patricia McCabe.
5 So there were two nurses. What I'm wondering is how you
6 knew, did they actually say to you?
7 A. They were indicating, banging on to the window, "Do
8 something, do mouth-to-mouth". So --
9 Q. At that stage, could you hear anything?
10 A. You could hear a bit, but not very clearly.
11 Q. You've described them later arriving and seeing them or
12 at least one of them close to Laura. Could it have been
13 at that stage you're made aware that they're nurses?
14 A. They never said, I never asked, it was just ...
15 Q. They obviously knew what they were doing?
16 A. Yes, more than me.
17 Q. I think you've said you'd never been in this position
18 before or had any training?
19 A. Of course.
20 Q. I think it's right -- and the lady who asked questions
21 just before me, Ms Gallagher, has gone on to deal with
22 other things and other people that you've seen in the
23 carriage. So for the period of time you were in
24 carriage number 2, you obviously moved to various
25 places?

1 A. The first half of carriage number 2.

2 Q. The first half of carriage number 2. Because we know
3 that at least one other person -- Mr Hucklesby -- goes
4 to Laura and tries, not only the mouth-to-mouth, but CPR
5 on her chest. All right? But you don't see that,
6 I don't think, do you?

7 A. No, I can't recall.

8 Q. May I just then clarify, one of the final things that
9 was put to you is from your statement about:

10 "Lives could possibly have been saved if paramedics
11 had arrived earlier", and I think your words to
12 her Ladyship were "and I stand by that".

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. May I just deal with it in this way: as far as Laura was
15 concerned, I think the way you described her was barely
16 breathing, motionless and it was her last few breaths.

17 A. I could say that.

18 Q. One understands, Mr Boodi, you have no medical training
19 at all, but clearly the observation you've made to
20 her Ladyship about paramedics wouldn't, in your mind,
21 apply to Laura Webb?

22 A. If they were there the next -- if they were there by
23 9.00 ...

24 Q. Forgive me for putting it this way, Mr Boodi, you've
25 done what you tried to.

1 A. Of course.

2 MR SAUNDERS: But you described Laura as being within her
3 last few breaths. It may be unfair for me to press that
4 with you.

5 Can I merely thank you, Mr Boodi, on behalf of the
6 Webb family for the efforts you made? You had no
7 training. You did your best under direction of those
8 who also were trying, and the family would like to thank
9 you for your efforts on their behalf. Thank you very
10 much.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Yes,
12 Ms Simcock?

13 Questions by MS SIMCOCK

14 MS SIMCOCK: Thank you, my Lady. Mr Boodi, you made your
15 statement on 28 July 2005, is that right?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. At the time you wrote that statement, did you have any
18 specific knowledge at all as to how either Mr Brewster,
19 the man in the hole, whom you saw, or Ms Webb, the lady
20 you've just been asked about, had died?

21 A. Sorry, could you repeat that again one more time?

22 Q. Did you have any specific information, on 28 July, when
23 you wrote your statement, as to how either of those two
24 people had died?

25 A. No.

1 MS SIMCOCK: Thank you.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Boodi?

3 Those seem to be all the questions for you,

4 Mr Boodi. I think we'd all agree that one of the most

5 impressive things that we've learnt during the course of

6 the inquest is how fellow passengers went to see what

7 they could do to answer those cries for help and, as you

8 described it, went into a war zone.

9 You've heard from Mr Saunders what it means to some

10 of the families. So I'm sorry that we had to ask you to

11 relive it, and I'm sorry that we gave you such late

12 notice, but thank you for coming to help.

13 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I say, I hope it assists in our

14 attempts to piece the pieces of the jigsaw together, but

15 it may be worth reminding ourselves that Mr Bourbrook in

16 his witness statement refers to an Indian male with whom

17 he enters the second carriage. That may be a reference

18 to Mr Boodi.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So we think he was the Mediterranean

20 man?

21 MR KEITH: Secondly, in his oral evidence he refers to

22 a couple of people attempting to revive Ms Webb. He may

23 have amalgamated two attempts by two separate people,

24 Mr Boodi and Mr Hucklesby.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm very grateful, Mr Keith, I meant

1 to ask that, whether we'd identified the Mediterranean
2 man. We think we know who went with you, Mr Boodi.
3 Would that be a convenient time to take a break?

4 MR KEITH: My Lady, yes.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

6 (11.40 am)

7 (A short break)

8 (11.55 am)

9 MR KEITH: My Lady, the next scheduled witness was
10 Mr Brough, Mr Michael Brough. He's produced for us this
11 morning an original notebook in which he recorded some
12 contemporaneous events from the morning of 7 July, and
13 so Mr Smith has kindly photocopied those extracts from
14 the diary for those to be handed round, and for my
15 learned friends to consider them will take a moment or
16 two so I'm going to call in his place first
17 Mr David Matthews, with my Lady's leave.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

19 MR KEITH: Mr Matthews, please.

20 MR DAVID JAMES MATTHEWS (affirmed)

21 Questions by MR KEITH

22 MR KEITH: Good morning. Could you give the court your full
23 name, please?

24 A. David James Matthews.

25 Q. Mr Matthews, by 2005, you had worked for

1 London Underground for 17 years?
2 A. Yes, about that.
3 Q. Roughly?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. I think, of those 17 years, you had been driving trains
6 and were a train operator for over ten years?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Did you drive, at that time, trains on the
9 Hammersmith & City and Circle Lines?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. That morning, Thursday 7 July, had you booked on for
12 duty around quarter to 5?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Were you down on the rota for that morning as a spare
15 driver?
16 A. Yes, I was.
17 Q. So you would fill in to the rota or go into the rota and
18 take over a train as and when required?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. I think you were in -- quaintly, historically, it's
21 called the smoking mess --
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. -- because I'm sure it's not there now --
24 A. No.
25 Q. -- having a cigarette, when you heard a thud?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Was it quite noticeable?

3 A. Yes, because they were portakabins, so if you hear

4 a thud in a portakabin, you are -- it's paper, really,

5 isn't it?

6 Q. Was the portakabin on the platform level or was it up

7 near the offices on the station level?

8 A. It was up above platform level.

9 Q. Station level?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. You may have carried on having your cigarette, but

12 somebody came in to your portakabin and said "Something

13 has happened"?

14 A. Said something had gone on, yes.

15 Q. Yes. As a result, did you go down to the platforms?

16 A. I did.

17 Q. To platforms 3 and 4?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Were there quite a few drivers standing on the platform?

20 A. There was.

21 Q. Is that because Edgware Road station is a depot point?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. How many, roughly, do you think there were?

24 A. I would say approximately ten.

25 Q. From the platform, could you see into the tunnel?

1 A. I could.

2 Q. And what could you see?

3 A. A lot of smoke, well, dust. Two trains, one on the
4 east, one on the west.

5 Q. Could you see the lights from any of the -- either of
6 the trains?

7 A. I could see the lights from the eastbound one, the
8 driver's light.

9 Q. The front of the eastbound?

10 A. Yes, and --

11 Q. What about from the rear of the westbound?

12 A. The red lights from the rear of the westbound one.

13 Q. What about tunnel lights?

14 A. I couldn't say that they were on or off, to be honest
15 with you.

16 Q. From the platform, could you hear banging from people
17 banging on doors and windows and screaming?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. So it carried all the way from there to the platform?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Was it immediately apparent that something was very
22 badly wrong?

23 A. It was apparent something was wrong, and it was apparent
24 that we had to get down there and find out what was
25 wrong.

1 Q. Did you have a high-vis jacket on?
2 A. No.
3 Q. Did you have a torch?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Did you have anything?
6 A. I had a uniform.
7 Q. How long did you wait on the platform before going down
8 the tunnel?
9 A. Five minutes.
10 Q. We know from your witness statement, and we know also
11 from the witness statements of Mr Rodgers and Mr Brough,
12 whom we'll be coming to next, that there was some debate
13 on the platform as to whether or not the traction
14 current -- which we know you call the "juice" -- was
15 off?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. Were steps taken to see whether or not it was properly
18 off?
19 A. Steps were being taken at the time.
20 Q. How was that done?
21 A. Mr Brough was checking the juice rail with CRIDs.
22 Q. With?
23 A. CRIDs, it's a machine that you put on. If the lights
24 light up, it means there's juice.
25 Q. Is there another way of doing it, which is to phone

1 somebody?

2 A. Yes, there's the affirmed way, which is, you ask them if

3 the juice is off or can you turn the juice off, and they

4 affirm to you --

5 Q. Do you recall anybody phoning?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Do you recall anybody using a radio at that time?

8 A. No.

9 Q. How long does it take to use CRIDs to see whether or not

10 the power is off?

11 A. It depends who's using them. It depends what track

12 they're on.

13 Q. Did you wait for Mr Brough to confirm that the power was

14 off?

15 A. No.

16 Q. What did you do?

17 A. We went.

18 Q. How do you go down a rail if the power is still on?

19 A. Well, we're trained to do that. We just don't stand on

20 the posi or the negative rail. That's the middle and

21 the end rail.

22 Q. We haven't heard any evidence about actually which is

23 the rail. We all know from using the Tube that the

24 middle rail has got --

25 A. That's the negi.

1 Q. -- has got -- the word has totally escaped my brain --
2 conductors underneath --
3 A. Yes, yes.
4 Q. -- and, therefore, is that one of the two live rails or
5 just the single live rail?
6 A. You've got the live live rail is the positive rail,
7 which is --
8 Q. Which was that?
9 A. That's the one next to the left-hand rail, if you're
10 going westbound. Okay? And then the middle rail is the
11 negative rail.
12 Q. So there are two --
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. -- to be careful of?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Who went down the tunnel with you?
17 A. There was me, Simon Blakesly, Chris Ibrahim, Lee Hunt --
18 Q. Let's take the names shortly again, but just slow down
19 a little bit because they need to go into the record.
20 Simon Blakesly?
21 A. Yes. Chris Ibrahim.
22 Q. Chris Ibrahim.
23 A. Lee Hunt.
24 Q. Lee Hunt.
25 A. Alec Birmingham.

1 Q. Alec Birmingham.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. They are all drivers?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Train operators?
6 A. Yes.
7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, just before we go on, going
8 back to the two rails, do you have to make a link
9 between both the negative and the positive to be in
10 trouble?
11 A. I think you have to make a link between any of them to
12 be in trouble, so if you're standing on the rail and
13 stand on the positive, you won't be standing on anything
14 else because it would kill you.
15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Just a foot on the positive rail will
16 be sufficient?
17 A. Yes.
18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You don't have to, as it were, make
19 any kind of link?
20 A. No.
21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: What about if you put a foot on the
22 negative rail?
23 A. Same thing.
24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right, thank you.
25 MR KEITH: May we have on screen INQ10282-15, please? It

1 should be a photograph of the front -- INQ10385 is an
2 alternative number.

3 I'm sorry, my Lady, it may be that one of our core
4 bundle photographs isn't -- [INQ10325-1]. There we go.
5 Thank you very much. I'm very grateful to Mr Hay.
6 Is that the sight that confronted you? Because the
7 left-hand train is the back of the bombed train, we can
8 see carriage 5558 on the left, and the right-hand train
9 is the front of the eastbound train.

10 A. Mm-hmm, yes.

11 Q. Did you go on to the westbound, that is to say the
12 bombed train, via the rear door which we can see there?

13 A. I did.

14 Q. Which of the doors do you go in, or did you go in?

15 A. I went in the door that you could see with 216 on it.

16 Q. Was the ladder up?

17 A. No.

18 Q. What about short-circuiting devices?

19 A. That was dealt with by Simon Blakesly.

20 Q. Then or later?

21 A. He would have done that after I got in to turn them.

22 Q. So when you approached, there were no devices on the
23 track --

24 A. No.

25 Q. -- and no ladder?

1 A. No.

2 Q. Did you haul yourself up on to the back of the carriage?

3 A. Yes, I did.

4 Q. What did you do?

5 A. I opened the interconnecting doors and I was a bit

6 apprehensive because of the screaming and shouting, and

7 I was greeted by -- I think it was a South African

8 gentleman who said he was a paramedic, is there anything

9 that we could do?

10 Q. Was he just behind the door between the driver's cab and

11 the most rear of the carriages?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. What did you tell him to do?

14 A. I told him that, if he steps out, a colleague of mine

15 will instruct him if he needs him to help.

16 Q. Did he go out of the train, did you see?

17 A. I think so.

18 Q. Did you then start proceeding through the rear carriages

19 of the train, carriage 6, 5, 4, 3, 2 and so on?

20 A. I did.

21 Q. What did you do in each of the carriages?

22 A. I was calling out that, "We're evacuating from the rear

23 of the train, please make way".

24 Q. The carriages towards the rear of the train, what was

25 the state of the passengers?

1 A. They were calm, they were extremely calm.

2 Q. As you moved through the carriages, did there come
3 a point when you heard screaming from somebody outside
4 the train?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Was there a point where you heard somebody calling out
7 about their legs?

8 A. No.

9 Q. I ask because in your witness statement that you made,
10 obviously much nearer the time, you recall how you are
11 moving through the carriages, and possibly between the
12 second and third carriage near an interconnecting door
13 you heard someone shouting, "I've got no legs".

14 A. No, I didn't hear that at all. What I had said in my
15 statement was a gentleman, an American gentleman
16 I think, said there was someone under my train, under
17 the train and I called out and then he said that "I have
18 no legs, they've blown my legs off".

19 Q. I was just trying to elicit that you heard somebody say
20 those words?

21 A. Yes, after I asked him if there was anyone there.

22 Q. Could you tell where that voice was coming from?

23 A. I couldn't tell directly, but it was from under the
24 train somewhere.

25 Q. You couldn't say whether it was towards the tunnel wall

1 side or the other train side?
2 A. Oh, it was definitely the tunnel wall side.
3 Q. It was the tunnel wall side?
4 A. Definitely the tunnel wall side.
5 Q. Did you reply or try to call out some sort of
6 reassurance to whoever it was?
7 A. I told him assistance was coming down the side.
8 Q. Down the side of the train?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. How did you know that?
11 A. Because Simon -- well, at that stage, I thought
12 Simon Blakesly was behind me, but he wasn't, and
13 Lee Hunt and Chris Ibrahim was going down the side.
14 Q. May I ask you this: why did you assume, and why did they
15 perhaps, go down the tunnel wall side as opposed to
16 trying to get down between the two trains that were
17 adjacent to each other? Is that because there's more
18 room on one side?
19 A. I couldn't tell you.
20 Q. You don't know?
21 A. I really couldn't tell you.
22 Q. All right. As you went through the train going to the
23 front, could you see the westbound train on your
24 right-hand side?
25 A. I could.

1 Q. Did people ask you what had happened?

2 A. Well, it wasn't they asked, what they said is we've
3 heard that there's a power surge.

4 Q. Did you know, as you went through the train, what it
5 was?

6 A. No, I did not.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So you're saying passengers were
8 saying they'd heard it was a power surge?

9 A. Yes.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It's just that for many of us
11 I suspect the first we'd ever heard of power surges as
12 passengers was that day, as we sat on a Tube, but you're
13 saying that the passengers themselves were talking about
14 power surges?

15 A. Yes, no one told me it was a power surge.

16 MR KEITH: As you moved towards the front of the train, did
17 the injuries appear to become successively more serious?

18 A. Well, as I was going towards the front of the train, it
19 wasn't so much injuries, it was, I would say, faces, the
20 shock, because there wasn't no really sustainable
21 injuries until I got to the third carriage, and that's
22 when people from the second carriage, I presume they
23 were in the second carriage, were on the way out, that's
24 when the injuries started to occur.

25 Q. What sort of injuries did you notice?

1 A. Just walking wounded, blood, smoke, a lot of smoke
2 and -- well, steaming smoke, sort of thing.

3 Q. Tell us, please, what you can recall of your approach to
4 the second carriage? Take your time. I appreciate it's
5 extremely difficult.

6 Perhaps let me ask you a question about it and we'll
7 see whether we can progress that way. As you approached
8 the second carriage, was there a lady who told that you
9 there was another person who was very hurt and you
10 looked around and saw there was a lady sitting on the
11 floor just before you got to the second carriage?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Did you get down on your hands and knees and give
14 reassurance to that lady by telling her --

15 A. Assistance --

16 Q. -- that help was on the way?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Were you aware of other people coming through the
19 carriage behind you or of assisting in any way, or were
20 you on your own?

21 A. There was loads of people assisting. There was people
22 assisting --

23 Q. Other passengers or other London Underground?

24 A. Other passengers were assisting the injured passengers.

25 Q. Did you see Mr Porter, your colleague, in the other

1 train?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. We know the front of the other train was obviously
4 alongside the westbound train?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Could you see him in the driver's cab or on the track?

7 A. Where are we talking? Are we talking --

8 Q. We're talking through the westbound train.

9 A. -- as I'm walking going through the train?

10 Q. As you're going through.

11 A. I see him on the adjacent train.

12 Q. Was he on the train or was he --

13 A. He was on the train.

14 Q. Did you speak to him?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. How did you get his attention?

17 A. I tried to open the doors as best I can, just
18 a fraction, and shouting out to him.

19 Q. What did you tell him?

20 A. I told him we've got dead and dying.

21 Q. You hadn't reached the second --

22 A. No, I was in that carriage then.

23 Q. You were inside the second carriage --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- when you spoke to Mr Porter?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Right, because that's the question I wanted to ask you.

3 I hadn't understood how you knew there were dead and

4 dying.

5 A. Yes, I was in the carriage then.

6 Q. Did he respond?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. What did he tell you he would do?

9 A. He said would he go and get some now.

10 Q. We've heard a great deal of evidence about the second

11 carriage, Mr Matthews, so I'm not going to ask you about

12 your general recollections of the state of the carriage.

13 In your statement, you refer to how, whilst you were

14 in the second carriage, a passenger said to you that you

15 were standing on somebody --

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. -- and you realised that you were, indeed, standing on

18 somebody lying on the floor.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. You state how you saw people that you believed to be

21 dead.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. I'm going to ask you a series of questions about that --

24 A. Okay.

25 Q. -- as shortly as I can.

1 A. Okay.

2 Q. Do you recall whether those people were in the first
3 section of double doors as you entered the second
4 carriage or the second?

5 A. As we entered from the third carriage.

6 Q. From the third carriage. I'm sorry, they would have
7 been further forward. Which set of double doors do you
8 think those people were in?

9 A. The first set, as I come.

10 Q. The first set as you came in.

11 A. I think.

12 Q. Are you sure it wasn't further down the carriage?

13 A. It could have been.

14 Q. It could have been?

15 A. It could have been.

16 Q. Because we know the bomb --

17 A. It could have been because --

18 Q. -- was to the front of the carriage?

19 A. Yes, it could have been. It's either the first or the
20 second set of doors.

21 Q. How far down the second carriage did you go?

22 A. All the way.

23 Q. All the way to the crater where the bomb had been?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Did you go past the crater?

1 A. I couldn't.

2 Q. You couldn't?

3 A. No.

4 Q. As you went through the carriage, did you try to stop
5 and see, count, how many people were lying in the floor,
6 and in what state each individual person was in?

7 A. No.

8 Q. What was the purpose of going into the second carriage?

9 A. Find the driver.

10 Q. Why?

11 A. I know the driver. Need help from the driver.

12 Q. Right. Can you help us at all with any detailed
13 recollection of where the individual people were in the
14 carriage or is it just a general sense of there were
15 people dead and dying in the carriage?

16 A. Okay, you had -- well, the gentleman for Mr Boodi. Do
17 you want to put the thing up?

18 Q. Yes, why don't we give you the carriage map, [INQ10282-9]?

19 This is the plan of the second carriage, Mr Matthews.
20 To get your bearings, this is the second carriage. The
21 first carriage is to the left of the screen, if you can
22 imagine it there.

23 A. Right.

24 Q. The third carriage from which you entered is to the
25 right of the screen. So we know the bomb was towards

1 the front of the carriage as you were walking through
2 from the rear.

3 A. Yes, okay, yes.

4 Q. Can you tell us, please, where you recollect those
5 persons who you thought may have been dead were?

6 A. Well, we had a gentleman that died subsequently, he was
7 in a full set of seats, whether it's from 26 to 23 or 22
8 to 19, it's one of them.

9 You had another lady that was Laura Webb, as you
10 said. She was near 1 and 2 near the double doors.

11 Q. At the front of the carriage?

12 A. Yes. You had a gentleman -- well, it says
13 Jonathan Downey there, he was between 1 and 2 and 32 and
14 31. The other two, I'm not sure, but they probably were
15 where they said, if I had stood on one, trying to get
16 help.

17 Q. Do you recall where you were when you believed that
18 you'd stood on somebody?

19 A. Well, I thought it was on the first set, but it's -- D5
20 would be the better bet.

21 Q. May you be mistaken about that? It may, in fact, have
22 been further forward?

23 A. It could have been, yes.

24 Q. All right. I'm just going to ask you now some questions
25 about each of the people you've just mentioned.

1 The lady at the front of the carriage, who we know
2 to have been Laura Webb, you didn't know her name then,
3 of course.

4 A. No.

5 Q. Do you recollect anything of her?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Is it just that you recall that there was somebody
8 lying, a female, lying on the floor?

9 A. There was someone lying.

10 Q. Was there anybody attempting to resuscitate her or --

11 A. Later on. Later on, there was.

12 Q. There was?

13 A. Yes, while I was dealing with something in the next
14 carriage on, because I was dealing with a gentleman on
15 the next carriage.

16 Q. On carriage 3?

17 A. 1.

18 Q. On carriage 1?

19 A. 1.

20 Q. But you hadn't gone past the crater, you thought?

21 A. I went through the crater to the track.

22 Q. You did go through the crater?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. All right. Could you see anything about the attempt to
25 resuscitate the person who was sitting on the --

1 A. There was someone trying to resuscitate her, yes.
2 Q. Do you recall whether that was a man or a woman?
3 A. It was a man.
4 Q. Was there a woman next to him?
5 A. I don't think so, no.
6 Q. All right. Do you know how long that person was
7 attempting to resuscitate for?
8 A. No, I couldn't tell you that.
9 Q. All right. Do you recall there being another person
10 lying on the floor in the same area as Laura Webb?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Can you tell us, please, what you can recall of that
13 person?
14 A. Well, I can't -- not much, because, if I'm -- I'm sure
15 that he was covered by the door, or some sort of debris
16 was covering him.
17 Q. Right. Was there anything about him to indicate that he
18 was alive?
19 A. No.
20 Q. How close did you go to Laura Webb and the other person
21 who was in the area?
22 A. How close?
23 Q. How close?
24 A. I wouldn't say I was that close because the first -- as
25 soon as I got in the carriage and seen what was needed,

1 the first object is I have to find the driver.

2 Q. So you carried on going through the carriage?

3 A. Yes, I have to -- once you find the driver, and then
4 that's your assistance.

5 Q. We've heard a great deal of evidence about the crater
6 and the presence of Mr Brewster, the gentleman who was
7 in the crater.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Do you recall anything about him and the attempts to try
10 to pull him out and to give him --

11 A. Not the attempts, but I did see him as I went through
12 the train.

13 Q. Was there anybody around him at that time trying to help
14 him?

15 A. Yes, yes, there was.

16 Q. What about in that area where he was, in the standing
17 area between double doors D3 and D4, do you recollect
18 anything of the people lying on the carriage floor
19 there?

20 A. No.

21 Q. You've mentioned somebody lying across some seats just
22 a few moments ago.

23 A. That was Mr Brewster.

24 Q. That was?

25 A. Mr Brewster.

1 Q. Oh, that was Mr Brewster.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Because the crater extended into the seat area, didn't

4 it, between 30 and 27?

5 A. There was two craters, wasn't there?

6 Q. We've heard some evidence there were two holes.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. There was a huge crater caused by the bomb.

9 A. Yes, and another one further up.

10 Q. Possibly, and was that towards the rear, that's to say

11 carriage 3, so between --

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. -- seats 7 and 23?

14 A. Yes, between 26 and 23, yes.

15 Q. Right. Might that have been a manhole cover that had

16 come up from the floor of the carriage?

17 A. It could have been, but it was -- no, because the seats

18 were missing, so it was definitely not a manhole cover.

19 Q. All right. You were trying to find the driver so you

20 yourself weren't able to stop and to --

21 A. And assist no one.

22 Q. -- assist any of the individuals. Could you see people

23 moving round the carriage trying to bring aid to them?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Where you got to the crater, did you leave the train

1 because you couldn't get past --

2 A. That's right --

3 Q. -- in the middle of the carriage, you couldn't go down

4 on to the track --

5 A. -- I did.

6 Q. -- and then carry on forward to the first carriage?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Did you find Ray Whitehurst at the front of his train?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. We know from him he told you that someone had tried to

11 blow his train up, and we've heard from him that you and

12 he went to a signal box.

13 A. A signal phone.

14 Q. A signal phone. Was that OP11?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Did you speak to the signaller on the phone or was it

17 just him?

18 A. He was speaking, I took the phone off him.

19 Q. Why was that?

20 A. Because he was babbling.

21 Q. What did you tell the signaller?

22 A. Well, I said that we needed to take the people off the

23 front carriage, as they were coming off anyway and we

24 needed to take them somewhere, and we were instructed to

25 evacuate from advance, as the train is our protection,

1 so I asked could I take them to Paddington.

2 Q. Standard operating procedure dictates that you --

3 A. Move forward.

4 Q. -- move forward when detraining from a train?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. What was his response?

7 A. No, you can't.

8 Q. Because he couldn't be sure that the current was off?

9 A. That the traction current was off at that end.

10 Q. So did that leave you with no option but to detrain from

11 the front of the train back down the tunnel wall?

12 A. But that option -- as the passengers were coming out, we

13 couldn't send them through the middle because the doors

14 were -- the train was intertwined, we couldn't send them

15 through the other train because that would have caused

16 a panic, so the option was send them down the side of

17 the train, which we did.

18 Q. Did you speak to the signalman about the need for help

19 and a lot of help and very quickly?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Would you have specified the sort of help you needed?

22 A. Well, I couldn't be sure I said that I needed -- but

23 emergency services -- if you've got dead and dying, you

24 need everything, really, don't you?

25 Q. Do you recall whether there was a response?

1 A. He -- his words were he says we've got explosions all
2 over, roughly about eight.

3 Q. But he didn't indicate that help wouldn't be
4 forthcoming?

5 A. No.

6 Q. After that conversation, did you then start to detrain
7 from the front of the train?

8 A. Yes, we did.

9 Q. Do you recall whether it was just the passengers from
10 the first carriage that you detrained that way?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. How many roughly were there?

13 A. 20. We didn't count, to be honest with you.

14 Q. Did you accompany them down the tunnel wall or did you
15 stay at the end of the train?

16 A. No, I stayed on at the end of the train.

17 Q. Once they'd detrained, did you go on to the train or
18 start to go back?

19 A. I went on to the first carriage.

20 Q. Who did you find there?

21 A. A young lad, Matt or Max his name, one or the other.

22 Q. Matt.

23 A. Was it Matt? He had an injury to his leg.

24 Q. To his leg?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And possibly his chest, do you recall?

2 A. It could have been.

3 Q. Did you help him?

4 A. I assisted -- well, someone else was helping him as well

5 at the time.

6 Q. What did you do?

7 A. We put a tourniquet on and we was instructed to do that

8 because I don't know anything about that.

9 Q. But the other person knew something about how to do it?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. So you helped comfort him and applied a tourniquet?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Once he was stable and you had been able to give him

14 some help, where did you go after that?

15 A. I went to the next train to reassure the passengers on

16 that train.

17 Q. How did you get to the other train?

18 A. From the rear of -- the rear of Jeff Porter's train.

19 Q. So you went off the front of the westbound train?

20 A. On the rear of the eastbound.

21 Q. Across the tracks and back in the rear of the eastbound

22 train?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Did you help with the evacuation or detraining from that

25 train?

1 A. I just told them that they are evacuating from the front
2 and then I went back into the -- back into the westbound
3 train.
4 Q. Was Matt still there?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Did you help some more?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. In what state was Mr Whitehurst, if I may ask?
9 A. Well, Ray is a lovely bloke, you know, he was dying for
10 a fag, put it that way.
11 Q. You kept an eye on him?
12 A. I did.
13 Q. Keeping an eye on him and keeping an eye on Matt, did
14 that mean that you stayed towards the front of the
15 westbound train?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Did you notice paramedics, the emergency services,
18 arriving?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Where did they come from?
21 A. They come from the adjacent train. They were walking
22 down with Mr Corbin.
23 Q. We've heard from him that he flagged down two paramedics
24 outside Edgware Road station and went on to the train
25 with them. Do you recall there being two paramedics or

1 more?

2 A. Two.

3 Q. Because they appeared at the rear of the eastbound

4 train?

5 A. I see them coming through the train.

6 Q. Right.

7 A. So I went to meet them.

8 Q. Right. Then where did they go?

9 A. They went on my train, on the -- not my train, but on

10 the bombed train.

11 Q. They entered through the front of the first carriage --

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. -- to get through to the bombed carriage?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Do you recall time passing before more paramedics

16 arrived?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Do you know how much time passed?

19 A. 10, 15 minutes.

20 Q. During that time, was it therefore just a question of

21 Mr Corbin being there with the two paramedics,

22 yourself --

23 A. Mr Corbin didn't get on the train.

24 Q. He didn't go on to the westbound train?

25 A. No, he didn't get on to the train at all.

1 Q. The paramedics were there?
2 A. Yes, they got on the train.
3 Q. You were at the front of the train?
4 A. I was.
5 Q. Was there anybody else helping in terms of emergency
6 services at that time?
7 A. No.
8 Q. You gave an interview to Luton Today, I think --
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. -- on 2 January 2009?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. You made a reference in that article, in that interview
13 to some 40 minutes elapsing before the emergency
14 services arrived.
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. How were you able to judge that time?
17 A. I looked at my watch.
18 Q. Do you recall what --
19 A. 9.35.
20 Q. What happened at 9.35?
21 A. The paramedics got there.
22 Q. That was when Mr Corbin and the paramedics appeared on
23 the other train?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. So it was just over 40 minutes, in fact, from the point

1 of the explosion at 8.50?

2 A. Yes.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So 9.35 for Mr Corbin and his two
4 paramedics?

5 A. Yes.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Then, if we add 10 to 15 minutes,
7 9.45, 9.50, you say, before the mass, as it were,
8 arrives?

9 A. Yes, which would come from -- they come through the
10 bombed train on the west end. Is that correct? They
11 were walking through the train where the first two come
12 through the rear of the eastbound.

13 MR KEITH: Did you, yourself, go back into the bombed
14 carriage after Mr Corbin and the two paramedics had
15 arrived at the front?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. What did you do?

18 A. I was just assisting.

19 Q. How were you -- what were you doing precisely?

20 A. Just moving things, you know, window frames, you know,
21 moving metal things, so we could get people out, trying
22 to open doors.

23 Q. Who was in the bombed carriage with you?

24 A. There was Alex King.

25 Q. Is he another duty manager?

1 A. He's a duty manager.

2 Q. Alex King?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Anybody else?

5 A. Ray Whitehurst was still with us at that time.

6 Q. Ray Whitehurst?

7 A. Yes, he was still with us at that time.

8 Q. Steve Hickin?

9 A. Steve Hickin.

10 Q. Another duty manager trains?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Paul Bloomfield?

13 A. He come down -- he come down after, asking for me and

14 Ray, to get us out of the train.

15 Q. So in the bombed carriage at 9.35 --

16 A. A bit later now, a bit later than that.

17 Q. -- two paramedics --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- a handful of London Underground duty managers and

20 train operators?

21 A. Well, two. Two managers, two drivers and a manager come

22 down asking for Ray and myself to leave the train.

23 Q. What time do you recall that you were asked to leave the

24 train?

25 A. About a quarter to, ten to. Ten to, say. Ten to ten.

1 Q. Did you help with the removal of Matt --
2 A. I did.
3 Q. -- the gentleman who was injured at the end of the first
4 carriage, out of the train?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. How was he taken out?
7 A. He was taken out on a stretcher, but he had to go out
8 through -- I'm not sure if we managed to open the doors
9 somewhere or he went through the window.
10 Q. Did you help carry his stretcher to the platform?
11 A. To the adjacent -- no.
12 Q. To the adjacent train?
13 A. I went back and helped again.
14 Q. You were obviously in the second carriage for quite
15 a time.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Can you recall any more detail of the people who we now
18 know to have died in the explosion in the second
19 carriage?
20 A. What sort of detail?
21 Q. For example, were you there when attempts, subsequent
22 attempts, if they occurred, were made to resuscitate
23 Laura Webb, the young lady at the end of the carriage?
24 A. They were still trying to resuscitate her then, as it
25 was going on.

1 Q. When you say "they", do you remember one or more
2 attempts to resuscitate her?
3 A. I can remember one, one for sure, a gentleman was --
4 Q. The one you described earlier?
5 A. Yes, he was definitely. And the next time I -- they had
6 covered Laura up, the next time, when we were starting
7 to take the injured out by stretcher, and then she had
8 been covered up.
9 Q. Do you recall any of the events surrounding Mr Brewster,
10 the gentleman in the crater and the attempts by
11 Mr Coulson to help him?
12 A. No.
13 Q. Did you, Mr Matthews, yourself move -- help in moving
14 any of the deceased passengers in the carriage?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Did you see anybody moving any of the bodies in the
17 carriage?
18 A. No.
19 Q. What time did the police arrive?
20 A. The first policeman I see must have been about, I don't
21 know, 20 past 10.
22 Q. There was a discussion, was there, about secondary
23 devices?
24 A. Yes, because we had the -- I don't know if it was
25 a policeman or Bomb Squad with his dog and he said the

1 dog had smelt a secondary device, but there was nothing
2 we could do by then anyway, so ...

3 Q. You've told us how you were instructed to leave the
4 train --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- firstly by a manager, but in fact you stayed, but
7 then the police -- a police officer asked you to leave
8 as well?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Did you then leave at that point?

11 A. I did.

12 Q. I think you must have then gone out of the other train,
13 the eastbound train, and gone out that way?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. By the time you left, was the person who was lying on
16 the tracks at the front of the eastbound train covered
17 up?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. I think I'm right in saying, Mr Matthews, that on
20 account of your efforts to help in the train, that you
21 were awarded the MBE in January 2009?

22 A. Yes.

23 MR KEITH: Thank you very much. Will you stay there,
24 please? There may be some further questions for you.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

1 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

2 MS GALLAGHER: Mr Matthews, a lot of the areas I wanted to
3 cover have been dealt with already, so I hope I won't
4 detain you too long. Could I start by asking you some
5 questions about equipment, just from your knowledge as
6 a train operator? We've heard about the paddles which
7 can open doors in an emergency --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- kept in the emergency pod in the driver's cab by the
10 J door.

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. In your statement at the very end, when you're
13 describing trying to get Matt out, you did describe
14 trying to break into the emergency pod. You say:

15 "We then tried to break the emergency pod ..."

16 A. Break off, break off. Not break in, break off.

17 Q. Yes. What it says in your statement is:

18 "We then tried to break the emergency pod, which is
19 situated on the back of the J door. Half of it broke
20 off."

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. So was your attempt to open it successful? What do you
23 mean by "half of it broke off"?

24 A. Well, the problem was we were trying to get the J door
25 off completely, so a stretcher could go out straight

1 where you ain't got to tip it or anything. But the
2 J door, because of the explosion, it had buckled, so we
3 couldn't get the J door off at all.

4 So the next option was trying to get off the pod,
5 take the pod completely off the back of the J door, but
6 we only broke the lid.

7 Q. Thanks very much. Just in relation to train radios,
8 we've heard evidence, some of which you may have heard,
9 from other drivers. Yesterday, we heard evidence from
10 Mr Whitehurst where he was critical of train radios
11 suggesting that they weren't necessarily reliable
12 100 per cent of the time and they often didn't work.
13 Would you agree with that criticism?

14 A. 100 per cent.

15 Q. We've heard from Jeff Porter today that there were
16 particular problems with train radios at the time. He
17 noted first that there was no way of knowing whether
18 there was a response at the other end, so that it was
19 a one-way system, you didn't know if your message had
20 been received. Would you agree with that criticism?

21 A. Sometimes, yes.

22 Q. He also described problems with what he said was a leaky
23 feeder system which prevented the cable working in
24 places and his phrase was it was a "Stone Age system"
25 that he was working with. Would you agree with that

1 criticism?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. We also heard from Mr Porter about signal phones and how
4 some signal phones are too high to reach in places, if
5 you're going to them by foot. In your experience, is
6 that also correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. So some phones are lower and some phones are higher?

9 A. Some are higher.

10 Q. Is there any rhyme or reason to the ones that are
11 higher, the ones that are lower in your experience?

12 A. The higher ones are usually the ones where you're in
13 line with your cab and the lower ones are for when
14 you're out of the train.

15 Q. Mr Matthews, you may also have heard, if you were in
16 court earlier, that I asked Mr Porter about whether he
17 was aware of any training he'd had in respect of
18 a bombing or any protocol he was aware of in respect of
19 a bombing. I asked the same to Mr Whitehurst yesterday.
20 Mr Whitehurst told us that he was aware of what would
21 happen with IRA bombs in the 1970s, but nothing
22 specific, and Mr Porter today told us that he had had no
23 training about what to expect or what to do in the event
24 of an explosion, just some guidance on suspect packages.
25 Were you aware of any particular protocol that was

1 in place about bombings?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Had you had any training about how to deal with bombings
4 or what to expect?

5 A. No.

6 Q. In your statement, very close to the end of your
7 statement, it's just been touched on by Mr Keith, it's
8 the fourth page of your statement, just for my Lady's
9 reference. At the very bottom, you say:

10 "When the police arrived ..."

11 Which, of course, is after the paramedics, you say:

12 "... mention was made of secondary devices."

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Was that the first time you'd thought of secondary
15 devices, when it was mentioned by the police when they
16 arrived with the sniffer dogs?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. You've also said in your statement, Mr Matthews, that
19 when you were in the tunnel, you began to realise
20 obviously that something was seriously wrong. In fact,
21 when you were on the platform, you say you knew
22 something was seriously wrong, and you've told us today
23 that your instinct was to go down into the tunnel to
24 help. You say you had to get down there.

25 You've told us about some particular drivers who

1 definitely went down with you. Were you aware of any of
2 the drivers who were with you on the platform going to
3 alert anyone to that view that something was seriously
4 wrong, or did you think they all came with you?

5 A. Well, no, there was a lot more train staff than
6 I realised, and I realised that after, and not all of
7 them come down, and if there -- there was a manager
8 Mick Brough, who's in here, and he's checking for
9 traction current to be off, then they know that
10 something is seriously wrong. As soon as you get even
11 a power surge, you know it's seriously wrong, so you
12 expect some sort of aid to come to you.

13 Q. So your instinct was to go and help?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. You assumed, because of the traction current being off,
16 that an alert would have been given --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- and that help would then be on the way.
19 When you then later say that you shouted out
20 reassurance to the person who said his legs were blown
21 off and then later to the walking wounded and you said
22 "Assistance is coming" from your evidence today it
23 sounded as if you were referring to other
24 London Underground staff who you knew were on the way?

25 A. When I was on the phone, and they said, when I spoke to

1 the signalman, they did say --

2 Q. This is before the phone, so it's when you go in first,

3 and you hear the person shouting about his legs.

4 A. Well, "assistance is coming" is London Underground

5 staff.

6 Q. Sure.

7 We've heard about the signalman and that is

8 obviously what you're referring to, but that's later.

9 You know Alexander King, you've referred to him in your

10 statement --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- and you've referred to having a conversation with

13 Mr King a little later on in your statement.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Mr King, in his written statement to the police, says:

16 "He was able to give me a fuller account" -- this is

17 you:

18 "He was able to give me a fuller account confirming

19 a bomb had indeed exploded."

20 Do you recall having a conversation with Mr King

21 expressing the view that you believed a bomb had

22 exploded?

23 A. Yes.

24 MS GALLAGHER: My Lady, if you need the reference it's

25 INQ7464-3.

1 In relation to Mr Brewster, Mr Matthews, you
2 described him as a gentleman who died subsequently and
3 you've spoken in detail about where he was to Mr Keith.
4 This may seem obvious, but I need to ask you, how
5 did you know he was alive at the time when you were in
6 the carriage?

7 A. People were speaking to him and he was speaking back.

8 Q. Could you hear anything he was saying?

9 A. No.

10 Q. The other body that was close to the lady who was being
11 resuscitated, you've described that as being
12 Jonathan Downey, and that fits with our view of the
13 evidence. You've said you thought he was covered by
14 a door or --

15 A. Or some sort of debris.

16 Q. -- some sort of debris.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Was it a large debris, which is why you thought it was a
19 door?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Very helpful. Can you tell us whether he was fully
22 covered or whether only part of him was covered?

23 A. Well, I didn't notice him until I was dealing with Matt
24 who was on the -- who was on the other side of the door,
25 and that was the reason we couldn't get through that

1 section, and then, once we lifted Matt up, then we
2 noticed he was there.

3 MS GALLAGHER: That's very helpful, Mr Matthews. The reason
4 is that there's some evidence from people who could see
5 him fully, some evidence from people who describe him as
6 being obscured, so it may help with us the timing, and
7 also there's evidence from some people who were sitting
8 in the area about a door being placed on one of them and
9 later being moved. So thank you for that.

10 Everything else has been covered, I've nothing
11 further, thank you.

12 A. Thank you.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

14 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

15 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Matthews, I won't keep you long at all. In
16 your statement where you're describing the woman who we
17 believe to be Laura Webb and the male who was blocking
18 the next set of doors, so that's --

19 A. Interconnecting.

20 Q. -- exactly -- between carriage number 2 and carriage
21 number 1. You then in your statement go on to say this,
22 so it reads in this way:

23 "There was a woman and a male who were blocking the
24 next set of doors."

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. "I believed these people to be dead."
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Now, you've told us -- and obviously my Lady has heard
4 evidence about a number of people who have tried to
5 assist Laura, but should we take from this that this is
6 at an early stage where you believe that both this male
7 and female are dead?
8 A. That's probably as I was exiting the crater to find the
9 driver --
10 Q. Exactly.
11 A. -- that I see one and one.
12 Q. Yes.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. So it's at that stage, and we understand, and I think
15 I've managed to follow it, Mr Matthews, all the efforts
16 you made, but it's at that very early stage when you're
17 exiting to still find Ray Whitehurst?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. It's at that point you believe this couple have already
20 passed away?
21 A. Yes.
22 MR SAUNDERS: Thank you very much. Thank you, my Lady.
23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Matthews?
24 Those are all the questions, Mr Matthews. For those
25 of us who travel by Tube, it's very reassuring to know

1 there are people like you prepared to go down into
2 a tunnel, not knowing what to expect, but to do your
3 best to help, and you obviously did do your best to
4 help, and you stayed to the bitter end until there was
5 nothing more you could do. I'm sorry we've had to ask
6 you to relive it and I hope you haven't found it too
7 distressing.

8 A. Thank you.

9 MR KEITH: I invite to you call Michael Brough, please.

10 MR MICHAEL JOHN WILLIAM BROUGH (sworn)

11 Questions by MR KEITH

12 MR KEITH: Could you give the court your full name, please?

13 A. It's Michael John William Brough.

14 Q. Mr Brough, in 2000, you became a Tube driver or more
15 formally known as a train operator?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. In June 2003 you became a duty manager?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. What does a duty manager do?

20 A. Manages train crew, ensures the correct train has
21 a track driver, because all the drivers have set duty
22 lengths. Then there's also the incident management side
23 like this, trying to get the train service back and
24 running as quickly as possible.

25 Q. Thank you. Mr Brough, could I ask you to do your utmost

1 to keep your voice up as loud as you can?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. It's very hard to hear and you're very softly spoken,

4 so --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. The microphone won't amplify. We need to rely on you to

7 keep your voice up.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Could you please have a look at the screen and look at

10 [TFL568-11], which is an extract from London Underground

11 Safety Case.

12 We can see at the bottom:

13 "Duty manager (trains):

14 "Are responsible for managing train operators ...

15 "Assessing the fitness of train operators ...

16 competence ..."

17 Then over the page, page 12 [TFL568-12]:

18 "Directing and coordinating trains ...

19 "Managing and investigating incidents."

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Is there an incident office, therefore, at Edgware?

22 A. There is, yes.

23 Q. Is that where you were that morning?

24 A. It was, yes.

25 Q. What goes on in the incident room?

1 A. We write our reports. All the paperwork that we need is
2 kept there. There is some emergency equipment there,
3 and just -- where we go to get ready for work, our
4 lockers are there and that, and that's about it, really.

5 Q. What emergency equipment can you recall was kept there
6 then?

7 A. We have a CRID, current rail indicator device, in the
8 office.

9 Q. Sorry, a CRIB? Is it CRIMP or CRIB?

10 A. CRID --

11 Q. CRID?

12 A. Yes, current rail indicator device. Our handheld radios
13 are kept there.

14 Q. They are the handheld radios that work in the immediate
15 environment of the station?

16 A. No, these are handheld train radios that, at the time,
17 just duty managers had.

18 Q. Just duty managers?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Where would they work?

21 A. They should work along the tunnels, anywhere where the
22 trains run.

23 Q. Did they?

24 A. I never had a particular problem with them, but we don't
25 tend to use them as much as train operators do.

1 Q. What other equipment was there?
2 A. Ice scrapers, the yellow jackets we use, hi-vis, hi-vi
3 vests.
4 Q. Medical equipment?
5 A. Not in the incident office. There would have been
6 a first aid kit in the booking on point, but at that
7 time we didn't have, like, a major incident bag, like we
8 do now.
9 Q. In the incident office, is there any other way of
10 communicating other than the handheld radios that you
11 had?
12 A. We've got autophones.
13 Q. Is that an automatic dial system for London Underground
14 at that time?
15 A. It's an internal system used by the Underground,
16 although you can phone external numbers as well, if
17 required.
18 Q. You were in the incident office, I think you'd arrived
19 at work about 6.30, when you heard a bang --
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. -- from downstairs. You glanced at the clock in the
22 office?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. What was the time?
25 A. 8.50, 8.49, 8.50.

1 Q. You've shown us this morning, very helpfully, a notebook
2 that you kept --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- perhaps habitually at the time, certainly in which
5 you recorded details of the events that morning, and
6 we've got copies now. I hope my Lady has received
7 a copy. It's on the system already. Oh, we can put it
8 up on the system.

9 There we are, thank you very much.

10 There's an "08.50" there above the word "detrained"?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. We presume that's not connected to the detrainment that
13 occurred later, 08.50, that's because that was when the
14 bang was?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Were you in the office with anybody else?

17 A. Trevor Rodgers was also in the office.

18 Q. Is he a duty manager trains as well?

19 A. He is, yes.

20 Q. As a result of the bang, did you ring anybody?

21 A. I rang Monica Hogan, who was on a desk downstairs.

22 Q. Who was she?

23 A. Duty manager trains. She was organising the train crew
24 that day, and I asked her if everything was all right
25 downstairs. I didn't know what the bang was. I hadn't

1 heard one before, and it sounded as though it came from
2 downstairs.

3 Q. What was her response?

4 A. Just that there had been an explosion with smoke in the
5 tunnel.

6 Q. She said there had been an explosion, or did she say
7 other people had reported there were explosions?

8 A. Yes, she said other people had reported there had been
9 an explosion and smoke in the tunnel.

10 Q. Did you know which tunnel she was referring to?

11 A. I don't remember her saying.

12 Q. Do you know whether either she -- or do you recall
13 whether either she or you called anybody else in the
14 London Underground system, NCC for example, or the line
15 controller or the DOM, the duty operations manager, to
16 report what you had obviously, just moments ago, before,
17 discovered?

18 A. Not at that time. I went down to assess the situation
19 first and find out, you know, what it was.

20 Q. We know from records that have been produced to my Lady
21 that a Mr Steve Gozka, who was the group station manager
22 at Edgware, phoned the NCC, the Network Control Centre,
23 at 3 minutes past 9.

24 Did you see him at that time before you went down to
25 the platform?

1 A. No, I don't remember seeing him.

2 Q. Did it cross your mind or Ms Hogan's mind for somebody
3 to call the NCC to say there's been an explosion?

4 A. We don't generally call the NCC direct. Our first port
5 of call is the line controller.

6 Q. Did anybody call the line controller?

7 A. Once I'd gone down to the platform, and realised --
8 because a number of agitated train operators -- I can't
9 think of the word, but something major had happened,
10 I tried to call the line controller to get traction
11 current turned off.

12 Q. That's a little later. I'll come back to that in
13 a moment.

14 Before you went down to the platform, nobody, as far
15 as you were aware -- it may only have been that you had
16 spoken to Ms Hogan and that's all you knew -- called
17 out?

18 A. No.

19 Q. All right. I said, actually, Mr Gozka phoned at 9.03.
20 In fact, he made two calls -- I don't want to mislead
21 you -- 08.59 and 09.03.

22 You put your jacket on and you collected your radio
23 and a bag?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. What did the bag contain?

1 A. Gloves, train keys, there's some plastic seals for
2 a couple of switches that need to be sealed in one
3 position. It would have --

4 Q. Keep your voice up.

5 A. It would have had my notebook in it and a pen, and
6 that's all. It's not a particularly big bag, just, you
7 know, basic personal stuff.

8 Q. Did you go down to the platforms?

9 A. I did, yes.

10 Q. Who was there?

11 A. I remember Alf Rogers and Mick Cooney, out of the
12 drivers, there were a number of drivers there. I can't
13 remember how many or the other people. They were just
14 down there, and there were a few passengers who had just
15 got off that train as well. They're the only two people
16 I remember.

17 Q. What was the first step to take?

18 A. I tried contacting the line controller. I can't
19 remember now if I tried the radio or the autophone, but
20 subsequently I contacted him on the autophone.

21 Q. Could you have made an autophone call from the platform?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Because there are handsets throughout the station?

24 A. That's correct, yes.

25 Q. But you recall that you were unable to get through on

1 the radio?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Were you able to get through on the autophone?

4 A. Eventually, yes.

5 Q. From there, from the platform?

6 A. From the platform, yes.

7 Q. Did that take time?

8 A. It did, yes.

9 Q. Was it that, although there was a line, no one was

10 answering, or was there no line on the autophone?

11 A. The phone was ringing, and it was just ringing for

12 a long time, and we subsequently found out he was

13 dealing with the Aldgate situation, and I just had to

14 wait until he picked the phone up.

15 Q. When he did, did you ask for the traction to be turned

16 off?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Do you recall whether the tunnel lights were already on?

19 A. I can't remember if they were on when I first got down

20 there, but certainly, once he had confirmed the traction

21 current was off, they were all on.

22 Q. We know now that the bomb caused the telephone -- the

23 tunnel telephone system to trip on both lines, on both

24 roads, one by debris and then the first trip tripping

25 the second one.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. If the current is tripped, and there's no juice in the
3 line, is there a risk that, unless the traction current
4 is actually turned off, it can reenergise the line?

5 A. It depends. If the traction current has been turned off
6 by the use of a tunnel telephone wires, and nobody gets
7 in contact with the line controller, they will try to
8 reenergise the traction current after seven minutes.

9 Sometimes, the traction current goes off on
10 overload, if there's too many trains in the section, in
11 which case they try to reenergise immediately, because
12 they can tell the difference at the power control room.

13 Q. Right. We've heard, just a few moments ago, evidence
14 from Mr Matthews as to how you put a CRID on the line.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Was that before or after you got an answer from the line
17 controller?

18 A. It would have been after. I didn't take a CRID down
19 with me, and while I was trying to get through, I asked
20 one of the train operators to go back and get one.

21 Q. Is that just a way of making doubly sure that there is
22 no traction current?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. But did some of your drivers not wait for an answer from
25 the line controller and the CRID?

1 A. I never saw Mr Matthews down there, so it appears as
2 though he went down before I got there.

3 Q. Do you recollect drivers walking down the tunnel before
4 you'd finished speaking to the line controller?

5 A. The drivers that were down there waited for me to get
6 confirmation, and then went down.

7 Q. Having received confirmation that the traction current
8 was off, what did you do?

9 A. Then proceeded down onto the track with the drivers.
10 They went to the westbound train. I went down the
11 right-hand side of the westbound train to try to see
12 what had caused it.

13 Q. There was some suggestion in a witness statement of
14 Mr Simon Eyles, whom we'll be hearing from shortly, to
15 the effect that you were appointed, or nominated
16 yourself, or adopted, the role of Silver control.

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. When did that happen?

19 A. I suppose when I came back off the track then, realising
20 it was something totally unusual.

21 Q. All right, so it wasn't before you went down into the
22 tunnel?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Having approached the two trains, what did you realise?

25 A. Before I went down there, I was trying to work out what

1 could have exploded on the trains -- I didn't even think
2 about a bomb -- and was looking for bits of machinery
3 that might have come off the train. Once I got down
4 there, and I saw the debris on the track, it was sheet
5 metal, doors and that, it was -- some of it was painted,
6 and I realised that it was something totally, I don't
7 know, unexpected, unexplained, as far as I could -- as
8 far as I was concerned at the time.

9 Q. Did you go on to either of the two trains?

10 A. No. I heard somebody on the westbound train saying that
11 there was injured people on there, and around the same
12 time -- almost simultaneously, I spoke to Jeff and he
13 told me -- he said something along the lines of,
14 "There's a person under my train" or "There's one
15 under".

16 Q. There's a person under the train?

17 A. Yes, so I decided to turn round, go back to the
18 autophone, ring the line controller again --

19 Q. On the platform?

20 A. On the platform, ring the line controller again and
21 indicate that we need emergency services down there, and
22 I relayed what I found out.

23 Q. Did you see the person to whom you think Mr Porter might
24 have been referring?

25 A. No.

1 Q. Did you go into the second carriage at this stage?
2 A. I didn't go into either of the trains all day.
3 Q. You went back to the platform. You used the autophone.
4 Whom did you speak to?
5 A. The line controller.
6 Q. The line controller again?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. So the second time you'd spoken to the line controller?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Did you ask for emergency services?
11 A. I did.
12 Q. Did you specify which you had in mind or did you just
13 say, "We need emergency services"?
14 A. I think I just said, "We need emergency services".
15 I told -- from what I can remember, I told him there was
16 injured people and a person under the train, which the
17 line controller would then realise would need
18 ambulances, Fire Brigade and a Emergency Response Unit.
19 Q. Was the chain of command such that the line controller
20 was expected to phone or to speak to the emergency
21 services?
22 A. The line controller then contacted the Network
23 Operations Centre and they're the ones who contact the
24 emergency services.
25 Q. Having made that call, did you wait by the train, the

1 trains, or did you go to the platform or the ground
2 level?

3 A. I stayed on the platform.

4 Q. Were you waiting, in essence, for the emergency services
5 to arrive?

6 A. I was, yes.

7 Q. Did you see any of your colleagues go down the tunnel
8 during that time towards the trains, or were the drivers
9 and the DMTs from the platform already on the trains and
10 the other train too?

11 A. As I went down the first time, the other drivers
12 followed me down, and by the time I'd looked down the
13 side of the train, got the information and gone back to
14 the platform and phoned the line controller, passengers
15 were already starting to come off.

16 Q. So passengers were coming off and your colleagues had
17 already gone down?

18 A. Yes, they had organised themselves into the detraining
19 of the passengers.

20 Q. Did you have your notebook with you?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Did you record the times at which emergency services
23 arrived?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Were they the first times; so when you first saw

1 a firefighter or you first saw a London Ambulance
2 Service vehicle, it was the first one you logged?
3 A. Yes. I logged down 9.15 for the first ambulance as it
4 was then.

5 Q. Could we have the same page, please, on the screen as we
6 had earlier? Was that when they first appeared on the
7 platform or at station level?

8 A. They would have been up at station level. It's when
9 I was made aware of them. I remember Simon Eyles coming
10 out to me and asking for some sort of stretcher,
11 a specialist stretcher, and I went out and asked the
12 ambulance if they had one, which I don't think they did.

13 Q. Was that the first time you saw an ambulance?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Was that when you noted the time?

16 A. It would have been around then. I couldn't say exactly
17 when.

18 Q. So they might, in fact, have arrived a few moments or
19 minutes before?

20 A. Possibly, yes.

21 Q. On that page, we can see 09.15:
22 "Emergency service Am", ambulance?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. You must have spoken to them, because you've taken the
25 name of the technician?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Mr Dickason and a number?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Did you stay up there?

5 A. No, I went back down to the platform.

6 Q. Similarly, in relation to the Fire Brigade, was their

7 arrival something that was reported to you or did you

8 see them arrive at station level or platform level?

9 A. I would have been on the platform when they arrived, to

10 me, as it were.

11 Q. Did you have a watch?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. In relation to the Fire Brigade, do you say "approx" --

14 is it "approx 9.40"?

15 A. Yes, approximately.

16 Q. "FB", Fire Brigade?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Then the call sign number?

19 A. Yes, yes. I would have --

20 Q. There were two of them?

21 A. I can't remember how many people came down initially, to

22 be honest.

23 Q. I'm very grateful to Mr Hay. L84, just going back up

24 the page to 09.15, is a British Transport Police call

25 sign.

1 A. Right.

2 Q. Do you recollect police arriving?

3 A. There was somebody there, yes. But I don't know when

4 they turned up or anything.

5 Q. And Mr Dickason is a policeman.

6 So may it be that you recorded both the arrival of

7 the London Ambulance Service, and then, after that, the

8 arrival of a police officer, Mr Dickason?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Then the Fire Brigade?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Over the page, did you also record at 09.52 the first

13 stretchered casualty out of the train?

14 A. That's correct, yes.

15 Q. Was that when they went past you onto the platform?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Do you recall over and above these times the emergency

18 services arriving in dribs and drabs or in a group, in

19 a fairly obvious arrival?

20 A. The ambulance people turned up first and there was one

21 ambulance. The next thing I knew is the Fire Brigade

22 turning up. I would say one unit turned up to start

23 with. I can't remember after that.

24 Q. Did you remain either on the platform or at ground

25 level?

1 A. I remained on the platform at all -- well, either at
2 platform or the concourse immediately above it, but in
3 that area all the time.

4 Q. When did you first discover that it was not a question
5 of someone being under the train, there had been a bomb
6 on the westbound train?

7 A. Somebody told me during the morning that there had -- it
8 was a bomb and there had been another one.

9 Q. When you say "during the morning", do you mean after the
10 casualties had been removed from the westbound train, so
11 after 10.00, 10.15, or during the time that the
12 emergency services were arriving?

13 A. The walking people were still coming out, from what
14 I can remember, and I can't remember who told me. But
15 it was fairly soon after it happened.

16 Q. Did you speak to the line controller again to update him
17 as to the state of play of casualties on the train, your
18 knowledge as to whether it was just a person under the
19 train or a bomb?

20 A. I don't remember speaking to them again.

21 Q. Did you consider speaking to him again in order to
22 update him and then the NCC as well?

23 A. Insofar as I was involved in seeing everybody out and
24 that, that was what was taking my time up at the time.

25 The fact that we weren't going to get trains moving

1 again, the need to update him, didn't seem as pressing
2 as if we were liable to get a service running again. So
3 until the trains were detrained, it was a situation
4 ongoing, as far as I was concerned.

5 Q. Who, to your knowledge, would have been contacting the
6 line controller to allow the line controller to speak to
7 the emergency services to update them as to what was
8 needed in light of the developing understanding of what
9 was going on on the train?

10 A. I don't know if anybody else would -- I was waiting
11 there for the emergency services and, once they started,
12 I was involved with getting them on the track and
13 informing them that it was safe to go down, and
14 I didn't -- I don't remember updating them after that.

15 MR KEITH: Thank you, Mr Brough. My Lady, is that
16 a convenient moment?

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Well, I think we might see -- I don't
18 know, do we have a lot of questions, Ms Gallagher?
19 There's no restriction upon you, obviously.

20 MS GALLAGHER: It's only about three or four questions. It
21 is quite short.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Let's see how we go, and if we find
23 that -- we'll carry on for a bit.

24 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

25 MS GALLAGHER: Mr Brough, could you assist us in relation to

1 how messages get passed on at Edgware Road. You told us
2 at the start of your evidence that you spoke to
3 Monica Hogan just after you heard the bang.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. You've said that she mentioned that there were reports
6 of an explosion and smoke in the tunnel.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. That fits in with what it says in your statement.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. So she made no reference at that time to any fatalities
11 or casualties?

12 A. No.

13 Q. And no reference to the need for emergency services?

14 A. No, she would have -- was just relaying what the train
15 operators had told her.

16 Q. She's described in your statement as being on reception
17 and you've told us today she's a duty manager trains and
18 her role was organising the train crew that day, so how
19 would she have received those messages that you've
20 referred to?

21 A. Train operators were coming into the booking on point
22 from the platform and telling her that way. I don't
23 know if anybody phoned her. There are direct lines from
24 that platform. They may have phoned her via those to
25 let her know.

1 Q. If someone were to use the signal phone in the tunnel,
2 we've heard evidence that two people used phone 0P11,
3 that signal phone, and they've described getting through
4 to a signaller, but of course they have no idea who they
5 were hearing at the other end of the phone. Would that
6 have been Monica Hogan?

7 A. No.

8 Q. So that would have been someone else?

9 A. That signal phone will go to the signal box.

10 Q. You describe, after speaking to Monica Hogan, thinking
11 at the time that it was possibly that a compressor had
12 exploded. That's what you said in your statement. Is
13 that right?

14 A. Yes, because I was trying to think what on our trains
15 would explode, and not even thinking it was a bomb.

16 MS GALLAGHER: In fact, Mr Brough, everything else that I
17 wanted to ask you has been addressed already by Mr Keith
18 so I've nothing further, thank you.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Ms Gallagher.

20 Mr Saunders?

21 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing thank you, my Lady.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Boyd?

23 Questions by MS BOYD

24 MS BOYD: Mr Brough, I just want to ask you a couple of
25 questions on behalf of London Fire Brigade. It's just

1 in relation to the timing.

2 I think your evidence was that you were on the
3 platform when you noted the first firefighters arriving
4 on the platform --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- which you've put at about 09.40.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. We know from other records that, in fact, the first fire
9 appliance to arrive was 9.18, shortly followed by
10 another one at 9.23.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. I think their assessment will be that they were on the
13 platform and going on to the tracks a little before
14 9.40. Do you think --

15 A. Yes, the fact that I put "approximately" in my notebook
16 indicates to me that I didn't take a time check when
17 they appeared, but once I had notified them of the
18 situation and the fact that it was safe to go on, I then
19 tried to estimate what time they arrived.

20 Q. So your 9.40 could be out by as much as five, ten
21 minutes?

22 A. It's possible, yes. It's not a definite time.

23 Q. I think you've recorded G27. Did the officer give his
24 name as Loft or did you just take his call number?

25 A. I just took his number. We just take the numbers and

1 not names.

2 MS BOYD: Thank you very much.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Canby?

4 Questions by MS CANBY

5 MS CANBY: Mr Brough, I just have a couple of questions to
6 ask you to clarify some of the points that have been
7 raised. You've been asked by Mr Keith about some of the
8 emergency equipment that's kept in the duty incident
9 office. Could we please have on the screen [TFL16-59]?
10 Now, this is an extract, Mr Brough, from the
11 Edgware Road station emergency plan.

12 A. Mm-hmm.

13 Q. It lists the emergency equipment that was at
14 Edgware Road, and in the final column there it tells us
15 the location of equipment.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. So from this document we can see that in the incident
18 office that you were in that morning there were two
19 current rail indicator devices --

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. -- a body fluid kit. Do you know what's in a body fluid
22 kit? Is it gloves, do you know?

23 A. I think it's for taking samples for prosecution if
24 somebody, like, spits and that, we're not sure.

25 Q. Going further down, we can see there's a fire blanket in

1 the incident office kitchen and there are a couple of
2 fire extinguishers as well?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Does that reflect the emergency equipment that was held
5 in the office at the time?

6 A. Yes. There was -- we've amassed the odd sort of track
7 camera and crowbar, but as far as that, yes, that was
8 what was in there at the time.

9 Q. We've heard that before you went down to the platform,
10 you had a conversation with Monica Hogan.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. You also say in your witness statement to the police
13 that, before you went down -- or, sorry, we've had
14 a statement from Ayo Puddicombe. Was she a duty manager
15 train or was she a duty station manager at Edgware Road?

16 A. She was a duty manager trains as well and she was
17 assisting Monica Hogan downstairs on the desk. At that
18 time, there was two DMTs running the desk.

19 Q. She says in her witness statement that's already been
20 read that she also spoke to you and told you that
21 Vicky Martin, a train driver at platform 1, had said
22 there's been an explosion and she could see the end of
23 train 216, and it was Ms Puddicombe who asked you to go
24 down and have a look. Do you recollect that
25 conversation with Ms Puddicombe?

1 A. No.

2 Q. You don't. Could it have happened and you've now
3 forgotten about it, or do you think she's wrong?

4 A. It could quite possibly have happened and I've just
5 forgotten it, yes.

6 Q. You referred to putting on your high visibility vest,
7 and you said that your high visibility was yellow. Are
8 you wrong about that? Was it orange?

9 A. It's orange, all our high-vis stuff is orange.

10 Q. We've heard some evidence -- and we're going to hear
11 some more -- about your attempts to contact the line
12 controller, and you've told us today that you made two
13 attempts, one on your radio and then a second on the
14 autophone.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Was it the emergency number to the line controller that
17 you used on the autophone or was it the general number
18 for the line controller, can you remember?

19 A. I think I tried all of them.

20 Q. You tried all of them?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. I think you say in your witness statement that it took
23 about two minutes for you to get information from the
24 line controller, relaying information that he got from
25 the power control room that traction current was off.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. We've heard different estimates. We're going to hear
3 estimates of about 30 seconds to wait for that
4 confirmation, and we've heard estimates of about
5 5 minutes. How long do you think it took in your mind?

6 A. From the point of actually speaking to him?

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. A minute or two minutes, because he has to phone
9 Leicester Square.

10 Q. Leicester Square is where the power control room is
11 based?

12 A. It's where the power control room is. So as long as it
13 takes for him to phone, which is probably just
14 a direct-dial push button.

15 Q. Did it take longer than usual that morning?

16 A. Only to get through to the line controller initially,
17 yes.

18 Q. So there was no difficulty once you got through to him,
19 the difficulty was actually getting him to answer the
20 phone?

21 A. That's it. We didn't realise at the time that
22 Aldgate -- the bomb at Aldgate, had happened. So that
23 would explain why it took longer, because he would have
24 been dealing with the Aldgate situation.

25 Q. As the Met Line controller he would also have to be

1 dealing with the Aldgate situation?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. In your view, do you think there needs to be any change
4 in seeking confirmation that traction current is off and
5 the procedure as to how that's done?

6 A. I don't see any way you could change it and keep it as
7 safe.

8 Q. You've told us that there was some conversation that you
9 had with Jeff Porter.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. He tells you that he thinks there's somebody under his
12 train, and you immediately go back to the platform to
13 call emergency services and you do that via the line
14 controller as the procedure is.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Are you able to say which line controller you spoke to?
17 We know there was Ron Ryband and Paul Marks.

18 A. Paul Marks.

19 Q. It was Paul Marks?

20 A. It was definitely Paul Marks.

21 Q. The first occasion when you had sought confirmation that
22 traction current was off, was that Ron Ryband or
23 Paul Marks?

24 A. I don't remember speaking to Ron at all that morning.

25 Q. So all contact that you had with the line controller was

1 with Paul Marks?

2 A. With Paul Marks, yes.

3 Q. Are you able to say how long after the explosion you
4 made that request to the line controller for emergency
5 services?

6 A. At a guess, five minutes.

7 Q. Five minutes after the explosion?

8 A. I would say about a minute up in the office, wondering
9 what it is and making a phone call, another minute or so
10 walking down to the platform, and then trying to get
11 through to the line controller, yes, so four or five
12 minutes.

13 Q. But the conversation where you're asking for emergency
14 services, that was the second conversation?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So that would be later than the five minutes?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So it's five minutes to get confirmation that traction
19 current is off.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Then how long after that when you request emergency
22 services?

23 A. At a guess, probably another five minutes, by the time
24 I've walked down and then walked back.

25 Q. So ten minutes after the explosion, you'd made your

1 second phone call to the line controller for emergency
2 services?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. You've told us that you first saw ambulances at 9.15 --
5 A. Mm.
6 Q. -- or an ambulance. Before 9.15, had you seen
7 Bryan Corbin, the line standards manager, coming down
8 the platform with a paramedic and a lady?
9 A. I don't remember seeing him.
10 Q. You don't remember seeing him. Is it that you may have
11 missed him?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. You've told us that you took on the role of Silver
14 control.
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. Could we have a look, please, again, at your note and
17 it's page 3 of the note?
18 We see there in the left-hand column there's
19 a reference at 10.00. It says "[something] Silver
20 control". What do those letters mean, Mr Brough?
21 A. I assume it's Fire Brigade, "FB".
22 Q. Does that indicate that at 10.00, as Silver, you'd had
23 a conversation with London Fire Brigade's Silver?
24 A. I would imagine so, but I can't remember, I can't give
25 you a definite answer on that, no.

1 Q. So you can't really recall what that entry now means?

2 A. Not really, no.

3 Q. After the incident, you were evacuated at about 10.50?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. You saw Mr Whitehurst outside the station. How did he
6 seem to you?

7 A. Very shaken, very pale, he was obviously shocked at what
8 had just happened, yes.

9 MS CANBY: Thank you very much, Mr Brough, I don't have any
10 further questions.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Do I gather there are some questions
12 on behalf of British Transport Police?

13 MS WOODS: Yes, my Lady, just one small matter.

14 Just to clarify something arising out of your note,
15 if we could have page 1 of the note up again, please,
16 you've helpfully been told by Mr Keith that, in fact,
17 L84 is the call sign for the British Transport Police?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Indeed, you said you do have a recollection of police
20 officers arriving.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Can you remember whether you first saw those officers in
23 the station or at platform level?

24 A. What do you mean by station level?

25 Q. Up on the ground level, if I can put it like that,

1 rather than down on the platform?

2 A. I spent most of my time on the platform, so I can't give
3 you a definite answer, but I would imagine it's the
4 platform.

5 Q. You have, if I can say it, rather impresssively recorded
6 the call sign. Now, we know from our records that L84
7 is in fact a British Transport Police van and we also
8 know that there were five police officers in that van.
9 Can you recall whether you saw several police officers
10 arriving at that time?

11 A. I can't recall, no.

12 MS WOODS: Thank you.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Brough?
14 Thank you very much, Mr Brough. Thank you for coming to
15 help. We'll break now until 2.15.

16 (1.15 pm)

17 (The short adjournment)

18