

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005
Hearing transcripts - 17 November 2010 - Afternoon session

1 (2.15 pm)

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith?

3 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call Trevor Rodgers.

4 MR TREVOR GERARD RODGERS (sworn)

5 Questions by MR KEITH

6 MR KEITH: Good afternoon. I'm sorry we didn't get to you
7 this morning. You've been waiting in court all morning.

8 Could you give the court your full name, please?

9 A. Trevor Gerard Rodgers, that's Rodgers with a "D" by the
10 way.

11 Q. Mr Rodgers, you heard what I said to the previous
12 witness. If you could try to keep your voice as loud as
13 you can, it makes it so much easier to hear you --

14 A. Okay.

15 Q. -- and it's important that we hear what you have to say.
16 In 2005, you were a duty manager trains employed by
17 London Underground?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. I think you'd been at Edgware Road for a number of
20 years?

21 A. A number of years, yes.

22 Q. How long had you been there?

23 A. Well, since the place opened, about 12, 15 years ago,
24 I think, about 15 years ago, I think.

25 Q. Were you planning that day to drive some trains

1 yourself, perhaps to keep your operator's licence
2 current?
3 A. That's correct, that's correct.
4 Q. Around about quarter to 9, were you in the incident
5 office -- we've heard it described as such by
6 Mr Brough -- with Mr Brough?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Did you hear a bang?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. As a result of the bang, did one or other of you phone
11 anybody?
12 A. Yes, Mike immediately phoned downstairs to speak to
13 Monica Hogan, and he chatted with her about what was
14 going on. He talked to her about what was going on,
15 basically.
16 Q. To find out what the bang might have been?
17 A. To find out what the bang might have been. Is that
18 better?
19 Q. It doesn't amplify your voice, Mr Rodgers. The
20 microphone, in fact, just relays it to the annex --
21 A. Right, okay.
22 Q. -- where my Lady's court is deemed to be sitting as
23 well.
24 A. Right.
25 Q. So we've got to rely on you to keep your own voice up.

1 A. Okay.

2 Q. Did you call anybody?

3 A. Yes, I contacted the DOM, the duty operations manager,
4 Mr Tony McKinnon.

5 Q. What is the role of the duty operations manager as you
6 understood it to be?

7 A. To actually coordinate any incidents that might occur on
8 the railway at the time.

9 Q. Why did the taking place of a bang seem to you to be
10 sufficient to require a phone call to the DOM?

11 A. Because I thought immediately that's where calls would
12 be going, to the line controller, who actually sits with
13 the DOM, or the DOM sits with the line controllers, so
14 they would be getting information straightaway, so --

15 Q. Is that in the office in Baker Street?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. Did you understand that either the line controller or
18 the DOM would be responsible for liaison with any
19 emergency services --

20 A. Absolutely.

21 Q. -- and calling them, if they were required?

22 A. Yes, that is correct.

23 Q. Did you get the impression that the duty operations
24 manager, Mr McKinnon, had already heard about the bang
25 or the noise, or was that the first he'd heard?

1 A. Certainly he replied to me that, "Yes, we think it might
2 have been a transformer on a track that's gone off".

3 I think he might even have said, "Yes, the power has
4 gone off on overload, and trains are stalled in the
5 section".

6 Q. So it was apparent that he already knew about the power
7 going off, but was surmising, was hypothesising, as to
8 what it might have been. Neither he nor you knew more
9 about what the cause was?

10 A. Knew more than that, no.

11 Q. We know from your witness statement to the police that
12 you then put on your hi-vi and you went down to the
13 signal cabin, which is next to platform 1. Was the
14 signalman, Mr Gilbert, there?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. While you were there, was a call received from
17 Mr Whitehurst, the driver --

18 A. That is correct, yes.

19 Q. -- of the train?

20 A. From the signal telephone, yes.

21 Q. Did you speak to him?

22 A. To Mr Whitehurst?

23 Q. Yes.

24 A. Yes, I did.

25 Q. Why was that?

1 A. Because, as soon as I entered the signal cabin,
2 Steve Gilbert was actually talking to him at that time
3 and, as soon as I walked in, Steve said, "Oh, the
4 manager's just walked in, you'd better speak to him",
5 and he handed me the phone.

6 Q. What did Mr Whitehurst tell you, do you recall?

7 A. He said, "Oh, you've got to come down to me, the
8 trains -- the doors have been blown open, there's people
9 lying dead, you've got to come down and help me".

10 Q. Was there reference to an explosion?

11 A. Yes, yes, something's exploded.

12 Q. So you knew that there had been an explosion of some
13 sort and it was severe enough as to have led
14 to fatalities because he referred to people dead?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. How long after the explosion was this, do you think?

17 A. Minutes, three or four minutes. It didn't take too long
18 to walk from our office to the signal cabin, so two
19 minutes maximum.

20 The first thing I actually said to Ray was, "Sorry,
21 Ray, thanks for that, but I must ask you, was the
22 explosion trackside or trainside, Ray, in your
23 opinion?", and he said, "Trevor, it's definitely
24 trainside, I felt the train lift".

25 Q. Did you give him any degree of reassurance or any kind

1 of promise as to what help might be forthcoming?

2 A. Well, I said to him, "As best you can -- do the best you
3 can, Ray, help's on its way".

4 Q. Did you know about Aldgate?

5 A. Right, immediately after speaking to Ray, I then
6 contacted Tony McKinnon again from the signal cabin.

7 Q. The DOM?

8 A. The DOM, on his direct line, 41417, and explained to
9 Tony McKinnon exactly what the conversation I just had
10 with Ray Whitehurst, to which the reply was, "Yes, Trev,
11 we've also had one go off at Aldgate as well". So
12 I said, "Fair enough, Ton, I'll make my way down to the
13 track now".

14 Q. Did you call Mr Whitehurst back to report --

15 A. No.

16 Q. -- that there was a problem at Aldgate as well and that
17 may affect --

18 A. No, I didn't.

19 Q. Did you have --

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, just pausing there, would you
21 have been able to -- if he'd rung you on a signal phone,
22 would you have been able to get back to the same --

23 A. No --

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: -- even if he'd stayed there?

25 A. -- no, I thought the best thing to do was for me to

1 start taking action now, rather than bothering -- well,
2 Ray's told me as much as I really need to know.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You wouldn't have been able to get
4 back to him anyway?

5 A. No.

6 MR KEITH: Thank you, my Lady.

7 Did you have any discussion with the DOM as to what
8 sort of emergency help was required?

9 A. No, but I felt at the time the information I've given
10 him would constitute him dealing with it as an emergency
11 situation regarding whatever services were required on
12 that.

13 Q. Please keep your voice up, if you can.

14 A. Right.

15 Q. Was telling him that there had been an explosion and
16 that there were dead and dying people on the train, and
17 it was a trainside rather than a trackside explosion,
18 sufficient for him, in your estimation, to have summoned
19 all the help that he could get?

20 A. Yes, I would have thought so, at the time, yes.

21 Q. Are you expected, if you are an incident officer or
22 you're a duty manager trains involved in an incident, to
23 identify what sort of help you need in any given sort of
24 incident?

25 A. To a certain degree, yes. If I was actually on-site

1 immediately able to witness for myself what the
2 situation would be, I could, well, contact the DOM and
3 say what services might be required, but in that
4 situation I thought just telling him what I've heard
5 from Ray Whitehurst was enough to constitute emergency
6 services being contacted.

7 Q. Did you speak to the DOM again later?

8 A. No, only on those two occasions.

9 Q. We know from other evidence before my Lady that at about
10 two minutes past 9 the DOM contacted the NCC and
11 requested emergency services to attend Edgware Road as
12 there was a report of a person under train at the
13 Praed Street junction.

14 Can I ask you two questions, please? One, did you
15 ever mention to the DOM anything about a person being
16 under a train?

17 A. No, I did not.

18 Q. Secondly, did you have any -- was there any discussion
19 or did you ever refer to the incident as having occurred
20 at the Praed Street junction?

21 A. No, I did not.

22 Q. So you then made your way down to the tunnel?

23 A. Mm-hmm.

24 Q. Was the power off?

25 A. The tunnel lights were on and, as far as I was aware,

1 the -- what I could see of the trains, the emergency
2 lighting was on, so I assumed traction current had been
3 discharged.

4 Q. Were there other members of London Underground staff
5 there ahead of you?

6 A. There were several train operators with hi-vi vests on
7 on the scene detraining in what I could see --
8 detraining both trains in what was an organised manner,
9 an orderly manner.

10 Q. Dealing with the westbound train first, was that being
11 detrained from the rear --

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. -- towards Edgware --

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. -- Edgware station?

16 In relation to the eastbound, could you see people
17 coming out of the driver's cab through the front of that
18 train?

19 A. I could.

20 Q. Were there a very large number of passengers coming out
21 of that train in particular?

22 A. There was quite a few, yes.

23 Q. Did you see somebody lying on the tracks in front of the
24 eastbound train by the side of the westbound train?

25 A. I did indeed. It's termed as the "six-foot", which is

1 the gap between the two running lines, and there was
2 a body in the six-foot.

3 Q. Could you see whether that person had already been
4 partially covered by a blanket or some object?

5 A. I could indeed, she was partially covered by a blanket.

6 Q. What did you do in addition?

7 A. I noticed it was quite near the vicinity of the
8 emergency ladder on the eastbound train where people
9 were stepping down from, and the legs were exposed, two
10 legs, bare legs, exposed to what could have been seen by
11 those people being detrained, so I then covered her over
12 with a piece of tarpaulin, covered her legs.

13 Q. You did so to preserve her dignity, I expect?

14 A. Absolutely.

15 Q. Having done that, did you then become aware of somebody
16 screaming from the other side of the westbound train?

17 A. That's right, on the westbound train, tunnel side of the
18 westbound train. Sorry, wall side of the westbound
19 train.

20 Q. Were you able to gauge what the nature of the injuries
21 suffered were by that person?

22 A. Yes, I did peer round and I could see it was definitely
23 leg injuries being treated.

24 Q. He was lying in the gap between the carriage and the
25 tunnel wall?

1 A. And the tunnel wall, yes.

2 Q. We now know that person to be Danny Biddle.

3 Could you see any other people around him, whether
4 they be London Underground members of staff or
5 paramedics?

6 A. He was certainly being treated where he was. He was
7 certainly being treated by someone.

8 Q. So there was a paramedic there, or a passenger?

9 A. Possibly a passenger. I don't recall a green uniform,
10 a green outfit or anything like that, which would
11 identify a paramedic, I don't recall anything --

12 Q. You did say in your witness statement to the police that
13 you saw a paramedic there.

14 A. I did, I did, but --

15 Q. This is very early on in the incident, and I'm curious
16 as to whether that was, in fact, a correct recollection.
17 Is it possible that it was a passenger as opposed to
18 a paramedic?

19 A. It's actually recorded as a paramedic, but at the time
20 I don't recall seeing a green outfit.

21 Q. Right. It's possible that it was a passenger from the
22 train helping the gentleman with the severe leg
23 injuries?

24 A. Possibly, yes.

25 Q. Did you see a London Underground member of staff called

1 Lee Hunt near there?

2 A. I did, but I didn't identify him at the time.

3 Q. There was somebody there?

4 A. Yes, dealing with the leg injuries, yes.

5 Q. So there were two of them?

6 A. Mm-hmm.

7 Q. Could you see passengers coming up the side of the train

8 between the tunnel wall and the carriage?

9 A. Yes, along the tunnel wall side of the train, there were

10 passengers making their way towards where the person was

11 being treated for his injuries, to which I called out to

12 them and I held my hand up and I said, "Hold on

13 a minute, you can't come any further. There's a man

14 being treated for his injuries just in front of us here.

15 Can you stop and I will get back on the train, open the

16 doors for you, and you're going to have to reboard the

17 train and walk through the train?".

18 Q. So you went back on -- or you went on to the train --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. -- the westbound train, and were you able to open up

21 doors on the tunnel wall side of the train to allow them

22 to get on to the train?

23 A. That is correct, that is correct.

24 Q. Then did they emerge out of the rear of the westbound

25 train --

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. -- near Edgware Road station?

3 A. Mm-hmm.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: How did you open the doors?

5 A. It's what's known as "paddling" open the doors. With

6 the assistance of Mick Cooney and Phil Smith, we raised

7 the train seats, discharged the air that's -- that works

8 the train doors. There is a metal lever that operates

9 the train doors which, with the assistance of a paddle,

10 we could prise it open like that, and that's what we

11 call paddling open the doors in an emergency.

12 MR KEITH: Is it a quick process to undertake?

13 A. It can be. If you know what you're doing and,

14 hopefully, the paddle doesn't break or you get stuck

15 with anything, it can be a quick process.

16 Q. How long did it take you?

17 A. About a minute.

18 Q. After you did that, were the passengers able to get on

19 to the train?

20 A. That is correct. Phil Smith brought us an emergency

21 ladder which we laid down, which we put down, for them

22 to climb back up on to, and all of them climbed up, back

23 on to the train, and we detrained them via the exit to

24 the rear.

25 Q. Did you stay there while they were boarding the train or

1 did you help them out the rear of the westbound train?

2 A. I stayed there while they were boarding the train.

3 I stayed in the carriage while they were boarding the
4 train.

5 Q. Once they'd boarded the train and began to move towards
6 the rear, did you then go further along the train
7 yourself?

8 A. After I made sure the last person had got back into the
9 train, I made my way towards the blast car. I did enter
10 the blast car at the time, but what I saw, I realised
11 that there's not a lot I could do for the injuries to
12 the people that were in the actual blast car itself, and
13 I could see movement towards the far end of the blast
14 car, which I assumed were assisting, so I didn't really
15 attend to any of the gross injuries, the horrendous
16 injuries that were sustained that I saw to the people in
17 the blast car at that time.

18 Q. In your statement you refer to the fact emergency
19 services were seeing to people near the front of the
20 carriage. I wanted to ask you about that, because from
21 the evidence that my Lady has heard, it may be that the
22 emergency services were not there by this time.

23 I wanted to know why you thought they were there.

24 A. I don't recall saying at the time, although it is in my
25 statement about emergency services, but I don't recall

1 seeing any orange vests or green uniforms or anything
2 like that assisting. It certainly looks like fellow
3 passengers, through the mist, were assisting the
4 passengers towards the front of the carriage.

5 Q. You also refer to hearing a Fire Brigade officer on the
6 trackside of the train talking about using a crowbar to
7 open the doors.

8 A. That is correct, yes.

9 Q. Was that at that time or later?

10 A. That was a couple of minutes later, on the -- which is
11 now the six-foot -- the train the other side to the wall
12 side --

13 Q. Between the two trains?

14 A. Between the two trains, I heard him shouting out, "We
15 will have to crowbar the doors open to get on the
16 train".

17 Q. How did you know it was a Fire Brigade officer and not
18 another member of staff?

19 A. I assumed it was, I assumed it was.

20 Q. You don't know?

21 A. I didn't know, no, at the time.

22 Q. It's possible it was another member of
23 London Underground staff.

24 A. It could have been, yes.

25 Q. Did you then try to spend some time opening doors on

1 that side as well?

2 A. Yes, well, I actually called out to the Fire Brigade,
3 who I've identified now to be the Fire Brigade, to say
4 "You don't have to crowbar the doors open, we can open
5 the doors from the inside of this train to allow you
6 on".

7 Q. So you subsequently saw them in the flesh and realised
8 they were members of the Fire Brigade?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. I understand. Did you open any of the doors in the
11 bombed carriage?

12 A. Not in the bombed carriage, no.

13 Q. After the doors were open, did that enable some
14 casualties to be brought out of the side of the train
15 through the open doors?

16 A. That's correct, yes. The LFB boarded the train through
17 the doors we opened on that carriage and subsequently
18 carried through injured people on stretchers through and
19 handed them down to LFB that were on the trackside.

20 Q. We know from other evidence that members of the London
21 Fire Brigade didn't, in fact, enter the tunnel and,
22 therefore, the train until perhaps 9.40 or 9.44. You've
23 plainly described their presence in the carriage. Can
24 you help us as to how long had elapsed before you saw
25 members of the Fire Brigade?

1 A. No, it was a fair bit of time, though. I wasn't
2 checking my watch at any time, to be honest.
3 Q. When you saw them, do you remember whether there were
4 any other police officers around at the same time?
5 A. Not at the same time as the LFB, no.
6 Q. Did you stay on the westbound train or between the two
7 trains helping with the removal of casualties --
8 A. I did.
9 Q. -- and helping members of the Fire Brigade --
10 A. I did.
11 Q. -- and paramedics, and you didn't then, in fact, go into
12 the second carriage yourself?
13 A. Not again, no, no.
14 Q. Did you, at any time while you were in the tunnel, have
15 any opportunity to speak to Mr McKinnon, the DOM again,
16 or to speak to other members of the London Underground
17 by radio or signal phone?
18 A. No, I did not.
19 Q. When you were there, were you aware of any requests for
20 further equipment, either from paramedics or from the
21 Fire Brigade?
22 A. No.
23 MR KEITH: All right. Thank you very much, Mr Rodgers.
24 Will you stay there? There may be some further
25 questions for you.

1 A. Okay.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

3 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

4 MS GALLAGHER: Mr Rodgers, you've described in some detail
5 today your two conversations with the DOM. The first
6 one just after the bang and the second one after
7 speaking with Ray Whitehurst in the signal box?

8 A. That's right, yes.

9 Q. When you were describing the first conversation, you
10 were asked if you assumed it was sufficient that the DOM
11 or the line controller would communicate with emergency
12 services rather than you doing it directly, and you
13 agreed.

14 A. Mm-hmm.

15 Q. There was obviously nothing to indicate in that first
16 conversation that emergency services would be called?

17 A. Well, I would have thought the doors being open and
18 people falling out the train at that time, as I've
19 described to Tony McKinnon, after speaking with
20 Ray Whitehurst, I thought that would've --

21 Q. No, I'm talking about the first conversation, because in
22 the first conversation you didn't have that information?

23 A. The initial conversation, I was still in the office at
24 the time and I was just seeing if he had any information
25 he could give me basically and that.

1 Q. Of course. All he could say -- this is when he made the
2 reference to it possibly being a piece of trackside
3 equipment such as a transformer?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. You then have the conversation in the signal cabin where
6 Steve Gilbert is with Mr Whitehurst. Mr Whitehurst is
7 sure that he said in that conversation that he believed
8 it was a bomb, but there's no reference to a bomb in
9 either your statement or your evidence today. Do you
10 recall a reference to a bomb rather than just an
11 explosion?

12 A. I think, looking back, as having asked the question
13 whether it's trackside or trainside, the fact that he
14 confirmed it was definitely trainside, he felt the train
15 lift, I think that's all I needed to know, that it would
16 have been a bomb.

17 Q. Certainly.

18 Then, in your second conversation with
19 Tony McKinnon, you've told us that you didn't
20 specifically ask him for the emergency services, but
21 obviously you did tell him about the dead people and the
22 explosion.

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. You relayed that message from Ray Whitehurst?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. From your conversation, Mr Rodgers, with Tony McKinnon,
2 with the DOM, did you understand that emergency services
3 would be called?

4 A. I would -- yes, I would have done, yes.

5 Q. In relation to the bombed carriage, Mr Rodgers, you
6 referred in your statement to people having severe
7 injuries in the bombed carriage, and today you've made
8 just passing reference to people having gross or
9 horrific injuries.

10 Did you see any bodies up close or was that just
11 a general sense that you got?

12 A. That's a general sense, yes. The bodies that I could
13 see through the smoke and the mist and what have you --
14 because it was dark, there was no emergency lighting at
15 all in the blast car, it was only the light that was
16 reflected through from the tunnel wall lights and from
17 the train and the emergency lighting from the train on
18 the opposite side.

19 Q. So it's a distant, fleeting glimpse, and that's the
20 sense that you had, rather than any specific bodies
21 which you can describe?

22 A. Absolutely, yes.

23 MS GALLAGHER: Thank you very much. I've nothing further.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

25 MR SAUNDERS: My Lady, with your permission, may I simply

1 thank, on behalf of the Nicholson family, Mr Rodgers,
2 for your efforts in the circumstances for what you did
3 for Jenny Nicholson, who we know it to be on the
4 six-foot gap, where you did everything you could to
5 preserve Ms Nicholson's dignity, and we're very grateful
6 for that.

7 A. Thank you.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Saunders. Any other
9 questions for Mr Rodgers? Ms Canby?

10 Questions by MS CANBY

11 MS CANBY: Mr Rodgers, I have some questions to ask you on
12 behalf of Transport for London. We've heard this
13 morning some questions in relation to training of train
14 operators. Could you assist us with what training, as
15 a duty manager trains, you had received?

16 A. Regarding?

17 Q. Had you had training in relation to the management and
18 investigation of an incident?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Had you had training in how to detrain a train?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Training with how to deal with people under trains?

23 A. Yes, I have dealt with several, quite a few, about half
24 a dozen "one unders" in my time, yes.

25 Q. In July 2005, were you a qualified first aider?

1 A. At the time, yes.

2 Q. Had your training prepared you for what you had to deal
3 with on that day?

4 A. To a certain level, I suppose, yes, to a certain level.

5 Q. Do you think it's actually very difficult to give any
6 training to deal with the circumstances that you were
7 faced with?

8 A. How do you mean, what, for the future?

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. I don't know, I think it could be done, I would
11 certainly like to be part of that training, if I could
12 be involved in that in any way at all. But prior to
13 that, I don't think we were trained to deal with that
14 type of incident.

15 Q. Do you think it would have made any difference to you on
16 the day if you had had any different training or to the
17 actions that you took?

18 A. Not really, because I think I would have reacted in the
19 same way, because you can only go by what you're going
20 to do in a spur of the moment situation, so what I did
21 was not necessarily through training, but what I felt
22 was the right thing to do at the time.

23 Q. You've told us about the conversation that you had with
24 Tony McKinnon who's the duty operations manager. Could
25 we have on the screen, please, document TFL649 [TFL649-1]?

1 Mr Rodgers, this is an organisational chart, and we
2 can see here that you're on the right-hand side as
3 a duty manager trains, and the train operators report to
4 you. Then, in the column next to that, we can see that
5 the line controller, who we've heard a bit about and
6 we've heard about Ron Ryband and Paul Marks, and they
7 report to the duty operations manager and that was
8 Tony McKinnon?

9 A. That's correct.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Is there any difference between
11 a train operator and a train driver?

12 A. Any what, sorry?

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: A train driver, is a train operator
14 what I would call a train driver?

15 A. It's the same, yes. It's just that technically --

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Is there any reason why we have to
17 call them different --

18 A. Technically, when we went from doing away with guards
19 and the driver was responsible for opening and closing
20 the doors and all the guards' responsibilities, they
21 then became train operators rather than just train
22 drivers as such, because they operated the full working
23 of the train.

24 MS CANBY: So it's because they do more than just drive the
25 train, is that right, Mr Rodgers?

1 A. Absolutely, yes.

2 Q. Can you remember how soon after you heard the bang you
3 spoke to Tony McKinnon?

4 A. I would say, by the time it took me to get from the
5 office to the signal cabin, to receiving the call, to
6 making a call to Tony McKinnon, three minutes, three or
7 four minutes, I suppose.

8 Q. There you're talking about the second call that you made
9 to --

10 A. The second call to Tony McKinnon, yes.

11 Q. The first call you made to Tony McKinnon, is that almost
12 as soon as you hear the bang?

13 A. I only made two calls.

14 Q. Sorry, the first call that you made.

15 A. The first call was, yes, within a minute or so of
16 hearing the bang.

17 Q. The call or the conversation that you have with
18 Mr Whitehurst, we heard a lot of his evidence yesterday
19 afternoon about the content of that conversation, and
20 I just want to put some of that to you to see if you
21 agree.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Did you say to him that you would contact the line
24 controller and get the emergency services?

25 A. I may well have done. I don't recall saying it, but

1 I think that's the natural thing for me to say, so I may
2 well have said it at the time.

3 Q. He has described to us four conversations that he had on
4 the signal phone. He's told us he wasn't able to
5 identify whom he had the conversation with.

6 A. Right.

7 Q. But the first conversation that he has on the signal
8 phone was at 8.54. Do you think that is a conversation
9 that you had with him? Does that time sound about right
10 to you?

11 A. It would have been, it would have been nice to know what
12 the content of the conversation was, because I can
13 remember what he said to me, but what he said to --

14 Q. I'll help you with that, Mr Rodgers. He said that he
15 told you there had been -- or certainly in that first
16 call at 8.54 he told the person on the other end of the
17 signal phone that there had been wounded people.

18 A. Right.

19 Q. He said, "If I've got to do a detrainment, is it safe to
20 take them forward to Paddington?"

21 A. He did not say that to me, no.

22 Q. Then the response from the man on the other end of the
23 phone was, "Well, I can tell you that the traction
24 current is off where you are and at Edgware Road, but
25 we've lost all contact with Paddington and I don't know

1 if there's any trains in the vicinity, and we've got no
2 way of telling if the traction current is on or off
3 there".

4 Did you have any conversation with Mr Whitehurst
5 about the traction current?

6 A. No, but listening to what you've just said, seems to me
7 strongly it would be the conversation he would have had
8 with Steve Gilbert, the signal operator, who would have
9 been able to tell him all that information, and that's
10 why Steve might have thought, "The manager's walked in,
11 best to hand the phone to the manager to deal with it".

12 Q. So it may well have been that the conversation about
13 traction current was between Mr Whitehurst and
14 Mr Gilbert before you entered the signal cabin?

15 A. Yes, I would say, yes.

16 Q. It's at that point that you then take over the
17 conversation with Mr Whitehurst?

18 A. I would say so, yes.

19 Q. Did Mr Whitehurst tell that you there were passengers on
20 the track?

21 A. Yes, I think he would -- people have been blown out from
22 the train onto the track, yes.

23 Q. Did you ask him whether or not he was going to do an
24 emergency detrainment?

25 A. No, I didn't mention the word "detrainment", no.

1 Q. Did he say to you, "It's a bit late for that because
2 they're already on the track, but what I will do is the
3 passengers that are on the train I'll think about it and
4 see how best it is to get them off"?

5 A. I don't recall that conversation, no.

6 Q. Did he say to you, "We must have the emergency
7 services"?

8 A. I don't recall him saying that.

9 Q. Did you ask him whether it had been a transformer?

10 A. No, how I actually worded that was, "Ray, did you feel
11 the explosion was trainside or trackside", which would
12 have answered the question for me, really, so --

13 Q. You've explained that the significance of that question
14 is because if it's trainside, it enables you to decide
15 whether or not it's a bomb?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. The fact that Mr Whitehurst said to you it was trainside
18 indicated to you that it was probably a bomb?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. So did you say to him, "Don't worry about it, the line
21 controller says it's only a power surge"?

22 A. I don't recall saying that.

23 Q. In fact, you hadn't spoken to the line controller that
24 morning, had you?

25 A. In fact I didn't speak to the line controller at all for

1 the whole day, to be honest, only Tony McKinnon.

2 Q. Tony McKinnon we've seen is the line controller's direct
3 manager, so he's the line controller's boss?

4 A. Yes, yes.

5 Q. Did you just have the one telephone conversation with
6 Mr Whitehurst?

7 A. Yes, that's correct.

8 Q. Were you able to gain any impression of how
9 Mr Whitehurst was doing at that point?

10 A. To be honest, he sounded to me like he was just coming
11 to terms with what was going on, really, and going to do
12 as much as he could, but obviously was desperately
13 seeking some sort of assistance with the situation,
14 which I felt he was capable of doing so at the time,
15 having spoken to him that briefly.

16 Q. You may have said to him that you were going to call the
17 line controller, and what you in fact did was go one
18 further and call the duty operations manager?

19 A. Yes, the reason I done that was because I thought the
20 line controller would be inundated with calls at this
21 time, so the DOM would have been a quicker access to the
22 phone being answered, which it was, actually, because he
23 answered straightaway.

24 Q. And they were, anyway, in the same room, the line
25 controller, at Baker Street?

1 A. Absolutely, yes. Basically, when you speak to the DOM,
2 it's -- you're literally, it's like the line controller
3 and the DOM, most of the time, in a situation like that.

4 Q. And next to each other?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. You told us that you assisted in detrainning passengers
7 from the westbound and the eastbound train. Are you
8 able to estimate how many passengers in total were
9 detrained from those two trains on that day?

10 A. No, to be honest. I was more concerned with the body in
11 the six-foot and the screaming from the tunnel side
12 rather than watching, counting people coming off the two
13 trains.

14 Q. Did it seem to you that there was a large number of
15 passengers who had to be detrained?

16 A. Yes, yes, I would say so.

17 Q. You told us how you had to paddle open one of the doors
18 in the second carriage.

19 A. Mm-hmm.

20 Q. Before you used the paddle, had you attempted to use the
21 butterfly cocks outside the carriage?

22 A. To operate the butterfly cock, I would have had to leave
23 the train and go round to the outside to operate the
24 butterfly cock, so the easiest way for me to do it at
25 the time --

1 Q. Was with a paddle?
2 A. -- was a paddle.
3 Q. I think, Mr Rodgers, that you stayed down there until
4 about 11.00. Is that right?
5 A. That's correct, yes.
6 MS CANBY: Thank you, I don't have any further questions.
7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Rodgers?
8 Thank you very much, Mr Rodgers. Those are all the
9 questions we have for you, and I echo the thanks that
10 you heard from Mr Saunders. Thank you.
11 MR KEITH: If my Lady will excuse me, Mr Hay will call the
12 next three witnesses.
13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly.
14 MR HAY: My Lady, may I invite you to call Simon Blakesley,
15 please?
16 MR SIMON BLAKESLEY (affirmed)
17 Questions by MR HAY
18 MR HAY: Good afternoon.
19 A. Hello.
20 Q. Can I ask you to give your full names to the court,
21 please?
22 A. Simon Blakesley.
23 Q. Mr Blakesley, in 2005, you were a train operator on the
24 Hammersmith & City and Circle Line?
25 A. Yes.

1 Q. I think, on 7 July, you were booked on at Edgware Road
2 at about 8.40 in the morning?
3 A. That's right, yes.
4 Q. Where did you go to when you got to Edgware Road?
5 A. I went to the booking on point, booked on and then went
6 into the mess room to get a drink of tea.
7 Q. Where's the mess room in relation to platforms 3 and 4?
8 A. It's -- if you can see out the window, it's above the
9 westbound platform.
10 Q. What then happened?
11 A. Well, we was all talking, and general chitchat, and
12 then, all of a sudden, we heard a bang and the blinds
13 from the windows in front of us blew up and then went
14 back down again.
15 Q. You said "We were all talking". Who else was in there?
16 A. There was a number of train operators, I think,
17 Craig Ayles was one, Paul Thompson, there was a number
18 of us, all booking on at the same time and other ones on
19 meal reliefs.
20 Q. When you heard the bang, what did you think had
21 happened?
22 A. For some reason, I straightaway thought it was a bomb.
23 Q. In response to the bang, what did you do?
24 A. I went straight down on to the -- I got my hi-vi, high
25 visibility vest, I went straight down onto the platform.

1 Q. As a train operator, would you have a handheld radio at
2 that time?
3 A. No, no.
4 Q. Do you recall who else went down to the platform with
5 you?
6 A. At first, it was just me, and then I was followed by
7 Dave Matthews and Michael Brough.
8 Q. When you say you went down to the platform, which number
9 platform did you go down to?
10 A. Platform number 4.
11 Q. Platforms 3 and 4, they are effectively the same, aren't
12 they?
13 A. That's right, yes.
14 Q. When you got down to the platform, what could you see?
15 A. I could see that the train had -- the westbound
16 Circle Line train had stopped in the tunnel, and I could
17 see smoke and dust coming from it.
18 Q. From the platform, were you able to see the eastbound
19 train?
20 A. No.
21 Q. When you saw the smoke and the dust, were you able to
22 hear anything as well?
23 A. It was quiet, I couldn't hear -- there was no sound at
24 all.
25 Q. From the smoke and the dust and the bang and your

1 initial thought that it was a bomb, you must have
2 immediately thought this was quite a -- a very serious
3 incident at the least?

4 A. I did, yes.

5 Q. We've heard from Mr Brough and we've heard about the
6 delays or the time it took to confirm that the traction
7 current was off.

8 From your perspective, standing on the platform, are
9 you able to say how long you were waiting before you
10 decided to go onto the track?

11 A. A matter of minutes, very short. Mr Brough was waiting
12 by the phone trying to get confirmation of -- that the
13 traction current has been discharged, and by that time,
14 we could then hear people shouting and banging, so me
15 and Dave Matthews -- I said to Dave, I said, "Come on
16 let's go", and me and him went anyway. We wasn't sure
17 that the traction current had been discharged, but we
18 went down.

19 Q. You didn't wait for confirmation that traction current
20 was off?

21 A. No, no.

22 Q. You and Mr Matthews went onto the track anyway?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Presumably you -- and Mr Matthews, we've heard from --
25 but you're also trained in walking along a live rail?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. When you approached the tunnel, which train did you go
3 to?

4 A. The westbound train.

5 Q. What did you do when you got there?

6 A. We immediately got a J door -- we need to have a J door
7 key to open. The front door is called an M door.

8 That's the door into the driver's cab. We opened up the
9 M door, we both got into the M door, and then the next
10 door is the J door, which goes into the passengers.

11 Q. We saw some photographs this morning of the M door, and
12 those had a set of steps, a ladder effectively, laid out
13 in front, to allow you to get up into the M door. Were
14 you able to reach up and open --

15 A. There wasn't a -- I put the -- I got the ladder. There
16 was no ladder there when we got there. We -- there's
17 a handle that we just pulled ourselves up -- well,
18 I did -- and opened the door and we both got in.
19 There's a coupling, there's a coupling unit at the front
20 of a train and we used that as a step up.

21 Q. When you opened the M door, the next door is then the
22 J door, isn't it, where the -- which leads into the
23 passenger carriages?

24 A. That's right, where the passengers were, yes.

25 Q. When you opened the J door, what did you see?

1 A. Just a mass of people.

2 Q. Did anyone in particular make themselves known to you?

3 A. Yes, a gentleman, the first thing he said to me is that,

4 "I'm a first aider, and is there anything I can do to

5 help?".

6 Q. Do you know whether or not that gentleman had a South

7 African accent at all?

8 A. To be honest, I couldn't tell you, no.

9 Q. What did you say to him in response?

10 A. I said, "Would you mind just waiting a second until

11 other people, managers, come down to help, and then I'll

12 tell them that, you know, you're available?".

13 Q. Did he give you any idea as to why he thought someone

14 needed help?

15 A. No, he didn't, no.

16 Q. Were you able to hear a man at this point screaming in

17 any way for help?

18 A. Not at that point, no, not straightaway.

19 Q. When did a point come when you could hear that

20 gentleman?

21 A. When we started the evacuation of the train.

22 Q. To start the evacuation of the train, there are a number

23 of processes you have to go through. What did you have

24 to do to make sure that it was safe for people to

25 detrain?

1 A. We have a piece of equipment called a short-circuiting
2 device, we call it an SCD. That needs to be put onto
3 the track to make sure that the traction current is off
4 and can't be recharged, because it short-circuits the
5 electric.

6 Q. Who assisted you with putting down the short-circuiting
7 device?

8 A. Mick Cooney.

9 Q. Mick Cooney is also a train operator or an instructor?

10 A. He was an instructor operator, yes.

11 Q. Once you put down the short-circuiting device and also
12 the emergency ladder that you referred to earlier, do
13 you recall then what happened to the gentleman who said
14 he was a first aider or a paramedic and could help?

15 A. I think he was then talking to Mick Cooney and that's
16 the last I saw of him.

17 Q. Once you'd gone through all the procedures, did you then
18 start to evacuate the train?

19 A. I did, yes.

20 Q. What can you tell us about the people that were coming
21 off? Did they seem distressed initially, or --

22 A. Very quiet. It was very quiet, very organised.
23 Everybody was just -- wanted to get off, but there was
24 no panic, nobody was -- there was no screaming or
25 anything like that, people were just walking in an

1 orderly manner.

2 Q. Did there come a point when people seemed to be either
3 more distressed or have injuries or covered in soot?

4 A. Yes, after the initial people there did start -- people
5 did start coming down, it was more -- obviously had been
6 nearer the explosion, yes.

7 Q. Where were you standing whilst the evacuation was
8 happening?

9 A. I was right -- I was off the train by this time, on the
10 track. We'd formed, like, a human chain, and was -- we
11 were seeing the people back towards the platform, I was
12 just off of the train onto the track.

13 Q. Are you able to say how many people you evacuated from
14 the train?

15 A. I couldn't tell you, it was an awful lot. It was a rush
16 hour train, so I couldn't tell you exactly how many, no.

17 Q. Do you know how long it took to completely clear the
18 train --

19 A. I think --

20 Q. -- of those who were able to walk?

21 A. Yes, I think it was around about 30 to 40 minutes.

22 Q. When do you first recall the emergency services
23 arriving?

24 A. From what I remember, we'd already evacuated the first
25 train, and we were starting the evacuation on the second

1 train, and that's when I started seeing the -- the first
2 people I saw was two paramedics, and then, by that time,
3 there was more people then arriving, Fire Brigade,
4 police.

5 Q. The two paramedics, did you see where they went to?

6 A. They went through the train, they went through the
7 bombed train, the first train, because by this time
8 there was -- everybody was off of it.

9 Q. At any point, were you made aware of a concern that
10 there may be secondary devices?

11 A. It was in my mind, but nobody -- we did see police with
12 sniffer dogs and things like that, but, no, no,
13 I wasn't, no.

14 MR HAY: Mr Blakesley, thank you very much, I have no more
15 questions for you, but others might.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

17 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

18 MS GALLAGHER: Mr Blakesley, could I just start by asking
19 you some questions about train equipment and your
20 training from your knowledge as a train operator.

21 At the time that this happened, you'd been employed
22 as a train operator for 13 years, so you were quite
23 experienced?

24 A. That's right, yes.

25 Q. The first thing I want to ask you about is train radios.

1 We've heard from some other witnesses three criticisms
2 of train radios. I'm going to put them to you and see
3 if you agree.

4 Number one, we heard a criticism that train radios
5 at the time were unreliable so didn't always work, and
6 you couldn't rely on them as working.

7 Is that a criticism you'd agree with?

8 A. I didn't. As a train operator, we didn't have a train
9 radio. The only radio we've got is actually in the
10 cabs.

11 Q. The only radio you've got is in the cabs, I'm speaking
12 about the radio in the driver's cab.

13 A. I never -- to be honest, I never had any problems with
14 the radios.

15 Q. So other witnesses describing it as a "Stone Age
16 system", you wouldn't agree with that?

17 A. Oh, no, it is very old, but when I needed to get hold of
18 somebody generally I did.

19 Q. The other two criticisms -- I'll put them to you and see
20 if you agree -- were that reliance on the leaky feeder
21 system caused problems because sometimes there wasn't
22 a signal.

23 Is that something you'd agree with?

24 A. I couldn't say, sorry.

25 Q. You may not be able to help with this one either, but

1 another witness was critical of the fact that the radio
2 only worked one way, so there was no means of knowing if
3 your message had been received at the other end.

4 A. I couldn't say.

5 Q. Similarly, we've heard some criticism from other
6 witnesses of the signal phones and the fact that signal
7 phones in the tunnel are sometimes too high to reach on
8 foot. Is that a criticism you'd agree with?

9 A. The reason they're like that is because, usually, you're
10 in your cab when you're using them, so they're at
11 a height where you can use them from the cab rather than
12 from the track.

13 Q. Of course. The difficulty is that the fallback system
14 in a document we saw earlier, when you can't make
15 a mayday call from your train radio, is that the next
16 port of call is for you to use the signal phone.

17 A. That's right.

18 Q. Because, if your train radio is out and there's no power
19 and you can't access the signal phone on foot, that may
20 cause some difficulty.

21 A. That's right, yes.

22 Q. Mr Blakesley, could I ask you about the training that
23 you'd had at this time? As a train operator in 2005,
24 had you had any specific training on what to expect in
25 the event of a bombing?

1 A. No.

2 Q. And no training on what to do in the event of a bombing?

3 A. No.

4 Q. You don't recall, obviously, any particular training
5 after the Madrid train bombing in March 2004?

6 A. No.

7 Q. There have been some references made by other witnesses
8 to secondary devices. Was the possibility of secondary
9 devices something that occurred to you when you followed
10 your instinct to help and go into the tunnel?

11 A. Not straightaway, but immediately when we got on the
12 train and started the evacuation, then I did give it
13 some thought then.

14 Q. That's not from training you had, that was just from
15 your knowledge?

16 A. No, it's just from thought, yes.

17 Q. There's just one final thing, Mr Blakesley. In your
18 witness statement you describe making a telephone call
19 to your wife. You say that you did that when you went
20 down to the platform with your high visibility vest, you
21 say:

22 "When I got there, I looked into the tunnel."

23 You see the train, you see the haze of smoke and
24 dust, and then you call your wife on your mobile to
25 reassure her that you're okay, and then you turn your

1 phone off.

2 Could you just help us with where exactly you were
3 when you made that call? Were you on the platform?

4 A. Yes, I was, yes.

5 Q. And you had a signal without difficulty?

6 A. Yes.

7 MS GALLAGHER: I've nothing further, thank you very much,
8 Mr Blakesley.

9 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing, thank you, my Lady.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Yes, Ms Canby?

11 Questions by MS CANBY

12 MS CANBY: Mr Blakesley, I've got some questions to ask you
13 on behalf of Transport for London. Could we have,
14 please, on the screen document INQ10325 [INQ10325-1]? You were asked
15 about the M door and you've told us a little bit about
16 the yellow short-circuiting device. This is
17 a photograph taken after the incident. The left-hand
18 train is the bombed train. The right-hand is the
19 eastbound train, and the door that we can see with the
20 wooden steps coming up to it, is that the M door?

21 A. Yes, it is, yes.

22 Q. Are they the steps that you put down?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Then we can see just behind the steps is a yellow bar
25 with blue on one end and red on the other. Is that the

1 SCD, the short-circuiting device?

2 A. Yes, it is, yes.

3 Q. Thank you. Could we have that off the screen, please?

4 Thanks.

5 Did Paul Thompson, another train operator who we're
6 also going to hear from this afternoon, also assist you
7 in putting the emergency ladder up at the rear of the
8 bombed train?

9 A. I was actually in the -- I was in the cab, so I was
10 passing down the equipment, and I passed down the SCD to
11 Mick Cooney, and then I can't remember exactly who it
12 was I passed down the ladder to, but I passed down the
13 ladder to another colleague. That's when we started
14 putting it up, yes.

15 Q. You've described how London Underground staff formed
16 a human chain from the rear of the bombed carriage --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- sorry, the bombed train back to the station. Are you
19 able to estimate how many members of London Underground
20 staff were in that chain?

21 A. It's only an estimate, but I think there was seven or
22 eight of us.

23 Q. You've said that you saw paramedics, and those
24 paramedics were walking through the westbound train, so
25 the bombed train. Before then, had you seen line

1 standards manager Bryan Corbin with one male paramedic
2 and a female walking through the adjacent train?

3 A. No.

4 Q. You've been asked some questions about the train radios
5 that you had at that time in your driver's cab. Your
6 evidence was that you've not had any -- certainly at
7 that time, you didn't have any real problems with them.
8 But you accepted that they were perhaps a Stone Age
9 system. Do you now have a CONNECT radio system?

10 A. Yes, we do.

11 Q. If the old system was Stone Age, somebody has described
12 CONNECT to me as being like having electricity for the
13 first time.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Would you agree that it's been that significant?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Please could we have on the screen -- you were asked
18 about your training and you accepted that you'd never
19 had any training in relation to bombs, but you had had
20 training in relation to the mayday procedure?

21 A. Yes, that's right.

22 Q. Could we have on the screen, please, TFL974 [TFL974-1]? This is
23 a document that we've seen yesterday and this morning.
24 This is a green sticker that is in the driver's cab of
25 a C stock train, is that right, Mr Blakesley?

1 A. That's correct, yes.

2 Q. This is to remind train drivers or operators of the
3 procedure that must be gone through when there's an
4 emergency?

5 A. That's right, yes.

6 Q. Although you'd not had specific training as to what to
7 do if a bomb occurred, it would be the same, wouldn't
8 it, the same procedures would have to be gone through?

9 A. Yes, yes.

10 MS CANBY: Thank you very much, Mr Blakesley. I don't have
11 any further questions.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Ms Canby. Any other
13 questions for Mr Blakesley?

14 Thank you very much, Mr Blakesley. Those are all
15 the questions we have. I hope that you heard what
16 I said to Mr Matthews earlier. The travelling public
17 are very reassured there are people like you who follow
18 their instincts to go and help people in distress, so
19 thank you.

20 A. Thank you very much.

21 MR HAY: My Lady, may I invite you to call Paul Thompson,
22 please?

23 MR PAUL THOMPSON (affirmed)

24 Questions by MR HAY

25 MR HAY: Mr Thompson, can you give your full name to the

1 court, please?

2 A. Paul Thompson.

3 Q. Mr Thompson, you're also a train operator.

4 A. I'm not at the moment. I was at the time. I've changed

5 grades now.

6 Q. You also were a train operator on the Hammersmith & City

7 and Circle Line?

8 A. That's correct, yes.

9 Q. In 2005, you'd been a train operator for some nine

10 years?

11 A. Yes, yes.

12 Q. In your statement, you refer to Edgware Road as your

13 home station.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Can you just explain what you mean by "home station"?

16 A. Well, that's where we were based. Some drivers are

17 based at Barking, some at Hammersmith and some at

18 Edgware Road. I was based at Edgware Road.

19 Q. On the morning of 7 July, you had booked on at about

20 8.45?

21 A. No, I was earlier, actually. I booked on -- I used to

22 get in quite early to have breakfast. So I actually

23 arrived at around 8.00 in the morning, and had my

24 breakfast in the mess room.

25 Q. Where is the mess room, in relation to platforms 3 and

1 4, that you were in?

2 A. You've got platforms 3 and 4, then you've got a flight
3 of stairs. You turn left into the train crew
4 accommodation and the mess room is above the westbound
5 track.

6 Q. Whilst you were having your breakfast, what do you
7 recall happening?

8 A. Well, I'd just finished my breakfast around about 08.50,
9 then we heard -- I could describe it as a deafening
10 thud, a loud thud noise.

11 Q. What did you think had happened at that point?

12 A. I personally -- although I'd never heard a bomb before,
13 I did personally think it was a bomb. Someone did say
14 it sounded like a train derailling and hitting a tunnel
15 wall, but I did think that was a bomb, and a colleague
16 in front of me also said that sounds like a bomb.

17 Q. In response to that, what did you do?

18 A. We grabbed our hi-vi, high visibility vest, and went out
19 the mess room, down the stairs on to platforms 3 and 4.

20 Q. Similarly to Mr Blakesley, as a train operator, you
21 wouldn't have your own handheld radio, would you, at the
22 time?

23 A. No, no.

24 Q. When you got down to platforms 3 and 4, what did you
25 see?

1 A. The DMC, Michael Brough was on the autophone to the
2 controller to confirm that traction current was switched
3 off and we were just waiting to get that confirmation.
4 Then he announced that it's safe, traction current is
5 switched off.

6 Q. Just pause there, when you came down to the platform,
7 was Mr Brough already on the platform?

8 A. He was on the phone when I came down the steps.

9 Q. He was already on the phone?

10 A. Yes, yes.

11 Q. How long after getting on to the platform did you have
12 confirmation that traction current was off?

13 A. It seemed like ages, because we were eager to go into
14 the tunnel, but I think it was only seconds, it's like
15 sort of 20 seconds, then he confirmed that traction
16 current's off, and we went down into the tunnel.

17 Q. In your statement, you mention, "We kept shouting 'Is it
18 off, is it off?'. "

19 A. Yes, because we were eager to get down there and we were
20 shouting at him "Is it off?", then he replied, "Yes,
21 it's off".

22 Q. Before you made your way on to the track, could you
23 actually hear anything coming from the tunnel?

24 A. I could hear a male voice screaming down the left-hand
25 side of the westbound train. I recall this because it

1 stuck with me for quite a while, "Help me, help me",
2 a male voice.
3 Q. You say by the left-hand train?
4 A. It's coming down the left-hand side of the westbound
5 train, between the train and the tunnel wall.
6 Q. I think we now know that person to have been Mr Biddle.
7 A. I believe so, yes.
8 I also heard sort of muffled voices coming from
9 inside the train, but that was a distinctive voice
10 outside the train.
11 Q. Once you had confirmation that the traction current was
12 off, you made your way onto the track.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Who was already in front of you?
15 A. I was behind Simon Blakesley and Simon was behind
16 Dave Matthews.
17 Q. What was the distance between you and Mr Blakesley,
18 because we know that Mr Blakesley and Mr Matthews didn't
19 wait for confirmation?
20 A. It was right behind, as soon as they entered the -- onto
21 the track, we got confirmation that traction current was
22 off, and we were right behind them.
23 Q. Which train did you make your way towards?
24 A. I was -- I made my way to the rear of the westbound
25 train, the bombed train.

1 Q. We know that Mr Blakesley had opened the M door and
2 boarded the train.

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. Where were you at that point?

5 A. I was at track level. Simon Blakesley put the emergency
6 ladder down from the cab of the train onto the track,
7 and I was at the track level at the base of the ladder.

8 Q. Did you assist with the detraining?

9 A. That's correct, yes.

10 Q. Are you able to say how many people you think were
11 detrained that day?

12 A. I couldn't put a figure on it. It just seemed
13 never-ending at the time, I couldn't put a figure on it.

14 Q. It's right, isn't it, that you didn't remain by the
15 train the whole time?

16 A. I remained at the base of the ladder. I did leave at
17 one point when there was a gentleman standing in the
18 doorway of the M door and he was swaying, he seemed very
19 unsteady, so I went up to the -- I went up the ladder
20 and held the top of his arms to support him, because
21 I thought he was going to fall.

22 As I held his arms, I could feel my hands getting
23 wet and cold, and I looked and they were covered in
24 blood. So I could tell he had injuries to his upper
25 body. It was clear that he couldn't walk on his own, so

1 I asked a colleague, Mick Geater, who was with me on the
2 track, to help me with him, and that particular person,
3 we took out the tunnel onto the platform and we actually
4 took him right outside to the station entrance.

5 Q. When you got to the station entrance, at that point, how
6 much time do you think had passed since the explosion?

7 A. I think he was around about -- it's difficult to say.
8 Approximately 15 minutes after the explosion.

9 Q. Were there any emergency services there at that point?

10 A. No, no. I kept on reassuring him in the tunnel that,
11 "As soon as I get you out, I'll get a paramedic on to
12 you", and he kept on saying "Thank you", and we got him
13 out the tunnel, and I was quite upset because, when we
14 got him out, there was no one to welcome him. So I had
15 to put him down under a cash machine and go back down.

16 Q. Were there any London Underground staff there which you
17 could leave with him?

18 A. There was two female station assistants, and I said,
19 "Keep an eye on him until paramedics arrive".

20 Q. At that point, when you went back down, did you go back
21 down to the bombed train or did you go to any other
22 trains?

23 A. I went down -- we were just about to go down into the
24 tunnel when we were stopped by DMC Michael Brough and
25 Monica Hogan who asked myself and Mick Geater would we

1 be prepared to inspect two trains for anything
2 suspicious. First, they said do we mind doing this, and
3 we both said "No".

4 There was a train on platform 1 and a train on
5 platform 2. They needed someone to walk through the
6 train, look for anything suspicious, not to lift any
7 seats, but just to have a visual check of the train.
8 Mick Geater took the train on platform 1, and me and
9 Monica Hogan took the train on platform 2, and we walked
10 through the length of the train.

11 Q. The fact that Mr Brough asked to you do that, did that
12 indicate to you that he thought this wasn't a train
13 crash or a derailment or that there was one under, but
14 actually something more serious than that or more
15 sinister?

16 A. Yes, the indication I got was we were looking for
17 another device, yes.

18 Q. Once you'd performed that search, I think you then went
19 back to the bombed train, is that correct?

20 A. Yes, I took up the same position at the base of the
21 ladder.

22 Q. Was the evacuation of that train still going on?

23 A. It was, yes, yes. I did leave the site another time
24 when there was a lady with a large bag who was very
25 unsteady. I helped her out the tunnel with her bag, but

1 just took her up to the ticket hall, then came back down
2 to the tunnel.

3 Q. When you took that lady up to the ticket hall, how much
4 time had passed since the explosion?

5 A. I would say about 20, 25 minutes.

6 Q. At that point, do you recall seeing any members of the
7 emergency services?

8 A. No.

9 Q. The gentleman whom you had taken up the first time, was
10 he still not being assisted by any --

11 A. I didn't go that far with the lady. I just took her to
12 the central concourse. I didn't take her right out to
13 the exit.

14 Q. So it may be that there might have been members of the
15 emergency services at the exits, but in the concourse
16 area you couldn't see any?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. When was the first time you did see any members of the
19 emergency services?

20 A. I saw two paramedics walk into the tunnel and I remember
21 thinking -- I can't remember looking at my watch, but
22 I did remember thinking this must have been around
23 25 minutes before we saw anyone.

24 Q. It was just two paramedics?

25 A. I saw two paramedics. I did see Bryan Corbin, line

1 standards manager, with a female and I think she was
2 wearing a green uniform, and that was before we saw the
3 two paramedics.

4 Q. When do you remember seeing Mr Corbin with the female?

5 A. I think that was around about the time I helped the man
6 out the tunnel. So that could have been about 10,
7 15 minutes.

8 Q. Where did you first see Mr Corbin?

9 A. He was walking down from the platforms in between the
10 two trains.

11 Q. So you saw him, you think, about 10 to 15 minutes, so
12 9.00 to 9.05 at the earliest?

13 A. It might have been a bit before, I can't recall, really.

14 Q. How long did you remain in the tunnel for?

15 A. I remained in the tunnel until everyone was off both
16 trains. The police came up to us and said that it's now
17 officially a crime scene and that all LUL staff have got
18 to leave the tunnel.

19 Q. Do you recollect what time that was?

20 A. I tried to ring my wife on the platform when I got out
21 the tunnel and I couldn't get a signal. I went upstairs
22 to the admin office, I rung her on a landline, and the
23 digital display was 10.28 when I made the phone call
24 from the office. So given about perhaps ten minutes,
25 about quarter past 10 approximately.

1 Q. If it assists, in your statement dated 10 August 2005,
2 you mentioned trying to ring your wife at about 10.10.

3 A. That must have been on the platform, yes.

4 Q. That was on the platform with your mobile phone?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. You then went to the office and used the landline?

7 A. Yes, yes.

8 MR HAY: Mr Thompson, thank you very much. I have no more
9 questions for you, but others may.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

11 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

12 MS GALLAGHER: Mr Thompson, you've told us that you're not
13 a train operator now.

14 A. No.

15 Q. Are you still employed by London Underground?

16 A. I am, yes, yes.

17 Q. What's your current role?

18 A. I'm a line information specialist on the
19 Piccadilly Line.

20 Q. When did you move from being a train operator to that
21 role?

22 A. I lost my train operator's licence due to a medical
23 problem, not related to this incident, about three years
24 ago.

25 Q. Would you have been in the position in 2006, 2007? You

1 would still have been a train operator in 2006

2 certainly.

3 A. Yes, yes.

4 Q. It's some time in 2007 that you changed role?

5 A. I changed role -- yes, 2007, yes.

6 Q. I'm not sure if you were in court earlier, but there's

7 been some criticism from some other witnesses of the

8 train radios that were in place at the time.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. The reason I asked you for the timing is that we know

11 the CONNECT system was rolled out in 2006/2007.

12 A. Yes, yes.

13 Q. So you've had experience of both the old system and the

14 new system?

15 A. Yes, yes.

16 Q. I'm not sure if you've heard any of the criticisms, but

17 in summary, other witnesses have described the system

18 that was in place at the time as a Stone Age system.

19 Would you agree with that?

20 A. I don't know about Stone Age. There was certain spots

21 known as dead spots where they were prone that you

22 couldn't get through to the controller in certain areas.

23 Q. This was because of the leaky feeder system, so not

24 having coverage in certain areas?

25 A. You can't always get a decent signal, that's right.

1 Q. So blind spots?

2 A. Yes, yes.

3 Q. There's also been some criticism of signal phones. Are
4 you aware of any changes to signal phones, to the
5 placement of signal phones, since 2005?

6 A. No, I think some of the -- some of them have been
7 disused and taped up, but that's all. I think some have
8 been taken out of commission.

9 Q. Thanks very much, Mr Thompson. In relation to
10 training -- you may also have heard me asking some other
11 witnesses this -- we've asked a number of train
12 operators, or people who were train operators at the
13 time, whether they had any specific training in 2005
14 about what to expect in the event of a bombing or what
15 to do in the event of a bombing, and they've all said
16 they hadn't. Was that also your experience?

17 A. That's correct, yes, we hadn't.

18 Q. You don't recall anything specific, in particular after
19 the Madrid train bombing in 2004?

20 A. No, no.

21 Q. There have also been some references in the documents to
22 secondary devices. Again, was that something that
23 occurred to you, the possibility of the risk of
24 a secondary device, when you followed your instinct to
25 go into the tunnel?

1 A. Yes, I remember, as we were detraining people out of the
2 train, I remember seeing in the corner of my eye some
3 police officers holding the spaniels, the sniffer dogs.
4 I remember thinking to myself they're obviously looking
5 for secondary devices, but --

6 Q. That's much later, that's when you see the sniffer dogs
7 when the police have arrived?

8 A. When the police came down with the dogs in their arms,
9 yes.

10 Q. Given that you've told us both in your statement and
11 today that, instantly, when you heard the noise, you
12 assumed it was a bomb, that was your first thought?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Did you have any thought at that early stage about the
15 risk of secondary devices?

16 A. No, I didn't really give that a thought until we saw the
17 police with the sniffer dogs.

18 Q. Could I have TFL974 [TFL974-1] on screen? This will be very
19 familiar to you, Mr Thompson, which is the mayday
20 emergency procedure. It's on the screen just in front
21 of you, the small screen.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. There really seem to be three stages in this. Number
24 one, contact the control room by radio, and there's
25 detail there in terms of what information you should

1 provide.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Number two, the penultimate paragraph:

4 "If necessary, use the tunnel telephone handset to

5 discharge traction current and speak to the line

6 controller."

7 Then number three is that in extreme emergencies you

8 use SCDs.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. That fits with the procedure you understood in 2005?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. But if the radio doesn't work and you can't explain what

13 assistance is required, you're reliant on option 2, to

14 telling the line controller, not only to turn off the

15 current, but also explaining the situation and

16 requesting help, you're reliant on the tunnel radio to

17 do that?

18 A. Yes, your first port of call is to contact the line

19 controller through a mayday message.

20 Q. If you can't do that, you've got to rely on the signal

21 phone?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. What I'm just wondering about is the third option here,

24 which presumably you use if you can't use the radio and

25 you can't use the signal phone in the tunnel, the third

1 option just says that you put down SCDs. It doesn't say
2 what you need to do in terms of explaining what's
3 happened or in terms of summoning assistance.

4 A. No, the next action is to put SCDs down, front and rear.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Presumably on the basis that, if it's
6 not already blown, that blows the power and therefore
7 somebody ought to know what's happening. Is that the
8 theory?

9 A. That confirms traction current is switched off and can't
10 be switched back on again.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: That's the theory?

12 A. Yes.

13 MS GALLAGHER: There's just one other matter, Mr Thompson,
14 that I want to ask you about. In your witness
15 statement, which you gave in August 2005, you just
16 described something that occurred a little later on when
17 you're down in the tunnel. I'm just going to read it
18 out to you. You say:

19 "Mick Brough asked us to check two trains on
20 platforms 1 and 2 to make sure there was nothing
21 suspicious on them. DMT Monica Hogan asked if we were
22 happy to do it and we both said 'yes'."

23 You're referring to your colleague Mike Geater
24 there.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. "She then checked the train on platform 2 with me. It
2 was just a visual check. We did not lift seats or
3 anything. The train appeared okay."

4 So you were asked to check for suspicious items on
5 the train. What were you looking for?

6 A. Anything out of the ordinary, really. An unattended
7 bag, a package, anything which could be a secondary
8 device or any device.

9 Q. But you told us earlier you didn't have any bomb-related
10 training in particular.

11 A. No.

12 Q. So you were really just looking for possibly loose
13 luggage, something else that maybe triggered an alarm
14 bell?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Do you know, at this time, when you were asked to do
17 this check to look for anything suspicious, were there
18 any police on the scene?

19 A. No, I don't believe there were, no.

20 MS GALLAGHER: Thank you very much, Mr Thompson, much
21 appreciated.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Ms Gallagher.

23 Ms Canby?

24 Questions by MS CANBY

25 MS CANBY: Mr Thompson, just two short matters, please.

1 You've been asked some questions about signal
2 phones.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Could you tell us what the primary purpose of signal
5 phones is?

6 A. If you're -- if you've got a problem -- at some signals,
7 there're junctions you can get the wrong signal, so you
8 stop the train and you contact the signal operator to
9 inform the signal operator you've got the wrong signal.
10 Then they do something, they take a release and give you
11 the correct signal. So it's a contact from the train
12 operator directly to the signal operator.

13 Q. That contact would generally be made when the train
14 operator is within his driver's cab?

15 A. Correct, yes.

16 Q. Is that the reason why most signal phones are actually
17 quite high up in the tunnel?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. So that train operators can reach them from their cab?

20 A. They can use them at cab level, yes.

21 Q. Please could we have back on the screen TFL974 [TFL974-1]? This is
22 the green sticker summarising the mayday emergency
23 procedure, and although you accepted that you'd had no
24 training in relation to what to do when a bomb occurs,
25 this is the procedure that would have been followed and

1 was followed when there's any emergency. Is that right?

2 A. Well, this is really a mayday, this is a -- yes, an
3 emergency, not a normal incident.

4 Q. In what circumstances, then, would you use the mayday
5 emergency procedure?

6 A. Things like a one under, a person under a train,
7 something like what happened on that day, any loud
8 noises that stalls the train.

9 Q. A derailment, perhaps, something along those lines?

10 A. Yes, yes.

11 Q. So this mayday emergency procedure is to be used when
12 a major incident occurs?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. We can see here it says:
15 "Contact [the] control room by radio."
16 By that we mean the line controller?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. The radio we know at the time that you had in 2005 was
19 a permanent radio in the cab, it wasn't portable --

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. -- and it only allowed you to speak to the line
22 controller?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. After the introduction of CONNECT in 2006 and 2007,
25 you're now able to speak on a portable CONNECT radio?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. That can put you through to anybody on the
3 London Underground network?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. There's no difficulty with the CONNECT radio, in terms
6 of working in a tunnel, it works in tunnels --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- and anywhere on the London Underground system?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. But in 2005, you were told that you had to contact the
11 control room by radio. When the line controller
12 answered, you were to state the train number, location
13 and direction, the nature of the emergency, the action
14 required regarding traction current and the assistance
15 that would be needed. All messages were to be repeated.
16 Then, if the radio didn't work, there's the
17 reference there to the tunnel telephone handsets. Now,
18 the tunnel telephone handset, that's separate to the
19 signal phone?

20 A. It is, yes.

21 Q. That's a handset that is kept in the driver's cab?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. There is no point in trying to use the tunnel telephone
24 handset if you already know that traction current has
25 been discharged. Is that right?

1 A. Yes, if you know traction current's switched off, then
2 you don't need that to switch the traction current off.

3 Q. So if your radio hasn't worked and you know that
4 traction current has already been discharged, there's no
5 point in trying to use the tunnel telephone, so you may,
6 as we know happened at Aldgate, perhaps try to use your
7 own mobile phone?

8 A. Yes, yes.

9 Q. You may then use the signal phone, but that's not the
10 primary purpose of a signal phone?

11 A. No, no.

12 Q. You can also walk to a station and use platform phones?

13 A. Yes, yes.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: What is the purpose of the tunnel
15 telephone handset?

16 A. Well, you can connect the tunnel handset -- it's a way
17 of discharging traction current and speak to the
18 controller.

19 MS CANBY: So it has two purposes, Mr Thompson. You can use
20 it to speak to the line controller, but presumably you
21 can only use it to speak to the line controller if you
22 know that traction current is still live?

23 A. Yes, that's correct.

24 Q. Then it has a secondary purpose, in that you can also --
25 do you need to use a tunnel telephone handset at all to

1 be able to discharge traction current or can you just
2 rub the two wires together and that discharges traction
3 current?

4 A. You can, yes.

5 Q. So the primary purpose of the tunnel telephone is to try
6 to speak to the line controller?

7 A. Yes.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Canby, perhaps you can help me,
9 I appreciate I might hear other evidence on this, but
10 the tunnel telephone handset is what kind of
11 communications system?

12 MS CANBY: Well, Mr Thompson, I don't know if you can help
13 us with this. It looks like a telephone handset that we
14 would --

15 A. It is, yes.

16 Q. -- use in domestic purposes?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Do you know at all how it works by attaching it to the
19 tunnel telephone wires?

20 A. As I say, I've never had to use it.

21 Q. Is it right it only goes through to the line controller?

22 A. Yes, I believe so.

23 MS CANBY: My Lady, it may be that we can seek further
24 assistance from later witnesses.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: By the sounds of it, it's not going

1 to be relevant because the power was off.

2 MS CANBY: Precisely. Thank you very much, Mr Thompson.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Are there any other questions? Thank
4 you very much, Mr Thompson, those are all the questions
5 we have and thank you for everything you did to try to
6 help the people on the trains.

7 MR HAY: My Lady, there is one more live witness this
8 afternoon and three short reads. I don't know whether
9 or not now is a convenient time?

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think, as we didn't start until
11 2.15, shall we carry on?

12 MR HAY: Grateful, my Lady. My Lady, may I invite to you
13 call Craig Ayles?

14 MR CRAIG TONY AYLEN (sworn)

15 Questions by MR HAY

16 MR HAY: Can you give your full name to the court, please?

17 A. It's Craig Tony Ayles.

18 Q. Mr Ayles, in 2005 you were a train operator?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. You were also a train operator on the Hammersmith, City
21 and Circle Line?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. But unlike Mr Thompson, Barking depot was your home
24 base. Is that correct?

25 A. It was, yes.

1 Q. On the morning of 7 July, I think you were on duty very
2 early?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. You'd completed a number of circuits, was it, of the
5 Circle Line?

6 A. Yes, I had gone to take my train down to Hammersmith and
7 put it down in the depot, it had been taken out of
8 service, I came back to Edgware Road on another train,
9 and my duties had been suspended, basically, until 9.50,
10 I was supposed to be picking up another train to carry
11 on.

12 Q. Where were you waiting for the next train at
13 Edgware Road?

14 A. I was in the non-smoking mess room, just by the -- where
15 the platform 3 and 4, up the flight of stairs, turn left
16 into our accommodation. The non-smoking mess room is
17 right by platforms 3 and 4, basically.

18 Q. We know that at about 8.50 you heard an explosion.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. What did you think had happened at that point?

21 A. I suppose initially -- well, a bomb basically, is what
22 was going through my mind, yes.

23 Q. Where did you think it had come from?

24 A. The tunnels, inside the tunnels. It was a -- the sound
25 of the explosion sounded like it was a -- well,

1 basically enclosed. So it seems as if it had come from
2 the inside of the tunnels, yes.

3 Q. Particularly from the westbound tunnel rather than
4 from --

5 A. I think it must have been because the westbound is
6 closest to us, the eastbound is quite some way away.

7 Q. In response to that, what did you do?

8 A. With everyone else, we grabbed our hi-vis and we went
9 outside to see what was happening.

10 Q. Which platform did you go to?

11 A. We come down the stairs to platforms 3 and 4.

12 Q. Who was on the platform when you got there, do you
13 remember?

14 A. Michael Brough was the manager. I think basically there
15 was a group of us that went down at the same time.

16 There was Dave Matthews, there was Simon, Paul Thompson,
17 there was -- Michael Brough was the manager there. So
18 I think there was Alf Rogers, Kevin Murr was another
19 person. A group of people.

20 Q. When you got there, what was Mr Brough trying to do?

21 A. Again, he was trying to contact the line controller to
22 confirm that the current had been turned off.

23 Q. Do you recollect him using the CRID?

24 A. In my mind, I thought, because he couldn't get through
25 straightaway to the line controller, he used a CRID. He

1 might have said about the CRID, he might have sent

2 someone to get the CRID, but for some reason or another

3 we just carried on and we went down into the tunnel.

4 Q. So you didn't wait for confirmation that the power was

5 off?

6 A. No, it was all so quick, it was -- I think, basically,

7 once Dave Matthews had gone, everyone just followed

8 going down there as well.

9 Q. Presumably, you're also trained to walk on a live track?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. When you made your way towards the tunnel, what did you

12 see?

13 A. Basically, there was a lot of smoke obviously, there was

14 debris on the track, there was the two trains, the rear

15 of the westbound and further down was the eastbound

16 train coming in.

17 Q. Which train did you make your way towards?

18 A. I see there was Dave Matthews and there was Simon and

19 Paul obviously had gone to the west. At the time, there

20 was a lot of screaming, there was a gentleman screaming.

21 I went round the side to see if I could go in between

22 the two trains to see if we could get to someone there

23 because them two, Simon and Dave Matthews, was getting

24 up on the back of the westbound train.

25 Q. Just pause there. Before you went between the two

1 trains, do you remember seeing Mr Porter?

2 A. As I was walking down in between the two trains I see

3 Mr Porter by his back door, his front door, sorry.

4 Q. What did he say to you?

5 A. I think he was in a bit of shock at the time, he didn't

6 realise what was going on. I think -- I know he asked

7 if I could help him to detrain his train, he said

8 there's a big flash had just gone on, and I think we

9 said, "I think it must be a bomb", he was talking --

10 I know -- I think, before we see Jeffrey come across the

11 body that had been lying there in between the two --

12 Q. I'm going to come on to that in a moment. Once he told

13 you he thought there had been an explosion, did he tell

14 you which train it was on?

15 A. Yes, he said it was the other train. He said, as the

16 train was going past him, there was a big explosion as

17 the train was carrying on past him, and he just stopped

18 and -- basically that.

19 Q. We've heard this morning from Mr Porter and he mentioned

20 there being debris on the track.

21 A. Right.

22 Q. But you then made your way between the two trains.

23 A. Yes, I tried to.

24 Q. You've mentioned seeing a body.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. I'm not going to ask you about the details of the injury
2 to that person.

3 A. Right.

4 Q. But it was a lady, wasn't it?

5 A. It appeared to be a lady at the time, yes.

6 Q. When you saw that lady, was it clear to you that they
7 were -- there were no signs of life?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. What did you do in response to that?

10 A. Well, I think we -- well, I picked up something that was
11 lying there, I couldn't tell you what, it was a bit of
12 train door, it might have been, I don't know, to put on
13 top of her.

14 Q. You did that to preserve her dignity?

15 A. Yes, yes.

16 Q. Once you had done that, did you then return to the
17 eastbound train where Mr Porter was?

18 A. Yes, yes, it was basically right next to where Jeff was.

19 Q. What did you do at that point?

20 A. Well, he asked me, I think, that -- we said, "We've got
21 to get these people out". I think obviously -- you've
22 been saying there's secondary devices of chemicals at
23 the time, there was talk about silly things, but I think
24 that we said that we need to get everybody off the train
25 as soon as possible and away.

1 Q. Just pausing there, who mentioned the possibility of
2 secondary devices or chemicals?
3 A. It might have been me, I think, I don't know.
4 Q. Was that because you'd already, in your own mind -- in
5 your own mind, you thought it was a bomb?
6 A. Yes, I think so, yes.
7 Q. So you were already alert to the possibility of
8 secondary devices?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. So obviously you were keen to get people off the train?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Did you get on to the train and walk through it or did
13 you walk outside the train?
14 A. About one or two carriages through. Jeff had got in
15 front of me. He said he was going to go to the rear of
16 the trains and start bringing people forward. As he
17 walked through, I walked through behind, and started --
18 as he walked straight through, he started telling people
19 that they needed to be coming forward.
20 Q. Do you remember which carriages you went into?
21 A. Only the first, perhaps opened the door to the second.
22 Jeff had gone through first, because it was open, but
23 maybe the second carriage as well. I can't remember.
24 Q. At any point, do you remember going into the third
25 carriage?

1 A. No.

2 Q. No, you don't remember or, no, you didn't go there?

3 A. I didn't go that far in, no.

4 Q. What did you tell the people in the carriage to do?

5 A. That there's been an explosion and we need to evacuate

6 the train and we need to walk forwards to Edgware Road,

7 to the platform.

8 Q. Once you had been through the first and second carriage

9 and told the people to start making their way forward,

10 where did you then go?

11 A. Back out the front. I can't remember if me and

12 Mr Porter put the ladder down or the SCD, but there was

13 a ladder there, I don't know, I can't remember who

14 actually put the ladder down, I think it might have been

15 us, it might not have been.

16 Q. Then did you remain standing by the front of the train?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Are you able to say how many people were evacuated from

19 that train, approximately?

20 A. It seemed like it went on forever. I could say there

21 was 150 to 200 people come off. It might have been

22 a lot more, a lot less, but there were a lot of people

23 on that train and it takes a long while to get them off.

24 Q. When you say "forever" or a "long while", are you able

25 to say how long it took to evacuate that train?

1 A. I'm only saying figures that I've heard, about half an
2 hour to get everybody off, I would imagine.

3 Q. That's figures you've heard, but are you able to say
4 what you remember?

5 A. It was about half an hour, yes.

6 Q. When was the first time you recall seeing the emergency
7 services arrive?

8 A. I think Mr Corbin with a -- the paramedic was trying to
9 go down the side of the train, where I'd gone to go
10 before. It was then that I informed him that there was
11 somebody laying in the six-foot gap. I think it was
12 then that they stopped and went through the train
13 instead.

14 Q. With Mr Corbin, you mention a paramedic. Do you
15 remember whether there was one person with him or two
16 people with him?

17 A. Just one. It was one male that I saw.

18 Q. At any point, do you remember seeing a female with him?

19 A. No.

20 Q. You directed him to the person who was between the two
21 trains?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Did they come back on to your train and make their way
24 through the eastbound train?

25 A. Yes, I think they did, yes, walked through.

1 Q. Do you recall approximately what time you saw Mr Corbin
2 or how much time had elapsed since the explosion?

3 A. I think that most of the people were off the train by
4 then. Before any emergency services, there was --
5 I think both trains had been detrained or most people
6 were off the trains before we see any paramedics,
7 firemen, or anyone, basically.

8 Q. We heard earlier from Mr Thompson. He thought he saw
9 Mr Corbin about 9.00 or 9.05 around the platform area,
10 I think, from recollection.

11 A. Right.

12 Q. Does that help you at all as to when you think you may
13 have first seen him?

14 A. Well, again, it was basically after we'd -- I would have
15 said more along the lines of 9.25 by the time I see him,
16 roughly, because most of the people must have been off
17 the train by then.

18 Q. How long did you remain in the tunnel for?

19 A. Until the Fire Brigade come, and they told us to go,
20 I think it was the Fire Brigade told us, it might have
21 been the police, but an official come and said that we
22 need to leave.

23 Q. At any point, were you warned of the possibility of
24 secondary devices by anyone?

25 A. No. We see -- there was -- with a sniffer dog was

1 about, but they didn't come close, I didn't see them
2 close up, we see them just by the platform edge, but
3 that's what we saw.

4 MR HAY: Mr Ayles, thank you very much, I have no more
5 questions for you, but others may.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

7 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

8 MS GALLAGHER: Mr Ayles, I just have a couple of short
9 questions for you. In your witness statement, which you
10 gave in April 2006, you said that, in your opinion, you
11 thought it took about 25 to 30 minutes to get everyone
12 off the eastbound train.

13 A. Right.

14 Q. Could you just help me with that: is that 25 to
15 30 minutes from the time of the explosion or that it
16 took 25 to 30 minutes to do the detrainment?

17 A. I think to do the detrainment.

18 Q. Do you have any idea of timing in terms of when the
19 detrainment started, can you assist us with that?

20 A. It must have been -- we started getting people off, it
21 must have been about 10 minutes after the explosion,
22 I would imagine. There wasn't a lot of time. When the
23 explosion went off and by the time we got down there, we
24 started getting people off straightaway.

25 Q. So you think probably about ten minutes before the

1 detrainment starts --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- you then estimate 25 to 30 minutes for the

4 detrainment to occur. That takes us to about 35 to

5 40 minutes after the explosion?

6 A. Okay.

7 Q. You then in your statement say, after that detrainment,

8 it was some time before the police, Fire Service and

9 paramedics arrived?

10 A. Right.

11 Q. Again, I appreciate it's very difficult, but can you

12 give us any estimation of the length of time between the

13 detrainment concluding and you seeing any assistance

14 arriving?

15 A. In my mind, I think that it was -- the paramedics got

16 there first, they are the first people I saw. It must

17 have been about -- I would say about five minutes after

18 everyone was off the train before we see the

19 Fire Brigade and then the police coming down.

20 Q. There's a gap but not a particularly long one?

21 A. Well, depends if you're injured or not.

22 Q. There's just one last thing, Mr Ayles, which I want to

23 ask you about. I think I probably know the answer but

24 I've asked everyone else who was a train operator at the

25 time. Did you have any training in 2005 about what

1 precisely to expect in the event of a bombing?
2 A. I don't -- we had training to deal with emergencies as
3 in detrainment, to contact, how to get the live juice
4 off.
5 Q. The mayday procedure and so on?
6 A. The mayday procedure, yes.
7 Q. But you had nothing bomb-related?
8 A. I suppose that is bomb-related, isn't it, detraining?
9 Q. So you had the general training?
10 A. Yes, for emergencies, yes.
11 Q. But nothing specific?
12 A. Well, we was trained for emergency procedures, yes.
13 MS GALLAGHER: That's fine. Thank you very much, Mr Aylen,
14 I've nothing further.
15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?
16 Questions by MR SAUNDERS
17 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Aylen, just a few matters, please.
18 You've described to your Ladyship how, when you
19 approached Jeff Porter's train, you are aware of seeing
20 debris.
21 A. Right.
22 Q. That debris, can we assume, is the debris from
23 Mr Whitehurst's westbound train?
24 A. I think it must have been, yes.
25 Q. I mean, trying to put it together now, it would appear,

1 wouldn't it, that that's what it was --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- and is in front of the eastbound train?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. But have I understood this right, it's in very close

6 proximity to the cab that Mr Porter would have been in?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. You've described -- I represent the family of the young

9 lady that was between the trains. All right? You've

10 described seeing Ms Nicholson, we've heard it being

11 referred to as the six-foot gap.

12 A. Okay.

13 Q. Is that right, it's between the two lines?

14 A. That's right, it's between the east and the westbound,

15 yes.

16 Q. We, in fact, have a plan. I wonder if Mr Ayles could

17 see [INQ10282-10], please?

18 To get your bearings, Mr Ayles, because you may

19 never have seen this before, to the right of the plan is

20 Edgware Road where you've come from.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. All right? The left-hand of the two you can see the

23 sixth carriage, which is obviously the bombed train, now

24 proceeding westerly. The one furthest up the plan, as

25 it were, is Mr Porter's eastbound train.

1 A. Right, okay.

2 Q. All right? Now you will see a reference point there,
3 the approximate position of Ms Nicholson, do you see
4 that?

5 A. Yes, I do.

6 Q. The red dot. This is, so that you understand it,
7 a depiction taking on, as best the Metropolitan Police
8 have been able to, a number of witnesses, including
9 yourself.

10 A. Right.

11 Q. It's believed that Ms Nicholson is obviously to the
12 front of Mr Porter's cab.

13 A. Right.

14 Q. Do you see that?

15 A. Yes, I do, yes.

16 Q. Is it possible, Mr Aylen, that that's where she was?

17 A. In my mind, she was in between, not so far in front of
18 Mr Porter's train.

19 Q. I think others have referred to her being a matter of
20 feet in front. Could that be right?

21 A. Yes, yes.

22 Q. All right, and finally this: I think it was you, sir,
23 who was responsible for covering Ms Nicholson's body
24 initially.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. That would appear to be right, wouldn't it?

2 A. Yes.

3 MR SAUNDERS: May I simply say on behalf of the family that,
4 bearing in mind the situation you were in, you used
5 whatever material was available, and they wish to thank
6 you for according her as much dignity as was possible in
7 the circumstances. So thank you very much for your
8 doing that, Mr Ayles. Thank you, my Lady.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Saunders. Any other
10 questions? Ms Canby?

11 Questions by MS CANBY

12 MS CANBY: Mr Ayles, just two brief matters, please, on
13 behalf of Transport for London.

14 You've been asked about training and you were asked
15 about whether or not you had received training in
16 relation to how to deal with a bomb. You said that
17 you'd received training in relation to emergency
18 situations.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. In particular, you've received training, firstly, in
21 relation to the mayday procedure.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Secondly, in relation to how to detrain a train, how to
24 evacuate passengers from a train.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Have you heard of the HOT procedure?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Is that something that you'd been trained in as well?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Can you tell us what the HOT procedure is?

6 A. Suspect packages, it's -- obviously don't use radios to

7 contact supervisors, your management, if you come across

8 a suspect package, use a landline, and report it,

9 really. Basically, evacuate the area, if needed, and --

10 Q. You'd had that training before July 2005?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Does the HOT procedure in fact mean that, if you see an

13 unattended item then the "H" stands for "hidden", "O" is

14 "obviously suspicious", and "T" is "typical for the

15 area", and they're the three things that you must have

16 in your mind for an unattended item?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Having then considered those three things, if you decide

19 that the item is suspicious, what would you then do?

20 A. Well, contact somebody to let them know.

21 Q. Would that be the line controller?

22 A. It could be any -- management, the DMT, a line

23 controller, anyone that's got contacts who -- the

24 emergency services, if needed.

25 Q. Thank you, Mr Ayles.

1 Just one last matter. That's in relation to when
2 you see Bryan Corbin.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. He's the line standards manager. We've heard him give
5 evidence and we've also heard Mr Thompson's evidence
6 about when he thinks he saw him with one male paramedic.
7 We do know from Mr Corbin's evidence that he was with
8 a female doctor, but she, in fact, had been in the area
9 at the time, so she wouldn't have anything on her to
10 indicate that she was a doctor.

11 Mr Corbin's evidence was that, in fact, he came on
12 to the scene with the male paramedic and the female
13 doctor before the detrainment of the eastbound train had
14 finished, and he said that, in fact, he had to ask for
15 the detrainment of the eastbound train to be stopped in
16 order for him and the male paramedic and the female
17 doctor to walk through.

18 A. Right.

19 Q. With that evidence in mind, do you think, therefore,
20 that Mr Thompson may be closer to the time of when
21 Mr Corbin was down there with the paramedic and the
22 doctor and, therefore, it was at about 9.05, rather than
23 the 9.25 that you'd given us earlier?

24 A. It's possible. I mean, it's -- it's a long time ago,
25 isn't it?

1 Q. I appreciate that, Mr Ayles.

2 A. I wasn't asked specifically at the statement stage of
3 saying that, so -- obviously, if we'd have stopped the
4 detrainment and they've gone through, then that might
5 have been what's mixed up, but it is possible, yes.

6 MS CANBY: Thank you very much for trying, Mr Ayles.

7 I don't have any further questions.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Ayles?

9 Thank you very much, Mr Ayles. I understand from
10 your statement that, sadly, this isn't the first time
11 you've had to see horrific incidents and I hope that by
12 coming here to tell us we haven't asked you to relive
13 too many appalling memories, and thank you for
14 everything you did to try to help the people.

15 A. Thank you.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Mr Hay?

17 MR HAY: My Lady, as I indicated earlier, there are three
18 short reads.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

20 MR HAY: The first is that of Michael Cooney, dated
21 26 August 2005, which has the usual declaration of
22 truth.

23 Statement of MR MICHAEL COONEY read

24 "I am employed by London Underground Limited as an
25 instructor operator, teaching new train drivers and

1 managers the operation of Tube trains. On Thursday,
2 7 July 2005, I was due to start duty at 9.00 am.
3 I arrived at about 8.30 am and I was in the training
4 room at Edgware Road station. At about 8.50 am, I heard
5 a loud bang which shook the portakabin that our offices
6 are situated in. I made my way down to the platform and
7 saw a number of staff gathered at the West End of
8 platform 1. I could see a train inside the tunnel about
9 50 yards or so on the westbound track. There was
10 another train alongside on the eastbound track. There
11 was a lot of smoke and dust coming from the tunnel. At
12 this stage, it was not clear what had happened. The
13 driver of the eastbound train shouted to me words to the
14 effect, 'Something bad's happened, get the juice off'.
15 I went back to the office and got my high visibility
16 vest.
17 "On returning to the platform, more staff were
18 assembling, mostly drivers. I sent a couple of drivers
19 to the front of the westbound train. I put
20 a short-circuiting device on the track to the rear of
21 the westbound train and arranged for the same thing to
22 be done on the eastbound track.
23 "I cannot recall at this stage whether it was
24 apparent what had happened. I think one of the lads
25 came back from the front of the train saying there had

1 been an explosion. It was decided to detrain the
2 passengers. A ladder was placed at the rear of the
3 westbound train, which was in darkness. I detailed one
4 of the drivers, Phil Smith, to board the rear cab of the
5 train and assist passengers to exit one at a time.
6 I stayed at the foot of the ladder with Alf Rogers,
7 a train operator, and assisted passengers getting off
8 the train.
9 "All the passengers were covered in dust. A line of
10 staff was formed so that passengers were passed along
11 the line to the platform. Amongst the passengers
12 detraining were a number of walking wounded covered in
13 blood with cuts and burns. Towards the end of the
14 evacuation, emergency services began to arrive.
15 A fireman said to me they were trying to get the train
16 doors open. I boarded the train and opened the doors
17 with the aid of Phil Smith. We managed this by levering
18 the doors up with a wooden paddle, which is a standard
19 procedure for opening or closing doors in an emergency.
20 "The train was very stuffy and smoky with a strong
21 smell of burning flesh. I was unable to open the train
22 doors in the second from front car. I could see that
23 the centre doors on both sides of the train had been
24 blown out. There was a hole in the train floor.
25 I could hear screaming. There was a man who appeared to

1 be on the track screaming. I saw a woman laying
2 motionless in the aisle door where the second and third
3 cars meet. She was covered in dust. There were body
4 parts in the vicinity of the hole in the floor.
5 Paramedics had arrived and were treating injured people.
6 I made my way to the front car where I found that there
7 were still passengers on board. I did not want to lead
8 these past the site of the explosion, so I assisted them
9 in detraining through the driver's cab. I did this with
10 the assistance of the driver, Ray Whitehurst.

11 "I led the passengers along the side of the train by
12 the tunnel wall and placed a ladder so that they could
13 reboard the train once clear of the damaged section and
14 be evacuated by walking through the train. Once the
15 passengers had been evacuated, I assisted with taking
16 stretchers to the point of the train where injured
17 passengers were located. By this time, emergency
18 services were on the scene in numbers. I decided there
19 was nothing more we could do to help. I made my way
20 back to the platform and eventually back to the office
21 in order to get cleaned up."

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Had Mr Cooney been here, I would have
23 thanked him for everything he did as well, Mr Hay.

24 MR HAY: Grateful, my Lady. My Lady, the next statement is
25 that of Alfred Rogers dated 3 August 2005. That also

1 has the usual declaration of truth.
2 Statement of MR ALFRED ROGERS read
3 "I am a London Underground train driver. I am based
4 at Barking Underground station. I operate either on the
5 Hammersmith & City Line or the Circle Line. On
6 7 July 2005, I was on duty. I had driven a couple of
7 trains and at about 8.30 I took a refreshment break at
8 the train crew accommodation rest room at Edgware Road.
9 I had been in the room a little while when I heard what
10 I took to be an explosion. I did not check my watch at
11 the time, so I cannot be specific about time. I went
12 down on to platforms 3 and 4. These are the westbound
13 platforms for the Hammersmith & City Line and the
14 Circle Line. I saw people looking into the tunnel.
15 I looked myself and saw two trains standing side by side
16 just inside the tunnel, one westbound, one eastbound,
17 probably making its way on to platform 1.
18 "I went upstairs to make the duty manager aware of
19 a serious incident. I do not recall his name. I went
20 back down on to platform 3 as the view into the tunnel
21 is better. I was waiting for confirmation the electric
22 current had been switched off. I believe that it had
23 because both the trains were in darkness.
24 "The duty manager who had now come down onto the
25 platform was trying to contact the controller for

1 confirmation about the electric current. He was unable
2 to do so because he could not get through via his radio
3 or telephone. He therefore sent for a device which
4 checks the current.

5 "He got down onto the track and, with the use of
6 this device, gave the all clear. We, the staff, then
7 entered the tunnel and made our way towards the trains.
8 I stopped at the westbound train and got the emergency
9 ladders out of the driver's cab at the rear of the
10 train. These ladders were then hooked on to the
11 driver's cab and we began detraining the passengers.
12 "I could see injuries such as cuts to their arms,
13 faces and legs. They were also in shock. An off-duty
14 paramedic identified himself to me. I gave him my high
15 visibility jacket and he went to the front of the train
16 to assist the injured. A member of staff mentioned
17 a dead body between the trains. I later saw it between
18 the front of the eastbound and halfway down the
19 westbound. I cannot recall the sex of the body.

20 "I was also told of a casualty between the westbound
21 train and the tunnel wall. I later saw the casualty.
22 I believe he or she had a fracture injury. I was again
23 informed by the staff of a body under the westbound
24 train near the tunnel wall. I later saw it under the
25 train with severe injuries. I helped detrain the

1 passengers. There must have been over a thousand on
2 board the train. We ushered them back to Edgware Road.
3 I then went back to the train to check for passengers
4 that were able to walk. I boarded the train at the
5 rear. I could see that the badly injured passengers
6 were being cared for by other passengers and some staff
7 members.

8 "With regards to the damage to the train, that was
9 limited to one carriage, the second carriage from the
10 front. The doors were blown off. The roof was damaged
11 and there was glass everywhere. I made my way towards
12 the front of the train. When I was in the badly damaged
13 carriage, I made my way on to the tracks by jumping
14 down. Again I was checking for passengers. I made my
15 way east towards Edgware Road between the two trains.
16 I knew that the eastbound train was being detrained, but
17 I did not know what had occurred on that train. At this
18 point, I saw the dead body in between the two trains.
19 I saw the paramedics arriving. They wanted to be taken
20 to the main bombsite and so I escorted them to the
21 second carriage.

22 "I walked back to the rear of the train and jumped
23 down onto the tracks. I then saw the firefighters
24 arriving. I again took them through the train. I again
25 got back onto the track from the third carriage from the

1 front. I then saw the badly injured body that was under
2 the train. He or she was dead. I accompanied one of
3 the firefighters who was carrying out some safety
4 checks. I then went to the front of the train where
5 I saw a passenger who appeared to be in shock. He told
6 me he worked for British Rail and that he had lost his
7 bag. It was on the westbound train. I told him the
8 police would sort that out. I then got him on to the
9 eastbound train which was still in the process of
10 detraining. We got on through the rear carriage door.
11 I walked with him behind the main group to ensure full
12 passengers detraining. I then saw managers who told me
13 to make my way back to the train crew accommodation at
14 Edgware Road which I did. In my dealings with the
15 passengers, nobody said anything of particular note
16 which could assist the police investigation.
17 "I later found out the train I had first got on was
18 the westbound Circle Line train and the second one
19 I boarded was the eastbound Circle Line train."
20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I would also have thanked Mr Rogers.
21 MR HAY: My Lady, the final statement to be read is that of
22 Emily Victoria Marton, dated 23 February 2006 and which
23 has the usual declaration of truth.
24 Statement of MS EMILY VICTORIA MARTON read
25 "I am the above named person and I work as a train

1 or Tube driver for London Underground. I have worked
2 for the company since September 2002 and have been
3 a driver since August 2004.

4 "On 7 July 2005, I was due to work what is basically
5 a spare turn shift that we call '8 duty'. I had a 4.45
6 start time and drove to Edgware Road station and parked
7 in the staff car park. That morning, as planned, I was
8 relief cover. I only drive trains on the Circle,
9 District and Hammersmith & City line.

10 "On that day, I drove a Hammersmith & City Line
11 train from Edgware Road to Barking, back to Hammersmith
12 and then back to Edgware Road, where I was then due to
13 go in for a break. This was at 08.49 and I know that
14 I was on time.

15 "The train I had been driving was eastbound into
16 Edgware Road and arrived at platform 1. As I got out of
17 the driver's doors, my relief was waiting for me. I am
18 not sure of this driver's name. He was a white male of
19 large build.

20 "I started to walk back along platform 1 towards the
21 stairs that lead to the crew quarters. There was
22 a District Line train on platform 2. I was about level
23 with the front of the westbound District Line train on
24 platform 2. Having been out of my train for no more
25 than 30 to 40 seconds, I was on my own.

1 "At this point, I heard what I would describe as
2 a very loud muffled bang coming from the tunnel that
3 I was now facing, platforms 3 and 4.
4 "Immediately, I knew this was a bomb. As this
5 explosion had happened, the doors on the train I was on
6 immediately reopened as they had just started to close.
7 The lights on the train I had driven also went out.
8 I immediately went to the autophones on the platform,
9 which is linked to the London Underground internal phone
10 network, and called the duty desk which was just
11 upstairs at Edgware Road. I spoke with one of the duty
12 managers. I only know the lady I spoke to as Ayo."
13 My Lady, you'll recall the witness statement of
14 Ayo Puddicombe and also Ms Canby's questions earlier
15 today to Mr Brough regarding that phone call.
16 "I told Ayo there had been an explosion in the
17 tunnel and that we needed to get more staff down here
18 now. I had been carrying my bags, so I put this bag
19 into the driver's cab of the District Line train on
20 platform 2. I immediately put on my high visibility
21 orange waistcoat. I looked over to platform 3 and could
22 see a male driver I only know as Becks looking into the
23 tunnel. There was by now real confusion, but it was
24 clear that something very serious had just happened in
25 the tunnel. I could just see the end lights of the

1 westbound train in the tunnel and by now there was
2 a mass of dust and smoke bellowing out of the tunnel.
3 There was a strong smell like an electrical fire as
4 well.

5 "I realised that we needed people down here quickly
6 so went to the crew quarters and spoke with Ayo, the
7 duty manager I had spoken to on the phone a short time
8 before. I said the same as before to her, that we
9 needed staff there now. Also, there was another duty
10 manager called Monica.

11 "I then went immediately down the stairs that lead
12 to platforms 3 and 4. On platform 3 there was between
13 10 and 15 London Underground staff. There was still
14 a lot of confusion, as we were not sure if the power to
15 the track was still live. I and some others decided to
16 walk along the tracks to the tunnel. We are trained to
17 be able to do this even when the power is on. As it
18 turned out, it was off at this point. I am not sure how
19 many of us entered the tunnel. I know there were a few
20 in front of me and some behind. The only person I can
21 name is a driver called Jerry Kelly.

22 "Nobody really took charge. I do not recall any of
23 the managers being there at that time. I am sure it was
24 all the train drivers. There was a lot round that time
25 due to meal relief.

1 "As I entered the tunnel, I could hear screams and
2 a lot of people were crying out asking for help.
3 I walked along the gap between the two sets of rails
4 which is known as the six-foot. I got to about
5 25 metres from the eastbound train to Edgware Road,
6 which is the train that had been following the one I was
7 driving. This train was driven by a driver called
8 Jeff Porter. On the track in front of me there was
9 a mass of twisted metal that had jagged edges. I knew
10 this must have been part of a train, but it was
11 virtually unrecognisable as such. I could see
12 Jeff Porter at the small door of the front of the train
13 that we know as the M door. There were passengers
14 behind him.

15 "There was total confusion at this point. There was
16 still masses of smoke and dust and the sounds of people
17 screaming was horrific. I remember there was one male
18 shouting out, 'They've blown my fucking legs off', he
19 was continually shouting this over and over again. We
20 did not have torches with us and really did need to get
21 hold of some. I said I would go back to the crew
22 quarters to get some. I then went back the way I had
23 come in and back up the stairs. I told the duty manager
24 we needed torches. I went up to what we call the
25 incident room and managed to get three torches.

1 "I went back down to the platform and handed out two
2 of the torches to other drivers. I then went back down
3 the tunnel but this time walked on the same side of the
4 train where the bomb had exploded. I saw a lady get out
5 of the bombed train. I can describe her as a white
6 female in her 40s, possibly foreign. She had a blouse
7 on, but I cannot say what colour it was. The blouse had
8 been by the blast forced open, exposing her chest,
9 though not fully. I cannot say what other clothing she
10 had on. She had dark, curly hair which was cut to just
11 above shoulder length. Her hair had clearly been burnt
12 and she was very dirty and her face was covered in dust
13 and grime from the explosion. Her hands were also
14 burnt.

15 "I spoke to her and I think she said her name was
16 Marie, though I am not certain of this. I decided to
17 help this lady out and guided her back along the tunnel
18 onto the platform, up the stairs and out on to the
19 concourse area and to where there were four telephone
20 kiosks just behind the main entrance to the station.

21 "I got her to sit down on the ground with her back
22 to the wall. I made a phone call for her to her works
23 number from my mobile phone. I spoke to a male at her
24 works. I told him who I was and that I was with Marie
25 and that she was injured and in shock. I got this male

1 on the phone to arrange to contact her husband to advise
2 that she would be going to hospital. I stayed with
3 Marie about another five minutes. By now there was
4 a large amount of other passengers coming up from the
5 platforms. A number were suffering from the same type
6 of injuries as Marie.

7 "I decided to return to the tunnel. There were by
8 now a great number of London Underground staff,
9 including office workers who were assisting people
10 coming out of the tunnel. I went back into the tunnel
11 and stood at the point on the eastbound track level with
12 the end of the train that the bomb had exploded on.

13 "Jerry Kelly, who I had originally gone into the
14 tunnel with, was at the end door of the eastbound train
15 helping people get off the train. I was aware that
16 almost under the front of the eastbound train there was
17 a body. I cannot describe this as I tried to avoid
18 looking at it. I was assisting people by directing them
19 with my light from my torch. I remained at this point
20 until the last person was off the train, which would
21 have been at least 45 minutes, I would estimate.

22 "By then, there were a number of staff from the
23 police, Fire Brigade and Ambulance Service in the
24 tunnel. The only persons I can describe were a lady who
25 was later in most of the national papers with a bandaged

1 mask over her face. I saw her without this whilst still
2 in the tunnel. I also remember off the eastbound train
3 there was a male who was visually impaired. I cannot
4 describe him but recall that he needed assistance to get
5 off the train. There was another male who got off the
6 train, who I would describe as a vagrant, who I had seen
7 a number of times before.

8 "After I had left the tunnel, I went up to the crew
9 room. I remember the news was on the television about
10 the bombings. This would have been about 10.40 by now
11 and the reporters were still talking of this all being
12 a power surge, but by now there was a report that there
13 had been an explosion on a bus as well. I spent the
14 next few hours sat with Ray Whitehurst, who was the
15 driver of the train which the bomb exploded on. I was
16 with him until he was called by the police. I drove him
17 at about 1.00 pm."

18 My Lady, Ms Marton then goes on to describe the
19 effect the incident had on her.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: She is yet another member of
21 London Underground staff who is to be commended for
22 going down to do whatever she could to help.

23 MR HAY: I'm grateful, my Lady. That completes today's
24 list.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you all very much.

1 Tomorrow, this court will be used for the hearing to
2 consider the ruling I made as far as closed hearings are
3 concerned, so the Divisional Court will be sitting in
4 here tomorrow. So I'm afraid people need to make sure
5 their papers are not going to get in the way, so that
6 nobody picks them up by mistake or anything of that
7 kind. I'd better do the same here.
8 So we'll sit again as far as the inquests themselves
9 are concerned at 10.00 on Friday.
10 (4.10 pm)
11 (The inquests adjourned until 10.00 am on Friday,
12 19 November 2010)
13
14