

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005

Hearing transcripts - 24 November 2010 - Morning session

1 Wednesday, 24 November 2010

2 (10.00 am)

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith?

4 MR KEITH: Good morning, my Lady. May I invite you to call

5 Brett Loft, please?

6 MR BRETT ASHLEY LOFT (sworn)

7 Questions by MR KEITH

8 MR KEITH: Good morning. Could you give the court your full

9 name, please?

10 A. Brett Ashley Loft.

11 Q. Mr Loft, in July of 2005, were you -- you remain

12 a sub-officer with blue watch stationed at

13 North Kensington fire station?

14 A. Yes, correct.

15 Q. What is blue watch?

16 A. Blue watch is -- the way it works, we've got four shift

17 systems, and they're blue, white, green and red, and we

18 were the blue watch.

19 Q. Are they regulated by the amount of hours in the day

20 that they do on watch?

21 A. Yes, it varies. They're on a shift system that rotates.

22 Q. Your shift was 9.00 in the morning until 6.00 in the

23 evening?

24 A. That's right.

25 Q. Were you in charge of appliance G272?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. What sort of appliance was that?

3 A. It's a pumping appliance.

4 Q. A pump?

5 A. A pump, it's a pump as opposed to a pump ladder.

6 Q. You received a call to attend a fire and explosion at

7 Edgware Road Tube station. Could we have on the screen

8 [LFB8-1]?

9 If you could expand the bottom half of the page,

10 G272, is the second entry, 09.13.59, mobilised. Mobile

11 at 09.15.27 and arrived 09.18.58.

12 So it only took you three minutes, just over three

13 minutes, from leaving North Kensington fire station to

14 get to Edgware Road?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. When you arrived, can you recollect whether you were the

17 first from your station, North Kensington, to arrive?

18 A. Yes, I was.

19 Q. Were there any other fire appliances from other stations

20 there?

21 A. Not that I could see, no.

22 Q. We know from other evidence that by the time you arrived

23 at 09.18, there were a large number of casualties coming

24 out of the station.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. I'm sure that you recollect them. Do you remember  
2 whether or not there were also a substantial number of  
3 paramedics and emergency medical technicians and police  
4 officers in the station entrance?

5 A. I remember seeing lots of ambulance staff, yes.

6 Q. Police officers?

7 A. There may have been, but I remember the ambulance more  
8 clearly.

9 Q. Did you speak to them, the paramedics, in order to find  
10 out what was going on?

11 A. Yes, I went up towards the station entrance and saw  
12 a paramedic that seemed to be organising things and  
13 asked him what had happened.

14 Q. Did he tell you what he needed, if anything?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. What was that?

17 A. It was lighting down on the train because the lights had  
18 been blown out. That was the main thing.

19 Q. Did he express any need for the Fire Brigade to assist  
20 by way, at this stage, of stretchering people out of the  
21 carriage?

22 A. Not at this stage, no.

23 Q. What about cutting people out of debris or assisting in  
24 getting into the carriage and applying any sort of first  
25 aid, no mention of that?

1 A. There was no mention of that, no.

2 Q. Before you had a chance to do anything about the request  
3 for lighting, did a colleague, a senior officer,  
4 Assistant Divisional Officer Davies, arrive?

5 A. Yes, he did.

6 Q. Was that within a few moments of you arriving?

7 A. Yes, as I was talking to the paramedic, I saw him  
8 arrive.

9 Q. So no doubt you relayed what you'd been told by the  
10 paramedic to that officer. Is it customary practice,  
11 when you arrive at a scene, to try to establish an  
12 equipment dump, a place where you can put your equipment  
13 so that it can be readily to hand?

14 A. Yes, that's right, yes.

15 Q. Did you decide to establish such an equipment dump here?

16 A. It was, as -- my officer in charge, Station  
17 Officer U'Chong, when he arrived, he started to organise  
18 that straightaway.

19 Q. Do you recall which appliance Mr Chong was with?

20 A. He was on Golf 271, which was the pump ladder from  
21 North Kensington.

22 Q. That was the fellow crew from the same station as  
23 yourself, in fact?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Where was that equipment dump established?

1 A. I'm not entirely sure. It was -- I know it was  
2 obviously out in the street as opposed to in the  
3 station, so it wasn't going to hinder anybody going in  
4 or out, I'm not exactly sure where it was at the time.

5 Q. Did you take part in establishing that dump or not?

6 A. No, I didn't.

7 Q. All right. Did there come a time when a phone call was  
8 received from the other Edgware Road station, the  
9 Bakerloo station, on the other side of the A40?

10 A. Yes. I was told by one of the LUL staff that there was  
11 a phone call from another crew.

12 Q. Another fire crew?

13 A. Another fire crew, yes, on the station-to-station phone,  
14 so he showed me where the phone was. I answered it,  
15 there was no one there at the time, so I presume they  
16 had already come round to the correct entrance.

17 Q. Was there also a discussion about whether or not the  
18 explosion -- and you had surely known it was an  
19 explosion by then -- was a dirty bomb or not?

20 A. No, there wasn't any information.

21 Q. No discussion about whether there was?

22 A. Yes, there was discussion about it. Between myself,  
23 ADO Davies and Station Officer U'Chong we came to the  
24 conclusion that, if it had been anything nasty, the  
25 amount of time the paramedics had been there, we would

1 have seen signs of something, so we were quite confident  
2 that it wasn't dirty.

3 Q. Was there also a discussion about whether or not to  
4 declare a major incident?

5 A. Yes, there was.

6 Q. We know from evidence before my Lady, in principle, in  
7 fact, evidence heard before the London Assembly 7 July  
8 Committee, that a major incident was declared by the  
9 London Fire Brigade at Edgware at 9.34. So that would  
10 seem to suggest that there was about 15, or 10 to  
11 15 minutes of discussion between yourself, Mr Chong,  
12 Mr Davies, a debate of a major incident and a debate  
13 over whether or not the explosion was a dirty bomb  
14 before a major incident was declared. Does that seem to  
15 you to be about right?

16 A. It didn't seem that long at the time, but, yes.

17 Q. During this time, were steps being taken to meet the  
18 requests from the paramedic to have lighting established  
19 in the tunnel?

20 A. The crews from our pump and pump ladder were setting up  
21 an equipment dump and lighting and stuff out.

22 Q. So since he had asked you, you had asked your crews to  
23 get on and do it --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- while you discussed matters with Mr Chong and

1 Mr Davies?

2 A. Yes, that's right.

3 Q. Do you know whether they were successful in establishing  
4 lighting in the tunnel?

5 A. Yes, they were.

6 Q. How long did it take?

7 A. Difficult to say.

8 Q. I appreciate that.

9 A. From when we got down there, I should think it was no  
10 more than maybe five, ten minutes, before the first set  
11 of lighting was working in the carriage.

12 Q. Were there some difficulties in setting out the  
13 lighting? Because the generator has to be outside on  
14 the street because of the fumes, which necessarily means  
15 a very long cable run from the generator to the lights  
16 themselves in the tunnel.

17 A. That's right. What we did, we put the generator on the  
18 edge of the platform because, with the design of the  
19 station, there's plenty of air for the fumes to escape  
20 from there, and then we run the cables down the track  
21 towards the trains.

22 That's when I realised the trains were further away  
23 than we thought, so we had to get extra cable reels from  
24 other appliances to -- obviously to connect it up  
25 completely.

1 Q. Did you, yourself, go and get the other cable, the  
2 additional cable?  
3 A. No, I didn't.  
4 Q. Did you instruct someone to go and get it?  
5 A. I did, yes, the crews that came down with me. I ...  
6 Q. Your statement shows that you had to radio somebody to  
7 ask for further equipment, further cable.  
8 A. The crews who came down with me brought down the cable  
9 reels, yeah, that's right, then I radioed back to get  
10 extra cables down. I didn't oversee that. I just  
11 passed the message on. I know it was done.  
12 Q. How do you know it was done?  
13 A. Because the lighting came on in the carriage, so I knew  
14 it had been connected up.  
15 Q. In the bombed carriage or just at the carriage at the  
16 end of the train?  
17 A. In the bombed carriage.  
18 Q. I want to ask you about the radio that you used to send  
19 the message to ask for more cabling. Was that  
20 a handheld radio that operates amongst your own crew or  
21 on a wider net in the London Fire Brigade?  
22 A. It's one for the Fire Brigade, yes, our own crew,  
23 handheld.  
24 Q. So on the platform, were you able to radio your  
25 colleagues elsewhere?



1 A. Yes, I was.

2 Q. From what you said, there obviously came a time when you  
3 went down to the platform because you were aware of the  
4 cabling being set out for the lighting. We know from  
5 CCTV evidence capturing the movements of people on the  
6 platform that some Fire Brigade firefighters went down  
7 onto the platform at 09.39, so about 9.40. That's about  
8 five or six minutes after the major incident was  
9 declared.

10 It may not have recorded all the movements on the  
11 platform, because it's only one camera, but if I were to  
12 suggest that you went down with the first group of  
13 firefighters at about 9.39, would that seem to you to be  
14 about right?

15 A. That would seem about right, yes.

16 Q. Do you recall whom you went down with?

17 A. There was Firefighter Perry and firefighter McDonnell  
18 from my crew and -- I can't remember -- there were two  
19 others from the pump ladders crew as well.

20 Q. You no doubt spent a bit of time on the platform making  
21 arrangements for the lighting and further debate as to  
22 what should be done by you and your colleagues.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. So may we take it that perhaps a little further time  
25 elapsed before you then went into the tunnel itself?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. The CCTV suggests that you may not have gone into the  
3 tunnel until 9.44, about five or six minutes further on.  
4 Does that seem to you to be about right?

5 A. Yes. Again, that seems longer than it felt at the time.

6 Q. When you went into the tunnel and you approached the  
7 trains, was there some lighting from the eastbound  
8 carriage, the eastbound train?

9 A. Yes, there was.

10 Q. So you could see your way around?

11 A. You could, yes.

12 Q. Do you recollect paramedics and emergency personnel  
13 holding their own torches?

14 A. Yes, once -- there was emergency lighting in the  
15 carriages on the bombed train until you got to the one  
16 that was -- that was actually where the bomb was, and  
17 then it was pitch black, and you could see all the  
18 paramedics in there with their torches.

19 Q. Did you get the impression that there were a number of  
20 paramedics inside the bombed carriage and certainly  
21 enough to attend to the people who were inside?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. When you arrived with your colleagues, what was the main  
24 priority for you? What, in essence, were the paramedics  
25 requesting of you?

1 A. Well, the main thing to start with was to get lighting  
2 up so they could see better what was going on, and then  
3 I asked the question generally into the carriage, that  
4 we were here to assist, "What do you need from us?"

5 Q. What happened?

6 A. They asked us -- they basically said we've got a lot of  
7 people that need to be stretchered out, so we need  
8 personnel down here with stretchers to help  
9 stretcher-bear.

10 Q. Do we take it from that that, when you arrived, the  
11 paramedics themselves didn't have the necessary  
12 stretchers, they needed you both to carry the stretchers  
13 and to go and get stretchers?

14 A. Yes, because they were all involved in treating  
15 casualties on the train, so they didn't have any  
16 personnel themselves to get the stretchers.

17 Q. So did you and your colleagues, or some of your  
18 colleagues, go back up to the platform and then to the  
19 ground level in order to get stretchers to help them?

20 A. Again, I radioed through that we needed stretchers and  
21 personnel and also sent one of my colleagues back just  
22 to make sure that message was relayed.

23 Q. Did you radio from the carriage or from the platform?

24 A. From the carriage.

25 Q. So your radio worked from the carriage?

1 A. Just about, yes.

2 Q. How long after your arrival in the carriage, do you  
3 think the lighting was established for that second  
4 carriage, the bombed carriage?

5 A. Again, it doesn't seem like long, but I would say it's  
6 again five, ten minutes, once I was in there.

7 Q. Were you there when the lights came on?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Was there a difficulty with removing stretchers from the  
10 carriage? Because the only alternatives were to try to  
11 walk out of the bombed doors -- the blasted open doors  
12 of the second carriage -- or to walk stretchers and  
13 casualties down the train, so did you try to open some  
14 of the side doors?

15 A. Yes, there were -- we noticed the first few stretchers  
16 came out through the same way I came in, down the bombed  
17 train. Obviously, that was a bit tight because there  
18 were people coming in and out, and then I noticed that  
19 the train that was alongside, they managed to open the  
20 doors, and we sort of established a one-way system,  
21 really. We took them out through the undamaged train  
22 and then people coming in with stretchers came in  
23 through the bombed train.

24 Q. Did you stay in the carriage throughout the time whilst  
25 casualties were being removed on stretchers?

1 A. I did.

2 Q. Did you and your colleagues from the Fire Brigade assist  
3 in carrying the stretchers out of the train?

4 A. We did, yes.

5 Q. Did you also help in carrying the stretchers up to  
6 ground level?

7 A. As far as I know, they did. As I say, I was in the  
8 bombed carriage, so --

9 Q. You were directing operations for your crew?

10 A. Correct, yes.

11 Q. Whilst you were in the carriage, do you recollect any  
12 discussion or debate over sufficiency of medical  
13 equipment? Were people calling out for more equipment  
14 to be made available; not just stretchers, but  
15 dressings, analgesics, IV bags and so on?

16 A. Not that I recall.

17 Q. You don't recall anything of that sort?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Did you go all the way down the bombed carriage to the  
20 point of the crater where the bomb had been?

21 A. I did.

22 Q. As you went through the carriage, were you able to see  
23 where the casualties were, where the passengers who were  
24 deceased lay on the carriage floor?

25 A. Yes, I did.

1 Q. My Lady has heard a great deal of evidence about the  
2 location of all those who died in the carriage, and so  
3 I'm not going to ask you in detail about your  
4 recollections, but in broad terms, do you record in your  
5 statement that there were two bodies in the doorway in  
6 the vicinity of the origin of the explosion near the  
7 crater, and two further passengers further down the  
8 carriage towards the front in the next set of standing  
9 doors --

10 A. Yes, that's right.

11 Q. -- the standing area. Were you also able to see  
12 a passenger inside the crater caused by the explosion of  
13 the bomb?

14 A. Yes, I did.

15 Q. From what you've told us, it seems clear that, by the  
16 time you arrived, any medical attention directed towards  
17 those who had tragically died had ended, it was  
18 a question of taking out the walking wounded and the  
19 more seriously injured casualties by stretcher out of  
20 the carriage?

21 A. As far as I could see at that point, yes.

22 Q. Could you tell us, please, something of the conditions  
23 in which you worked in the carriage in order to get the  
24 seriously injured out by stretcher?

25 A. Obviously it was very crowded, there was a lot of people

1 down there, casualties and rescue personnel. It was  
2 quite orderly once it was done. We literally waited for  
3 the paramedics to call through saying, "We need two  
4 people with a stretcher". I had sent two firefighters  
5 through with a stretcher and then they'd take them out  
6 through the other carriage and it worked in quite an  
7 orderly system at that point.

8 Q. Would you wait for the firefighters who had taken the  
9 stretcher out to come back down for the next casualty,  
10 or were they taken out in sequence more rapidly than  
11 that?

12 A. As far as I know, they went out through the other  
13 carriage. I didn't see whether they were passing them  
14 through or took them out individually themselves.  
15 I don't know.

16 Q. Can you recollect how long the process of removing the  
17 seriously injured from the carriage took?

18 A. It must have been at least an hour, possibly more,  
19 actually.

20 Q. So the last casualty may not have been removed until  
21 well after 10.30, on the basis that you arrived in the  
22 carriage about quarter to 10?

23 A. Yes, that's correct.

24 Q. Were you one of the last firefighters to leave the  
25 carriage once all the seriously injured had been

1 removed?

2 A. Yes, I was.

3 Q. Did you take steps to check that everybody was out?

4 A. I checked down the carriage, which is when I noticed the  
5 deceased. I also had someone check underneath the  
6 carriage just to make sure there was no one left on the  
7 track, and then I left.

8 Q. So either yourself or your colleagues checked all the  
9 way down the train?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And behind the train as well on the tunnel wall side?

12 A. That's correct, yes.

13 Q. When you left, do you recollect whether there were  
14 senior police officers there advising both yourself and  
15 your colleagues and the paramedics to leave the carriage  
16 on account of the fact that there was a risk of  
17 a secondary device or, alternatively, that it was now  
18 a crime scene?

19 A. Yes, there was. Once I came off -- coming out the end  
20 of the train, there were senior officers there.

21 Q. What did they tell you?

22 A. They said it's now a crime scene, you know, don't go  
23 back in there unless you really need to.

24 Q. You then went back up to the station level?

25 A. That's correct.



1 MR KEITH: Sub-Officer Loft, thank you very much. Will you  
2 stay there, because there may be some further questions  
3 for you?

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

5 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

6 MS GALLAGHER: Mr Loft, we know you gave a witness statement  
7 to the police on 31 January 2006, almost seven months  
8 after the explosion, but is it right that you also  
9 prepared notes closer to the time?

10 A. Yes, it is.

11 Q. We do have a memorandum without a date -- the reference,  
12 my Lady, for you is INQ8496 -- which is a memorandum  
13 about a major incident at Edgware Road. It's addressed  
14 to "Sir" signed off by you. We don't have a date.  
15 You make reference in your statement to having  
16 prepared notes -- to your notes being dated 9 July 2005.  
17 Are they the same notes?

18 A. They would be the same ones, yes.

19 Q. So in preparing your statement in January, you made  
20 reference to those notes?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Just two brief matters. Firstly, on your arrival at the  
23 station, you've described today a paramedic that seemed  
24 to be organising things, and in your statement and in  
25 your note you referred to a paramedic who seemed to be

1 in charge. Did you notice anything to formally indicate  
2 he was in charge or was it just that he seemed informed,  
3 active and organised, so the natural person for you to  
4 go to?

5 A. It seemed like the natural person. He seemed like he  
6 knew what was happening and -- et cetera.

7 Q. You have mentioned that when you were in the station,  
8 you saw that paramedic, you saw a large number of  
9 casualties exiting the station and you also saw a number  
10 of ambulance personnel at station level.

11 Were those ambulance personnel in the station  
12 entrance tending to casualties there or were they  
13 en route down to the tunnel?

14 A. Both. There were some casualties in the station  
15 entrance, and the others were going down to the tunnel.

16 Q. Just one final matter, Mr Loft. You've been asked to  
17 assess when you think the lighting came on in the bombed  
18 carriage and, very understandably, it's difficult to  
19 assess, but you've given us the best estimate.

20 Could you help us with this: we know that you were  
21 in the carriage when the stretchered casualties began to  
22 be removed. Could you tell us by reference to that  
23 process when the lighting came on, so do you recall if  
24 the lighting came on before the stretchered casualties  
25 began to be removed, at about that time, or later?

1 A. I would say it was about that time. I can't be sure if  
2 it was just before or just after the first ones.

3 Q. That's very helpful. It's in keeping with evidence  
4 we've already heard from London Ambulance Service  
5 personnel who describe the lighting only coming on on  
6 the bombed carriage just when they're starting to leave  
7 with the stretchered casualties.

8 So, in your view, that estimate of when the lighting  
9 came on is likely to be accurate?

10 A. Yes.

11 MS GALLAGHER: Thank you very much, Mr Loft. I've nothing  
12 further.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Ms Gallagher.

14 Mr Saunders?

15 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing, thank you, my Lady.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Boyd?

17 Questions by MS BOYD

18 MS BOYD: Mr Loft, you were mobilised at 09.13, we've seen  
19 from LFB7 -- sorry, LFB8 [LFB8-1], if we could have that back up  
20 on the screen, please.

21 We can also see that at the same time three other  
22 appliances were mobilised with you: G271, whom you've  
23 already referred to, that's also from North Kensington.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. That was Station Officer U'Chong, and we can see that he

1 arrived at 09.23, and also G331, that's the first entry,  
2 and that's Sub-Officer Morgan, I think, and several fire  
3 officers. They arrived at 09.24, we can see.  
4 Then the fourth appliance was G386, and they arrived  
5 slightly later at 09.35.  
6 Following the declaration -- if we could keep that  
7 on the screen for the moment, please -- for a major  
8 incident procedure, we can see that there's a second  
9 mobilisation at 09.37. So about eight lines down that  
10 starts, and we have there H276. That's  
11 Sub-Officer Moore and Firefighters Darsley and Anderson,  
12 I think we've heard from Mr Darsley yesterday, and they  
13 made their way from Praed Street.  
14 Then we have A211, that's Station Officer Emburey,  
15 and he arrived at 09.43, and we're going to hear from  
16 Station Officer Emburey.  
17 Then G282, we don't have an arrival time, and A261,  
18 I think they'd also gone to Praed Street first.  
19 We've also heard, Mr Loft, that Mr Nunan attended  
20 slightly later, he was in G342, and together with G341.  
21 So at about that time, within the first sort of  
22 20 to 30 minutes, it looks as though we have ten  
23 appliances and others on their way. Does that mean that  
24 there are at least 40 personnel --  
25 A. Yes, there would have been.

1 Q. -- attending at that stage?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Can I also ask you about your actions on your arrival?

4 You identified the paramedic and the need for lighting,

5 and you then meet up with ADO Davies, who's walked from

6 Praed Street, I think?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. So he immediately becomes the Incident Commander?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. Now, on arrival, is it right that in the initial stages

11 there are a number of competing demands and priorities?

12 The first is, obviously, the need to gather information

13 and as much information as possible to know what's

14 required of you and what resources?

15 A. Yes, that's right.

16 Q. We know that you established there was a need for

17 lighting.

18 Second, is there also a need to ensure that the

19 scene is safe, not only for those involved in the

20 incident, but also for the rescuers to make sure they

21 can be effective?

22 A. Yes, that's correct.

23 Q. Is it right that, as we've heard, the issue of CBRN was

24 a particular concern to ADO Davies?

25 A. It was, yes.

1 Q. He will be able to tell us about that tomorrow. But  
2 whilst that risk assessment was undertaken, you've told  
3 us that other crews were being directed to make an  
4 equipment dump of generators, amongst other things, is  
5 that right?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. Also, were other crews dealing with setting up  
8 a casualty handling area for the number of casualties  
9 exiting the station?

10 A. I don't know about that. I know we were setting up an  
11 equipment dump and I know the LAS were leading people  
12 to -- I think it was Marks & Spencers next door, as  
13 a casualty. I don't know if we assisted in that or not,  
14 though.

15 Q. Once the assessment is undertaken and it's felt that  
16 it's safe to go down to the station and a major incident  
17 is declared, you and four officers are the first crew to  
18 go down, as we understand it.

19 A. Yes, correct.

20 Q. You've told us that you took down Firefighter McDonnell  
21 and Perry, who were from your fire station, so you knew  
22 them?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. You refer to two other firefighters, was that  
25 Firefighters Gilson and Hockin from G33?

1 A. No, that wasn't. They were from Golf 271, which is our  
2 pump ladder from North Kensington. But I can't  
3 recollect who it was at the time.

4 Q. Right. Did another ADO, ADO Cunningham, another senior  
5 officer, follow you down shortly afterwards, or are you  
6 not able to say?

7 A. I don't know.

8 Q. You told us that you and your crew took down some  
9 lighting. Was that just one generator or two  
10 generators?

11 A. As there were only four of us and the generator is  
12 a two-person lift, we took one generator, I believe it  
13 was two cable reels and one lighting unit.

14 Q. So having got down to the platform, it's then that you  
15 realised that you need more extension cables in order to  
16 get to the train and, indeed, the carriage?

17 A. Yes, that's correct.

18 Q. So does that take a few minutes to appreciate and  
19 organise and radio up for more cables?

20 A. Yes, well, obviously, until I got to the platform,  
21 I couldn't see how far away the train was, so I was  
22 trying to work out exactly how far away and how much  
23 reel we needed.

24 Q. You presumably could see the end of the train. Did you  
25 know exactly how far in the bombed carriage was?

1 A. No, not at that point.

2 Q. So you had to work out, not only the distance required  
3 to the train, but also to the bombed carriage?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. You weren't sure where that was?

6 A. No.

7 Q. You then radioed four further extensions. As far as  
8 you're aware, did other members of either your watch or  
9 other crews immediately come down with further cable  
10 extensions?

11 A. Yes, as far as I'm aware, they did, yes.

12 Q. In terms of the actual lighting, is it something that is  
13 hung from the ceiling of the carriage or is it  
14 freestanding?

15 A. It can be freestanding. It fits to a tripod. But with  
16 the nature of the carriages, it's got a handle at the  
17 top of it, and we literally hooked it over the top  
18 hand-holding bar, you know, that goes across by the  
19 roof. That was the easiest way. That way it keeps it  
20 nice and high so you get more illumination.

21 Q. I think Mr Nunan yesterday described when he came down  
22 with some additional lighting, or at least his crew did,  
23 that there was a light hanging from the ceiling.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. So that would accord with your recollection.



1 A. Yes.

2 Q. By the time it got to the stage of evacuating stretchers  
3 and casualties, how many firefighters were in the  
4 carriage, in the bombed carriage, at that stage? Were  
5 there quite a few?

6 A. In the actual bombed carriage, there was literally just  
7 enough that had been asked through by the paramedics, so  
8 it would be two, maybe three, to a stretcher. I can't  
9 remember how many there was at any one time. It  
10 wouldn't have been a huge amount.

11 Q. Did you remain actually in the carriage?

12 A. I remained right -- yes, right at the end of the  
13 carriage so I could basically control people coming in  
14 and out through that entrance.

15 Q. Were there other firefighters in the first carriage, or  
16 is this just the bombed carriage?

17 A. This is just the bombed carriage. There were -- other  
18 firefighters were in the carriages leading up to the  
19 bombed carriage ready to come in when needed.

20 Q. Were you aware of Station Officer Emburey at the end of  
21 the train, who was coordinating, or were you in the  
22 carriage and, therefore, not aware of what was going on  
23 outside?

24 A. I wasn't aware. I was in the carriage and there wasn't  
25 a lot I could see from there, really.

1 Q. You were asked by Mr Keith how long you thought that  
2 whole process took.  
3 A. Yes.  
4 Q. You thought it took about an hour. In fact, there is  
5 evidence to suggest that the last casualty was removed  
6 at about 10.26.  
7 A. Okay.  
8 Q. Finally, did you ask any firefighters to check under the  
9 train?  
10 A. Yes, I did. Firefighter Gilson from Kensington.  
11 MS BOYD: Thank you very much.  
12 A. Thank you.  
13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Loft?  
14 Thank you very much, Mr Loft, and thank you for all  
15 that you and your colleagues did to evacuate the  
16 seriously injured.  
17 A. Thank you, ma'am.  
18 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call David Emburey?  
19 MR DAVID EMBUREY (sworn)  
20 Questions by MR KEITH  
21 MR KEITH: Good morning.  
22 A. Good morning.  
23 Q. Could you give the court your full name, please?  
24 A. It's David Emburey.  
25 Q. Mr Emburey, what rank were you in July 2005?

1 A. I was a station officer.

2 Q. A station officer. Were you assigned to a pump ladder  
3 appliance A, Alpha, 211?

4 A. Yes, that's correct.

5 Q. At Paddington?

6 A. That's it.

7 Q. Your statement describes in general terms how you went  
8 to Edgware Road around about 9.45, quarter to 10. But  
9 I've seen a reference to your call sign, Alpha 211, as  
10 attending Praed Street. Were you on that appliance?

11 A. No, I wasn't. I come on duty at 9.00, and that call was  
12 responded by the red watch, which was the watch I took  
13 over from.

14 Q. So might the same call sign, A211, be applied,  
15 therefore, to two different appliances, one from each  
16 watch?

17 A. No. There's only one appliance, which is the pump  
18 ladder at Paddington, which is A211.

19 Q. Could we have a look, please, at LFB7, page 1 [LFB7-1]?  
20 If you can enlarge the middle of the page, please,  
21 you'll see there there is a call sign A211,  
22 Sub-Officer Andrew McKay.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. But he wasn't in fact on your appliance when you went to  
25 Edgware Road?

1 A. No, he was the officer in charge of the red watch, and  
2 I come on duty at 9.00 in charge of the blue watch.  
3 Q. Right. Further down the page, right down towards the  
4 bottom -- I think maybe you'll have to go over the page [LFB7-2],  
5 then, yes, that's the last line -- there's  
6 a mobilisation call to A211 to Praed Street. We can see  
7 A211 at the top of the page, around about 9.00.  
8 If you go one page further on [LFB7-3], please, the summary  
9 of the movements for A211, you'll see mobilised 09.14,  
10 A211, mobile 09.01, arrived 09.04, and that's at  
11 Praed Street.  
12 You went to Edgware Road at quarter to 10 with A211.  
13 A. Right. So that was a separate call attended by the red  
14 watch, with a different officer in charge, on the same  
15 day.  
16 Q. That's what I had thought.  
17 A. Yes.  
18 Q. On the same vehicle or not?  
19 A. The same vehicle.  
20 Q. The same vehicle?  
21 A. The same vehicle.  
22 Q. So A211 was called out at 9.00 to go to Praed Street?  
23 A. Yes, just before we come on duty, yes.  
24 Q. Right. Because you said you came on duty at 9.00.  
25 A. Yes.

1 Q. But in fact, when you came on duty, A211 had already  
2 gone out to Praed Street?

3 A. Yes. Obviously, we were on the station prior to 9.00  
4 for a handover procedure so I was aware they'd gone out.

5 Q. So they went off at 9.00, arrived at 09.04 at  
6 Praed Street, but left at 09.34, we can see there.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Then, if we can go to LFB8, page 2, [LFB8-2] A211 -- I think, I'm  
9 sorry, we may have to go back to the previous page [LFB8-1],  
10 09.41.29 for mobile arriving 09.43.

11 So the appliance obviously got back to Paddington --

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. -- just before you were mobilised. There was a very  
14 quick turn-around, and you were off again?

15 A. It was immediate.

16 Q. Immediate?

17 A. Two fire engines returned, which was our pump, which is  
18 Alpha 212 was on a separate call, and Alpha 211 returned  
19 both simultaneously. We only had enough officers on  
20 duty to ride one appliance on that day, so we rode  
21 Alpha 211, that's the primary appliance, the ride with  
22 rescue equipment. So as they came back, we put our fire  
23 gear on it and we was immediately mobilised.

24 Q. Do you happen to know whether your mobilisation was  
25 delayed because your colleagues were awaiting the return

1 of Alpha 211 from Praed Street, or whether or not the  
2 mobilisation just happened to have occurred at 09.37  
3 around about the time that the appliance was returning  
4 from Praed Street?

5 A. All I'm aware of is the time of call I received was  
6 09.41, when it returned, and I put my -- that's all  
7 I can refer to.

8 Q. All right. When you arrived at Edgware Road at 09.43,  
9 were you immediately aware that ADO Davies was present  
10 already?

11 A. Yes, I met him at the -- just near the entrance hall.

12 Q. Did you speak to him and find out what was going on?

13 A. I did, I did.

14 Q. What were you asked to do? Were there a number of  
15 priorities that were set for you?

16 A. What I did is I reported to him with my crew, which is  
17 our procedure. I asked him what he wanted to us do and  
18 he said that crews were making an initial assessment of  
19 the carriage, to wait where we were, and then we would  
20 respond to whatever their request was.

21 Q. Do you recall whether Sub-Officer Loft and his appliance  
22 272 was there, or do you know whether he'd gone down?

23 A. I never spoke to Sub-Officer Loft.

24 Q. Did you see him?

25 A. When I turned up, all I was aware of seeing was one fire

1 engine, but I did speak to the person doing the  
2 assessment -- or I didn't speak to, I heard over the  
3 radio, was a Station Officer Cunningham. Sorry,  
4 Assistant Divisional Officer Cunningham he was at that  
5 time.

6 Q. How long do you think you waited at station level for  
7 the outcome of the assessment being carried out on the  
8 train?

9 A. Only a couple of minutes.

10 Q. Then did you go down?

11 A. Yes, what we did, within that time, while we were  
12 waiting, I got some of my crew to start assembling first  
13 aid equipment and some basic rescue equipment in case it  
14 was required.

15 Q. Is that because you'd received information or that was  
16 a precautionary measure?

17 A. It was obvious -- we'd seen some of the casualties, it  
18 was obvious what we'd be doing.

19 Q. Then whom did you go down to the track with?

20 A. I went down with my crew, so that was my pump ladder's  
21 crew, initially to platform level.

22 Q. Then where?

23 A. Then I went to -- my crew was split, some went on to the  
24 affected carriage. So we had a sub-officer who'd gone  
25 forward, I was delayed actually talking to the

1 sub-officer from one of the rescue units, so I was on  
2 the platform disseminating some information with him.  
3 A couple of the crew went onto the platform with my  
4 sub-officer, so that is our procedures, he goes forward  
5 and with just a briefing to, "See what equipment you  
6 need or what you want from us and you let me know".

7 Q. Do you recall steps being taken by other firefighters  
8 around you to set up lighting?

9 A. Yes, I can recall that.

10 Q. What were they doing, do you remember?

11 A. I can remember generators being set up and cabling being  
12 run through.

13 Q. From the platform to the tunnel?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. By the time you arrived, which couldn't have been, of  
16 course, before quarter to 10, because you only arrived  
17 at 09.43, was there lighting set up or not?

18 A. No.

19 Q. So having carried out that further conversation on the  
20 platform with another of your colleagues, did you then  
21 go forward yourself to the train?

22 A. I did. Initially to the rear of the bombed train. At  
23 that time, they were actually starting to bring  
24 casualties out of that train.

25 Q. On stretchers?



1 A. On stretchers or being assisted out.

2 Q. But did you then go through the train towards the bombed  
3 carriage to see what help --

4 A. Later on, I did. Not for quite a while.

5 Q. How long after?

6 A. 20, 30 minutes.

7 Q. Oh, I see. So not until quite a long time after?

8 A. What was established quite early on was that no further  
9 Fire Brigade personnel were required in there. There  
10 was enough people, and what the plan was, to set up  
11 a holding area along the track between the platform and  
12 the track, the Fire Brigade personnel, so that, when  
13 somebody was removed to the rear of the train and  
14 brought down, we had crews in place, four at a time, to  
15 actually stretch them up to street level.

16 Q. So you were in charge of that part of the operation?

17 A. That part of the operation, yes.

18 Q. To get them from the rear of the train when they were  
19 being brought out up to street level?

20 A. To street level.

21 Q. To street level. Did you have enough firefighters with  
22 you to carry out that task?

23 A. We did, yes.

24 Q. Were they brought out one by one with a gap between each  
25 one, or in a rush of --

1 A. Sometimes two would appear at the same time. Sometimes  
2 singly. What was done was I liaised with my  
3 sub-officer, which was Sub-Officer Manning, and he would  
4 say, "We've got one more person come in". The crews  
5 were being placed, they would know exactly who was the  
6 next crew to take the person, so we would say to them,  
7 "One more person is coming down, you're the next crew",  
8 so that they were immediately in place. So that was the  
9 system we had running.

10 Q. I understand. How long after the system commenced do  
11 you recollect lighting being established in the tunnel?

12 A. I can remember it going on for some time, but I couldn't  
13 put a definite time on it.

14 Q. But it wasn't on, certainly when you arrived, and for  
15 perhaps quite a few minutes after that, it took some  
16 time to get the lighting up and running?

17 A. Yes, I can remember crews still dealing with it and  
18 Sub-Officer Manning still asking me saying that the  
19 lighting still wasn't on and was in progress.

20 Q. That was obviously important, because lighting was  
21 needed, not only for the purposes of treating the  
22 casualties in the carriage, but also helping --

23 A. Safety, safety as well.

24 Q. -- the firefighters carrying stretchers out?

25 A. And for our safety as well.

1 Q. I want to ask you, please, about a lady who was lying on  
2 the track, as we've heard from other evidence, at the  
3 front of the eastbound train. Your statement records  
4 that either yourself or other firefighters covered her  
5 over.

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. Was that yourself or one of your colleagues?

8 A. It was one of my colleagues. I instructed him to do  
9 that.

10 Q. Do you recall, please, what was used to cover her over?

11 A. I believe it was a blue salvage sheet, which is a sheet  
12 we have on our fire engines. I can't recall exactly.

13 Q. Did you instruct that to be done?

14 A. I did, yes.

15 Q. No doubt you did that soon after your arrival on the  
16 track at the front of the train?

17 A. Fairly soon after.

18 Q. Did you stay there in the vicinity of the front of the  
19 eastbound train, the rear of the westbound train, until  
20 all the casualties were out?

21 A. What happened was, initially, we were at the rear of the  
22 bombed train. One of the firefighters -- I can't  
23 remember what station he was from -- used to work on the  
24 Underground, and he had worked out that we could open  
25 two sets of doors that're level to each other and bring

1 the casualties from the bombed train to the unaffected  
2 train and it would be an easier route to remove them.  
3 So we actually moved our personnel to the rear of  
4 the unaffected train to speed the operation up.  
5 Q. So the front of the unaffected train?  
6 A. The rear -- would it be the front?  
7 Q. The Edgware Road end?  
8 A. Yes.  
9 Q. So they were brought out across the double doors, into  
10 the eastbound train, down the eastbound train --  
11 A. That's it.  
12 Q. -- towards Edgware Road?  
13 A. Yes.  
14 Q. Did there come a time when you became aware that all the  
15 casualties had been stretchered out and, therefore, it  
16 was time to go through the train to the bombed carriage  
17 and check that everybody was indeed out?  
18 A. That's correct.  
19 Q. Did you go all the way through the westbound bombed  
20 train?  
21 A. No, I didn't, no. I got to a point where I liaised with  
22 Sub-Officer Manning and Leading Firefighter Tuhill, who  
23 was from my crew, and a police officer, and really just  
24 went through that we'd done a systematic check, that  
25 we'd checked the sides, above and below the train.

1 There was also concern that someone might have got  
2 off the train and gone forward into the tunnel, that  
3 we'd checked that. Liaised with the police that we were  
4 all happy that we'd done a systematic check and, really,  
5 the advice was that this was a crime scene and that  
6 there was no reason for anyone else to enter into here,  
7 and the London Fire Brigade could withdraw.

8 Q. We've heard some evidence to suggest that then police  
9 officers were then stationed at each end of the two  
10 trains to establish that it was a crime scene and no one  
11 else was then allowed back on.

12 A. Yes, I remember one -- I can remember one being there.

13 Q. Do you recollect what time, roughly, you then emerged  
14 back at street level?

15 A. Where, sorry?

16 Q. What time did you get back to street level?

17 A. Well, I've obviously heard the evidence this morning.  
18 I would -- if you hadn't asked me before I'd heard it,  
19 I would say I was down there for about an hour. It  
20 seemed about an hour.

21 Q. From about quarter to 10 until about quarter to 11?

22 A. Yes.

23 MR KEITH: Thank you, Officer. Will you stay there? There  
24 may be some further questions for you.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

1 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

2 MS GALLAGHER: Mr Emburey, you made a statement to the  
3 police on 15 December 2005, but in making that statement  
4 did you rely on notes you'd made closer to the time?

5 A. I made notes really for a debrief that we did amongst  
6 our own personnel, they were the notes I would have  
7 used.

8 Q. These were the notes you prepared on 17 July 2005?

9 A. I probably would have prepared them immediately after,  
10 within a day or two of the incident.

11 Q. In your statement, you say you used your earlier notes  
12 as an aide-memoire.

13 A. Sorry?

14 Q. In your statement, you say you used your earlier notes  
15 as an aide-memoire to help you when you were making your  
16 statement to the police in December 2005.

17 A. I can't recall what I did with my notes, if that's what  
18 I said, then ...

19 Q. No problem. There's just one matter I wanted to  
20 address. You've been asked quite a number of questions  
21 about lighting, and you've said, understandably, that  
22 you couldn't say when the lighting came on, although you  
23 know it took some time, and it's certain from what  
24 you've said that it wasn't on when you begin to see the  
25 stretchered casualties being removed.

1 In your statement, you describe going to the bombed  
2 carriage after you're informed that there were no other  
3 living persons left. Is that right?

4 A. Yes, that's correct.

5 Q. So when you've said today you didn't go into the bombed  
6 carriage for 20 or 30 minutes -- the reference my Lady  
7 was page 33, line 7 -- so until 20 or 30 minutes later  
8 after the casualties begin coming out, that's when you  
9 go in, 20-30 minutes later after you're told there are  
10 no other living persons left?

11 A. No, it was at the end of -- I'm a little bit confused  
12 with your question there. It was at the end of  
13 operations, when we were told that all the casualties  
14 were out, that was when I went there.

15 Q. So how much later is it that you go into the bombed  
16 carriage?

17 A. Well, at the end of the operations, so --

18 Q. Much later? The reason I'm asking, Mr Emburey, is that  
19 in your witness statement you say that, when you go to  
20 the blast carriage, it was all black and unlit, only  
21 slightly illuminated, and I'm just wondering why you say  
22 that, when the impression you get from your statement is  
23 that you've only gone to the carriage at that very late  
24 stage.

25 A. If that's the impression I had at the time, of it not

1 being that well-illuminated, that's all I can refer to.

2 Q. So you can't say, when you went into the blast carriage,  
3 whether the lighting was on -- the emergency lighting  
4 was on or not?

5 A. No, even if there was some lighting in there, you're  
6 working in an area which is in an enclosed tunnel, so it  
7 would appear to be dark anyway.

8 Q. So there's only so much the emergency lighting can do?

9 A. Yes.

10 MS GALLAGHER: That's fine, Mr Emburey. I have no further  
11 questions, thank you.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

13 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

14 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Emburey, I'm not going to ask you anything  
15 about lighting, but I want to deal with one matter.

16 Mr Keith has already asked you about it. It's the young  
17 lady we know as Jenny Nicholson, who was outside of the  
18 carriage on the track, and he asked you questions about  
19 one of your colleagues who, in fact, under your  
20 direction, obtained a sheet.

21 I think that, in fact, was Firefighter Cam. You may  
22 not recall that --

23 A. I don't know Firefighter Cam.

24 Q. -- but I've seen his and, for my Lady's note, it is  
25 INQ8096 is Mr Cam's statement.



1 I think what he also did was obtain an umbrella  
2 which was also placed over Jenny Nicholson to avoid  
3 anybody inadvertently stepping on to her.  
4 May I thank you and Mr Cam for those efforts that  
5 were made on the family's behalf? Thank you very much.  
6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Saunders. Ms Boyd?  
7 Questions by MS BOYD  
8 MS BOYD: Just one question. In terms of communication,  
9 you've explained how you positioned yourself at the end  
10 of the carriage or, sorry, the end of the train,  
11 I should say, and others were in the carriage and  
12 stretchers were then being evacuated.  
13 Was there a good communication between you and your  
14 sub-officer in the carriage and how did that take place?  
15 A. The radios were working. Obviously, we are aware of  
16 problems we can encounter of working with radios and we  
17 were working on channel 1, which is our normal fire  
18 ground radio and it was working.  
19 Q. So you were able to communicate --  
20 A. We were able to communicate via radio.  
21 MS BOYD: Thank you.  
22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions?  
23 Thank you very much, Mr Emburey, and thank you for  
24 all did you that day.  
25 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call Nathan Sinden,

1 please?

2 MR NATHAN KEITH SINDEN (sworn)

3 Questions by MR KEITH

4 MR KEITH: Could you give the court your full name, please?

5 A. Yes, Nathan Keith Sinden.

6 Q. Mr Sinden, on 7 July 2005, you commenced your shift at

7 9.00 at Paddington fire station, did you not?

8 A. That's correct, yes.

9 Q. I think on that day you were assigned to Alpha 212,

10 a pump appliance?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. Was there a difficulty, in that you had no driver?

13 A. I believe so, yes, on the day.

14 Q. Were you waiting, therefore, for another firefighter to

15 attend from another station to make up the numbers?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. You may have been in the station, therefore, when other

18 appliances started to leave, just after 9.00, to go to,

19 first, Praed Street and then Edgware Road. Do you

20 recollect that?

21 A. Yes, that's correct, yes.

22 Q. Could we have on the screen, please, [LFB8-2]? You were

23 A212. If you go down one there to 09.34.50, A212, did

24 there come a time about 9.30 -- we can see there

25 09.34 -- when A212 was called to attend or not?

1 A. I can't remember, no.

2 Q. You can't remember that?

3 A. No.

4 Q. According to your statement, about 10.00 you received  
5 a phone call asking whether you had enough officers to  
6 man another appliance.

7 A. That's correct, yes.

8 Q. What was the other appliance?

9 A. It was Alpha 21 Hotel and it was a casualty handling  
10 unit, basically.

11 Q. What is a casualty handling unit?

12 A. It had collapsible stretchers and collapsible  
13 wheelchairs on it.

14 Q. If we go back up the page, please, on that exhibit, we  
15 can see A21H, which is the casualty handling unit, and  
16 we can see there that there was a mobilisation at 10.08  
17 and a mobile, that's to say you actually departed, at  
18 10.41.48.

19 Does that time seem right to you or not?

20 A. Not really, no. If it says it on the screen, then it  
21 must be right, but I mean, I remember leaving at about  
22 8 minutes past 10, roughly.

23 Q. All right. You weren't very far away from Edgware Road  
24 because you were at Paddington fire station.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. So do we take it it was a fairly short journey?

2 A. Yes, a couple of minutes down the road.

3 Q. When you arrived, did you go and speak to one of your  
4 colleagues in order to get instructions as to what was  
5 needed to be done?

6 A. Yes, when we parked up at Edgware Road, the first person  
7 I saw was Sub-Officer Morgan, who was at Kensington at  
8 the time.

9 Q. Will you keep your voice up? I'm sorry, we're finding  
10 it hard to hear.

11 A. He was at Kensington fire station at the time.

12 Q. What did he tell you?

13 A. He just said to me and Nick Hackett, who I was with as  
14 well, he just said, "Just get down there and, you know,  
15 help carry the casualties", so that's what we did.

16 Q. Going back to the casualty handling unit, how many  
17 stretchers, collapsible stretchers, were on it and was  
18 there any other medical equipment on it, or was it just  
19 those stretchers?

20 A. As far as I'm aware, it was only stretchers and  
21 collapsible wheelchairs. I don't recall how many we had  
22 on there. But that's all I recall that had been on  
23 there.

24 Q. So having spoken to that officer, did you then go down  
25 to the track?

1 A. Yes, I went -- we went down, down the steps, to the  
2 platform level, and I think on the way down there  
3 I assisted carrying a stretcher up with firemen and  
4 I believe paramedics or police officers, I can't really  
5 remember.

6 Q. Because they were coming up with a stretcher and  
7 a casualty --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- and they were having difficulty, so you lent a hand  
10 to help them?

11 A. Yes, I just gave a hand and brought it up to street  
12 level and then made my way back down again.

13 Q. Do we presume that you took the extra stretchers down  
14 with you?

15 A. No, at that time, when we pulled up at Edgware Road, me  
16 and Firefighter Hackett got off, we left Adele with the  
17 truck to open up the back of the truck and we let her  
18 know if we needed anything, and then we made our way  
19 down after that, so we didn't take anything from the  
20 casualty handling unit at the time.

21 Q. Do you know whether the stretchers from the unit were,  
22 however, used and brought down by somebody else?

23 A. I don't.

24 Q. You don't know one way or the other?

25 A. I don't know whether anything got used off the truck or

1 not.

2 Q. Did you then take part in helping your colleagues taking  
3 casualties by stretcher off the train?

4 A. I did, yes.

5 Q. Can you help us with how many people you helped in this  
6 way?

7 A. Obviously, the first time I went down and I got probably  
8 halfway down and took the first -- helped with the first  
9 stretcher, which I told you about. The second time  
10 down, I went down and assisted with another one, another  
11 stretcher, and took that person up with other firemen up  
12 to street level, and then straight back down and then  
13 another stretcher which then got put off on to, like,  
14 a trolley.

15 Q. It's a trolley that sits on the rails --

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. -- and is pumped along the track?

18 A. I don't remember it being pumped. I just remember it  
19 being on the rails and it made it a lot -- you know, for  
20 that one, just to slide it up the track and then again  
21 up to street level.

22 MR KEITH: My Lady, I have a faint recollection that  
23 Mr Tulloch was brought out on a trolley, but I may be  
24 mistaken.

25 Then having helped with that casualty, did you then

1 go back into the carriage?

2 A. Yes, I then went back. All the times that I went down  
3 to the carriage, I never -- at this point, I never  
4 actually went into any of the carriages. You know, as  
5 the other witnesses have said, they came out the back or  
6 the front as you said of the -- I think the unaffected  
7 carriage, and then, at that point, after the last  
8 casualty that I had taken was taken out, that's when  
9 I went back into the unaffected carriage.

10 Q. There was a pause, no stretchers were being brought out  
11 so you went into the train itself, in order to see  
12 whether you could help?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Did you go all the way down to the second, the bombed  
15 carriage?

16 A. I did, yes.

17 Q. The reason that I'm asking you about this is that your  
18 statement records that in the second carriage when you  
19 entered, you saw the body of a man lying on the carriage  
20 floor and you noted that he had bleached blond hair.

21 Can we have please on the screen INQ10282 [INQ10282-9]? This is the  
22 second carriage. You would have come in from the  
23 right-hand side, where the third carriage was, from the  
24 rear of the -- from the westbound train, and the  
25 explosion occurred at the point where the red X is

1 situated.

2 Can you help us where you think the body of the man  
3 with the blond hair lay when you saw him?

4 A. Just with relation to this picture, where would the  
5 Edgware Road end have been? On the right or the left?

6 Q. Edgware Road is to the right. The tunnel wall is on the  
7 bottom. The other track, with the eastbound train, is  
8 on the top of the map.

9 A. Right.

10 Q. So imagine the other rail is on the upper side of this  
11 diagram.

12 A. Yes, so the unaffected train would have been above.

13 Q. Yes, above, and the large hole caused by the explosion  
14 is where the red cross is.

15 A. Yes. I believe, because I can't remember, I can't  
16 completely remember, what door I was looking in through  
17 there, so I wouldn't know what part of the train. But  
18 I remember the person with the blond -- the victim with  
19 the blond hair was on my right-hand side when I looked  
20 in through the double doors.

21 Q. Did you look in through the double doors from the tunnel  
22 wall side or from the other train?

23 A. From the other train.

24 Q. From the other train. Do you recall any other bodies  
25 lying on the floor in the near vicinity of the young man



1 with blond hair?

2 A. I remember a casualty with the blond hair on the right.

3 I remember, I think, on the left-hand side, there was  
4 a lady with curly brown hair on the left-hand side, and  
5 I remember seeing someone who had been dismembered, her  
6 head -- well, didn't have a head as well, on the far  
7 side as well.

8 Q. When you say as well, next to the man or the woman?

9 A. I can't remember, but I just remember seeing someone  
10 without a head, obviously.

11 Q. All right. When you went to the carriage, it can only  
12 have been because all the casualties had been removed by  
13 that stage, because that's why you went in.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. So may we take it that the carriage was emptying by this  
16 stage, the firefighters and the paramedics were  
17 withdrawing from it?

18 A. Yes, yes.

19 Q. Did you go through the carriage and the adjacent  
20 carriages and check that everybody was out who needed to  
21 be brought out?

22 A. By the time I got up to the carriage, the adjacent  
23 carriage and looked in -- literally, it was probably  
24 seconds -- I had a look around and then I heard someone  
25 say, "Everyone's out, make your way out". So I made my

1 way out.

2 Q. Do you recall that there were police officers at the end  
3 of the trains --

4 A. I don't.

5 Q. -- checking everybody was coming out and saying, "You  
6 can't go back in"?

7 A. I can't remember. To be honest, on the way out it was  
8 a bit of a blur. I don't really remember seeing --  
9 there were people there, but I don't remember whether  
10 they were firemen or police or ambulance. I can't  
11 remember, and I just remember making my way up to street  
12 level.

13 Q. Finally, may I ask you this? Whilst you were located at  
14 the rear of the bombed train helping with the casualties  
15 as they were being brought out of the westbound train --  
16 the eastbound train, do you recall any calls for further  
17 equipment? Was there any suggestion that there was  
18 a shortage of medical equipment?

19 A. No.

20 Q. Do you remember paramedics going back and forth from the  
21 train to the platform and back again or not?

22 A. I don't. I remember seeing paramedics on the back of  
23 the -- or the front, however way you look at it, of the  
24 unaffected train. I remember seeing paramedics around,  
25 but I don't remember seeing paramedics up and down,

1 basically. I just remember seeing firemen.

2 MR KEITH: Thank you, Mr Sinden. Will you wait there?

3 There may be some further questions for you.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

5 MS GALLAGHER: My Lady, my solicitor is just taking

6 instructions on a brief matter. It should just take

7 a moment.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Of course.

9 MS GALLAGHER: Thank you.

10 MR SAUNDERS: Would it help, my Lady, if I went, because

11 I have some discrete matters, and there's no rush then

12 on Ms Gallagher?

13 MS GALLAGHER: I'm certainly happy with that.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Very well, thank you.

15 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

16 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Sinden, I'd like to ask you some more

17 questions about this emergency lorry. All right?

18 Mr Keith has already asked you how many stretchers

19 you believed it had on it, and you were unable to help,

20 but give us some idea. Is it going to have a dozen on

21 it or many more?

22 A. I couldn't give you a figure, to be honest with you.

23 I don't know. It's not a machine that is permanently on

24 the station or anything. I think it had maybe come to

25 us maybe two or three months beforehand.

1 Q. So it was based at your station?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. How many more of these types of vehicles are there in  
4 London?

5 A. I'm not too sure.

6 Q. We'll ask Mr Davies, shall we?

7 A. I'm not too sure, I don't know.

8 Q. The purpose of this machine, clearly it has on it  
9 stretchers and collapsible wheelchairs. Presumably it's  
10 for an incident such as this?

11 A. If they needed to be used, yes.

12 Q. Where there's a large number of casualties and it's  
13 a vehicle that can be taken for use by the emergency  
14 services?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. But do we understand that, because of the delay, as it  
17 were, in getting there, nothing from this vehicle was  
18 ever used?

19 A. I don't know whether it was used or not. Like I said  
20 before, I don't know whether anything was used off of  
21 the truck or not. It may have been. I don't know. But  
22 when I got down there, there seemed to be enough  
23 stretchers and the casualties were coming out, so  
24 I don't know whether anything was used or not.

25 Q. You've come from the same station as Mr Emburey we've

1 just heard.

2 A. That's correct, yes.

3 Q. He's obviously the senior officer. Who was the officer  
4 who was actually in charge of this vehicle that you were  
5 on, Alpha 21 Hotel?

6 A. Crew Manager Phemister.

7 MR SAUNDERS: Thank you very much, my Lady.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

9 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

10 MS GALLAGHER: Mr Sinden, I'm not going to ask you any more  
11 questions about the body that you've described seeing in  
12 the carriage, but there is just one issue which touches  
13 on it that I need to ask you.

14 Your statement was made on 24 November 2005, but we  
15 know that you made notes at an earlier stage. You made  
16 a report on 13 July 2005. You don't make any reference  
17 in that report to the body that you describe seeing in  
18 the statement.

19 So in the statement, were you giving the details  
20 from your memory in November 2005, or did you have any  
21 notes you've made closer to the time to assist?

22 A. I think I was using it from memory. I did make some  
23 notes, but I think I used it from memory as well.

24 Q. In your statement, you describe other appliances leaving  
25 the station to attend Edgware Road, and you've described

1 that today. You say in your statement:

2 "We were aware that they were attending a major  
3 incident."

4 You describe being aware of that from about 9.20 am.

5 Is that right?

6 A. I believe so, yes.

7 Q. You also then say, Mr Sinden, that while you were  
8 waiting, after the other appliances have left but while  
9 you're still in the station, that you put the news on  
10 the TV, you were watching the coverage, and it was  
11 reported that it was a suspected terrorist attack.

12 So is that the first you'd heard that it might be  
13 a suspected terrorist attack, from the coverage you saw  
14 on TV?

15 A. I don't know, I don't know whether that was the TV that  
16 I heard it was, or whether I had heard it through the  
17 radio, or through the Brigade radio, I'm not too sure,  
18 I can't --

19 Q. But it may have been through the media rather than  
20 through official channels?

21 A. It may have been, I don't know. I may have heard it  
22 through official channels and then, after, the media,  
23 but I can't remember on the day.

24 MS GALLAGHER: I've nothing further, Mr Sinden, thank you  
25 very much.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Boyd? Any other questions? Those  
2 are all the questions for you, Mr Sinden. Thank you  
3 very much, and I'm sorry I had to ask you to relive what  
4 you saw that day and thank you for the help that you  
5 gave.

6 A. Thank you.

7 MR KEITH: My Lady, I have four statements to read, and  
8 because we anticipated this morning would go short,  
9 Mr Wilson, who is the forensic scene examiner for  
10 Edgware Road, is available to be called this morning but  
11 wishes to have a few moments to speak to his counsel.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly.

13 MR KEITH: So I'm in my Lady's hands now. I can read out  
14 the four now, then invite to you take a short break so  
15 that that can take place.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Let's do it that way.

17 MR KEITH: The first statement is that of David Wise dated  
18 2 December 2009.

19 Statement of DR DAVID WISE read

20 "I am Dr David Wise, a registered medical  
21 practitioner ..."

22 Then he lists his qualifications:

23 "I am currently employed as a consultant in accident  
24 and emergency medicine at the Royal London Hospital.

25 I have been asked to prepare a report of the Helicopter

1 Emergency Medical Service (HEMS) response to an  
2 explosion on a Tube train close to Edgware Road station  
3 on 7 July 2005.

4 "HEMS were tasked at 10.05 by Central Ambulance  
5 Control to a major incident, declared by the London Fire  
6 Brigade, at Edgware Road Tube station. HEMS responded  
7 by helicopter from the Royal London Hospital. The HEMS  
8 team consisted of myself, Dr Sabeena Qureshi, paramedic  
9 Lee Parker and paramedic Clare Tinker. On arrival at  
10 the surface of Edgware Road Tube station at 10.15, the  
11 HEMS team were requested by the Bronze ambulance officer  
12 to split into two teams, one to triage patients already  
13 removed from the scene who were now in a nearby hotel,  
14 and one to attend the scene.

15 "Dr Qureshi and Paramedic Parker went to the hotel  
16 to triage, whilst myself and Paramedic Tinker attended  
17 the scene. We arrived on platform 4 at 10.24, having  
18 collected a radio from the surface-based AIO [I think  
19 that is the acronym for assistant incident officer].  
20 I assumed the role of Silver doctor. After discussion  
21 with the line controller by telephone and the FIO  
22 regarding safety, the HEMS team approached the scene  
23 which consisted of one Tube train approximately  
24 100 metres from the platform in a tunnel.

25 "The train had apparently suffered an explosion in



1 or under the third carriage from the Edgware Road  
2 platform 4 end. On the track alongside was another Tube  
3 train.

4 "London Ambulance Service and London Fire Brigade  
5 reported there were seven fatalities in the exploded  
6 train and two fatalities outside the exploded train.  
7 All other passengers had been extricated by London  
8 Ambulance Service and London Fire Brigade prior to the  
9 arrival of the HEMS team.

10 "I pronounced life extinct on one adult female at  
11 10.30. Her body was on the track between the two  
12 trains. At 10.36, at the request of the  
13 Metropolitan Police and the London Fire Brigade, the  
14 HEMS team then retreated to the platform while the scene  
15 was searched with the aid of sniffer dogs for other  
16 explosive devices. The HEMS team then waited on the  
17 platform for the arrival of the MAIAT team [the  
18 multi-agency assessment team] to perform a CBRN  
19 assessment [chemical, biological, radiological and  
20 nuclear assessment]. The MAIAT team arrived at 11.30.  
21 The HEMS team departed the platform at 11.52 prior to  
22 getting the all clear from the MAIAT team because we had  
23 been retasked by Central Ambulance Control to  
24 Tavistock Square.

25 "Prior to departing the scene, we asked the incident

1 officer to request London Ambulance Service personnel to  
2 return to the scene once given the all clear by the  
3 MAIAT team to recheck any other casualties that may have  
4 been ejected from the carriage. The HEMS team travelled  
5 by road to Tavistock Square, but found on our arrival at  
6 12.00 the scene had been cleared and we were not  
7 required. We therefore returned by road to the  
8 Royal London Hospital."

9 The next statement is that of Keith Roy, a short  
10 statement dated 7 July 2005.

11 Statement of MR KEITH ROY read

12 "I am an explosives officer employed by the  
13 Metropolitan Police and have over 16 years' experience  
14 in the field of explosives and ammunitions. At  
15 approximately 9.43 on 7 July I was tasked to  
16 Edgware Road London Underground station to investigate  
17 an explosion that had occurred on a carriage of a Tube  
18 train.

19 "On my arrival, I was fully briefed by the  
20 Gold Commander at the scene, Superintendent Gomm, who  
21 informed me of the events that had taken place.

22 "During the course of Explosive Ordnance Disposal  
23 actions, I identified the seat of an explosion in the  
24 second carriage of the Tube when looking front to rear.

25 The extent of the damage was consistent with the

1 functioning of approximately one to four kilograms of  
2 high explosive. I checked the train, immediate area and  
3 the rail track from the platform to the train for  
4 further improvised explosive devices. After ensuring  
5 the explosive safety of the area, I handed over the  
6 scene to the attending S013 anti-terrorist exhibits  
7 officer at approximately 11.40."

8 My Lady, the next statement is that of  
9 Timothy Clayton, a forensic scientist dated  
10 20 July 2005.

11 Statement of MR TIMOTHY CLAYTON read

12 "I am a senior forensic scientist employed by the  
13 Home Office Forensic Science Service based at the  
14 Wetherby Laboratory. I am a registered forensic  
15 practitioner and have been a forensic scientist since  
16 1990. I specialise in forensic biology. I have  
17 participated in the research, development and validation  
18 of DNA profiling techniques currently in use by the  
19 Forensic Science Service and have been involved in the  
20 implementation of these systems for use in forensic  
21 casework and the National DNA Crime Intelligence  
22 Database in England and Wales.

23 "I have conducted many examinations of the type  
24 detailed in this statement and have provided evidence  
25 for the Court of Appeal, Crown Courts, Magistrates'

1 Courts, Coroners' Courts and courts outside the British  
2 jurisdiction. I am the co-author of several scientific  
3 publications on the subject of DNA profiling.  
4 "From information received with this case,  
5 I understand that it is alleged that the unidentified  
6 muscle sample RW58 is from Mohammed Sidique Khan."  
7 My Lady, muscle sample RW58, as we'll see in  
8 a moment from another statement, is a sample of muscle  
9 taken from an exhibit MW84. MW84 is an exhibit  
10 exhibited by Mr Wilson, from whom we'll hear in  
11 a moment, and it comprises human remains taken from the  
12 Edgware Road tunnel identified by the number 60021456.  
13 "I understand that Tika Khan and Mamida Begum are  
14 the biological parents of Mohammed Sidique Khan and that  
15 all three are of Asian descent ...  
16 "Purpose of examination:  
17 "The above items have been analysed by DNA profiling  
18 to determine whether or not there is any scientific  
19 support for the assertion that the muscle sample RW58 is  
20 from a biological son of both Tika Khan and  
21 Mamida Begum.  
22 "The DNA profiles of Tika Khan and Mamida Begum have  
23 been established under their respective reference  
24 samples under the instruction of my colleague Mr Chapman  
25 of the Forensic Science Laboratory, London. I have been

1 supplied with copies of these profiles together with  
2 a profile obtained from the muscle sample.  
3 "DNA profiling reveals bands, half of which a child  
4 inherits from its biological mother and half of which it  
5 inherits from its biological father. In this case, all  
6 of the bands present in the profile from the muscle  
7 sample RW58 are represented in the combined profiles of  
8 Tika Khan and Mamida Begum. This is what I would expect  
9 to find if the unidentified sample was from a biological  
10 son of theirs.  
11 "In carrying out a statistical evaluation of these  
12 results, I have considered the following alternative  
13 propositions for the results obtained. Either the  
14 unidentified muscle sample RW58 originated from  
15 a biological son of Tika Khan and Mamida Begum or the  
16 unidentified muscle sample is from an unknown Asian man  
17 who is unrelated to them. Using data available for the  
18 Asian population in the United Kingdom, a figure has  
19 been calculated called a likelihood ratio. This is  
20 a numeric evaluation of the strength of the DNA  
21 evidence. In this case, the figure is 170 million.  
22 That is, the results showed that the DNA profile  
23 obtained from the muscle sample RW58 is approximately  
24 170 million times more likely to have originated from  
25 a biological son of Tika Khan and Mamida Begum rather

1 than an unknown Asian male unrelated to them.

2 "It should be stressed the above statistical  
3 evaluation does not take into account any possibility  
4 that the unidentified muscle sample originated from  
5 another close male relative of them.

6 "In my opinion, the results detailed above provide  
7 extremely strong support for the view that the  
8 unidentified muscle sample originated from a biological  
9 son of Tika Khan and Mamida Begum."

10 My Lady, in accordance with the usual practice, he  
11 then lists the levels of certainty from limited  
12 support -- from no support to extremely strong support,  
13 so the conclusion that he reaches is the highest order  
14 of certainty in that list.

15 My Lady, I now turn to the report from a consultant  
16 forensic pathologist, Dr Djurovic, on the post-mortem  
17 examination of the remains identified as being those of  
18 Mohammed Sidique Khan.

19 My Lady, parts of the statement are extremely  
20 delicate in the way in which they refer to the remains  
21 and I therefore don't intend to read out the entirety of  
22 the statement, but to paraphrase where appropriate.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

24 MR KEITH: It reads:

25

1 Statement of DR VESNA DJUROVIC read  
2 "Post-mortem examination."  
3 The report is dated 4 June 2007 and it relates to  
4 human remains numbered 60021456.  
5 My Lady, those are the human remains exhibited as  
6 MW84 taken from the westbound track by Mr Wilson:  
7 "Date and time of examination: 10 July 2005, 11.25.  
8 The remains were subsequently identified as  
9 Mohammed Khan.  
10 "Place of examination: The London Resilience  
11 Mortuary.  
12 "Pathologist: Dr Djurovic."  
13 Then Dr Djurovic lists the persons present and  
14 states that the post-mortem was carried out under the  
15 authority of the then coroner Dr Paul Knapman.  
16 "Fluoroscopy: fluoroscopy was undertaken at 11.05 on  
17 Monday, 10 July and showed the following:  
18 "What appeared to be a circuit board close to the  
19 lumbar spine.  
20 "Wire fragments at the level of the torso.  
21 "A metal mesh, several studs and a curved fragment  
22 of wire near the top of the torso.  
23 "Metal fragments near the top of the spine.  
24 "Wire and metallic objects, including studs, screws  
25 and a bolt lower down at the level of the torso.

1 "Further metallic objects, including coins, wire and  
2 metal fragments at the top right section of the torso.  
3 "Further fluoroscopy ..."  
4 And I interpose simply to say examination to see  
5 whether or not there is the presence of metallic  
6 objects.  
7 "... was undertaken on 15 July and found a small  
8 metallic fragment in the region of the left shoulder,  
9 a T-shaped metallic fragment below into the right of the  
10 previous item, glass fragments and further small metal  
11 debris.  
12 "External examination:  
13 "Inside the bag marked 60021456 was a further bag  
14 marked MW84 ..."  
15 Which is the exhibit number given formally to the  
16 remains by Mr Wilson.  
17 "... containing severely damaged and fragmented  
18 parts of what appeared to be the body of a young adult  
19 male appearing well built. These consisted of the  
20 following:  
21 "Most of the scalp tissue ... but separated into two  
22 larger fragments. Attached to this part of the scalp  
23 tissue were several large fragments of broken vault of  
24 skull. The other part of the scalp originated from the  
25 back and right side of the head including the right



1 parietal region."  
2 My Lady, the upper right parietal region is the  
3 upper posterior part of the head:  
4 "The lower edge showed marked blackening and  
5 superficial and deep vertical lacerations. There was  
6 parchenting and blackening of the skin on both sides of  
7 the neck. The facial skeleton was absent. There were  
8 multiple fractures on the base of the skull. The upper  
9 segment of the spinal column was present."  
10 She then lists the disruption to the top of the  
11 larynx and the bones in the trachea and the cartilage  
12 thereto:  
13 "Attached were remains of strap muscles ..."  
14 Those are the neck muscles:  
15 "... the manubrium and upper part of the body of the  
16 sternum ..."  
17 The manubrium is the upper part of the sternum bone.  
18 "[Attached also were] carotid arteries ...  
19 "The spine was separated at the level of the upper  
20 thoracic spine."  
21 That's to say the upper back:  
22 "Attached to the back of the neck was a large  
23 fragment of the skin of the back of the torso. There  
24 was a further large fragment of skin, probably part of  
25 the lower part of the back and the upper buttock. There

1 was a separate large fragment of skin. There were  
2 several fragments of soil tissue ... there was a large  
3 section of spinal column with the sacrum [which is  
4 a bone at the bottom of the spine] consisting of the  
5 lumbar and most of the thoracic spine up to the fifth  
6 thoracic vertebra ...

7 "Removed from the body were fragments of newspaper,  
8 metal from the railway, pieces of cardboard, seat  
9 fragments, circuit board, pieces of wire, card, coins  
10 and white metal fragments and miscellaneous debris.  
11 "A re-examination was carried out on 15 July when  
12 further fragments of wire, glass, plastic and fabric  
13 were removed from the body."

14 My Lady, on the next page, page 5, there is then  
15 a list of those fragments removed from the remains of  
16 Mr Khan, including on that page RW58, which is  
17 significant because that is the muscle sample examined  
18 by the previous witness Timothy Clayton. RW58, a piece  
19 of deep muscle for DNA examination from the spinal  
20 column:

21 "Clinicopathological correlation:  
22 "The remains were those of a young adult male  
23 showing severe disruptive injury. Preserved were large  
24 fragments of the skin of the back of the head, neck and  
25 torso, parts of base and vault of skull, some neck

1 structures, a large section of the spinal column with  
2 the sacrum and parts of the intestine. The nature and  
3 extent of damage is consistent with the deceased being  
4 in the immediate proximity of the explosive device.  
5 A more detailed interpretation of the mechanism of  
6 injury may be possible after further body parts are  
7 recovered."

8 Indeed, further examination was carried out, which  
9 will form part of the forensic evidence which my Lady  
10 has directed will be heard in February.

11 My Lady, may I invite you to take a short break  
12 there for Mr Wilson to confer with his lawyers?

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly.

14 (11.20 am)

15 (A short break)

16 (11.35 am)

17 MR KEITH: Would my Lady give me a moment? (Pause)

18 My Lady, in the same way that my Lady directed that  
19 Mr Meneely be called in relation to the Aldgate scene,  
20 Mr Wilson, who's the forensic scene examiner for the  
21 Edgware Road scene, will be called to give evidence in  
22 a moment in relation to the forensic examination of the  
23 scene and very broadly to the situation that confronted  
24 him on arrival, on 7 July, along with his colleagues.  
25 My Lady knows that the issue, although of huge

1 importance to the families, concerning recovery of the  
2 bodies and the aftermath of the explosions, is outside  
3 the scope, proper scope, of these inquests and so  
4 I simply emphasise that point, as I did before, calling  
5 Mr Meneely in relation to the Aldgate scene, I will not  
6 be asking questions about those issues and my learned  
7 friend Ms Gallagher is, of course, well aware of that,  
8 as are those whom she represents.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

10 MR KEITH: Mr Wilson, please.

11 DC MALCOLM WILSON (sworn)

12 Questions by MR KEITH

13 MR KEITH: Could you give the court your full name, please?

14 A. Yes, it's Detective Constable Malcolm Wilson.

15 Q. Mr Wilson, in 2005, you were attached to the  
16 Anti-terrorist Branch at New Scotland Yard, is that  
17 right?

18 A. I was, yes, sir.

19 Q. Was your role that of forensic scene examiner and  
20 exhibits officer?

21 A. Yes, it was.

22 Q. Could you tell us, briefly, what the main functions are  
23 of such a person and, in particular, by contrast to  
24 a bomb scene manager?

25 A. Certainly, sir. The bomb scene manager, if I can start

1 with that person first, is the person in overall  
2 responsibility of the examination of the bomb scene as  
3 a whole, normally remains outside the inner cordon and  
4 acts as a two-way conduit of information from the SIO to  
5 the scene and from myself --

6 Q. SIO?

7 A. Senior investigating officer -- I do apologise -- and  
8 from the scene back out to the senior investigating  
9 officer and other interested parties in relation to  
10 items of interest that are found.

11 Q. Plainly, when you examine a scene and when a scene is  
12 examined, it's of huge importance not only to address  
13 the issues concerning the casualties of a bomb scene,  
14 but also to ensure that, for investigatory purposes,  
15 items of interest that are found are immediately brought  
16 to the attention of those officers who are actually  
17 investigating the crime that is suspected to have taken  
18 place?

19 A. That is very much the case, sir. If you can imagine,  
20 I am the eyes and the ears of the scene investigating  
21 officer. If I don't pass that information out, the  
22 investigation can't advance.

23 Going on to the role of the scene examiner, it's my  
24 responsibility to undertake the forensic examination of  
25 the scene as a whole, to liaise with the respective

1 parties; first of all, the explosive officer, health and  
2 safety issues, and then direct the team that would be  
3 working underneath me to forensically -- to conduct  
4 a forensic examination of the scene.

5 Q. Your role at Edgware Road was, in fact, replicated by  
6 other officers carrying out similar functions at  
7 Aldgate, King's Cross, Russell Square and  
8 Tavistock Square?

9 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

10 Q. Did you have a substantial number of officers underneath  
11 you working to your command?

12 A. Yes, I did.

13 Q. Bomb scene assistants, searching officers, vehicle  
14 officers, photographers and so on?

15 A. Yes, that is correct.

16 Q. On Thursday, 7 July, you were obviously aware of the  
17 incidents evolving at various places in London during  
18 the course of the early hours of the morning?

19 A. Yes, I was.

20 Q. You were, as we know, deployed to Edgware Road.

21 A. I was, yes.

22 Q. When was that decision taken?

23 A. I can't remember the exact timing, sir, but I was in our  
24 main office when I was asked by Detective  
25 Sergeant Asman, who turned out to be the forensic

1 coordinator, to make my way as fast as I could to  
2 Edgware Road.

3 Q. According to your statement -- which was made some years  
4 ago now, and nearer to the events in question -- you  
5 arrived at Edgware Road at 10.45, and no doubt, when you  
6 arrived, you made yourself known to the other police  
7 officers and the senior officers who were there from the  
8 other emergency services?

9 A. Yes, I did, yes, sir.

10 Q. When you arrived, were casualties still being treated in  
11 Marks & Spencers and the nearby Hilton Hotel?

12 A. That is correct, sir, yes.

13 Q. Did you announce yourself to a senior British Transport  
14 Police officer, Superintendent Price, and tell him that  
15 you'd come to take over the scene for the purposes of  
16 the forensic examination?

17 A. Yes, I did.

18 Q. Your statement records that you entered the station at  
19 11.40 and you started to go down towards the platforms.

20 A. Yes, I did.

21 Q. Were you made aware that the station and, in particular,  
22 the trains, had already been swept by explosive officers  
23 with dogs?

24 A. Yes, I was made aware of that.

25 Q. So did that mean that it was safe for you to continue or

1 to commence your functions on the train?

2 A. It was as safe as it possibly could be for me to go in  
3 at that stage, yes.

4 Q. You approached the trains and we know from your  
5 statement that you entered the eastbound train, that's  
6 to say the train that was facing Edgware Road, and you  
7 walked through to the point adjacent to the bombed  
8 carriage on the westbound train so you could see through  
9 into it?

10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. My Lady has heard evidence as to the location of those  
12 persons who died in the train and I won't ask you about  
13 them in detail, but may I ask you this: was it apparent  
14 to you that all those persons who had tragically died in  
15 the carriage, as well as the person outside the  
16 carriage, had been tagged with a label pronouncing them  
17 to be deceased?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. The explosives officer who had carried out the search of  
20 the trains led you round the train --

21 A. Yes, he did.

22 Q. -- and pointed out the location of all those who died?

23 A. That is correct, sir, yes.

24 Q. I think shortly after that, a detective sergeant from  
25 the Anti-terrorist Branch arrived and told you that he



1 would be the bomb scene manager, the role that you've  
2 described to us a few moments ago?

3 A. Yes, he did.

4 Q. Did you then start to divide up the scene into zones for  
5 the purposes of carrying out the forensic search that  
6 would no doubt take a number of days, if not weeks?

7 A. That is correct, yes.

8 Q. In broad terms, did you separate up the areas into  
9 a number of different zones depending on the -- by  
10 reference to the carriages, the track and, in relation  
11 to the second carriage, parts of that carriage?

12 A. Yes, that is correct, yes.

13 Q. Was there an issue in relation to whether or not the  
14 tunnel was safe to work in?

15 A. Yes, that is correct. The normal course of events is we  
16 will always seek advice from structural engineers if  
17 there are damaged buildings, or gas/electricity/water,  
18 if we have holes in the ground, so it became apparent  
19 that we needed to speak to London Underground to find  
20 out if, in their opinion, the tunnel was now safe, for  
21 to us start the forensic examination.

22 Q. Was concern expressed about the state of two iron beams  
23 that traversed the roof of the tunnel?

24 A. Yes, it was.

25 Q. What were you told?

1 A. I was told that from the position that they were, it was  
2 impossible for them to say 100 per cent, but they did  
3 have concerns, because of the age of the tunnel, and  
4 needed equipment to be brought to the scene so it could  
5 be erected so they could have a closer look at those  
6 beams.

7 Q. Was there some difficulty encountered in getting the  
8 necessary equipment to Edgware Road?

9 A. Yes, there was.

10 Q. Did it, in fact, take some hours to get it there?

11 A. Yes, it did, sir, some considerable hours.

12 Q. Did that delay the forensic examination of the scene in  
13 any way?

14 A. Yes, it did. It meant in general terms, other than the  
15 initial recovery we had to make, that no one could enter  
16 the tunnel during that period.

17 Q. Did you, amongst your first decisions, decide that,  
18 because of her location, the young lady  
19 Jennifer Nicholson should be formally identified and  
20 removed from where she lay at the front of the eastbound  
21 train?

22 A. Yes, I did, sir. I was aware other people would have to  
23 attend and obviously wanted to remove her from that  
24 environment to a location onto platform 4.

25 Q. Later on 7 July, indeed not until the early evening, did

1 asbestos testers then arrive in order to monitor the  
2 tunnel to see whether or not there were levels of  
3 asbestos that made it dangerous for you and your  
4 officers to continue working?

5 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

6 Q. Did that, therefore, also contribute to a delay before  
7 the forensic examination could start?

8 A. There was a slight delay in that equipment arriving,  
9 being set up and us giving the all clear to commence  
10 work.

11 Q. Then to compound the situation, was the station then  
12 evacuated due to a possible gas leak that evening as  
13 well?

14 A. Yes it was, that is correct.

15 Q. Some concern has been expressed outside the environment  
16 of this court as to whether or not there was a delay  
17 brought about by, firstly, the discovery of asbestos  
18 and, secondly, the discovery of methane gas.

19 So that we can be quite plain about it, those issues  
20 were issues that concerned you in your role as the  
21 forensic examiner for the scene. They weren't issues  
22 that arose during the course of the rescue operation in  
23 the carriage?

24 A. That is correct, sir, it was an issue concerning myself  
25 and the health and safety of the individuals that would

1 be working in that environment.

2 Q. Nothing to do with the emergency operation that took  
3 place in the immediate aftermath of the bomb?

4 A. No, sir.

5 Q. Much later on that night -- so shortly before midnight  
6 on Thursday, 7 July -- were you then advised that it was  
7 necessary for a forensic medical examiner to attend to  
8 pronounce life extinct in relation to all those who had  
9 died at Edgware Road?

10 A. Yes, I was.

11 Q. Were you, therefore, required to wait for the attendance  
12 of that doctor?

13 A. Yes, I was.

14 Q. Dr Costello attended at 1.07 and pronounced life extinct  
15 on each of the persons in the tunnel, did he not?

16 A. Yes, he did.

17 Q. My Lady has heard evidence from Dr Costello. He gave  
18 evidence in the course of the Aldgate evidence. Are you  
19 aware, and can you confirm, that he examined each person  
20 in turn and formally pronounced life extinct?

21 A. Yes, he did.

22 Q. I think he was on the scene for upwards of an hour?

23 A. Yes, he was.

24 Q. The scene was then closed overnight?

25 A. That is correct.

1 Q. But not, I think, until 2.30 in the morning, and then  
2 reopened the following morning, the Friday morning, at  
3 6.00 am?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. No doubt officers were stationed in the tunnel to ensure  
6 that it was kept uncontaminated?

7 A. Yes, sir. The standard procedure is I always would be  
8 the last person to leave, to ensure that everyone was  
9 out of the scene, and the first person in in the  
10 morning. I had a conversation with a uniformed sergeant  
11 and expressed that I needed two people on the platform,  
12 constantly all night, one at either end and one to  
13 remain on the inner cordon, and under no circumstances  
14 was anybody allowed to enter until I arrived back at  
15 6.00 am and, if there was an issue, they were given my  
16 mobile number to ring during the hours that I was away  
17 from the scene.

18 Q. The issue of the identification and recovery of the  
19 deceased is outside the scope of these inquests, but  
20 I want to ask you one broad generic question about that  
21 process, if I may. Throughout your process of forensic  
22 examination was a priority given to the needs of the  
23 deceased and their families and the teams who would  
24 identify them in relation to the disaster victim  
25 identification process?

1 A. Yes, there was, sir, definitely.

2 Q. Did you constantly consult with the other officers who  
3 were concerned with that process as to how best to meet  
4 their needs in relation to what they had to do?

5 A. Yes, I did.

6 Q. Were the deceased, in terms of the recovery of their  
7 bodies from the tunnel and the way in which they were  
8 treated, treated with dignity and respect at all times?

9 A. Always, sir. Bare minimum amount of people there to do  
10 the recovery process and certainly dignity maintained at  
11 all times.

12 Q. You had throughout the many days, indeed weeks, that you  
13 were on the scene a large number of meetings with  
14 officers from the DVI section.

15 A. Yes, I did.

16 Q. My Lady knows that the Metropolitan Police have served  
17 a statement from Commander Bracken, who was in charge of  
18 the DVI process, setting out the details of that process  
19 outside the scope of these inquests for the bereaved  
20 families.

21 The scene was photographed, of course, and we've  
22 seen a photographic video record of the scene. Was that  
23 done on the Friday as well?

24 A. There was some initial photography and then the  
25 photography was ongoing throughout the whole period the

1 scene was open.

2 Q. Throughout the time that you were there, did you keep,  
3 and did you instruct your officers to keep, a record of  
4 every single significant find made in the tunnel?

5 A. Yes, that was kept by myself, sir, yes.

6 Q. Was one such find, what is known as exhibit MW84 -- and  
7 I don't refer to that exhibit in any way in  
8 a disrespectful way, but it was a technical exhibit  
9 given to human remains found on the westbound line of  
10 the track?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. Were those remains, MW84, the remains from which  
13 a muscle sample, RW58, was taken?

14 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

15 Q. Was that muscle sample then dispatched for DNA  
16 examination?

17 A. It was.

18 Q. Were those remains, MW84, also the remains that were  
19 examined by Dr Djurovic in her post-mortem on  
20 10 July 2005?

21 A. Yes, they were.

22 Q. Were they subsequently identified as those of  
23 Mohammed Sidique Khan?

24 A. Yes, they were.

25 Q. The remainder of the victims of the bomb were themselves

1 recovered in addition, of course, to Jennifer Nicholson  
2 whom we've already addressed. Were they recovered  
3 formally on Saturday, 9 July at the times at which you  
4 record in your statement?

5 A. That is correct, yes.

6 Q. Each was given, for the purposes of identification,  
7 a number and the DVI team then pursued what they had to  
8 do in relation to identification?

9 A. That is correct, yes.

10 Q. Once the deceased had been formally removed from their  
11 locations, was a credit card found in the near vicinity  
12 of the underneath of the westbound train under the blast  
13 hole?

14 A. Yes, there was.

15 Q. Was that a visa card, MW85, in the name of Mr S Khan?

16 A. Yes, it was.

17 Q. The card was entangled with human debris near the  
18 location of the explosion?

19 A. That is correct.

20 Q. Was it immediately identified by you as being  
21 a significant find?

22 A. It was significant in so much as it was an ID of some  
23 description so, therefore, needed to be rung out to the  
24 investigation team.

25 Q. Did you contact the investigation team at Scotland Yard



1 to pass on the fact that you had found that card?

2 A. Yes, I did.

3 Q. Also, that there was more human debris found in the near  
4 vicinity of that card?

5 A. That is correct, yes.

6 Q. Each day and each night the scene was -- each night and  
7 each day that the scene was closed and then opened, and  
8 that process continued throughout the Friday, Saturday,  
9 Sunday, Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday the following  
10 week?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. On the Wednesday, was a further exhibit found: namely,  
13 a Halifax debit card in the name of Khan, on the floor  
14 of the inside of the second carriage?

15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. On Thursday, 14 July, was the search of the track  
17 completed up to the point of the second carriage?

18 A. Yes, it was.

19 Q. At that point, therefore, were you able to arrange for  
20 some of the carriages of the westbound train to be  
21 removed from the scene?

22 A. The last four were winched back during the course of the  
23 night, yes, sir.

24 Q. To Edgware Road station?

25 A. Yes, into the platform itself, yes.

1 Q. Did that then allow you to carry out further forensic  
2 searches of both the carriage itself and the underneath  
3 of the train?

4 A. That is correct.

5 Q. As a result of that, on Thursday, 14 July, did you find  
6 further exhibits relating to Sidique Khan: namely,  
7 a Leeds City Council permit and an insurance card?

8 A. Yes, I did.

9 Q. Were they found inside the bombed carriage?

10 A. Yes, they were.

11 Q. The scene was closed on the Thursday night and open  
12 again on the Friday, and so the process continued  
13 through the Saturday, Sunday. I think on the Sunday  
14 night, London Underground, yourselves and the Metronet  
15 team worked through the night?

16 A. Yes, we did.

17 Q. Then, on the Sunday, was the second carriage wrapped in  
18 order to facilitate its removal from the scene?

19 A. That is correct.

20 Q. On Tuesday, 19 July -- so some ten or eleven days  
21 later -- did the point then arise at which it was  
22 possible to make arrangements for the lifting of the  
23 second carriage from the tracks?

24 A. That was correct, yes, sir.

25 Q. Was it then winched towards -- or taken away from the

1 scene to a storage depot?

2 A. Yes, it was.

3 Q. You then handed over the scene formally to British  
4 Transport Police and the London Underground network on  
5 Wednesday, 20 July when your officers left the scene?

6 A. That is correct, sir, yes.

7 Q. The exhibits that you discovered in the course of your  
8 and your officers' examination of the scene were all  
9 sent to Scotland Yard for the purposes of the  
10 investigation?

11 A. They were probably sent to laboratories, the majority of  
12 them, direct from the scene under escort with another  
13 officer.

14 MR KEITH: Thank you, Mr Wilson. Those are all the  
15 questions that I have for you, but there may be some  
16 further questions for you from my colleagues.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

18 MS GALLAGHER: My Lady, I have no questions for this witness  
19 but the Downey, Foulkes, Morley and Brewster families  
20 have asked me to note a matter for the record in open  
21 court.

22 It's very brief and very general. I can either do  
23 it now or I can do it at the conclusion of this  
24 witness's evidence. I'm in your hands.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Do it at the conclusion, if you

1 prefer.

2 MS GALLAGHER: Certainly. Thank you, my Lady.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

4 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing, thank you, my Lady.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other -- ah, it sounds as if it  
6 is the conclusion, Ms Gallagher.

7 MS GALLAGHER: Thank you.

8 The issue which they've asked me to note for the  
9 record in open court is that they intend to continue to  
10 pursue their concerns regarding post-death delays with  
11 the Metropolitan Police Service in writing.

12 Mr Wilson, in both his oral evidence and his  
13 statement, has referred to a number of those delays and  
14 he describes in detail what was occurring underground in  
15 the days following the explosion when the families, they  
16 feel, had minimal information. Some of them even had no  
17 family liaison officer throughout this time, and one  
18 family, in particularly distressing circumstances, had  
19 to read information about their son in the Sunday  
20 newspapers, on 10 July, while they were receiving no  
21 information, radio silence they considered, from formal  
22 sources.

23 We're very conscious that these matters are outside  
24 scope, but they are of huge importance to the families.  
25 The families are also conscious that limited questions

1 on these matters, although outside scope, were allowed  
2 in respect of Aldgate. The reference is Day 16,  
3 pages 79 to 85.

4 I've, of course, explained to my clients that it's  
5 not proper for me to put questions which are outside  
6 scope for this witness, but we hope that it will be  
7 possible that these questions can be properly explored  
8 outside the formal inquest process, particularly in the  
9 light of the Metropolitan Police Service's earlier  
10 agreement to assist in this regard and the efforts that  
11 have already been made in the form of the report which  
12 we have seen.

13 I do not intend to say anything about that report,  
14 save that the families whom I represent feel that there  
15 are a number of -- a very large number of unanswered  
16 questions and they hope that the Metropolitan Police  
17 Service will continue to assist, and it may be that  
18 questions which my clients have for Mr Wilson can be  
19 addressed to him in writing via the MPS rather than in  
20 this formal process where the questions they are raising  
21 are technically outside scope, given the ruling that we  
22 had earlier this year.

23 I hope that covers the issues which my families  
24 wanted raised. But they were very anxious for it to be  
25 said for the record rather than just dealt with in

1 writing quietly in the background.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Ms Gallagher. Mr Hill

3 I see you're here today.

4 MR HILL: Yes.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You've heard what Ms Gallagher says.

6 Do you have any comments to make?

7 MR HILL: I hope helpfully this, yes: there, in fact, have  
8 been now two occasions on which written reports entitled  
9 "Ancillary Issues" have been provided by the  
10 Metropolitan Police through the correct channel for  
11 communication, which is via Mr Smith, and we repeat, as  
12 I've said on many previous occasions, that we remain  
13 willing to address any factual issues which any of the  
14 families wish to raise which are beyond the scope of  
15 these proceedings.

16 The first ancillary issues report in which we  
17 attempted to deal with any and all questions posed by  
18 any of the bereaved teams was, I think, dated  
19 22 September.

20 A second report specifically entitled "Ancillary  
21 Issues Edgware Road" was provided yesterday. We very  
22 much hope that, through Mr Smith's good offices,  
23 everybody's had the opportunity to read it.

24 The headline issues in that Edgware Road report are  
25 responses under the heading:

1 "Why the body recovery process at Edgware Road was  
2 comparatively longer than at the Aldgate scene."

3 Then a subsidiary heading:

4 "The steps taken to preserve the dignity of the  
5 deceased."

6 Those parts of that report were specifically  
7 generated by queries that Mr Saunders had very properly  
8 raised with us via Mr Smith. We have not received any  
9 further specific queries through Ms Gallagher. We  
10 remain willing to deal with any further factual issues  
11 that there are, but we would invite attention to chapter  
12 and verse of the report provided this week.

13 It is a mechanism that has been working and we hope  
14 providing at least some answers to those families who,  
15 for obvious reasons, need answers. They only need to  
16 formulate in writing through your team any further  
17 questions that there may be and we will do our best to  
18 answer them.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Hill, could you remind me, what  
20 date did you say this second report had become  
21 available? It's just that a number of the families  
22 behind you have been shaking their heads to indicate  
23 they don't know what you're talking about.

24 MR HILL: The note that Mr Suter and, via him, Mr Keith has  
25 just handed to me I think explains.

1 The Edgware Road ancillary issues report, I think,  
2 although provided yesterday, only went -- and we're  
3 grateful to Mr Smith and his team -- to the Russell  
4 Jones & Walker team. That makes sense in the context:  
5 namely, that we knew it was Mr Saunders who was leading  
6 those enquiries.

7 In fact, we would recommend, if this is possible,  
8 that Ms Gallagher and all other teams now please be  
9 provided with that report. It's with the Inquest team.

10 If Ms Gallagher could see that, if she then has  
11 subsidiary questions and those that she represent do,  
12 again, please, via Mr Smith, if a further ancillary  
13 report is required, we'll compile it as soon as we can.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It sounds, Ms Gallagher, as if you  
15 ought to see -- given the concerns that you've expressed  
16 on behalf of the bereaved families that you represent,  
17 that you ought to see that report as soon as possible so  
18 that you can try to --

19 MS GALLAGHER: Certainly. Mr Hill may not have seen it, but  
20 there were very specific written questions raised on  
21 behalf of a number of the families I represent. They  
22 were raised prior to 22 September. The families didn't  
23 feel that those questions were answered in that  
24 22 September report, which was in more general terms.  
25 It may be that they're answered in this new report, and,



1 if not, I'm grateful for the indication that we can  
2 continue to pursue this via Mr Smith in writing to the  
3 Metropolitan Police Service.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Of course, and I'll leave it to you  
5 to discuss with Mr Hill before anyone leaves today to  
6 ensure that you get the information you need as soon as  
7 possible.

8 MR HILL: We answered all of the questions that we were  
9 aware of in the 22 September report. If there has been  
10 a breakdown in communication, we'll put it right.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Exactly. We have you all here and  
12 any breakdowns can be resolved before everybody leaves  
13 today, please.

14 Whatever comments may be made about other aspects of  
15 the investigation, Mr Wilson, it's plain to me that you  
16 personally got very little rest as you undertook your  
17 meticulous search in horrible conditions, so thank you  
18 for what you did.

19 A. That's the team as well, my Lady, not just one person.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Indeed.

21 A. Thank you very much.

22 MR KEITH: Thank you, my Lady. Thank you, Mr Wilson.

23 My Lady, that concludes the evidence scheduled for  
24 today. Tomorrow, we will turn to Bronze and  
25 Silver Commanders, or some of them, in relation to

1 Edgware Road.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Could I ask, because I was not in  
3 court, for obvious reasons, when the Divisional Court  
4 gave the result as far as the attempt to review  
5 judicially my ruling was concerned, nothing was said on  
6 that occasion as to any decisions as to whether or not  
7 any appeal would be launched, was it?

8 MR KEITH: My Lady, no. When their Lordships heard  
9 submissions the date of the actual argument, I brought  
10 to their attention the fact that, plainly, it would be  
11 necessary, not merely to have a decision, but also the  
12 reasons, so as to allow people to consider their  
13 position and also because the date of their ruling would  
14 impact upon my Lady's PII process.

15 If I may say so, I think they were well aware of the  
16 issues and the difficulties that had been presented, and  
17 Lord Justice Maurice Kay indicated that they would give  
18 their reasons at the end of this week or the beginning  
19 of next week, and I'm sure he did so because he was  
20 alive to that difficulty.

21 Those of my learned friends whom I've had a chance  
22 to discuss the next steps with have all indicated that  
23 they would be unable to take any decisions in relation  
24 to whether or not they would apply for leave to appeal  
25 until they've seen the actual reasoning and my Lady may

1 feel that that is a reasonable step for them to take.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: They could start taking instructions.

3 MR KEITH: They could certainly start.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: The reasons must be fairly  
5 straightforward.

6 MR KEITH: Well, I think the degree of the rejection of the  
7 argument may have some impact upon whether or not an  
8 appeal is in the public interest.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Very well. So -- I mean, had I been  
10 here, I would have tried to extract from those acting  
11 for the Secretary of State some kind of undertaking as  
12 to when a decision might be taken after the reasons are  
13 available.

14 MR KEITH: It's certainly open to my Lady, as soon as the  
15 reasons have been given, to convey a message, as my Lady  
16 has in the past, to the Secretary of State that the  
17 court expects her to reach a decision within a certain  
18 number of days and that message can be communicated via  
19 Mr Smith when the reasons are promulgated.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Very well. Thank you very much.  
21 10.00 tomorrow, please.

22 (12.05 pm)

23 (The inquests adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)

24

25