

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005

Hearing transcripts - 7 December 2010 - Morning session

1 Tuesday, 7 December 2010

2 (10.00 am)

3 MR KEITH: Good morning, my Lady.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith?

5 MR KEITH: May I invite you to call Sergeant McGrotty,
6 please?

7 PS CHARLES JOHN MCGROTTY (affirmed)

8 Questions by MR KEITH

9 MR KEITH: Good morning, Sergeant. Could you give the court
10 your full name, please?

11 A. Charles John McGrotty.

12 Q. Sergeant, in July of 2005, were you then a police
13 constable?

14 A. That's correct, yes.

15 Q. With, as you are now, the British Transport Police?

16 A. That's correct, yes.

17 Q. That morning, were you, with other officers, aware of
18 a message over the radio referring to reports of an
19 explosion in Liverpool Street?

20 A. That's correct, yes.

21 Q. Can you help us more now with your recollection of the
22 nature of the messages that you received and what you
23 understood to be the problem at Liverpool Street?

24 A. The messages were mixed. Words of "explosion" and
25 "electrical disturbance" were used.

1 Q. As a result of hearing those calls, did you and your
2 colleagues -- Police Sergeant Noon and Police
3 Constable Johnson -- travel to Liverpool Street?

4 A. Yes, we did.

5 Q. Can we have on the screen [BTP150-1], please.

6 At 08.48.12, you will see there that a male tells
7 the British Transport Police controller:

8 "There's been some kind of explosion down in the
9 actual Liverpool Street Underground. There's loads of
10 smoke coming out from the Underground Hammersmith & City
11 Line, over."

12 Controller says:

13 "Received, standby."

14 There's a reference then to Alpha 80 en route, and
15 then to Alpha 81 en route, and then to BX, which is the
16 control, Bravo 30, and then Bravo 30 responds; or rather
17 the other way round, there is a reference from Bravo 30
18 and the controller says "Bravo 30"?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Was Bravo 30 yourself and your fellow officers?

21 A. That's correct, yes.

22 Q. Over the page [BTP150-2], one of you says:

23 "Do you want to us attend Liverpool Street?"

24 The controller says:

25 "If you can make your way, please, until we can get

1 further information grade 1, over."
2 Was that the controller telling your colleagues and
3 yourself to make your way to Liverpool Street?
4 A. That's correct, yes.
5 Q. What did "grade 1" mean?
6 A. It means to go with the sirens on, blues and twos.
7 Q. You arrived and we know from your statement that there
8 was a crowd of people congregating outside the entrance.
9 In broad terms, what did you and your fellow officers
10 do?
11 A. We liaised with people who were already on the cordon.
12 We tried to ascertain more details, the nature of the
13 problem. However, there was nobody who could clearly
14 define what the problem was.
15 Q. Could you see what the problem was?
16 A. No. The front of Liverpool Street Underground had been
17 closed off. There was cordon tape preventing any
18 access, and the people who were stood there, nobody
19 could give us any clear information.
20 Q. There were a number of other officers there, though,
21 weren't there? There were police community support
22 officers, there were City of London police officers
23 there and also members of the London Underground?
24 A. That's correct, yes.
25 Q. While you were there, did you receive some further

1 information that there was another problem, perhaps
2 connected -- you weren't sure -- at Aldgate?

3 A. It was mentioned to me by the City of London Police
4 officer that they had heard of an electrical disturbance
5 at Aldgate.

6 Q. So did there come a time when yourself and Police
7 Sergeant Noon and Police Constable Johnson decided that
8 there were sufficient officers there and you might not
9 be needed there after all?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. If we can look, please, again, at [BTP150-46], we can see
12 there again a reference to Bravo 30:

13 "Everything seems to be under control at
14 Liverpool Street, we've enough officers here ...
15 redeploy to the King's Cross area, or is there somewhere
16 else you want us to go?"

17 The controller says:

18 "Standby."

19 Was that you and your officers, your colleagues,
20 indicating that you were now at the controller's
21 disposal and you were free to go anywhere else that he
22 wished?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. As a result, did you, in fact, if we go over the page [BTP150-47],
25 and if you could enlarge the --

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Just before we move on, I'm sorry to
2 interrupt, Mr Keith, when you arrive at Liverpool Street
3 and you've had there community support officers, City of
4 London Police, London Underground staff, what exactly
5 was the problem in finding out from them what was going
6 on? I mean, was it that you couldn't find somebody of
7 sufficient authority, that you didn't have any idea who
8 was in charge? What was the --

9 A. There was nobody there who could clearly define what the
10 problem was. We liaised with members of staff, City of
11 London Police officers, and also officers who were based
12 at Liverpool Street, and because the entrance to the
13 Underground had been closed off, there was no access
14 into it, and nobody could clearly ascertain what the
15 problem was.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So what, the impression you got was
17 everybody had just been evacuated?

18 A. Yes.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Staff, passengers, the lot?

20 A. Yes.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: They were all just standing outside
22 and nobody knows why they had been evacuated?

23 A. Essentially, yes.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right. Thank you. Sorry.

25 MR KEITH: Not at all, my Lady.

1 May I ask a supplementary question? You didn't,

2 I think, go down to the control room at

3 Liverpool Street, did you?

4 A. No, we did not.

5 Q. Because, my Lady, of course, we've heard some evidence

6 that there were senior officers or perhaps a senior

7 officer by that stage in the control room at

8 Liverpool Street, but you weren't able to get down

9 there?

10 A. No, we'd no physical access to that part of the station.

11 Q. At 09.08.50, a caller, a radio caller to the controller

12 for British Transport Police refers to about

13 20 casualties emerging at King's Cross and asks for

14 ambulances to King's Cross, and so the controller refers

15 to you -- Bravo 30 -- and asks you to go to

16 King's Cross.

17 A. That's correct, yes.

18 Q. So did you then leave Liverpool Street as quickly as you

19 were able and proceed as fast as you were able to

20 King's Cross?

21 A. That's correct, yes.

22 Q. I think, when you arrived at King's Cross -- could we

23 have [BTP150-57] -- you indicated to the controller at

24 09.18 that you had arrived, because we can see in the

25 middle of the page:

1 "Bravo 30 received" just below "Bravo 30 off at
2 King's Cross".

3 Was that you signifying that you had arrived?

4 A. That's correct, yes.

5 Q. My Lady, we know that these transcripts are a couple of
6 minutes early. In fact, the time would be about 9.20,
7 therefore, that you arrived at King's Cross and your
8 pocket notebook records, does it not, that you arrived
9 at 9.20 at King's Cross?

10 A. It does, yes.

11 Q. When you arrived at King's Cross, what was the position?

12 A. It was very unclear and we entered by the front of the
13 station. There was nobody around who could indicate
14 what the problem was, and we went down into the booking
15 hall area of King's Cross Underground station.

16 Q. Why did you go there particularly?

17 A. The information had been walking wounded leaving the
18 Underground and we felt that was the appropriate place
19 to go because I know that there's a control room at
20 King's Cross.

21 Q. When you reached the booking hall, were you able to see
22 passengers in a state of distress?

23 A. Yes, we could see passengers coming up from the
24 escalators going into the booking hall area.

25 Q. If we could have on the screen, please, [INQ10283-3], we

1 can see there, can't we, that if you go to the ticket
2 hall, the booking area, you will find yourself at the
3 top of the main escalators from the Piccadilly Line and
4 the Victoria Line?

5 A. That's correct, yes.

6 Q. So anybody coming up from the Piccadilly Line has to
7 emerge in the ticket hall area?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. Were you able to ascertain from the state of those
10 passengers what had happened, or had you received any
11 other information?

12 A. No, at that time, we still had limited information.
13 There was a member of LUL staff stood outside of the
14 control room and there were two members of the public
15 sat there in some distress. I observed that the people
16 who were coming up the escalators were in varying
17 degrees of distress and dishevelled.

18 Q. So did you decide that the best thing to do was to then
19 proceed further down into the station, down to the
20 Piccadilly Line platforms?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. How did you know that the Piccadilly Line platforms were
23 the place to go as opposed to the Victoria Line or the
24 other lines?

25 A. That was the direction in which the stream of traffic

1 was coming up the escalators.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: What kind of member of LU staff was
3 it who was there and were they able to help you at all?

4 A. We asked them if they had any further information, and
5 they didn't. The gentleman had an orange
6 high visibility vest on. I didn't know whether he was
7 a member of staff or a member of the -- or a team
8 leader, but he was unable to provide any further
9 information.

10 MR KEITH: At the bottom of the escalators, which of the two
11 Piccadilly Line platforms did you go to?

12 A. I turned to my left, which would have been the westbound
13 platform.

14 Q. Any particular reason why it was the westbound you went
15 to?

16 A. That was still the direction in which members of the
17 public were coming from in a steady stream.

18 Q. On the platform, did you meet a member of
19 London Underground staff?

20 A. Yes, we did.

21 Q. Did you ascertain that the power was off?

22 A. Yes, we did.

23 Q. Again, did he know what the problem in the tunnel -- by
24 then you knew there was a problem in the tunnel -- what
25 it was?

1 A. He couldn't tell me what the problem was. He did
2 indicate that we were not to go down there.

3 Q. Did he tell you why you were not to go down there?

4 A. No, he couldn't give us a justifiable reason.

5 Q. Did he refer to having received instructions from
6 somebody?

7 A. No, we hadn't received any instructions up until that
8 point.

9 Q. We know, Sergeant, from other evidence that my Lady has
10 heard, that a British Transport Police inspector,
11 Inspector Mingay, had gone down there and left
12 instructions that certainly his colleague was not to
13 enter the train. He'd gone down to the front of the
14 carriage.

15 Did you receive any impression that a fellow officer
16 or somebody else had been down before you and had left
17 these instructions, or was there no information as to
18 what the nature of the instructions were?

19 A. I had no knowledge that any other police officer had
20 been down there. From my point of view, I felt that we
21 were the first police officers to attend.

22 Q. Were the injuries which you could see on the passengers
23 becoming steadily worse?

24 A. Yes, they were.

25 Q. Did one of the passengers refer to having seen a dead

1 passenger on the track in the tunnel?

2 A. Yes, that's correct.

3 Q. As a result of that, what did you decide to do?

4 A. Collectively, we decided that we had to go down there to

5 ascertain exactly what we were dealing with.

6 Q. My Lady's heard evidence about the nature of the

7 lighting and the conditions in the tunnel and the

8 extraordinarily difficult conditions underfoot. In

9 general terms, was it a very hazardous journey down

10 through that tunnel?

11 A. Extremely.

12 Q. Did all three of you go together or did one of you

13 remain behind on the platform?

14 A. All three of us went together.

15 Q. During your journey to the train, did one of you veer

16 off to help a passenger who was in need of immediate

17 assistance?

18 A. Yes, my colleague, PC Johnson.

19 Q. Therefore, did he stay there with that passenger and not

20 join you immediately on the train?

21 A. He stayed with her for a very short period of time.

22 Myself and Sergeant Noon continued on towards the train.

23 Q. Was it hot?

24 A. Extremely hot.

25 Q. What were you wearing?

1 A. I was wearing body armour. I also had my fluorescent
2 high visibility jacket on, as well as my belt carrying
3 all my necessary accoutrements and equipment.

4 Q. Could you see the train ahead of you?

5 A. Yes, I could.

6 Q. We know that there are two tunnels, because there's
7 a crossover tunnel from the eastbound tunnel and there
8 was the westbound tunnel in which the train was located.
9 You were approaching from, we presume, from what you
10 said about the platform, down the westbound tunnel --

11 A. That's correct, yes.

12 Q. -- to the rear of the train. Was the door open?

13 A. Yes, it was.

14 Q. Were people still coming off as you approached?

15 A. Yes, people were still coming off. However, not as many
16 as before.

17 Q. What did you do?

18 A. There was a member of staff assisting members of the
19 public off the train. We asked him had he any further
20 information. He couldn't provide any, and myself and
21 PC Johnson climbed aboard the train to go and
22 investigate further.

23 Q. Was that through the driver's cab, through the rear
24 driver's cab, I should say?

25 A. Possibly one of the side doors was open, I can't be

1 quite specific on which door it was.

2 Q. But it was definitely the end of the train rather than
3 the double doors on the side carriage?

4 A. Yes.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Did you see a colleague, Mr Collins?

6 A. No, I did not.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Do you know Mr Collins?

8 A. I don't, no.

9 MR KEITH: Where are you stationed? Where were you
10 stationed then, Sergeant?

11 A. At that time, I was based at King's Cross.

12 Q. So you boarded the train. Had Mr Johnson rejoined you
13 by this time?

14 A. Yes, he had.

15 Q. Did the three of you start to proceed down the train
16 towards the front?

17 A. I can recall that myself and PC Johnson were on board
18 the train when we first got on and started to make our
19 way down. I can't recall what Sergeant Noon was doing.

20 Q. Were there passengers still moving towards the rear of
21 the train through those first few carriages you went
22 through, carriages 6, 5, 4, 3?

23 A. No, it was empty.

24 Q. So very quiet?

25 A. Yes, it was.

1 Q. When did you first see passengers?

2 A. I had progressed through approximately two or three
3 carriages and I then came across members of the public
4 who had remained and who were sat down.

5 Q. Were they passengers, did you think, who had come from
6 further up the train who were resting before trying to
7 get out the rear of the train, or did it appear as if
8 they had been injured in situ, injured where they were?

9 A. I can't say exactly where they may have been injured.
10 However, they were in a position where they couldn't
11 physically get up to leave the train.

12 Q. Because of the severity of their injuries?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. How far did you go?

15 A. I managed to get all the way through the train up until
16 the final carriage where the main body of the injured
17 people were and I couldn't physically get into that last
18 carriage.

19 Q. That's the first carriage of the train?

20 A. That's correct, yes.

21 Q. In the preceding carriage, carriage 2, did you come
22 across severely injured passengers?

23 A. Yes, I did.

24 Q. Was one of them a female sitting on your right-hand side
25 as you moved forward through the train towards the front

1 carriage?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Can you recall anything of her?

4 A. I believe it was an Asian lady, mid-20s, I think she was
5 wearing some sort of crop-top. She had her -- I think
6 she had her legs up on the seats. I stopped and spoke
7 with her, asked her how she was. She was able to
8 communicate with me. She was asking, "Are there
9 ambulance services, paramedics, en route?". I reassured
10 her, made sure that she was comfortable as best that she
11 could be, and I then continued on.

12 Q. Did you see why her legs were up on the seat?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Did she appear to have some injuries to her legs that
15 you could see because of the blood in which they were
16 caked?

17 A. She had blood on her upper body and possibly some on her
18 head, but I couldn't see exactly where her injuries
19 were.

20 Q. On the same side of the train, was there also a male,
21 who appeared Asian in appearance, who was also injured,
22 indeed you thought that he was in a more serious
23 condition?

24 A. Yes, that's correct.

25 Q. Was Mr Johnson still with you or had he gone off

1 somewhere else?

2 A. No, Mr Johnson wasn't with me at that point.

3 Q. Did you subsequently discover that he had left the
4 carriage or left the train, in fact, because he'd heard
5 shouts from somebody outside the train between the train
6 and the tunnel wall and he'd gone to help?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. We'll hear from Mr Johnson in relation to Lee Harris and
9 Sam Badham. So it was just you and Mr Noon by this
10 stage?

11 A. I still can't recall where Mr Noon was at that stage.

12 Q. So having attended to the lady and seen that she was not
13 in need of immediate assistance, and having done what
14 you could for her, did you then try to move forward to
15 the front?

16 A. That's correct, yes.

17 Q. Could you hear somebody calling?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Who was that?

20 A. There was a person who I believe was a member of staff,
21 either a driver or somebody else who worked for
22 London Underground in the first carriage, and he was
23 calling to me through the interconnecting door.

24 Q. Did you have a torch?

25 A. I did, yes.

1 Q. So might he have seen you coming down the carriage or --
2 I suppose carriage 2 was lit, so he might have seen you
3 through the interconnecting door?

4 A. It was in partial darkness. However, I did have my
5 fluorescent coat on, and he did have some sort of torch
6 that he shined out.

7 Q. Did you go to him?

8 A. Yes, I did.

9 Q. What was the interconnecting door like?

10 A. The interconnecting door was damaged. It appeared to be
11 buckled, and it was preventing me gaining access into
12 that last carriage. He tried to open the door from his
13 side and I tried to open the door from my side, but
14 unfortunately, it wouldn't move.

15 Q. Could you see through the smashed window in the door,
16 the two doors --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- and see that there were also people lying on the
19 other side of the door --

20 A. Yes, I could.

21 Q. -- in the first carriage on the floor?

22 Can you recall anything of the people lying just
23 inside that first carriage?

24 A. Yes, there was a lady lying on the floor directly in
25 front of that door. She had -- she was wearing bright

1 clothing, I believe possibly red trousers,
2 a multicoloured top. I believe I referred to it as
3 a rainbow, fashion-type colouring. I could see that she
4 had lower leg injuries. She was semi-conscious, in that
5 her head was moving. I also saw her arms moving.

6 Q. Later in your statement, you refer to a lady who was
7 taken out of the carriage on a stretcher and taken up to
8 the surface, and you suppose that that was the same lady
9 that you had earlier seen at this stage just inside the
10 door of the first carriage?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Can we, therefore, presume that the lady that you saw in
13 the second carriage on the right-hand side with the legs
14 caked in blood, and the lady inside the door of the
15 first carriage both survived?

16 A. Yes.

17 MR KEITH: My Lady, that will be relevant to the evidence
18 that we'll hear in due course from Mr Annals and the
19 position concerning Behnaz Mozakka.

20 Because you weren't able to get through the door,
21 what did you do?

22 A. I asked the driver if he'd known that emergency services
23 had been contacted. He was unable to tell me. He
24 didn't know if that was the case. I asked him to
25 describe what he could see. He described a number of

1 people, some were dead, some people with very serious
2 extensive injuries, and there were some people trapped.

3 Q. We've heard evidence -- my Lady's heard evidence from
4 Simon Cook, who was a duty station manager at
5 King's Cross, who was in the first carriage, and he was
6 able to get into the first carriage and, indeed, while
7 he was in the first carriage, he sees other
8 London Underground staff coming from the Russell Square
9 end because he's able to see them appearing in the
10 driver's cab.

11 Did you find out from that gentleman, the gentleman
12 you saw, how he was able to get into that first
13 carriage, given that you weren't able to get through the
14 interconnecting doors?

15 A. No, I believed he was the driver. I thought that he
16 had -- was already in that part of the train prior to
17 the incident.

18 Q. Did he have a torch with him?

19 A. I think he did, I can't be specific on it, but I think
20 he did.

21 Q. How much were you able to see through the
22 interconnecting doors?

23 A. I had a limited view. I had a small Maglite torch as
24 part of my equipment. I shone that into the train.
25 However, I could only see a short distance into it.

1 Q. It was a terrible scene, was it not?

2 A. It was, yes.

3 Q. Were you able to see literally piles of passengers lying

4 on the floor?

5 A. Yes, both on the floor and on the seating.

6 Q. What did you decide you should do?

7 A. I had to ensure that this information was conveyed up to

8 the top. I was unable to use my radio, as my radio

9 wasn't equipped with the channel 2 function which gives

10 officers the ability to speak on their radio

11 underground, and I had to ensure that I got up top and

12 passed that essential information out.

13 Q. Where is your personal radio normally used?

14 A. It's normally used above ground.

15 Q. Are you normally stationed above ground?

16 A. Yes, I am.

17 Q. So you went back through the second carriage where the

18 male and the female, whom you've already described, were

19 still there?

20 A. That's correct, yes.

21 Q. Did you give them some reassurance as you went back past

22 them?

23 A. Yes. Again, they were asking where paramedics were.

24 I said that I was going to ensure that they were called

25 and make sure that they were on their way. They could

1 still communicate with me, so I was happy to move on.

2 Q. As you emerged from the rear of the train, did you then
3 see Mr Johnson?

4 A. Yes, I did.

5 Q. Where was he?

6 A. Mr Johnson was -- he was down on the track looking
7 underneath the train.

8 Q. Could you see whether there were other people or
9 passengers alongside the train between the train and the
10 tunnel wall down that left-hand side?

11 A. No, from my point of view, I couldn't see that.

12 However, PC Johnson did describe to me exactly what he
13 had seen.

14 Q. What did he tell you?

15 A. He told me there were a number of people under the
16 train, some of which he believed were dead. However,
17 there were two or three people who were in need of
18 medical assistance and had suffered serious injury.

19 Q. Did you tell him that you were going to report what you
20 had seen and that you were going to get help?

21 A. That's correct, yes.

22 Q. Did you then go straight back to the platforms?

23 A. Yes, I did.

24 Q. What did you do there?

25 A. I climbed up onto the platform and I then ran up the

1 escalators. I then ran through the booking hall and
2 straight up on to the forecourt area of King's Cross
3 station.

4 Q. Did you make a call or use your radio there?

5 A. I did not. Because, once I got up there, I could see
6 that there were a number of emergency services personnel
7 at the front of King's Cross and I believed that the
8 people I needed to speak to were there.

9 Q. Why?

10 A. I could see a number of people who I needed to
11 communicate with, one of which was a HEMS doctor.
12 I spoke with him and passed on the information. I then
13 also saw a London Ambulance Service, I recognised him as
14 being a duty officer.

15 Q. A duty officer?

16 A. Yes, and I explained to him exactly what I'd seen.
17 I went through a major incident mnemonic covering what
18 I'd seen.

19 Q. Is that the CHALET?

20 A. That's correct, yes.

21 Q. Forgive me for asking what may seem to be an obvious
22 question. From the fact that you spoke to the HEMS
23 doctor and a duty officer from the London Ambulance
24 Service, was that because the greatest need, it seemed
25 to you, was the need for first aid for paramedics to be

1 got into the train?

2 A. Absolutely, absolutely.

3 Q. We have in the records, sergeant, at [BTP169-69], a record
4 of a radio transmission to British Transport Police
5 control which refers to two people under the train at
6 King's Cross, at 09.44.56.

7 It doesn't refer to Bravo 30. There is a reference
8 instead to Bravo Kilo 25. But there is a reference, as
9 you will see there, to:

10 "Possibly two people trapped under a Tube train at
11 King's Cross, over. Fire Brigade are aware."

12 You had spoken to PC Johnson, and PC Johnson was the
13 person who knew that there were possibly people under
14 the train, because he was down there between the tunnel
15 wall and the carriage.

16 A. That's correct, yes.

17 Q. He told you. Do you know how this information came to
18 be reported to the British Transport Police Control?

19 A. Another person that I spoke to when I came up was
20 Sergeant Betts, who, at that time, was my line
21 supervisor.

22 Q. Is he, perhaps, Bravo Kilo 25?

23 A. Possibly, I'm not clear on who was the actual call sign.

24 Q. Does it seem to you that that is the information that
25 you had relayed from Mr Johnson to Sergeant Betts?

1 A. That's correct, yes.

2 Q. So on the basis that you made that -- you had that
3 conversation with Sergeant Betts shortly after your
4 arrival at the surface, you must, therefore, have come
5 up from the carriage at about 9.45?

6 A. Yes.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: What about the "Fire Brigade are
8 aware", would that have come from information you passed
9 on?

10 A. Up until that time, ma'am, I hadn't spoken to any
11 members of the Fire Brigade.

12 MR KEITH: Had Sergeant Betts, as far as you were aware,
13 been at the surface all the time?

14 A. I believe so.

15 Q. So he may have spoken to other members of the emergency
16 personnel including the Fire Brigade --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- who, we know from other records, had arrived well
19 before then?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Having passed on the information, what did you decide to
22 do?

23 A. I knew that I needed to get back down to the scene as,
24 at that time, there were very few emergency services
25 down there. I also -- what with the heat, I saw that

1 cases of water had appeared on the ground. I grabbed
2 one of these cases of water and ran straight back down
3 again.

4 Q. When you say there had been few emergency services on
5 the train, in fact the only people you had seen had been
6 members of the London Underground --

7 A. That's correct, yes.

8 Q. -- and your fellow officers, Mr Johnson and Mr Noon?

9 A. That's correct, yes.

10 Q. As you had proceeded -- I'm sorry to take you back --
11 from the rear of the train to the front on your first
12 journey down to the train, had you seen that, as you
13 passed through the train, there were some open doors on
14 the right-hand side which were allowing people to come
15 on and off the train and then go down through
16 a crossover tunnel to the eastbound track?

17 A. I wasn't aware of that.

18 Q. In carriage 4, do you recall a set of double doors being
19 open in carriage 4 as you went through?

20 A. I'm afraid I can't.

21 Q. All right. So you picked up the water and you returned
22 down. Did you see members of the London Fire Brigade
23 when you reached the tunnel again?

24 A. Yes, I did.

25 Q. What were they doing?

1 A. I believe there were two fire officers who were stood on
2 a platform. As I went past, a discussion was had about
3 going down to the train. They intimated that they
4 couldn't go down until they had their full team with
5 their full complement of equipment.

6 Q. You had already been down and you knew that assistance
7 of any kind was vitally needed?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. When you refer to there being a discussion between you,
10 do we take that to mean that you perhaps suggested that
11 they came with you?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. What was their response?

14 A. They said that they couldn't go until they had their
15 full team.

16 Q. Was this a debate that you had the time or the luxury of
17 continuing?

18 A. No. I felt it was important I had to get down, as I had
19 water and it was extremely hot down there.

20 Q. Did you understand what their full team consisted of or
21 what the precise equipment was that they felt they
22 lacked preventing them from going down to the train?

23 A. No, I have no knowledge of that.

24 Q. I don't suppose you know their names?

25 A. Unfortunately not, no.

1 Q. Were there members of the London Underground still
2 present on the platform?

3 A. Yes, there was.

4 Q. Were they still looking after passengers who were coming
5 out of the tunnel, or were all the passengers -- the
6 walking passengers -- by then ended?

7 A. At that time, there were no other walking members of the
8 public.

9 Q. Did you tell those officers from the Fire Brigade that
10 there were passengers who were dead and dying in the
11 train?

12 A. I can't recall stating that to the officers.

13 Q. Did you refer to the severity of the conditions in the
14 train?

15 A. Yes, yes, I did.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Are we talking officers or are we
17 talking firefighters?

18 A. Firefighters.

19 MR KEITH: So with your water, did you go back along the
20 track?

21 A. Yes, I did, I took the exact same route that I had
22 already gone down to the train originally.

23 Q. Was Mr Johnson still there alongside the rear of the
24 train?

25 A. Mr Johnson was in the same position as I had seen him

1 earlier on.

2 Q. Was he tending to some person or persons alongside the
3 train?

4 A. Yes, he was.

5 Q. Could you see anything of them and what condition they
6 were in?

7 A. I'm afraid I couldn't. I was on board the train looking
8 down at Mr Johnson, and I left some water with him.

9 Q. For him and whoever he was looking after?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. You went straight on to the train. Did you proceed
12 through the train straightaway to the second carriage
13 again?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Was there anybody injured, wounded, between the rear of
16 the train and the second carriage or was it empty as it
17 had been the first time?

18 A. It was still empty as it had been when I originally
19 boarded.

20 Q. What was the state of the male and the female in the
21 second carriage?

22 A. They were still the same as when I had left them. They
23 could still communicate with me. I left them some water
24 and assured them that emergency services were en route.

25 Q. Who was in the first carriage or at the end of the

1 second carriage when you came back this time?

2 A. When I came back this time, there were now more members
3 of London Underground staff. There were also
4 a Metropolitan Police inspector and also
5 a Metropolitan Police sergeant.

6 Q. Were you able to get their names at all?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Did you see them again later?

9 A. I spent some time with them in that carriage for the
10 next hour and a half to two hours.

11 Q. Have you seen them since or found out their names since?

12 A. No, I haven't.

13 Q. What was the position with the interconnecting doors by
14 this time?

15 A. The London Underground staff were trying to open the
16 door. One member of staff had different sets of keys.
17 They were also trying to physically force the door.
18 However, it wouldn't budge.

19 Q. Were there some other members of the Fire Brigade, some
20 firefighters, also in the carriage by this time --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- near the end of the carriage, I should say?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Were they trying to get the door open as well?

25 A. Yes, they were.

1 Q. How were they trying to do that?

2 A. I think they had some equipment with them and they were
3 trying to set up this equipment in order to force the
4 door open.

5 Q. Was it cutting equipment powered by a generator, for
6 example, or handheld equipment?

7 A. I believe it was handheld equipment.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, again, pausing there, you'd
9 seen some firefighters at the platform who said they
10 were waiting for their full team and their full
11 complement of equipment. You then go back down into the
12 bombed -- or towards the bombed carriage and you say --
13 are the firefighters or the members of the London Fire
14 Brigade in the carriage when you got back to it; in
15 other words, had there been some members of the
16 Fire Brigade who had gone down before the chaps on the
17 platform, or did they arrive back after you?

18 A. I believe there was a short period of time when I had
19 gone back and they had appeared, whether they'd been
20 there prior to my arrival, I'm not 100 per cent, I'm not
21 clear on that.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So you can't say whether they were
23 there when you got back or whether they arrived after
24 you?

25 A. No, but it was -- I know it was a short period of time

1 and then they were there trying to force the door open.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You are somebody who had been
3 misdirected to the wrong scene, you'd been up and down
4 to the train twice and, when you get back, it's possible
5 that the Fire Brigade are just getting there, and there
6 are still no paramedics on the carriage?

7 A. That's correct, yes, ma'am.

8 MR KEITH: This is at least 9.44, because 9.44 was when you
9 passed the information to Sergeant Betts about
10 Mr Johnson's two casualties by the side of the train.
11 You had spoken to the officials, the HEMS doctor, and
12 the duty officer from the London Ambulance Service,
13 you'd found the water, and then you'd gone all the way
14 back down. So it must have been a substantial time
15 after 9.45?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Was the heat getting worse?

18 A. The heat was unbearable. I had to --

19 Q. Because of the equipment or just could you feel it in
20 your lungs?

21 A. What with the weight that I was carrying, with my
22 equipment, I took all of that off and got rid of it.
23 The heat was building up tremendously. It got to
24 a stage where myself and London Fire Brigade began to
25 smash out the windows of the train.

1 Q. It wasn't easy to do, was it?

2 A. No, the physical makeup of the train, the plasticity of
3 the glass, made it difficult to break.

4 Q. I think you tried to smash it with your baton?

5 A. Yes, that's correct.

6 Q. But that didn't actually work?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Then you tried to kick the glass by holding on to a rail
9 and using your weight and your feet to smash your feet
10 through the glass?

11 A. That's correct, yes.

12 Q. Did that work?

13 A. That partially worked, and what, with the assistance of
14 the London Fire Brigade, and they had some more rather
15 weighty tools, we managed to smash out the windows.

16 Q. In which carriage was that?

17 A. This would have been in the second carriage.

18 Q. The one preceding the bombed carriage?

19 A. That's correct, yes.

20 Q. The male and the female were still there in the
21 carriage?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. More and more people arrived, did they not?

24 A. They did, yes.

25 Q. An inspector, Inspector Shields, arrived?

1 A. That's correct, yes.

2 Q. Did you know him?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Also, Police Sergeant Betts --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- who had been upstairs earlier, arrived on the scene

7 as well?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. Were you conscious of more members of the Fire Brigade

10 and more paramedics arriving?

11 A. Yes, I was.

12 Q. Did you gain a sense of how the paramedics were going

13 about the job of looking after the people in the first

14 carriage and assessing those who were dead and those who

15 were alive and giving first aid to those who were alive,

16 or were you more concerned with events in the second

17 carriage?

18 A. I was more concerned with events in the second carriage.

19 Once the door had been opened, and access was gained,

20 things started to come together a lot better.

21 Q. We've heard evidence that cutting equipment was required

22 in order to try to get those interconnecting doors out

23 of the way. Do you recall that?

24 A. That's correct, yes.

25 Q. Did that take some time, do you remember?

1 A. I can't put a timeframe on it. It felt a lot longer
2 than possibly what it was because we were anxious to get
3 in.

4 Q. While you were there, there had been attempts with
5 handheld equipment to open the doors. You'd been trying
6 to smash open the windows. More and more people were
7 arriving. No doubt you were tending to the male and the
8 female. Perhaps some 20 minutes had passed from your
9 return to the scene.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Less or more?

12 A. I would say between 20 minutes to half an hour.

13 Q. So we're talking now perhaps about 10.15?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. An hour and a half after the bomb?

16 A. Yes.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So 20 to 30 minutes before the door
18 is opened, what's the 20 to 30 minutes from? From your
19 return to the scene to what?

20 A. From returning to the scene after my getting the water
21 and coming back down again, there was possibly another
22 15 to 20 minutes before we could get this door open.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: The 20 to 30 minutes is ...?

24 A. From the point of relaying the information up top to
25 coming back down.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So the 20 to 30 minutes had passed
2 from relaying information to getting the door open?

3 Thank you.

4 MR KEITH: Did there come a time when some of the passengers
5 who had passed away were brought out of the first
6 carriage in order to make room for the emergency
7 services to assist the wounded?

8 A. Yes, that's correct.

9 Q. Did you assist in that process?

10 A. Yes, I did.

11 Q. Did you carry them out in bags or in some sort of
12 sheeting, or were they taken out as they were and then
13 subsequently placed in some form of bag?

14 A. They were handed back through the now open connected
15 door and they were placed on the floor of the second
16 carriage. I made a decision to pick the bodies up for
17 two reasons: firstly, to create space. Space was now
18 limited, what with the amount of people who were now
19 there, and the extra equipment that was being brought
20 in. Also, I felt that, from a dignity factor, to ...

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Take your time.

22 MR KEITH: Sergeant, there's some water there if that would
23 help at all.

24 A. From a dignity factor, to place them in the bags and to
25 try to keep them as safe and as out the way.

1 Q. Because of the terrible conditions, including the
2 shortage of room and the confined spaced, there was
3 a risk, was there not, that the emergency services, who
4 were desperate to get to the living, could trample upon
5 the dead?

6 A. That's correct, yes.

7 Q. And that, in part, is why you brought them out?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. You refer in your statement to being helped in this
10 process by a member of the London Underground staff, and
11 you refer to a particular member who you said was very
12 practical member of staff.

13 A. Yes, he was.

14 Q. You don't, I suppose, remember his name or ever got his
15 name?

16 A. Unfortunately not.

17 Q. But you were helped in the process of taking those two
18 persons out of the carriage by him and no doubt other
19 persons who were there?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Who else helped you, do you recall?

22 A. I believe --

23 Q. Sergeant Betts or other people?

24 A. I think it was other people. There was Metropolitan
25 Police officers who were there and the inspector and the

1 Sergeant, they were assisting in any way that they
2 could.

3 Q. The two persons whom you brought out were placed
4 carefully, as you say, with dignity and respect, in the
5 door opening of one side of the second carriage --

6 A. That's correct, yes.

7 Q. -- away from what was going on?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. At the same time, were the casualties being brought out
10 of the first carriage --

11 A. Yes, they were.

12 Q. -- on stretchers and on whatever could be used as
13 stretchers?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Do you recall what was used as stretchers?

16 A. I'm afraid I can't.

17 Q. How did the process work? Was there a call for you and
18 your fellow officers to stand by, that somebody was
19 ready to be taken out, and then you would go in and pick
20 them up with whatever you could and then bring them out
21 and then carry them to the end of the train, or were
22 they passed daisy chain from group to group?

23 A. Some of those who couldn't physically walk were passed
24 daisy-like chain, and people were carried to a clearer
25 part of the carriage whereby they could be rested down

1 so as that, when the stretchers did eventually get
2 there, they could be taken away from the scene.

3 Q. Why do you say when the stretchers "eventually" got
4 there? Was there a problem in finding stretchers to
5 carry the injured out?

6 A. I know there was only so many stretchers at one point
7 and, due to the volume of people who required
8 stretchers, more had to be ferried down.

9 Q. Her Ladyship has heard evidence of, at the
10 Russell Square end of the train, blankets being used to
11 ferry the injured out. Do you recall, at the
12 King's Cross end, makeshift stretchers being used?

13 A. Yes, I do.

14 Q. What was used?

15 A. Anything that would take the weight of an adult, I do
16 believe I did see blankets unfolded out and used.

17 Q. We've heard evidence from Mr Chaudhury, who was a member
18 of the London Underground staff, who said that he took
19 off his hi-vi jacket and that was used in one instance
20 to carry a casualty out. Do you remember jackets being
21 used?

22 A. I can't recall that specifically.

23 Q. Is it quite possible?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. You, yourself, had divested yourself of your heavy body

1 armour. You had no gloves?

2 A. No.

3 Q. You just had to get on with doing your duty in those
4 terrible conditions?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. How long did it take for those casualties to be brought
7 out in this way?

8 A. I can't put a specific time on that. However, I would
9 estimate anything from 45 minutes to an hour.

10 Q. Do you remember, during that time, a British Transport
11 Police inspector, Inspector Mingay, appearing in the
12 carriage and then leaving again?

13 A. Yes, he did.

14 Q. Was he accompanied out?

15 A. I believe he was.

16 Q. The lady whom you described in the second carriage as
17 having the legs caked in blood, she was removed?

18 A. Yes, she was.

19 Q. And was plainly conscious when she was removed?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. The male who was also in that carriage was also removed,
22 was he?

23 A. Yes, he was.

24 Q. The lady who had the legs caked in blood, were you able,
25 when she was removed, to see a little more clearly that

1 she had severe injuries to her legs, both her right leg
2 and her left foot, in fact?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. She had an accent and you thought that she may have
5 given a name, a French name, Marianne, or something of
6 that sort?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. You spent some time with her reassuring her and bringing
9 comfort to her until her stretcher was available, did
10 you?

11 A. That's correct, yes.

12 Q. You picked her up, supported her under the shoulders and
13 the legs, and placed her down on her stretcher?

14 A. That's correct, yes.

15 Q. At any stage while you were there during that 45 minutes
16 to an hour -- and so we may presume, because we know
17 from other evidence that all the casualties were removed
18 by about 11.10, so you must have been there from about,
19 in this process, 10.15 to 11.00 or thereabouts.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Did you go back and see how Mr Johnson was at the end of
22 the train?

23 A. I did, yes.

24 Q. What was happening there?

25 A. Mr Johnson was assisting the paramedics who had gone

1 under the train. He said to me that he required more
2 morphine and I then said that I would go and try to find
3 some more for him.

4 Q. Were you able to find some?

5 A. Unfortunately not, no.

6 Q. Did you speak to the paramedics or the doctors who were
7 in the first carriage?

8 A. Yes, I did.

9 Q. Did they just not have any morphine?

10 A. They just didn't have any more supplies.

11 Q. They'd run out?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. It was obvious, wasn't it, that the casualties that
14 Mr Johnson was looking after were in dire need of pain
15 relief?

16 A. Yes, they were.

17 Q. No doubt, when you returned, they were -- certainly the
18 male was screaming, was he not?

19 A. I couldn't hear that. However, Mr Johnson had made it
20 very clear to me that there were people in pain.

21 Q. The time came when Inspector Shields, your inspector,
22 invited you to leave the train because all the
23 casualties were out.

24 A. That's correct, yes.

25 Q. Did you help with one final casualty who was on the

1 train and take him down the tunnel to the platform

2 carrying him along with other officers?

3 A. That's correct, yes.

4 Q. When you emerged at station level, were there a large
5 number of emergency service vehicles there?

6 A. Yes, there was.

7 Q. Personnel coming in and out and around and about and so
8 on?

9 A. Yes, there was lots of activity.

10 Q. Were casualties being attended to on the pavement?

11 A. I can't specifically recall seeing that. When I emerged
12 from the Underground, I briefly looked out on to the
13 forecourt and I could see lots of movement, lots of
14 activity, and from that point then, I went to platform
15 number 8, to the Duke of York public house, which was
16 now being used as a forward operating base.

17 Q. The word went round, did it not, that volunteers were
18 then sought to search the train and the tunnel for
19 possible secondary devices, and officers who were
20 trained in chemical, biological, radiological and
21 nuclear searches were asked for.

22 Did you volunteer yourself in order to go back down
23 to the tunnel?

24 A. Yes, I did.

25 Q. Together with some other officers and a dog handler from

1 the Metropolitan Police, did you then have to put on all
2 your specialist protective equipment again and go back
3 down to the tunnel?

4 A. Yes, I did.

5 Q. The heat was, no doubt, as intense as it had been?

6 A. Yes, it was.

7 Q. When you arrived at the train, did you see a police
8 officer keeping watch with a logbook -- he had an
9 incident logbook with him -- at the end of the train, he
10 was not wearing protective equipment?

11 A. That's correct.

12 MR KEITH: My Lady, that may have been Mr Collins.

13 Did you then go through the train taking readings as
14 best you could in those confined quarters?

15 A. That's correct, yes, we did.

16 Q. Did the equipment register anything of note?

17 A. No.

18 Q. But no doubt that was something, in hindsight, you were
19 aware of, you couldn't be sure that there would be
20 nothing there when you went through the train?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. Were the two persons who had passed away in the first
23 carriage still lying in the second carriage in the bags
24 in which you'd placed them?

25 A. Yes, they were.

1 Q. Were there any other bodies lying in the second carriage
2 or was it just the two whom you had brought out?

3 A. Just the two that I had placed in the bags.

4 Q. On this occasion, did you then have to go through the
5 first carriage as best you could with your equipment on,
6 with the constricted visibility and take readings in the
7 first carriage?

8 A. That's correct, we did, yes.

9 Q. Did you go all the way through?

10 A. We went as far into the carriage as we could up until
11 a certain point.

12 Q. Have you -- I shan't ask you questions, but have you
13 made a note of all those persons whom you can remember
14 lying in the first carriage as you went through?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. By this stage, the emergency services had all departed,
17 had they not?

18 A. That's correct, yes.

19 Q. So there were in the carriage only yourself and your
20 fellow searching officers and the deceased?

21 A. That's correct, yes.

22 Q. Was it extremely difficult?

23 A. It was. Our ability to move was hampered. One, with
24 our equipment, but also the floor was extremely slippery,
25 what with medical waste as well as body matter. We

1 proceeded on through to where the seats of the blast had
2 been. There was structural damage to the train and so
3 the floor was weak underfoot. We could only proceed
4 a few feet past the seat of the blast, as there were
5 a number of deceased in varying positions.

6 Q. Did you decide that it was better not to try to move
7 them --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- or to walk on them, but to take the readings as best
10 you could without having to go through them?

11 A. That's correct, yes.

12 Q. I think there was an occasion, was there not, Sergeant,
13 where you, yourself, almost went through the hole in the
14 floor --

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. -- and had to steady yourself?

17 That obligation having been completed, did you then
18 return to the platforms and then the surface level, but
19 continued to carry out your duties because I think you
20 then took part in a search of the King's Cross mainline
21 station?

22 A. That's correct, yes.

23 Q. Your duty was not, in fact, complete until 5.00 that
24 afternoon?

25 A. That's correct, yes.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: And back on duty at 7.00 the next
2 morning and sent to Edgware Road?
3 A. Yes, ma'am.
4 MR KEITH: Sergeant, thank you very much.
5 A. Thank you.
6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?
7 Questions by MR COLTART
8 MR COLTART: Sergeant, I represent the interests of the
9 family of Ciaran Cassidy who died at King's Cross. It's
10 extremely likely that one of the bodies that you placed
11 into the body bags in carriage number 2 was the body of
12 Mr Cassidy. I know that they would like me to thank you
13 for the care and dignity which you took in that
14 procedure in the period immediately following his death.
15 I've got a few areas to cover with you, if I may.
16 Can we go back to the beginning of the day when you were
17 at King's Cross and you receive the radio call to go to
18 Liverpool Street?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Now, we entirely understand why you made that journey,
21 that was the first information you had received and that
22 was your instinctive response, and off you went with
23 Sergeant Noon and the others.
24 After the event, you must have reflected upon the
25 fact that you had left the scene of one bombsite to go,

1 in fact, to the scene of where you thought a different
2 bomb had gone off, only then to come back to the
3 original venue.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. You were, despite that journey, the first emergency
6 responder on to the carriage, but did you have any
7 discussions after the event with your colleagues, either
8 formally or informally, as to how it was that that time
9 had been wasted and you had been sent on that journey?

10 A. We certainly had numerous discussions on that because of
11 the ambiguity of the information that had come over the
12 radio and because nobody could be specific with where
13 the exact problem was, information relating to Aldgate,
14 to Liverpool Street.

15 So we went to Liverpool Street with a view to trying
16 to establish what the cause was.

17 Q. We know that it was really a message at 09.08, possibly
18 if you add a couple of minutes to that, 09.10, that you
19 were asked to return to King's Cross. Were there
20 already, by that stage, difficulties with communicating
21 by handheld radio sets because of the congestion of
22 traffic?

23 A. Yes, it was extremely busy.

24 Q. When you got back to the station at King's Cross, as we
25 understand it that was at about 9.20, do you recall

1 seeing, as you arrived back at the station, a single
2 London Fire Brigade appliance already in attendance at
3 King's Cross?

4 A. I can't be specific on that, unfortunately.

5 Q. Do you recall, in fact -- and it may be that we'll have
6 to ask PC Johnson about this in a moment or two -- but
7 do you recall, when you went down the stairs and the
8 escalators to get all the way down to the platform at
9 King's Cross, passing a group of firemen at the top of
10 the escalators who were having a meeting?

11 A. I don't recall seeing any firemen when I initially
12 arrived.

13 Q. So the first time, in fact, that you saw any members of
14 the London Fire Brigade was when you'd been back up,
15 you'd had your discussion with the doctors -- and I'm
16 going to return to that in a moment -- and then you went
17 back downstairs and there were two firemen on the
18 platform who were declining to enter the tunnel until
19 further units had arrived?

20 A. That's correct, yes.

21 Q. It's fair to say, isn't it -- and in fairness to the
22 fire officers, we'll explore their protocols with them
23 later -- but you didn't show any hesitation yourself in
24 getting to where the scene of the problem really lay?

25 A. No, I'd been there initially and I knew that more

1 assistance was required.

2 Q. It was perfectly obvious to you, wasn't it, that
3 something had gone very badly wrong at King's Cross?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. It was imperative that you got to the point at which
6 that incident had occurred; in other words, you'd got to
7 the front of that train carriage?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Absent that, not only were you unable to do anything to
10 assist those who may be injured or dying down there, but
11 you would be unable also to provide an accurate report
12 to those at the surface as to what was happening?

13 A. No, not in terms of numbers, because I couldn't quite
14 clearly see in, I just had a limited view, and also with
15 the information that the member of staff provided to me
16 which was limited.

17 Q. This interconnecting door was a real problem, wasn't it,
18 between carriage number 2 and carriage number 1?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Although, as we'll hear from other witnesses who will
21 follow you, in fact it might have been possible to get
22 one or two of the passengers through that door whilst it
23 was still buckled by manoeuvring them without
24 stretchers, the fact of the matter is that most of the
25 passengers who were the King's Cross side of the

1 bombsite in that carriage were effectively trapped in
2 there, weren't they --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- until something had been done about that door?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Of all the emergency services, it's the job of the
7 Fire Brigade, isn't it, to deal with the removal of
8 defective equipment like that?

9 A. It would have been the appropriate -- they would have
10 had the appropriate equipment to do the job.

11 Q. They are the people with the cutting equipment, aren't
12 they? They are the people -- if it's a road traffic
13 accident, they are the people who are going to take the
14 doors off the car.

15 In this situation, it was their responsibility,
16 wasn't it, to ensure that access was improved into that
17 first carriage?

18 A. In that particular circumstances, they would have had
19 the equipment to do the job.

20 Q. Can I just deal briefly, please, with your return to the
21 surface, having carried out your initial assessment of
22 the situation, return to the surface and your brief
23 meeting with the member of the London Ambulance Service?

24 I'm just going to read out, if you don't mind, a short
25 passage from your witness statement, then ask you a few

1 questions about it.

2 You say:

3 "I then spoke with a member of senior London
4 Ambulance Service. I would describe him as follows:
5 white male, mid-40s, large build, about 5' 10" wearing
6 round glasses and a green LAS outfit with yellow pips on
7 the shoulders. He wore a hard hat. I told him about
8 the numbers of casualties and the types of injuries and
9 the fact that there had been fatalities. I tried to use
10 the major incident reporting principles contained in the
11 mnemonic CHALET and this covers casualties, hazards,
12 access, location of incident, emergency services
13 required and type of incident."

14 Then this sentence:

15 "This person said that he did not have the resources
16 to deal at this time."

17 Now, as far as the time is concerned, the best
18 estimate we can put on this is somewhere around about
19 9.40, 9.45 perhaps.

20 When he said that he didn't have the resources to
21 deal with the incident at this time, did he explain to
22 you what it was that he was lacking?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Did he give any explanation as to what he was trying to
25 do about the situation?

1 A. No, I could see that he was very uncomfortable with the
2 fact that he was telling me that he didn't have the
3 resources to deal.

4 Q. Without beating around the bush, Officer, he must have
5 been pulling his hair out, mustn't he?

6 A. He was very uncomfortable with the information I was
7 giving him.

8 Q. You're telling him, aren't you, that there are dead
9 people down there and there are very seriously injured
10 people down there. Did he give any indication of
11 communication difficulties which he was experiencing at
12 that time?

13 A. No, he did not.

14 Q. Can we take it that this was a very short exchange
15 between the two of you?

16 A. It was.

17 Q. Just one final topic, if I may.

18 You referred, when Mr Keith was asking you
19 questions, to the young lady, you believed was a French
20 lady. She had been moved, I think, hadn't she, at some
21 point from carriage 1 into carriage 2?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. You say in your statement you were with her for about
24 10 to 15 minutes until a stretcher became available.

25 During that time, were you ever aware of another

1 female casualty being brought into carriage number 2 and
2 left on a scoop stretcher in that carriage awaiting
3 either treatment or stretcher bearers in order to assist
4 her?

5 A. I'm afraid I can't.

6 MR COLTART: That's all I ask, thank you very much.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

8 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

9 MR SAUNDERS: Sergeant, I wonder if you can assist me?
10 Dealing with Police Constable Johnson, I've followed
11 what you've explained so far and you've then described
12 Mr Johnson being to the left-hand side of the train
13 between the train and the tunnel wall?

14 A. That's correct, yes.

15 Q. I'm going to show you a diagram. It's [INQ10283-12].

16 So that you get your bearings, the left-hand side is
17 the front of the Tube, Russell Square is obviously to
18 the left, carriage 6 is the end, going back towards
19 King's Cross and various of the counsel have already
20 asked you about the additional tunnel that appears at
21 the top of the plan. Does that give you your bearings?

22 A. Yes, it does, thank you.

23 Q. I think you've described to Mr Keith, the gentleman that
24 first asked you questions, getting on at the rear of
25 carriage 6 and making your way through. At some point,

1 you describe Police Constable Johnson being off the
2 carriage -- forgive me, off the Tube.
3 If you see carriage number 4, Sergeant, you see
4 together, at one point, two people named Lee Harris and
5 Samantha Badham.

6 A. Yes, I do.

7 Q. Obviously, we're going to hear from Mr Johnson, but can
8 we assume that it's at that area when you're unable to
9 see who he's talking about?

10 A. Yes, that's correct.

11 Q. He is positioned, but the message he's giving that you
12 then take back to the surface is: medical aid is needed?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. You've explained to us as best you can, with the help of
15 some of the additional messages, that that is at 09.44,
16 when you've gone back up and given, as it were, the
17 CHALET description as best you can -- you believe to
18 Sergeant Betts -- before returning and seeing, as you do
19 on your return, Sergeant Noon again.

20 Have I understood it right, that he's to the right
21 of the Tube train?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. So you've got Mr Johnson on the left, Sergeant Noon on
24 the right?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Thank you. Her Ladyship was asking you questions about
2 the difference between the two Fire Brigade officers,
3 the pair that are on the platform and the pair that
4 you've later described. I think what you're saying is
5 that you can't now recall whether there was a gap
6 between seeing them. So it's not that you leave the
7 platform and come across them trying to access the door?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. You then went on to explain that the removal of bodies
10 you think takes some 45 to 60 minutes. Should
11 her Ladyship look at that time as being from when you're
12 now back down on the Tube train itself?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Does that time start at 10.15?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So your timings were 9.44, you then thought 20 to
17 30 minutes for the next sequence. As Mr Keith has said,
18 we know all the living casualties were moved by 11.10.
19 So that timing, in fact, fits there, doesn't it?

20 A. Yes, that's correct.

21 Q. Thank you. You describe the efforts that you have made
22 and CHALET being the acronym that's used for being able
23 to report back.

24 Had any triaging taken place, as far as you were
25 aware, before seeing paramedics?

1 A. No.

2 Q. You've mentioned at about the 9.44 timing -- that's when
3 the message goes back from Bravo Kilo 25 -- that you
4 see, you believe, a HEMS doctor.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. So that I've understood this, may I read -- Mr Coltart
7 read a passage to you, so it's just before that, where
8 you're back now on the surface, so we think it's about
9 9.45.

10 "I saw ambulances and Metropolitan Police
11 officers ..."

12 Forgive me, my Lady, it's the top of page 6, second
13 line down, I'm obviously reading, Sergeant, from your
14 statement, as you'll appreciate:

15 "I saw ambulances and Metropolitan Police officers
16 and a person who I believe to be a paramedic attached to
17 the Helicopter Emergency Medical Service."

18 When you gave evidence, you thought you'd spoken to
19 a doctor. Now, if this helps you, Sergeant, we know
20 that doctors did attend with paramedics. Do you
21 remember who it was, whether it was a paramedic you saw
22 or a doctor?

23 A. I don't know, I can't be specific. I do know that he
24 was wearing a brightly coloured uniform of the HEMS
25 service.

1 Q. You wouldn't know -- if I gave you names, that wouldn't
2 help you at all --

3 A. Unfortunately not.

4 Q. -- as to who it may or may not have been?

5 But the explanation you were giving to him was --
6 because you knew from what Police Constable Johnson was
7 telling you, the people he was dealing with, who we
8 believe to be Lee Harris and Samantha Badham, needed
9 help and that was at 9.45.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. It must be before 9.45, because that is when the message
12 gets through to Control that help is required. Is that
13 fair?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. I'll just repeat, in case -- because I don't want to
16 mislead you, Sergeant. You speak to Johnson. He tells
17 you, "I've got these people who desperately need help".
18 We know the message goes at 9.44 from Bravo Kilo 25.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Should we take it, because it comes in the sequence in
21 your statement that, before that, you've spoken to HEMS
22 and you've explained what the problem is?

23 A. No, I went straight from PC Johnson directly up to the
24 surface and, when I get to the front of the station,
25 King's Cross station, there's a variety of activity and,

1 within a very short period of time, I get to speak to
2 three individuals, those being the HEMS doctor,
3 Sergeant Betts and also the London Ambulance duty
4 officer.

5 Q. So would it be fair to say that that timing, when you're
6 giving two of the three being the medical services, the
7 information about help being needed on the track?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Forgive me, may I just put to you very briefly, because
10 I represent a number of families, you later give
11 a description when you've gone back down now, wearing,
12 literally, your CBRN hat, describing a number of people
13 that you see. All of these are clearly, we all accept
14 now and acknowledge, fatalities. One was, in fact, on
15 the right-hand side of the train -- you are in the first
16 carriage now -- a large, black female, face down, with
17 clearly serious traumatic injuries?

18 A. That's correct, yes.

19 MR SAUNDERS: My Lady, it may well be that that's
20 Ojara Ikeagwu. You then describe later seeing somebody
21 you believe to be Monika, because of what you've seen.
22 In that same area, do you see a young white lady in
23 about her 20s, lying on her side with a priority tag --
24 forgive me, it's not a priority tag, but it's a label
25 that somebody has considered that person and has put

1 a label of "dead"?

2 A. That's correct, yes.

3 Q. Again, that young lady, serious injuries, light-coloured
4 hair?

5 A. That's correct, yes.

6 MR SAUNDERS: My Lady, it may well be, because we've heard
7 of Monika already being referred to, that that is
8 possibly a reference to Emily Jenkins.

9 Sergeant, thank you very much for your help.

10 A. Thank you.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Patterson?

12 Questions by MR PATTERSON

13 MR PATTERSON: Sergeant, just one thing, if I may, please.

14 You've described that it was perhaps some time around
15 about 10.10 by the time the Fire Brigade had got the
16 door opened, and it was possible to remove the
17 casualties from the first carriage.

18 A. That's correct, yes.

19 Q. You described the two dead bodies that were removed and
20 dealt with by you and brought in to the second carriage.

21 Can you help us with the order in which things were
22 done?

23 Were the living casualties brought out first before
24 those two dead bodies, or were they brought out first,
25 or can you not remember?

1 A. My understanding of that, in order to create space in
2 the first carriage for those members of the Fire Service
3 who had gained access, they needed to get to those
4 people who were injured.

5 In order to create space, they passed those deceased
6 through into the second carriage so as to make the
7 necessary space for them to progress forward.

8 Q. So that was one of the first things that happened once
9 the door was opened and the paramedics were able to
10 begin their work?

11 A. Yes.

12 MR PATTERSON: Again, can I make it clear that I act for the
13 family of one of those two deceased persons,
14 Philip Beer, and I know that their family also are very
15 grateful to you for the respect with which you dealt
16 with Philip. Thank you.

17 A. Thank you.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Patterson? Ms Canby?
19 Questions by MS CANBY

20 MS CANBY: Sergeant, just one matter, please, on behalf of
21 Transport for London.

22 We know that you arrived back at King's Cross at
23 about 9.20. By the time you arrived at King's Cross,
24 were you aware that Inspector Mingay had declared
25 a major incident at King's Cross at about 8.58?

1 A. No.

2 Q. You've told us that you spoke to a member of
3 London Underground staff on your arrival, and he was
4 outside the control room. In your witness statement,
5 you say that he had a first aid bag next to him and he
6 was comforting some of the injured passengers. Is that
7 right?

8 A. That's correct, yes.

9 Q. Did you try to go into the control room in order to get
10 any further information from members of staff inside
11 there?

12 A. No, I didn't, no.

13 MS CANBY: Thank you very much.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Simcock?

15 Questions by MS SIMCOCK

16 MS SIMCOCK: Thank you, my Lady. You've entered the
17 carriage from the King's Cross end, is that right?

18 A. That's correct, yes.

19 Q. Were you aware of paramedics entering the carriage from
20 the other end, from the Russell Square end?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Do you think that that's because you were concentrating
23 in the area around you and it's possible that they did?

24 A. Very much so, yes.

25 Q. You have been asked about a tag that you saw on

1 a deceased body. Were you also aware of paramedics
2 using a tagging system and tagging with priority numbers
3 1 and 2? You mention it in your statement.

4 A. Yes, I was, yes.

5 Q. Was that from the King's Cross end, the end that you
6 were dealing with?

7 A. That's correct, yes.

8 Q. But again, you wouldn't have been aware of paramedics
9 doing -- working from the other end at Russell Square,
10 is that right?

11 A. No, I had no knowledge of what was happening at that
12 end.

13 MS SIMCOCK: I'm very grateful, thank you.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Boyd?

15 Questions by MS BOYD

16 MS BOYD: May I just ask a couple of questions on behalf of
17 the London Fire Brigade.

18 You've told us you weren't aware that
19 Inspector Mingay had already been on to the train prior
20 to you.

21 A. No, I had no knowledge of that.

22 Q. You weren't aware that he'd made his way up to surface
23 level and reported the terrible scene that he had found
24 both to London Underground at 09.40 and then
25 a Fire Brigade officer at 09.45, but you were unaware of

1 that?

2 A. I was unaware of that.

3 Q. When you went down to the train the second time, you
4 hadn't actually spoken to anyone from the Fire Brigade
5 at that stage?

6 A. No, not up to that point.

7 Q. You say that there were two firefighters on the platform
8 but, by the time you made your way into the bombed
9 carriage, you say that other firefighters were either
10 there or arrived very quickly?

11 A. That's correct, yes.

12 Q. Can I suggest that, in fact, they were already there and
13 were ahead of you? The reason I say that is that
14 Leading Firefighter Roche, whose statement is going to
15 be read to the court tomorrow, says that he entered the
16 tunnel with breathing apparatus with Firefighters Wilson
17 and Jackson, who we'll also hear from tomorrow, that is
18 Mr Jackson, and he instructed another crew, which would
19 be Firefighters Shaw and Newton, to remain on the
20 platform.

21 Now, you're not aware of BA procedures --

22 A. No, I'm afraid not.

23 Q. -- and you wouldn't have been aware of that instruction,
24 but that would fit with you seeing two firefighters on
25 the platform, going on to the train and, in fact,

1 firefighters already being in the carriage?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Meanwhile, Firefighter Shaw, who's giving evidence
4 tomorrow, says that, having been instructed to remain on
5 the platform, he took off his BA set and, in fact, went
6 up to surface level to seek medical assistance.

7 I think you mentioned that you did have
8 a conversation to the effect that there was something
9 terrible going on in the tunnel?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Now, can I also just ask you about the timing on the
12 train and the removal of that door? Firefighter --
13 I should say Leading Firefighter Roche again says in his
14 statement that the door was, in fact, jammed half open
15 and he entered the carriage with Firefighters Jackson
16 and Wilson, made a quick assessment -- I think they
17 actually had to move a casualty out of the doorway --
18 and then the first thing that they did was to remove the
19 door. So in other words, that was done almost
20 immediately upon their arrival in the carriage.

21 I think you were suggesting there was a bit of an
22 interval. Do you think that's right?

23 A. Sorry, could you just repeat that last part again?

24 Q. In other words, Leading Firefighter Roche and
25 Firefighters Jackson and Wilson say that they managed to

1 enter the bombed carriage because the door was jammed
2 half open, and they made a quick assessment of the scene
3 and moved a casualty from the doorway in carriage 1 and
4 then the first thing they did was to remove the door.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. You seem to suggest that there might have been a delay
7 in removing the door, and I just want you to cast your
8 mind back as to whether that is right or whether, in
9 fact, the door was removed pretty quickly and
10 efficiently.

11 A. I'm afraid I can't be specific on the timing of the
12 removal of the door, I'm sorry.

13 Q. That's perfectly all right, Sergeant. I know that it
14 was a terrible scene that you are all having to deal
15 with. They will say that actually removing the door
16 with their cutting equipment took a matter of minutes,
17 but if you can't assist on that, then so be it.

18 Now again, as far as timing is concerned, I'm not
19 sure, I think you were suggesting that, by the time the
20 door was removed, it was about 10.15.

21 Again, they will say that they were in the carriage
22 and there is some CCTV evidence to suggest they entered
23 the tunnel at about 9.50, and if they are right that the
24 door was removed pretty quickly, then, again, your
25 timing of 10.15 might be a bit out.

1 A. Yes, possibly.

2 Q. Do you think that's possible?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. So that casualties were being moved by about that time?

5 A. Yes.

6 MS BOYD: Thank you very much, Sergeant.

7 A. Thank you.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Yes?

9 Questions by MR FURNESS

10 MR FURNESS: I'm asking questions, Sergeant, on behalf of

11 HEMS, the air ambulance, and again, it's just a question

12 of timings.

13 Dr McKenzie, who was the senior HEMS --

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Could you put the microphone on?

15 Don't worry, we all get used to it after a while.

16 MR FURNESS: Dr McKenzie, who was the senior HEMS doctor at

17 the scene recalls that the helicopter arrived at

18 9.46 am. What he's going to say is that, a few minutes

19 later, he was approached by a British Transport Police

20 officer who had a conversation with him, which may have

21 been you. It must have been a very few minutes later

22 because he goes on to say that, at 09.50 hours, he sent

23 the junior HEMS doctor and a paramedic into the station

24 to find out what was going on. Would that coincide with

25 your recollection of timings?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Do you think you spoke either to the doctor or the HEMS
3 paramedic last or first of your three conversations?

4 A. Possibly first.

5 MR FURNESS: All right, thank you very much.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Mr Gibbs?

7 Questions by MR GIBBS

8 MR GIBBS: Sergeant, could we just clear up one thing? It's
9 the door by which you got on to the train, whether it
10 was carriage 4 or carriage 6.

11 Did you get on and off the train at the same point
12 each time?

13 A. Yes, I did.

14 Q. Was it a side door or a driver's front door?

15 A. Possibly a side door.

16 Q. Was it the door by which Mr Johnson, later on, was
17 dealing with the two people under the train?

18 A. No, Mr Johnson was -- once I got on, turned right, he
19 was a short distance in, into the train.

20 Q. When you walked through the train, did you notice -- I'm
21 repeating a question that my learned friend Mr Keith's
22 already asked you -- from wherever you got on, as you
23 walked up the train, did you ever come to a door on your
24 right-hand side, which was a double door which was fully
25 open, which had a member of London Underground staff at

1 it, or was that the door that you got on at?

2 A. I believe that was the door that I got on.

3 Q. Did you know, in fact, that there were two routes from
4 two different platforms down to this stricken train?

5 A. No, I didn't, not at that time.

6 Q. If we were to call up diagram [INQ10283-8], we can see
7 that both -- of course the train was to the west of
8 King's Cross, wasn't it?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. So when we talk about the eastbound platform, we mean
11 the platform for the track that will run east.

12 Do you see where the train is in the tunnel on that
13 diagram?

14 A. Yes, I do.

15 Q. We're going to hear from Mr Johnson and Mr Noon very
16 shortly and they were with you and came on at the same
17 point as you, I think.

18 A. That's correct, yes.

19 Q. I think they will describe going down that crossover
20 tunnel, do you see, which comes in at about carriage 4
21 from the eastbound platform?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. I wonder whether it might have been there that you got
24 on?

25 A. Yes, I believe so.

1 Q. I'm fortified in that by what's in your notebook. If we
2 could bring up [BTP82-3], please, and if we amplify the
3 bottom half of the page, do you see that it looks like
4 there's a correction, an overwriting, on there at 09.20:

5 "Between King's Cross ..."

6 If you follow it down a few lines --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- we get:

9 "Enter Underground and made our way to ..."

10 It looks as though you've originally written "west"

11 and then you've written over the top:

12 "... eastbound Piccadilly Line. Numerous walking

13 wounded walking off the track."

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Another thing that will help us to clear it up, I think,
16 is this: the door through which you entered the train
17 had a member of London Underground staff at it and not
18 a BTP constable called Collins, am I right?

19 A. That's correct, yes.

20 Q. You never saw, nor did you cross with, Inspector Mingay,
21 who had already been on the train?

22 A. No.

23 Q. At the time that you arrived at the train, some time
24 after 9.20 when you got to the station, there was still
25 a continuous stream of passengers from the ticket hall,

1 the booking hall, all the way down the escalators on to
2 whichever platform you came down through the tunnel and
3 actually up to the doors where you entered the train.

4 Am I right?

5 A. That's correct, yes.

6 Q. We of course know the time by which the last of the
7 passengers in the final two carriages had already exited
8 the rear of the train.

9 Just so that my Lady has it, could I ask that one
10 other document be brought up? It's [INQ9949-1].

11 This is a sketch which you drew of the scene in the
12 first carriage, isn't it?

13 A. That's correct, yes.

14 Q. It shows where you observed bodies and parts of human
15 bodies and it shows the furthest point that you got to?

16 A. That's correct, yes.

17 Q. You've located the bomb blast. Is that the position
18 which you found when you went down for the last time on
19 the CBRN scan or the position that you found on the
20 first time at 9.20 plus, 9.30?

21 A. That was my last visit into the carriage in my CBRN
22 capacity when I had clear visibility of the layout of
23 that carriage.

24 Q. So where you have described there visible bodies and
25 body parts, those cannot be people who have at any stage

1 been removed. Those are all murder victims in situ?

2 A. That's correct, yes.

3 MR GIBBS: Thank you very much.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Gibbs, sorry, before you sit down,
5 I appreciate you will have focused on the activities of
6 the British Transport Police officers, so I wonder if
7 I could ask you one or two questions?

8 MR GIBBS: Yes.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: We had to read the statement of
10 Inspector Mingay for health reasons. I'm just trying to
11 work out how the sergeant's evidence fits with
12 Inspector Mingay's evidence. You've explained why they
13 may not have seen each other on the routes because there
14 was more than one route.

15 MR GIBBS: Yes.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: But am I right in thinking that, if
17 what Inspector Mingay's statement indicated is
18 correct and the sergeant is correct, we have essentially
19 both Inspector Mingay and this officer upstairs at
20 station level briefing representatives of the emergency
21 services at about the same time?

22 MR GIBBS: That's right.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: When Inspector Mingay had briefed the
24 London Fire Brigade and London Underground, he then felt
25 a bit shaky and he goes outside.

1 MR GIBBS: Yes.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Do we think that it's possibly at
3 that time that the sergeant comes along and he briefs
4 them, thereby missing Inspector Mingay again? Is that
5 how you would ...

6 MR GIBBS: It may be that Mr Mingay is slightly ahead of
7 this officer. The only reason why I say that is that
8 the 9.44.56 telephone call, to which one must add two
9 minutes --

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Indeed.

11 MR GIBBS: -- is made by Sergeant Betts from whom you will
12 hear in due course and must follow, by perhaps not
13 a great distance, the report that has been made by this
14 officer. We have Mr Mingay's conversations timed at
15 9.40 and 9.45 by his loggist, Constable Collins, who
16 gave evidence to you yesterday.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, I've been using his evidence to
18 get my timings.

19 MR GIBBS: Yes.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: But what it does mean is that, as the
21 likes of the sergeant go up and brief people upstairs,
22 we're not getting liaison, "Yes, we know this, we've
23 already received it from ..." so they're obviously
24 meeting and discussing this with different people.

25 MR GIBBS: It may well be that that's the case, but as

1 your Ladyship knows, it may be that Mr Mingay's --
2 Mr Mingay, at ground level, was in a state where he was,
3 at that stage, perhaps making his points less coherently
4 than this witness.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right. Thank you very much.

6 No other questions for the sergeant?

7 Sergeant McGrotty, thank you very much indeed. You
8 didn't have to go down to the train in the first place.
9 You may even unknowingly have been disobeying orders.
10 You certainly didn't have to go back to the train on two
11 more occasions. What you did went way beyond the call
12 of duty. You acted, in my view, with great courage,
13 humanity and a significant degree of professionalism,
14 and you played a significant role in the rescue attempt
15 for which I commend you. Thank you.

16 A. Thank you.

17 MR KEITH: Thank you, Sergeant.

18 My Lady, may I make one point in relation to an
19 observation made by my learned friend Mr Saunders? We
20 would certainly support his observation that the two
21 persons observed by Sergeant McGrotty are Ojara Ikeagwu
22 and Monika Suchocka.

23 We have no evidence to support the possibility, but
24 it is a possibility, that the third person whom the
25 sergeant saw, a female with white-blond hair, is indeed

1 Emily Jenkins, but I am --

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So put a question mark by --

3 MR KEITH: I'm afraid, with Mr Saunders, we suggest it is
4 a possibility, but it is impossible to be sure one way
5 or the other.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think that is what --

7 MR KEITH: That is how he put it. In relation to Mr Gibbs'
8 points concerning Inspector Mingay and
9 Sergeant McGrotty, my Lady will recall, of course, that
10 the two debriefings that Inspector Mingay conducted were
11 with the London Fire Brigade and London Underground, and
12 the Sergeant, of course, spoke to, as my Lady observed,
13 a member of the HEMS staff, as well as to a duty officer
14 with the London Ambulance Service.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Indeed. One of the matters that's
16 concerning me generally is the liaison between the
17 different organisations, as it were, at what might be
18 the centre of operations, apart from the scene itself.

19 MR KEITH: It is becoming something of a theme, is it not?

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It is. Would that be a convenient
21 time to take a break?

22 MR KEITH: My Lady, yes.

23 (11.37 am)

24 (A short break)

25 (11.50 am)

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith?

2 MR KEITH: May I invite you to call Kevin Johnson?

3 INSPECTOR KEVIN GERARD JOHNSON (sworn)

4 Questions by MR KEITH

5 MR KEITH: Good morning, Inspector. Could you give the

6 court your full name, please?

7 A. It's Kevin Gerard Johnson.

8 Q. Mr Johnson, in 2005, you were a police constable with

9 the British Transport Police. You are now, as we can

10 see, an inspector.

11 A. That is correct, yes.

12 Q. On Thursday, 7 July, were you rostered to work an early

13 turn shift at King's Cross station?

14 A. I was, yes.

15 Q. Where is the King's Cross British Transport Police

16 station?

17 A. It's halfway down platform 8, at King's Cross station.

18 Q. On the mainline station?

19 A. On the mainline station, yes.

20 Q. We've heard evidence from Sergeant McGrotty. I think

21 you were in the back of court, and so you may have heard

22 him give evidence. Is that right?

23 A. I did indeed, yes.

24 Q. I'm not, therefore, going to ask you about your trip to

25 Liverpool Street other than to ask you to confirm that

1 what you heard him say appears to you to be right?

2 A. That is correct, yes.

3 Q. Were you any better informed in relation to what you
4 understood to be the problem at Liverpool Street?

5 A. No, the only information we had at that time was there
6 was a possible electrical surge, power surge and one of
7 the substations had blown out.

8 Q. Was that information you'd received over the radio?

9 A. That is correct, yes.

10 Q. What is a power surge, or what did a power surge mean to
11 you, if anything?

12 A. A power surge was quite common in -- back in 2005, due
13 to the age of the infrastructure, both on the mainline
14 and on the Underground. Basically, it's -- the cable
15 fails due to the high voltage and another one of the
16 main fuses or something along that line blows, and the
17 circuit is taken out.

18 Q. All right.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Presumably, everything just comes to
20 a stop?

21 A. Yes.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Somebody might bang their head or
23 something, but we're not talking --

24 A. No, we're not talking a major thing. It was quite
25 a common occurrence due to some of the age of some of

1 the infrastructure.

2 MR KEITH: But there can be sometimes, I think we've seen in
3 some of the material, an alarming noise if a heavy piece
4 of machinery trips?

5 A. Indeed, yes.

6 Q. But there is no question of explosion or of parts of the
7 machinery causing injury to anybody around?

8 A. Not as in a sense of an explosion when we say it's
9 exploded. It's just the power. It's like a household
10 fuse which goes, but on a much bigger scale.

11 Q. You returned to King's Cross. We know from a pocket
12 notebook that you returned at 9.20 and you also called
13 in to the Control for British Transport Police to
14 signify that you had returned to King's Cross?

15 A. That is right, yes.

16 Q. When you arrived, could you see emergency service
17 vehicles drawn up at the front of the station?

18 A. There was indeed, yes.

19 Q. What did they consist of, do you recall?

20 A. There was numerous police vehicles. There was
21 a Fire Brigade tender and I believe there was possibly
22 an ambulance or two that was there.

23 Q. The first fire appliance arrived at 9.13, so could
24 plainly have been there, and the first ambulance arrived
25 at 9.20 and, if you arrived at 9.20, it's therefore

1 quite possible that you saw the first ambulance arrive
2 there.

3 We've heard evidence that you went down almost
4 straightaway to the platforms. Did you have any sense,
5 as you went down to the platforms and then the track
6 with your fellow officers, as to what might have
7 occurred, having seen the passengers coming up the
8 escalator?

9 A. Yes, it was in the back of my mind possibly there had
10 been an explosion of some sort. Nothing had actually
11 been confirmed at this stage, but when we got down into
12 the ticket hall, there was -- in front of the
13 London Underground station supervisor's office, there
14 was two passengers seated that had injuries, I couldn't
15 actually tell you what injuries, but I believe they were
16 to the legs.

17 Q. Sorry, your voice is dropping. I'm sorry, Inspector,
18 could you keep your voice up? It's difficult to hear
19 you.

20 There was something about their injuries that led
21 you to believe that there was a possibility of an
22 explosion?

23 A. It was crossing the back of my mind that it could
24 possibly be an explosion of some sort, along with the
25 fact that the people coming up were in different states

1 of dishevellment, distress, but no other people, at that
2 point, did I see had any physical injuries.

3 Q. Before you went down to the platforms, that is to say
4 whilst you were still at the top of the escalators, did
5 you see two firefighters from the London Fire Brigade
6 and a sub-officer?

7 A. I did indeed, yes.

8 Q. Where were they?

9 A. They were at the top of the escalator. Sergeant Noon,
10 I believe, spoke to them.

11 Q. Were you able to hear what it was that they were
12 discussing?

13 A. I did hear the fact that they was waiting for a second
14 team, which is normal protocol for them, due to
15 communication issues, and the fact that --

16 Q. I'm so sorry to interrupt, what does that mean? What
17 are communication issues in the context of waiting for
18 another team?

19 A. The communication issues at that time was that you --
20 unless you had a channel 2 radio set, which basically
21 the Underground officers had, and Underground staff had,
22 you didn't have communication downstairs.

23 Q. So it was your understanding that they may have been
24 waiting for a second team so that they could set up
25 a system of communication without having to rely upon

1 radios?

2 A. That's correct, yes.

3 Q. So you distinctly recall then the sub-officer saying
4 that they couldn't go further until another team had
5 arrived so that they had some way of putting into place
6 a runner system with the surface?

7 A. They normally -- what normally occurs, I did recall him
8 saying that they had two officers, firefighters,
9 downstairs on the platform helping people up, but
10 normally what they have is they do a back-to-back system
11 on their radios. So as long as they're in a line, they
12 can communicate with each other and relay it up.

13 Q. So it needs one team to be at the point of the
14 incident --

15 A. One team further back.

16 Q. -- to then pass a message to the second team, who can
17 then communicate with the surface, or with the Control?

18 A. As far as I understand, yes, that's correct.

19 Q. We'll hear further evidence from them as to how exactly
20 the communications worked, but your sense was, was it,
21 that they couldn't go on and do what they wished to do
22 because of something related to communication
23 difficulties?

24 A. That was my understanding at the time, yes.

25 Q. Also, before you went down the escalators, did you

1 become aware that a major incident had been declared at
2 King's Cross?

3 A. No, I wasn't aware of that at this time.

4 Q. You make reference in your statement to having heard
5 a Metropolitan inspector talking over his radio and of
6 him making reference to a major incident.

7 A. I did.

8 Q. What was that, then, a reference to?

9 A. That was a reference to those clearing the front of
10 King's Cross station and shutting Euston Road for access
11 of ambulance and treatment of the walking wounded.

12 Q. So although he made a reference to a major incident, you
13 didn't understand him to be formally declaring such
14 a thing?

15 A. No, I did not. It was as I was running past him into
16 the Underground.

17 Q. Were you concerned by the prospect of a secondary
18 device?

19 A. There was possibilities, if it had been an explosion,
20 with the previous experience, of secondary devices, from
21 the Irish side that had occurred previously. But it was
22 a case of we needed to find out exactly what was going
23 on.

24 Q. Finally, before we turn to the events on the platform,
25 did you go into the operation room or the control room

1 at King's Cross?

2 A. I did.

3 Q. Who was in there?

4 A. There was a couple of members of staff. They were
5 clearly staff because they was wearing the
6 London Underground clothing, and had their name badges
7 on, but I could not tell you who they actually were.

8 Q. Did you get confirmation, however, that traction current
9 was off?

10 A. I did.

11 Q. You then went down with Sergeant McGrotty, as he now is,
12 and Police Sergeant Noon, as he then was, and down to
13 the platforms. Did it become apparent that the severity
14 of the injuries on the passengers that you saw was
15 increasing?

16 A. Not until we got to the actual platform level. Most
17 people that was coming up the escalator at this time was
18 covered -- dishevelled, covered in dirt and soot. But
19 not any visible injuries that I could actually see.

20 Q. On the platform, did you see the Fire Brigade, the
21 firefighters to whom the sub-officer had made reference
22 when you spoke to him or when Sergeant Noon spoke to him
23 earlier?

24 A. I did, yes.

25 Q. Were they on the platform helping people up onto the

1 platform from the track?

2 A. They were, yes.

3 Q. Were there also members of London Underground helping

4 passengers up?

5 A. There was.

6 Q. Without much ado, yourself and Messrs Noon and McGrotty

7 went down the track?

8 A. We did. Sergeant Noon and -- or PC McGrotty did speak

9 to the member of staff because they were in front of me,

10 but I couldn't actually tell what was said.

11 Q. Did you go down the westbound tunnel or did you go down

12 the eastbound tunnel and use the crossover link?

13 A. We went down the eastbound tunnel and used the crossover

14 link.

15 Q. Could we please have on the screen INQ10337-1, or

16 INQ10338 [INQ10338-1]? Perhaps my references are mistaken. It

17 should be a picture of the inside. Yes.

18 That is a picture taken down the crossover link into

19 the westbound tunnel showing the side of the westbound

20 Piccadilly train.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. I cannot vouch that the lighting is the same, but as you

23 approached the train, is that more or less what you saw?

24 A. It would be, apart from the number of doors open. There

25 was only one set of doors open.

1 Q. Right. Was there anybody by the set of doors?

2 A. There was a member of staff. Whether he was -- he was
3 certainly near the train when I got there. There was
4 one in the tunnel with a quite powerful torch and there
5 was one by the train. He would have been in that
6 vicinity, yes.

7 Q. Did you pause in the crossover tunnel to help a woman
8 passenger who needed assistance?

9 A. That was before the crossover tunnel.

10 Q. So she was, what, in the eastbound tunnel?

11 A. She was in the eastbound tunnel. She was being assisted
12 by a gentleman and was obviously having very great
13 difficulty walking.

14 Q. Did you help her back to the platform?

15 A. Yes, I did.

16 Q. Then, having taken her there, you then went back down
17 the eastbound tunnel across the crossover and approached
18 the train, as we have just seen?

19 A. I did.

20 Q. Did you go on to the train through that side open door?

21 A. I did, yes.

22 Q. Presumably, because of the absence of a platform and the
23 absence of steps, the carriage floor was raised to some
24 considerable extent off the ground?

25 A. It was, yes.

1 Q. You had to haul yourself up on to the carriage floor?

2 A. I did, but there was actually a passenger still on the
3 train who approached me and asked me if he could help me
4 up, which he did.

5 Q. He pulled you up, did he?

6 A. He did, yes.

7 Q. You boarded the train, therefore. Was there anybody
8 inside that fourth carriage -- because we know that the
9 fourth carriage was adjacent to the crossover tunnel --
10 who was injured?

11 A. There was two people. There was a male and a female who
12 were to the right as I boarded the train on the
13 right-hand side of the train sitting down on the seats.

14 Q. Did you bring them some level of reassurance and try to
15 comfort them and tell them that help was on the way?

16 A. I did, yes.

17 Q. In what state were they?

18 A. They -- the woman was wanting to get out, up to the top
19 as far as I can recollect. The gentleman was a little
20 bit more quiet, but they were both eager to get off the
21 train and to get to the surface.

22 Q. In that fourth carriage, while you were there with those
23 two passengers, could you hear a cry for help?

24 A. It was after I left those two passengers and went
25 towards -- forward towards the front of the train, as

1 I approached the interconnecting doors, that I actually
2 heard the cry for help.

3 Q. Could you look, please, at [INQ10283-12]? You'll see the
4 crossover tunnel at the top of the diagram, and you will
5 see that carriage 4 is the carriage adjacent to the
6 junction. The two passengers, therefore, in that
7 carriage, you've told us. So you started to move
8 towards the front of the train towards the
9 interconnecting doors between 4 and 3, is that right?

10 A. That is correct, yes.

11 Q. Tell us what you heard.

12 A. I just heard repeated over and over, "Help me, help me"
13 in a very subdued voice, is the only -- faint voice,
14 just being repeated over and over again.

15 Q. Were you initially able to determine where the voice was
16 coming from?

17 A. No, I -- as I was walking forward, I was almost at the
18 interconnecting doors when I heard it, and I presumed it
19 was actually coming from the next carriage, which would
20 be carriage 3. I walked into carriage 3 to see if
21 I could find where this was coming from, and I can only
22 say to -- bewilderment, I couldn't actually see anyone
23 in carriage 3.

24 I walked a little bit into the carriage, in case
25 they was by the exit doors further down, and I couldn't

1 see them because of the partition, but as I walked into
2 the carriage, the voice became fainter and quieter.
3 The thought that occurred to me was I had somehow
4 missed them and walked past them and they might have
5 been in next to the door. I turned round and walked
6 back into carriage -- towards carriage 4 and, as I was
7 walking back towards carriage 4, the voice grew louder
8 and this sort of left me a little bit bewildered,
9 because I clearly could see that there was nothing in
10 carriage 4 apart from the two injured parties I had
11 already spoken to and the passenger who was assisting.
12 But I went back into carriage 4 to double-check and,
13 as I walked into carriage 4 away from the
14 interconnecting doors again, the voice grew fainter,
15 which left me with no other thought than that they must
16 be outside the train somewhere.

17 Q. So did you climb back out of the carriage through the
18 doors that you had entered carriage 4 --

19 A. I did indeed, yes.

20 Q. -- and then, if you look at the diagram on the screen,
21 did you go left or right as you look at the diagram?

22 A. I went left.

23 Q. So towards the front of the train?

24 A. I did, yes.

25 Q. Looking underneath the train now to see whether you

1 could see somebody?

2 A. Yes, I did.

3 Q. Did you have a torch?

4 A. I had my police-issue Maglite, a small Maglite, which

5 didn't provide a great deal of light in the conditions.

6 Q. Could you see anybody under the train when you looked at

7 that stage?

8 A. No, I couldn't.

9 Q. So did you then go back on the train in order to try to

10 see whether you could see something on the other side

11 between the train and the tunnel wall?

12 A. I did, yes.

13 Q. What did you do?

14 A. I went back to the interconnecting doors. The passenger

15 who was assisting offered to try --

16 Q. The gentleman who had pulled you up on to the train?

17 A. Yes. He offered to actually go -- try and squeeze

18 between the two carriages via the interconnecting door.

19 I told him not to, because the space is far too small.

20 I went to the end of carriage 4 on the left-hand side

21 and I managed to get the single door --

22 Q. You mean on the left-hand side towards the front of

23 carriage 4?

24 A. Towards the front of carriage 4, there's a single door

25 next to the interconnecting doors either side. It was

1 the left one. I managed to get that one open and, on
2 looking out, I could see persons between the train and
3 the tunnel wall on the track.

4 Q. As you looked out of the single door at the front of
5 carriage 4, were those people to your left, that is to
6 say towards the rear of the train?

7 A. They was, yes.

8 Q. How many were there?

9 A. There were three I could see at that time.

10 Q. Could you describe, please, in general terms, the three
11 people that you could see?

12 A. The first one was a male. He was closest to the single
13 door. When you say describe it, do you want the
14 actual --

15 Q. No, I just really want a description of whether they
16 were men or women and, in broad terms, the nature of
17 their injuries, if you could tell, as you looked out
18 through the door?

19 A. As I looked out the door, because the first one was
20 immediately towards the left, towards the rear of the
21 train, he was a male. He wasn't moving at this point.
22 There was a male further back, who I believe was Lee,
23 and I could hear him saying "Help me, help me", he was
24 just repeating it over and over again, and there was
25 a female, who I now believe was Samantha, behind him.

1 Q. So you immediately realised that the person, as you say,
2 who had been calling out, was the man who you
3 subsequently discovered was Lee Harris. What did you
4 do?

5 A. I immediately got out of the train on the left-hand side
6 between the tunnel wall and the train, made my way to
7 the first person, checked for vital signs via a pulse,
8 breathing, any movement. He was clearly deceased.

9 Q. Can you recall anything of that gentleman either in
10 terms of clothing or age?

11 A. I believe I had something written in my statement if I
12 may refer to that.

13 Q. Your statement is a statement that you made
14 contemporaneously, did you not, I think in July 2005?

15 A. I did, yes.

16 Q. With my Lady's permission, you may certainly refer to
17 it. If you have the typed statement we are at page 10.
18 Six lines down from the top. You refer there to a male
19 who was dead. Is that the person to whom you're
20 referring?

21 A. Yes, I've got a different typed statement to what you
22 have.

23 Q. Could you find the page that starts with the words
24 "Pleading for help" at the top? "He kept saying 'Help
25 me, help me'". Can you see those words?

1 A. Bear with me one moment, please. (Pause).

2 Q. Do you refer, Inspector, to a third person, a male lying
3 face down on the tracks, whom you checked by way of
4 checking his pulse at the neck and you were unable to
5 find any sign of life?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Do you recall that?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. It's because you were unable to find a pulse that you
10 concluded that that gentleman was dead, did you not?

11 A. That is correct, yes.

12 Q. From memory, even if you're unable to find it in your
13 statement -- but I think we have got the same statement
14 and it's a third of the way down the tenth page of your
15 statement -- do you recollect anything of that person?
16 Having ascertained that he was dead, did you go back to
17 him thereafter and check him in any way or take a note
18 of his appearance?

19 A. No, I did not.

20 Q. All right. Can you tell us anything about his age? Do
21 you recall whether he was youngish or middle-aged?

22 A. I believe, from my recollection now, he would be young
23 to middle-aged. Any more than that, I couldn't actually
24 be specific.

25 Q. All right. So that was the first person. My Lady, in

1 relation to the position of the body, it would appear
2 that that may have been Arthur Frederick, because that
3 is where his body was found, but he was, in fact,
4 considerably older. Ihab Slimane, who was also on that
5 side of the carriage, was young, he was 24, but from
6 that evidence it is impossible to say which of the two
7 people that it may have been.

8 Do you recall, Inspector, going further down the
9 tunnel wall towards the front of the train, towards the
10 front, at any stage?

11 A. That was later on, yes.

12 Q. Did you find another body further down the tunnel wall?

13 A. I did, yes.

14 Q. Can you recall anything of that person, the person you
15 found subsequently?

16 A. That was an older man who was clearly dead, I checked
17 vital signs, but he was clearly dead.

18 Q. Do you distinctly recall that he was older?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Do you recall anything of the clothing or the injuries
21 of that other person towards the front of the train?

22 A. No, I do not.

23 Q. Do you recall, for example, whether or not the person
24 you found later, further down the tunnel wall, had
25 severe leg injuries, greater and more severe leg

1 injuries than the first person whom you found?

2 A. Unfortunately, all of the ones that I dealt with had
3 severe leg injuries.

4 MR KEITH: My Lady, Arthur Frederick, who was the older
5 gentleman, had more severe leg injuries. In fact, he
6 had injuries to both his legs. But the post-mortem
7 report relating to Ihab Slimane appears to indicate less
8 severe leg injuries and he was younger of the two. That
9 may be as far as we can take the location of those two
10 people.

11 So the first person you checked was the person you
12 described. Then did you start to look at Lee Harris and
13 the lady you subsequently discovered was
14 Samantha Badham?

15 A. I did, yes.

16 Q. What did you do for them?

17 A. All I could do was to reassure them. I've checked that
18 they were both still alive, tried to -- Lee wanted to
19 turn himself over, but I tried to stop him from doing
20 that, due to the excessive injuries he had, and to
21 reassure him as much as possible, that was merely all
22 I could actually do.

23 Q. Did you have any first aid equipment with you?

24 A. No, I did not.

25 Q. Did you have any means of carrying them out of the

1 tunnel?

2 A. No, I did not.

3 Q. Were you on your own?

4 A. I was at this point, yes.

5 Q. Sergeant McGrotty had gone into the train, had he not?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. As had Sergeant Noon?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Did Sergeant McGrotty reappear, having been down to the

10 end of the train?

11 A. He did, yes.

12 Q. What did he tell you?

13 A. I heard him coming running through the train, and

14 I called out to him as he had gone past the open door.

15 He came back and he relayed the facts of what he had

16 seen at the front of the train, which was that they

17 couldn't get into the first carriage, there had been an

18 obvious explosion in the first carriage, there was

19 numerous fatalities and injured parties, and that he was

20 going upstairs to relay the information.

21 Q. You no doubt said to him, "I need help immediately for

22 these two casualties"?

23 A. I told him exactly what I had, where I was. He took

24 that on board and went upstairs to relay the whole

25 scene.

1 Q. Went off to get help. Did he come back fairly soon
2 thereafter?

3 A. It was fairly soon, yes. It seemed a long time, but it
4 was probably not that long.

5 Q. Did he tell you that he had relayed the message of the
6 request for help?

7 A. He had, yes.

8 Q. All this time, was there anything that you could do for
9 Lee Harris or Samantha Badham?

10 A. The only thing I could do for them was to give them
11 reassurance and to let them know that help was on its
12 way and we would get them out as soon as possible.

13 Q. Tell us, please, something more of Samantha Badham. In
14 what state was she?

15 A. She was very still. When I spoke to her, she spoke back
16 in an extremely quiet voice. She had repeatedly said
17 that she was having difficulty breathing, and that was
18 as far as the information I got from her, apart from her
19 name.

20 Q. So she was able to talk, albeit very softly?

21 A. She was able to talk to me, but it was very softly and
22 she was clearly in a great deal of pain.

23 Q. Were you able to see where the most severe of her
24 injuries were?

25 A. The legs and lower part of the body.

1 Q. Were her trousers, in fact, completely shredded?

2 A. They was indeed, yes.

3 Q. Was she able to tell you of where she was in the
4 greatest pain or not?

5 A. No, all she kept on saying was that she had difficulty
6 breathing.

7 Q. What happened next?

8 A. Apart from giving them reassurance, a short time later
9 a paramedic turned up on the train and was going through
10 the train. I shouted out to him to stop, I needed help.
11 He stopped. I then explained to him, relayed to him,
12 exactly what we had at the side of the train, that these
13 two casualties were trapped between the tunnel wall and
14 the train. He then turned round and said to me he's not
15 there -- he cannot assist me, he's there to triage it,
16 to assess it, and to relay what resources and
17 requirements were needed.

18 Q. Do you recall what sort of uniform he was wearing?

19 A. I don't, no.

20 Q. Was he in the normal paramedic uniform, green uniform?

21 A. I could not tell you specifically what uniform he was
22 wearing. I do know he was from the ambulance paramedic
23 side.

24 Q. In your statement, you refer to him as being in full
25 uniform, wearing an orange helmet. May we take it that

1 that was a more accurate recollection nearer the time?

2 A. Yes, yes.

3 Q. He also had a rucksack on his back. Did you tell him,
4 particularly in relation to Samantha Badham, who was
5 having trouble breathing, that immediate medical aid was
6 required?

7 A. All I remember or recollect at this time is that I did
8 tell him exactly what I had there and that they
9 obviously needed assistance.

10 Q. Did some other paramedics arrive very shortly after
11 that?

12 A. Very, very short space of time, there was another two
13 dressed very much the same who arrived. We had a short
14 discussion because they said that they needed to assess.
15 At which point, I said, "You don't need all three to
16 assess, one of you could help here", and a short
17 discussion ensued and -- which included how they was
18 going to prioritise and the labelling system, and one,
19 in fact, stayed there and the other two then went
20 forward.

21 Q. We know from a radio message that Sergeant Betts sent
22 based on information passed to him by Sergeant McGrotty,
23 based on information from you when Mr McGrotty went past
24 you, at 9.44, that Sergeant McGrotty couldn't have got
25 back to you, back down, having sought help, until at

1 least 9.50, say, on the basis of the radio call being at
2 9.44.

3 Do you know by reference to that time, or can you
4 assess by reference to that time, when you think the
5 paramedics reached you?

6 A. I would say it was probably only a matter of minutes
7 after that. Maybe five minutes.

8 Q. So after Mr McGrotty came back?

9 A. Yes, indeed.

10 Q. So one of the paramedics joined you, did he, with
11 Lee Harris and Samantha Badham?

12 A. Yes, he did.

13 Q. Whom did he attend to first?

14 A. I do not have a recollection. I think he checked both
15 of them. It would have probably been Lee first,
16 being -- he was -- you had to go over him to get to
17 Samantha.

18 Q. Because he was lying in part across Samantha, was he?

19 A. No, you were in a very narrow part, possibly 18 inches
20 wide. The body of Lee was lying diagonally from the
21 rail to the tunnel wall, and a couple of feet away
22 Samantha was, further back towards the rear of the
23 train.

24 Q. So if the paramedic joins you from having climbed
25 through the carriage and out through the single door, he

1 would have come to Lee first?

2 A. That's right, yes.

3 Q. Can you tell us anything of the first aid that the
4 paramedic gave to Lee, do you recall?

5 A. No, I mean, I left the paramedic to work on both Lee and
6 Samantha. He had his rucksack with him and I assisted
7 as best I could with him.

8 Q. Do you recall any injections being given or any sort of
9 intramuscular injection of pain relief or anything of
10 that sort?

11 A. There was some injections given at some point.

12 Q. To either or both of them?

13 A. It may have been to both of them.

14 Q. All right. How long do you assess the paramedic was
15 there giving that initial first aid?

16 A. It's very difficult to actually put a time on it.
17 I would -- it would only be a guess.

18 Q. Did there come a time when you realised that they had to
19 be removed, that they would have to be taken out of the
20 tunnel?

21 A. Yes, I mean, they would need to be taken out. That was
22 obvious at the very start.

23 Q. Did Sergeant Betts come down through the carriage and
24 did you ask him to try to find some stretchers in order
25 to get these two casualties out?

1 A. I did, yes.

2 Q. When you asked him, was it just you and the paramedic or
3 had a HEMS doctor arrived by that stage?

4 A. I believe the HEMS doctor had already arrived, in my
5 recollection, and the HEMS doctor had gone on and it was
6 one of the HEMS paramedics that had come down to assist
7 as well.

8 Q. So you were joined, yourself and the paramedic, by
9 a HEMS paramedic?

10 A. I believe so. That's my recollection.

11 Q. Did that paramedic call himself Phil?

12 A. He did, yes.

13 Q. Did you discover subsequently that his name was
14 Phil Nation?

15 A. Yes, he introduced himself to me, asked me who I was and
16 we spoke as best we could, by way of actually getting --
17 progressing forward to what was needed.

18 Q. Did the treatment of the two casualties continue with
19 the HEMS paramedic?

20 A. It did, yes.

21 Q. Can you tell us anything of that treatment as far as you
22 are you able? Was the paramedic, for example, trying to
23 give further injections or trying to bandage or bring in
24 comfort and reassurance, or what?

25 A. He was giving, from what I can recollect, he was putting

1 in intravenous stuff and giving injections.

2 Q. Did both receive intravenous drips, do you recall, or
3 not?

4 A. I cannot recall that.

5 Q. All right. You can't be more precise as to who received
6 intramuscular injections, if, indeed, they received them
7 at all?

8 A. No. I know there were some injections given.

9 Q. Do you recall either of them being given oxygen?

10 A. I remember the oxygen -- there was an oxygen bottle
11 there. Whether they was given it or not, I couldn't
12 actually say for sure.

13 Q. Your statement records that you think at one point
14 Samantha was given oxygen. Would that be right?

15 A. That could be correct, yes.

16 Q. Who was stretchered away first? I don't think it's in
17 dispute.

18 A. I think it was Lee. Was it Lee or --

19 Q. Samantha, I think it would have been.

20 A. It was Samantha. The only reason I said Lee was because
21 Lee was nearest the door.

22 Q. But, in fact, Samantha was taken away and passed to
23 other Fire Brigade and police officers who were on the
24 carriage, was she not?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. She was stretchered away through the train from one side
2 to the other, wasn't she?

3 A. Yes, she was put on to the train, I believe, by the
4 single door and exited by the doors that I actually
5 entered.

6 Q. And taken down the crossover tunnel?

7 A. That's correct, yes.

8 Q. When she was taken away, who was left with Lee?

9 A. I cannot recall whether one of the paramedics went with
10 Samantha or not.

11 Q. Do you recall a further paramedic or further paramedics
12 appearing, a Mr Sinclair or a Mr Desmond?

13 A. I cannot remember that clearly.

14 Q. Do you remember there being a number of paramedics
15 there?

16 A. There was, as the time progressed, there was more and
17 more people assisting.

18 Q. All right. We've heard some evidence from
19 Sergeant McGrotty about how you asked for morphine --

20 A. That's correct, yes.

21 Q. -- to be located, and to be found from the paramedics
22 and the doctors at the front of the carriage. Who asked
23 you to ask him to get the morphine?

24 A. I believe that was Phil.

25 Q. Was that because you -- as you understood it, he had run

1 out?

2 A. He had, yes.

3 Q. Sergeant McGrotty came back and told that you there was
4 none to be had. Do you recall that?

5 A. I don't recollect that, but --

6 Q. Do you recollect Mr Nation getting more morphine in
7 order to give it to Lee or not?

8 A. He did get some more, because I believe I went, in the
9 end, to the doctor.

10 Q. Where did you go?

11 A. That was towards the front of the train.

12 Q. You got some from a doctor who was there, did you?

13 A. I did, yes.

14 Q. Then did there come a time when, as you told us earlier,
15 you walked down the side of the tunnel towards the front
16 of the train and that's where you saw a further
17 passenger lying on the tracks?

18 A. There was, yes.

19 Q. Or not on the tracks; in the gap between the tunnel and
20 carriage?

21 A. In between.

22 Q. Did you check for signs of life in relation to that
23 person?

24 A. I did, yes.

25 Q. Was it absolutely plain to you that there were no signs

1 of life and he had passed away?

2 A. It was, yes.

3 Q. Having done that, and having checked down the side of

4 the tunnel, did you go back to where Lee was?

5 A. I did, yes.

6 Q. Do you recall him being removed?

7 A. Yes, I assisted with his removal and getting him on to

8 the train.

9 Q. Did you, yourself, go into the train and further down

10 towards the front at any stage, other than to find

11 morphine from the doctor?

12 A. Yes. When we got him on the train, one of the

13 paramedics, possibly Phil, said that we needed the

14 doctor to assist with Lee.

15 Q. Why was that, did you understand?

16 A. I have no recollection as to ...

17 Q. Was it because his condition had changed such that the

18 paramedic felt the need for you to go and get a doctor?

19 A. The only recollection I have was it was -- his condition

20 was actually worsening and the doctor was required

21 for -- whether to give more medical attention or whether

22 to give more drugs, I'm not sure.

23 Q. So did you go into the train towards the front to try to

24 find the doctor?

25 A. I did, yes.

1 Q. Shouting out, we see from your statement, "Where is the
2 HEMS doctor?"

3 A. Yes, that's correct.

4 Q. As you passed through the train, did you see two white
5 body bags in the second carriage immediately adjacent to
6 the interconnecting doors to the first carriage?

7 A. I did, yes.

8 Q. No doubt you saw casualties being placed on stretchers
9 and being carried out of that first carriage?

10 A. Yes, I did.

11 Q. Did you find the HEMS doctor?

12 A. Yes, I did.

13 Q. Did he come back to Phil and Lee?

14 A. He did, yes.

15 Q. What happened next?

16 A. He had a short conversation with the paramedic and it
17 was decided that he needed to be taken to the platform
18 where they would continue to work on him.

19 Q. Did you see any further medical assistance, by way of
20 injection or anything of that sort, being given to Lee
21 before he was then taken away from that spot on
22 a stretcher?

23 A. No.

24 Q. So although you had found the HEMS doctor, the HEMS
25 doctor appeared then to have been required for the

1 purposes of making an assessment of his condition rather
2 than for the purposes of giving him further medicine?

3 A. No, I would say that the HEMS doctor and the paramedic
4 spoke with each other and it was decided it would be
5 better to take him back to the actual platform where
6 they could work on him. Whether it be with more
7 equipment or with more injections, I'm unsure.

8 Q. The reason I ask is that you say in your statement "the
9 doctor passed me the medical stuff to give to Phil,
10 which I did"?

11 A. That was when he was still down on the track.

12 Q. That was on the track.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. So there was some further medicine given?

15 A. Yes, there was.

16 Q. Then, as Lee Harris' condition worsened, it was then
17 decided he should be put on the train and taken away
18 from the area next to the tunnel wall?

19 A. It was when we got him on to the train that Phil decided
20 that his condition had worsened and the doctor was
21 required urgently.

22 Q. Did he come back?

23 A. He did, yes.

24 Q. What happened?

25 A. That was when the decision was made to actually take him

1 back to the platform where they would continue to work
2 on him.

3 Q. You had to go and get the doctor on that occasion as
4 well, did you?

5 A. I did, yes.

6 Q. When you went through on that occasion, did you get
7 a clearer view of the inside of the first carriage and
8 the significant number of deceased who were lying on the
9 carriage floor?

10 A. I did, yes.

11 Q. But you didn't, I think, go all the way in?

12 A. No, not at that point.

13 Q. How was Lee Harris taken out?

14 A. He was taken out on a stretcher via the doors that
15 I entered.

16 Q. Who carried him out?

17 A. No, it was -- I believe there was a combination of
18 Metropolitan officers and Fire Brigade officers that
19 appeared at the door as I was helping him through the
20 carriage, they appeared at the door and the stretcher
21 was handed over to them to take down to the platform.

22 Q. So both the casualties whom you had tended were by then
23 removed?

24 A. That is correct, yes.

25 Q. What did you do?

1 A. I then went back to the front of the train.

2 Q. What did you do there?

3 A. I -- it was at that point it was more or less coming to
4 an end where the casualties had all been taken out.

5 Inspector Shields then invited everyone to leave the
6 train and, as we walked through the train, we
7 double-checked to make sure that all casualties had been
8 taken out.

9 Q. I think a little later there was then a call for
10 volunteers to carry out a CBRN sweep, which was done,
11 and then you volunteered for a search, to carry out
12 a search of the whole of the mainline station at
13 King's Cross?

14 A. That is correct, yes.

15 Q. Therefore, you remained there for some time carrying out
16 your duties on behalf of the British Transport Police?

17 A. I did, yes.

18 MR KEITH: Thank you, Inspector. Will you stay there?
19 There may be some further questions for you.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

21 Questions by MR COLTART

22 MR COLTART: One short topic, please, Inspector, and that's
23 the meeting, the short meeting, that you had or that
24 Sergeant Noon had with the Fire Brigade officers at the
25 top of the Piccadilly Line escalator.

1 Do you have your witness statement with you there?

2 A. I have, yes.

3 Q. Can I ask you, please, to turn to page 5 of that
4 statement? About halfway down the page, do you see the
5 sentence which starts:

6 "All the people coming up from the Piccadilly Line
7 were covered in soot."

8 A. I do, yes.

9 Q. Just to put this in context, this is when you've arrived
10 back at King's Cross and yourself and the other BTP
11 officers are heading down to the platform to find out
12 what's gone on?

13 A. That is right, yes.

14 Q. You pass this group of firemen who are assembled at the
15 top of the Piccadilly Line escalator?

16 A. Yes, that is correct.

17 Q. "All the people coming up from the Piccadilly Line were
18 covered in soot. They had blackened faces. They were
19 a mixture of male and female adults. I did not see any
20 children. I saw a sub-officer and two other officers
21 from the Fire Brigade standing at the top of the
22 escalator."

23 My Lady, for your note, it seems likely that the
24 sub-officer is leading Firefighter Roche, whose
25 appliance had arrived at 9.13.

1 "These three Fire Brigade officers were all male.
2 The sub-officer was in his 40s. He was wearing full
3 uniform, including a white helmet, which is how I knew
4 he was sub-officer. Sergeant Noon went over and spoke
5 with him and I heard him say that he had officers
6 downstairs assisting people off the track."
7 So in other words, people arriving at the platform
8 from the tunnel were being assisted up onto the platform
9 by the fire officers who had gone downstairs?
10 A. That is correct, yes.
11 Q. "The sub-officer was waiting for another two units to
12 arrive."
13 In other words, before he was prepared to commit his
14 officers to the tunnel as opposed to the platform, he
15 was going to have to wait for two further fire engines
16 to arrive at the station?
17 A. That is what I understood.
18 Q. "Someone mentioned that there had been an explosion on
19 the train."
20 Can you recall who it was who made that observation?
21 A. I have no recollection as to ...
22 Q. In any event, the firemen are standing at the top of the
23 escalator watching the injured people come upstairs
24 covered in soot, and they've been told of an explosion
25 on the train but their protocols are preventing them

1 from going into the tunnel until two more fire engines
2 have arrived.

3 A. I can only presume that, yes.

4 MR COLTART: My Lady, again for your note, I anticipate that
5 we'll hear evidence tomorrow that that second appliance
6 arrived at 9.42, enabling the Fire Brigade to commit to
7 the tunnel.

8 You gave evidence a little earlier in response to
9 questions from Mr Keith about the reason why the London
10 Fire Brigade protocols dictate the sequence of events,
11 and you talked about channel 2 enabled radios.

12 Just so that we're plain about this, was this
13 something which you gleaned from the discussion which
14 took place at the top of the escalators, or is this from
15 your wider knowledge and experience of how the emergency
16 services work?

17 A. This is from previous experience with the Fire Brigade,
18 that they have a set procedure to go down into areas on
19 the Underground due to the communication problem.

20 Q. I just want to ask you a little -- and I hope you can
21 assist us and inform us in relation to this -- about
22 channel 2 enabled radios.

23 These are radios which are carried by at least some
24 officers of the British Transport Police, is that right?

25 A. That is correct, yes.

1 Q. Now, we understood from the evidence from

2 Sergeant McGrotty this morning that some BTP officers

3 have them and some don't. Is that right?

4 A. That is right, yes.

5 Q. Presumably, those who do have them are those who

6 routinely work at the Underground stations rather than

7 overground stations?

8 A. That is correct, yes.

9 Q. Was your radio channel 2 enabled?

10 A. No, it wasn't.

11 Q. If one does have a channel 2 enabled radio, what does it

12 permit that one without it doesn't have?

13 A. You can communicate on the Underground, providing you're

14 in the station or platform areas. Once you're in the

15 tunnel, it doesn't actually afford communication.

16 Q. What about London Underground staff? Their radios, do

17 they permit further access, or are theirs limited to the

18 same degree, or do you not know, in fairness?

19 A. As far as I know, it's just the same. It's within the

20 platform and station areas.

21 Q. You talked about a line of sight, I think, in relation

22 to the Fire Brigade officers and their use of radios.

23 A. When I say a line of sight, it's -- from my

24 understanding, it's back-to-back, you can be a certain

25 distance and the radio will pick that message up. But

1 you'd have to speak to the Fire Brigade.

2 Q. In any event, none of you, as far as you were aware, had
3 a radio which was going to be capable of working inside
4 the tunnel?

5 A. No, we did not.

6 MR COLTART: Thank you. That's all I ask.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

8 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

9 MR SAUNDERS: Inspector, can I take you back to you exiting
10 the train on the tunnel side, the tunnel wall side?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. You've described to Mr Keith the number of people you
13 come across. I'm going to ask you about two. One
14 family I represent is that of Lee Harris.

15 If you have your statement -- I think you have it
16 there -- can I have a quick look, please, with
17 your Ladyship's permission? I've put it at page 9
18 there. We're using numbers at the top right.

19 I think it's right, about a third of the way down,
20 Inspector, you say:

21 "I got out of the train to help the people that
22 I had seen."

23 The first person you see is a woman and then you go
24 on to describe the person we now know is obviously
25 Samantha Badham.

1 A. That is correct, yes.

2 Q. You describe her by age, description and clothing and
3 that she is, at this stage, able to tell you that her
4 name was -- you couldn't remember when you made your
5 statement but, in fact, you thought it may have been
6 either Sarah or Sam.

7 A. That is correct, yes.

8 Q. Then, just at her left, you then describe the person she
9 is with, which clearly, when reading through, is
10 Lee Harris. They are within a foot of each other, and
11 there is an amount of blood which you believed had
12 obviously come from him?

13 A. That is correct, yes.

14 Q. But I think it's right, notwithstanding -- and
15 Mrs Harris is here, the lady with the blue shawl around
16 her red jumper. So she is aware that her son had
17 traumatic leg injuries, but I think the point is this,
18 isn't it, that although there was an amount of blood, he
19 wasn't actually bleeding when you got there?

20 A. No, he wasn't.

21 Q. If he had been, there may have been other action you
22 would have thought of taking in terms of first aid?

23 A. That is correct, yes.

24 Q. But it wasn't that there was somebody bleeding in front
25 of you. Although there was blood clearly there, for

1 whatever reason he hadn't received any first aid, for
2 whatever reason he wasn't currently bleeding but was
3 obviously conscious, because I think, as you came down
4 the wall, as it were, he was still shouting "Help me"?

5 A. That is correct, yes.

6 Q. That was exactly the same voice you'd heard throughout
7 when you describe going into carriage 3 and back again
8 as it got more faint and coming back and hearing it
9 again?

10 A. That is right, yes.

11 Q. So you've seen him with the injuries that he has and
12 I think it's right -- it may be my confusion -- that
13 it's after that you see this third person. So you've
14 described seeing Sam first of all, then Lee, who's
15 within a foot, and then I think you go on to describe
16 a third person you see in about that area?

17 A. Yes, he was slightly further down.

18 Q. Slightly further down. I think, in fairness to you,
19 that's in your statement. It's at page 9, as I've just
20 shown you. Then over the page to page 10, please,
21 Inspector, where you simply deal with this third person
22 whom you checked for a pulse in the neck, you can't find
23 one, and the result of that and his injuries, you formed
24 the impression that he was dead?

25 A. That is correct, yes.

1 Q. Then can I take you through the sequence, because it may
2 be that it's me?
3 McGrotty -- forgive me, because I'm not going to use
4 his "Police Constable" or "Police Sergeant" -- comes and
5 you give him the information that these two people,
6 Samantha Badham and Lee Harris, clearly need medical
7 assistance.

8 A. That is correct, yes.

9 Q. He has gone and then he comes back.

10 A. That is right.

11 Q. I think you are aware, because of various of the
12 messages, that that must be a call that he makes or has
13 made by Sergeant Betts at 9.44?

14 A. That is right, yes.

15 Q. So he has come back within five minutes of that?

16 A. Correct, yes.

17 Q. Lee is still saying -- so he's still clearly
18 conscious -- he is still saying, "Help me"?

19 A. That is correct, yes.

20 Q. You're obviously doing your best to calm him down and to
21 say, "Well, help is on the way", and it's shortly after
22 that one of the paramedics arrive?

23 A. That is right, yes.

24 Q. Do you know, was that a paramedic called Peter Taylor?

25 A. I don't know the name.

1 MR SAUNDERS: My Lady, you're going to hear the evidence,
2 I think on Thursday of this week, from a number of them,
3 including obviously Mr Taylor and Mr Nation.

4 But shortly after that, although there's triaging,
5 you describe to us the triaging, one of them stays with
6 Lee and Sam throughout?

7 A. That is correct, yes.

8 Q. So it's not a case that all of them leave. One stays,
9 whoever it is, when others do go off and continue with
10 triaging?

11 A. That is right, yes.

12 Q. Did you assume from what they were saying that they
13 believed they were the first medical team on scene?

14 A. I did, yes.

15 Q. Because, in your experience, Inspector, is it the first
16 medical team that deals with triage?

17 A. It is, yes. In actual fact, that's what they told me
18 they was doing.

19 Q. Thank you. I think it's shortly after that the HEMS
20 paramedic turns up?

21 A. That is correct, yes.

22 Q. Can you help as to the time difference between the first
23 paramedic and the HEMS paramedic?

24 A. I would say that would be five minutes or so.

25 Q. He introduces himself as "Phil" --

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. -- who, as Mr Keith has said, we believe to be
3 Phil Nation, who was the HEMS paramedic. It's at that
4 point, isn't it, that he, Mr Nation, is helping with Lee
5 and Sam?

6 A. That is correct, yes.

7 Q. Sergeant Betts then arrives with a stretcher?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. I'm at page 11 of your statement now, Inspector. If you
10 need to refresh your memory, I'm sure her Ladyship will
11 have no objection.

12 So he arrives with a stretcher and somebody else is
13 then removed with the stretcher?

14 A. Yes, that is correct.

15 Q. Sam is put onto the stretcher and then she's taken
16 through the train and passed to various Fire Brigade and
17 police officers?

18 A. That is correct, yes.

19 Q. It's at that point that the paramedic, Phil Nation --
20 my Lady, I'm at the bottom of page 11 -- it's at that
21 point Phil Nation says that he needs more morphine for
22 Lee. About six lines from the bottom, Inspector.

23 A. That is correct, yes.

24 Q. But also that the doctor would have to administer it?

25 A. Yes, that is correct.

1 Q. So you then go in search of the doctor.

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. It's in the course of that that you see another person,
4 but eventually you shout out, "Where's the doctor?", and
5 the HEMS doctor makes himself known to you.

6 A. Yes, that is correct.

7 Q. That's what you've said, I think, in the middle of
8 page 12, it's the HEMS doctor, and you describe him, you
9 told him -- you passed on the information that the
10 paramedic, Phil Nation, had given you, that he wanted to
11 administer morphine to Lee?

12 A. That is correct, yes.

13 Q. It is only then a short period of some 30 seconds until
14 he follows you back to where Phil Nation is?

15 A. That is correct, yes.

16 Q. Though I think it's right that -- you've obviously heard
17 the distance between the carriage and the rail floor --
18 the doctor stays on the train.

19 A. That is correct.

20 Q. You get off with the supplies.

21 A. I jumped down first, he then -- the doctor talks to Phil
22 from the carriage and he passes me the morphine to give
23 to Phil to actually administer.

24 Q. Right. So the doctor is there and overseeing?

25 A. He is, yes.

1 Q. He is giving instructions to the paramedic as to the
2 administering of the drugs?
3 A. That is correct, yes.
4 Q. And you're there helping, as best you can, throughout
5 all of this?
6 A. Yes, I am, yes.
7 Q. The doctor then goes back to the front of the train
8 where there are obviously more casualties, and it's at
9 that point a decision is made to put Lee Harris on to
10 a stretcher and for him to be taken?
11 A. Yes, that is correct.
12 Q. It's then that Phil says that he's now concerned about
13 Lee and could the doctor be recalled?
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. So that's the sequence, where the doctor then returns
16 and explains it's best to treat Lee on the platform
17 where clearly there's more space and more light?
18 A. Yes, that is correct.
19 Q. Do you know, Inspector, how long it was you spent with
20 Lee and Samantha Badham?
21 A. No, I do not know. It was a fair length of time,
22 though.
23 MR SAUNDERS: I've been asked specifically by Mrs Harris,
24 Lee's mother, to thank you for all the time you spent
25 with them and for all the efforts you made in securing

1 both the doctor's help and the paramedics and the
2 treatment, but also for the comfort you've obviously
3 given both of them and the effort that you made on their
4 behalf, and she would very much like to thank you for
5 that. Thank you very much, Inspector.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Patterson? Ms Simcock?

7 Questions by MS SIMCOCK

8 MS SIMCOCK: Thank you, my Lady.

9 Inspector, in relation to when you first saw
10 Samantha Badham, in relation to her lower limb injuries,
11 you clearly appreciated they were very serious. Is that
12 right?

13 A. That is correct, yes.

14 Q. I'm sorry to remind you, but in your statement you use
15 the word "shredded". Does that describe what you saw?

16 A. Yes, it was.

17 Q. You say, though, in your statement that she didn't
18 appear to be bleeding badly. Is that right?

19 A. That is correct, yes.

20 Q. Could you see, in the same way that you could in
21 relation to Mr Harris, blood around her or not?

22 A. No, I could not, but it was particularly poor light in
23 there.

24 Q. Yes, I'm sure we all understand. You were also asked
25 about whether she was in pain and it seemed to you that

1 she was. Is that right?

2 A. It is, yes.

3 Q. In your statement, you also say that she kept telling
4 you that she was hurting. Do you remember that now?

5 A. I have a vague recollection, but it is vague. The main
6 thing that sticks with me is that she kept on repeating
7 that she had difficulty breathing.

8 Q. Yes. Do you remember at all whether she was able to say
9 where she was hurting?

10 A. No, I cannot recollect that.

11 Q. Did she appear to be -- you were clearly speaking to
12 her. Did she appear to be responding to what you were
13 saying or was she simply repeating the same thing over
14 and over again without responding to you?

15 A. No, she did respond to me because she told me her name
16 and various other small details.

17 Q. Did that consciousness level appear to you to be
18 relatively constant throughout the time that she was
19 with you?

20 A. It was, yes.

21 Q. So in contrast to Mr Harris when you were with her,
22 albeit that she was clearly in pain and having this
23 trouble with breathing, she didn't appear to deteriorate
24 significantly in the time you were there. Is that
25 right?

1 A. That is correct, yes.

2 Q. In relation to the situation with injections given by
3 paramedics and/or the HEMS doctors, can I just clarify
4 the position in relation to what you remember?

5 You remember an injection or injections being given
6 to either Samantha Badham or Mr Harris or both, but
7 you're not sure which of those is right?

8 A. No, I think there was a -- possibly a mixture of fluids
9 being administered or -- I certainly have a recollection
10 of the morphine injection being given by Phil under the
11 supervision of the doctor who was still on the train.

12 Q. That was to Mr Harris?

13 A. That was, yes.

14 Q. Was the first time you heard any mention of morphine in
15 relation to Mr Harris?

16 A. That was the first time I had any recollection of
17 a request for morphine, but they were working on him
18 and, because of the actual restriction in space, I was
19 obviously further back, so --

20 Q. So you couldn't see exactly what was being done?

21 A. No.

22 Q. So is the situation that you don't know how any
23 injection, or such injections that were given, how they
24 were given?

25 A. I wouldn't know how they were given, no.

1 MS SIMCOCK: Thank you.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Boyd?

3 Questions by MS BOYD

4 MS BOYD: Inspector, I'd like to ask you a few questions on
5 behalf of the London Fire Brigade.

6 In particular, can I ask you about the conversation
7 with the fire officers at the top of escalator on your
8 arrival and before you went down to the platform?

9 I think that would have been shortly after your arrival,
10 so soon after 9.20. Is that correct?

11 A. That is correct, yes.

12 Q. You thought that they were waiting for a second crew --
13 or you described two units, I'm not sure whether that's
14 two appliances or two crews, but it may not matter.

15 They advised you that they were waiting for two further
16 units, and you understood that the reason for that had
17 something to do with communications.

18 A. That is what I presumed.

19 Q. In fact, was it more to do with procedures concerning
20 deployment of crews and breathing apparatus? In other
21 words, did you understand that, in fact, the officer
22 wanted to send a BA crew -- breathing apparatus crew --
23 to investigate?

24 A. That I don't know and I wasn't there long enough.

25 I just heard a brief part of the conversation, because

1 it was Sergeant Noon who was actually having the
2 conversation with the sub-officer and I then went
3 straight to the station control room to check about the
4 power.

5 Q. Of course, information was very limited from the control
6 room because we know, from evidence we've heard, that
7 two LUL staff were in the bombed carriage, but of course
8 didn't have radios, so couldn't communicate back. So
9 information was very limited both for you and your
10 colleagues and also for London Fire Brigade.

11 But the information they did have was that there was
12 smoke in the tunnel and, of course, breathing apparatus
13 crews are used to investigate fires or conditions where
14 there is thick smoke, so where you wouldn't normally be
15 able to breathe without apparatus?

16 A. That would be correct.

17 Q. Is that your understanding?

18 A. Yes, that would be correct.

19 Q. So given the information, albeit limited, was that there
20 was smoke in the tunnel, it would be perhaps a natural
21 response of the fire officer to want to send a breathing
22 apparatus crew to investigate?

23 A. That could be quite correct, yes.

24 Q. You're not aware of what procedures govern breathing
25 apparatus or the deployment of breathing apparatus

1 crews?

2 A. No, I wouldn't have an understanding there.

3 Q. But you would perhaps appreciate that they can be
4 hazardous environments, and so, therefore, procedures
5 have to be in place for their protection?

6 A. Indeed, yes, yes.

7 Q. One wouldn't want anyone falling to be a casualty having
8 to be rescued themselves?

9 A. No, that's quite right.

10 Q. We, of course, now know that smoke actually in the
11 tunnel wasn't an issue and breathing apparatus wasn't
12 required, but that's with the benefit of hindsight?

13 A. Indeed it is.

14 MS BOYD: Thank you very much, Inspector.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Mr Coltart?

16 MR COLTART: Sorry, can I ask one question arising out of
17 that questioning from Ms Boyd?

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes.

19 Further questions by MR COLTART

20 MR COLTART: It has been suggested to you that there was no
21 way of knowing, this fire crew at the top of the
22 escalator, that there was no fire or heavy smoke inside
23 the carriage in question.

24 They were standing at the top of the escalator where
25 passengers who were covered in soot were coming up. Did

1 you hear them ask any of the passengers as to what the
2 conditions were like in the carriage?

3 A. No, I did not, but I didn't actually stand with them
4 that long, it was just a fleeting moment where I went to
5 the control room.

6 Q. In fairness to them, they might have been asking that
7 question, but we'll have to ask them when they come?

8 A. That is correct, yes.

9 MR COLTART: Thank you.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions?

11 Thank you very much, Inspector Johnson. It must
12 have been very distressing to you to learn that, despite
13 your valiant efforts, Sam and Lee died, but you've heard
14 what a comfort it is to their families to know that you
15 were there in their darkest hour offering them
16 reassurance and warmth. I see from your pocketbook that
17 you are another officer who, despite the horrors of that
18 day, were back on duty at 7.00 the next morning.

19 A. I was, yes.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much for everything
21 that you did and your humanity to those who were so
22 desperately injured and trying to get them some help.

23 Thank you.

24 MR KEITH: Thank you, my Lady. Thank you, Inspector.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right, Mr Keith, 2.05 pm.

- 1 (1.00 pm)
- 2 (The short adjournment)
- 3
- 4