

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005
Hearing transcripts - 8 December 2010 - Afternoon session

1 (2.00 pm)

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith?

3 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call
4 Matthew Jackson, please?

5 MR MATTHEW WARREN SPENCER JACKSON (sworn)

6 Questions by MR KEITH

7 MR KEITH: Good afternoon. Could you give the court your
8 full name, please?

9 A. Matthew Warren Spencer Jackson.

10 Q. Mr Jackson I'm sorry we have made you wait for quite
11 a while because you were scheduled to give evidence this
12 morning. I do apologise to you.

13 On Thursday, 7 July, were you part of the crew for
14 Alpha 241 --

15 A. I was, yes.

16 Q. -- out of Soho London Fire Brigade station?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. You arrived at King's Cross, we know from other records,
19 at 9.42. Do you remember seeing Mr Wilson, the driver
20 of Alpha 241, outside King's Cross station?

21 A. He was the driver of Alpha 242.

22 Q. I'm so sorry, you're quite right, 242. You were 241.

23 A. He was, yes.

24 Q. Did you see him when you arrived?

25 A. I believe so, yes, he was standing by the truck.

1 Q. Did you go to the control room with your fellow
2 officers, fellow firefighters, in order to try to get
3 some more information as to what was happening?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Do you recollect how much time passed between your
6 arrival and when you were sent down to the track?

7 A. The track itself, probably a good -- by the time we
8 actually had a quick brief in the control room, went
9 back to get the cutting gear, walked downstairs again,
10 probably five, ten minutes.

11 Q. Your evidence is important because, as you've just
12 mentioned, you were in charge of the cutting gear, and
13 I think you and one other firefighter were responsible
14 for using the cutting gear in the carriage?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Who was the other firefighter who --

17 A. Firefighter Wilson.

18 Q. It was Firefighter Wilson. So he left his appliance
19 when you went down, because he went down with you, even
20 though he'd been the driver of the other appliance?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Do you recollect taking other equipment down with you or
23 was it just the Holmatro cutting equipment?

24 A. We had our BA sets on and just the cutting gear, because
25 obviously, that's a two-man lift as such.

1 Q. Is it equipment that takes two people to carry?
2 A. Officially, it's four, but it was -- there was only two
3 of us at the time that took it.
4 Q. So you carried that kit which comprises the cutting
5 equipment and a generator to power it, in one --
6 A. Yes, yes.
7 Q. -- one appliance, one --
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. -- square metal sheet with --
10 A. It's a sort of trolley with two handles on each end.
11 Q. It's pretty heavy?
12 A. It's reasonable, yes.
13 Q. Did you have difficulty getting it through the carriages
14 into the first carriage?
15 A. Well, we didn't take it in the first carriage.
16 Q. To the end of the second carriage?
17 A. We took it to the end of the second carriage and,
18 obviously, we dropped our BA sets then, because
19 obviously we didn't need them, and we put the cutting
20 gear together and basically cut the door off.
21 Q. How long does it take to put the cutting gear together?
22 A. A couple of minutes, I would have thought, start the
23 generator up and get it going and connect the tools. So
24 it would have only been a few minutes.
25 Q. When you arrived at the end of the second carriage, was

1 it immediately clear that those were the doors that you
2 had to try to cut off?

3 A. Yes, it was the back door of the first carriage. The
4 front of the second carriage door was already open, so
5 it was only -- it was like half-open, the door, and we
6 couldn't move it by pushing it, so it was -- the only
7 way of doing it, obviously, was to cut it off, but you
8 could still walk through there.

9 Q. You could see people coming -- people were obviously
10 able to go through, but what couldn't have come through
11 were stretchers or various of the injured people?

12 A. Yeah, we couldn't have actually got anyone out of it
13 while the door was in that state, at the time.

14 Q. When you had concluded cutting the door off, did you
15 then go back towards the platforms and meet, in fact,
16 Sub-Officer Colebrook-Taylor on the way?

17 A. Yes, I met him halfway to the platform, we actually met
18 on the tracks, and I basically explained to him what we
19 did and what we've got to do. Instructed
20 Firefighter Cook, I believe, to get some lighting and
21 basically get everyone else on to the train to assist in
22 the rescues, basically.

23 Q. Did you leave the cutting equipment in the carriage
24 or --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. -- did you take that back with you?

2 A. We left it all in the carriage with the BA sets and
3 everything.

4 Q. Your statement records, as we know from other
5 firefighters, that there was no radio contact in the
6 tunnel, and so people had to run or walk back to the
7 platforms and then up to the surface level to get
8 messages out.

9 A. Mm-hmm.

10 Q. One such issue for you was lighting, because you record
11 how you requested lighting.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Did you go back and ask people on the surface for
14 lighting, or did you have to use somebody else as
15 a runner to --

16 A. No, when I met Sub-Officer Colebrook-Taylor in the
17 tunnel, he had Firefighter Cook, I believe, with him.
18 I basically said to Firefighter Cook, "Try to sort some
19 lighting out", and I walked back to the carriage with
20 Sub-Officer Colebrook-Taylor.

21 Q. Was that because it was obvious that the lighting in the
22 tunnel was insufficient for you and your colleagues to
23 be able to see what you were doing in the carriage?

24 A. Yes, and obviously there was no lighting at all in the
25 first carriage at all.

1 Q. Did some people have torches, do you recall?

2 A. Yes, we had our own personal torch, but --

3 Q. But it's not good enough?

4 A. -- it's not really for what we had to do.

5 Q. Did lighting appear, ever, do you recall?

6 A. It did. I believe they actually found some from the
7 construction that was going on in King's Cross itself,
8 and they brought some big lights through. That was the
9 first set of lighting that come through, basically.

10 Q. We've heard some evidence from a British Transport
11 Police officer who was able to go and get some Dragon
12 lamps which are bigger, handheld lamps.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Do you recall them turning up and assisting?

15 A. Possibly. I mean, there was so much going on at the
16 time.

17 Q. All right. So having met Sub-Officer Colebrook-Taylor,
18 you then went back to the train, and where were you
19 positioned? Were you in the first carriage, lifting up
20 and carrying the casualties and moving the deceased
21 passengers, or were you in the daisy chain of
22 firefighters who were passing stretchers out?

23 A. I would say 95 per cent of my time I was in the first
24 carriage literally trying to rescue the people.

25 Q. That was a terrible process, was it not, of trying to

1 locate and find the living amongst the dead and moving
2 the dead so that the casualties could be brought out?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. That went on for a long time, didn't it?

5 A. I would say probably just over an hour.

6 Q. Bit by bit, did you create more space and allow more
7 emergency personnel to get in to try to do their tasks?

8 A. To be honest, it was only the crew from Soho was in the
9 main carriage, because there wasn't any space at all.
10 We were literally trying to get them out, put them on
11 stretchers in the doorway of the second carriage, and
12 then literally turn around and try and do it again.

13 Q. There were paramedics in there with you, obviously.

14 A. There was one paramedic who prioritised, I believe, but
15 the rest of them, I believe everyone was going back to
16 the platform and they was working, all the paramedics
17 and doctors, the majority of them on the platform,
18 I believe.

19 Q. Do you not recall medical attention being given to some
20 of the casualties inside carriage 1 before they were
21 taken out?

22 A. No, because they were obviously underneath other people.

23 Q. What about London Underground staff, do you recall
24 London Underground staff being in the carriage 1 as
25 well?

1 A. Not when we was there. They might have been, obviously,
2 before we got there.

3 Q. How far into the carriage did you go? Did you go all
4 the way down past, I'm sorry to say, the piles of bodies
5 that were located in the middle of the carriage to the
6 far end, the driver's cab?

7 A. No, I probably went a couple of feet past where the
8 actual explosion took place.

9 Q. We know from other evidence -- and we'll hear some of
10 the evidence this afternoon, that in the middle of the
11 carriage, on the left and the right of the bombsite,
12 there were two piles of bodies.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. When you started your terrible task, had there been
15 piles in those places in the carriage or were they two
16 piles of deceased passengers that were put there by you
17 and your colleagues to make space?

18 A. That was probably us moving them, to be honest, because
19 obviously everyone was in the middle of the train at the
20 time when we arrived and we had to obviously --

21 Q. You moved them to the sides?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. In order to allow emergency rescue to go up and down the
24 middle of the corridors?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. No doubt, as you may have heard this morning, you
2 treated the deceased with as much dignity and care as
3 was possible in those awful circumstances?

4 A. Yes, we did.

5 MR KEITH: Mr Jackson, thank you very much. Those are all
6 the questions that I have for you, but there may be some
7 more from my colleagues.

8 A. Okay.

9 MR COLTART: No, thank you.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

11 MR SAUNDERS: No, thank you.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Patterson?

13 Well, Mr Jackson, I'm afraid you waited all that
14 time and then nobody else had any questions for you. We
15 can only imagine the full horror of what confronted you
16 rescuers when you arrived in that carriage, so thank you
17 very much for everything you did in the most dreadful
18 circumstances.

19 A. Thank you.

20 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call, then acting,
21 but now full, Chief Inspector Shields, please.

22 CHIEF INSPECTOR RAYMOND PAUL SHIELDS (sworn)

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm sorry if we kept you waiting.

24 Questions by MR KEITH

25 MR KEITH: Chief Inspector, I hope you have a copy of your

1 statement there with you.

2 A. I do.

3 Q. Could you, for the record please, unless you've already
4 given your name now and I've missed it, give the court
5 your full name?

6 A. I'm Raymond Paul Shields.

7 Q. In 2005, you were of the rank of Acting Chief Inspector
8 and were the officer in charge at King's Cross police
9 station --

10 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

11 Q. -- with the British Transport Police?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. That morning, were you on duty in full uniform with
14 a number of other officers?

15 A. I was, yes.

16 Q. Was one of them Sergeant Betts?

17 A. It definitely was, yes.

18 Q. We'll hear from Sergeant Betts, who's in court, this
19 afternoon. Did you also have the assistance of three
20 other officers, Messrs McGrotty, Johnson and Noon?

21 A. Yes, I did.

22 Q. Did they all normally, or did they then normally, all
23 work out of King's Cross or were two of them assigned to
24 you for the purpose of carrying out other duties that
25 day?

1 A. I believe they were all stationed there, but I may be
2 wrong.

3 Q. There is a suggestion in Sergeant Betts' statement that
4 we'll come to, no doubt, in a moment, that there was
5 a shortage of officers that morning and so some officers
6 were reassigned to other duties in order to make up the
7 shortfall.

8 Did there come a time before 9.00 when you started
9 to hear calls on your personal radio concerning
10 incidents occurring in London?

11 A. That's right, yes.

12 Q. What do you first recollect?

13 A. It was a call via my personal radio for units at
14 Liverpool Street station regarding a possible explosion
15 on a train.

16 Q. Could we have [BTP150-14] on the screen, please?

17 We have, courtesy of the British Transport Police,
18 a record of all the radio calls made to BX, the Control
19 of British Transport Police, as you know well. This is
20 a call made around 8.49, the times are in fact two
21 minutes too slow, so 8.51:

22 "BX to any unit can attend Liverpool Street,
23 Liverpool Street Underground station. There's
24 reports ... of an explosion heard."

25 Do you think that is one of the calls that you may

1 have heard?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. What exactly was the nature of your job at that time?

4 A. I was in charge of the police station and all the

5 personnel that worked out of King's Cross.

6 Q. So although there was obviously something very serious

7 occurring at Liverpool Street, it didn't, at that point,

8 directly touch upon King's Cross, did it?

9 A. No.

10 Q. But the calls continued, did they not?

11 A. They did, yes.

12 Q. Did you then receive a report or hear a report of

13 casualties exiting Aldgate station?

14 A. Yes, I did.

15 Q. Did the incidents and the reports appear gradually to

16 start to concern you more?

17 A. Yes, because the -- they were slowly becoming closer to

18 King's Cross, and more and more reports.

19 Q. So did you leave your office, in the end?

20 A. I did, yes. I then left my office and made my way

21 across the concourse to the entrance to the Underground.

22 Q. We know that your office and the King's Cross police

23 station is on the ground level?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Alongside -- at the side of the King's Cross --

1 A. At the time --

2 Q. -- next to platform 8?

3 A. -- it was situated on platform 8, that's right.

4 Q. The main entrance to the Underground station was then,

5 as it is now, in the main concourse by the departure

6 boards?

7 A. The entrance on the Underground, on the concourse now,

8 has gone, and that's moved to the side. So at the time,

9 the main entrance was just slightly to the centre of the

10 concourse.

11 Q. Right. Is that where you went?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Was there anything unusual that you observed when you

14 arrived at the entrance to the Underground station?

15 A. The signs above the station were illuminated and the

16 amber lights flashing, and I think the sign at the time

17 would have said "Do not enter" or something along those

18 lines.

19 Q. Is that a sign that is normally illuminated when the

20 station is being evacuated?

21 A. Yes, that's right.

22 Q. Could we have [BTP150-23] on the screen, please? There's

23 a reference there at 08.54.32 to the British Transport

24 Police control room:

25 "... for your information, King's Cross

1 London Underground we've been asked to evacuate at this
2 moment."
3 So I think we can agree that the evacuation had
4 certainly occurred by 08.55 or in process?
5 A. Yes, and Bravo Kilo 606 would have been a PCSO.
6 Q. Would have been a ...?
7 A. PCSO.
8 Q. One of yours?
9 A. One of mine, yes.
10 Q. Where did you go once you had approached the
11 Underground?
12 A. Well, my concern first was to find Sergeant Steve Betts,
13 see if he was involved in anything that was going on and
14 to try and find out more information.
15 After a few minutes, I couldn't find him, so
16 I decided to go downstairs and find out for myself what
17 was going on.
18 Q. Did you speak to members of the London Underground
19 staff?
20 A. Yes, once I was downstairs, yes.
21 Q. What did you discover?
22 A. On the circulating area, which is --
23 Q. Is that the ticket hall area?
24 A. That's above the ticket hall area, so it's the
25 pedestrian walkway that runs around the top of the

1 Victoria Line. On the right-hand side at the time,
2 there was a passageway which led from the Victoria Line
3 booking hall to the old St Pancras railway station, and
4 in that passageway were a number of people who were
5 obviously coming from underground.

6 Q. Members of the public?

7 A. Members of the public, yes.

8 Q. What can you say or what can you recall of their state?

9 A. An awful lot were covered in soot, dust, people were
10 crying, and some were sitting on the floor, some in
11 a state of shock. A member of London Underground staff
12 was stood by. I asked him to go and get water and
13 tissues so that people could drink, wipe some of the
14 mess from their faces.

15 Q. Did he know, that member of London Underground, what had
16 happened?

17 A. No, I don't believe so.

18 Q. There is a call at 09.00.55 -- could we have [BTP150-30] ,
19 please -- which refers to "walking wounded", right at
20 the bottom:

21 "BX I've got a Met liaison here and over the radio
22 they're receiving reports of walking wounded of a train
23 collision between Liverpool Street and Aldgate."

24 It's obviously not King's Cross, but do you recall,
25 as you went into the Underground station, hearing any

1 reports to walking wounded elsewhere in London?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. Do you recall whether that was before or after you met
4 the member of London Underground?

5 A. No, I don't.

6 Q. All right. At 09.06, [BTP150-39] , at the top of the page,
7 there is a call to BX from Bravo Kilo 11. Who was
8 Bravo Kilo 11?

9 A. Bravo Kilo 11 is myself.

10 Q. One one, sorry, not eleven. You say there:

11 "Can you show me at Bravo Kilo, please?"

12 What does that mean?

13 A. That's -- the purpose of that is to let the force
14 control room know exactly where I am. I must admit when
15 I -- it was either the first or second of my radio
16 transmissions, but my intention was to make sure the
17 control room knew where I was and what I was doing.

18 Q. Is Bravo Kilo the Underground?

19 A. Bravo Kilo is the call sign for the police station.

20 Q. Right. When do you think you sent that message then?

21 A. My recollection would have been about five or ten
22 minutes before that, but that may well have been
23 a second -- a second message.

24 Q. You wouldn't have been sending it if you were in the
25 Underground, you could only be sending it if you were

1 perhaps at ground level?

2 A. If I was above ground, yes.

3 Q. So it may be that you, in fact, went down with the
4 Underground a few minutes after that which you have
5 supposed; perhaps after 9.00 as opposed to just before
6 9.00?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Your statement records, Chief Inspector, how the
9 passengers were able to tell you a little about what
10 they thought had occurred, because they make a reference
11 to a big bang, or one of the passengers made a reference
12 to a bang, and it going dark. You were obviously
13 becoming aware that there was something very serious
14 occurring, or had occurred?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. When, do you recall, did you first ask for ambulances?
17 Because we know there is a call to BX at 09.08 so just
18 a couple of minutes after that last transmission, in
19 which there is a reference to 20 casualties at
20 King's Cross and ambulances being needed.
21 Was that when you had first come across the
22 passengers at the top, or was it a little later?

23 A. That would have been the passengers that were in the
24 cross-passage way from the Victoria Line to St Pancras.
25 Realising that I couldn't use my radio to transmit, went

1 back upstairs, which is a minute or so, and then got on
2 the radio and asked for ambulances.

3 Q. So it was just after you'd seen those passengers of whom
4 you've made reference in the cross-passageway?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Could we then, please, have that call? It's [BTP150-47] .

7 At 09.08.50:

8 "Bravo Kilo 11, we've got about 20 casualties
9 emerging at King's Cross. Apparently, we've got a lot
10 of casualties, walking wounded on the line. Can we have
11 ambulances, please, to King's Cross?

12 "Received. Just been told [says the controller] LAS
13 are called over."

14 So your first duty had been then to inform the
15 control room of the problem, of this incident, and to
16 ask for ambulances?

17 A. That's right.

18 Q. That being done, what did you do next?

19 A. I then went back through the ticket hall on the
20 Victoria Line to the London Underground control room and
21 asked where everyone was and got told that everyone is
22 on the Piccadilly Line.

23 Q. The control room is in the booking hall, is it?

24 A. Yes, it is, yes.

25 Q. When you came out of the control room, had more

1 passengers appeared?

2 A. Yes, there was more then starting to come up the
3 escalators on the left-hand side of the ticket hall,
4 which is the Piccadilly Line.

5 Q. Were they in a worse state than those whom you had
6 earlier seen?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Where did you go?

9 A. I then made my way down the one working down escalator
10 to the bottom of the escalators and then turned right on
11 to the eastbound platform, I believe.

12 Q. That's platform 6, is it, or 5?

13 A. 5, sorry.

14 Q. 5 is the westbound platform.

15 A. The westbound, sorry, yes.

16 Q. I'm sorry, now I'm confused, which one do you think you
17 went to?

18 A. Hang on. I reached the bottom, saw two members of staff
19 standing on my right on platform 5.

20 Q. Platform 5. So the westbound?

21 A. The westbound.

22 Q. Did you speak to the London Underground staff who were
23 on the platform?

24 A. Yes, I did. I said "Which way?", I was told that Acting
25 Inspector Mingay and a PC are already in the tunnel and

1 no one must enter until they return.

2 Q. Did you know Acting Inspector Mingay?

3 A. Yes, I did.

4 Q. You obviously realised from that that he had gone down
5 into the tunnel. Did you think it sensible to go after
6 him at that stage or were you content to rely upon him
7 to go and see what was happening and then come back and
8 report if necessary?

9 A. My intention was to let him go forward, find out what it
10 was that had happened, come back and report. I didn't
11 see much point two of us going to do the same job.

12 Q. Was there smoke coming out of the tunnel, do you recall?

13 A. There was smoke and dust, not so much smoke as in a fire
14 smoke, but dust.

15 Q. You refer in your statement to a phrase that we've not
16 seen before, which is "a crust". Is that because, over
17 the years, the dirt and the soot and the grime in the
18 tunnels settles on the bottom of the tunnel floor?

19 A. And the tunnel walls as well, because you'll see a thick
20 crust of dirt, effectively, soot, that just lines the
21 tunnel walls.

22 Q. So a major disturbance in the tunnel will cause that
23 crust to rupture --

24 A. It would have lifted off.

25 Q. -- causing the dirt and the grime and the smoke to

1 emanate out?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Were there also passengers on the other platform and
4 London Underground staff helping them?

5 A. Yes, there were, yes.

6 Q. So having seen this, and knowing that Inspector Mingay
7 was in the tunnel, did you go back to the concourse?

8 A. I then made my way back upstairs, yes.

9 Q. Whom did you speak to?

10 A. LUL and Network Rail staff, and they were asking me what
11 we should do.

12 Q. What did you decide to do about the casualties?

13 A. At that time, on the forecourt at King's Cross and on
14 the concourse there were a lot of people having come out
15 of the Underground. I then decided that I needed to
16 create a casualty clearing area, so I closed half the
17 concourse and the ticket office and then had staff get
18 as many people as they could out of public sight and
19 somewhere dry and that -- that, when ambulances arrived,
20 they could tend to them properly.

21 Q. The top end of the Underground entrance, that's to say
22 the one on the concourse in the King's Cross mainline
23 station, had been cordoned off in the evacuation?

24 A. That's right.

25 Q. So where were the passengers going, those who were

1 coming up from the Piccadilly Line and up the escalators
2 and out of the booking hall?
3 A. They would then have turned left out of the booking
4 office and then left up the stairs on to the forecourt
5 at King's Cross.
6 Q. The forecourt is, what, the --
7 A. The large pavement area before --
8 Q. The pavement area in front of King's Cross?
9 A. In front of the station, between the station and
10 Euston Road.
11 Q. Could we have [BTP167-63] ? There is a radio transmission
12 at 09.10.09 from BK24, who I think was Sergeant Betts --
13 A. That's right.
14 Q. -- to you, BK11:
15 "Sir, I've got a load of Met PCs here. These
16 injured people, whereabouts are they going to be coming
17 from? Are they going to be coming up from the side of
18 Euston Road or at the back of King's Cross?"
19 You say:
20 "No, they've just come out of the Great Northern
21 Hotel exit, Great Northern Hotel exit, over."
22 A. That's right.
23 Q. Is that because they were coming out, both on the
24 pavement in front of King's Cross and at a westbound
25 exit nearer St Pancras outside the Great Northern Hotel?

1 A. No, this is the group that I had in the cross-passageway
2 between the Victoria Line and the St Pancras station.
3 Because I'd gone in that route, I decided to take them
4 out the route I'd walked in, because I knew it was safe,
5 and the nearest exit was out on to the Great Northern
6 Hotel side.

7 Q. So your main priority at this stage was to deal with the
8 exit of the passengers and to deal with the casualties,
9 those who couldn't just walk away but needed treatment?

10 A. That's right, yes.

11 Q. You set up a rendezvous point -- could we have
12 [BTP151-1] -- at 09.12. So this is all rapidly occurring:

13 "BK11, go ahead.

14 "Yeah, Gov, can you organise a rendezvous point for
15 control room please to request an RVP for FIT teams from
16 headquarters."

17 What are FIT teams?

18 A. Well, FIT teams, it's a public order term for forward
19 intelligence officers -- sorry, it's a forward
20 intelligence team. It's probably out of context here
21 and, to be honest, I've got no recollection of that
22 radio message.

23 Q. What do you think you were looking for by asking for
24 more officers to attend?

25 A. I wasn't. That's to set up an RVP and, to be honest,

1 I don't recall that conversation.

2 Q. All right. But in any event, you were aware that you
3 needed to set up an area for the casualties?

4 A. Yes, that's right.

5 Q. You ordered your subordinates to clear the concourse,
6 the booking hall area, and to keep it clear and
7 uncontaminated for the purposes of the casualties?

8 A. That's right, yes.

9 Q. Having done that, where did you go? Did you go out to
10 the front?

11 A. I was out on the front of the station on the forecourt,
12 speaking with the Metropolitan Police, and then, shortly
13 afterwards, one of my own -- sorry, then Acting
14 Inspector Steve Mingay came back up.

15 Q. Before he came back up, do you recollect anything of the
16 arrival of other emergency services? By this time, we
17 know it must be about 9.15. Do you recall the first
18 ambulance arriving and the first fire appliance
19 arriving?

20 A. I recall the first ambulance arriving. It was a single
21 crewed vehicle.

22 Q. 09.13, yes?

23 A. 09.13. I asked the driver, who was, I believe,
24 a paramedic, to assist. He said he couldn't, he had to
25 set up a control point.

1 Q. Because he was the first?

2 A. Because he was the first.

3 Q. Protocol demanded he remained by his vehicle as

4 a command post?

5 A. That's right.

6 Q. What about the first Fire Brigade, do you recall the

7 first Fire Brigade appliance arriving?

8 A. No, I don't, I'm afraid.

9 Q. All right. There were some Metropolitan Police officers

10 there. Do you remember speaking to them?

11 A. Yes, I do, yes.

12 Q. What was the nature of that discussion?

13 A. That, because I couldn't get on to our own radios,

14 because they were so busy, that I asked that he pass,

15 via his own radios, to the Met CAD room that I believed

16 an explosion had taken place downstairs.

17 Q. Inspector Mingay then comes back up. He, of course, had

18 been into the tunnel. He had left one of his other

19 officers on the platform with orders not to let anybody

20 down, which is why you'd received those -- or you'd been

21 told that no one was to go into the tunnel, although you

22 outranked him, of course.

23 In what state was he when he came back up to surface

24 level?

25 A. Steve was extremely distressed. At one point, he was

1 unable to stand and he fell over in Euston Road. He was
2 crying and shaking, and he said to me that he believed
3 a bomb had gone off and that there were bodies
4 everywhere.

5 Q. That represented a notable escalation in the gravity of
6 the situation?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. So did you relay that information to the
9 Metropolitan Police officers who were around you --

10 A. Yes, I did.

11 Q. -- and, no doubt, to anybody else who was in that area?

12 A. That's correct, yes.

13 Q. There is, at 09.24, a message from you, [BTP151-26],
14 Bravo Kilo 11, and you make reference to:

15 "100 casualties now at King's Cross with ..."

16 Then, over the page, please:

17 "We've got the booking hall on the mainline at
18 King's Cross and half the concourse, which is being used
19 as a casualty clearing stage. Ambulance are already on
20 scene and they're liaising with me, over."

21 A. That's right.

22 Q. It may be, by then, the first single crewed response
23 vehicle and the first ambulance had arrived?

24 A. That's right, yes.

25 Q. There's no mention there to the information that

1 Mr Mingay had given you about an explosion or a bomb.

2 May we presume that that call from you at 09.24,

3 therefore, was after all or the majority of the walking

4 wounded had come up in that first group of passengers

5 but before you had spoken to Mr Mingay?

6 A. That's right, yes.

7 Q. Mr Mingay, we know from other material, must have come

8 back up to the surface around about 9.30, because he

9 gave Mr Collins ten minutes while he was in the tunnel.

10 He went in at 9.20. After Mr Mingay spoke to you about

11 the bomb, do you recall passing on that information to

12 your Command network?

13 A. Yes, I do. I spoke to Chief Superintendent McCafferty

14 and Inspector Nicky Watson who was acting as his

15 loggist.

16 Q. Was that over the radio?

17 A. No, that was face-to-face.

18 Q. Oh, that was face-to-face, because he'd arrived at the

19 scene?

20 A. He'd arrived at the scene then, yes.

21 Q. Was it around that time that you commenced or asked

22 somebody to commence logging an incident management log?

23 A. I didn't, at the stage, because Inspector Watson had her

24 own log with Mr McCafferty.

25 Q. Right. Could we have, please, [INQ9450-6]?

1 This is an extract from the incident management log.
2 We'll see there just at the bottom of the -- we'll see
3 there:
4 "Inspector Shields, British Transport Police, 09.30,
5 liaises with EK1."
6 Who would be EK1?
7 A. That would be the duty officer from Holborn, I believe.
8 Q. From the Metropolitan Police?
9 A. From Metropolitan Police.
10 Q. At the top of the page, we can see at 09.25 a reference
11 to an explosion at Moorgate and two fatalities:
12 "Russell Square - possibly 200 injured."
13 Then references to a Serial of the Commissioner's
14 Reserve, a level 2 public order Serial 111A, B and C.
15 So it seems as if Metropolitan Police officers had
16 arrived just before then --
17 A. Starting to arrive now as well, yes.
18 Q. -- in substantial number, those three Serials.
19 You spoke to Chief Superintendent McCafferty. Did
20 you make some decisions about the Command structure?
21 A. Yes. Because Acting Inspector Mingay had now come
22 upstairs, I realised there was nobody in control
23 downstairs. I told Mr McCafferty this and he directed
24 that I go underground and assume control underground.
25 Q. For what it's worth, you were nominated as Bronze

1 Underground?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Did that have any practical significance, Chief

4 Inspector?

5 A. At this time, no, because everyone is still in

6 life-saving mode.

7 Q. This is part of the golden hour, so-called?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Where the priority is to get in and help?

10 A. And help, yes.

11 Q. But on a practical level, it was plainly important for

12 somebody to go down and replace Mr Mingay, who was now

13 on the surface?

14 A. That's correct, yes.

15 Q. So did you and Sergeant Betts go down to the train?

16 A. We did, yes.

17 Q. We've worked on the presumption that this was about some

18 point after 9.30. Mr Mingay reports in his notebook, or

19 rather his sergeant's notebook, that he briefed members

20 of the London Fire Brigade at 9.45 and members of the

21 London Underground at 9.40.

22 Do you recall whether or not you and Sergeant Betts

23 left to go underground after Inspector Mingay had been

24 able to speak to the other emergency services at ground

25 level?

1 A. When Inspector Mingay came out of the Underground,
2 I think I was probably the first person he saw. So
3 I don't recall that -- Steve having that conversation,
4 I didn't see it. I think I probably was underground by
5 the time Steve was having that conversation.

6 Q. We might get an answer from a document [INQ9450-9], which
7 is an extract again from the incident management log.

8 "King's Cross closed. Query explosion."

9 So that is a reflection, perhaps, of the information
10 that Inspector Mingay gave you.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. "Multiple casualties/possible fatality. Possible CBRN?
13 Inspector Shields BTP update 09.45."

14 So may that indicate that you were still receiving
15 information around 9.45?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Then over the page, page 10 [INQ9450-10] of that document, please,
18 09.45:

19 "EK1", so EK1 was the officer from Holborn,

20 "requests PSU to clear forecourt ..."

21 So those are officers trying to clear the forecourt
22 for casualties?

23 A. Yes, that's right.

24 Q. "... on request of Inspector Shields BTP. HEMS

25 Dr McKenzie briefed by EK109.47."

1 Obviously the officer stays there to brief the dog
2 handlers who arrive as well.

3 So it may be that you'd also, before you'd left to
4 go down, made a request to have the forecourt cleared at
5 9.45?

6 A. At that time of the morning, the pavement is extremely
7 busy, so my priority was to move away those pedestrians
8 that were hampering activities on the forecourt.

9 Q. There is a radio transmission finally at BTP152-69 at
10 09.56. We can't actually say what time it is, but it's
11 between 9.52 and, over the page, a subsequent time.

12 But if we could go back to BTP152-69, there is
13 a reference to -- I think I have the wrong reference.
14 Could we have please [BTP152-80] instead? Go back one
15 page.

16 There is a time on the previous page, page 79 [BTP152-79], of
17 09.54, and then going back to page 80 [BTP152-80], so it must be at
18 some point after 09.54, you'll see in the middle of the
19 page:

20 "Caller: Bravo Kilo 11, I'm going underground at
21 King's Cross with Bravo Kilo 24. I'm now Bronze
22 Underground, Bronze Underground at King's Cross."

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Would that be you?

25 A. That's myself.

1 Q. It may be, by the time you'd given all the instructions
2 that had to be given before you could leave the scene at
3 the top, it was about 9.54, 9.55?

4 A. That's correct, yes.

5 Q. You went down and you retraced your steps back down to
6 the platforms where you had been earlier and you went
7 down the tunnel.

8 Do you recall whether you went down the westbound
9 tunnel to the rear of the train or from the eastbound
10 platform through the crossover tunnel?

11 A. Eastbound through the crossover tunnel.

12 Q. When you reached the train, could you see a person lying
13 on the track next to the train?

14 A. Yes, I could.

15 Q. Your statement records how you reached the view that
16 that person was obviously dead. Was that a conclusion
17 you reached because of the lack of any signs of life?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. No movement?

20 A. No movement.

21 Q. Nothing to suggest that that person was breathing?

22 A. Nothing to suggest that that person was alive, no.

23 MR KEITH: My Lady, from the location of the Chief

24 Inspector, that person must have been Mihaela Otto.

25 As you boarded that carriage part of the way down

1 the train, could you hear somebody calling out?

2 A. I heard someone shouting "Help, help". I shouted back,
3 "Hello, where are you?", and we didn't get a response.

4 Q. Could you tell whether that was a male or a female
5 voice?

6 A. No, I couldn't at the time.

7 Q. Did you subsequently understand, however, that your
8 fellow BTP officers, particularly Sergeant Betts and
9 then PC Johnson, now Inspector Johnson, had located
10 a passenger outside the train carriage between the train
11 carriage and the wall?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Having boarded the carriage, did you turn right to go to
14 the front of the train?

15 A. That's correct, yes.

16 Q. What did you do?

17 A. Myself and Sergeant Betts walked in through the first
18 carriageway, through the single doorway that links the
19 carriages into the third carriage from the back of the
20 train, what I assume was the back of the train.

21 Q. You record in your statement, at the top of page 5, how,
22 once you'd boarded the train and you turned right, you
23 saw a dead body lying against the train.

24 Do you think that is a reference to the same person
25 whom you had seen outside the train as you approached

1 the train, but you were merely seeing the person from
2 inside the train? Because I have to say that we are
3 unable to trace somebody lying dead inside carriages 3
4 or 4.

5 A. It may well have been.

6 Q. As you went through the train, did the level of injuries
7 in the passengers become successively worse?

8 A. Yes, that's right, and, subsequently, the damage to the
9 train as well.

10 Q. The windows were smashed in the carriages nearest the
11 bombed carriages, and were there injured members of the
12 public lying or seated in those carriages before the
13 bombed carriage being attended to by paramedics?

14 A. Yes, there were.

15 Q. Do you have any sensation of the number of paramedics
16 who were there by this time?

17 A. No, I'm afraid I don't, no.

18 Q. You came across, did you not, PC McGrotty or
19 Sergeant McGrotty?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Was he looking after a passenger in the carriage
22 preceding the bombed carriage?

23 A. Yes, he was with a female with a severe leg injury.

24 Q. Did you or as far as you are aware your colleagues have
25 any medical equipment with you?

1 A. No, none of us.

2 Q. As you reached the first carriage, the bombed carriage,
3 can you tell us, please, what you saw?

4 A. Most of the windows in that carriage were smashed.
5 That's the carriage before, I think.

6 Q. That's the carriage before. You may be assisted if you
7 look at the bottom of that fifth page:
8 "In the preceding carriage, there were also
9 casualties in here."

10 A. My first reference to the bombed carriage is on page 7,
11 which is:
12 "I walked towards the entrance of the following
13 carriage, which I'll call the bombed carriage."

14 Q. Yes, I was concerned, in fact, with the position of the
15 end of the second carriage, the preceding carriage.
16 If you have the same copy of the statement that
17 I have, Chief Inspector, you'll see on page 5 at the top
18 right-hand corner, the bottom of that page, a paragraph
19 stating:
20 "Most of the windows in this carriage were smashed.
21 There were also casualties in here."
22 It's the page that commences with the words at the
23 top "with the casualties whilst the paramedic tended to
24 them"?

25 A. I must have a different --

1 Q. Would you like to pass it over and I'll see if I can
2 find the reference? (Handed)

3 You make a reference, at the bottom of the page
4 where I've marked, to a carriage before the bombed
5 carriage and there being two dead bodies in the carriage
6 by the doors, one lying in the door by the vestibule
7 area --

8 A. That's correct, yes.

9 Q. -- with shredded clothing, and another further down the
10 carriage.

11 A. That's correct, yes.

12 Q. Can you be sure -- because I don't think you checked
13 those persons yourself -- that they were indeed dead as
14 opposed to very severely injured casualties who were
15 there for the purposes of being treated?

16 A. My view at the time was, because of the disruption to
17 the bodies, that they were dead.

18 Q. But they weren't, in fact, checked by you?

19 A. No.

20 Q. So you can't be sure in relation to that?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Then you approached the bombed carriage itself, and it
23 was in total darkness, was it not?

24 A. That's correct, it was, yes.

25 Q. The windows were blown out and were there bodies and

1 body parts everywhere?

2 A. Yes, that's correct.

3 Q. I want to ask you, please, in particular, about a male
4 whom you saw inside the first carriage, a black male,
5 who had very severe injuries to his legs. Do you recall
6 anything of him?

7 A. Only so much as it was a black male with -- basically,
8 his legs had been removed by the blast.

9 Q. You appear to be more sure at this point that the pile
10 of bodies in which he was located contained passengers
11 who were all dead.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. May I ask you this: do you know that because you saw
14 them being checked, or you checked, for signs of life or
15 because that was an assumption that you reached on
16 account of the severity of their injuries?

17 A. It was an assumption I reached on account of the
18 severity of their injuries. I didn't see anyone check
19 for life and I didn't either.

20 Q. You then go on to describe a female in much greater
21 detail, in her early 20s, wearing a cream-coloured
22 jumper, pulled up to her neck, and you describe how she
23 was lying on her back, lying across the arms of chairs
24 on top of the seats, and you go on to describe the
25 nature of her injuries.

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. In relation to her, can I ask you, did you check for
3 signs of life?

4 A. No, I did not.

5 Q. Have you subsequently discovered who you think that
6 person was?

7 A. I was told the name a few days ago, but I can't recall
8 at the moment.

9 Q. All right, but you, yourself, haven't endeavoured to
10 discover who it was?

11 A. No.

12 Q. All right, I don't want to put the name to you, lest it
13 causes distress if the right name has not been put.

14 Were there, when you arrived in the first carriage,
15 notably piles of deceased passengers in the carriage?

16 A. Yes, there were.

17 Q. Were they spread throughout the carriage or, by the time
18 you arrived, were they generally located on the left and
19 right-hand sides, having been placed there by
20 firefighters?

21 A. Generally on the left-hand and on the right-hand sides,
22 and in the vestibule area where paramedics were still
23 working.

24 Q. Did it seem to you, therefore, that they may have been
25 moved there by firefighters and the paramedics in order

1 to try to get access to the living?

2 A. Yes, that's correct.

3 Q. What were the conditions like?

4 A. Horrific. It was very dark, very hot. As we've already
5 said, there was human debris everywhere, piles of
6 bodies.

7 Q. What seemed to you to be the priority, as far as
8 yourself and your own officers were concerned?

9 A. It was the living, was to get the living out, rescue the
10 living, get them to a position where they could receive
11 the right medical aid.

12 Q. Were there secondary considerations after that primary
13 consideration: namely, the possibility of a secondary
14 device and establishing that it was a crime scene?

15 A. A crime scene and also a consideration of mine was the
16 likelihood of any CBRN incidents as well.

17 Q. Did those considerations hinder you or in any way
18 practically affect the rescue assistance that you gave
19 to the persons in the carriage?

20 A. No, they were our consideration, but our primary role
21 was to rescue the living.

22 Q. Did you, yourself, become engaged in the process of
23 passing stretchers, lifting up the living casualties and
24 carrying them physically down the carriage?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Was that also what Sergeant Betts and, with him, PC Noon
2 were concerned with?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Mr Johnson wasn't there with you, was he?

5 A. No, not at that time, no.

6 Q. We know, in fact, that he was with Sam Badham and
7 Lee Harris by the side of the train next to carriage 4.
8 Was there a shortage of any sort of equipment,
9 medical, IV, sheets, gloves, stretchers, anything of
10 that sort, that you can recall?

11 A. Medical equipment, I wouldn't be able to comment on.
12 Stretchers were coming out with casualties on. There
13 was a lack of people to carry stretchers. At one point,
14 I asked Sergeant Betts to go upstairs to get a radio
15 message up for more assistance to help us carry out
16 casualties.

17 Q. We know that there were a substantial number of
18 firefighters there, and you no doubt saw them helping
19 with taking casualties out. Was it that the number of
20 police and firefighters together could not possibly meet
21 the number of casualties?

22 A. Just couldn't have met it.

23 Q. Were there any delays brought about by lack of
24 stretchers, as far as you can recall?

25 A. Not that I'm aware of at all, no.

1 Q. Was that because it took time for each of the casualties
2 to be stabilised or brought to a position whereby they
3 could be taken out?

4 A. That's correct, yes.

5 Q. Was there an issue as to whether it was appropriate or
6 desirable to bring the casualties past the deceased out
7 of the carriage?

8 A. We didn't really have an awful lot of choice. Some of
9 the casualties had to come out of the King's Cross end.
10 There were deceased laying around. I was concerned
11 about the dignity of the deceased. Equally about, you
12 know, those that are still alive witnessing much more
13 than they had done already by being taken past those
14 that were already deceased.

15 Q. Did there come a time when some of the deceased -- two
16 in particular -- were covered with a hi-vi jacket in
17 order to accord them some level of dignity while the
18 living casualties were brought past?

19 A. Yes, that's correct, yes.

20 Q. You describe in your statement -- I shan't ask you about
21 it -- how a gentleman, who I think was Garri Hollness,
22 was brought out severely injured, how Mr McGrotty lifted
23 a female casualty in his arms along the carriage, and
24 you recall how a police inspector, who we think is
25 Inspector Mugridge, was also at the scene and assisted.

1 There came a time when all the live casualties were
2 rescued and were taken out. Were you and your fellow
3 officers there throughout?

4 A. Yes, we were.

5 Q. When the living casualties were brought out, did an
6 eerie silence descend on the carriage?

7 A. Yes, very much so.

8 Q. What did you and your colleagues do then?

9 A. My concern then was -- it was about the preservation of
10 evidence, close it down as a crime scene and, once I put
11 in cordons, I then withdrew my officers and myself.

12 Q. Did you ever meet officers coming from the other end,
13 from the Russell Square end?

14 A. I met Detective Sergeant Carney when I was in the bombed
15 carriage and Inspector Glen McMunn as well.

16 Q. Did you, yourself, go through the first carriage trying
17 to identify, as best you were able, the number of
18 fatalities?

19 A. Yes, I did.

20 Q. And trying to assess the number of bodies and to try to
21 gauge the number of bodies by reference to the body
22 parts that were there?

23 A. To the torsos. Trying to count arms and legs wouldn't
24 have been effective, but torsos perhaps would have been
25 the only way. So I counted torsos.

1 Q. But it was a deeply difficult and almost impossible
2 task, was it not?

3 A. Absolutely.

4 Q. Two of the bodies were placed in body bags before you
5 left the scene, I think.

6 A. Yes, that's right, I think.

7 MR KEITH: My Lady, those two persons were, of course,
8 Ciaran Cassidy and Philip Beer, who were placed in the
9 second carriage.

10 Did a member of the Fire Brigade attend to start
11 commencing an investigation?

12 A. Yes, a member of the Fire Brigade turned up with
13 a digital camera, asked if he could take some pictures.
14 Because I was concerned then that the scene was rapidly
15 deteriorating, I agreed.

16 Q. Thereafter, was your primary duty to ensure that the
17 scene was kept secure and did you post police officers
18 on the train in order to ensure that nobody approached?

19 A. I did, yes.

20 Q. Did you later then take part -- organise and take part
21 in the search, both of the carriage for CBRN, chemical,
22 biological, radiological or nuclear devices, and also
23 a main search of the King's Cross mainline station?

24 A. That's correct, yes. On the request of Chief
25 Superintendent McCafferty, I returned with a team of

1 officers and undertook another search.

2 Q. I think you remained there until 6.00 that evening?

3 A. That's correct.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: And another officer back on duty at
5 7.00, if your notebook --

6 A. That's correct, ma'am, yes.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: The next morning.

8 MR KEITH: Thank you, Chief Inspector.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

10 Questions by MR COLTART

11 MR COLTART: Just one point of clarification, if I may. You
12 talk about two casualties being worked on by paramedics
13 in the carriage towards the end of your statement, the
14 bottom of page 7, if you've got it to hand. You say:
15 "I remember two casualties who were being worked on
16 by the paramedics in the carriage. One was a black
17 gentleman ..."

18 You go on to describe his injuries. Do you have
19 that point in your statement?

20 A. I think that my statement is numbered differently to
21 yours, I'm afraid.

22 Q. Don't worry, I can just read out the section to you. In
23 relation to the other casualty, you say:

24 "The other was a woman in her 50s. The paramedics
25 were most concerned about this lady. Unfortunately, we

1 could not stretcher her out of the train because the
2 Italian or Spanish lady I mentioned earlier was blocking
3 the exit."

4 A. That's correct, yes.

5 Q. In relation to the woman who was in her 50s, can we just
6 have the plan back up on the screen, please, of the
7 carriage?

8 Are you able to recollect now by reference to the
9 seat numbers on this plan -- do you see where the point
10 of the explosion is -- where the paramedics were working
11 on this particular lady?

12 A. No, I'm not, I'm afraid.

13 Q. Are you able to recall what it was that they were
14 concerned about or particularly concerned about, as far
15 as she was concerned?

16 A. Well, the inference from the conversation I heard was
17 that the concern was that, if we didn't move quickly,
18 that she would pass away.

19 Q. You go on to say in your statement:

20 "Myself and PC McGrotty lifted her onto a seat to
21 allow the more seriously injured through."

22 Then you talk about carrying her down the tunnel.

23 But do we take it you're talking there about the Italian
24 or the Spanish lady?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Rather than the 50-year-old woman?

2 A. Yes.

3 MR COLTART: Yes, thank you very much.

4 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing thank you, my Lady.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Patterson?

6 MR PATTERSON: No questions.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Gibbs?

8 MR GIBBS: No, thank you.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Those are all the questions we have

10 for you, Chief Inspector Shields. You don't know the

11 names of the people you saved and they probably don't

12 know your name, given the condition that they were in,

13 so on their behalf, thank you for everything that you

14 did to help them.

15 MR KEITH: Thank you, my Lady. Thank you, Chief Inspector.

16 May I invite you to call Sergeant Betts, please?

17 INSPECTOR STEPHEN MICHAEL BETTS (sworn)

18 Questions by MR KEITH

19 MR KEITH: Good afternoon, Sergeant. I'm sorry that you've

20 been kept waiting. Could you give the court your full

21 name, please?

22 A. Yes, my full name is Stephen Michael Betts.

23 Q. You are a police sergeant with the British Transport

24 Police. In fact you're not, you're an inspector now?

25 A. I am now, yes.

1 Q. My apologies. You were, in 2005, a police sergeant with
2 the British Transport Police?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. On that Thursday, 7 July, were you rostered for the
5 early turn shift at King's Cross station?

6 A. I was.

7 Q. You were the uniform shift sergeant, so you were in
8 charge of the constables there that morning, were you
9 not?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. We've heard evidence from them. Did they include
12 PCs McGrotty and Johnson, and also there was there
13 Police Sergeant Noon?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. There was some issue, I think, with whether or not you
16 had enough officers to fill the roster that morning.

17 A. That's correct. Normally, I would have had six police
18 officers allocated to my relief. On that particular
19 day, I believe two were on a training course and
20 I believe two others were stationed up in Scotland for
21 the G8 Summit.

22 Q. Were one of duties that you were performing that morning
23 supervising the departure of trains from King's Cross?

24 A. That wasn't actually my responsibility. I believe that
25 was Inspector Mingay's responsibility. However, two of

1 the officers allocated to his Serial, his police Serial,
2 volunteered to act under my control to boost my
3 resources for the day.

4 Q. Was that Police Sergeant Noon and a constable called
5 PC Jones?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. Did you also have some police community support officers
8 attached to you?

9 A. That's correct. I had eight on duty that morning.
10 Again, I was not their immediate supervisor. Their
11 immediate supervisor was not on duty, so I deployed them
12 on his behalf.

13 Q. So as to address them and then perhaps not to have to
14 return to them, they carried out valuable duties, did
15 they not, in the Underground station and the mainline
16 station in the course of the morning, but they did not,
17 themselves, pursuant to an order from you, actually go
18 down onto the track?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. You've heard the evidence from Chief Inspector Shields.
21 Do you broadly agree with the chronology established by
22 what he said?

23 A. I do, yes.

24 Q. In particular, having seen Inspector Mingay -- you saw
25 him at surface level?

1 A. I went downstairs on to the Underground station as he
2 was coming upstairs from the Underground station, which
3 was about 9.40, maybe slightly beforehand.

4 Q. That's where I want to pick up the narrative. Was it
5 plain that he was in a bad way?

6 A. It was.

7 Q. He was going up the stairs to brief all whom he could
8 and to report what he had seen. On his way past you,
9 did he tell you what he had seen?

10 A. No, he did not, no. He was in a state of distress and
11 certainly, when I spoke to him, it wasn't clear what
12 he'd seen or experienced.

13 Q. Did he tell you that he was the first person there?

14 A. He did, yes.

15 Q. Because he couldn't tell you in detail what had
16 occurred, did you walk with him outside?

17 A. I did. I followed him upstairs and I walked with him up
18 to the front of King's Cross, where the entrance to
19 Euston Road is, where he was seen by an attending
20 ambulance.

21 Q. When you had gone back upstairs with him, do you recall
22 Police Sergeant McGrotty, who had been down to the first
23 carriage but not been able to get into it, come up to
24 the surface?

25 A. Yes, certainly after Mr Mingay came upstairs, within

1 a couple of minutes Sergeant McGrotty followed him and
2 found myself.

3 Q. Could we have on the screen [BTP169-69]? Police
4 Sergeant McGrotty told my Lady that he was downstairs,
5 he'd spoken to Mr Johnson, and Mr Johnson told him that
6 there were people under the train, and so, when he came
7 back up, he relayed to somebody, he thought it might
8 have been you, that there were people under the train.
9 There was a radio call at 09.44.56. It actually says
10 from Bravo Kilo 25. Who was Bravo Kilo 25?

11 A. That's actually a reference to Sergeant Steve Noon.
12 I think I've got the call signs mixed up.

13 Q. Because you were Bravo Kilo 24, were you not?

14 A. I was Bravo Kilo 24 and Sergeant McGrotty's call sign
15 was Bravo Kilo 53.

16 Q. But you made this call?

17 A. I did, that's right.

18 Q. Did you tell the Control that there were possibly two
19 people trapped under a Tube train at King's Cross?

20 A. I did.

21 Q. You made that call after you'd spoken to Mr McGrotty and
22 you spoke to Mr McGrotty while you were up at the
23 surface?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. Did he also tell you that there was a desperate need for

1 more paramedics to bring medical attention to bear on
2 the casualties?

3 A. He did.

4 Q. Can you recall what, if any, steps you took to deal with
5 that request from him?

6 A. He disappeared back downstairs -- back downstairs
7 shortly thereafter, at which point I informed
8 Ray Shields, who was with an ambulance supervisor.

9 Q. So rather than calling the Control, did the information
10 about the need for ambulances go straight to the
11 paramedic who was there or the ambulance controller who
12 was there?

13 A. Absolutely, yes.

14 Q. The station had been evacuated by this time, had it not?

15 A. Yes, the mainline station and the Underground station
16 had both been evacuated.

17 Q. Did you then go down with Chief Inspector Shields to the
18 train?

19 A. I did.

20 Q. You heard what he said about the radio call at 09.56.

21 Does that seem to accord with your recollection?

22 A. Absolutely. Certainly that's what he said. I actually
23 felt, at the time, it was possibly 10 minutes earlier,
24 though.

25 Q. It's beyond my ability to accuse British Transport

1 Control office of misrepresenting its own time, so
2 I think we'll have to take it that it was 9.56.
3 You went down with him. When you went down, were
4 there still London Underground staff on the platform?
5 A. There was at least one, yes.
6 Q. Were there any passengers there by that time?
7 A. I did not see any passengers on the platform, no. But
8 there were members of the Fire Brigade there.
9 Q. There were members of the Fire Brigade?
10 A. That's right.
11 Q. Do you recall seeing them when you were up at the
12 surface level before you went down?
13 A. I do, yes.
14 Q. Do you recall some Fire Brigade firefighters standing on
15 the platform waiting in any way?
16 A. They were standing on the platform and they were putting
17 on various backpacks.
18 Q. Breathing apparatus?
19 A. I believe so, although I couldn't be entirely sure.
20 Q. Did they go down the tunnel with you, do you remember?
21 A. Myself, Mr Shields, left before them and I don't recall
22 them following.
23 Q. When you approached the train and you boarded the
24 carriage at the end of the crossover tunnel, did you
25 also hear a voice calling for help?

1 A. I did, I heard it very clearly.

2 Q. Were you able to see where the voice was coming from?

3 A. Unfortunately, no. I heard the voice from my left-hand

4 side. I looked under the train, thinking it had come

5 from under the train, and I couldn't see anybody. But

6 I was certain it had come from the left-hand side of the

7 train.

8 Q. Mr Johnson had gone down before you, hadn't he?

9 A. He had, that's right.

10 Q. Were you aware that Mr Johnson was in that near

11 locality?

12 A. Not at that time, no. I only saw him once I actually

13 boarded the train.

14 Q. When you went through the train, he was going the other

15 way?

16 A. When I boarded the train, he was standing by the

17 entrance at the doors where I boarded.

18 Q. All right. Did you tell him that there was somebody --

19 that you'd heard a voice by the carriage that you'd

20 entered?

21 A. No, not at that time, no.

22 Q. There were passengers in their seats. Do you remember

23 Sergeant McGrotty trying to give first aid to a severely

24 injured passenger?

25 A. When I first saw him again, he was on -- effectively on

1 his knees tending to somebody who was lying on the
2 floor, although I don't recall exactly what first aid he
3 was giving, he just appeared to be with them.

4 Q. You, too, made reference to a deceased passenger lying
5 in the fourth carriage, that's the carriage that you
6 boarded the train on?

7 A. That's right, yes.

8 Q. Might it again -- you heard what I said to the chief
9 inspector -- might it have been that, in the absence of
10 checking for signs of life and whether they were
11 breathing, you assumed that they were dead from the
12 sheer severity of their injuries?

13 A. Certainly I didn't check for any signs of life, but
14 I was under the opinion at the time that the person was
15 deceased.

16 Q. As you moved through the train, did you gain some
17 information from your fellow officers, and particularly
18 Mr Johnson, as to the extent of the incident?

19 A. Yes, he said to me that there were other people who were
20 deceased.

21 Q. Did he indicate where they were?

22 A. He indicated outside the train at the time.

23 Q. Mr Shields asked you to go and get some equipment?

24 A. He did.

25 Q. You had to go back past the carriage that you had

1 entered through?

2 A. That's right.

3 Q. Did you hear the voice again?

4 A. I did hear the voice calling out for help, yes.

5 Q. So what did you do then?

6 A. Well, the voice was coming from in front of me, which

7 was the fifth carriage from the front of the train.

8 I walked into that carriage, I heard the voice calling

9 for help again, and it was apparent that it was coming

10 from outside the train. I then looked outside and I saw

11 three people lying outside the train.

12 Q. Could we please have on the screen [INQ10018-1], please.

13 Is that a drawing that you made of the fourth and

14 fifth carriages?

15 A. Yes, it is.

16 Q. Did you mark on them -- it may well be, Officer -- it's

17 no criticism of you -- that, in fact, the people lying

18 on the track, as you can see marked A, B and C, were

19 actually alongside carriage 4 rather than carriage 5,

20 but did you mark three people there?

21 A. I did, yes.

22 Q. Can you tell us what you can recall of those three

23 people?

24 A. Certainly the first person I saw is the one I've

25 marked A, it was a male wearing a blue T-shirt and he's

1 the one who had been calling out for help. He made
2 several attempts to try and raise his body up.

3 The person described as number B, I believe was
4 deceased, and the person described as number C was
5 a female who had very serious leg and arm injuries.

6 Q. Did you gather in due course that the male at A was
7 Lee Harris?

8 A. I've only learned that information in the last two
9 weeks, but, yes.

10 Q. All right. Person B, how did you know that person B was
11 dead?

12 A. I was fairly -- well, I was absolutely satisfied, due to
13 the nature of the injuries they'd suffered.

14 Q. Was there, during the time that you were there, any sign
15 of life, anything to suggest that the person may have
16 been alive, albeit unconscious?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Can you tell us, please, without telling us the exact
19 detail, what you thought were the nature of that
20 gentleman's injuries?

21 Were they injuries confined mostly -- as far as you
22 could see -- to the scalp and face or were they injuries
23 to the legs or to the torso, because you describe them
24 as "horrendous"?

25 A. They were very serious torso injuries to the mid-chest

1 section and lower half.

2 Q. Can you recall anything of the clothing that that
3 gentleman was wearing?

4 A. No, I don't.

5 Q. You describe him as wearing dark clothing in your
6 statement.

7 A. Right.

8 Q. Can you be any more precise? I appreciate it's very
9 difficult.

10 A. Unfortunately, I can't, no.

11 Q. All right. But you're sure, are you, that the location
12 of that gentleman was very close, if not immediately
13 next to, person A, Lee Harris?

14 A. Yes, that's right.

15 MR KEITH: Therefore, my Lady, that would seem to support
16 the proposition that that gentleman was
17 Arthur Frederick, as the plan would indicate.

18 He was, my Lady I should say, wearing a navy jacket
19 and a dark, navy-style jumper. That would be consistent
20 with a description of dark clothing.

21 Can you tell us a bit more, please, about the state
22 of Lee Harris, the gentleman, and the lady,
23 Samantha Badham? Lee Harris firstly.

24 He was obviously able to call out to you?

25 A. Yes, he was. His voice was very, very clear, although

1 he did sound very distressed as well, and he repeatedly
2 called out for help, which was the reason why I followed
3 his voice to his location.

4 His injuries were what I can describe as very, very
5 serious leg injuries, and it appeared that he'd lost
6 part of both legs.

7 Q. What about the lady, Samantha Badham?

8 A. Certainly when I found her, again, due to the dark
9 conditions, I wasn't sure it was a person at first until
10 I heard her call out for help.

11 Q. How was her voice?

12 A. She had a very, very quiet voice, extremely quiet, it
13 was very difficult to hear what she was saying.

14 Unlike Mr Harris, she wasn't able to move. She was
15 lying on her back, and, again, she had very serious
16 injuries; in fact, more serious than Mr Harris.

17 Q. If anything, they were more extensive insofar as they
18 concerned a traumatic amputation of her lower limbs?

19 A. That's absolutely right, yes.

20 Q. You touched her perhaps to give her comfort and to show
21 her that you were there. Did she move?

22 A. I didn't think she could hear me. Although she was
23 calling out for help, and I did respond to her, she
24 never replied to me. I certainly only touched her to
25 give her some indication that there was somebody there

1 to help her, although I never felt that she was aware of
2 this.

3 Q. Did you call out for help?

4 A. Yes, I did, yes.

5 Q. Did you see, shortly thereafter, your colleague
6 Mr Johnson, Kevin Johnson, and a HEMS doctor?

7 A. Yes, he appeared almost immediately after I had called
8 for help.

9 Q. Did you subsequently discover that he had, in fact, been
10 there before you, but had gone away to get more
11 assistance and had come back just after you arrived?

12 A. Yes, certainly when I first came across these three
13 people, I thought that I was the first person to find
14 them. However, it quickly became apparent that I was
15 not and I was absolutely satisfied by that stage that
16 they had already been assessed by a paramedic of sorts
17 and that they had been found already.

18 Q. How did you know they'd been assessed by a paramedic?

19 A. It was a reference which Kevin Johnson had made to me
20 whilst I was still on the track and whilst he was on the
21 train. I forget exactly what it was, but I'm absolutely
22 certain that they had been assessed by that stage.

23 Q. Because you thought that they had been assessed and
24 because Sergeant Johnson was there, Inspector Johnson
25 was there, and there was a HEMS doctor or HEMS

1 paramedic, did you feel that you were needed or did you
2 feel that the two casualties there were being
3 sufficiently looked after?

4 A. Yes, I had two certainly considerations. The first one
5 was that I had already been asked by Mr Shields to get
6 more help from the surface level. I was also satisfied
7 that Kevin Johnson was more than capable and
8 experienced, with the doctor, of looking after the
9 people concerned.

10 Q. So did you then go back to the surface to try to get the
11 help that Mr Shields had asked for?

12 A. Yes, I did.

13 Q. This time when you arrived, which must have been some
14 time, I suppose, between 10.10, 10.15, 10.20?

15 A. I think it was probably about 10.20.

16 Q. Were there many more emergency service vehicles at the
17 top?

18 A. Yes, there were.

19 Q. Indeed, a profusion of emergency personnel, I expect?

20 A. Yes, that's correct.

21 Q. Did you find Mr Shields?

22 A. Mr Shields was -- had remained on the train.

23 Q. I'm so sorry, not Mr Shields. Who did you speak to in
24 order to relay Mr Shields' request?

25 A. I saw Chief Superintendent McCafferty and Chief

1 Inspector Watson.

2 Q. Did you tell them what you had found out and what you
3 had been told to relay?

4 A. Yes, I gave them a precis of the information I'd seen so
5 far.

6 Q. Was Mr McCafferty on the way to attend a Silver meeting?

7 A. He was, and he had asked me to remain on the surface
8 level to attend that meeting.

9 Q. Did you?

10 A. No, I did not, no.

11 Q. Because you wanted to get back to the train with what
12 Mr Shields had asked for?

13 A. Yes, certainly I felt a clear obligation to return to
14 the train with the resources Mr Shield had asked for,
15 and I think Mr McCafferty was very clear that that was
16 my main concern at the time, and he released me from the
17 Silver meeting.

18 Q. The Silver meeting, we know, was scheduled for 10.30.
19 Was it just shortly before he left for the Silver
20 meeting that you last spoke to him?

21 A. It must have been about that time, yes.

22 Q. What did you take back down to the train?

23 A. I managed to come across a sergeant from the
24 Metropolitan Police when I went to the surface level.
25 I don't know who he was, but I asked him to collect

1 a number of different items and some more police
2 officers.

3 I also collected a torch and some body bags and the
4 sergeant concerned joined me shortly thereafter with
5 a number of officers and at least two stretchers.

6 Q. With all that equipment and with his officers you went
7 back down through the tunnel to the train?

8 A. That's right.

9 Q. When you got back down, do you remember seeing any of
10 the casualties that you'd earlier seen with Mr Johnson
11 being removed from the train?

12 A. Yes, I boarded the train again and I believe it was
13 Mr Harris who was being removed from the train by
14 Sergeant Noon.

15 Q. We've heard evidence -- perhaps you could confirm
16 this -- that he had to be placed on a stretcher on the
17 train, having been brought in from one side, from the
18 tunnel wall side, and then was taken off on the other
19 side nearest the junction and the crossover tunnel.

20 A. Certainly by the time I joined the train, his position
21 had clearly moved, although I couldn't be sure where,
22 but he was already on a stretcher when I found him and
23 Mr Noon.

24 Q. On the train or in the crossover tunnel?

25 A. He was on the train, on a stretcher.

1 Q. Were you able to see anything of his condition?
2 A. No.
3 Q. Where did you take your equipment to?
4 A. The equipment was placed on carriage 4, the fourth one
5 from the front of the train but, shortly thereafter,
6 I became involved in the conveyance of stretchers from
7 the front to the back of the line.
8 Q. So you were in the daisy chain of officers passing
9 stretchers down the train?
10 A. I was, that's right, yes.
11 Q. But you must have gone quite a long way forward because,
12 did you see two deceased passengers in carriage 2
13 perhaps being placed in body bags?
14 A. Yes, I did, yes. I think they were already in body bags
15 by the time I'd seen them.
16 Q. Were all your colleagues involved, as far as you could
17 tell, in this assistance --
18 A. They were.
19 Q. -- by way of stretcher carrying?
20 A. They were.
21 Q. Did there ever come a time when there were too many
22 casualties for the number of stretchers you had?
23 A. No, no.
24 Q. Did they come out fairly regularly out of that first
25 carriage?

1 A. Certainly where my position was in the line, they
2 appeared to come out one after another, all of them on
3 stretchers.

4 Q. Was it an extremely arduous and difficult job carrying
5 them through the carriage?

6 A. It was, yes, it was. It was very cramped and it was
7 extremely hot.

8 Q. Some of the officers became, understandably, very
9 distressed.

10 A. They did.

11 Q. There came a time when all the casualties had been taken
12 off the train. Did you check the train with
13 Chief Inspector Shields?

14 A. I did.

15 Q. Did that require you to have to go through all the
16 carriages, including the bombed carriage?

17 A. Yes, it did.

18 Q. I don't propose to ask you in detail about the nature of
19 the bombed carriage. It is, as we know, and as one
20 might expect, a terrible scene indeed.

21 Did you have very real difficulty getting through
22 the carriage because of the physical nature of the
23 damage remains?

24 A. Certainly, when I did go into the front carriage for the
25 first time, there was a lot of damage to it and part of

1 the roof structure by the rear door had collapsed
2 towards the floor of the train and it was -- it wasn't
3 easy getting past that.

4 Q. I think you tried to walk under some grating, in fact,
5 and cut yourself, as you did so, trying to get through?

6 A. Yes, I cut my ear, yes.

7 Q. When you reached the end of the train, did you find some
8 police officers who had come from Russell Square?

9 A. I did, yes.

10 Q. Did you tell them that the carriage was clear of live
11 casualties?

12 A. I did, yes, and I asked them to leave.

13 Q. Did they do so?

14 A. They did. They went towards Russell Square.

15 Q. While you were there, did you see somebody lying on the
16 tracks?

17 A. There was somebody lying at the front of the train on
18 the tracks, yes.

19 Q. You had initially thought, I think, that it was the
20 driver, but you became aware and perhaps were informed
21 that this person was a passenger from the carriage.

22 A. That's right.

23 Q. Was that person plainly deceased?

24 A. Yes, they were.

25 MR KEITH: My Lady, that is the reference -- and, indeed,

1 I think the only evidence -- to the location of
2 Shelley Mather.
3 By the time the living casualties had been removed
4 and the firefighters had assisted in moving the
5 deceased, had those who died in the first carriage been
6 generally moved to the left and right of the carriage --

7 A. That's right.

8 Q. -- in the doorways, surrounding the location of the
9 blast?

10 A. Yes, that's correct.

11 Q. We've heard from Chief Inspector Shields how some fire
12 investigators attended. Were you there when they
13 arrived?

14 A. I was there, yes.

15 Q. Did you and Chief Inspector Shields start to countenance
16 the possibility that there had been, in fact, a suicide
17 bomb and the remains of the bomber might also have been
18 inside that carriage?

19 A. Yes, that's correct. We had a conversation about it.

20 Q. Was that part of a general consideration that the scene
21 had to be secured because it was a crime scene?

22 A. Yes, absolutely. We discussed this and certainly it was
23 guidance from him, but I was fully aware that it had to
24 be deemed a crime scene and treated as such from that
25 point onwards.

1 Q. Did you ask an officer to go and get some crime scene
2 logs so that a proper crime scene log could start to be
3 kept of anybody then thereafter going in and out?
4 A. I did, yes.
5 Q. When you reached the surface area, compared to the
6 scorching heat of the tunnel, did you find yourself
7 physically shaking with cold?
8 A. Yes. It was very, very cold.
9 Q. Did you carry on performing your duties until 6.00 that
10 evening?
11 A. I did, yes.
12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: And back on duty at 7.00?
13 A. I'm afraid so.
14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: British Transport Police get their
15 money's worth out of their officers, don't they?
16 A. Mm-hmm.
17 MR KEITH: Thank you, Inspector. I've no further questions.
18 A. Thank you.
19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart? Mr Saunders?
20 Questions by MR SAUNDERS
21 MR SAUNDERS: Very briefly, Inspector. I represent the
22 family of Lee Harris. Can I just confirm this, that
23 it's clear, isn't it, when one reads your very full and
24 helpful statement, that you learn later that Police
25 Constable -- Inspector, as he now is -- Johnson had

1 already come across Lee and his partner Sam Badham?

2 A. That's right.

3 Q. So although you quite properly went straight there,
4 because of the call, it appears that Mr Johnson, having
5 been with them had gone back inside to find more
6 proficient medical help?

7 A. Yes, I think he had left them at the point where
8 I entered carriage 4 for the first time.

9 Q. Although you refer to it in your statement, Mr Johnson
10 thinks that the first help he's able to secure for them
11 is a paramedic. I think that -- presumably you don't
12 know whether he was a doctor or paramedic?

13 A. I certainly thought it was a doctor, but I couldn't be
14 sure.

15 Q. So it may be a little later, when we do know a doctor
16 comes to the end of carriage 4, when there's some
17 discussion about drugs being administered.

18 A. That would be consistent, yes.

19 Q. Can I ask you this, Inspector, because it may come up
20 later: were you ever present or aware of any drugs being
21 given to either Lee Harris or Sam Badham?

22 A. I was not, no.

23 Q. What you've done is to try to comfort them in the
24 position they were in and, at that stage then, other
25 help comes and you go on to try to deal your best with

1 others?

2 A. That's correct.

3 MR SAUNDERS: Then may I simply thank you for your efforts
4 with both of those people? Mrs Harris is in court and
5 would very much like me to express that to you.

6 A. Thank you.

7 MR SAUNDERS: Thank you very much, Inspector.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Patterson?

9 MR PATTERSON: No questions.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Boyd?

11 Questions by MS BOYD

12 MS BOYD: Inspector, just one point of clarification. You
13 went down to the platform with Inspector Shields at
14 09.56 and you mentioned that you saw some members of the
15 Fire Brigade on the platform putting on some kit.

16 A. That's right.

17 Q. You then left ahead of them?

18 A. I did.

19 Q. When you got to the train, however, is it right that
20 there were other firefighters already on the train?

21 A. Yes, there were, many of them.

22 MS BOYD: Thank you very much.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Yes, Mr Gibbs?

24 Questions by MR GIBBS

25 MR GIBBS: Could I just add one detail of timing, Inspector?

1 Could we have ?[BTP127-34] It's at the bottom of the
2 page. If we just -- this is your call at 11.35.52, you
3 say, don't you:

4 "For your information, all officers have now left
5 the King's Cross Underground station and three
6 Underground officers have now set up a crime scene
7 cordon."

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. That is, after that time, the below ground is now
10 designated a crime scene, everyone is out, and just
11 those officers are left behind?

12 A. That's right.

13 MR GIBBS: Thank you very much.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for
15 Inspector Betts?

16 Thank you very much, Mr Betts. As you've heard from
17 Mr Saunders, it's very important to the bereaved
18 families to know there were rescuers committed to doing
19 their very best to save their loved ones. It goes
20 without saying how important it was to those you did
21 actually save, so thank you for everything you did.

22 A. Thank you, my Lady.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith?

24 MR KEITH: My Lady, that concludes the witnesses for today.

25 May I return, please, briefly, to the remainder of the

1 statements who were to be read yesterday but whom we did
2 not reach.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly.

4 MR KEITH: The first is that of Jonathan Bye dated
5 12 July 2005.

6 Statement of PS JONATHAN BYE read

7 "On Thursday, 7 July 2005, I was on duty in full
8 uniform at Buckingham Gate feeding centre deployed as
9 a sergeant on the G8 aid serial [Commissioner's serial]
10 111A. We paraded for duty at 5.30 and attended
11 Buckingham Gate at about 8.30. Also on serial 111A were
12 Inspector Mugridge, PC Harding, PC Colomb, PC White,
13 PC Field, PC Harwood [from whom my Lady heard],
14 PC Joshua and PC Smalley.

15 "Shortly after 9.00, a call came about an incident
16 on a train at Liverpool Street station. Several other
17 units were assigned to this call. At about 9.10,
18 Serials 111A, B and C were deployed to King's Cross to
19 stand by.

20 "We arrived on scene at about 9.20 and parked our
21 vehicle outside the station. At this time, there were
22 several police units, London Fire Brigade and some
23 paramedics on scene. The information we had received is
24 that there may have been an electrical explosion on an
25 Underground train. I spoke with a female police officer

1 who was holding a clipboard. She was standing at the
2 top of the stairs leading from the Underground station
3 to the main entrance to the station. She indicated the
4 ticket hall area of the main line station was being used
5 as a first aid post for those emerging from the
6 Underground area. We were asked to assist in helping
7 any people who were injured and to clear the area.
8 "As we were doing this, we were informed that
9 someone was in the Underground lobby, having had a heart
10 attack. I went to this area with several officers. The
11 area we found the casualty in was at the top of the
12 escalators that led from the Underground platforms. He
13 was a middle-aged, white male sitting in a chair being
14 tended to by Underground staff. There were also two
15 females sitting in chairs in distress.
16 "I returned to the entrance of the station and spoke
17 with four paramedics there to request their assistance.
18 They stated that they could not assist at that time, as
19 they were the first on the scene for the London
20 Ambulance Service and needed to follow their protocols.
21 I returned to the casualties.
22 "The escalator area was busy with people coming up
23 from the platforms. Everyone appeared quite calm and
24 people were being given bottle of water by staff.
25 I noticed that some people coming up had black marks on

1 their faces, as if they had been near a smoky fire.
2 I had also noticed that the amount of blackening on
3 people's faces was beginning to get worse as more people
4 came up.
5 "Some people were appearing with various injuries,
6 from blood on their faces to ripped clothes. A First
7 Aid at Work police constable from Serial 111C was with
8 us and was tending to the casualties who were sitting
9 down. A British Transport Police inspector then
10 approached us. He stated that there had been a possible
11 explosion on a train and that there was a lot of smoke
12 in the tunnel. He asked that some of us go to the
13 platform and others assist in directing people out of
14 the station. He also instructed us to remain in pairs.
15 "I went down to the platform area with the police
16 constables I was with. I believe all the PCs from my
17 Serial were with me at this time. People were still
18 coming out the escalators and, as we got to the platform
19 entrance, I paired all my officers off. I do not recall
20 the pairings.
21 "I posted some of my officers to remain by the
22 escalators to assist evacuating the station and took the
23 rest of my officers to the platform to the left of the
24 escalators. I turned left on the platform and was by
25 the entrance to the tunnel. I saw several members of

1 London Underground staff there. They were helping
2 people off the track and onto the platform. They told
3 me that the track was not live and that the train
4 involving the incident was about 200 metres down the
5 tunnel. The last of the passengers from the train were
6 helped onto the platform. I then went down the track
7 with my officers to assist on the train, as I was told
8 there were still people on board who were injured. As
9 we walked down the tunnel, there was a lot of smoke and
10 dust in the air. It was very hot and there was no
11 lighting."

12 My Lady, he then goes on to describe how he finds
13 other officers, including police Sergeant Bouchard, on
14 the train and that Mr Bouchard tells him of casualties
15 and fatalities in the front carriage. I will recommence
16 the narrative, if I may, at the top of the next page:

17 "I could hear people groaning, screaming and crying.
18 I shouted out that we were the police and that medical
19 assistance was on the way. I also shouted for people to
20 stay still and we'd get to them. I was handed a large
21 torch that I turned on.

22 "A member of London Underground staff suggested
23 I turn it off so that the casualties could not see the
24 fatalities. I decided I needed to get a full look at
25 the carriage, however, to assess how many people there

1 were and their condition. I pointed the torch into the
2 carriage, but it was still hard to see due to the smoke.
3 I could see many people with serious injuries lying on
4 top of each other and serious damage to the structure of
5 the carriage.

6 "As we were deep underground, our radios were not
7 working and I was informed that the London Underground
8 radios were not working either. I established that no
9 one had updated the control room of what the situation
10 was. I then returned down the tunnel and ran up the
11 escalator to the entrance to the station where I found
12 a chief superintendent. I informed him that there were
13 approximately 40 people in the front carriage with
14 serious injuries, some were dead. I stated that
15 lighting, ventilation, paramedics and stretchers were
16 needed immediately.

17 "When I passed this information, I returned to the
18 platform. There were now some stretchers there and
19 I took these down to the train with some officers from
20 my Serial. With PCs 805, 872 and 501, we helped
21 a female onto the stretcher who was in the second or
22 third carriage. She had a serious leg injury and could
23 not walk. We carried her to the platform, up the
24 escalator and into the first aid office in the ticket
25 office. As we did this, we were accompanied by a female

1 doctor.

2 "I left two of the officers with the female and
3 returned with the other officer to the train to assist
4 other people. I ran back down the escalator. I saw
5 another person being brought up by officers on
6 a stretcher and I saw PC193 carrying a female up in his
7 arms. At this point, I thought for the first time how
8 serious the incident was and how it was highly likely to
9 be terrorist-related.

10 "Although, on reflection, this was obvious from the
11 outset, it had not crossed my mind previously, due to
12 the overwhelming need to assist people. I considered
13 the possibility of secondary devices, noxious substances
14 in the bomb and the possibility of instability in the
15 tunnel. Although the risks were great, withdrawing
16 emergency services was not an option. On returning,
17 I took off my Met vest and cap and left them on the
18 platform, as it was too hot to wear them. I returned to
19 the train and met Police Sergeant Bouchard in the second
20 carriage. There were now London Fire Brigade on scene
21 and several medical staff tending to injured persons.
22 We continued to assist in looking after injured people
23 and I believe some officers took another casualty off on
24 a stretcher.

25 "The working environment was terrible. The heat was

1 overwhelming. There was still acrid smoke in the air.
2 There was little lighting, and there was the disturbing
3 sight of the casualties.
4 "There were two fatalities lying in the doorway of
5 the second carriage covered with police uniform.
6 I could see their lower legs were missing and what was
7 left was exposed flesh and bone. I directed two female
8 officers to leave the train, as there were many other
9 police officers present. The second carriage was quite
10 full of emergency service personnel. I was standing by
11 awaiting a direction from Inspector Mugridge. I had
12 several PCs waiting outside the carriage ready to take
13 the stretchers. I do not recall in great detail all the
14 actions taken during this time, due to the
15 circumstances, and I cannot remember exactly which
16 officers were doing what.
17 "A BTP officer brought some body bags to the
18 carriage and I assisted to place the two fatalities that
19 had been put by the doors into these bags. A black male
20 was then brought out on a stretcher and I assisted to
21 remove this person to the platform with several other
22 officers. This male had serious injuries to his lower
23 legs and, again, flesh and bone were exposed."
24 My Lady, that must have been Garri Hollness.
25 "At the platform, medical staff treated him. I got

1 onto the platform with my officers and ensured all were
2 accounted for. We took a break for a minute and drank
3 some water. All the officers were soaking wet, due to
4 sweating in the heat. We were then given face masks to
5 prevent us breathing in the smoke, but as we prepared to
6 go back down, we were told there were no more casualties
7 to be removed."

8 My Lady, the next three statements are short
9 statements from other passengers on the carriage.

10 The first is from Mariana Cheianu dated

11 12 July 2005.

12 Statement of MS MARIANA CHEIANU read

13 In July 2005, I was pregnant. As a result of my
14 pregnancy, I had been feeling unwell, especially last
15 Tuesday and Wednesday, 5 and 6 July.

16 "A friend recommended a doctor in the Ladbrooke Grove
17 area who I could visit. I therefore arranged to meet
18 a friend at Hammersmith who would take me to the
19 doctor's and I decided to take the Tube to Hammersmith
20 on the Thursday morning.

21 "I caught a train from the Angel fairly quickly,
22 knowing I had to change at King's Cross and, once there,
23 I had to walk quite a distance to the Piccadilly Line.
24 It was very busy that morning with many commuters. When
25 I reached my platform, I found that this was also very

1 busy, and I thought I would find it difficult to get on
2 a train, so I remained near the front of the platform
3 where I could board the first carriage.
4 "After about five minutes of standing on the
5 platform, a train came in. This train was very full.
6 A number of people came off the train and many more went
7 on to it. I decided the train was too full and I waited
8 for the second train.
9 "After about 6 or 7 minutes, a second train arrived.
10 Again, this was very busy. A number of people came off
11 the train, none of which I recall. I moved along the
12 carriage and entered by the third set of doors, the
13 train having come from my left. As I entered,
14 I immediately turned right, standing in the centre of
15 the aisle, holding on to the ceiling support."
16 My Lady, this witness has been attributed number 68
17 on the master plan.
18 "The carriage was very full with people standing
19 behind me. I remember a man with a large bag pushing in
20 behind me but I could not describe anyone. I remember,
21 as the train started moving off, I looked up at the
22 train map and started counting the stations to
23 Hammersmith. I never finished counting because
24 I suddenly felt that I was getting an electric shock
25 which shot down my arm. My whole body felt it was being

1 squeezed and I could not breathe. I felt that I was
2 dying and I was losing my baby. I did not hear any loud
3 noise but was then aware that I was falling. Someone
4 helped pick me up so I must have been on the floor.
5 "When I opened my eyes, I felt blood coming down my
6 face and felt glass in my eyes. I had blood coming from
7 my ear as well. I began to cry and I think my lenses
8 came out. I could not see anything, as the whole
9 carriage was dark and I was breathing in smoke. I still
10 felt that it was something to do with an electrical
11 fault. A woman was screaming, whilst others were
12 crying, trying to calm people down and I could hear
13 others praying. I was aware there was glass and metal
14 on the floor. The woman who had been sat in front of me
15 was still in her seat, and there was a man sitting on
16 her lap. His back was towards me and he was asking for
17 water which someone handed to him.
18 "I could then see a little bit of the carriage, as
19 people turned on their mobile phones. I saw a man with
20 severe head injuries who was standing at the time but
21 given a seat. There was an Oriental lady standing to my
22 left and I remember she had a white top and she had
23 a personal organiser which gave out a light and she
24 handed me some tissues.
25 "I remember a tall, black man who was telling

1 everyone to be calm. He went past me and towards the
2 driver's carriage. I don't know if he got through.
3 I recall someone asking for something to tie some wounds
4 and two men removed their ties, which I think were used
5 on someone's legs.

6 "After about 20 minutes, I walked along the carriage
7 with others. There was a tall young woman covered in
8 blood walking beside me. We went through to the next
9 carriage, which did not appear damaged and which had
10 some light. We carried on all the way through the train
11 and came off the end into the tunnel and we walked the
12 two to three minutes back to the station platform.

13 "I was helped up onto the platform and slowly walked
14 up the escalators, finally getting out. I walked into
15 a cafe area where I was given a drink and there
16 I remained for about 10 minutes before I was seen by
17 a medical person."

18 She then describes her injuries and how they were
19 treated at the Royal London Hospital in Whitechapel.

20 The next statement, my Lady, is -- the next two
21 statements are, in fact, from the same witness,
22 Annaick Guittenny, 14 December 2005.

23 Statement of MS ANNAICK GUITTENNY read

24 "On the morning of 7 July, I left my home address
25 with my friend Claire Prentice. We walked down to

1 Turnpike Lane Tube station at approximately 8.15. It
2 was our intention as usual to catch the Piccadilly Line
3 Tube and we got on the Tube as normal. However, we had
4 to wait longer than normal. We had just missed a train
5 and there was an announcement that a train had broken
6 down at Caledonian Road. We got on the first carriage,
7 the one nearest the front."

8 My Lady, she marks on a plan where she went to, and
9 it is number 95 on the master plan.

10 "Claire got off the Tube at King's Cross. I stayed
11 on with a view to going to Leicester Square in order to
12 change on to the Northern Line. By this stage, the Tube
13 was really packed. Approximately one minute from
14 pulling out of King's Cross is when the incident took
15 place. I did not hear the bomb go off. I can only
16 presume that this is because my ear drums were
17 perforated immediately.

18 "I felt an intense heat coming from my right-hand
19 side from the front of the train. Due to the heat,
20 I put my jacket over my head. It felt like the skin on
21 my face was going to burn off. I remember that the
22 train was still running, and it was at this point that
23 I lost consciousness. I do not know for how long I was
24 out, but when I woke up, the train was stopped.

25 "I did not know what had happened. I assumed that

1 there had either been a bomb or a bad accident, but what
2 I saw was devastation. It was dark. People were
3 screaming and appeared to be panicking, the carriage was
4 wrecked and there were people with injuries around me.
5 I realised that my leg was stuck under metal. I knew
6 that I had an injury to my right leg, but I could not
7 see exactly what at this stage. To my left-hand side,
8 was a black female sitting down. She seemed okay. She
9 left before as I did. I have marked her on the diagram.
10 There was a white male in the carriageway opposite me.
11 I found out his name was Paul. He had a badly injured
12 leg and I would describe him as medium build with short,
13 blond hair. There was a black male on the carriage
14 floor. His T-shirt was ripped. I recall prodding him
15 but got no response.
16 "Opposite me, there was a male who I think was
17 called Phil. He was white. I did not see any obvious
18 injuries on him."
19 My Lady, that may have been a reference to
20 Philip Beer.
21 "There was also another French girl on the carriage
22 called Marion. She had injuries to her legs, but could
23 walk. At one point, she sat down next to me. I was
24 translating to her what was going on. I recall she
25 fainted."

1 She then describes injuries to another male nearby.
2 She says:
3 "I saw he had a bad injury to the lower part of his
4 face caused by the same metal bars over my legs. I saw
5 this when the fireman moved him later. I think he was
6 dead. I was unable to see my injuries, due to the
7 debris covering them. I recall at one stage feeling
8 down to the bottom of my leg. I was aware that I was
9 touching flesh, but I knew it was not my limbs. My
10 recollection is that we were there for up to two hours.
11 "The first person who came from carriage 2 to help
12 us was a policeman. He told us help was coming and then
13 he left the same way. More police officers arrived who
14 said they were from British Transport Police. One who
15 stayed for a while chatting and reassuring us, I think
16 his name was similar to Fabian, but my ears were
17 injured. He was a tall, white male. The Fire Brigade
18 came and started moving people out. Marion first and
19 then Paul. I noticed at this point that Paul's legs
20 were next to mine."
21 It may be, my Lady, that's a reference to
22 Paul Mitchell:
23 "They moved the metal, which enabled me to be freed.
24 This was the point that I saw the extent of [the last
25 male that she describes]... injuries. I hopped into the

1 second carriage to the open doors. I could not get down
2 to the track, due to my injured leg, but two male
3 Underground workers carried me back to King's Cross on
4 a chair and I was carried up the stairs at King's Cross
5 by a policeman."
6 She was transported to Royal London Hospital by bus
7 where she remained for two weeks.
8 My Lady, her second statement describes in greater
9 detail the explosion, her injuries and the persons
10 around her. The most relevant point of her second
11 statement is contained on the second page, where she
12 describes how the man lying on the floor in the aisle
13 slightly to her left she knows to be called
14 Paul Mitchell, because she went to a survivors' meeting
15 before Christmas in 2005 and met up with him and he told
16 her his name. Then she says:
17 "I also mentioned in my previous statement about
18 a male sat opposite me called Phil. I marked him on the
19 map. I believe he was called Phil as I recall, after
20 the explosion, a male voice shouting 'Phil, Phil' and
21 the male opposite me seemed to grunt a response when
22 'Phil' was being called."
23 That must have been a reference to Patrick Barnes
24 calling out.
25 "I cannot describe him any more than I previously

1 did, as a white male."
2 The final short statement is that of Sharif Valeeve,
3 dated 11 July.
4 Statement of MR SHARIF VALEEEVE read
5 "During the explosion, I was a passenger on the
6 Piccadilly Line train travelling from King's Cross to
7 Holborn and was standing at the rear of the front
8 carriage. I went to Finchley Central Underground
9 station that morning and took the Northern Line to
10 King's Cross. I went to the Piccadilly Line platform.
11 A train came into the station. I waited for people to
12 get off. The train was very busy and full of people.
13 After people had got off the train, I entered the
14 carriage through the rear door of the front carriage.
15 I took two steps in and stood by the door."
16 My Lady, his place has been given number 106 by the
17 Metropolitan Police on the provisional plan.
18 "After people had got off the train, I entered the
19 carriage through the rear door of the front carriage.
20 I took two steps in and stood by the door. It was very
21 busy. There was a man standing next to me wearing
22 glasses. He was about 60 with white hair and he was
23 short. I cannot remember what clothes he was wearing.
24 The train moved away from the platform and, after about
25 20 seconds, there was a loud bang and everything went

1 black. There was a lot of dust and I could hear a woman
2 screaming.
3 "I could feel the dust in my nose and in my eyes.
4 I pulled my T-shirt up over my mouth. The carriage was
5 dark and people were using their mobile phones as
6 a light. I could not smell anything other than dust.
7 People from the next carriage passed through the window
8 at the end of the carriage a first aid kit. The window
9 which this was passed through is the window that you
10 pull down. I passed the first aid kit on to somebody
11 else in the train. I do not know who. I then stood for
12 about five minutes. I had glass in my hair and I was
13 obviously very lucky, as I could see blood on other
14 people. I had a little pain in my ears and people
15 around me were not very injured. I had blood on my
16 T-shirt and jeans. This was not my blood. I do not
17 know where it came from.
18 "A policeman then came. He was standing by the
19 connecting door of the second carriage. I walked from
20 the rear of the first carriage through the second
21 carriage and got off the train via the rear door.
22 I went onto the tracks and everybody was calm. We then
23 made our way to King's Cross station and a policeman
24 helped everybody on to the platform."
25 My Lady, that concludes the evidence from today and

1 yesterday.
2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much, Mr Keith. 10.00
3 tomorrow, please.
4 (3.45 pm)
5 (The inquests adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)
6