

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005

Hearing transcripts - 17 December 2010 - Morning session

1 Friday, 17 December 2010

2 (10.00 am)

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr O'Connor?

4 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Good morning, my Lady. May I invite  
5 you to call Constable Whelan?

6 PC GARY MICHAEL WHELAN (affirmed)

7 Questions by MR ANDREW O'CONNOR

8 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Could you give your full name, please?

9 A. I am PC Gary Michael Whelan of the British Transport  
10 Police. I am currently working at Central London police  
11 station where I'm a response officer, as I was five  
12 years ago.

13 Q. Thank you. Five years ago, on the morning of 7 July,  
14 I believe it's right that you were assigned to the duty  
15 of manning a prison van?

16 A. Yes, I was.

17 Q. The duties that you would have performed that morning  
18 were transporting prisoners from the police station to  
19 various courts around London?

20 A. Yes, just the one court.

21 Q. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, I think?

22 A. Two trips to the one court.

23 Q. You were manning the prison van with another constable,  
24 whose name was PC Aaron Debnam?

25 A. Yes, that's correct.

1 Q. The van had the call sign Lima 41?

2 A. Yes, it did.

3 Q. Just before 9.00, I think it's right to say that you  
4 were in the middle of these court runs, you'd already  
5 done one run and you'd come back to the police station  
6 to pick up another prisoner and you were due to take him  
7 to the Magistrates' Court?

8 A. Yes, that's correct, we were just doing the paperwork to  
9 take the second prisoner to court.

10 Q. At around this time, is it the case that you received --  
11 or that the police station received an emergency call  
12 indicating that there was an emergency at  
13 Liverpool Street station?

14 A. Yes, I heard that message over my personal radio.

15 Q. At the police station was Inspector McMunn, who my Lady  
16 heard from earlier this week?

17 A. Yes, he was.

18 Q. His duties required him then to attend Liverpool Street  
19 station?

20 A. Yes, he did. As the duty officer, he would attend any  
21 incident of a more serious sort of nature.

22 Q. If you could try to keep your voice up, Mr Whelan.  
23 I know it's difficult, but you'll find that the  
24 microphone in front of you doesn't actually amplify your  
25 voice, it just relays it. So if you can try and keep

1 your voice up, that would be helpful.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Inspector McMunn then needed to be taken to  
4 Liverpool Street and you and Mr Debnam volunteered to do  
5 that in your van?

6 A. Yes, we did.

7 Q. You went to Liverpool Street with him, and I think it's  
8 right to say that when you arrived at Liverpool Street,  
9 Mr Debnam stayed with the van, but you got out with the  
10 inspector?

11 A. Yes, it was difficult to park the vehicle near the  
12 station because there were cordons in, so PC Debnam took  
13 the vehicle away, while me and Mr McMunn made our way to  
14 a cordon on foot, which was at the Broad Street exit of  
15 Liverpool Street.

16 Q. Now, Mr McMunn has said in his evidence two days ago  
17 what happened at Liverpool Street. I'm not going to ask  
18 you about that. But it's right, isn't it, that after  
19 a period of time -- some minutes -- he decided that he  
20 would need to go to Edgware Road Tube station?

21 A. Yes, if I recall, in his capacity as duty officer, he  
22 was asked to attend Edgware Road, so we all attended in  
23 Lima 41.

24 Q. You went back to the prison van, got in and drove the  
25 other way back across London towards Edgware Road?

1 A. Yes, we did.

2 Q. Could we have on the screen, please, [BTP169-4]? Before

3 we look at this document, Mr Whelan, as far as timings

4 are concerned, it's right, isn't it, that you were

5 driving back through London at about 9.20?

6 A. Yes, we were driving along Tottenham Court Road and we

7 were just approaching the junction with the Euston Road.

8 Q. Then we see this call at 09.27 made from -- these

9 transcripts are of the British Transport Police radio --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- communications on that morning. We see a call from

12 the Control Centre:

13 "Any uncommitted Lima Tango, any Lima unit ..."

14 What does that mean, "any Lima unit"?

15 A. Lima would be the prefix that goes on -- at the

16 beginning of each call sign for vehicles belonging to

17 the London Underground area of the British Transport

18 Police.

19 Q. So any unit meeting that description, presumably that's

20 a broad range of units?

21 A. Yes, any Underground vehicle at all that was available

22 to attend that location.

23 Q. The message is to attend Russell Square?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. You heard this message. Did you personally hear it?

1 A. Yes, I did, yes.

2 Q. At the time, we see it's timed at 09.27, but one of the  
3 features of the BTP logs, it seems, at least on that  
4 day, is that they were two minutes behind, so we can  
5 read that as being something like 9.29.

6 You, at the time, were close to Russell Square  
7 Underground station?

8 A. Yes, we were just around the corner.

9 Q. If we move on to the next page, so page 5 [BTP169-5], do you see  
10 just before halfway down where it says:

11 "Caller: Lima 41, we're diverting to Russell Square  
12 from Edgware Road."

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Who was it that actually made that call?

15 A. It would have either been myself or PC Debnam.

16 PC Debnam was driving with the blue lights on, so I dare  
17 say that was probably myself.

18 Q. Indicating that you're diverting, you're not asking for  
19 permission here, you're simply informing them that  
20 that's what you're doing?

21 A. We're saying we're going to that location.

22 Q. Then if we can, the last reference, please, go to  
23 a different document, [BTP168-31], we may need to go back  
24 to the page before just to pick up the time, so we see  
25 at the bottom there that [BTP168-30], at approximately 09.31, if we

1 can now go back to the next page [BTP168-31], we see towards the  
2 bottom:  
3 "Lima 41 off at Russell Square."  
4 A. Yes.  
5 Q. That indicates that your vehicle had then arrived at  
6 Russell Square?  
7 A. Yes, it does.  
8 Q. So something in the region of 9.33, a few minutes after  
9 you heard that call?  
10 A. Yes.  
11 Q. What did you see when you arrived at Russell Square  
12 station?  
13 A. When we initially arrived at the station, we pulled up  
14 in the vehicle. I believe there was an ambulance just  
15 in front of where we finally parked. We went into the  
16 booking hall area and there were a number of people  
17 sitting, lying, on the floor, who had injuries, cuts --  
18 injuries along those sort of lines.  
19 Q. While you were in the ticket hall, did you see other  
20 British Transport Police arriving?  
21 A. I did, yes, yes.  
22 Q. Can you remember the names of any of them?  
23 A. Yes. I believe, while we were at the top of the stairs,  
24 a DC Alex Bell and a DS -- I think his name was  
25 Mick Carney -- arrived and spoke with Mr McMunn.

1 Q. So to give us some idea of the timing, that was how many  
2 minutes after you had arrived?

3 A. That was very, very shortly after we'd arrived. We  
4 hadn't, in fact, made our way down to the platform at  
5 that stage, so I'd imagine that they must have arrived  
6 literally around the same time as us, seconds behind us.

7 Q. From what you say, then, you didn't stay very long in  
8 the ticket hall, but you made your way down to the  
9 platform?

10 A. We made our way down to the platform very quickly.

11 Q. Was that a decision that you took or was it something  
12 that the inspector decided on?

13 A. I think it was a decision that was made collectively, to  
14 be honest. We were at the top of the stairs, it seemed  
15 to be quite a natural thing to do, to go down and see  
16 what was happening.

17 Q. The staircase at Russell Square is very long, isn't it?

18 A. It is.

19 Q. Can we assume you went down as quickly as you could?

20 A. Yes, we did.

21 Q. What did you find at the bottom?

22 A. When I got onto the platform, I recall looking to my  
23 left and seeing a number of Metropolitan Police  
24 officers, and it was probably a sergeant and six or  
25 seven PCs, all wearing yellow hi-vis. I then looked to

1 my right and I could see a lady sitting on a bench,  
2 I could see a large, black male pacing up and down and,  
3 also, at the end of the platform, at the point more or  
4 less where the train would enter from the tunnel onto  
5 the platform, I could see a couple of paramedics who  
6 were treating somebody who was just at that point.

7 Q. You mentioned that the Met Police were wearing high  
8 visibility jackets?

9 A. Yes, they were.

10 Q. Were you wearing jackets at all?

11 A. No, I didn't, I just had my usual black kit on.

12 Q. We've heard Inspector McMunn give evidence about what  
13 happened on the platform. We've heard his evidence to  
14 the effect that, essentially, a group of people gathered  
15 on the platform and, after a period of time, set off  
16 towards the train.

17 A. Yes, that's correct.

18 Q. We heard that, as they were setting off, another member  
19 of the British Transport Police, Mr Nixon, made a call  
20 to inform Control that that's what was happening.

21 A. Yes, he did.

22 Q. Could we just have a quick look at that, please? It's  
23 [BTP151-75].

24 I think you refer to this call in your statement.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Do you remember Mr Nixon making this call?

2 A. I remember distinctly. I had attempted to make the call  
3 myself, but the point where I was standing, I couldn't  
4 get a signal on my radio, so Chris made the transmission  
5 instead.

6 Q. Let's just look at it, if we may. You see here 09.44,  
7 we can read that as something like 09.46. This is  
8 Mr Nixon speaking, but he says:

9 "From Inspector McMunn, we are now entering the  
10 tunnel eastbound to the train, where there's suspected  
11 dead and wounded, although this hasn't been cleared  
12 because of the risk of health and life to other people.  
13 We are now entering the tunnel to get to the train,  
14 over."

15 I want to ask you how that call was made. Do I take  
16 it from what you said it was made on a radio?

17 A. It was made on PC Nixon's channel 2 radio.

18 Q. From the platform?

19 A. From the platform.

20 Q. Channel 2 being the British Transport Police radio  
21 channel that is effective underground?

22 A. Yes, I don't know the technical stuff, but five years  
23 ago, we would use one radio with two different channels  
24 on it, 2 being the one that we used underground.

25 Q. There's some other evidence that we might hear later on

1 this morning to the effect that channel 2 wasn't working  
2 that morning. From what you say on your radio, you were  
3 having trouble using channel 2.

4 A. Mine personally, where I was standing -- the problem  
5 with the old channel 2 radios is you could stand in one  
6 place and transmit and they wouldn't receive it; you  
7 could step two paces to your left or right, and you'd  
8 get a perfectly clear signal.

9 My radio had been working and, indeed, I made  
10 a call, before Chris Nixon did, from Russell Square,  
11 using my radio. So I think it was more where I was  
12 standing as opposed to my radio not being working.

13 Q. I see. In any event, just for the avoidance of doubt,  
14 this system -- the channel 2 system -- is no longer in  
15 use. Is that right?

16 A. It's no longer used, no.

17 Q. When the group set off, I think Mr McMunn said there  
18 were between 10 and 15 people. Is that roughly your  
19 memory?

20 A. Yes, that's correct.

21 Q. Give us a picture, if you can. Was it a sort of solid  
22 group of people who moved together up the tracks, or was  
23 it a more elongated crowd, with perhaps gaps in between,  
24 smaller groups within that number?

25 A. It certainly wasn't like a rugby scrum. It was a little

1 more stretched out than that, but people were within  
2 touching distance of the person in front of them, and  
3 kind of strung out that way, but certainly within  
4 ear/eyeshot, and in most cases, I would imagine,  
5 certainly from where I was, if you put your hand out,  
6 you'd have touched the person in front of you and the  
7 person behind me, if they'd have put their hand out,  
8 would have been able to touch me.

9 Q. Were you towards the front or towards the back of the  
10 group?

11 A. I was towards the front.

12 Q. Can you give us an estimate of how long it took to walk  
13 to the train?

14 A. Time's a little bit vague, but it took, I would say,  
15 probably five minutes to walk to the front carriage of  
16 the train.

17 Q. It was at some time around this moment that the bomb on  
18 the bus in Tavistock Square exploded. Some of the  
19 witnesses -- although not you, I think -- describe  
20 hearing it. Can you remember hearing it at all?

21 A. No. To be honest, I was completely focused on the task  
22 that was ahead of us or that we thought might be ahead  
23 of us and I didn't hear that.

24 Q. You say you were focused on the task ahead of you. What  
25 was your understanding as you walked up the tunnel of

1 what you were likely to find?

2 A. I expected to find casualties. I was aware that there  
3 were probably dead people on the train, people with very  
4 serious injuries, and I was aware, at that point, that  
5 a bomb or an explosion had certainly occurred on that  
6 train.

7 Q. To the extent that there's a difference between those  
8 two things, were you aware that there had been a bomb or  
9 simply that there had been some sort of explosion?

10 A. I had been told by -- I'd heard a member of staff on the  
11 platform, prior to going up there, say that a bomb had  
12 gone off. I certainly expected there to have been an  
13 explosion, but, personally, I suspected that a bomb had  
14 probably gone off.

15 Q. What did you see as you came into view of the train?

16 A. As we approached the train, I -- obviously steps down  
17 from the driver's carriage. To the left of those steps,  
18 there was a man who had lost the lower portion of one of  
19 his legs. He was kind of leaning against the tunnel  
20 wall, and he seemed to be trying to make his way along  
21 the tracks. He was being assisted by, I think it was  
22 the train driver.

23 Q. I think that was probably Mr Nairn and Mr Glennerster,  
24 both of whom we've heard from, that you're describing.

25 A. Okay, yes. A short while after that, the man with the

1 injury to his leg, some of the officers that we'd gone  
2 down with, and the man that was standing with him, took  
3 him away on either a portable stretcher or a blanket and  
4 took him away.

5 Q. Can you remember whether it was a stretcher or  
6 a blanket?

7 A. No, I don't. It looked like a blanket to me, but it  
8 equally could have been the type of stretcher that  
9 resembles a body bag, obviously without the zip-up  
10 compartment.

11 Q. That's Mr Glennerster then.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Did you then get into the carriage?

14 A. Yes, we did. We followed the paramedics on to the  
15 carriage. I don't know how close behind them I was, but  
16 I was in fairly quickly after those, and I saw a person  
17 lying on the floor who, initially, I thought had some  
18 kind of injuries or maybe even was dead.

19 The paramedics informed me that he was okay, so we  
20 kind of stepped over him. If I recall correctly,  
21 a little while later, he more or less got up himself and  
22 was helped to the door and then some other officers  
23 outside the train helped him away from the scene.

24 Q. Before I ask you further about what you found in the  
25 carriage, you described the paramedics going in, and

1 then you said that "we went in". Do you mean by that  
2 you and Inspector McMunn?

3 A. Well, there was certainly more officers than that.  
4 There was a small team of officers that had gone up the  
5 tunnel and entered the train. I know certainly that  
6 Mr McMunn was one of those officers. I know I was there  
7 and I can recall PC Debnam being there.

8 Q. Yes. For example, I think you've said there there were  
9 anything -- six or seven Metropolitan Police officers  
10 and a number of British Transport Police officers. But  
11 my question really was whether they all went inside the  
12 carriage or whether some of them waited outside.

13 A. No, there wouldn't have been room for everybody inside  
14 the train, so it was only a few of us that went inside  
15 the train. The rest waited at the bottom of the steps.  
16 I think the intention was that, hopefully, we'd be able  
17 to get people off and then they could help them away.

18 Q. Going back to the carriage, then, you mention the man  
19 whom you stepped over, as it were.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Your statement then describes how you went up to a lady,  
22 who was a little bit further into the carriage, who had  
23 injuries, very serious injuries, to both her legs, who  
24 sounds like Gillian Hicks, who we've also heard evidence  
25 from.

1 A. Yes, yes.

2 Q. Can you tell us how you assisted her?

3 A. I just approached Gillian, myself and other officers.  
4 I remember distinctly at this point that DS Carney was  
5 on the train at this point, because he was also dealing  
6 with Gill. She was conscious, although not particularly  
7 lucid. If you spoke to her, she would answer your  
8 questions, but only in so much as she would nod or shake  
9 her head. We basically tried to comfort her, just some  
10 kind words, stuff like that. She'd had a label put on  
11 her by the paramedics who had gone into the train and  
12 assessed everybody.

13 Q. Yes.

14 A. She had a label which read priority 1, which I took to  
15 mean that she was somebody who needed to be evacuated  
16 immediately, which turned out to be the case.  
17 Myself, DS Carney, and other officers assisted in  
18 removing her from where she was in the carriage up to  
19 the door, where she was then passed out to other  
20 officers who took her away. Unfortunately, having no  
21 stretchers, we had to make do with what we could find  
22 and try to manufacture some stretchers out of clothing  
23 that we'd found strewn around on the floor.

24 Q. Were there then, at this point, simply no stretchers to  
25 be had?

1 A. No, there were absolutely no stretchers. After -- just  
2 before taking Gill out, one of the civilians who had  
3 come down -- I think he worked for Network Rail -- had  
4 said to me that he would "... take over from talking to  
5 her, to see if you can find something more important to  
6 do".

7 I, at that point, had gone to the train and shouted  
8 up the tunnel that we needed -- basically needed more of  
9 everything, one of those things being stretchers, and  
10 I don't know who made the reply, but it was that there  
11 wasn't any to be had, basically.

12 Q. So as you say, knowing that there weren't any stretchers  
13 either in the carriage or ready to come in, you  
14 improvised?

15 A. Yes, we did, yes.

16 Q. The first person that you describe leaving the carriage  
17 by that route was Gillian Hicks?

18 A. Yes, she was, yes.

19 Q. She was put onto one of these makeshift stretchers, but  
20 from what you say in your statement, it sounds as though  
21 she didn't stay on the stretcher. Is that right?

22 A. No, the stretchers that we made became kind of -- well,  
23 they weren't doing the job that we'd expected that they  
24 would do, so it ended up being a mixture of -- being in  
25 kind of like a hammock made out of a jacket and then

1 somebody holding on to the tops of her legs.

2 Q. Were you one of the people who was actually carrying her  
3 out of the carriage?

4 A. Yes, I believe I had hold of her legs or the tops of her  
5 legs.

6 Q. What happened to her once you'd managed to get her out  
7 of the carriage?

8 A. We got her out to -- out to where the steps were and  
9 with the other couple of people, who didn't have such  
10 serious injuries, who had left the train prior to Gill  
11 coming off. Officers had gone away with those, so there  
12 weren't that many officers left at the bottom of the  
13 steps to do the ferrying.

14 I seem to recall that a couple of other officers had  
15 turned up -- Ray Beresford-Cole was there -- and they  
16 tried to get her away up the tunnel initially on one of  
17 these stretchers. But it wasn't working.

18 So in the end, PC Debnam threw her over his shoulder  
19 and took her away up the platform -- up the track,  
20 sorry.

21 Q. You saw that, but you didn't go with them?

22 A. No, I decided to remain on the train. There were more  
23 people who I could see were going to -- were going to  
24 need to be taken out at some point.

25 Q. So you went back into the train?

1 A. Yes, I mean, I didn't actually leave the train, I just  
2 stood at the top of the stairs.

3 Q. In your statement, you describe another lady being  
4 carried out in much the same way.

5 A. Yes. I think that was Shelley, Shelley Mather.

6 Q. In fact -- I think in your statement you refer to  
7 someone else before Shelley Mather being carried out.  
8 Do you have a memory of that now?

9 A. I do, yes, yes, I do.

10 Q. Briefly, tell us what happened.

11 A. That was a lady who had a pain in her back, I seem to  
12 remember. She was kind of trying to get up herself.

13 She, again, was carried to the door. She had no visible  
14 injuries -- you know, any traumatic visible injuries,  
15 and we assisted her to the door where, again, lack of  
16 officers, I remember a Met PC doing pretty much the same  
17 with her, carrying her out of the tunnel in the same  
18 way.

19 Q. Again, were the makeshift stretchers not very effective?

20 A. They weren't fit for purpose, to be honest.

21 Q. Was it then that you went back into the carriage and  
22 assisted Shelley Mather?

23 A. Yes, I did, yes.

24 Q. Once again, she was being carried out on another one of  
25 the makeshift stretchers?

1 A. Well, initially, she was lying on the ground when  
2 I first encountered her. I believe I'd spoken to her  
3 briefly before and she seemed kind of -- again, she  
4 wasn't having a conversation, but she would answer  
5 a question by nodding or shaking her head.

6 Q. Where was she when you spoke to her earlier?

7 A. She was where Gill Hicks was, which was down the  
8 carriage, probably two rows of seats down the carriage,  
9 quite near to where the largest amount of bodies was,  
10 she was a little bit further towards the train driver's  
11 cabin.

12 Q. Perhaps we could have up on the screen [INQ10283-11].

13 This, Mr Whelan, is a plan of the carriage. The  
14 driver's cab, you can see, is on the left here, that's  
15 where you came in and out. In fact, these red marks  
16 show where the bodies of the deceased were recovered  
17 from, but most of the evidence has been to the effect  
18 that Gillian Hicks was found somewhere on seats 8 and 9.  
19 I don't know if that accords with your memory?

20 A. Yes, that would be about correct, yes.

21 Q. So if you could perhaps use this plan and the numbers on  
22 the seats to tell us where it was you think that you saw  
23 Shelley Mather when you first spoke to her?

24 A. She would have been further towards the driver's cab,  
25 probably 5, 6, 7.

1 Q. I see. Going back to what she said and what you said to  
2 her --

3 A. I was just, you know, speaking with her. As I say, she  
4 didn't -- it wasn't conversational, but it was just to  
5 let her know that we were aware that she was there, she  
6 was going to be taken out, you know, as soon as possible  
7 and, indeed, it was all very quick.

8 I remember, after speaking to her, the paramedics  
9 saying, "This person has to go", with quite a lot of  
10 urgency, so then I went and assisted in removing her.

11 Q. We've heard evidence already that, in fact, before  
12 Shelley was carried out, the paramedics undertook some  
13 treatment on her inserting a needle into her chest.

14 Is that something that you saw or maybe you were out  
15 of the carriage when that was happening?

16 A. No, I believe, when that was happening, I was probably  
17 further up the carriage towards the interconnecting  
18 door, because I didn't see -- I saw the paramedics  
19 treating her, but I didn't see exactly what they were  
20 doing.

21 Q. But you saw them treating her in the carriage?

22 A. Yes, I saw them squatting, sitting over her, talking to  
23 her, the same way as, you know, everybody else was, they  
24 were certainly talking to her, trying to comfort her and  
25 things like that. That's what I perceived they were

1 doing.

2 Q. But, as you say, the time came when they decided that  
3 she needed to be moved out of the carriage?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Tell us about your involvement in that exercise.

6 A. Basically, with a degree of urgency, they said that,  
7 "This person needs to go out of the carriage now", so  
8 I went up to -- back up the carriage to where she was.  
9 Basically, we tried to use the stretcher, the improvised  
10 stretcher scenario again. I believe it might have been  
11 DS Carney, or one of the other officers there, placed  
12 a jacket on the floor, I think it was like a hi-vi  
13 jacket --

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. -- and she was placed on top of that. Obviously, it  
16 wasn't long enough to take the entire length of her  
17 body, so I decided to -- I found another jacket and  
18 I decided to place it around the backs of her thighs, in  
19 order to try to lift her up, the reason being she had  
20 quite bad injuries to the backs of her legs and I didn't  
21 want to be interfering with those at all.

22 Q. How many of you were there engaged in this exercise of  
23 lifting her and carrying her?

24 A. I would say everybody that was in the carriage got  
25 involved at some point in trying to get her out as

1 quickly as possible. The paramedics were either side of  
2 her and I know certainly I had the legs for a -- to  
3 a point. Obviously, the carriage -- the driver's cab  
4 door is extremely narrow, so it took a bit of  
5 manoeuvring to get her to that door, and I believe, when  
6 I got to that door, I ended up passing her legs to  
7 Mr McMunn, who was standing sideways in the door, just  
8 purely on the basis that he was in a better position to  
9 help get her out through the door than I was.

10 Q. Were you able to see what Shelley's condition was during  
11 this time?

12 A. While I was -- I gave up, basically, on the jacket and  
13 held her under the arms. While this was happening, she  
14 kept pulling her legs up, kind of going into a foetal  
15 position. I asked her, as nicely as I could -- you  
16 know, told her it was all right, and that we were going  
17 to get her out, and one of the paramedics turned around  
18 and said words to the effect of, "It's not what you're  
19 doing. It's okay, carry on doing what you're doing".  
20 But she was certainly going into a foetal position.

21 Q. Did she seem to you to be able to understand what you  
22 were saying at any rate?

23 A. Yes, I believed so. She certainly didn't answer "Yes"  
24 or "No", but she seemed to answer what I was doing, what  
25 I was asking her to do. Obviously, then I passed over

1 to Mr McMunn, who then carried her out, with the other  
2 people.

3 Q. Did you go out with her or stay in the carriage?

4 A. I stayed on the carriage. I went to the top of the  
5 steps. Again, purely the logistics of too many people  
6 trying to get through too small a space. I moved back  
7 until they got her off, and I saw her taken out and she  
8 was placed away from the train on the side.

9 Q. You refer in your statement to a doctor --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- wearing civilian clothes who came and treated her at  
12 this time.

13 A. Yes, he was brought up the tracks, I believe, by  
14 PC Nixon. He was -- he had red curly hair, silver  
15 framed glasses and a light-blue shirt on. He came up  
16 the tracks and Chris Nixon, who had brought him up,  
17 introduced him as a doctor. He then attended to Shelley  
18 where she was.

19 Q. Just pausing there, you say "where she was". Where was  
20 she when he attended to her?

21 A. She had been brought down and moved to -- if you were  
22 looking up the tunnel back towards Russell Square, she  
23 had been moved to the left of the tracks. So he was  
24 doing stuff with her there.

25 Q. You were still at the top of the steps?

1 A. I could see at the top of the stairs, yes.

2 Q. So you could see what was happening but you weren't  
3 close-up?

4 A. Yes, I wasn't close-up and I obviously couldn't see what  
5 procedures or what he was actually doing with her.

6 Q. From what you were able to see, what happened?

7 A. Well, I could just really see the back of the doctor  
8 leaning over her. That's all I could see. So  
9 I couldn't even see what his hands were doing.

10 Q. We know from other evidence that it was this doctor who  
11 declared Shelley Mather dead.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Did you see that happen, were you aware that that was  
14 what was happening at the time?

15 A. I heard, a few moments after the doctor had finished  
16 crouching over her, that she had died, unfortunately.

17 Q. There's some evidence that he actually tried to treat  
18 her at this time. It sounds, from what you say, as  
19 though you may not be able to help very much whether he  
20 did or didn't?

21 A. No, I only saw him crouching over her. I couldn't see  
22 any procedures or anything that he may or may not have  
23 been carrying out.

24 Q. Roughly speaking, how long was he with her before you  
25 were aware that he had declared her dead?

1 A. Two, three minutes.

2 Q. What did you do then?

3 A. I went back inside the tunnel. There were other people  
4 still on the train.

5 Q. You said you went back inside the tunnel. I think you  
6 meant you went back into the train.

7 A. Sorry, I apologise. I went back into the train carriage  
8 and, basically, there was another gentleman there lying  
9 on the seats, his name was Garri.

10 Q. Was he a black gentleman?

11 A. He was. He, again, had lost the lower portion of one of  
12 his legs. Just, basically, some water had arrived at  
13 that point, I remember giving him a sip of water and  
14 just, again, trying to reassure him that he wouldn't be  
15 there for much longer and that we were going to help him  
16 out of there.

17 Q. This man I think was Garri Hollness.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. We know that he was, in fact, taken off the train in the  
20 other direction, back towards King's Cross. Did you see  
21 that happen?

22 A. I seem to recall, at some point, people arriving at the  
23 other end of the train. I wasn't aware that he'd gone  
24 off that end of the train. To be honest, I wasn't sure  
25 whether he'd come off of Russell Square end or

1 King's Cross end.

2 Q. It's clear from what you say that you weren't involved  
3 in moving him?

4 A. I didn't assist in moving him out.

5 Q. Did there come a time that you were given an order, in  
6 effect, to leave the carriage, because there were no  
7 longer any living casualties on board?

8 A. Yes, there did. Basically, when everybody who had been  
9 removed from that carriage who was alive could be  
10 removed, Mr McMunn declared the place a crime scene and  
11 basically, at that point, I left with the paramedics.

12 Q. You went back up to Russell Square?

13 A. I did, yes.

14 Q. I think it's right that you then went to a Holiday Inn  
15 that was nearby for some much-needed refreshment?

16 A. Yes, we were directed there by, I think it was  
17 Chief Inspector Saunders, who was upstairs, where we  
18 were basically given a cup of tea, stuff like that, and  
19 also so that he could corral all of us together,  
20 because, obviously, at that point, I think they realised  
21 that they would be needing to take our uniforms for  
22 forensic opportunities, et cetera.

23 Q. In your statement, you give an estimate of the time that  
24 you reached the Holiday Inn as 11.00?

25 A. Yes, about that time, although I'm not sure, that could

1 be 15 minutes out, to be honest.

2 Q. Certainly.

3 A. It could be 20 minutes out.

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. The time we spent in the tunnel, parts of it went very  
6 quickly, other parts went very slowly. So my honest  
7 answer would be I have no idea how long I was in that  
8 train for.

9 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Yes. Thank you, Mr Whelan. Those are  
10 all the questions that I have for you. It may be that  
11 others have questions for you.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

13 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

14 MR SAUNDERS: Officer, is the position this: that although  
15 you had no actual stretchers, you and your colleagues,  
16 as it were, improvised by trying to use these coats and  
17 jackets?

18 A. Yes, we did.

19 Q. Was anybody, as far as you were aware, delayed in being  
20 taken off the train as a result of there being a lack of  
21 stretchers?

22 A. I suppose, if we had stretchers, it probably would have  
23 been quicker than having to make the improvised  
24 stretchers.

25 Q. Is that the sheer need, as it were, to tie arms of

1 jackets together?

2 A. Yes, just the amount of seconds it takes to tie arms  
3 together, and also to make sure that those arms are tied  
4 securely enough that they're not going to collapse at  
5 the first --

6 Q. Because, obviously, some of the casualties you had were  
7 fully-grown adults, and some of them you've described as  
8 being quite large.

9 A. Yes, yes.

10 Q. But was there a decision ever taken -- I don't suggest  
11 there was, Mr Whelan; I'm simply enquiring -- was there  
12 ever a decision taken that somebody wouldn't be moved  
13 until a stretcher came?

14 A. Not as far as I recall.

15 Q. Similarly, you've told her Ladyship that there were two  
16 examples where, when a casualty had been taken from the  
17 carriage and then it became very difficult to use your  
18 improvised stretchers, they were literally carried back  
19 towards the platform?

20 A. Yes, they were.

21 Q. So again, no delay waiting for a stretcher to come to  
22 take over?

23 A. Well, no, no delay in actually getting the people moved.  
24 Obviously, had we have had stretchers, maybe the  
25 resources that we had -- it only takes two people to

1 move a stretcher, whereas it may take several people to  
2 move somebody on an improvised or with no stretcher.

3 Q. Again, her Ladyship heard Inspector McMunn -- I should  
4 say now Chief Inspector McMunn -- on Wednesday, saying  
5 that he had gone down and, as Mr O'Connor has just asked  
6 you, about 10 to 15 in number.

7 So there appear, do there not, to have been  
8 sufficient, as it were -- forgive me for saying --  
9 nonqualified, but people who could actually do the  
10 stretcher-bearing?

11 A. Yes, it did appear that way, but, unfortunately, the  
12 first casualty who was taken away, the man who was  
13 outside the train with the leg missing, I think it took  
14 four or five of the officers that we brought down just  
15 to move him. So our numbers were depleted fairly  
16 quickly.

17 MR SAUNDERS: Thank you very much, Mr Whelan.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Patterson?

19 Questions by MR PATTERSON

20 MR PATTERSON: Just on that point, please, Constable, in  
21 your statement you refer to one particular woman whom  
22 you were trying to evacuate on one of these makeshift  
23 stretchers, and the words that you used in your  
24 statement were "it was ridiculous", and I think you  
25 described, in particular with Shelley Mather, that you

1 were having real trouble negotiating through the door  
2 into the driver's cabin.

3 A. Yes, that's correct.

4 Q. So trying your best with these jackets and so forth,  
5 obviously it would have been a lot quicker and easier if  
6 you'd had actual stretchers?

7 A. Yes, it probably would have been, yes.

8 Q. It also sounds from your statement as though there might  
9 have been less pain for the casualties if there had been  
10 real stretchers.

11 In your statement, you refer to one woman whom you  
12 gave up with the makeshift stretcher. As you described  
13 it, a "big lump of a bloke", a Met PC, put her over his  
14 shoulders and she was screaming, complaining about the  
15 pain in her back.

16 A. Yes, she was, yes.

17 Q. Obviously, no criticism of this officer doing his best  
18 with what was available, but it sounds as though the  
19 pain was exacerbated because there were no stretchers?

20 A. Yes, I mean, that could have been the case.

21 MR PATTERSON: Thank you, Constable.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

23 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

24 MS GALLAGHER: Two brief matters, Constable.

25 Firstly, could I just deal with your original

1 deployment? Today in evidence you've described how,  
2 when you were doing paperwork, you got an emergency call  
3 saying there was an emergency at Liverpool Street  
4 station. You heard the message over your personal  
5 radio. Is it right that that first message referred to  
6 a power surge?

7 A. Yes, I've only referred to one call in my notes, because  
8 I would routinely only write in my notebook the calls  
9 that I'm going to attend. The first call did say "power  
10 surge".

11 Q. It becomes apparent a little later that it's more  
12 serious than a power surge?

13 A. Yes, it then goes on to -- the word "explosion" was  
14 used, which is the point when Mr McMunn deploys himself,  
15 as duty officer, to go and see what's going on.

16 Q. In both your statements which you gave on 4 August  
17 2005 -- so much closer to the time -- and also in your  
18 handwritten notes, you describe it becoming apparent  
19 that it was more serious, not only because of the  
20 reference to the word "explosion", but also -- I'm just  
21 quoting from your statement -- "by the way control room  
22 were kind of panicking", and you also use that word in  
23 your handwritten notes. The reference is [BTP89-6].

24 If we could just turn it sideways, this seems to be  
25 a time line. Is that right, Constable?

1 A. I'm sorry, this -- these notes aren't mine.

2 Q. They're not yours?

3 A. No.

4 Q. They're in a document that made it appear that they were  
5 yours. There's reference to "panic" there. We can take  
6 it off the screen, if that's not his handwriting.

7 But certainly in your statement you refer to  
8 "control room kind of panicking", so is it right you got  
9 a sense there was panic at the other end of the phone?

10 A. It seemed -- I say the word "panic"; a sense of urgency  
11 would be more accurate.

12 Q. Thank you. Then one last matter. It's just about the  
13 timing of your arrival. We know that you arrived -- and  
14 you were taken to this earlier -- about 9.31 on the BTP  
15 log, which we know is about 9.33 in real-time. We've  
16 heard and seen -- you suggested in evidence today that  
17 you believed there was an ambulance already there when  
18 you arrived.

19 We've heard and seen other evidence which suggests  
20 that the first ambulance on scene at Russell Square was  
21 a little later than that, about 9.38. That's G108,  
22 my Lady, Liam Whittaker and Tracey Russell, and that was  
23 evidence from Day 38.

24 Could it be that the vehicle you saw wasn't an  
25 ambulance as such, but was a different type of London

1 Ambulance Service vehicle?

2 A. It could have been. We pulled up there and were out of  
3 that van in seconds. All I know is that the van ended  
4 up parked behind something that certainly resembled an  
5 ambulance.

6 Q. Certainly, because we know there was a fast-response  
7 vehicle there already, so it could have been that rather  
8 than an actual ambulance?

9 A. It may well have been the smaller-type ambulance.

10 MS GALLAGHER: That's very helpful. Thank you, Constable.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions?

12 Ms Simcock?

13 Questions by MS SIMCOCK

14 MS SIMCOCK: Thank you, my Lady. Constable, was part of the  
15 difficulty in evacuating casualties from the train the  
16 conditions in the carriage itself?

17 A. Yes, certainly.

18 Q. So it was dark, we've heard.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. There was debris from the train underfoot and, indeed,  
21 we've heard about wiring hanging down from the roof. Is  
22 that right?

23 A. Yes, there was, that's correct.

24 Q. There were also, unfortunately, body parts and bodies in  
25 the way. Is that right?

1 A. Yes, that's correct.

2 Q. The floor underfoot was also slippery.

3 A. It was very slippery.

4 Q. Also, in going out via the Russell Square end of the  
5 train, you had to negotiate through what was quite  
6 a narrow doorway into the driver's cab, didn't you?

7 A. Yes, we did.

8 Q. That made it difficult?

9 A. Yes, it did.

10 Q. Those problems clearly would have existed and made it  
11 difficult to evacuate casualties, even had they been on  
12 real stretchers rather than makeshift stretchers. Is  
13 that right?

14 A. Yes. The size of the driver's cab is -- it's a very  
15 narrow doorway, so there would have inevitably been  
16 problems in getting people through that size of a gap.

17 MS SIMCOCK: Yes, thank you.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions?

19 Thank you very much, Mr Whelan. Those are all the  
20 questions that we have for you. You've given your  
21 evidence about what you and your colleagues did that day  
22 in a very matter-of-fact way. I know that it's taken  
23 a very heavy toll on all of you rescuers who went into  
24 the bombed carriage. I hope that knowing that you saved  
25 the lives of some, even if, sadly, you lost

1 Shelley Mather, helps you recover from the events of  
2 that day. Thank you very much.  
3 A. Thank you, my Lady.  
4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Mr O'Connor?  
5 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: My Lady, may I invite you to call next  
6 Michael Carney?  
7 DS MICHAEL PATRICK CARNEY (sworn)  
8 Questions by MR ANDREW O'CONNOR  
9 A. Michael Patrick Carney, formerly Detective Sergeant 3178  
10 of the British Transport Police, and I'm now serving  
11 with the Metropolitan Police.  
12 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Thank you, Mr Carney. As you have just  
13 indicated, in July 2005 you were serving with the  
14 British Transport Police as a detective sergeant?  
15 A. That is correct, sir.  
16 Q. I believe you were on duty, on 7 July, at  
17 Force Headquarters, the British Transport Police  
18 Force Headquarters, which is in Tavistock Place?  
19 A. That is correct, sir.  
20 Q. Another witness describes that building as being,  
21 I think, about 200 or 300 yards away from Russell Square  
22 Tube station. Do you agree with that?  
23 A. That's correct, sir.  
24 Q. You have described in your witness statement that, on  
25 that morning, you were stationed in the major incident

1 room?

2 A. That's correct, sir.

3 Q. What function did that room in the Force Headquarters  
4 fulfil?

5 A. At that time, myself and my colleagues were involved in  
6 a protracted train crash enquiry and we were preparing  
7 evidence for the coroner in order that he could then  
8 undertake an inquest.

9 Q. So first of all, the major incident room, as you've  
10 described it, had nothing to do with the events of  
11 7 July, which we know were major incident?

12 A. That's correct, sir, it was purely for that enquiry and  
13 I believe there were two smaller enquiries that involved  
14 Detective Sergeant Bell and some of the other officers.

15 Q. From what you say, the major incident room, its purpose  
16 was to enquire retrospectively into major incidents that  
17 had happened that were now finished --

18 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

19 Q. -- rather than to deal in any way with major incidents  
20 that were happening at the time?

21 A. That is correct, sir.

22 Q. You have said in your statement that, on that morning,  
23 you and the other officers in your room were hearing  
24 reports over the radio of the developing emergencies and  
25 reports of injured casualties and, indeed, fatalities.

1 Is that right?

2 A. It is. Initially, the information came to us via some  
3 of our uniformed colleagues who were in offices adjacent  
4 to us, who were making their way to various locations as  
5 a result of messages concerning those incidents being  
6 broadcast. So they mentioned to us, as they went  
7 through our office to exit the building, that there were  
8 these sorts of problems developing in central London.

9 Q. There came a time, did there not, when you gathered  
10 together a group of officers and went with them to  
11 Russell Square station?

12 A. I did, sir, yes.

13 Q. Was that because you'd been instructed to do that or  
14 you, or any of you, had been instructed to do that, or  
15 was it on your own initiative?

16 A. It was on our own initiative, sir, and what happened  
17 was, after the sort of information concerning smoke in  
18 tunnels, power surges, my staff put one of the force  
19 radios on and then there was a message saying there was  
20 an unconfirmed report of an explosion in  
21 Victoria Street. I got the A to Z out and saw that  
22 Victoria Street runs parallel to Victoria station, so  
23 I had some concerns about what was potentially  
24 developing, and it was at that point that I said to the  
25 team in the office, "I think we should gather as much

1 first aid kit and other equipment as we can", because  
2 I had a feeling we might have to respond to one of the  
3 locations.

4 So we were prepared to volunteer and go to one of  
5 the scenes.

6 Q. So you were preparing from that point -- plainly, you  
7 didn't go to Victoria station. What was it that made  
8 you go to Russell Square station?

9 A. Because we sort of regrouped in the office with what  
10 equipment we could get and then a call went over the  
11 main channel, BTP, that there were around 200 injured  
12 people at Russell Square and there were believed to be  
13 fatalities, and it was at that point that I said to the  
14 team, "Right, I think we should go to Russell Square",  
15 and we --

16 Q. Being only 200 yards away, it was a short journey?

17 A. Yes, we run from the Force Headquarters to  
18 Russell Square and we were there very, very quickly.

19 Q. You've been in court this morning, I take it?

20 A. I have, sir, yes.

21 Q. You heard, then, Constable Whelan's evidence and we're  
22 able show from the contemporaneous documents that he  
23 arrived at Russell Square station just a few minutes  
24 after 9.30. His recollection is that you arrived at  
25 around the same time, possibly a minute or so after him?

1 A. I would say that's quite possible, sir, yes.

2 Q. That seems to be the right timescale.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. What did you see at Russell Square when you arrived?

5 A. When I arrived, it was obvious there were officers  
6 arriving at the scene and I can remember the cordon tape  
7 was being put around the roadway outside Russell Square.  
8 I then ran into the booking hall and I saw, I would  
9 estimate, 30 to 40 people who appeared dishevelled, who  
10 had blackened faces. Some had, what I could see,  
11 possibly leg injuries, and that was my initial opinion  
12 of -- my view of the booking hall area at  
13 Russell Square.

14 Q. Did you stay and help those people that you saw or did  
15 you make your way down to the platform?

16 A. I made my way down, because there were other uniform  
17 officers coming behind me and I could see officers  
18 running down towards either the lifts or the emergency  
19 stairs.

20 So I wasn't aware that other officers were already  
21 on the platform, so I was going down to try and make an  
22 assessment of the incident and quantify what resources  
23 would be needed.

24 Q. You refer to the lifts. Were you aware whether or not  
25 the lifts were working at that time?

1 A. I wasn't aware at that stage, sir, but I deliberately  
2 took the emergency stairs because that was the quickest  
3 and most direct route.

4 Q. You took the stairs and you went all the way down to the  
5 platforms?

6 A. I did, sir, yes. I think there were other officers  
7 slightly ahead of me going down the emergency stairs.

8 Q. We've heard, for example, that Inspector McMunn and  
9 Constables Whelan and Debnam must have been going down  
10 at around the same time.

11 Did you see those gentlemen, either in the ticket  
12 hall or when you got down to the platform?

13 A. Inspector McMunn and the group of officers were already  
14 on the platform, and at the very far end of the  
15 platform, so I would say they would have been there  
16 several minutes before me, sir.

17 Q. You describe in your statement how you, shortly after  
18 that, assisted carrying a casualty back up or you  
19 assisted carrying the casualty part of the way back up  
20 to the ticket hall.

21 A. That is correct, sir, yes.

22 Q. Can you describe what happened?

23 A. I went down to the platform, basically saw  
24 Inspector McMunn and the officers at the far end of the  
25 platform. I immediately went along the platform.

1 I could see one female who appeared injured, and she was  
2 possibly being attended to by a Metropolitan police  
3 officer.

4 I then saw a large black male sat on the benches  
5 there who appeared to have burn-type injuries. I went  
6 up to speak to Inspector McMunn, but he was engaged in  
7 using his radio and I didn't feel it right or proper for  
8 me to interrupt him and to try to ascertain what had  
9 happened, so I felt, "I will use this time now to try to  
10 evacuate the large male", and by this time, my  
11 colleague, DC Hand, had joined me, and we were assisted  
12 by two London Underground employees. They managed to  
13 find a stretcher.

14 Q. Can I interrupt you there? You refer to this stretcher  
15 in your statement. Do we take it that this was a proper  
16 stretcher?

17 A. Yes, sir, it was a canvas stretcher with wooden poles.  
18 I believe it would be of a type that would have been  
19 stored at the station, sir.

20 Q. We've heard some evidence that perhaps one stretcher of  
21 that nature is kept at a station, and would that seem to  
22 be the one that perhaps was kept at Russell Square?

23 A. I could see by its condition, sir, it was quite old, but  
24 it did the job.

25 Q. You, with Constable Hand, and I think one or two other

1 people, including --

2 A. We initially were assisted by two London Underground  
3 employees. I wasn't aware at the time, but the one chap  
4 turned out to be the Tube driver. But we were really  
5 struggling with: (a) the size of the man, and the sort  
6 of terrain of the steps and, very shortly, the two  
7 London Underground employees were replaced by colleagues  
8 from the Metropolitan Police, and so, it was four police  
9 officers were used to get this male up the emergency  
10 steps.

11 Q. I don't think you actually stayed with the stretcher  
12 right to the top, or did you?

13 A. No, sir, I got about halfway up, and then an officer  
14 coming down took over from me: (a) because I was sort of  
15 quite tired, exhausted, because of the incline as well,  
16 and the weight of the chap, and I felt my services might  
17 be better utilised down on the platform with  
18 Inspector McMunn.

19 Q. Just give us an idea of roughly the half of the way up  
20 the stairs that you were involved with, how long did it  
21 take to carry the stretcher that far?

22 A. You're talking -- I think in my statement I put  
23 between -- around 10 minutes. It may have been less  
24 than that, but it was very hard because of the incline  
25 of the steps. Myself and DC Hand were literally sort of

1 on our knee level to try and keep the stretcher level,  
2 and the poor officers behind us were literally at raised  
3 arm level to try to stop the gentleman sliding off the  
4 stretcher.

5 Q. Yes. In any event, as you say, you were relieved  
6 halfway up the stairs. You went back down to the  
7 platform. We've heard that Inspector McMunn and the  
8 others at one point left the platform and went off up  
9 the tunnel. Were they still there when you got back or  
10 had they gone?

11 A. They'd already headed into the tunnel, sir, by the time  
12 I got back to the platform.

13 Q. Did you then go into the tunnel following them?

14 A. I did, sir, yes, myself and a female officer.

15 Q. You made your way to the train?

16 A. I did, sir, yes.

17 Q. Did you meet anyone coming back the other way; for  
18 example, any of that group of officers who had gone with  
19 Inspector McMunn carrying anyone back?

20 A. I don't recall that, sir, no.

21 Q. What did you find when you got to the train?

22 A. After a fast walk to get to the train, on arrival I saw  
23 that the group of officers, which numbered around 10 to  
24 15, and which comprised of both Metropolitan and British  
25 Transport Police officers, were stood at the front of

1 the train and Inspector McMunn then informed us that  
2 there were medical staff on board, basically assessing  
3 and prioritising the evacuation of the seriously  
4 injured, and basically, we would then file on to the  
5 train and have some kind of conveyor belt system whereby  
6 the survivors could be carried out through the tunnel.

7 Q. Did you then go on to the train?

8 A. I did, sir, yes.

9 Q. You've been in court this morning, so you've heard  
10 Constable Whelan's evidence about what happened there,  
11 the makeshift stretchers, moving the casualties off one  
12 by one.

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. You describe that process in your statement. Were you  
15 actually involved in constructing the stretchers and  
16 moving the casualties?

17 A. I did, sir, because I made a point of moving to the head  
18 of the queue to assess what was going on and give  
19 Inspector McMunn support, if needed. I could quickly  
20 see that, because of the nature of the injuries, it  
21 would be very hard to evacuate the survivors.

22 So I then heard -- and it must have been the other  
23 officer this morning -- calling for stretchers and  
24 I thought, "There's no way we can get stretchers here in  
25 a very quick time", so I decided to improvise and the

1 first stretcher, I took about four or five jackets that  
2 had been discarded, tied the sleeves together, which  
3 made a sort of sling affair, and then the injured were  
4 moved in priority as decided by -- there were two female  
5 paramedics, Stacey and Tracey, there who were assessing  
6 and treating the seriously injured.

7 Q. You know that one of the people that was carried off the  
8 train in that way was Shelley Mather who, sadly, died  
9 just outside the train.

10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. Do you have a memory of her being carried off the train?

12 A. I do, sir, yes.

13 Q. Tell us what you remember about that.

14 A. Well, basically the system we had together to get the  
15 injured off very quickly was that the paramedics -- the  
16 two female paramedics were assessing the priority of  
17 evacuation. I, meantime, was cobbling together what  
18 I could as a sling and, when one of the slings was  
19 ready, I would then, with the female paramedics, move  
20 the survivor down to a suitable point where they could  
21 be put on the makeshift sling and then that could be  
22 moved down the train to the officers, in order that that  
23 person could be carried off.

24 Q. That's the process that took place with Shelley Mather,  
25 is it?

1 A. Yes, that is correct, sir.

2 Q. Were you actually involved in carrying her as she was  
3 taken off, do you recall?

4 A. I would have passed her down the train at some stage,  
5 sir, yes. But not -- I did not leave the train until  
6 ordered to, once all the survivors had been evacuated,  
7 sir.

8 Q. It may be that you don't have a particular memory of her  
9 condition as she was carried off, because you weren't  
10 involved at that point.

11 A. No, sir, we were working very, very quickly to get the  
12 passengers off. So my recollection of the injuries and  
13 the descriptions of the people is sort of vague because  
14 of the speed we were working at, I didn't sort of dwell  
15 on and try and memorise details of clothing. But I've  
16 done my best to describe the situation.

17 Q. Of course. You stayed on the carriage, I believe, until  
18 all the living casualties had been evacuated from it?

19 A. That is correct, sir.

20 Q. What happened then?

21 A. It was at that point that, when we first entered the  
22 carriage from the Russell Square end, the explosion had,  
23 in effect, divided the train into two. So access from  
24 the King's Cross end was virtually impossible, but at  
25 a stage where we were just about to deal with the black

1 gentleman with the amputated leg, the Fire Brigade had  
2 been able to make some progress and a small area had  
3 been cleared from the King's Cross end, and they managed  
4 to pass through a collapsible stretcher -- I believe  
5 they call it a scoop, and -- which this gentleman was  
6 placed on, but I can't recall which route he exited the  
7 train.

8 Q. I think the person you're referring to is Mr Hollness.

9 A. I believe that to be the case.

10 Q. The evidence has been that he was taken back to the  
11 King's Cross end of the train. The evidence also  
12 suggests he was the last casualty to be removed.

13 Is it right that, once he'd gone, the word went  
14 round that officers, such as yourself, were to leave the  
15 carriage because the scene was now to become a crime  
16 scene?

17 A. I think what happened then was, once this gap had been  
18 opened up, that possibly two HEMS, helicopter emergency  
19 doctors, came through --

20 Q. Yes.

21 A. -- and looked for signs of life with the bodies that  
22 were there, and it was after this point then -- and,  
23 sadly, no signs of life were found on the other persons  
24 on the train, and then, after that point, the -- an  
25 officer from the Fire Brigade came through to photograph

1 the scene in order to make a record of it.

2 Q. You left the carriage at around that time.

3 A. As soon as the Fire Brigade photographer had undertaken  
4 that task, I think Inspector Shields came through from  
5 the King's Cross end and said this was to be treated as  
6 a crime scene, and it was at that point that I exited  
7 the train with Inspector McMunn.

8 Q. From the front of the carriage?

9 A. The Russell Square end, sir, yes.

10 Q. You went back to Russell Square station?

11 A. I did, sir.

12 Q. I think it's right that you didn't go back to the train  
13 for the rest of that day.

14 A. That is correct, sir.

15 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Thank you very much, Mr Carney. Those  
16 are all the questions I have for you, others will have  
17 some questions.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

19 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

20 MR SAUNDERS: You've helped already with some of the timing.  
21 You thought it took, I think you said, about ten minutes  
22 to get from the platform halfway up to the stairs  
23 carrying the stretcher?

24 A. It seemed -- certainly seemed ten minutes, sir, yes.

25 Q. Just for her Ladyship's benefit, I want to try to use

1 your assistance to work out the sort of time it would  
2 have taken to have got somebody from the train back up  
3 topside.

4 A. Right, sir.

5 Q. In your statement -- which, Mr Carney, I think was  
6 within a week of this -- on 15 July, and of course you'd  
7 made notes as well --

8 A. I had, sir, yes.

9 Q. -- you, doing your best, thought that the walk, when you  
10 were going back the other way to the front of the Tube,  
11 so from the Russell Square end to the front of the Tube,  
12 took between 7 and 10 minutes.

13 A. Again, yes, that was my perception.

14 Q. Now, is that from the platform back to the Tube?  
15 Because what you're doing in your statement is  
16 describing, having taken that first stretcher upstairs,  
17 coming back, realising then at the platform  
18 Inspector McMunn has gone, and you and this other  
19 uniformed officer going down to the tunnel, going into  
20 the tunnel; yes? So does that give you now the place  
21 you were at in the statement?

22 You then go on to say:

23 "The walk from Russell Square to the front of the  
24 Tube took us between 7 and 10 minutes."

25 A. That was my recollection, sir, yes. I would say it was

1 probably about half a mile underground.

2 Q. So if one had to extricate one of the casualties from  
3 the carriage, get back topside at Russell Square,  
4 looking at these timings, what would you say?

5 A. I would say you can't give a sort of global timing,  
6 because the problem comes when you have to negotiate the  
7 emergency stairs, and then it depends on the individual,  
8 how many people are carrying, what the means of carrying  
9 is. So I don't think there's a hard and fast rule for  
10 timing.

11 Q. I'm not trying to tie you down to a definitive answer,  
12 Mr Carney.

13 A. I'm trying to be totally honest.

14 Q. Of course you are.

15 A. It would depend, I think, on the nature of that person's  
16 injury, the number of people carrying. You could walk  
17 quickly through the tunnel. That would save time. But  
18 it's the negotiation of the stairs, I would say, would  
19 be the problem.

20 Q. If it is 7 to 10 minutes walking from the carriage to  
21 the platform, is it fair that it could have taken as  
22 much as half an hour to get a casualty from the carriage  
23 back topside?

24 A. I would say it could be done well under that, sir.

25 I mean, again, my -- that was my recollection. It might

1 be that it wasn't 7 to 10 minutes. It might have been  
2 4 to 6 minutes. But, again, I didn't know at what stage  
3 the train was in the tunnel. So, you know, it can alter  
4 your perspective of time --

5 Q. Of course.

6 A. -- because you're in virtual darkness.

7 Q. What you've tried to do with these times is, as it were,  
8 best guess and judge what you thought it was taking,  
9 plus, obviously, the fatigue you've described, the  
10 difficulty getting that first stretcher up the emergency  
11 stairs?

12 A. That's correct, sir.

13 Q. All right, so we shouldn't place too much emphasis on  
14 that's the time it would take for a casualty to be  
15 removed?

16 A. No, sir.

17 MR SAUNDERS: Right. Thank you very much, my Lady.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Carney, just before I ask anybody  
19 else if they have any questions, you're involved in  
20 carrying out your investigation into another incident,  
21 what was it exactly that triggered your response, the  
22 use of a particular word or was it just the build-up?  
23 What was it that made you think "Something serious is  
24 going on here"? Did someone mention the word  
25 "explosion"? Can you remember?

1 A. No, ma'am. Other than the word "unconfirmed reports of  
2 an explosion in Victoria Street", that's why I felt that  
3 we could be looking at something along the lines of  
4 a major incident.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So it is the use of the word  
6 "explosion" that really triggers your thinking, "Wait  
7 a minute, something serious might be happening"?

8 A. That is correct, ma'am.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Mr Patterson?

10 Questions by MR PATTERSON

11 MR PATTERSON: Just this. Obviously, however long it did  
12 take for you and your colleagues to take the stretcher  
13 up the stairs -- it was a spiral staircase, is that  
14 right?

15 A. That is correct, sir.

16 Q. We heard yesterday how long it is. Is it a particularly  
17 cramped and narrow staircase or can you help us with the  
18 staircase at Russell Square?

19 A. It's probably wide enough for two people, sir.

20 Q. But certainly, it would have been a lot easier if you'd  
21 had either an escalator or a lift that was working, and  
22 we've heard that the lifts weren't working that morning?

23 A. It would have speeded up the process, sir.

24 MR PATTERSON: Thank you very much.

25 MS GALLAGHER: Nothing, thank you.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions?  
2 Those are all the questions we have for you,  
3 Sergeant Carney. Plainly, as soon as you were alerted  
4 to the possible serious nature of the incident, you used  
5 your own initiative, for which you are to be commended,  
6 and I have absolutely no doubt that you and your  
7 colleagues played a significant role in rescuing people  
8 that day. Thank you for everything you did.

9 A. Thank you, my Lady.

10 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: My Lady, I believe Mr Keith will invite  
11 you to call a witness.

12 MR KEITH: I'm very grateful to my learned friend.  
13 My Lady, on this afternoon's list is Detective  
14 Constable Robin Lane, who was the forensic scene  
15 examiner for King's Cross. He has childcare commitments  
16 this afternoon, which we were not aware of, and I wonder  
17 whether, with my Lady's leave, and provided that my  
18 learned friends aren't in any way inconvenienced by  
19 having him early, I may interpose him now?

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Very well.

21 DC ROBIN LANE (sworn)

22 Questions by MR KEITH

23 A. My Lady, DC Robin Lane, now attached to the Specialist  
24 Crime Directorate of the Metropolitan Police Service  
25 formerly at the Anti-terrorist Branch.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

2 MR KEITH: Mr Lane, in July of 2005, did you attend the  
3 King's Cross/Russell Square bombsite?

4 A. Correct, my Lady, yes.

5 Q. What role were you directed to perform by your  
6 superiors?

7 A. I was going to be the bomb scene examiner for this  
8 scene.

9 Q. What does that mean by contrast to a forensic scene  
10 examiner?

11 A. It's exactly the same. It would be the forensic  
12 recovery of evidence from that crime scene, but also the  
13 body and body parts alongside that.

14 Q. There was another officer called Detective  
15 Sergeant August, of the Anti-terrorism Branch of  
16 Scotland Yard, who was to perform the role of bomb scene  
17 manager. How do those two roles distinguish themselves?

18 A. Basically, my Lady, I am responsible for what takes  
19 place within the inner cordon, so I am responsible for  
20 the collection and the integrity of the evidence  
21 recovered.

22 The bomb scene manager, if you like, is my link to  
23 the outside world, my link to the senior investigating  
24 officer, the provision of staff, stores, equipment. He  
25 helps me do what needs to be done within the crime scene

1     itself.

2     Q. There is in our bundle a statement from an officer  
3     called Detective Chief Inspector Pearce, who declares  
4     that he was the officer in overall charge of the  
5     investigation and recovery of bodies. How did his  
6     duties fit into the overall pattern that you've  
7     described?

8     A. He's my supervising officer, so he will ensure that the  
9     processes that I was putting into place at this scene  
10    were correct and fell in line with the policy for the  
11    Anti-terrorist Branch at the time. He's my boss for the  
12    scene, so to speak.

13    Q. Thank you.

14    When you arrived at Russell Square Tube station,  
15    because that's where you went first, did you not?

16    A. Correct, my Lady, yes.

17    Q. There were still a great deal many individuals from the  
18    police, London Ambulance Service and Fire Brigade there.  
19    Did you wait for a while, while you directed that  
20    cordons be put in place and for an assessment to be made  
21    of any structural damage to the tunnel that would impact  
22    your ability to carry out the forensic searches?

23    A. Correct, my Lady. My job is quite specific. We do not  
24    get involved with the rescue stage that has to take  
25    place first of all.

1 Q. But at 12.35, were you led into the scene in order to be  
2 able to conduct a scene assessment so that you could see  
3 initially what needed to be done and, at that stage, was  
4 it plain to you that the rescue stage was entirely  
5 complete?

6 A. That's correct, my Lady. It's a process that's called  
7 the scene handover. The explosive officer will take me  
8 into the scene to explain a scene to me, to identify  
9 potential hazards, what may have happened, where bodies  
10 or body parts were, and then, after he's taken me  
11 through the scene, we then formally have a scene  
12 handover. The explosive officer is then able to leave  
13 that scene and the responsibility then falls with  
14 myself.

15 Q. How many officers did you have with you to carry out  
16 your duties as the bomb scene examiner?

17 A. Quite a few, my Lady. It was quite an extensive scene.  
18 I'd split the scene up into four separate zones, so  
19 there was an exhibit officer for each of those zones  
20 responsible for the forensic evidence collection, and  
21 that officer was assisted by, in most cases, a detective  
22 sergeant from the Anti-terrorist Branch, two other  
23 detective constables, and there were two body recovery  
24 officers as well.

25 Q. The zones roughly corresponded, did they, to zone 1

1 being the Tube train itself?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. Zone 2, the westbound platform of the Russell Square

4 Tube station?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. Zone 3, the ticket lobby at Russell Square and the

7 surrounding areas down to the platform?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. Zone 4, the westbound section of the Tube track and the

10 surrounding areas inside the tunnel?

11 A. Correct, from King's Cross leading up to Russell Square,

12 my Lady.

13 Q. When the scene was handed over to you, did you determine

14 in broad outline an order of events commencing with

15 cordons and swabbing for explosives?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. What was the general order?

18 A. The general order was going to be cordons to ensure the

19 integrity of the scene, because it was a crime scene,

20 and, as per our operating procedures, for a trace

21 explosive recovery kit to be utilised within the scene

22 itself as close to the seat of the explosion itself, and

23 then it was going to be body recovery and then forensic

24 and body part recovery.

25 Q. What was the need for a forensic test to be made of the

1 bombsite itself to be conducted first?

2 A. We needed to establish that a bomb had gone off and we  
3 needed to establish what type of explosive could have  
4 been used within that bomb.

5 So before the scene is contaminated any further, the  
6 first thing that we do is to do what's called a trace  
7 explosive recovery kit, and then to get that kit  
8 transported, as soon as possible, to the forensic  
9 explosive laboratory so they could work on it.

10 Q. Were checks also carried out to ensure that there were  
11 no secondary devices and did that require all the  
12 bags -- all the holdalls and the equipment found on the  
13 Tube and the surrounding areas -- to be checked?

14 A. Correct, my Lady. I went down with the explosive  
15 officer. We had to be mindful of secondary devices.  
16 From my work with the Anti-terrorist Branch, I'm fully  
17 aware of secondary devices. So I went down with the  
18 explosives officer and I left him down there after  
19 a while, but he tagged all of the bags to say that they  
20 were clear from any bombs. He then reported that to me  
21 later on, but issued caution around the body matters,  
22 my Lady.

23 Q. At the same time, did you direct officers to carry out,  
24 together with London Underground, an assessment of the  
25 tunnel and the Tube to ensure that it was -- they were

1 safe to work in?

2 A. Correct. I knew that there would be a number of  
3 officers working within this scene for a number of days,  
4 and we had to ensure that it was going to be a safe  
5 environment to work within.

6 Q. Could you give us some idea of the clothing and the  
7 equipment carried by members of your team in order to  
8 carry out their forensic duties?

9 A. Because it's a bomb scene, my Lady, they are dangerous  
10 places. So they would have had to have worn heavy-duty  
11 boots. We have bomb overalls that we wear, and there  
12 would have been a forensic suit on top of that as well.  
13 So layers of clothing which would have made anybody  
14 feel quite warm just standing still, let alone getting  
15 to and working within this scene.

16 Q. What about face masks, goggles and the like?

17 A. Yes, hard hats, goggles, and we were advised to wear  
18 what's described as P3 masks. That was for twofold:  
19 because of the potential problems from the asbestos; and  
20 because of the scene itself, the smell that was within  
21 the scene.

22 Q. And gloves as well?

23 A. Absolutely.

24 Q. My Lady has received some information from an individual  
25 who attended one of the meetings after 7 July 2005 at

1 which there was some debate as to whether or not there  
2 had been a high level of asbestos in one of the bomb  
3 scenes and whether or not that had delayed you and your  
4 officers in being able to undertake the body recovery  
5 and forensic process.

6 Do you recall there being a problem with asbestos in  
7 the King's Cross/Russell Square tunnel?

8 A. We were warned of the potential of it, but that did not  
9 delay us getting on with the body recovery as soon as we  
10 were able to do so. There were a number of hazards  
11 there. I know there were different types of asbestos  
12 and mercury and acids, as well as sharps. There were  
13 a whole magnitude of dangers within that scene.

14 Q. Lastly, by way of preparation, did you permit officers  
15 in to photograph the scene before anything was moved?

16 A. That is correct. Record photography and also video.

17 Q. Also, did you arrange for lighting and proper  
18 communications to be installed, so that officers down in  
19 the tunnel could speak to their colleagues at surface  
20 level?

21 A. Correct, my Lady, yes.

22 Q. And proper lighting so that they could see what they  
23 were doing?

24 A. Correct.

25 Q. I think also in those first early hours forensic

1 scientists from the forensic laboratory were allowed in,  
2 in order to be able to carry out a preliminary  
3 assessment of the nature of the explosive device that  
4 had plainly exploded.

5 A. That is correct, to assist me, but also to give some  
6 indication to the senior investigating officer who would  
7 obviously be looking into this enquiry -- this  
8 investigation, rather.

9 Q. You considered, I think, whether or not it would be  
10 possible to move the Tube by dividing off or separating  
11 off carriages 3, 4, 5 and 6 and then bringing out  
12 carriages 1 and 2 to one of the stations so that you  
13 could undertake the body recovery process and start the  
14 forensic examination there. But for a number of  
15 reasons, did that prove to be unfeasible?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. In particular, would it have delayed you overall in the  
18 process of body recovery if you'd gone down that route?

19 A. It would, and I wasn't going to allow that to happen.

20 Q. May I now turn, please, to the question of the body  
21 recovery?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. You were familiar, were you not, with the process of the  
24 disaster victim identification?

25 A. I was, my Lady, yes.

1 Q. Is that a process which is applied to officers  
2 undertaking body recovery operations for the purposes of  
3 reducing the risk of an error in identification?

4 A. Absolutely.

5 Q. During the time of body recovery, are all your officers  
6 aware of the need -- I'm sure they are -- to treat  
7 everybody whom they find with dignity and respect and  
8 with the greatest possible care?

9 A. That goes without saying, my Lady.

10 Q. There were, terribly, a very large number of deceased at  
11 the scene.

12 A. There were.

13 Q. So did you have to put in place an order by which you  
14 would go about the body recovery process, dealing with  
15 those who were most readily accessible and in the way of  
16 your colleagues?

17 A. I did, for logistical reasons and also for health and  
18 safety reasons.

19 First of all, I directed that those bodies that were  
20 on the track were to be recovered first of all, and then  
21 I split the teams up to deal with the bodies coming into  
22 the front and the rear of carriage 1 and to basically go  
23 through a systematic process basically to recover them  
24 as they would come across them, just to make it easier  
25 to recover them.

1 Q. So was the first person who was recovered Sam Badham,  
2 because she, of course, had passed away at surface level  
3 or rather been taken up to the surface and, was she,  
4 therefore, formally recovered and given a disaster  
5 victim identification number first?

6 A. Correct, my Lady, yes.

7 Q. Next did you turn along with your officers to the  
8 recovery of those persons who had either been propelled  
9 out of the train or had died outside the train and, in  
10 particular, therefore, did you recover the bodies of  
11 Shelley Mather, Arthur Frederick, Ihab Slimane,  
12 Karolina Gluck and Mihaela Otto?

13 A. My Lady, correct.

14 Q. In relation to Shelley Mather, did a doctor attend the  
15 scene in order to formally certify life extinct?

16 A. That is correct and, again, that is part of our  
17 procedure. We would call a force medical examiner to  
18 formally pronounce life extinct, and that arrangement  
19 had been put in place for the first body to be  
20 recovered.

21 However, I was later informed that blanket authority  
22 had been given by the coroner for me to be able to  
23 declare all the bodies as deceased. Therefore, that  
24 would negate a forensic medical examiner having to go  
25 into the scene, which would have slowed things down as

1 well.

2 Q. On a point of detail, in fact the disaster victim  
3 identification process was conducted under the authority  
4 of three coroners, of all the coroners with jurisdiction  
5 over the areas, and so, did you receive authority from  
6 all of them that the need for forensic medical  
7 examination could be dispensed with?

8 A. I did, via my boss, DCI Pearce.

9 Q. Then, those persons having been recovered, did you  
10 recover the bodies of Philip Beer and Ciaran Cassidy  
11 whose bodies had been placed at the end of carriage 2?

12 A. They were within carriage 2, that's correct.

13 Q. Then did you turn to the bodies located within  
14 carriage 1 itself?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. Over a substantial amount of time -- indeed, a number of  
17 days, because of the sheer number of deceased -- did you  
18 turn to the recovery of the bodies of James Adams,  
19 Anna Brandt, Rachelle Chung for Yuen, Elizabeth Daplyn,  
20 Gamze Gunoral, Ojara Ikeagwu, Emily Jenkins,  
21 Adrian Johnson, Helen Jones, Michael Matsushita,  
22 James Mayes, Behnaz Mozakka, Atique Sharifi,  
23 Christian Small, Monika Suchocka and Mala Trivedi?

24 A. We did, my Lady, yes.

25 Q. That process occupied your officers, from soon after

1 your arrival on the scene, for the purposes of body  
2 recovery on 8 July through to 10 July?

3 A. We did. The last body was recovered at 20 minutes past  
4 midnight on 10 July.

5 Q. During the course of the body recovery process, did you,  
6 in fact, discover another body to which you gave  
7 a disaster victim identification number 60022242, the  
8 injuries to which appeared to indicate that that person  
9 may have been in very close proximity to the explosion?

10 A. I did, my Lady, yes.

11 Q. Was that fact brought to the attention of your superior  
12 officers and the investigating officers with whom you  
13 conducted this investigation?

14 A. It was, my Lady, and I asked for that particular body to  
15 be subjected to the temporary mortuary procedure first  
16 of all.

17 The reason for that was I decided that that  
18 particular body had -- would have either been the bomber  
19 or would have been a person very, very close to the seat  
20 of the explosion. Therefore, the body of which would  
21 have been a good receptacle for debris and component  
22 parts of the bomb, which we would need to recover as  
23 soon as possible.

24 Q. Thereafter, and whilst the process of body recovery was  
25 underway, a large team of officers undertook the

1 forensic searches of the train, the carriages and the  
2 tunnel?

3 A. Correct.

4 Q. You've explained how it was divided up into zones. Was  
5 this the position: that it was not until 11 July -- the  
6 Monday -- that it was possible to complete the searches  
7 of carriages 4, 5 and 6, which were then removed,  
8 followed by carriage 3?

9 A. That's correct, yes.

10 Q. There was then a further search of the tunnel and the  
11 track underneath the removed carriages?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. You'd hoped to remove carriage 2, but the force of the  
14 explosion had buckled carriage 2 into carriage 1 and so  
15 you couldn't take away carriage 2 when that examination  
16 was complete?

17 A. Correct. It would have taken too long. To cut it apart  
18 would have potentially added to the crime scene and, as  
19 it transpired, the officers who were doing the forensic  
20 recovery within carriage 1, because it was so cramped  
21 and full of sharps, were able to utilise carriage 2 for  
22 forensic equipment. So we kept it in situ.

23 Q. The searches continued between 12 July and 16 July. On  
24 the 16th, the searches of carriage 2 and all the other  
25 zones were completed, with the exception of carriage 1

1 itself.

2 A. That is correct, my Lady, yes.

3 Q. I think forensic scientists attended on the 16th, in  
4 order to reach a firmer view as to the nature of the  
5 explosion which had occurred?

6 A. They did, my Lady, yes.

7 Q. Then between 16 and 23 July, so a further week, did the  
8 search of carriage 1 continue and, in relation to the  
9 tunnel, did your officers have to divide up the entirety  
10 of the area into one-metre searching areas,  
11 one-metre-square searching areas, in order to examine  
12 minutely the debris that was found in the tunnel?

13 A. It was, my Lady. Not only for any forensic parts or  
14 component parts of the device, but also to ensure that  
15 all body parts were recovered.

16 Q. Was all the debris that was discovered then sieved --

17 A. It was.

18 Q. -- in work stations on the Russell Square platform?

19 A. It was, it was sifted, which, again, is yet another  
20 search process.

21 Q. The searching was then finally complete on 24 July?

22 A. Correct, my Lady.

23 Q. Around that time, it was then discovered that, although  
24 you had hoped to remove the carriage 1 at that stage,  
25 the force of the explosion had damaged the roof to the

1 extent that the train couldn't be pulled easily out of  
2 the tunnel, so further work had to be carried out to cut  
3 away parts of the carriage roof?

4 A. They did. They had to crimp it in to get it safely  
5 through the tunnel.

6 Q. Then, finally, were the carriages 1 and 2 wrapped for  
7 the purposes of removal to a storage depot in Acton on  
8 24 July?

9 A. That is correct, my Lady, yes.

10 Q. In fact, I correct myself, 25 July. Was that the date  
11 at which the scene was then handed back to  
12 London Underground?

13 A. Correct, my Lady.

14 MR KEITH: Thank you very much, Mr Lane, I have no questions  
15 for you.

16 MR SAUNDERS: I have no questions.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Patterson?

18 MR PATTERSON: Nothing, thank you.

19 MS GALLAGHER: No questions, thank you.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Anybody else? Mr Hill?

21 Questions by MR HILL

22 MR HILL: Just to clarify one or two matters that were  
23 mentioned, if I may. The cordons at the scene, there  
24 was an inner cordon and an outer cordon, is that right?

25 A. That's correct, yes.

1 Q. The inner cordon, is this right, was effectively the  
2 ticket barrier at the station?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. By "the station", for your purposes, we refer  
5 particularly to Russell Square station --

6 A. This is correct.

7 Q. -- which became your base?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Which takes us to this: the reference to any possible  
10 concerns about asbestos or disturbances at the scene,  
11 you've dealt with questions about it, but I think it  
12 became clear to you quite early on that King's Cross  
13 station was going to be reopened as soon as possible.

14 A. It was. I knew there was pressure to open the mainline  
15 station -- after all, it's one of the main rail termini  
16 into London -- and for the Tube network to get running  
17 again.

18 So, therefore, I asked for the Tube tunnel to be  
19 plugged, which is basically a plug, my Lady, like a big  
20 paddling pool put up at either end of the tunnel. That  
21 would stop our scene being ventilated and evidence being  
22 disturbed. The downside of that was we had no fresh  
23 air. The air was a lot more stale and the temperature  
24 rose.

25 Q. Was it recorded, at any stage, just how high the

1 temperature rose and how difficult your working  
2 environment became?

3 A. From memory, either 42 or 48 degrees. I think it was  
4 48 degrees on day one or day two, on 8 July, it was  
5 extremely hostile, my Lady.

6 Q. 48 degrees centigrade?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. This scene -- the nature of the work that you had to  
9 undertake, the team that you had available -- was it the  
10 fact that, at this scene, it was kept open 24 hours  
11 through day and night?

12 A. It was initially, and then, after we got the bodies out,  
13 it was shut between midnight and 6.00 am.

14 Q. But during the earlier phase, then, whilst there were  
15 still bodies in situ on and around the train, would it  
16 follow that there was never a time, day or night, when  
17 bodies were left entirely unattended?

18 A. Absolutely.

19 MR HILL: Thank you.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Lane?

21 Mr Lane, yours is, or was, a dreadful and, I've no  
22 doubt, terribly distressing job. Obviously somebody has  
23 to do it, but the rest of us are enormously grateful  
24 that you and your team were prepared to carry out that  
25 terrible job in those appalling conditions, so thank you

1 for what you did.

2 A. Thank you, my Lady.

3 MR KEITH: Thank you, Mr Lane. My Lady, is that

4 a convenient moment?

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly.

6 (11.30 am)

7 (A short break)

8 (11.45 am)

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr O'Connor?

10 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: My Lady, could I invite you to call

11 Constable Gareth Hill?

12 PC GARETH JOHN MICHAEL HILL (affirmed)

13 Questions by MR ANDREW O'CONNOR

14 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Could you give your full name, please?

15 A. Yes, I'm Police Constable 4260, Gareth John Michael Hill

16 of the British Transport Police force, currently based

17 at 16-24 Whitfield Street, London W1T 2RA.

18 Q. Constable, you were, in 2005, as you are now,

19 a constable with the British Transport Police?

20 A. That is correct, yes.

21 Q. I believe that, in 2005, you were also, as you are now,

22 based at the British Transport Police Central London

23 police station in Whitfield Street?

24 A. That is correct, yes.

25 Q. Whitfield Street is, I think, just next to

1 Tottenham Court Road?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. On the morning of 7 July 2005, you were at  
4 Whitfield Street police station?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. You were, I think, listening to the British Transport  
7 Police radio frequency?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. You could hear the calls, that we've heard evidence  
10 about, about the developing emergencies in different  
11 parts of London?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. You describe in your witness statement hearing a call  
14 summoning all units to Russell Square and responding to  
15 that.

16 A. That is correct, yes.

17 Q. In, I think, the notebook that you kept you described  
18 arriving at Russell Square at 9.18. Is it in fact the  
19 case that the call that you heard summoning all units to  
20 Russell Square was the call that went out at about 9.27  
21 or a minute or two after that?

22 A. It was the call that went out at 9.27. The pocket  
23 notebook wasn't filled out contemporaneously at the time  
24 but was filled out at a later date. So, therefore, all  
25 the times are --

1 Q. Of course. Mistakes like that are easy to make, but  
2 just to be clear, it was the call that we looked at with  
3 Mr Whelan earlier summoning everyone to Russell Square?

4 A. Yes, that is correct. 9.27.

5 Q. So if the call that you heard was at 9.27, you describe  
6 in your statement the journey you made from  
7 Tottenham Court Road, first running, and then you,  
8 I think, were picked up by a Metropolitan Police vehicle  
9 the rest of the way.

10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. Can we take it that you arrived at Russell Square Tube  
12 station between 9.30 and 9.40, something along those  
13 lines?

14 A. It would have been around that time, yes.

15 Q. What did you see when you arrived there?

16 A. On getting out of the van, I believe there was some  
17 cordon tape up, and on the road that runs down to the --  
18 past the station, myself and -- I was in company with  
19 other officers, including PC Christopher Nixon, who I'd  
20 left Central London police station with, and there were  
21 large numbers of people outside the station on the  
22 opposite side of the road and, I believe, looking into  
23 the station, and PC Nixon told them that there may be  
24 a bomb, in order to clear them away.

25 Once we got into the station, there were large

1 numbers of people around the booking hall and

2 I estimated at the time to be between 80 and 100,

3 I mean, that's purely my estimation.

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. But some appeared not to be injured at all, some

6 appeared to have wounds to their legs, to their arms.

7 There seemed to be some people in distress. Many of the

8 people appeared to be in shock, and I just remember

9 seeing some members of London Underground staff.

10 As I say, I was focused on what we were to go and

11 do, so didn't pay a great deal of attention at, really,

12 who else was there. I was just looking at what

13 I believed at the time were injured passengers.

14 Q. We've heard from a number of the other officers -- in

15 particular, British Transport Police officers like

16 Inspector McMunn, as he then was, Mr Whelan,

17 Mr Carney -- that their first reaction, as it were, was

18 to go down to the platform and find out what was going

19 on down below.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. I think it's right that you stayed upstairs for the

22 first period of time that you were there?

23 A. PC Nixon asked me to start a log and he proceeded to go

24 down the emergency stairs. On looking around, obviously

25 in the booking hall, and by the ticket machines and

1 obviously with a large amount of injured people,  
2 I decided, at that point, obviously, I didn't have a log  
3 to fill out and that I was probably better off trying to  
4 treat and comfort the wounded and to try and do the best  
5 job that I could.

6 Q. Yes, and so you moved around them, as you say --

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. -- treating them, comforting them as appropriate?

9 A. That is correct.

10 Q. I think, also, you were trying to prioritise them so  
11 that when --

12 A. I was trying to prioritise the casualties so that, when  
13 the London Ambulance Service arrived, I could give them  
14 an indication of those casualties who required treatment  
15 as a priority.

16 Q. You weren't aware, is this right, of any London  
17 ambulance staff upstairs at the time you were there?

18 A. Not at that time, although I was aware that there were  
19 possibly two paramedics downstairs.

20 Q. We've heard from Mr Kilminster and Mr Whittaker and so  
21 on, but as far as you were concerned upstairs, you were  
22 still waiting for more London Ambulance people to  
23 arrive?

24 A. That is correct, yes.

25 Q. You describe in your statement some people arriving,

1 I think police officers arriving at the station, with  
2 curtains or blankets from a local hotel.

3 A. That's correct, yes.

4 Q. Do you know, first of all, whose decision it was to get  
5 those?

6 A. Initially, I'd made -- Inspector Garrett had come to the  
7 station and I'd asked for first aid kits, and that we  
8 had no stretchers, and blankets were supplied,  
9 I believe, from the Holiday Inn Hotel.

10 These were subsequently used, as I believe -- I know  
11 a number were taken downstairs to the platform and  
12 a number of them were used, obviously, for people who  
13 had -- were suffering from shock, so it was like a dual  
14 application, so to speak. We used some to try to keep  
15 people warm and others were taken down, and I was of the  
16 belief they were to be used as some sort of device to  
17 help transport casualties upstairs.

18 Q. Yes. You may not know the answer to this question, but  
19 do you know what it was they were initially requested  
20 for? Were they intended simply to keep people warm or  
21 were they intended to be used as stretchers?

22 A. I think they were intended to be used as stretchers.

23 Q. I see, I see. During the time that you were upstairs,  
24 more ambulance crew arrived and started to treat the  
25 passengers that you had previously been looking after.

1 A. Well, two -- I remember that a number of -- two  
2 paramedics came through and I tried to inform them that  
3 I had a number of casualties who required treatment, the  
4 ones that I'd prioritised that were, you know, needed  
5 treatment, not so much as a priority, in that they  
6 were -- it was going to be a fatality, but that they did  
7 require treatment, and they just looked at me and said,  
8 "We know you've got injured up here, but there are more  
9 severely injured people downstairs" and they proceeded  
10 to go down the staircase. I didn't see them again, and  
11 I recall that, when I did go to the entrance of the  
12 station, I believe there was an LAS Command Unit and  
13 there were a number of LAS personnel who appeared to me  
14 to be of quite high rank and I informed them of what we  
15 had in the station and they said that they would take  
16 care of it.

17 Q. Was it around this time that you decided that you would  
18 be better -- you would be better deployed, as it were,  
19 downstairs rather than upstairs?

20 A. It wasn't that I decided myself, it was a sergeant from  
21 the Metropolitan Police who turned up with a number of  
22 other officers with first aid kits. I'm not sure the  
23 reason why, but said, "I think officers are required  
24 downstairs. Could you go down?", and so, therefore,  
25 I -- obeying a lawful order, I went down.

1 Q. Yes. When you got down to the platform, I believe you  
2 saw Constable Nixon, whom you'd travelled from the  
3 police station with?

4 A. That's correct, yes, he was at the far end of the  
5 platform before the tunnel.

6 Q. Around this time, were there casualties arriving back on  
7 the platform who were being brought from the train?

8 A. As I recall, yes. As I recall, yes.

9 Q. Were they walking wounded only or were they actually --  
10 or had the people who were being carried back from the  
11 train started to arrive?

12 A. I believe some of them were being carried, yes.

13 Q. How long did you stay on the platform before you went up  
14 to the train?

15 A. I remember calling out his name, I think it was  
16 approximately three times, and I think on the first two  
17 occasions he didn't answer me. I believe, on the third  
18 occasion, he did, but I went to the bottom of the  
19 platform and he was carrying a large bundle of blankets  
20 with him.

21 Q. "He" being Mr Nixon?

22 A. Mr Nixon, yes.

23 Q. Do you mean to say he was already setting off?

24 A. He was already setting off up the tunnel with these  
25 blankets, and I caught up with him, and at this time we

1 were joined by a gentleman who identified himself to us  
2 as a doctor. So the three of us began the walk up the  
3 tunnel, up towards the train.

4 Q. Yes. Other people have described that as being five  
5 minutes or so. Would that be about right, do you think?

6 A. Well, I roughly estimated, when I came out of the  
7 tunnel, that it was approximately 700 to 800 metres by  
8 looking at the markers on the track. I would imagine it  
9 would have taken between 5 and 10 minutes. I couldn't  
10 give you an accurate time, because, obviously, walking  
11 on a pavement is a lot different to walking on ballast  
12 and track, and although the emergency lighting was on,  
13 there was sort of smoke and the air was heavy to  
14 breathe, and we were aided by a small, mini-Maglite  
15 torch in order to give us some sort of illumination as  
16 to where we were walking.

17 Q. Were you helping Mr Nixon with the blankets?

18 A. Yes, we both walked up there carrying the equipment.

19 Q. What did you see when you got to the train, Officer?

20 A. Getting to the train, I've seen a normal -- it was the  
21 front of a standard Piccadilly Line front carriage with  
22 the door open, and there was a set of stairs that had  
23 obviously been fixed on to the front, and I could see  
24 that there were numerous emergency services personnel  
25 around the front, and I believe one of them was

1 PC Gary Whelan.

2 I got up on to the steps and then realised that  
3 there was a -- like a chain, and a body was -- a person  
4 was being -- coming through. So we got off the steps  
5 and round the side, and then this body was taken through  
6 and we just all sort of facilitated and got the body  
7 down, just to help those people who were carrying --  
8 obviously, as I referred earlier, this was the lady  
9 identified as Shelley Mather.

10 Q. Indeed it was.

11 A. And obviously, she was then put down on the left-hand  
12 side of the track, as looking towards Russell Square.

13 Q. Just pausing there for a minute, Officer, did you, in  
14 fact, help to carry her?

15 A. Just assisted, because obviously the main people -- but  
16 obviously just to get her down, because it was very  
17 awkward. Obviously, you had the -- you've got the  
18 door -- the interconnecting door between the driver and  
19 the carriage, which is very tight, and then you've  
20 actually got the driver's door and, obviously, the steps  
21 are quite steep, it's a quite steep angle, and just  
22 stood at the side and assisted getting her down and then  
23 on to the ballast at the side.

24 Q. Were you close enough, were you helping for long enough,  
25 to be able to get -- form an impression of

1 Shelley Mather's condition?

2 A. I believe that she was in a very serious condition.

3 I believe she was quite -- as I recall, quite a large  
4 lady. I believe she was having difficulty breathing,  
5 and obviously she needed -- she required urgent medical  
6 attention.

7 Q. Was she saying anything at this time?

8 A. Not that I can recall, but obviously, with people  
9 talking and the struggling and that, I may not have --  
10 she may -- you know, she may have done, but I don't  
11 recall.

12 Q. Now, you've mentioned the doctor who caught you up, you  
13 and Mr Nixon up, as you were walking up the platform?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. You've already referred to the fact that he became  
16 involved in treating Shelley Mather.

17 A. Yes, that's correct.

18 Q. Tell us what he did from the time that you arrived at  
19 the carriage?

20 A. Because the doctor had obviously -- we realised that she  
21 obviously -- she was having trouble breathing, he was  
22 going to perform an emergency tracheotomy, where you put  
23 a slit in the throat and insert a tube, and he asked --  
24 I recall that he asked, as it's in my statement, he  
25 asked someone for a catheter.

1 Q. Just pause a minute. Do you think it could have been  
2 that he asked if anyone had a cannula, or do you think  
3 it was a catheter?

4 A. It was probably a -- yes, I think a -- but that's --  
5 possibly, yes. And we were down beside her, and he got  
6 down beside her, and I think he -- I can't remember  
7 whether he checked her pulse up here or in her -- but he  
8 then turned round and said, "No" -- I think it was along  
9 the lines of, "No, I'm afraid she's gone".

10 Q. Just for the sake of the transcript, Officer, when you  
11 said you can't remember about him checking the pulse,  
12 I think you said you couldn't remember whether he  
13 checked her pulse at her neck or on her wrist?

14 A. That's correct, but I know he checked for vital signs.

15 Q. Did he, in fact, try to treat her at that time?

16 A. Well, I believed he was going to actually perform this  
17 procedure, but obviously he realised that there was no  
18 sign of life and, therefore, he obviously changed his  
19 mind.

20 Q. So in the end, he didn't treat her?

21 A. No.

22 Q. He simply drew the conclusion that, sadly,  
23 Shelley Mather had died at that time?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. You were standing there at the time, were you?

1 A. I was by him, yes.

2 Q. I think you saw an ambulance person -- I think perhaps  
3 it was Stacey Rixon -- put a blanket over her body?

4 A. That's correct, somebody then proceeded to put a blanket  
5 over the -- over Shelley Mather, and then I do recall it  
6 was put up to her neck, and then I recall somebody else  
7 lifted the last part of the blanket and covered her  
8 completely.

9 Q. Put it over her head?

10 A. Yes, that's correct.

11 Q. You then, I think, moved away and went into the first  
12 carriage itself.

13 A. That is correct, yes.

14 Q. You describe it in your statement as being a scene of  
15 devastation.

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. Did you see other casualties being moved at that time?

18 A. I believe that other casualties were taken through -- at  
19 least one casualty was taken through the interconnecting  
20 door and taken out via King's Cross, and I recall that  
21 HEMS had come through because they were identifiable in  
22 their bright orange boiler suits, and we had a period  
23 where there was, like, a quiet period in the carriage  
24 and we were listening to see if we could hear any vital  
25 signs -- any movement from any other person, because

1 there was such a large number of bodies that obviously  
2 we were seeing if we could see anyone breathing or any  
3 moaning.

4 Q. Did you or any of the other officers at that time find  
5 anyone else alive in the carriage?

6 A. Not to my recollection, no.

7 Q. Shortly after that, was a decision taken that all the  
8 officers and other emergency services in the carriage  
9 should leave the carriage and, in effect, it would then  
10 become a crime scene?

11 A. Yes, it was then to be like a sterile area and, yes,  
12 obviously then the next part of the rescue operation  
13 began.

14 Q. We've heard that it was at this point that most of the  
15 officers left and walked back either to King's Cross or  
16 to Russell Square.

17 A. That is correct, yes.

18 Q. You weren't so lucky?

19 A. No.

20 Q. You were asked to stay at the front of the carriage --

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. -- and, in effect, stand guard over the carriage?

23 A. That's correct, myself and PC Nixon were asked by  
24 Inspector McMunn, and it was along the lines of, "I'm  
25 sorry, lads, I hate to do this, but could you ..." and

1 obviously we quite willingly carried out our duties as  
2 requested.

3 Q. You stayed there. The log, I think, has you and  
4 Mr Nixon emerging back into Russell Square station,  
5 having been relieved at 12.10?

6 A. That is correct, yes.

7 Q. So that would mean that you had stayed in front of the  
8 carriage for something like an hour or a bit longer?

9 A. That is correct, yes.

10 Q. Then you went upstairs, I take it?

11 A. Yes, upstairs into the booking hall where I realised  
12 then that most of the injured people had obviously been  
13 transported to hospital, because it was all quite clear,  
14 and then we proceeded out of the station across to the  
15 Holiday Inn.

16 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Thank you very much, Officer, I don't  
17 have any more questions for you.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any questions? Mr Patterson?

19 Questions by MR PATTERSON

20 MR PATTERSON: Officer, when you arrived, it sounds as  
21 though there were other police officers who had already  
22 gone downstairs but that you were left essentially on  
23 your own upstairs.

24 A. Well, at the time, obviously, it was a very -- it was  
25 a situation where I was very focused on what I was doing

1 and there's just certain parts of what I recall that --  
2 I recall myself going round the booking hall and  
3 I wasn't really paying too much attention to what else  
4 was going on, but certain things, I recall that there  
5 were members of London Underground staff assisting, and  
6 there was a cleaner going round giving water.  
7 But, I mean, there may have been other officers  
8 there, but in my mind, I was so concentrating on what  
9 I was doing that I just don't recall.

10 Q. I think your estimate was about 80 or 100 casualties up  
11 in that booking hall area?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. Looking at the detail in your statement made obviously  
14 a lot closer to the time, and having listened to what  
15 you said this morning, it sounds as though it was really  
16 you, on your own, from the police, doing the best that  
17 you could in those minutes upstairs with all of those  
18 casualties, many of whom needed treatment?

19 A. I know that a lot of the officers from my station that  
20 arrived did go downstairs, because obviously the very  
21 serious people were still on the carriage --

22 Q. Of course?

23 A. -- and needed to be evacuated. So that was a priority.  
24 But as I say, I don't think it was that long before  
25 other officers -- I do recall officers arriving from the

1 Metropolitan Police, but as I say, there may have been  
2 other officers in the booking hall. I do recall that  
3 one of the BTP officers was constantly coming up and  
4 down the stairs, so ...

5 Q. I think you referred to an Inspector Garrett who had  
6 arrived after a while.

7 A. Inspector Garrett, that's correct, yes.

8 Q. In the period before he arrived, did you ask for more  
9 resources to be sent to this Underground station, for  
10 more ambulance services personnel?

11 A. I didn't have the facilities. I had a dead mobile --  
12 the battery on my mobile phone was dead. My radio  
13 battery was dead, and it was a case of, as in my  
14 statement, I was telling a lot of people that London  
15 Ambulance Service were on their way, it wouldn't be too  
16 long, but I had no actual estimated time of arrival for  
17 any ambulances or paramedics.

18 Q. Roughly how long was it that you were there before  
19 Inspector Garrett showed up?

20 A. I really don't know.

21 Q. In your statement, you said that of the various  
22 casualties who were up in the booking hall -- 80 to  
23 100 -- you've described them from the uninjured to those  
24 who were injured and some were more seriously injured  
25 and so forth.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. In your statement, you said there were four in  
3 particular who caused you concern --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. -- who were high risk and needed hospital treatment.

6 A. That's correct, yes.

7 Q. So obviously, the problem that you faced was that your  
8 radio wasn't working?

9 A. That's correct, yes.

10 Q. Had it been working, you, presumably, would have been  
11 able to use it there and then to request support?

12 A. That's correct, yes.

13 MR PATTERSON: Thank you, I've no more questions.

14 A. Thank you.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions, yes, Ms Canby?

16 Questions by MS CANBY

17 MS CANBY: PC Hill, just one matter, please, on behalf of  
18 Transport for London.

19 We know from your witness statement that you went  
20 down to the platform using the stairs.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. You came back up from the platform using the lift.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Why did you use the stairs to get down to the platform?

25 A. Because I was under the impression at the time that the

1 lifts weren't working.

2 Q. Was that impression gained from something that somebody  
3 had told you?

4 A. I think the station supervisor initially had told me,  
5 because there were a lot of people by the lifts, by the  
6 lift doors on either side, so obviously you didn't want  
7 to move people, and it was only, I think, after many of  
8 those people had been taken out of the station to  
9 hospital that the lift service resumed. But I was --

10 Q. So, so far as you were aware, it wasn't that you  
11 couldn't access the lift because of the number of  
12 casualties, as far as you were aware, it was because the  
13 lift, at that point, wasn't working?

14 A. Yes, I was told that the lifts were out of operation.

15 MS CANBY: Thank you very much.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Mr Gibbs?

17 Questions by MR GIBBS

18 MR GIBBS: Officer, can I just pick up the question of the  
19 arrival of other officers. You were there by 9.40, it  
20 would seem?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. We will hear, I think, in a minute or two, that  
23 Inspector Garrett was there soon after you.

24 A. Right.

25 Q. Chief Inspector Saunders was there by 9.50, and there

1 were other BTP officers and other Metropolitan Police  
2 officers arriving the whole time that you were there,  
3 weren't there?

4 A. As I say, I was so focused on what I was doing, I just  
5 didn't pay attention to -- you know, it was -- I just  
6 didn't pay attention.

7 Q. As you discovered when you went downstairs, there was  
8 a choice for any officer arriving, who wasn't actually  
9 having to take control upstairs, between helping to deal  
10 with the casualties upstairs and getting down to the  
11 train and trying to remove from the train those who were  
12 really terribly injured.

13 A. Injured, yes.

14 MR GIBBS: Thank you.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Hill?

16 PC Hill, thank you very much indeed. You may have  
17 followed orders when you went down to the platform, but  
18 you weren't following orders when you went on to the  
19 train. You were using your own initiative to try to  
20 save lives. Thank you very much.

21 A. Thank you very much.

22 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: My Lady, may I invite you to call  
23 Chief Inspector Garrett?

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

25

1 CHIEF INSPECTOR PAUL STEPHEN GARRETT (sworn)  
2 Questions by MR ANDREW O'CONNOR  
3 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Could you give your full name, please?  
4 A. Good afternoon, my Lady. My name is Paul Stephen  
5 Garrett, I'm a chief inspector with British Transport  
6 Police.  
7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.  
8 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: As you say, Mr Garrett, you are now  
9 a chief inspector. I think, in 2005, you were  
10 an inspector and still with the British Transport  
11 Police?  
12 A. That's correct, sir.  
13 Q. In July 2005, you were stationed at Force Headquarters  
14 in Tavistock Place?  
15 A. That's correct, sir.  
16 Q. So the same place we heard Mr Carney was working in at  
17 the time?  
18 A. Indeed.  
19 Q. Your statement indicates that, in 2005, you were  
20 a member of what was described as the Assessment and  
21 Inspection Unit, British Transport Police?  
22 A. Yes, I was part of an audit team that went round  
23 inspecting BCUs and commissioning different standard  
24 operating procedures, that sort of thing,  
25 non-operational at that time.

1 Q. I'm sorry, you said you were inspecting?

2 A. Different basic command units, so we would go round the  
3 force looking -- identifying best practice and other  
4 things like that.

5 Q. I see. Your morning, on 7 July 2005, started normally,  
6 I think. You had a meeting or more than one meeting?

7 A. Yes, sir, I was in a meeting at that time with Chief  
8 Superintendent Peter Zieminski.

9 Q. It was at about 9.15 that morning that you were called  
10 out of the meeting and your statement indicates that you  
11 were told at that point that a bomb had gone off.

12 A. I was told to report to Mr Hilton's office and at that  
13 point I was told -- that was approximately 9.20, 9.25 --  
14 that a bomb had gone off, yes.

15 Q. Are you sure that those words were used, that you were  
16 told that a bomb had gone off, rather than that, for  
17 example, there had been an emergency or there had been  
18 an explosion?

19 A. No, it's my recollection that the word "explosion",  
20 "bomb" was used.

21 Q. Again, were you given the impression that there was  
22 simply a single bomb, or that there may have been more  
23 than one in different places?

24 A. Again, it was only from situation awareness, if you  
25 like, from the conversations in Mr Hilton's office, but

1 I was aware there were multiple sites for this incident.

2 Q. Multiple sites with multiple bombs or multiple sites --

3 A. I don't know that, but they were talking about different  
4 locations other than Russell Square.

5 Q. I see. In any event, at around that time, is it right  
6 that you were told to go to Russell Square, which, as  
7 we've heard, was only round the corner from your  
8 offices, and at that site to take up the position of  
9 Bronze Commander for the British Transport Police?

10 A. That's correct. I was given a brief task to complete  
11 initially to facilitate the movement of the Assistant  
12 Chief Constable, but then I was tasked to get there as  
13 soon as possible, which I did.

14 Q. Were you given any additional information about the  
15 position at Russell Square?

16 A. No, sir. As part of being sent there, I think it was to  
17 actually -- part of my remit, if you like, was to glean  
18 that information and pass it back into the centre.

19 Q. Can you give us an idea of whether you would have  
20 expected to have known a bit more about the situation  
21 that you were going into?

22 A. I think, in an ideal world, then you would have lots and  
23 lots of information, it was obviously a confused scene,  
24 confused incidents going on, and part of my role was to  
25 get there as quickly as possible and supply that

1 information back. I don't think it was available.

2 I think, if it was available, it would have been given  
3 to me.

4 Q. As far as your time of arrival is concerned, we can take  
5 it, can we, that you made the journey very quickly, it's  
6 only 200 yards?

7 A. From Mr Hilton's office, I sprinted back to my office,  
8 grabbed my utility belt, which would have had my Airwave  
9 radio on, pocket notebook, mobile phone, things that  
10 were actually at the centre to perform that function,  
11 and then literally sprinted down.

12 Q. I think you give in your statement an indication that  
13 you arrived some time between 9.30 and 9.35?

14 A. Indeed, sir, I'm confident I was there by 9.35.

15 Q. I'll ask you in a minute about the Tavistock Square  
16 bomb, but you are one of the witnesses who remembers  
17 hearing that.

18 A. Indeed.

19 Q. We know that that exploded at 9.47. Can we take it,  
20 then, that you have a memory of being at Russell Square  
21 for ten minutes or so before that explosion?

22 A. Yes, that would be about correct.

23 Q. What did you find when you arrived, then, at  
24 Russell Square, at about 9.35?

25 A. My recollection was, obviously, arriving into the

1 booking hall and seeing what was clearly a triage centre  
2 with, I would estimate, between 30 and 40 people with  
3 various different injuries. I recall seeing police  
4 officers there bringing more. It was a constantly  
5 changing situation. There was -- I definitely remember  
6 seeing members -- paramedics. There were other people  
7 who, by their actions, would appear to be  
8 self-presenting medical practitioners from the way that  
9 they were behaving. There was blood everywhere.

10 Q. You described the ticket hall as a triage centre.

11 A. Absolutely.

12 Q. Did you see who was conducting the triage?

13 A. It was being done by individuals. It didn't appear --  
14 I can't see what you're getting at. It didn't appear to  
15 be one person triaging people as they came up. They  
16 were being respectfully placed into an available space,  
17 which was rapidly diminishing and then individuals were  
18 coming round and seeing to their needs as best as  
19 possible, and prioritising those. There was clearly  
20 some where someone was standing by them and treating  
21 them.

22 Q. We heard Constable Hill this morning saying he was  
23 conducting a sort of triage as well as comforting less  
24 seriously injured patients. Were you aware of him being  
25 there?

1 A. I was aware of Constable Hill being there, yes.

2 Q. You describe also meeting someone you describe as  
3 a senior member of the Ambulance Service.

4 A. A part of the role for -- to ascertain what the  
5 situation was and to pass back to our control room, was  
6 to find other senior members of emergency services who  
7 were attending. It was clear from -- I believe from his  
8 insignia, but certainly there was a gaggle of people  
9 around this gentleman, whose name I don't have, but he  
10 was probably the same Bronze Commander, if you like, on  
11 the scene from London Ambulance Service, or certainly  
12 from the Health Department, so I attached myself to him  
13 fairly quickly to ascertain what was going on.

14 Q. One of the people it might have been was a gentleman  
15 called Paul Ward. Does that name help you to remember  
16 at all?

17 A. I have no recollection of his name, sir.

18 Q. Was he wearing -- you described that you saw from what  
19 he was wearing that he was a senior man. Was it because  
20 he was wearing what we've heard described as a sort of  
21 tabard or a vest, or was it simply his uniform?

22 A. I would be guessing, sir. It was clear from the people  
23 that were surrounding him that he was the person in  
24 charge.

25 Q. So what did you gather from talking to him?

1 A. I gathered from him that there were approximately 100  
2 casualties. He had staff going to and from the train,  
3 being assisted by police officers, and they had been  
4 using the area at the centre -- in the booking office as  
5 a triage.

6 Q. We know that one of your colleagues --  
7 Inspector McMunn -- must have arrived at Russell Square  
8 station at around the same time as you.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Did you see him above ground at this point?

11 A. No. Very early on, I was informed -- in fact, the  
12 reason why I attached myself to the London Ambulance  
13 Service, as opposed to going down to the scene, was we  
14 did have supervisory officers as well as  
15 a substantial -- but there can never be enough officers  
16 down there, but actually underground. So I decided to  
17 perform the function that was expected of me to take  
18 control, as much as could be possible, above ground.

19 Q. So do we take it that it's probable that he arrived  
20 a few minutes before you and went straight down?

21 A. Yes, certainly, sir. It's in my statement, there was  
22 a supervisory officer downstairs.

23 Q. That was Inspector McMunn?

24 A. It must be the case.

25 Q. Now, you also say that the British Transport Police

1 radio channel 2, which, as we've heard this morning, is  
2 the channel that's used for communication underground,  
3 you say it's your understanding that channel wasn't  
4 working that morning?

5 A. I was equipped with an Airwave radio at that time.  
6 Being in a non-operational role at that time, I didn't  
7 have a channel 2 radio, which were given to officers who  
8 would routinely patrol underground. My Airwave radio  
9 wouldn't work underground at that time, so my -- the  
10 evidence for that is anecdotal from people returning  
11 from sub-surface informing me of that.

12 Q. I see, so you didn't have channel 2 at all?

13 A. I didn't have channel 2 at all.

14 Q. You were told, or you understood from what others told  
15 you, that channel 2 wasn't working?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. We've heard from others that I think the position is  
18 that it was working, although, because it wasn't  
19 a particularly effective system anyway, as normal, it  
20 was working intermittently.

21 A. Okay.

22 Q. But you wouldn't challenge that account?

23 A. I heard from a number of -- there was a constant stream  
24 of officers coming up, or it appeared to be a constant  
25 stream of officers coming up, all with the same

1 information, that the radio comms were -- weren't  
2 present downstairs, and that the lifts weren't working.

3 Q. Now, one of the matters that you refer to in your  
4 statement as being a problem was a lack of stretchers.

5 A. From my meeting with the senior member of LAS staff, it  
6 became clear that they were short of equipment and they  
7 needed -- again, part of my role within Bronze was in  
8 facilitating the rescue, so I sent some DCs -- I think  
9 Neil Barnes was certainly one of them -- to the hotel  
10 which was literally adjacent to the station, and they  
11 were able to provide lots of blankets and lots of towels  
12 and things like that.

13 Q. I see, these were the officers we just heard about  
14 a moment ago?

15 A. These are DCs, I don't think their names have been  
16 mentioned previously, but certainly DC Neil Barnes was  
17 one, from memory.

18 Q. Yes, so they arrived back at the station with some  
19 blankets?

20 A. Well, it's literally next door, it's the next door along  
21 from the station.

22 Q. So the blankets were intended to be used as stretchers  
23 rather than to keep patients warm?

24 A. I think they were for both. I think they were to aid  
25 with treatment and the care of the people above ground

1 as well as being used for makeshift stretchers below.

2 Q. We've heard, then, that a number of the blankets were  
3 taken down to the platform and then were taken up to the  
4 train by officers.

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. Later on in your statement, you refer to a slightly  
7 later moment of the day when there was a request for 100  
8 stretchers that was being made to you.

9 Was there ever, did you think, a possibility of  
10 getting that sort of number of proper stretchers to the  
11 station?

12 A. You say conveyed to me. I was aware that LAS were  
13 requesting 100 stretchers. I don't think that demand,  
14 that request, was made of the police service. I was  
15 just aware that LAS were requesting it from their  
16 stores.

17 Q. I see, so it was a request that LAS was making  
18 internally with their own structure, rather than asking  
19 you to facilitate that?

20 A. That's my recollection, sir.

21 Q. I see. You describe in your statement that you  
22 contacted your own Control Centre and asked for further  
23 resources.

24 A. Yes, my -- virtually my first action on arriving was to  
25 grab DC Alex Bell, who I'd worked with in the past and

1 was familiar with him, to act as my loggist, and try and  
2 convey those messages. I know that he struggled to get  
3 on the Airwave radio just because of the sheer density  
4 of the Airwave traffic.

5 Q. What were the further resources that you wanted to try  
6 and get to the station?

7 A. I requested further ambulance staff and more police  
8 officers, but as I said, I was aware there were multiple  
9 scenes. So those -- it was right that we logged those  
10 requests, but I wasn't overly hopeful of what may  
11 actually arrive.

12 Q. It was around this time, was it, that you heard the  
13 Tavistock Square blast which we've mentioned a moment  
14 ago?

15 A. Yes, a further role of how I saw my role panning out  
16 that morning was to protect the scene as far as  
17 possible, so one of my initial actions was to put in  
18 place cordons further away to give a protected  
19 environment for those rescuers to work within. There  
20 was a dog handler there, BTP, I believe -- I could be  
21 erroneous in that -- who had an explosive search dog and  
22 was going to search within those cordons that I'd set  
23 up, which weren't as far as away as I would have liked,  
24 but they were the best we could do with the limited  
25 resources above ground, and about that sort of time,

1 I heard distinctly, and felt distinctly, the bomb go off  
2 at Russell Square -- sorry, at --

3 Q. At Tavistock Square?

4 A. At Tavistock Square.

5 Q. What did you think that you'd heard?

6 A. I thought that I'd heard a bomb.

7 Q. What did it make you think, in terms of your own scene  
8 and your own responsibilities?

9 A. It made me think that my actions to that point had been  
10 correct in trying to protect the individuals who were in  
11 that cordon, aiding the rescue mission and trying to  
12 save lives. It made me very thankful that there was an  
13 explosives dog and a handler there who could aid in  
14 searching for any secondary devices.

15 So it affirmed what I was doing, sir, and from radio  
16 traffic it became clear that my suspicions were correct  
17 and there were BTP officers there or thereabouts again.

18 Q. You mentioned secondary devices. That, I take it, from  
19 what you say, was already a concern of yours at  
20 Russell Square?

21 A. Primarily, the reason for the cordon going in was to  
22 protect the scene, be it from intruders or from  
23 secondary -- to make a sterile area so that the other  
24 attenders could work.

25 Q. Did either your existing concern about secondary devices

1 or hearing the bomb and no doubt having that concern  
2 underlined, cause you to take any steps which delayed or  
3 slowed down the emergency processes that were going on?

4 A. No, the two were working in parallel. I was keen that  
5 the -- no resources should be diverted from sub-surface,  
6 or even the booking hall area. These were -- the cordon  
7 was fairly loose, shall we say. There weren't huge  
8 numbers of officers or, indeed -- there were probably  
9 two blocking off a single -- well, quite a main road.

10 Q. Thank you. Now, it was shortly after you heard the  
11 Tavistock Square blast, which we know was something like  
12 9.47, that Chief Inspector Saunders arrived at  
13 Russell Square station.

14 A. That's correct, sir.

15 Q. He tasked you, did he, to go down to the Tube train and  
16 provide a situation report for him?

17 A. Yes, most of the information that was coming out from  
18 resources who were dedicated to the rescue mission  
19 was -- which is detailed -- the officers there were  
20 doing the job in rescuing the people rather than having  
21 a situational awareness of exactly what was going on  
22 down there. So he tasked me. I was the obvious person  
23 to choose, because I had just been relieved of that  
24 Bronze Commander's role, I was spare for that second,  
25 I was relatively fit, and ran down.

1 Q. You ran down the steps?

2 A. No, not down the steps, because that was at the office.

3 Once onto the platform level, I took Alex Bell with me,

4 and we ran to the train.

5 Q. How did you get down to the platform?

6 A. From memory, it was by -- in fact, it was certainly by

7 the steps, because I passed people coming up.

8 Q. What was your view -- and you've heard some evidence

9 about this already -- about whether the lift was: (a)

10 working or not; and (b) the right means of

11 transportation to use?

12 A. Again, I was going on the information I'd been told by

13 other officers. I did not check the lift myself. I was

14 informed it was out of operation.

15 My role, at that time, was to get to the train as

16 quickly as possible and back to give Mr Saunders and the

17 BTP's command the best picture. The stairs was the

18 obvious option.

19 Q. I see. So from what you say, you went as fast as you

20 could down the steps onto the platform and, again, as

21 quickly as you could, up the tunnel to the train?

22 A. Yes, it was slippery, but we were significantly faster

23 than a fast walk. We were running at different times.

24 Q. As you went up the tunnel towards the train, indeed when

25 you were on the platform, did you meet anyone coming

1 back, either walking wounded or people carrying  
2 stretchers?

3 A. There were a number of people passing. There were --  
4 I recall people resting in the tunnel, clearly having  
5 been exhausted from the efforts of bringing people out.  
6 I mean, it was dark, it was smoky, it was difficult to  
7 see, but there were numerous people coming in the  
8 opposite direction.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Chief Inspector Garrett, I'm sorry to  
10 interrupt. Just rewinding a little, before you decided  
11 to go down to the train so you could report back to  
12 Mr Saunders, what liaison had there been between -- or  
13 with other agencies? You'd spoken to the senior LAS  
14 officer or the person you thought was senior. Was there  
15 any liaison -- we're now 9.50, we're an hour after the  
16 bomb has gone off, and I've heard of a number of  
17 representatives from a number of organisations who felt  
18 they had to go down to find out what was going on and  
19 I'm just wondering what's going on up on the surface as  
20 people arrive, what liaison is going on?

21 A. Well, I was there, as I say, with the London Ambulance  
22 Service gentleman, but I don't recall there being any  
23 other -- there was certainly no London Fire Brigade  
24 representative there with us, and I believe the station  
25 supervisor was inside the station, but not actually with

1 us.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Do I take it from the fact that you  
3 needed to go down and get more information that the LAS  
4 officer wasn't able to give you the detail you wanted or  
5 wasn't able to give you the kind of detail you needed as  
6 a police officer?

7 A. A bit of both, my Lady. Certainly Mr Saunders was keen  
8 to get a police perspective from what was actually going  
9 on at the scene with regards to our specific needs.

10 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Just pursuing that for a moment,  
11 Inspector, some of the people whom you would have met  
12 coming back the other way would have been police  
13 officers, Metropolitan Police or British Transport  
14 Police officers?

15 A. That's correct, sir.

16 Q. Did you consider asking them what the position was at  
17 the train?

18 A. Yes, we -- and we did ask them, but they weren't able to  
19 give a full picture of what was going on. They were  
20 exhausted, they had another primary role, and I really  
21 needed to speak to the supervisor who was on the train  
22 to actually ascertain what had gone on.

23 Q. Being on your own and not carrying anything, you did --

24 A. I was with Alex Bell, sorry.

25 Q. Sorry, you were with Mr Bell, but did you feel you could

1 get to the train relatively quickly and perform your  
2 task --  
3 A. Yes.  
4 Q. -- and get back to Chief Inspector Saunders?  
5 A. Absolutely, sir.  
6 Q. What did you see when you approached the train up the  
7 tunnel?  
8 A. The train -- on approaching the train, there was  
9 a number of officers at the front of the train aiding  
10 the exit of casualties from the train as well as,  
11 clearly, police officers standing in the door. It was  
12 a very busy scene.  
13 Q. As you arrived, was a casualty being carried out of the  
14 train?  
15 A. Yes, and myself and Mr Bell got involved in removing  
16 that person from the train.  
17 Q. That person as we now know was Shelley Mather.  
18 A. Yes.  
19 Q. When you were helping to carry her from the train, were  
20 you close enough to see what condition she was in?  
21 A. No, my recollection is that she was clearly unconscious  
22 at that point, but we were being guided by a member  
23 of -- I'm not sure if it was ambulance staff, but  
24 a person, medical staff, who just instructed us to lay  
25 her to one side.

1 Q. Having assisted lying her down on the ground, did you  
2 stay there, or did you move on?

3 A. No, there were other officers with her, and medical  
4 staff. My role was pretty clear, to get to Mr McMunn to  
5 actually find out what was going on and then get back to  
6 the surface to convey the information.

7 Q. So we've heard that, once Shelley Mather had been laid  
8 down, a doctor and others treated her or attended to  
9 her, but you, presumably, can't help us any more about  
10 what happened there?

11 A. No, I was very much then focused on getting the  
12 information I needed and getting back to the surface.

13 Q. The person you spoke to, to obtain that information, was  
14 Inspector McMunn. Is that right?

15 A. I believe so, sir, yes.

16 Q. He was standing at the top of the steps at the front of  
17 the carriage?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Did you, in fact, then go into the carriage or did you  
20 simply stand outside it and speak to Mr McMunn?

21 A. I believe I just stood outside. In fact, I know I stood  
22 outside it.

23 Q. What did he tell you?

24 A. He told me that, from counting different parts of  
25 bodies, there were approximately 22 casualties on board

1 the train, that there was an urgent need still for  
2 officers, for equipment. He highlighted the welfare  
3 needs of the officers down there who had been subjected,  
4 obviously, to what they'd first attended to, and that  
5 was -- I think there was lots more detail, if you like,  
6 but they were the key messages that were coming back.

7 Q. Could I just take you back to something you just said?

8 You said that there were 22 casualties on the train.

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. Do you mean, in fact, 22 people who had been killed on  
11 the train?

12 A. Yes, apologies, yes.

13 Q. So having spoken to Inspector McMunn and obtained the  
14 information from him, was that sufficient for your  
15 purposes or did you need to obtain any further  
16 information before going back to see Mr Saunders?

17 A. No, I wanted to get back to the surface as soon as  
18 possible to convey that.

19 Q. So you turned round and went back?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Again, did you go as fast as you could?

22 A. Yes, again, at different times, it was -- keen not to  
23 get in the way of the rescue effort or people who were  
24 taking part, but when there was a clear bit of track,  
25 Alex and I ran, yes.

1 Q. You went back to Chief Inspector Saunders, who was still  
2 above ground at that point, was he --  
3 A. That's correct, sir.  
4 Q. -- and gave him your situation report?  
5 A. Indeed.  
6 Q. Is it right that, a short time after that, you went back  
7 to the train?  
8 A. That's correct, sir.  
9 Q. What was the purpose of that trip?  
10 A. Again, it was to liaise with the people on the train and  
11 to relieve Inspector McMunn, who was on the train  
12 setting up the -- a cordon log on the way with  
13 Sergeant Rose at the head wall of the tunnel.  
14 Q. You said the head wall of the tunnel, do you mean on the  
15 platform?  
16 A. Sorry, as you were -- the nearest -- the tunnel entrance  
17 as you walk down the platform towards the train --  
18 Q. On the Russell Square platform?  
19 A. -- which was an obvious place to put a cordon control in  
20 and at least log who was coming in and out.  
21 Q. Yes, so the purpose of your trip, or one of them, was,  
22 in fact, to relieve Inspector McMunn?  
23 A. Yes.  
24 Q. In fact, when you -- by the time you got back to the  
25 train, did you find that they had reached the point

1 where all the live casualties had been taken off the  
2 train, and that, in fact, everyone was due to come back  
3 to Russell Square in any event?

4 A. When I returned to the train, Inspector McMunn was there  
5 and, if not next to, then in contact with  
6 Inspector Ray Shields, who had received a message from  
7 BTP Silver, who had said that the area was now to be  
8 a crime scene and we were to seal it off.

9 So there was no need to relieve Mr McMunn from that  
10 particular role and, indeed, once we'd put that in  
11 place, then we both departed down the tunnel after  
12 instructing PCs that under no circumstances should  
13 anyone enter the train.

14 Q. So you and Inspector McMunn then left the train and went  
15 back to the platform?

16 A. No, we both left together. However, on walking back,  
17 one of the first people we bumped into were members of  
18 London Fire Brigade staff who had a battery-operated  
19 rescue thing, which -- I informed them of the decision  
20 that had been taken by the police at that time, that the  
21 rescue phase was over, if you like, and there wasn't any  
22 point in them proceeding.

23 Shortly after that, within a couple of hundred  
24 yards, I bumped into some members of S013 and our own  
25 specialist response officers again. Knowing what I'd

1 just told the PCs -- and Mr Hill, earlier on, was one of  
2 those -- I knew that they wouldn't be afforded any kind  
3 of entry to the train without me going back with them.  
4 So I escorted them back to the train, explaining to the  
5 PCs that they were to be afforded access because they  
6 were there to look for secondary devices.

7 Q. Yes. Having carried out those tasks, was it at that  
8 point that you went back to Russell Square?

9 A. It was at that point I went back to the surface.

10 Q. You didn't go back to the train at all that day?

11 A. No.

12 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Thank you very much, Inspector. Those  
13 are all the questions I have for you.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, sir.

15 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing, thank you, my Lady.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Patterson, Ms Gallagher? Ms Boyd?

17 Questions by MS BOYD

18 MS BOYD: Just one question, please, on behalf of the London  
19 Fire Brigade. So that there's no misunderstanding, are  
20 you aware that the London Fire Brigade were not, in  
21 fact, called to Russell Square?

22 A. Sorry, I didn't quite catch that.

23 Q. I'm sorry, I'll speak up.

24 A. It's my fault, I'm sorry.

25 Q. So that there's no misunderstanding, were you aware that

1 the London Fire Brigade were not, in fact, called to  
2 Russell Square?  
3 A. I was unaware of that fact.  
4 MS BOYD: Thank you.  
5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions?  
6 Those are all the questions that we have for you,  
7 Chief Inspector Garrett. Obviously, any major incident  
8 involves people playing different roles and I've no  
9 doubt that your instincts and responsibility for trying  
10 to give some structure to the rescue mission was  
11 extremely important. Thank you.  
12 A. Thank you, my Lady.  
13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Mr O'Connor?  
14 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: My Lady, can I invite you to call  
15 Helen Skeggs?  
16 PC HELEN SKEGGS (sworn)  
17 A. I'm Helen Skeggs, attached to the Specialist Crime  
18 Directorate and I apologise for my sore throat today.  
19 Questions by MR ANDREW O'CONNOR  
20 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Please don't apologise for your sore  
21 throat. Let us thank you for coming today when I know  
22 that you haven't been very well this week.  
23 A. Thank you.  
24 Q. I think it's right to say that, in July 2005, you were  
25 a constable based at Hampstead police station.

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. On the morning of 7 July, you were expecting to be  
3 undertaking street duties in Hampstead?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. Things didn't work out quite that way. In fact, shortly  
6 after 9.00, a group of officers from your police station  
7 were tasked with putting on high visibility kit, getting  
8 into a vehicle and being driven into the centre of town  
9 to respond to a developing emergency?

10 A. Yes, that's correct.

11 Q. What did you know, as you were being driven in to town,  
12 about what you were going to meet?

13 A. Originally, it came out as just a power surge and no one  
14 was really sure what was happening, and then it emerged  
15 that it might have been a minor train collision. So we  
16 were kind of making our way to King's Cross to see  
17 whether we could assist just evacuating people off of  
18 maybe a broken down train or something similar to that.

19 Q. I'm sorry, so you thought you were going to  
20 King's Cross. Is that right?

21 A. Yes, we originally were heading to King's Cross.

22 Q. In fact, we know you went to Russell Square.

23 A. We did, yes.

24 Q. Were you aware, sort of sitting in the back, that you  
25 were being diverted or did you simply realise, when you

1 got there, that you hadn't got to King's Cross?

2 A. We were sort of -- because a lot of emergency services  
3 were making their way, we were going a route passing  
4 Russell Square, and then it came out over the radio  
5 officers were needed urgently at Russell Square Tube  
6 rather than King's Cross, so because we were literally  
7 right there, we put up on the radio that we would go  
8 there and we did.

9 Q. I see. I think fairly shortly after these events, you  
10 completed a debrief sheet. On that sheet, it indicates  
11 that you arrived at Russell Square at about 9.30.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Do you remember filling in that sheet, do you remember  
14 arriving at about 9.30, or is that too distant a memory?

15 A. No, I don't remember that.

16 Q. Let me just -- let's perhaps just call it up so that you  
17 can see it. Could we have, please, [INQ9866-2]?

18 Is that your handwriting?

19 A. Yes, it is.

20 Q. Do we see there about the fifth or sixth line down:

21 "Start time of deployment: 09.30."

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Would that be the time you left Hampstead or would that  
24 be the time you arrived at Russell Square?

25 A. That would be the time we arrived at Russell Square.

1 Q. Do you remember roughly when you completed this?

2 A. Yes, I remember. That was after we dealt with the whole  
3 day and we were back at the Renaissance Hotel.

4 Q. So it was on 7 July?

5 A. On the day, yes.

6 Q. So that at any rate, as far as later on the day, was the  
7 time you thought you'd arrived at Russell Square?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. I see. Thank you. What did you find when you got to  
10 Russell Square Tube station?

11 A. It's quite hard to explain. It was more like a scene  
12 you'd expect in a sort of film. There was walking  
13 wounded everywhere. It was very -- lots of blood  
14 everywhere. People sort of crying for help, and sort of  
15 very slowly walking out of Russell Square towards us,  
16 when we arrived.

17 Q. You were led, I think, by a sergeant, someone called  
18 Sergeant Drinkwater?

19 A. Yes, that's correct.

20 Q. What did he instruct you, your group, to do as you went  
21 into the station?

22 A. He went and found out where officers were needed and  
23 basically they were needed to help evacuate casualties  
24 on the Tube and we were informed that people were still  
25 on the Tube, so he directed us to go down onto the

1 platform, so we ran down the stairs and we met  
2 Sergeant Timms on the platform and, when we got to the  
3 platform, again it was covered in blood, we could hear  
4 cries coming from the Tube, and it was just very dark  
5 and you could see smoke coming out of the entrance of  
6 the tunnel.

7 Q. At this point, were you still in a group of between 8  
8 and 10 officers?

9 A. Yes, we were all together.

10 Q. How long did you stay on the platform before you went up  
11 the tunnel?

12 A. It was literally a moment, if that. Sergeant Timms very  
13 quickly briefed us that he believed it was a terrorist  
14 incident, and that we had a choice then, if we wanted to  
15 go down to assist or, if we didn't, then we didn't have  
16 to. We all obviously said that we would go down and so  
17 we were instructed to get rid of as much uniform that we  
18 didn't need as possible, because it was going to be  
19 quite horrendous conditions down there.

20 Q. We know that a group of rescuers went up to the train at  
21 about 9.45 that morning with Inspector McMunn, one or  
22 two British Transport Police officers, also some  
23 paramedics, and some Met Police officers. Do you think  
24 that you were part of that group that went up at around  
25 that time?

1 A. I know that there was probably at least two other Met  
2 officers there who had got there just before us and that  
3 there were some other BTP officers there. So there's  
4 a chance we could have all gone down together or that  
5 they could have just got there just before us.

6 Q. You went up the tunnel, in any event?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. As you were walking up the tunnel, did you hear the  
9 sound of an explosion?

10 A. Yes, we thought we could hear a sort of explosion above  
11 our heads, but we didn't know -- I knew it wasn't in the  
12 tunnel, but I didn't know where or what it was until  
13 later on, when we'd come out.

14 Q. You thought it was an explosion, though?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Did it give you concern about your own safety?

17 A. Yes, it did. And also the surroundings. I mean, you've  
18 probably heard what it was like down there, but there  
19 was bits sort of hanging down everywhere, you couldn't  
20 really see where you were going, you couldn't really  
21 breathe, I wasn't sure what was going to happen when we  
22 got down there.

23 Q. Did you give any thought to turning round and going  
24 back?

25 A. No, I just looked at a friend and we sort of said,

1 "Let's do this", and she was a colleague,  
2 Philippa Mason, and then we got to the Tube.  
3 Q. What did you find when you got to the Tube?  
4 A. On the way there, we were met by some more walking  
5 wounded that were walking themselves off of the Tube.  
6 One was -- again, it was very much like a film to me, it  
7 was a female and a male, and they looked like they'd  
8 sort of had a lot of their clothes blown away, they were  
9 sort of assisting each other to come out and were  
10 slightly injured, but could walk. You could hear  
11 screams. There was a gentleman who had had his leg  
12 blown off and he was screaming quite loudly, and also  
13 screams from people trapped still on the Tube.  
14 Q. The gentleman with his leg blown off, was he sort of  
15 sitting down to one side?  
16 A. Yes, to the left as we approached the Tube, and he was  
17 shouting, I think, stuff like, "There's an explosion.  
18 Can you help me?", and he was quite distressed at the  
19 time.  
20 Q. Did you go on to the Tube at that point, or did you wait  
21 until you were asked to help people?  
22 A. Well, because we'd gone up in sort of a line, the people  
23 at the front were taking the first casualties off, so  
24 I was waiting until I could assist, and I was called on  
25 to the Tube, actually on to the Tube. There was a male

1 on the floor who couldn't get up and he was covered in  
2 just sort of glass and a bit of debris, but the  
3 paramedics told us that he was fit enough and well  
4 enough to be able to walk. So that's when myself and  
5 another officer, PC Brown, went on to the Tube and tried  
6 to help -- assist picking him up off the floor.

7 Q. Did you help picking him up?

8 A. We did. He basically was quite -- he was very  
9 distressed and he basically said that, "I'm going to  
10 die, leave me alone", you know, again, it was quite  
11 horrible conditions there, but we managed to persuade  
12 him to -- you know, "You're safe, you're well, we'll get  
13 you up", and we both managed to get him -- he put his  
14 arms around us, and we escorted him back along the --  
15 off of the Tube and then back along the tunnel.

16 Q. Did you go all the way back to the train with him --  
17 sorry, all the way back to the platform with him?

18 A. Yes, I did. PC Brown -- there was someone coming behind  
19 on a stretcher and they were struggling to carry, so  
20 PC Brown left me and went back and I carried him --  
21 assisted him the rest of the way.

22 Q. You were on your own for the rest of the way?

23 A. Yes, I was.

24 Q. You got him back as far as the platform?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. What happened then?

2 A. There was two British Transport workers there and they  
3 had water, and they saw me kind of struggling with him,  
4 so they basically jumped down and assisted me, they were  
5 two male workers, and they took him off of me, and so,  
6 when they relieved me, I took the water from them and  
7 then turned around and went back into the tunnel.

8 Q. Back into the tunnel back to the train?

9 A. Yes. On the way, I was passing casualties, so I just  
10 gave them some water, and officers as well, because it  
11 was really hot down there.

12 Q. When you got back to the train, were there still  
13 a number of your colleagues waiting outside to be called  
14 on to help with casualties being removed from the train  
15 or not?

16 A. No, there was no officers there.

17 Q. Is that because they'd all taken people back to the  
18 platforms by then?

19 A. Yes, we basically just took it in turns, whenever anyone  
20 was free, to assist in taking the casualties out. So  
21 obviously I'd passed quite a lot on my way back to the  
22 Tube, I heard people shouting for assistance, that they  
23 needed officers urgently, and I shouted out, "Well,  
24 there's only one. It's me".

25 Q. So you went into the carriage to respond, did you?

1 A. Yes, I did.

2 Q. What did you find when you got into the carriage?

3 A. I could see who I believed to be a doctor and I thought

4 it was a couple of paramedics with a woman and they'd

5 placed her on a high visibility jacket that they were

6 using as a stretcher, and then the doctor told me that

7 she was very sick and she needed to be taken off the

8 train immediately, and he --

9 Q. Just pausing there a minute, this is the casualty who we

10 now know was Shelley Mather?

11 A. Yes, that's correct.

12 Q. Were you asked to hold her hand and to look after her

13 head?

14 A. Yes, I was.

15 Q. I think it's right she was being taken off front first?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. So that would have meant you were sort of at the front

18 leading the way, as it were?

19 A. Yes, I was -- I came obviously last, so I took her head

20 and her hand and was assisting in carrying her down the

21 steps.

22 Q. We know, we've heard from you and from other witnesses,

23 that it was dark in the tunnel --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- and smoky, but were you able to see Shelley Mather

1 and to see what condition she was in?

2 A. Yes, she wasn't moving, and she wasn't talking, and her  
3 head was slightly to the side. It was like she was  
4 looking at me and her eyes were open.

5 Q. Did you think she was alive?

6 A. I thought she was alive, yes.

7 Q. Did you try to speak to her or communicate with her in  
8 any way?

9 A. Yes, I was speaking to her quite a lot. I just said,  
10 "Don't worry, we're going to get you out of here, you're  
11 going to be safe and well. Just hold on", kind of  
12 thing, just trying to reassure her that she was going to  
13 be okay.

14 Q. Were you able to form a view as to whether she was  
15 understanding what you were saying or was it simply not  
16 possible to?

17 A. No, it wasn't possible. She wasn't -- she was just sort  
18 of looking at me.

19 Q. How long did it take, that process, from when you held  
20 her hand, you were supporting her head? Were you  
21 presumably walking backwards as she was coming out of  
22 the carriage?

23 A. Yes, that's correct.

24 Q. How long did it take for you to get her out of the  
25 carriage?

1 A. It was seconds or moments, it was very quickly, you  
2 know. I got there just as they were trying to lift her  
3 down, and then we just lifted her down and placed her on  
4 to the tracks.

5 Q. We've heard the evidence of others that, as she came  
6 down the steps, she was placed on the ground just to one  
7 side of the steps.

8 A. Yes, that's correct.

9 Q. Were you still with her at that point?

10 A. Yes, I was. But that's when I was informed by either  
11 the doctor or the paramedic -- I can't remember who said  
12 it -- that she'd actually passed away, and that they  
13 would attend to her and I was to go back on to the Tube  
14 to assist in any other casualties.

15 Q. Did you, yourself, notice a change in her condition over  
16 this time? Did you form a view about whether she was  
17 still alive or not, or was it simply that someone else  
18 told you what had happened?

19 A. It was someone else told me. Her eyes were still open  
20 and the doctor told me.

21 Q. Were you watching her breathing at all? Did you think  
22 that she was breathing at one point and then not  
23 breathing at another?

24 A. No. I was literally just concentrating on her head, and  
25 just trying to talk to her. I didn't look at the rest

1 of the injuries.

2 Q. You then say you went back into the carriage?

3 A. Yes, that's correct.

4 Q. What did you do there?

5 A. Then I was informed by another doctor that there was  
6 a male who needed to be carried out of the Tube and he  
7 was the last remaining live casualty there.

8 I remember looking at him and, again, it was very  
9 surreal because he was very calm, he wasn't screaming or  
10 shouting like a lot of the other people were. He was  
11 just laying there on the right-hand side of the Tube,  
12 very peacefully.

13 Q. Was he a black gentleman?

14 A. Yes, he was.

15 Q. What did you do for him?

16 A. Well, it was explained that he was too sort of heavy and  
17 it was too far to get him out of Russell Square, so we  
18 had to try and get him out of the King's Cross entrance.  
19 So we needed to try and clear a route to get him out  
20 that way. So basically myself and another gentleman  
21 started clearing debris from the Tube to the sides.

22 Q. You say "debris", are we talking about parts of the  
23 carriage that had blown off and so on?

24 A. And also lots of casualties. As you can appreciate, the  
25 bomb went off from the ground, there was lots of people

1 had lost legs and limbs and lots of fatal casualties, it  
2 was kind of all blocking the King's Cross route. So we  
3 had to sort of try and clear a route so that we could  
4 carry him through.

5 Q. Yes. Were you also talking -- the casualty in question,  
6 I think, was Mr Garri Hollness. Were you talking to him  
7 and comforting him around this time?

8 A. Yes, I was, but I think the doctor informed me that he  
9 couldn't hear, and I'm sure he pointed to his ears as  
10 well, so I don't know whether he was deaf or whether he  
11 was struggling to hear because of the explosion, but  
12 I didn't think he could hear me, so I was just trying to  
13 say "Stay calm", and we'll get him out.

14 Q. We've heard from other witnesses -- and I think you  
15 refer to this in your statement too -- that there came  
16 a time when a proper stretcher was brought for  
17 Mr Holness from the King's Cross end of the train.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. You were still there at the time?

20 A. Yes, I was.

21 Q. Were you intending to be one of the people who would  
22 carry that stretcher back to King's Cross?

23 A. Yes, I was.

24 Q. What happened?

25 A. I was approached, I believe, by another officer, who

1 asked me how long I'd been down there, and it was very  
2 surreal, it all felt very quick down there, but it turns  
3 out actually I was down there for a good number of  
4 hours, and they asked me if I -- how I was breathing,  
5 and I said that, "I'm fine to carry him", but at this  
6 stage I was starting to get exhausted, so they said to  
7 me, "Go back to the surface and we'll carry him for  
8 you".

9 Q. So you then left the train, did you, from the other end,  
10 back towards Russell Square?

11 A. Back towards Russell Square, yes.

12 Q. As you went down the steps at the front of the train,  
13 you saw Shelley Mather's body, I think?

14 A. Yes, I did.

15 Q. Had it, by that stage, been covered?

16 A. Yes, it had.

17 Q. Did you also see a doctor who was sitting by the side of  
18 the track?

19 A. Yes, he was sitting to the left as I came out.

20 Q. Was he someone that you remembered who had been involved  
21 in treating or attempting to treat Shelley Mather  
22 earlier?

23 A. No, I don't remember seeing him earlier, but he was very  
24 distressed, and he looked quite upset, so I just  
25 presumed he'd been treating the casualties on the Tube.

1 That's why he was there.

2 Q. Did you say anything to him?

3 A. Yes, I basically said to him that I didn't believe there  
4 was any casualties left on the Tube to help, so if he  
5 was okay, he should go back to the surface.

6 Q. Did you then, yourself, go back to Russell Square  
7 platform?

8 A. We waited to start with, because there was some other  
9 officers there and they just said "Just in case there's  
10 anybody else left to help, we'll wait here". So we  
11 waited just for a few seconds outside the Tube and then  
12 someone shouted from within the Tube that, if there were  
13 any Met officers still down there, then we should make  
14 our way up to assist casualties on the surface.

15 So myself and the other officers that were there, we  
16 collected any spare equipment that we could, first aid  
17 equipment, any sort of gas, oxygen or anything that we  
18 could find, and we made our way back towards the  
19 surface.

20 Q. You went back to the Russell Square platform and then up  
21 above ground?

22 A. We got to the platform and we were told that there was  
23 a security scare above us and that they'd locked the  
24 lift and the stairs down so that we couldn't get out,  
25 basically. So we had to wait there for the all clear

1 and so we waited and we had some water, and then, once  
2 the all clear came, then we made our way back into the  
3 surface and the lift was working at this point.

4 Q. Having got to the surface, I think you were told to go  
5 to the Holiday Inn and have a rest?

6 A. Yes.

7 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Thank you very much, Officer.

8 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing, thank you, my Lady.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any questions?

10 Mr Hill?

11 Questions by MR HILL

12 MR HILL: I'll just see if we can help a little more about  
13 timing. Could we have INQ10111 on the screen, which is  
14 the police CAD, computer-aided dispatch record,  
15 number 2376.

16 Sergeant Drinkwater, who was your officer, has  
17 a collar number 404, which I think you recorded in your  
18 own statement of events that day?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. If we look at the bottom of that screen at 09.18.56 --  
21 I think we may need to go just over the screen [INQ10111-2] to see  
22 the remainder of that, the third line on that screen,  
23 09.18.56, third line, "404EK acting sergeant", so that  
24 would be Sergeant Drinkwater, with 358EK, that's Police  
25 Constable Louise Berry, who was one of the officers in

1 your group, I think, recorded again in your statement?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. "Also three tutors and six probationers making their  
4 way, shoulder numbers to follow."

5 You were a probationer officer, weren't you,  
6 in July 2005?

7 A. Yes, that's correct.

8 Q. How many weeks' service by 7 July?

9 A. Five weeks.

10 Q. The entry then suggests that shoulder numbers are to  
11 follow. If we can just look on to 9.29.18, further down  
12 the same screen, we can see the shoulder numbers there  
13 given -- thank you for highlighting -- the third one in  
14 is 289 and that's you?

15 A. Yes, that's correct.

16 Q. So you had been deployed by 9.18. The entry at 9.29  
17 suggests that you were perhaps not quite at your  
18 destination, "travelling time to RVP" is the way that  
19 entry concludes, but your recollection, as we've already  
20 seen on the debrief sheet that you completed later that  
21 day, is that you must have been almost there by 9.29,  
22 arrival time you recorded as 9.30?

23 A. Yes, that's correct.

24 Q. Did you receive a Commissioner's high commendation for  
25 your actions that day?

1 A. Yes, I did.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Ms Skeggs?

3 I don't know if you noticed, but when Mr Hill

4 elicited that you only had five weeks' service, a lot of

5 people's eyebrows were raised, Ms Skeggs. I don't think

6 any of us appreciated that when you gave your evidence

7 of what you did that day.

8 You couldn't have been criticised, if, when given

9 the choice, you had elected to stay on the platform or

10 to help people upstairs. You couldn't have been

11 criticised, if, when you heard the bomb, you had turned

12 back. You did neither. Not only do you have the

13 Commissioner's commendation, you have mine. Thank you.

14 Yes, Mr O'Connor?

15 MR KEITH: My Lady, the last witness is Detective Sergeant

16 Brunsdan, please.

17 DETECTIVE INSPECTOR JOHN BRUNSDEN (sworn)

18 A. Detective Inspector John Brunsdan, attached to

19 Specialist Operations; at the time, Detective Sergeant

20 John Brunsdan, attached to the Anti-terrorist Branch.

21 Questions by MR KEITH

22 MR KEITH: My apologies, you were a detective sergeant then,

23 you are a detective inspector now?

24 A. Yes, my Lady.

25 Q. You were part of the team that carried out a forensic

1 examination of the bombsite at  
2 King's Cross/Russell Square, were you not?  
3 A. Yes, that is correct, sir.  
4 Q. I think you were present when a forensic medical  
5 examiner, Dr Santani, attended the scene on 8 July in  
6 order to formally certify life extinct in relation to  
7 a lady who was lying on the track at the front of the  
8 train, Shelley Mather?  
9 A. Yes, that is correct.  
10 Q. I want to ask you, please, about some exhibits that you  
11 found in area Z at the end of the first carriage. Could  
12 we have please on the screen [INQ10164-2]?  
13 Is this a plan that you made of the first carriage  
14 showing the zonal areas for the purposes of the  
15 searching?  
16 A. Yes, that is correct, sir.  
17 Q. On the far right of the plan towards the rear of the  
18 first carriage, can we see that you marked area Z?  
19 A. Yes.  
20 Q. In that area, area Z, you did you find a plastic bottle  
21 which had been cut round an edge as opposed to simply  
22 destroyed in the blast?  
23 A. Yes, that's what it looked like to me.  
24 Q. Why did that bottle seem to you to be out of place?  
25 A. Obviously in the Anti-terrorist Branch we learn

1 a reasonable amount about explosives, and we were very  
2 conscious of the fact that explosives can be made from  
3 peroxide-based materials, and peroxide can be contained  
4 in plastic bottles, and so I was concerned that this may  
5 have something to do with that.

6 Q. Was that bottle found in the near vicinity of a male  
7 body to whom you formally gave the exhibit JB3?

8 A. Yes, that is correct, sir.

9 Q. Was that person given a disaster victim identification  
10 number, for temporary purposes, 60022242?

11 A. I'm sorry, sir, I haven't got that record.

12 Q. Will you take it from me, then, on this occasion?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. Did that person, JB3, turn out subsequently to be the  
15 bomber --

16 A. Yes, that is correct.

17 Q. -- Lindsay?

18 A. Jermaine Lindsay.

19 Q. When the body was moved, did you find a piece of circuit  
20 board attached to his body and also attached to his body  
21 another piece of plastic bottle which, again, had had  
22 a segment cut from it?

23 A. Yes, that is correct, sir.

24 Q. So in very close proximity to his body?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Subsequently, on 17 July -- and you may find a reference  
2 to this on page 4 of your statement, if it's the same  
3 typed statement as us, at the bottom, Detective  
4 Inspector -- did you recover from the same area, area Z,  
5 an envelope addressed to Mr Lindsay which you produce as  
6 exhibit 1116?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. That is the envelope. You also found an exhibit JB117,  
9 our INQ8818, please, a driving licence -- no that's 117.  
10 Could we have 117 which is 8818, I think, please, unless  
11 I have my reference wrong. It may be it's not on  
12 Trial Director. I'm afraid I think the envelope is on  
13 Trial Director, but not the content.

14 In any event, it was a counterpart driving licence  
15 in the name of Jermaine Lindsay, was it not?

16 A. I certainly found some correspondence in that name.

17 Q. Could we try 8818 one more time? No, don't worry,  
18 that's the envelope rather than the contents.

19 In any event, it was a driving licence counterpart  
20 in his name.

21 The following day, on 18 July, did you recover from  
22 the floor area, area Z, another piece of plastic that  
23 appeared to have been cut from a bottle?

24 A. Yes, correct, sir.

25 Q. In the same place, did you also find an exhibit JB123,

1 a passport, a United Kingdom passport, in the name of  
2 Jermaine Lindsay?

3 A. Yes, that's correct.

4 Q. Could we have INQ8816 [INQ8816-2], please? We can see at the bottom  
5 there the remains of that passport, JB123.

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. The exhibit had a number of different items in it.  
8 Split from it, did you also produce a certificate of  
9 mobile phone insurance, again in the name of Mr Lindsay?

10 A. Yes, that is correct, sir.

11 Q. Our INQ8815 [INQ8815-2], please. A certificate of mobile phone  
12 insurance, there we are. If we could just enlarge the  
13 number on the top left-hand corner --

14 A. Yes, that's correct, sir.

15 Q. -- we should see the name and address, and also split  
16 from that exhibit JB123, did you find a handwritten  
17 document, a Department of Work and Pensions letter,  
18 dated 9 May 2005?

19 A. Yes, sir.

20 Q. Our INQ8814 [INQ8814-2], please.

21 Could you just enlarge the top right-hand segment of  
22 that document, please? The significance of that  
23 document, Detective Inspector, was that it was  
24 a document addressed to him, but it contained  
25 handwriting on it, did it not?

1 A. Yes, it did, sir.

2 Q. On that front page, there was a reference there, wasn't  
3 there, to "one minute per train"?

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. On the reverse side -- which should be the next page in  
6 the exhibit [INQ8814-3], if you could enlarge the top half first,  
7 please -- there were a number of days in the week set  
8 out, as well as journey times, making references to  
9 "Holborn", "West", possibly Westminster, "Paddington",  
10 "Oxford Circus"?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. In the bottom half of the page, if you would rotate it,  
13 please, days of the week with more detailed explanations  
14 of distances and times from certain London Underground  
15 stations?

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. Could we perhaps return one more time -- I feel my luck  
18 might be better this time -- and try INQ8817 [INQ8817-2], please,  
19 for the DVLA letter, if it could be rotated -- I'm very  
20 grateful to Mr Suter -- there is the counterpart driving  
21 licence with the name Mr Lindsay.

22 A. Yes, I do recall it.

23 MR KEITH: Thank you very much, Officer, those are all the  
24 questions I have for you.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any questions? Mr Patterson?

1 Questions by MR PATTERSON

2 MR PATTERSON: Just one or two additional exhibits, please,  
3 Officer. I think there were other similar peroxide  
4 bottles that were found on the train that appeared to  
5 have the neck cut off them, rather like the one that  
6 you've already mentioned.

7 A. Yes, that is correct.

8 Q. I think there was one JB228, which was at area Y, so at  
9 that rear part of the carriage but --

10 A. On the other side.

11 Q. -- on the other side, exactly. There was a Nokia mobile  
12 phone, JB41, that was found in that first carriage near  
13 seat D --

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. -- which was later examined and found to be a phone that  
16 had text messages consistent with having been used by  
17 the bomber, Jermaine Lindsay?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. In addition, another document rather like the one that  
20 we've just looked at, which showed handwritten notes  
21 about Underground stations, there was another one,  
22 JB265, which was a Tube map which had ringed Underground  
23 stations including King's Cross, Bond Street,  
24 Oxford Circus and so forth?

25 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. So a similar document to the one we've looked at?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. Finally, this: I think there were also assorted pieces  
4 of rucksack that were found in different areas, also in  
5 that carriage, which were later considered by the  
6 scientist Mr Clifford Todd?

7 A. We did find a number of items of that description, yes.

8 MR PATTERSON: Thank you very much. That's all I ask.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

10 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

11 MS GALLAGHER: Just one very brief matter. We've looked at  
12 on screen JB125, so the Department of Work and Pensions  
13 letter which has the times written on it. Can we go --  
14 I'm not sure if it's on Trial Director -- it's  
15 [INQ9644-3]. Yes, it is.

16 At the very top box there, it just confirms that the  
17 handwriting is definitely Jermaine Lindsay. Just for  
18 completeness, my Lady, I thought it appropriate to raise  
19 that at this stage.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Of course.

21 MS GALLAGHER: There's a supporting statement, it doesn't  
22 need to be on screen, but if I can give you the  
23 reference, it's INQ9647, that's the expert subsequently  
24 confirming that that handwriting was Jermaine Lindsay's.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Any other questions?

1 Those are the questions we have for you,  
2 Inspector Brunsdon. Thank you very much indeed.  
3 MR KEITH: My Lady, that concludes the oral witnesses for  
4 today. There are two very short further statements,  
5 however, which Mr Hay will read.  
6 MR HAY: My Lady, if I may read the statement of  
7 Claire Moffet dated 11 July 2005 which has the usual  
8 declaration of truth.  
9 Statement of PC CLAIRE MOFFET read  
10 "I am PC Claire Moffet of street duties course at  
11 Hampstead Police Station in the borough of Camden,  
12 London. I have been a police officer  
13 since January 2005. On Thursday, 7 July 2005, I was  
14 engaged in my role as a street duties probationer at  
15 Hampstead police station.  
16 "Shortly after 9.00, myself, PS Neil Drinkwater,  
17 PC Derek Cheung, PC Louise Berry, PC Philippa Mason,  
18 PC Peter Singer, PC Mark Patchett, PC Helen Skeggs,  
19 PC Karen Miles-Holdaway were at Hampstead police station  
20 preparing to begin our tour of duties when we were  
21 informed by PS Drinkwater that we were to get our high  
22 visibility jackets and make our way to a van that was  
23 positioned outside the police station.  
24 "Once in the van, we were told that we were headed  
25 to Russell Square Tube station to help with what

1 appeared to have been an explosion on the Tube. On  
2 arrival, there were scores of injured people emerging  
3 from the platform and already on the concourse.  
4 "We immediately made our way to the platform and  
5 were briefed by PS Timms when we got there.  
6 "On arriving on scene, we encountered a number of  
7 injured people lying on the floor being tended to by  
8 paramedics and comforting one another. PS Drinkwater  
9 made his way to a uniformed British Transport Police  
10 inspector who informed him that there were uniformed  
11 Metropolitan Police officers on the westbound platform  
12 already and we were to assist there.  
13 "We made our way down the flight of stairs to the  
14 platform where PS Timms, BTP officers and  
15 London Underground staff greeted us. PS Timms informed  
16 us that this was a suspected terrorist incident and that  
17 there had been other explosions across London. They  
18 went on to say that the train was halfway through the  
19 tunnel and we were to assist in the evacuating of the  
20 injured passengers. Forming a line, we went into the  
21 tunnel. The tunnel was dimly lit, illuminated only by  
22 small lights in the sides of the wall. The air was  
23 filled with smoke, soot and dust, which made breathing  
24 difficult.  
25 "As we made our way towards the stricken train,

1 a white female and white male, both obvious casualties  
2 of the blast, made their way towards us. The female was  
3 partially clothed, in as much as her skirt had been  
4 blasted away. She had cuts and lacerations to both of  
5 her legs. The male, who was leading her, had facial  
6 injuries and head injuries. Two London Underground  
7 staff and PC Cheung, who were at the back of the line,  
8 aided these people out. At about this point, there was  
9 a rumour of a secondary device and we heard an  
10 explosion. I later found out that this noise was the  
11 explosion on board the number 30 bus at  
12 Tavistock Square.

13 "We continued our way to the train. When we  
14 arrived, there were already other police officers and  
15 London Underground staff there. Also present were  
16 London Ambulance Service paramedics administering  
17 emergency first aid to a man on the floor whose name was  
18 Paul. Paul had had his left leg blown away below the  
19 knee in the explosion. After approximately 2 minutes  
20 a stretcher had been found. Paul was placed on to the  
21 stretcher and carried out by police officers and  
22 London Underground staff.

23 "We were told that the remaining passengers on the  
24 train needed water, and also the officers on the track,  
25 due to the intense heat.

1 "Myself and PC Mason made our way back to the  
2 platform to get water and to try and get stretchers.  
3 There was already water on the platform so we instructed  
4 standing rail crews to take it to the train, while  
5 myself and PC Mason went up to ground level to get some  
6 more. Shops and businesses in the immediate vicinity  
7 had been evacuated, so we made our way to the  
8 Great Russell Square Hotel. They provided blankets and  
9 sheets and also more bottled water. We took these  
10 provisions in a laundry basket back to the platform. We  
11 grabbed what we could and made our way back towards the  
12 train. On entering the Tube, I came across various  
13 officers carrying two or three different casualties in  
14 makeshift stretchers. I gave out sheets and blankets  
15 with which to carry them and they continued towards the  
16 platform.

17 "When I finally reached the train again, PC Skeggs  
18 was helping to get a female out of the carriage with  
19 some other colleagues, so I placed a blanket on  
20 the floor to help carry her with. On getting her to the  
21 floor, it was confirmed by the doctor present that she  
22 had died.

23 "I was then asked to get on to the carriage to help  
24 remove the final remaining living male out of the  
25 carriage. There was a small amount of confusion as to

1     which way to carry him out, but doctors onscene and  
2     Fire Brigade made the decision to carry him out towards  
3     King's Cross, as the platform was closer. The male was  
4     lying horizontally on seats with serious leg injuries  
5     sustained. He also had cuts to his face and his arms  
6     which draped on the floor like it may have been broken.  
7     He could not hear anyone talking to him. Doctors  
8     suggested that this was not caused by the blast, but  
9     that he was probably deaf beforehand.

10    "As I looked down, I could see various bags and  
11    clothing scattered about the floor. The belongings of  
12    the people affected by the blast. I left the carriage  
13    after it was confirmed my assistance would not be needed  
14    and we were then instructed to leave the tunnel and to  
15    make our way to the platform. We were later told that  
16    this was because there was a suspect vehicle near the  
17    concourse and the station had been evacuated.

18    "Finally, we reached the surface again and we were  
19    instructed to gather on Marchmont Street. We were then  
20    told to wait in the nearby Holiday Inn Hotel, where we  
21    were given refreshments and we were allowed to telephone  
22    our families. We were then instructed to attend the  
23    Renaissance Hotel in High Holborn to make our notes and  
24    take our part in the debrief."

25    LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: PC Moffet was obviously another very

1 junior officer who gave little thought to her own  
2 safety.  
3 MR HAY: Indeed, my Lady.  
4 My Lady, the last statement to be read is that of  
5 Keith Pearce, dated 9 August 2006, which has the usual  
6 declaration of truth.

7 As my Lady has heard, Shelley Mather was pronounced  
8 life extinct by a forensic medical examiner, but the  
9 other deceased at King's Cross were not and this  
10 statement explains why.

11 Statement of DCI KEITH PEARCE read

12 On 7 July 2005, I was appointed the officer in  
13 overall charge of the investigation and recovery of  
14 bodies and evidence at the four bomb scenes on  
15 Underground trains in the vicinities of Russell Square,  
16 Aldgate, Edgware Road and the bus in Tavistock Square.

17 "On taking control of the crime scenes, it was  
18 obvious that the bodies that remained were dead but  
19 arrangements were in hand for a forensic medical  
20 examiner to attend to formally pronounce life extinct  
21 when agreement was reached with the coroner that all the  
22 bodies at the scene were obviously dead and, therefore,  
23 would be treated as dead bodies.

24 "The three coroners involved in this investigation,  
25 which is known as Operation Theseus, attended all of the

1 scenes during the course of this recovery phase."

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Hay.

3 Mr Keith that completes the evidence for this week?

4 MR HAY: It does, my Lady, and we have, therefore, simply

5 Monday to conclude the evidence in relation to

6 King's Cross/Russell Square.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you for getting through it so

8 efficiently, and to everybody else. Thank you.

9 (1.10 pm)

10 (The inquests adjourned until 10.00 am on Monday,

11 20 December 2010)

12