

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005
Hearing transcripts - 12 January 2011 - Afternoon session

1 (2.05 pm)

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Mr Keith?

3 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call Paul Rekret?

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

5 MR PAUL REKRET (affirmed)

6 Questions by MR KEITH

7 MR KEITH: Is your name Paul Rekret?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Mr Rekret, I want to ask you, please, about your
10 recollections of events on Thursday, 7 July 2005.

11 That morning, did you leave your home address and
12 walk to Caledonian Road Tube station with a view to
13 taking the Piccadilly Line westbound to Holborn?

14 A. That's correct, yes.

15 Q. Do you recall the conditions in the Tube when you
16 arrived at Caledonian Road?

17 A. Yes, I do. The platform was absolutely packed, much
18 more so than usual, and I was on the platform when one
19 train came, which I couldn't get on to simply because it
20 was too full.

21 Q. Do you recall what time it was, roughly, that you
22 arrived at Caledonian Road station?

23 A. Well, I don't now, but looking back at my statement,
24 I think I said I left the house at 8.30, so it would
25 have been just after 8.30.

1 Q. We take it your home is not more than a couple of
2 minutes away from the Tube station?

3 A. That's correct, yes.

4 Q. So having been confronted by the crowded Tube, did you
5 return to street level and try to catch a bus?

6 A. That's correct, yes.

7 Q. What was the bus that you caught?

8 A. That was the 91 bus going south, which I think goes
9 south to Trafalgar Square.

10 Q. We've heard from a previous witness that it stops just
11 outside Caledonian Road Tube station?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. Was that bus similarly very full or not?

14 A. Yes. Again, looking at my statement, I think two or
15 three passed before I was able to get on one.

16 Q. Do you recall, perhaps from refreshing your memory from
17 your witness statement, where you went in the bus that
18 you were able to board?

19 A. Yes. That I remember quite clearly. I was stood in the
20 area where wheelchairs or baby carriages would be, which
21 is directly opposite the back door against the window.

22 Q. You provided your witness statement because, as we now
23 know from it, you recalled on that bus a man who must
24 have joined it subsequently to your boarding it at
25 Caledonian Road, who you describe as having a notable

1 rucksack and he brought himself to your attention.

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. What was it about him that made you first notice him
4 amongst all the other many passengers who were on the
5 bus?

6 A. Well, the bus was quite crowded and the man in question
7 was -- well, first of all, taller than most people, he
8 was almost right beside me, and had a very large or very
9 full sort of quite new backpack, or rucksack, with
10 which, as he was sort of turning and looking about, was
11 bumping an elderly -- a small, elderly woman stood
12 beside me.

13 Q. How did you know or think that it might have been a new
14 rucksack?

15 A. It was quite -- I mean, I remember it being quite sort
16 of -- well, relatively new, let's say in the last few
17 years, not a sort of old, tarnished rucksack, but quite
18 new sort of camping gear that you would find in a ...

19 Q. Quite pristine. When you say it was full or large, was
20 that because of the length of the rucksack in terms of
21 the distance from the top to the bottom or because it
22 was sticking out from the man's back and had been filled
23 fully?

24 A. Both.

25 Q. Both?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Did it appear, because of the rucksack, that other
3 passengers on the bus were aware of him and perhaps
4 inconvenienced by him?

5 A. Certainly. I mean, the main reason he stayed in my
6 memory, as it were, is because someone actually tapped
7 him on the shoulder, a woman, who I described in my
8 statement as having -- a woman in her 20s, I think, with
9 dark hair, who tapped him on the shoulder and actually
10 politely asked him to be careful because he was hitting
11 this elderly woman as well as, perhaps, other
12 passengers -- I can't recall -- with his rucksack, and
13 he simply didn't react at all.

14 Q. Was there anything about his demeanour, his appearance
15 that was unusual? I mean, were you surprised that there
16 was no response at all from him? Did he look nervous or
17 agitated in any way?

18 A. Yes, I mean, at the time, I simply -- I thought he was
19 a lost and anxious tourist, and perhaps a foreigner, but
20 I certainly remember noting that he was behaving very
21 oddly, otherwise I wouldn't have remembered him.

22 Q. Indeed. Is there anything more about his description
23 that you can help us with in terms of his complexion or
24 accessories? Was he wearing glasses?

25 A. I mean, trying to recall it now is difficult, but at the

1 time and, again, looking back at the witness statement,
2 he did have sunglasses. I noted that I couldn't recall
3 whether he was wearing the sunglasses or whether they
4 were on his head. He had a dark complexion. He had gel
5 in his hair and, as well as the sort of backpack thing
6 I describe, he had a similar sort of jacket in a similar
7 style, a kind of camping jacket that one would wear,
8 outdoor kind of Gore-Tex or something like that.

9 Q. You have, no doubt, reflected on these events many
10 a time since 7 July?

11 A. Mm-hmm.

12 Q. Can you help us, on reflection, with where or precisely
13 he may have boarded the bus? It was obviously after
14 Caledonian Road and it was before Euston Road, because
15 that's when the bus was emptied completely. Can you
16 help us more as to when it was?

17 A. I'm afraid not.

18 Q. All right.

19 A. I think it was -- I mean, I think it was around
20 King's Cross, but I'm really not certain. There was so
21 much going on. At that point, we had driven by
22 King's Cross, there was thousands of people on the
23 street. We'd been told there was a fire in the station,
24 I was concerned about being late for work. So I neither
25 recall when he got on or where he got off, nor did

1 I take note of it.

2 Q. When you reached Euston Square, you were told by the
3 driver, along with all the other passengers, to
4 disembark from the bus, so what did you do?

5 A. I disembarked from the bus and, at that point, decided
6 to walk to work, which wasn't very far, towards Holborn,
7 and walked along Bloomsbury, Tavistock, whatever that
8 street, it changes names a few times.

9 Q. You crossed the major junction from Euston Square going
10 south towards Holborn and into Tavistock Square?

11 A. That's right.

12 Q. Where were you when the bomb went off on the number 30
13 bus?

14 A. I was about 15 or 20 feet ahead of the bus. The bus was
15 essentially moving slowly alongside of me as I walked
16 along Tavistock Square, so I think I was about 15 to
17 20 feet ahead of the bus.

18 Q. You presumably turned round when the bomb went off to
19 see what it was. Were you able to see, when you looked
20 at the bus, whether or not there were any passengers
21 either standing or seated on the upper deck?

22 A. Yes, I mean, from my vantage point I was looking at the
23 front of the bus and what I could see -- and again, here
24 memory might deceive me, but the way I recall it is
25 pieces of the roof of the bus sort of floating down to

1 the ground as a piece of paper would, some of which
2 landed effectively right at my feet, and the bus sort of
3 shaking, and people sat on the top deck of the bus as if
4 they were in a -- in a convertible.

5 Q. Did you see the roof of the bus, which had been blown
6 off and deposited in front and to one side of
7 Tavistock Square, come off?

8 A. I can't remember.

9 Q. Did people around you start running away, perhaps for
10 fear of a secondary explosion?

11 A. There was a moment of silence. I've no idea how long it
12 was. And somebody stood quite near me -- and I remember
13 him quite clearly -- a man in a suit, in a trenchcoat,
14 suddenly screamed, "It might go again, it might go
15 again" and started pushing and, in fact, I think he was
16 the one -- because I fell on the ground -- he was the
17 one that pushed me on the ground and started running
18 past everyone and that's when sort of pandemonium ensued
19 and people started running south along Tavistock Square.

20 Q. Something about what you had seen or what you had been
21 close to led you to speak to a police officer, because
22 your statement records how you spoke to a uniformed
23 police officer about what had happened.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Was that just in relation to the fact of the explosion

1 of the bomb or anything else to do with what you had
2 confronted that morning?

3 A. I think I was just in shock and I just asked him if
4 I was okay. He just told me to move on.

5 Q. I think your statement records that you were able to get
6 to a phone box to call your girlfriend to tell her to
7 stay at home.

8 A. That's right.

9 MR KEITH: Thank you very much, Mr Rekret, for giving
10 evidence. There may be some more questions for you from
11 my colleagues representing the interested persons in
12 these proceedings.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Patterson?

14 Questions by MR PATTERSON

15 MR PATTERSON: If I may.

16 Mr Rekret, you've already indicated that you are
17 relying to quite a degree on your witness statement made
18 back in July 2005.

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. Just one or two further details of this person that you
21 remembered at the time. You described him as being
22 a young man. I think in your statement he appeared to
23 be early 20s, is that right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. You were able to give the police a description of this

1 person's build, you described his build as broad.
2 A. Mm-hmm.
3 Q. As for the rucksack, you were able to give this detail,
4 that it was dark in colour?
5 A. Mm-hmm.
6 Q. All of that sounds correct, does it?
7 A. As far as I can remember, but again, it's so long ago
8 that ...
9 Q. Anyway, that was in your statement made on 19 July?
10 A. Yes.
11 MR PATTERSON: Thank you very much.
12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions?
13 It looks as if there are no other questions for you,
14 Mr Rekret. Do you think back as to how close you were?
15 It really is quite frightening, isn't it?
16 A. Yes.
17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm sorry that we had to ask you to
18 think back again as to how close you were, and thank you
19 for coming along to help us.
20 A. Thank you.
21 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call Richard Jones,
22 please?
23 MR RICHARD ROY JONES (sworn)
24 Questions by MR KEITH
25 MR KEITH: Good afternoon.

1 A. Good afternoon.

2 Q. May I invite to you give the court your full name,
3 please?

4 A. It's Richard Roy Jones.

5 Q. Mr Jones, the microphone in front of you won't, in fact,
6 amplify your voice, it will only relay it.

7 A. Okay.

8 Q. So can I ask you please to keep your voice as loud as
9 you can, so the ladies and gentlemen at the back of the
10 room in particular can hear you?

11 A. Okay.

12 Q. On Thursday, 7 July, did you travel from your home
13 address to Waterloo?

14 A. Yes, I did.

15 Q. The statement that you kindly gave to the police records
16 that you arrived at about 8.30.

17 A. That's correct, yes.

18 Q. Were you intending to travel to the Angel area via the
19 Waterloo & City line?

20 A. Yes, and at that stage it was identified that there was
21 a power out, a power outage, that's the excuse that they
22 gave at that time.

23 Q. Who gave that excuse?

24 A. That was on the announcement, that it was suspended.

25 Q. At Waterloo?

1 A. Yes, the Waterloo and City Line was suspended due to
2 power outage, and I then took an alternative route to
3 the Northern Line and was intending to go to Euston and
4 then get the City branch back down from the
5 Northern Line to the Angel where I was working.

6 Q. Were there considerable queues to get on to the
7 northbound Northern Line at Waterloo?

8 A. Yes, yes.

9 Q. Were you able to get the first train through, as far as
10 you were aware?

11 A. I can't recall, but it certainly was very busy.

12 Q. It got you to Euston?

13 A. Yes. This was a normal alternative route that I would
14 take if the Waterloo & City Line was out of action.

15 Q. You recorded in your witness statement how you had
16 arrived at Euston between 9.00 and 9.10.

17 A. Around that, yes.

18 Q. Was that an estimate that you made at the time of your
19 statement?

20 A. Yes, and at that stage there was an announcement saying
21 that the station was being evacuated, so I can't recall
22 how long it would take me to get out of the station, but
23 it was all crowded and trying to get out would have
24 taken a considerable amount of time.

25 Q. Having been told that the station was to be evacuated,

1 where did you go?

2 A. I then went and I was now looking at using a bus route
3 across to the Angel past King's Cross, so I went to the
4 station depot directly outside the station.

5 Q. There was a bus depot there?

6 A. Yes, checked and found I think it was a 205 and a 30
7 were on my route and looked around and the station area,
8 that area, was crowded.

9 So I then decided to walk towards Euston Square
10 because on the board it showed the direction of the bus,
11 yes, that identified which direction the bus was coming
12 from that went to Euston Square --

13 Q. So you were hoping to pick up the bus at a later stop?

14 A. -- so I could get on the bus ahead of the crush.

15 Q. So you walked down Euston Road --

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. -- to the next bus stop --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- knowing that the bus would come past you?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Did a number 30 bus indeed come past you?

22 A. A number 30 bus was at the stop, and I got on and showed
23 my travel card and was fortunate enough to get a seat on
24 the ground floor at the back.

25 Q. Could we look, please, at a map that you prepared kindly

1 for the Metropolitan Police, [INQ10040-3] ? Does that show
2 the lower deck of the number 30 bus with the driver? It
3 will be on the screen to your right, if that's any
4 easier.

5 A. Sorry, I have it here, yes.

6 Q. My fault, Mr Jones. You'll see there the map that you
7 drew --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- and the word "driver" in the bottom right-hand
10 corner. So that's the front of the lower deck.

11 Behind the word "driver", to the left, do you see
12 there a cross with a circle round it?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Is that where you were seated, or rather you were in the
15 seat next to that cross?

16 A. Yes, there was a sort of a luggage area in between and
17 I was sitting in the one seat in between a sort of
18 luggage area, a single seat that's there.

19 Q. Could we please have also on the screen [INQ10285-6]?
20 This is another diagram, the top half of which shows
21 the lower deck, prepared by the Metropolitan Police, of
22 those persons who were probably in those places at the
23 time of the explosion, but as we'll see in a moment, you
24 had left the bus.

25 Do we see that you were seated, therefore, in one of

1 the two single seats at 5 and 6?
2 A. I was sitting in number 9.
3 Q. You think you were in 9 to the right?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. So you were facing forward?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Not facing sideways?
8 A. No, sideways, I was facing sideways. It's a seat that
9 sits looking into the bus.
10 Q. So, as I've suggested, either 5 or 6? 5 or 6 are the
11 seats on the side of the bus looking sideways into the
12 middle of the bus?
13 A. Okay, right, it would have one of them, then.
14 Q. It was one of them.
15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Can we just go over that again,
16 Mr Keith? I'm not quite sure. Take your time,
17 Mr Jones. Number 9 --
18 MR KEITH: Is a seat sitting forward --
19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It faces from one side of the bus to
20 the other?
21 A. Yes, it faces into the middle of the bus.
22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It seems to have two separate rails,
23 it seems to be an enclosed seat.
24 A. That was the seat I was sitting in.
25 MR KEITH: I'm so sorry, the mistake is entirely mine.

1 I thought 9 was a forward facing seat.

2 A. No.

3 Q. Quite right, my Lady is quite right.

4 A. Yes, 5 and 6, I believe, are the luggage areas.

5 Q. I see. Inside the rail, yes, and 9 is the only seat in

6 that area?

7 A. Yes, there was only one seat.

8 Q. Thank you very much, Mr Jones. Thank you, my Lady.

9 Was the bus very crowded?

10 A. Not until we arrived into Euston, and then there was

11 a surge, and, as I remember, the driver had difficulty

12 closing the doors because of the number of people who

13 were wanting to get on the bus.

14 Q. So you had, in fact, walked out into Euston Road in

15 order to get the bus before it went through that crowd

16 of people in the depot?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So having boarded the bus, it took on board the extra

19 people outside Euston station and Euston Square and then

20 became more crowded?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. On your plan, you indicated, if we could go back to

23 INQ10040 [INQ10040-3], at 1 and 2, the location of two ladies whom

24 you recall were Asian and who were speaking to each

25 other, and there was some discussion between them as to

1 whether or not one would give up a seat to the other,
2 but did you also notice a man who you marked on the plan
3 at A, male A, with the words, as we can see from the
4 diagram "standing with his back to [you]"?

5 A. Yes, he was almost sitting on my -- standing on my
6 knees, because of the surge of the crowd. It was so
7 crowded.

8 Q. Now, Mr Jones, there's been some speculation about the
9 identity of that man, man A, and whether or not he was
10 connected to the bomber who was undoubtedly on the upper
11 deck of the bus, the number 30 bus, as it went
12 southbound, so I want to ask you, please, about what you
13 can recollect of that person, in order that we can
14 dispel any lingering concerns about whether or not he
15 was connected.

16 A. Okay. My recollection -- well, the real reason
17 I noticed him was the fact that he kept invading my
18 space, he was being pushed towards me, and also, at that
19 time, he had a bag on -- at his feet, which he kept
20 dipping into, and as he was dipping in, he was sort of
21 pushing further back into myself, and he actually done
22 this about 20 times in the short time that the bus took
23 from Euston into Tavistock Square. So he was actually
24 annoying me and I was getting quite concerned, you know,
25 as people invade your space, and he was dipping in and

1 he was fiddling about and then coming back out and
2 dipping in and fiddling about.

3 Q. Was he agitated in any way that you could see or
4 irritated?

5 A. I would think he was, yes. I mean, he was -- I just
6 couldn't understand what he was doing, yes. So as
7 I recall, I took notice of him, and he was wearing light
8 clothes, light-coloured clothes, he had a tan or was of,
9 I would have thought, Mediterranean extraction, quite
10 tall, about 6 feet, and very well-dressed.

11 Q. I'm going to ask you a little bit more, thank you very
12 much, about his appearance and description to see
13 whether or not we can exclude him from any connection to
14 the bomber, Hussain?

15 A. Okay.

16 Q. In relation to his build, you record in your statement
17 how he was of slim build. Is that right?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. You say he was cleanshaven. May we presume, it's
20 obvious from the use of the words, that there was no
21 beard --

22 A. No, there was no --

23 Q. -- or any kind of facial growth that you could see?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. My Lady, Hussain had, of course, a short beard, some

1 growth, on his chin, as evidenced by the post-mortem
2 report.

3 He was described in your statement as well-groomed,
4 this gentleman.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. I think he was wearing, according to your statement,
7 fawn, checked trousers and a short-sleeved, light-brown
8 top.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. So no question of a jacket with a zip --

11 A. No.

12 Q. -- or a hood or of jeans?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Was there a time when, in fact, during one of the
15 occasions when he was rootling around in his bag, that
16 you were able to see the colour of his underpants?

17 A. Yes, yes, they were white, and they were designer ones,
18 you know the sort of -- that youngsters wear, yes?

19 Q. All right. I'm no fashion victim myself --

20 A. No, neither am I.

21 Q. -- so I'm afraid I won't press you on the issue.

22 My Lady, Hussain's post-mortem report evidences that
23 he was wearing navy blue or dark-coloured underwear.

24 How did you come to leave the bus leaving the man on
25 the lower deck?

1 A. Well, very, very fortunately, a gentleman around me,
2 whether he was sitting or whether he was standing
3 I can't remember, said, "Well, we're now gridlocked.
4 This is going nowhere. I might as well walk", and
5 I thought, "Walk, that's a good idea", and at that
6 stage, the driver was letting people off at the front of
7 the bus. We weren't at a bus stop, we were in front of
8 the hotel there, and the driver was letting people off
9 at the front, and myself and the gentleman and a few
10 others moved to the back and banged on the back door.
11 Eventually, the driver noticed and opened the door
12 and I would think about half a dozen of us got off the
13 bus.

14 Q. Did you have to go past the man with the bag to leave
15 the bus?

16 A. Yes, I had to walk round him.

17 Q. Can you finally tell us any more about the nature of the
18 bag as you walked past?

19 A. No, no, I didn't pay any attention --

20 Q. Was it a rucksack, can you recall, or not?

21 A. The dimensions of the bag didn't go outside of his feet,
22 right, so it must have been only about 18 inches wide.

23 Q. So fairly small?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. You left the bus, and in which direction did you go?

1 A. Well, I sort of stood for a few minutes deciding,
2 because I was now trying to work out where the bus had
3 turned and what direction I was at and I decided that
4 there was a small pathway or lane which apparently was
5 running in parallel with Euston Road, so I stepped into
6 that and the bus blew up.

7 Q. So the bus was facing southwards --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- in Tavistock Square --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- having gone through Woburn Place?

12 A. Yes, it moved possibly 20, 25 yards away.

13 Q. You were, by that stage, behind it, trying to work your
14 way eastwards towards King's Cross and Angel?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Did you know straightaway that it was an explosion,

17 Mr Jones?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. As you turned round, did you see the explosive smoke and
20 the debris flying into the air?

21 A. Yes. There was a column of smoke about 20 feet going
22 straight up, about 2 to 3 feet wide, going straight up
23 from the upper deck, and the upper deck had
24 disintegrated, and that the lower deck had collapsed,
25 from what I could make out.

1 Q. Did you see the bodies of those unfortunates from the
2 top deck of the bus lying in the road or was it
3 impossible to see where everyone had landed?

4 A. No, the only movement I saw was the people at the very,
5 very front of the bus, after maybe a minute or so,
6 slowly getting up and starting to climb their way back
7 down from the top deck.

8 Q. Down through the staircase?

9 A. Through the wreckage, yes.

10 Q. Did people around the bus run towards it to help, can
11 you recall?

12 A. The initial reaction of people was to move towards the
13 bus, you know, strangely enough -- well, the initial
14 reaction is you hit the floor or you suddenly duck,
15 right? You know, suddenly this is this huge noise,
16 a lot of screaming around and you suddenly duck as soon
17 as you hear it, right? An instant reaction when
18 something like that happens, or a loud noise, and then
19 people were moving towards it. More people were moving
20 towards it, actually, than away from it, from my
21 observation, to try to help.

22 Q. You referred in your statement to there being a lot of
23 support services around. By that, do you mean it wasn't
24 long before members of the emergency services appeared
25 to be attending?

1 A. Correct. I moved -- obviously, I could do nothing, so I
2 moved -- made a quick phone call to my management in
3 Reuters to say I'd just come off a bus and it had blown
4 up and I would be late for work, and they informed me
5 that there was the other three bombs at that stage.
6 So from that point of view, that was only a few
7 seconds to make that phone call. I made one more phone
8 call to my son, who was working with Metropolitan
9 Police, he was a contractor working at the King's Cross
10 office, and he then advised me -- I quickly told him
11 what had actually happened, and mentioned this man and
12 he then advised me to get a policeman and tell them,
13 yes, which was the reason that I made the initial
14 statement.

15 Q. Because you approached a policewoman near the bus.

16 A. So within two or three minutes, the place was surrounded
17 with sirens and emergency services rushing towards
18 there. So what I'm saying is the things I done maybe
19 took a couple of minutes. In that space, right, there
20 was sirens going on all over the place, you know, and
21 services rushing towards the support.

22 I walked round the back of the medical --

23 Q. The BMA building?

24 A. The BMA building, right, through the lane and round the
25 back, and they were all being evacuated out of the

1 building at that stage.

2 Q. You met a policewoman following the advice that you had
3 taken and you told her -- her name was Charlotte
4 Brierly -- you told her you had seen a gentleman on the
5 ground floor, on the lower deck of the number 30 bus?

6 A. Yes, I relayed the evidence that I've just recounted.

7 Q. And you did so, I should make plain, quite properly and
8 very sensibly, given that you had seen something that
9 had caused you a certain degree, but a very modest
10 degree, of concern when you were on the bus?

11 A. I mean, at no stage have I ever said that I actually saw
12 the bomber. Right?

13 Q. No.

14 A. All I've ever, ever said was that somebody was acting
15 unusually and annoying me on the bus.

16 Q. But I hope we've established, Mr Jones, that there
17 appears to be no connection with the bomber and nor that
18 that particular gentleman was doing anything other than
19 acting as an ordinary member of the public, a passenger
20 on the bus?

21 A. Correct.

22 Q. But your statement, I'm afraid, has been open to
23 conjecture and surmise in the way of these things in the
24 public domain.

25 A. Yes, I know.

1 MR KEITH: Thank you, Mr Jones. There may be some more
2 questions for you from my colleagues.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any questions for Mr Jones?
4 It looks as if there aren't any questions for you,
5 Mr Jones. You're another passenger who, as you know,
6 had an extraordinarily close shave and must count your
7 blessings an awful lot of times.

8 A. Yes. Okay, thank you.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much indeed for coming
10 to help.

11 A. Thank you very much.

12 MR KEITH: My Lady, Mr Jones completes the evidence
13 scheduled for today in relation to Tavistock Square, but
14 my Lady will know that on the final day of evidence in
15 relation to King's Cross/Russell Square, there were six
16 outstanding read statements or statements to be read.

17 May I, with your leave, return to
18 King's Cross/Russell Square briefly, for the purposes of
19 reading out some of those statements?

20 My Lady has, of course, a closed hearing scheduled
21 for 3.00.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly. If anybody who's here
23 particularly because they wish to hear the evidence in
24 relation to Tavistock Square, I wouldn't feel at all
25 offended if they wanted to leave now.

1 I think we can carry on, Mr Keith. The families
2 have all been very discreet in the way that they come
3 and go.

4 MR KEITH: My Lady will have the statements in two places.
5 In the fourth bundle of the King's Cross/Russell Square
6 witness evidence and also in today's bundle.

7 Could I start with that of Stephen Munns, whose
8 statement is dated 9 January 2006. He describes himself
9 as a firefighter assistant.

10 Statement of MR STEPHEN MUNNS read

11 "I am employed as a station manager by London Fire
12 Brigade. On 7 July, I was the station manager at
13 Clerkenwell station. I was working the 8.00 to 5.00
14 shift [8.00 am to 5.00 in the afternoon shift]. At 9.20
15 I received a pager message from Control that there was
16 an eight-pump fire. I knew from this message that this
17 was quite a major incident due to the number of
18 appliances attending."

19 My Lady, his pager number is A27 and the
20 contemporaneous documentation shows that he was paged at
21 9.37.50, not, in fact, 09.20, as he had supposed, and
22 the reference for that is LFB11-4:

23 "I contacted Control who informed me that this fire
24 was at King's Cross Underground and I was asked to
25 attend this location. Within 45 minutes I had arrived

1 at King's Cross ..."

2 My Lady, the documentation shows that he was mobile

3 at 09.41.57 and so he must have arrived at some point

4 after that.

5 "... and I immediately went to a Clerkenwell

6 appliance driver, Gareth Betton, to find out who was in

7 charge. He did not know. As I walked towards the main

8 King's Cross entrance, I saw Leading Firefighter

9 Paul Chambers. He was not sure who was controlling the

10 incident."

11 Would my Lady wish me to pause while we --

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: No, I'm fine, thank you.

13 MR KEITH: "After speaking to Paul, I entered the Tube

14 station and went to the booking hall on the ground

15 floor. I was initially directed into the main booking

16 office by a leading firefighter who I do not know the

17 name of. Once in the booking hall, I saw quite a large

18 number of members of the public sitting around or

19 leaning against walls. They appeared to have dirty

20 clothing and several had minor cuts and injuries.

21 "I was not aware at this stage of what exactly had

22 happened on the Underground. From the booking hall, the

23 same leading firefighter took me to the top of the

24 escalator leading to the Piccadilly Line where I met the

25 Sub-Officer Colebrook-Taylor. We had a discussion

1 regarding the situation. Again, we did not know exactly
2 what had happened. We confirmed that the power to the
3 rail tracks was off and there was no fire on the Tube.
4 But there were numerous casualties.

5 "Throughout our conversation, there were police
6 officers, medics and walking wounded coming up the
7 escalator. It was decided he would go back down to the
8 platform level to assist casualties and operations and
9 I would return to the ground floor to direct operations.
10 Whilst on the ground floor, Assistant Divisional Officer
11 Steve Vincett arrived at the scene and asked if we had
12 considered the threat of a chemical, biological or
13 nuclear threat. He was nominated to go to the platform
14 level and take command of that area.

15 "I returned to the ground floor and met
16 Assistant Divisional Officer Ginty. We both discussed
17 what action needed to be taken. We formulated a message
18 to Control outlining the details of the incident which
19 were passed back to them via radio and commenced an
20 Incident Command Wallet. At some stage I was informed,
21 either by a police officer or a medic, I do not recall
22 which, that a Silver meeting was taking place.

23 I noticed at this time that Senior Divisional
24 Officer Adams was in attendance and due to attend the
25 Silver meeting. I assumed that he was now in command of

1 the incident. As a result, I informed him I was
2 proceeding to the head of the escalator to coordinate
3 operations from there between platform and ground level.
4 "Senior Divisional Officer Adams then attended the
5 Silver meeting. Divisional Officer Cowup arrived at the
6 scene with Sector Commander Jenkins. The operation was
7 divided into sectors. I was in sector B at the head of
8 the escalator. ADO Vincett was controlling sector A at
9 platform level and ADO Ginty was controlling sector C at
10 ground level. I did not assist with the removal of
11 casualties but was aware of them being taken out of the
12 station by police, firefighters and medics. At no time
13 did I enter the Tube or the Underground tunnel.

14 "We withdrew from the station once it was confirmed
15 there were no more casualties coming from the Tube and,
16 on returning to the home station, I immediately made
17 a record of my involvement at the King's Cross scene."

18 My Lady, the next statement is that of Mr Ginty, to
19 whom Mr Munn's made reference. His statement is dated
20 31 January 2006.

21 Statement of MR NICHOLAS STEPHEN GINTY read

22 "On Thursday, 7 July 2005, I was on duty. That
23 morning I was attending Euston for a meeting, this was
24 at about 9.00. I saw an appliance leave Euston fire
25 station. At 09.04 [my Lady, the evidence for that is

1 LFB11-2, 09.04.35], I received a pager message [his
2 pager number was A41] stating 'Euston Square
3 London Underground station, smoke issuing in tunnel,
4 King's Cross tunnels, Euston Square station,
5 Euston Road, St Pancras, London'.
6 "I drove on to the forecourt to Euston fire station
7 and telephoned Control. I was advised now of an
8 incident at Aldgate which was possibly a train crash or
9 power problem.
10 "I attended Euston Square London Underground station
11 where no incident was found. I explained to other crews
12 attending that there was an incident at Aldgate and
13 asked for a quick stop to get appliances available.
14 I then made my way again to Euston fire station on
15 Euston Road. At about 09.35, I arrived at Euston Road
16 and saw police officers running in the general direction
17 of King's Cross to the east. I was then re-sent to
18 Euston Square by a repeat of the earlier pager message.
19 "During this, I became aware of an incident at
20 Edgware Road and reports of an incident on a bus in
21 Upper Woburn Place nearby. By this time, terrorist
22 activity was apparent and major incident procedures had
23 been implemented. I then attended King's Cross and went
24 to the rendezvous point at the head of the stairs and
25 I saw Sub-Officer Papandrenicous with another

1 firefighter entering the station with water and first
2 aid equipment.

3 "I asked who was in charge and if he knew what was
4 happening. He advised me he had been asked to assist
5 triage in the ticket office. I went briefly inside and
6 noticed a number of casualties being treated for
7 a variety of injuries. I told him to return to me as
8 soon as possible and to assume, unless told otherwise,
9 that I was the officer in charge.

10 "I then went back to the rendezvous point and saw
11 ADO Munns talking to a crew. I advised him of the
12 situation. He advised that there were multicasualties
13 and fatalities on a Tube train. Munns and Vincett went
14 downstairs, so I suggested I set up a Command point here
15 and collate resources. This was agreed and they went in
16 with breathing apparatus and cutting gear.

17 "I then proceeded to set up a Command point,
18 equipment dump and gather as much information as
19 possible. I asked the police to check the area with
20 a dog before setting up to check for any secondary
21 devices. I requested roll boards of crews attending and
22 started to establish crew locations. I gradually
23 collated information on the incident, power to the
24 track, any resources needed, including increases in the
25 number of pumps attending to 12, marshalling the areas

1 linking the attending agencies, and establishing control
2 of the surface.

3 "Following the request for lighting, I liaised with
4 the Channel Tunnel Rail Link personnel and asked for
5 lighting and ventilation. I requested first aid kits
6 and cutting gear to be brought to the equipment area
7 from appliances, also breathing apparatus. The CBRN
8 risk [the chemical, biological, radiological and
9 nuclear] was also checked as the incident progressed
10 through the MAIAT [the Multiagency Initial Assessment
11 Team]. A short while later, Messrs Cowup and Adams
12 arrived and took over."

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Can we pause for a minute, Mr Keith?

14 MR KEITH: Yes.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: He is at Euston at 9.00. He gets
16 a pager message at 9.04.

17 MR KEITH: Yes.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: We then have him going, because of
19 different messages, Euston Square, Euston, going
20 backwards and forwards to the fire station, he then
21 eventually is told to go to King's Cross Underground.

22 MR KEITH: Yes.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: At 09.35, he's back at Euston Road.
24 After that, he becomes aware of Edgware Road, of
25 something happening there, and then he's told to go to

1 King's Cross. What is the best estimate of the time he
2 therefore arrives at King's Cross?

3 MR KEITH: My Lady, it's difficult to say because his
4 original tasking by pager showed him mobile in response
5 to the initial request to go to Euston Square
6 London Underground station tunnel King's Cross summons,
7 but when he arrived, he saw ADO Munns talking to
8 a crew -- and we can certainly remind ourselves of the
9 time at which ADO Munns arrives. I'm afraid I can't
10 recollect the time, but I think --

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It looks as if it's something like
12 9.45, isn't it?

13 MR KEITH: I think it's around 9.40 or 9.45, but we'll
14 double check. But it must have been after that, if
15 Munns was already there.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much. The reason for
17 my looking puzzled earlier is the second page of my
18 witness list has a whole number of witnesses, who
19 I suspect are being called on Friday, but it's headed
20 "Wednesday", that's why I was looking puzzled earlier.

21 MR KEITH: I'm sorry for pausing, my Lady.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: That's all right.

23 MR KEITH: The next statement is that of David Brennecke,
24 who was a duty station officer of the London Ambulance
25 Service. His statement is dated 24 October 2005.

1 Statement of MR DAVID ARNOLD BRENNECKE read
2 "I am employed as a duty station officer by the
3 London Ambulance Service. My base station is Camden.
4 I have been employed by the London Ambulance Service for
5 14 years. I have been a duty station officer for
6 6 months and I am a trained and qualified paramedic.
7 "On Thursday, 7 July, I was at work at Camden when
8 my attention was drawn to a news report being shown on
9 Sky relating to an ongoing incident at Liverpool Street.
10 It was at that time being reported as a power surge. As
11 a result of what I saw on the television, I contacted
12 our Central Ambulance Control and asked whether they
13 wanted me to respond. I was told to stand by at that
14 time, which was about 9.15.
15 "I continued monitoring the news report on TV and
16 they started talking about high numbers of casualties
17 coming out of Liverpool Street. I again contacted
18 Central Ambulance Control and they told me to attend
19 King's Cross railway station, as they had received
20 reports that the station was being evacuated.
21 "I left Camden at about 9.30 with my colleague,
22 Nigel Ward, who is a team leader. We travelled in the
23 station duty officer's car. It took us about 15 minutes
24 to get to King's Cross, arriving on scene at 9.45.
25 "I will always remember what I saw when I arrived at

1 the front of the station. A British Transport Police
2 inspector in uniform was sitting on the kerbside crying.
3 At this point, I realised something serious must be
4 happening. I got the major incident pack from the car
5 and I adopt the role of Silver medic. I also started
6 a log.

7 "The role of the Silver medic is outlined in the
8 major incident plan, but briefly it is a role adopted by
9 the most senior LAS officer at the scene who is in
10 charge of the Command and Control of all LAS staff on
11 the scene.

12 "Shortly after arriving at the station, I was
13 approached by one of the LAS first responders, I don't
14 know his name. I was told by this paramedic, who had
15 been to the immediate scene of the incident, that it was
16 actually a train crash which had been caused by the
17 power surge. There were 40 to 50 casualties, some with
18 severe injuries, and the scene was very smoky and dusty.

19 "On my arrival, there were police, ambulances and
20 Fire Service personnel already there. At 9.50, I saw
21 Steve Sale, who is a more senior member of the London
22 Ambulance Service to me ..."

23 My Lady will recall that the order of command then
24 I think ran: Peter Taylor, then Paul Rixon, then
25 Mr Brennecke and then Mr Sale.

1 "... and he took over the role of Silver medic.
2 I took on the role of his staff officer. This involves
3 accompanying Steve through the incident recording a log
4 of the incident, attending Silver Command meetings with
5 senior officers from the other agencies on scene and
6 assisting him in his role.

7 "Whilst I was acting as Silver Command, I recall
8 instructing Nigel Ward to act as Bronze medic. This
9 required him to go to the scene, assess the situation
10 and report back to me. As I recall, Nigel never
11 actually made it to the immediate scene due to the
12 numbers of people exiting the platforms. He ended up
13 carrying out the role of Bronze triage.

14 "The Bronze roles are again outlined in the LAS
15 major incident plan.

16 "The remainder of the Bronze roles at the scene were
17 allocated by Steve Sale. I can recall that I reported
18 at 10.00 am to our Central Ambulance Control that this
19 incident was to be dealt with as a major incident. One
20 of the areas of the station was designated as a triage
21 centre where casualties were initially assessed and then
22 cleared for evacuation to hospital. I remember
23 specifically seeing one lady who had sadly died whilst
24 being brought up from the train. She had been very
25 badly burnt.

1 "At 10.30, I accompanied Steve Sale to the first
2 Silver Commander's meeting. The meeting was attended by
3 Chief Superintendent McCafferty of British Transport
4 Police, a HEMS doctor, Rod Mackenzie, and Carol Winter,
5 a King's Cross station manager. It was at this meeting
6 that Rod Mackenzie reported the incident was caused by
7 an explosive device in carriage 6 of the train."
8 My Lady, that may not, of course, have been right.
9 "I remained at the scene it Steve Sale recording the
10 log. I have provided Detective Constable Barker with
11 a photocopy of the log that I prepared attached to which
12 is a police exhibit label ... which I have signed.
13 "LAS resources are getting to the scene okay
14 although they were experiencing problems with the
15 traffic congestion caused by the other incidents in
16 London at that time. Some of the resources intended for
17 King's Cross were also getting caught up in the
18 explosion that occurred on the bus at Tavistock Square.
19 "Whilst at the scene of the incident, the London
20 Ambulance Service dealt with seven priority 1
21 casualties, these are persons with potentially life
22 threatening injuries, three priority 2 injuries, which
23 are less severe, and around 80 priority 3 casualties,
24 which are walking wounded. The majority of the
25 priority 3 casualties were evacuated by buses

1 commandeered at the scene. I recall seeing a colleague,
2 Mark Rainey. He told me he had been to the immediate
3 scene and it was horrendous with numerous fatalities and
4 body parts distributed throughout the carriage. At no
5 time did I attend the immediate scene.

6 "I can recall that there were 16 confirmed
7 fatalities at the scene. At one stage I can recall that
8 there were concerns about CBRN issues and a team did go
9 to assess this."

10 My Lady, he then describes how there was a further
11 Silver meeting at 11.30, where the casualties were taken
12 to and his departure from the scene at 6.30.

13 My Lady, may I read Paul Ward and then pause there
14 so as to give my Lady time, along with the court, to
15 change arrangements for the closed hearing scheduled for
16 3.00.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly.

18 MR KEITH: That will leave two other statements on
19 a separate matter to be addressed when time is
20 convenient, in the next day or two.

21 Paul Ward is an ambulance operations manager also
22 with the London Ambulance Service. He has been there
23 for 27 years and his statement is dated 25 January 2005.
24 He is a senior operations manager, though completing
25 a secondment within the Professional Standards Unit.

1 Statement of MR PAUL WARD read
2 "On Thursday, 7 July I was on duty at the ambulance
3 headquarters in Waterloo Road when at about 9.00
4 I received reports of several incidents occurring around
5 London. The CAC is situated within ambulance
6 headquarters. This is an information room where 999
7 calls are received and the information is provided to
8 crews who are dispatched to the 999 calls. The
9 information of the emergency call is sent to the crews
10 via mobile data screens which are fitted to the
11 emergency vehicles. In addition, the Control contacts
12 the crew directly either by phone or a very high
13 frequency radio set which is also fitted to all
14 emergency vehicles.
15 "I attended the CAC and I was directed to attend
16 St Pancras. The incidents related to a number of
17 London Underground stations. I was en route in a fleet
18 vehicle to the rail station driving along
19 Southampton Row towards Woburn Place at the junction
20 with Russell Square when I saw a large number of people
21 coming out of the Russell Square Underground station in
22 Bernard Street. I could clearly see the majority had
23 been involved in some sort of incident as some had
24 blackened faces as if they had been near to a fire, some
25 had torn and dishevelled clothing and a few had minor

1 burns. I realised that one of the incidents had or was
2 occurring at Russell Square Underground station.
3 I turned into Bernard Street and stopped and parked just
4 past the Underground station facing towards
5 Brunswick Square. I was conscious that there were
6 a number of ambulances en route to the scene and made an
7 effort not to block the road for other emergency
8 services when they arrived. I could also see that one
9 ambulance had already arrived in addition to a response
10 vehicle.
11 "I got out of the vehicle. I had a dark suit on so
12 I put my high visibility jacket on along with a safety
13 helmet, both clearly identifying me as an ambulance
14 officer. I then went into the station itself. I was
15 confronted by at least 50 casualties. The concourse was
16 full of people, some were crying out for help, it was
17 chaos. Amongst these people I saw Bill Kilminster,
18 a paramedic from Camden. He gave me an initial report.
19 He had already been through the station and down to the
20 Piccadilly Line platform where there had been an
21 explosion on a train. There were numerous casualties
22 and a number of dead. On speaking to him, it was
23 estimated there were at least another 100 casualties on
24 the platform and the train in addition to those whom
25 I had seen on the concourse.

1 "I returned to the entrance to the Underground
2 station and contacted CAC. At 9.38 I spoke with them
3 and declared a major incident and requested the
4 necessary resources. As I spoke with them, I could also
5 hear radio traffic on the vehicle's radio set. This was
6 in relation to the other incidents around London. I was
7 confident that other units would be sent to us but
8 I also realised it may not be immediate and adequate.
9 "I had instructed Bill to assume a role of Bronze
10 medic. As the senior ambulance officer at the scene
11 I assumed the role of Silver medic (ambulance incident
12 officer) in line with the major incident plan. For the
13 London Ambulance Service the Command structure works on
14 three levels: Gold, Silver and Bronze. My role was to
15 determine priority in allocating resources. This is
16 administrative and I would not be directly involved in
17 the treatment of casualties. It includes to plan and
18 coordinate tasks to be undertaken at the scene, obtain
19 other resources required, liaising with other emergency
20 services, and the Silver Command officer assumes command
21 of all Ambulance Service operations at the scene."
22 He then goes on, my Lady, to describe the nature of
23 Bronze command which my Lady is familiar with already.
24 "I returned to the station entrance and entered the
25 concourse. As you enter there, there are a number of

1 ticket machines and through these you can gain entry to
2 the platforms via a spiral staircase.

3 "The lifts were not operational. In the concourse,
4 there were a large number of people lying on the floor.
5 Most had minor injuries and/or smoke inhalation. There
6 was a small amount of panic and cries for help. I could
7 see a number of Underground staff in the concourse area
8 and a further ambulance crew had arrived. The medics
9 were Tracey Brooker and Liam Whittaker. I also found
10 a Police Inspector Paul Garrett who was the police
11 Silver Command. We had a brief conversation in relation
12 to the situation and agreed to implement our emergency
13 action plan. We also arranged for regular contact.

14 I then turned to the casualties in the concourse and
15 took command by appealing to them to calm down. I gave
16 them assurances that other medical emergency services
17 would attend. I had also asked if anyone had any
18 medical background and/or training to assist us at this
19 point in time. A Dr Konrad Maurer approached me. From
20 his appearance, I assumed he might have been in the
21 vicinity of the explosion but he did help with
22 casualties in the concourse and started setting up
23 a triage process with the help of some of the police and
24 members of the public.

25 "I then instructed Bill Kilminster, Tracey Brooker

1 and Liam Whittaker to go down the spiral staircase ...
2 Once they were there, they were to find the train and
3 assist and assess the situation. I started to help with
4 the triage but a police officer approached me and
5 explained that they had received information relating to
6 secondary device on the train. Given the information
7 I was extremely concerned for the safety of my staff and
8 the other emergency services that were underground.
9 I made the decision to go down to the train and withdraw
10 the staff until such time as it was deemed to be safe to
11 operate. With the police officer, we went down the
12 spiral staircase."
13 My Lady, he then goes on to describe the conditions
14 in the tunnel which my Lady has of course heard of
15 already.
16 "As we walked through the tunnel, approximately
17 halfway between the platform and the train I saw four
18 people carrying a casualty in a blanket. Each person
19 had a corner of the blanket. I saw the casualty had
20 lost a leg. As we moved further into the tunnel,
21 I suddenly heard and felt an explosion. There was
22 a rumbling sound which echoed through the tunnel.
23 Having been told about the possibility of a secondary
24 device, my immediate thought was that a bomb had
25 detonated on the train. My first reaction was to turn

1 and get out of the tunnel as quickly as possible along
2 with the police officer. I had a vision of a fireball
3 coming through the tunnel. I was trying to work out
4 whether I was going to survive. We both got to the
5 platform in Russell Square and paused and looked back
6 into the tunnel. I could see a cloud of dust. I then
7 realised that I would have to go back in as I realised
8 the medics were potentially injured or worse.
9 "I saw some water bottles on the platform which
10 I picked up and we reentered the tunnel. We then found
11 the train. We entered it via the driver's cab. There
12 was a small ladder at the front of the train and we
13 moved into the first carriage where I saw to my relief
14 the medics treating casualties inside the carriage."
15 He then goes on, my Lady, to describe the
16 devastation inside the first carriage and he says:
17 "I cannot recall the specific position of the
18 individuals as I have blocked out most of those images.
19 This is my way of dealing with the incident and
20 I continued to get on with the job in hand. I spoke
21 with Bill Kilminster. All the live casualties had now
22 been evacuated from the train, they had been taken out
23 along the train and back towards King's Cross. I asked
24 Bill to conduct a sweep of the train to confirm that no
25 live casualties had been missed. I conducted a sweep in

1 the other direction.

2 "Tracey Brooker accompanied me on the sweep. The
3 police officer who had come down the tunnel with me
4 remained on the train. We then retraced our steps to
5 the platform. Once we got back to the platform, we took
6 time to rest and recover prior to climbing the spiral
7 staircase."

8 He then describes how he handed over the role of
9 Silver Command to Paul Woodrow and he passes on
10 information concerning the events and the scene that he
11 had discovered in the tunnel.

12 My Lady, I don't think that there is anything else
13 in the remainder of his statement which is relevant
14 other than of course he realised that the explosion that
15 he had felt and heard in the tunnel was that of the bus
16 bomb in Tavistock Square.

17 My Lady, there are two further statements as I have
18 said. Perhaps we could leave those over for another day
19 and a more convenient moment.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Very well. Will someone let me know
21 when you're ready, please.

22 MR KEITH: Thank you, my Lady.

23 (3.00 pm)

24 (The inquests adjourned until 10.00 am on Friday,

25 14 January 2011)