

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005

Hearing transcripts - 18 January 2011 - Morning session

1 Tuesday, 18 January 2011

2 (10.00 am)

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr O'Connor?

4 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Good morning, my Lady. My Lady, one  
5 piece of unfinished business from yesterday. You will  
6 recall there was an issue about a photograph that some  
7 of the witnesses were referred to and some enquiries  
8 were being made from the family IPs as to whether they  
9 had any objections to that photograph being released on  
10 to the public website.

11 I know that you're aware that, after you rose  
12 yesterday, the final families gave their instructions  
13 and indicated that they didn't have any objections, so  
14 I believe that that photograph is either already on the  
15 website or will be very shortly.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much.

17 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: My Lady, could I invite you to call  
18 Ciaran Dermody?

19 INSPECTOR CIARAN DERMODY (affirmed)

20 Questions by MR ANDREW O'CONNOR

21 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Could you give your full name, please?

22 A. Yes. I'm Inspector 3831, Ciaran Dermody, British  
23 Transport Police, call sign Alpha Tango 2.

24 Q. Thank you, Mr Dermody. In 2005, you were, as you are  
25 now, an inspector serving with the British Transport

1 Police?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. I believe that your duties at that stage were as officer  
4 in charge of the Central Crime Task Force based near  
5 Victoria station?

6 A. That's correct, sir.

7 Q. What did those duties involve, Inspector?

8 A. Those duties involved plainclothes work in  
9 anti-robbery-type operations and violent crime-type  
10 operations in London.

11 Q. On 7 July 2005, you were at your office near Victoria  
12 station?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. As you say, you were in plainclothes on that day,  
15 I believe.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. I imagine the day started as an ordinary day at the  
18 office. Is that right?

19 A. That's correct. It was a very mundane day, I was on the  
20 telephone sorting out maintenance for one of the  
21 vehicles.

22 Q. What time had your shift started?

23 A. My shift started just before 9.00 that day.

24 Q. What was it that first made that day a day that wasn't  
25 an ordinary day?

1 A. As I say, I was on the phone taking a phone call and  
2 a PC Gary Sims came into my office and, normally, when  
3 somebody's on the phone, you stop and wait, and he  
4 shouted at me that bombs had gone off in London and  
5 there was casualties.

6 Q. In the statement that you provided much nearer the time  
7 in 2005, you described that incident and you said that  
8 it took place at about 9.00. How sure are you of the  
9 timing of Mr Sims coming in and telling you that?

10 A. It was pretty -- it was just after 9.00, I would say.  
11 I'm pretty sure it was just after 9.00, because I hadn't  
12 long started my shift.

13 Q. The reason I'm asking you is that, as you know, the  
14 bombs had gone off in London but only a few minutes  
15 before that, only at about 8.50.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. We've heard a lot of evidence to the effect that there  
18 was still a great deal of confusion about how many  
19 incidents there were and what had happened at them.  
20 It's quite striking if as soon as 9.00, or shortly  
21 after, someone was telling you, not only that the  
22 problem was related to terrorist action rather than  
23 anything else, but also that more than one bomb had gone  
24 off.

25 How certain are you of exactly what Mr Sims said to

1 you?

2 A. I wouldn't be that certain of the time, but I know it  
3 was after 9.00, because it was after the start of my  
4 shift, but again, it's quite confusing at the time  
5 because you're not thinking of ...

6 Q. Could it have been 9.10 or 9.20?

7 A. Could have been. Yes, sir, could have been.

8 Q. Just to take you back to what he said, are you sure he  
9 said bombs, plural, rather than one bomb?

10 A. That's what I remember, sir.

11 Q. What was your reaction to hearing Mr Sims say that?

12 A. My reaction was to -- I left the phone down immediately  
13 and made my way to the PCSO's office in Victoria to  
14 actually listen to the radio to see if I could verify  
15 what he was after telling me.

16 Q. That was an office in the same building, was it?

17 A. Yes, sir, that's right.

18 Q. Did you listen to the radio?

19 A. We got to hear the radio momentarily and we heard that  
20 there was a lot of confusion on the radio and a lot of  
21 traffic, and I heard that there was a rendezvous point  
22 at King's Cross/St Pancras.

23 Q. What decision did you make then?

24 A. The decision I made was I asked Gary could he drive  
25 a vehicle and he said yes, and I made the decision to

1 take Gary and go to this rendezvous point to be deployed  
2 to this incident.

3 Q. You say to be deployed, but this was something that you  
4 were doing on your own initiative rather than --

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. -- something that you had been instructed to do?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. Was that because it was part of your role as the Central  
9 Crime Task Force to respond to incidents like this, or  
10 did you identify this as something that was out of the  
11 ordinary and you should simply take initiative?

12 A. I certainly identified this as out of the ordinary and  
13 it was to take initiative and, generally, the  
14 experience, certainly in our force, is that it's sort of  
15 all hands to the pump if something goes up and people  
16 respond.

17 Q. You took an initiative, but to be clear, was it part of  
18 your role or was it something you were doing outside of  
19 your role?

20 A. It wasn't particularly part of my role.

21 Q. Did you make a decision to go to King's Cross before you  
22 left the building or was that something that you decided  
23 once you were already en route?

24 A. I made the decision before I left the building, as  
25 I heard the radio message saying that the rendezvous

1 point was at King's Cross.

2 Q. You set off with Mr Sims. Where did you get the vehicle  
3 from to travel in?

4 A. It was one of my own vehicles and it was parked outside  
5 Victoria rail station, so we just went downstairs and  
6 picked the vehicle up from there.

7 Q. We'll hear from Mr Sims shortly, but was he in  
8 plainclothes as well?

9 A. Mr Sims had plainclothes as well, yes, sir.

10 Q. Before you left, you mention in the witness statement  
11 that you made at the time that you picked up a high  
12 visibility cap?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. That's right?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. I think you wore it later at Tavistock Square.

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. We'll come back to that in a moment.

19 A. Yes, sir.

20 Q. What route did you take, then, from Victoria towards  
21 King's Cross?

22 A. It was a fairly direct route, going up by  
23 Buckingham Gate Road and up towards, I believe,  
24 Hyde Park Corner, that direction. So it would have been  
25 the directest route, because Mr Sims was using the

1 emergency lights and sirens to get to the rendezvous  
2 point.

3 Q. What time approximately do you think you left your  
4 building?

5 A. It's very hard to say, but I would imagine somewhere  
6 between 9.15 and 9.25, I would imagine.

7 Q. We know, of course, that you'd reached Tavistock Square  
8 at about 9.45, so would the journey have taken something  
9 like 20 minutes or perhaps a little longer?

10 A. As I say, it's very hard to know the time now, but yes,  
11 the journey shouldn't have taken too long, 10,  
12 15 minutes possibly. Something like that.

13 Q. So you may in fact have left as late as half past 9?

14 A. Yes, could have been.

15 Q. Does that in turn make it possible that, when Mr Sims  
16 came to see you, it wasn't as early as 9.00, it may have  
17 been a little bit later?

18 A. Absolutely, yes, sir, that's correct.

19 Q. En route, you picked up another British Transport Police  
20 officer, Mr Lazenby, who we'll also hear from.

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. I believe it was somewhere near Russell Square that you  
23 picked him up.

24 A. Yes, that's correct. We were going towards  
25 Russell Square direction and I remember somebody

1 standing in the middle of the road dressed in black,  
2 with a black rucksack on his back, waving us down, and  
3 that turned out to be Neville Lazenby.

4 Q. Mr Lazenby was someone you already knew, I take it?

5 A. He was someone I had worked with before in the past,  
6 yes, I knew him well.

7 Q. What explanation did he give for flagging you down in  
8 this way?

9 A. He was on his way to City of London Police in  
10 Wood Street and he was there to act as a liaison officer  
11 for our force with them.

12 Q. Can you help us, Inspector, where is the Wood Street  
13 police station that he was trying to get to?

14 A. Wood Street police station is near Smithfield,  
15 Blackfriars, that type of area, just round the back  
16 there. It's in the City.

17 Q. Perhaps unsurprisingly --

18 A. Absolutely, yes.

19 Q. -- since it is a City of London Police force station, it  
20 is in the City?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. You were going to King's Cross?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Were you intending to go to Wood Street first and then  
25 return to King's Cross or what decision did you make?

1 A. Yes, I made the decision to assist Neville Lazenby and  
2 get him to Wood Street police station first and then  
3 carry on on my journey to King's Cross.

4 Q. So that, as it were, became your priority --

5 A. Absolutely.

6 Q. -- at that point?

7 Having picked him up, you headed north up  
8 Upper Woburn Place towards Euston Road, no doubt  
9 intending to turn right and travel into the City that  
10 way. Is that right?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. You'd reached, I think, the traffic lights at the  
13 junction of Upper Woburn Place and Tavistock Place. Did  
14 you then stop at red lights?

15 A. I can't actually remember.

16 Q. This, of course, as we'll hear in a moment, is where you  
17 saw the explosion from. Your statement simply refers to  
18 you having reached that junction, or reached the traffic  
19 lights of that junction.

20 A. I mean, I suppose we were on emergency blue lights and  
21 sirens, so we wouldn't have had to stop, only  
22 momentarily across the lights.

23 Q. That was my thought. But in any event, that was where  
24 you'd reached, I think. Was this the first time that  
25 you saw the bus coming in the other direction towards

1 you?

2 A. That's correct, that's the first time we noticed the bus  
3 coming down.

4 Q. There were a number of other buses travelling up and  
5 down that road that morning, we've heard from other  
6 witnesses.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Did you get a clear view of that particular bus at that  
9 point?

10 A. Yes, I did.

11 Q. It was on the other side of the road travelling towards  
12 you?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. How close was it when you were at that junction of  
15 Tavistock Place and Upper Woburn Place?

16 A. It was something like 40 yards in front of us at that  
17 point.

18 Q. What did you see happen at that point?

19 A. I noticed that there was an explosion that seemed to be  
20 on the top deck of the bus, and I say that because the  
21 explosion went up and out. Rather than damaging the  
22 bottom of the bus, it went up, out of the bus, almost  
23 like a chimney, and the top section of the bus, the  
24 roof, if you like, was damaged and flapped over and the  
25 plume of smoke went straight up.

1 Q. You describe the explosion going straight up.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. I assume you mean the debris, the smoke?

4 A. That's it, yes. It was almost as if the force of the

5 explosion went straight up.

6 Q. Did you see anything else?

7 A. All I've seen was the top of the bus opening out and

8 being thrown to the offside of the bus and the plume of

9 grey and black smoke and debris go up with the force of

10 the explosion.

11 Q. During the period of 15 or 20 minutes that you had taken

12 to travel from your office to Tavistock Square, I assume

13 you'd had the radio on in your car?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. You'd been listening to the radio traffic about the

16 developing incidents in London?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. Had you reached any clearer understanding, before you

19 saw the bus explode, of what was going on in London that

20 morning?

21 A. No, sir, not particularly. It was all very confusing

22 that morning, and I don't think anybody had a clear

23 picture.

24 Q. What was your immediate thought as to the explanation

25 for the bus exploding when you saw that happen?

1 A. I knew it was an explosion, I knew immediately, and we  
2 all in the car, I think, said at the same time, "It's  
3 a bomb in the bus", a bomb, you know, we knew instantly  
4 it was a bomb, we didn't think it was anything else.

5 Q. Could I ask you to look, Inspector, at a photograph,  
6 please? It's INQ10345-1 [not for publication]. You should see it on the  
7 screen in front of you.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Now, I am sure you can orientate yourself. Here's  
10 a photograph taken of the bus from -- we think it was  
11 probably one of the hotels close by.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Several storeys up, as you can see.

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. The photograph looks down the side of  
16 Tavistock Square --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- towards, I believe, where your vehicle was at the  
19 time you saw the bus explode. We can see, if we look  
20 beyond the bus, up the bus lane, we see a junction with  
21 a taxi driving right to left. Do you see that there?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Is that the junction of Upper Woburn Place and  
24 Tavistock Place?

25 A. That would be the junction, yes.

1 Q. That's where you were positioned?

2 A. That's where we were positioned originally when we have  
3 seen the bus go up.

4 Q. Not obviously in the same direction as the taxi, but,  
5 rather, facing towards where we now see the bus?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. If we now look in the foreground of the photo,  
8 Inspector, we see a man who looks like he's speaking  
9 into a handheld radio with a high visibility cap on.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Is that perhaps you?

12 A. That's me.

13 Q. Thank you. I should say, this photograph, we don't have  
14 a timing for this photograph, but it must have been some  
15 time after the explosion. For example, one can see on  
16 the right-hand side a fire appliance has arrived, do you  
17 see, just beyond the bus on the right-hand side of the  
18 road?

19 A. That's it, yes.

20 Q. So that puts it a period of ten or so minutes after the  
21 explosion took place.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Just so I'm sure, if we look at the  
23 zebra crossing, then there's a car, then there's  
24 somebody in a high visibility vest, then there's a cap,  
25 a yellowy-green cap, that's you?

1 A. Yes, my Lady, that's me.

2 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Going back to the explosion and your  
3 reaction, you say that you immediately understood it to  
4 be a bomb?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. Was that something that all three of you instinctively  
7 understood in the car or something that you had to  
8 discuss between you to arrive at that conclusion?

9 A. No, it was an immediate reaction from all three that  
10 exclaimed, "That's a bus -- that's a bomb".

11 Q. Can we look now please at a document [BTP169-69]? Now, in  
12 the vehicle, Inspector, you were sitting in the front  
13 seat, passenger seat, I think?

14 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.

15 Q. Mr Sims was driving, Mr Lazenby in the back seat?

16 A. That's right.

17 Q. Who was operating the radio?

18 A. Mr Sims was operating the radio.

19 Q. Thank you. But if we look, please, halfway down this  
20 page -- can I just say we see the timing at 09.44.

21 I don't know if you're familiar with the transcripts of  
22 the British Transport Police radio traffic that have  
23 been produced.

24 A. Yes, I am, sir, yes.

25 Q. Putting it shortly, there are a few problems with them.

1 The timings aren't always accurate.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Indeed, on occasions, one sees the same dialogue  
4 reproduced in more than one place with slightly  
5 different timings. We know, of course, that this  
6 message couldn't have been sent at 09.44, because the  
7 bomb exploded a few minutes after that. With that  
8 proviso, can we look and see? We see the entry:  
9 "Caller: active message Hotel Mike 82."  
10 Whose call sign was that?

11 A. I believe that's Mr Sims.

12 Q. That's Mr Sims' call sign. We see the controller, as it  
13 were, asking him to wait, is that right:  
14 "Hotel Mike unit just stand by with your active  
15 message, there's another active message taking place."  
16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. Then at the end of that passage, the end of that little  
18 entry, two or three lines down, the controller says:  
19 "Hotel Mike unit with the active message.  
20 Hotel Mike unit with the active message go now."  
21 Is that the controller saying "I'm now ready to hear  
22 your message"?  
23 Then we see underneath that the caller:  
24 "BX BX ..."  
25 What does that mean?

1 A. BX is the control room. When you're calling in for them  
2 and they say "BX", that's their call sign.

3 Q. So it's an indication from Mr Sims that that's who he's  
4 talking to?

5 A. That's right, yes.

6 Q. "... there's been an explosion on a bus at street level,  
7 Tavistock Square, WC1, we've seen the explosion, we are  
8 almost there, over."

9 Do you remember him making that call?

10 A. Yes, I do.

11 Q. Did you instruct him to or was it something he simply  
12 did instinctively?

13 A. No, he did it instinctively.

14 Q. We then see the controller asking what the location is.  
15 Then if we can go over to the next page, please [INQ169-70], we see  
16 the caller say:  
17 "Tavistock Place, wrong, Tavistock Square.  
18 Tavistock Square, it's a double decker bus, stand by for  
19 an update, over."

20 You remember him repeating that as well?

21 A. Yes, I do.

22 Q. Was that the first call, the immediate call, that  
23 Mr Sims made when you had seen this?

24 A. Yes, it was.

25 Q. What were you doing at that time? Did you immediately

1 get out of the car, or did you drive closer to where the  
2 bus was?

3 A. When that call was put up, the car naturally came to  
4 a halt when you've seen the explosion happening, and  
5 Neville Lazenby, from the back of the car, shouted,  
6 "Let's get up there", and Gary immediately put the car  
7 in gear again and shot off to get to the bus.

8 Q. I see. So perhaps he did that almost as he was relaying  
9 this message?

10 A. Yes, yes, he did.

11 Q. He plainly couldn't have driven very far. Did he drive  
12 past the bus or up to the bus?

13 A. There was a number of vehicles blocking our route. In  
14 particular, I remember some white vans and there was  
15 lots of debris, and we -- he drove another 20 yards or  
16 so and was about 20 yards from the scene when he stopped  
17 the vehicle and brought it to rest.

18 Q. You then all three got out, did you?

19 A. We then opened the door and ran out towards the bus.

20 Q. We now have you, then, arriving at the scene of the  
21 explosion. From what you say you must have arrived  
22 there within seconds --

23 A. Seconds.

24 Q. -- or no more than a minute or so of the explosion  
25 taking place?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. What did you consider your role and function to be at  
3 that point?

4 A. The only function I had in my head at that stage was to  
5 save life. That was my overriding concern at that  
6 stage.

7 Q. We've heard a fair amount of evidence about emergency  
8 protocols and so on and we've heard reference to the  
9 phrase "Silver Commander" meaning the person who takes  
10 control at the scene and delegates tasks to other  
11 people.

12 Was it going through your mind that you should adopt  
13 that sort of role or was it something much more  
14 practical going on at the time?

15 A. It was going through my mind that I had that role. That  
16 was my role. I was the senior officer there, and that  
17 was my initial considerations, to save life, but to do  
18 it in a manner that's -- that I should be doing it in,  
19 ie taking control.

20 Q. You talk about your concern being to save life. What  
21 were your concerns about what might threaten life at  
22 that point?

23 A. I had in my mind that there may have been the  
24 consideration of a secondary device, either on the bus  
25 or at the scene, and that certainly would have risked

1 life.

2 Q. What were you aiming to do to reduce or remove any  
3 threat from a secondary device?

4 A. My main concern was to get people away from that scene  
5 behind hard cover, in case a secondary device went up.

6 Q. The people at the scene being the people on the bus and  
7 the people around it?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. I think it's right to say that you actually got on board  
10 the bus.

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. Immediately or after a period of time?

13 A. I ran up and immediately went into the bus, yes.

14 Q. Which door did you use to get on to the bus?

15 A. I used the double side doors to the nearside of the bus  
16 to enter the bus and go up the stairs.

17 Q. To do that, you must have run past the first set of  
18 doors opposite the driver's cabin?

19 A. From what I can remember at the time, I didn't enter the  
20 first set of doors because they were damaged, or I felt  
21 they were damaged, and I couldn't get in.

22 Q. Do you recall if the doors that you did use, were they  
23 already open?

24 A. They were already open, yes.

25 Q. Were there people exiting the bus through them at the

1 time you arrived?

2 A. There was nobody exiting the bus when I arrived.

3 Q. Why was that? Was it because the people who were able  
4 to get off had already got off or they were all still  
5 inside?

6 A. I'm assuming now that some people had already got off  
7 the bus at that stage.

8 Q. What did you see when you went in through those doors?

9 A. I wasn't aware of anything or anyone on the bottom deck  
10 of the bus. I wasn't aware of anybody in that immediate  
11 scene. I went to walk up the stairs --

12 Q. Just pause there. As far as the lower deck was  
13 concerned, then, you didn't see anyone at all?

14 A. No.

15 Q. No doubt you couldn't see the whole of the lower deck  
16 set out with an absence of persons. We've heard  
17 evidence already that there was a tremendous amount of  
18 destruction, wreckage, at that scene. Did you see any  
19 dead bodies or any sign of anyone else there?

20 A. Not inside the bus on the bottom deck, no, I didn't,  
21 I didn't notice anybody.

22 Q. How long did you stay on the bottom deck before you went  
23 to the stairs?

24 A. I immediately went up the stairs.

25 Q. What did you see on the top deck?

1 A. As soon as I went to walk up the stairs, there was  
2 people coming off the top deck of the bus and I assisted  
3 two ladies down and out into the street from the top of  
4 the bus at that stage.

5 Q. Did you see them when you got up on to the top deck or  
6 did you meet them on the stairs as you were going up and  
7 they were coming down?

8 A. I met the two ladies on the stairs on my way up.

9 Q. So you would then have turned round and escorted them  
10 out of the bus --

11 A. That's right.

12 Q. -- without having gone up to the top deck yourself at  
13 that point?

14 A. Yes, that's correct.

15 Q. Did you then go back and go back to the stairs and go up  
16 on to the top deck?

17 A. At that stage, when I assisted the two ladies, I just  
18 looked up, up the stairs, and in the front section where  
19 there were still some seats, there was nobody else in  
20 that section, so I then went back out of the bus to get  
21 a better view of what was going on.

22 Q. I see. What did you see when you went back out of the  
23 bus at that point?

24 A. When I went back out of the bus, I went to the nearside  
25 of the bus and noticed that there was a lot of injured

1 people still on the pavement and the road. There was  
2 body parts and suchlike, and I noticed the top deck of  
3 the bus from the back three-quarters section was almost  
4 removed, seats removed, and the bus seemed to be  
5 compressed down to my height, which is 6' 1", was  
6 compressed down, and there was a number of people on  
7 that top deck of the bus trapped.

8 Q. I want to ask you about the casualties that you saw in  
9 a moment, but, before I do, I take it that your concern  
10 about secondary explosions and the danger of that was  
11 still present at this time?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. Had it been increased by anything that you saw on the  
14 bus when you had gone on at that moment?

15 A. There was a period after that that did increase my  
16 awareness of a secondary -- the possibility of  
17 a secondary device, which was a microwave.

18 Q. Yes, the microwave oven. Was that something that you  
19 saw when you first went on to the bus or was it  
20 something that you became aware of later?

21 A. It was something I became aware of later.

22 Q. Well then, we'll return to it in due course. Were you  
23 doing anything at this point about secondary explosions;  
24 for example, trying to contact or obtain sniffer dogs or  
25 anything of that nature?

1 A. At that point in time, I was purely assessing what I had  
2 because I hadn't seen the full picture. I'd been in the  
3 bus and then I've come out and I've walked round the bus  
4 and around the bus to see what I'm actually dealing  
5 with, how many dead, how many dying, and suchlike.

6 Q. So you were still in that preliminary stage of trying to  
7 understand what the scene contained and what your  
8 priorities should be?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. I wonder, then, if we could call up another plan. It's  
11 [BTP412-2]. This, Inspector, is a rough sketch plan that  
12 you drew -- it's exhibited to your statement, so you  
13 drew it fairly shortly after the events in question.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. We can just see -- we see the bus no doubt facing down  
16 the page, that's the arrow at the front of the bus, and  
17 you've marked -- we can see you've marked the side doors  
18 there. One of the casualties that you describe in your  
19 witness statement was a lady whom you identify as at  
20 position 2 to the rear of the bus. Do you recall that  
21 casualty?

22 A. Yes, yes.

23 Q. I think you describe her in your witness statement as  
24 being a white lady who's missing her right foot.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. What more do you remember about her?  
2 A. I remember that person sitting on the ground and  
3 somebody assisting that person.  
4 Q. Was she sitting or lying, or do you not recall?  
5 A. From what I can remember, she was sitting down, sitting  
6 up.  
7 Q. She was a white lady?  
8 A. Yes.  
9 Q. Do you remember the colour of her hair?  
10 A. No, I'm afraid not.  
11 Q. What she was wearing?  
12 A. No.  
13 Q. Her age?  
14 A. No, sorry.  
15 Q. You said in your witness statement that she was  
16 approximately 30 or 40 years' old.  
17 A. Yes.  
18 Q. From what you've said, I think it's clear that you  
19 thought that she was alive at that point.  
20 A. Yes, that's correct.  
21 Q. You say that you saw someone assisting her, treating  
22 her?  
23 A. There was somebody kneeling down assisting her at that  
24 stage.  
25 Q. Did you see whether that person was a gentleman or

1 a lady?

2 A. I think, from memory, it was a gentleman was assisting  
3 her.

4 Q. I've mentioned the injury that you thought this casualty  
5 had to her foot. Do you remember anything else about  
6 her condition or her injuries?

7 A. No, I don't.

8 Q. Moving on, you mention another casualty close to this  
9 lady which you've marked with a number 3. What do you  
10 remember about that casualty?

11 A. I remember that person had no legs or no arms and was  
12 lying face down on the road and the clothing was removed  
13 in the blast.

14 Q. We believe there was a gentleman lying in approximately  
15 that position. He had sustained extremely serious  
16 injuries to his legs, but he did still have his arms.  
17 Is it possible that you were confused about that?

18 A. It's possible. It was a quick snapshot at the time and  
19 you try to assess what was -- you do your best to assess  
20 it, but it was difficult to keep it all in your head.

21 Q. Of course. Were you able to form a view as to whether  
22 this man was alive or dead?

23 A. I believe that man was dead.

24 Q. Did you see anyone assisting or treating him?

25 A. No, I didn't.

1 Q. I should have asked you before, were you able to form  
2 a view as to whether he was a white man or coloured, or  
3 perhaps not, if he was facing down?

4 A. He seemed to be a white man. However, with all the  
5 casualties, it was quite difficult, as a lot of them  
6 were sort of covered in dirt, debris and very -- and  
7 dirty looking, so it was quite difficult sometimes to  
8 see.

9 Q. One particular matter that you mention in your statement  
10 which may help identifying this man, you say that his  
11 clothes had been removed. In particular, his trousers  
12 and undergarments had been removed.

13 A. That's correct, yes.

14 Q. Moving on again, you describe a third casualty, seeing  
15 him still on the bus, an Oriental male, as you describe  
16 him, with his head sort of hanging out of the side of  
17 the bus.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. What do you recall about that casualty?

20 A. That casualty was on the nearside of the bus and was  
21 badly trapped with the debris and other bodies lying  
22 round him and I remember he had short, black, cropped  
23 hair and he was still alive, because he was groaning and  
24 he was bleeding profusely from the head and neck area.

25 Q. How much of his body was visible? You obviously were

1 able to see his head. Were you able to see very much  
2 more of his body at all?  
3 A. No, sir, I wasn't.  
4 Q. Was there anyone tending to him or assisting him?  
5 A. Yes, at one stage there was a gentleman who had appeared  
6 on the scene, I don't know if he was a doctor or  
7 a member of the public, and he was assisting that  
8 Oriental male by holding his head up at that level.  
9 Q. Some of the evidence suggests that, in fact, you asked  
10 that gentleman to assist who we believe to be Sam Ly by  
11 holding his head. Is that right or --  
12 A. I didn't ask directly the gentleman to do it, but I was  
13 very pleased to see him doing it when I've seen it.  
14 Q. Could we just look, please, back at photograph  
15 INQ10345-1 [not for publication]?  
16 If we could zoom in on the nearside of the bus,  
17 I think we see there -- do you see, Inspector -- a man  
18 wearing a sort of beige coat?  
19 A. Yes, that's right.  
20 Q. First of all, is that roughly the position where Sam Ly  
21 was?  
22 A. Absolutely.  
23 Q. Do you think this might have been the man holding his  
24 head?  
25 A. That's very much like the man who was there.

1 Q. I think from the evidence it seems that he was there for  
2 some time?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 There was another person on the bus close to this  
6 casualty, just behind him, I think, someone you describe  
7 in your witness statement as being a black female. Do  
8 you recall that casualty?

9 A. Yes, I do.

10 Q. We think that that casualty was probably a lady called  
11 Shyanu Parathasangary, who was, in fact, of Sri Lankan  
12 descent.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Would that be consistent with your memory?

15 A. I remember that casualty was light-skinned -- a fairly  
16 light-skinned black female and I do remember her.

17 Q. What do you remember of her?

18 A. When I first seen her on top of the bus, on the  
19 wreckage, my instant thought was that she was dead.

20 Q. Just pausing there, you said, first of all, when you  
21 first saw her. How shortly after arriving did you see  
22 her?

23 A. When I entered the bus and came back out with the two  
24 ladies, as I said I went round the side of the bus and  
25 assessed and, at that stage, I've seen --

1 Q. It was at that point that you saw her?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. It wasn't as though you saw her when you were on the  
4 bus?

5 A. No.

6 Q. You saw her when you were on the pavement. You said you  
7 saw her at the top of the bus. What did you mean by  
8 that?

9 A. It was in that compressed area where the bus had  
10 collapsed down to my height, that's where I saw that  
11 lady.

12 Q. I see. All the evidence so far has been that she was  
13 sitting on the lower deck. You wouldn't quibble with  
14 that?

15 A. From my view, what makes me -- well, made me thought it  
16 was on the top deck was that it was at 6-foot, it was at  
17 my height, that the lady was and that all that  
18 particular rubble was. Now, it could have been the top  
19 deck or the bottom deck, depending on which way the  
20 rubble fell.

21 Q. It was in that part of the bus where, in effect, the top  
22 deck and the bottom deck had almost become one?

23 A. Absolutely, yes.

24 Q. No doubt it would be very difficult for you to see from  
25 there --

1 A. At that stage, I wouldn't --

2 Q. -- which deck was which?

3 Were you able to form a view as to whether she was

4 alive or not when you saw her?

5 A. I believed she was dead when I saw her.

6 Q. Why did you think that?

7 A. The lady was lying on her back. She had her head -- she

8 had her head back. The only way I can describe it is,

9 when somebody's doing CPR, when they put your chin up,

10 she was in that sort of position. She had her mouth

11 open and I believe her eyes were shut and she looked

12 lifeless.

13 Q. You said her eyes were shut. I think in your statement

14 you said her eyes were open. This may not matter very

15 much.

16 A. Yes, I mean, she was lifeless. Whatever way her eyes

17 were, she was actually lifeless, and it was quite

18 obvious by looking that that was the case.

19 Q. Did you simply have a passing look at her or did you

20 spend some time actually focusing on her and trying to

21 form a view as to whether she was still alive?

22 A. No, it was at that stage, it was the assessment stage

23 and I was trying to assess what I actually had, and that

24 was part of that assessment, to see what I could see on

25 the top of the bus.

1 Q. The view you formed that, at that point, she had sadly  
2 died, was that something you were confident about?

3 A. As confident as I could have been with my experience and  
4 my sort of training.

5 Q. Yes, thank you.

6 I've asked you about two particular casualties who  
7 were on the bus. Were you aware of any other  
8 casualties, alive or dead, still perhaps inside the  
9 wreckage of the bus?

10 A. Yes, at one stage, we became aware of a gentleman on the  
11 top of the bus and he was on the top offside of the bus  
12 which was facing the road rather than the pavement, and  
13 I could describe him as sort of an olive-skinned  
14 gentleman with longish, black hair and I think  
15 I described him of a -- he was actually, at one stage,  
16 shouting on top of the bus.

17 Q. Clearly still alive. Do you know what happened to him?  
18 Was he rescued?

19 A. He was rescued later on when the Fire Brigade and the  
20 ambulance people arrived.

21 Q. You describe in your statement being aware. I think, as  
22 you were doing this initial survey of the scene, you  
23 were aware that doctors were coming out of the BMA  
24 building and starting to assist with the casualties.

25 A. That's correct.

1 Q. Did you take any part in directing them who to treat or  
2 were you simply aware that they were taking their own  
3 course?

4 A. They were pretty much taking their own action and  
5 initiative on that, but I was speaking to them every now  
6 and again to see what was happening.

7 Q. So you've gone on to the bus --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- you've walked down the nearside of the bus, looked in  
10 the street behind. All part of your survey of the scene  
11 to form an assessment of what the position was.

12 Did you do any more as part of that process or were  
13 you, at that point, able to pass a message back to your  
14 Control and give an indication of what the scene was?

15 A. At that stage, I think before I passed the message,  
16 there was another traffic warden had approached me and  
17 told me about a torso in the park as well, but, yes,  
18 that was about the -- that initial assessment, to get  
19 a clear view of what I was dealing with, and then  
20 I gave, I think, a message to the control room.

21 Q. Yes. Let's look, if we can, at [BTP152-33]. I think, as  
22 you've already said this morning, you're Alpha Tango 2?

23 A. That's correct, yes.

24 Q. That's a call sign one keeps for one's whole career, is  
25 it?

1 A. No, we keep changing.

2 Q. It keeps changing, but it hasn't changed recently. We  
3 see then now the time, which, as I said before, isn't  
4 reliable, but the time at 09.53, in any event, was this  
5 call made some minutes after you arrived?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. After you'd conducted the survey that you've just been  
8 describing?

9 A. After I'd assessed the scene, yes.

10 Q. So you call Control and Control tells you to go ahead:

11 "Apologies, I can't get on 84."

12 That's another radio channel, is it?

13 A. I think that was the specific channel that the control  
14 room had put in place to deal with that particular  
15 scene.

16 Q. Then your message is:

17 "I'm at Tavistock Square with the bus. We're going  
18 to try to move these cordons back. People are still  
19 right near the bus and we're not sure about a secondary  
20 device."

21 That's your concern about the secondary device?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. What was the problem in moving the cordons back, as you  
24 described it there?

25 A. The initial problem was that there was quite a bit of

1 vehicles and debris around, there was injured people to  
2 move back and obviously the people on the bus. So  
3 although it was a small scene, it was quite a difficult  
4 scene to manage.

5 Q. Yes, and one of the things that one needs, in order to  
6 create cordons, presumably, in particular large cordons,  
7 is officers, is manpower, to man the cordons and stop  
8 people coming towards the scene?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Were there -- let's move on. You describe that you're  
11 going to try to get people off the bus and move them  
12 back. You're asked then:

13 "Do you have a sit rep?", a situation report, that  
14 is?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. You respond by saying:

17 "[It] looks like multiple dead, don't know how many  
18 yet, multiple wounded. I have enough officers on  
19 scene."

20 It's not a typo for "I have not enough officers",  
21 you're saying you have enough officers?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. That may seem slightly surprising this soon after events  
24 and when, as you've said, in order to create cordons,  
25 you needed manpower. Were there a lot of police

1 officers on the scene by this point?

2 A. There was a number of police officers on the scene and  
3 I think my thoughts there were that, as I said, it was  
4 a small scene and I had enough police officers to deal  
5 with that initial scene at the moment until it was  
6 ballooned out or bubbled out to bigger.

7 Q. You had yourself, Mr Lazenby and Mr Sims.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Were those the only police officers you had in mind when  
10 you said you have enough police officers?

11 A. I believe there was a couple of Metropolitan Police  
12 officers on the scene as well quite quickly.

13 Q. We'll hear evidence from a number of Metropolitan Police  
14 officers who came down from the cordons on the  
15 Euston Road. So there were more than just the three of  
16 you that you had in mind when you said that you had  
17 enough?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Still, presumably sending a message like that would, as  
20 it were, warn off your control room and they would then  
21 think "We don't need to send any more officers to  
22 Tavistock Square". Was that really the message you  
23 meant to convey?

24 A. Yes, I mean, at that -- yes, absolutely, at that point  
25 in time, it was, to my mind, I had enough police

1 officers on the scene to deal with that initial scene  
2 but I needed Fire Brigade and ambulance instead.

3 Q. What was in your mind about whether this would be  
4 a scene that, in the medium-term, would be taken by the  
5 British Transport Police as opposed to the  
6 Metropolitan Police? Was there -- were you expecting  
7 that the British Transport Police would remain  
8 principally in command of this scene or not?

9 A. No, sir, it was -- that particular scene was the only  
10 scene that was -- that was certainly Metropolitan Police  
11 jurisdiction and, as I say, it was only because we  
12 happened on the scene that we actually took control of  
13 it initially.

14 Q. So would it be fair to say that it was already in your  
15 mind at this point that, within the fairly near future,  
16 the Metropolitan Police would be taking control of what  
17 was going on there?

18 A. That's absolutely right, yes.

19 Q. You say that:

20 "There are some people still trapped in the bus,  
21 which we're attending to."

22 You mentioned one man who you were aware of, but  
23 there you're talking about several people?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. How were you aware of those other people?

1 A. From my initial assessment at the nearside of the bus  
2 I could see in quite well into the bus and there was  
3 a number of people on the bus. Apart from the Oriental  
4 male and apart from the black lady who we mentioned,  
5 there was another set of legs sticking out from the bus  
6 as well, but those people seemed to be quite heavily  
7 trapped on the bus.

8 Q. You mention a set of legs, Inspector. Do you recall  
9 what clothing the legs were clothed in at all?

10 A. I'm sorry, I can't.

11 Q. You simply then, on this message, return to the question  
12 of cordons and say that you are going to push them back  
13 as far as you can and indicate that there is a cordon in  
14 place, it's just not big enough.

15 You've described what you did, having arrived. What  
16 were Mr Lazenby and Mr Sims doing? Did they get on to  
17 the bus with you?

18 A. No, they didn't. Mr Sims and Mr Lazenby took their own  
19 initiatives at the scene and were assisting people away  
20 from the scene, and certainly I remember Mr Lazenby --  
21 the two ladies that I took off the bus, he assisted on  
22 down the street and directed them on, as their hearing  
23 seemed to be affected by what had happened.

24 Q. Was there a concern that the bus engine was still  
25 running at this time?

1 A. Yes, there was a concern around that, and Mr Lazenby  
2 certainly tried fairly frantically to look for an engine  
3 cutoff switch, but we couldn't manage to find one on the  
4 bus.

5 Q. Did you assist him looking?

6 A. Yes, I went round and looked with him.

7 Q. But you simply didn't find one?

8 A. No.

9 Q. So the engine stayed running during the period we're  
10 talking about?

11 A. I believe so.

12 Q. We mentioned earlier a concern that arose about the box  
13 with the microwave oven inside it, or at least with the  
14 picture of a microwave oven on the outside of it.

15 Was it at around this time -- in other words, after  
16 you had completed your survey of the scene and sent that  
17 initial situation report -- that the concern over the  
18 microwave box emerged?

19 A. Yes, it was shortly after that time that that issue  
20 emerged.

21 Q. How was it brought to your attention that that might be  
22 a concern?

23 A. A member of the public raised a concern with me about  
24 the item in question.

25 Q. What did they say, that they'd seen the box and they

1 were worried?

2 A. Absolutely. They said they'd seen a box, they were  
3 unhappy with it, and that I should look at it.

4 Q. There's some evidence -- I think it's Mr Sims -- who  
5 recalls that concern being held, not by a member of the  
6 public, but by a constable. It may, of course, have  
7 been that more than one person was concerned about it.

8 A. That's correct, yes, which is often the case.

9 Q. So do you have a memory of someone else being concerned  
10 about it as well, a police constable?

11 A. I remember just -- I just remember the public, I think,  
12 at that stage, raising that concern.

13 Q. I see. Now, did that mean anything to you when -- did  
14 you remember seeing the box when you'd been on the bus,  
15 or did you want to go and look and see if you could see  
16 it for yourself?

17 A. I didn't initially see the box on the scene because  
18 I was more concerned with getting people off the bus  
19 than sort of looking out for items, but when I got that  
20 message, I returned to where the box was and looked at  
21 it myself.

22 Q. Perhaps we could just look at a plan on the screen.  
23 Could we look at [INQ10285-7], please.

24 Inspector, here's a plan of the lower deck of the  
25 bus. We've heard other evidence that this box

1 containing a microwave oven -- which, in fact, had been  
2 brought on to the bus by a lady called Gladys Wundowa --  
3 had been placed, when she brought it on, in the luggage  
4 rack. Perhaps you know where that is, it's on the top  
5 of this diagram next to the seats.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Was it still there after this explosion or had it been  
8 moved by the force of the explosion into a different  
9 position?

10 A. The box was there and I believed at the time that it was  
11 the two seats facing that way, but it was obviously the  
12 luggage rack.

13 Q. I'm sorry, could you just repeat that?

14 A. Yes, I believed at the time that it was actually two  
15 seats it was on in that area, but it's obviously the  
16 luggage rack by looking at that.

17 Q. I see, so it was still in the luggage rack?

18 A. It was in that area, yes.

19 Q. Did you go back on to the bus to look at it or did you  
20 simply look at it from a distance?

21 A. No, I didn't go back on to the bus.

22 Q. But you saw it through the windows presumably?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. What was your reaction to seeing it?

25 A. I didn't -- I wasn't comfortable with that item on the

1 bus, I was quite -- bearing in mind my initial concerns  
2 about secondary devices, it gave me a more heightened  
3 sense that it possibly might be something that I need to  
4 deal with.

5 Q. What did you do to deal with it?

6 A. There was two ex-employee search dogs on the scene for  
7 the Metropolitan Police and I ushered them over and  
8 briefed them as to what I wanted done, simply to clear  
9 the bus and that particular box.

10 Q. As you say, they'd been on the scene. That's why  
11 I asked you earlier whether you'd called for them in any  
12 way?

13 A. No, I didn't call for them, they were on the scene.

14 Q. They simply appeared, did they?

15 A. Absolutely, yes.

16 Q. Did you ever find out if they'd been summoned or whether  
17 they simply arrived by good chance?

18 A. I never found out.

19 Q. But they, in any event, swept the bus, did they, with  
20 the sniffer dogs to --

21 A. They swept the bus with the two dogs and then I asked  
22 them to sweep the cordons.

23 Q. The cordons?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. How long did that process take?

1 A. Not very long, a matter of minutes, I guess.

2 Q. The result was negative, they indicated that they hadn't  
3 found any trace of any further explosives?

4 A. Yes, they came back to me later and reported that it  
5 seemed okay.

6 Q. Did that then remove your concern about secondary  
7 devices or is it that the sniffer dogs provide a certain  
8 level of comfort but don't entirely remove the concern?

9 A. The sniffer dogs do provide a certain level of comfort,  
10 yes, but it's not a foregone conclusion that things are  
11 as they should be. They do provide that sort of bit of  
12 reassurance that, you know, you've done what you could  
13 to ensure against that.

14 Q. Yes. Could we look at one more document, please,  
15 BTP152-40? That doesn't seem to be the right ... I'm  
16 grateful to Mr Gibbs. Could we try [BTP153-40]? Yes,  
17 thank you.

18 Here, Inspector, is another call that you made a few  
19 minutes later, timed at 10.00 possibly a minute or so  
20 after that. You say:

21 "I've just had at Tavistock on the bus, I've just  
22 had EXPO round with dogs ..."

23 That's the sniffer dogs, is it?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. " ... to check the bus out because there was a box we

1 weren't sure about. It seems to be clear, we've just  
2 got to move everybody back now, move people out of the  
3 way."

4 Does that illustrate, on the one hand, a level of  
5 comfort provided by the sniffer dogs but still needing  
6 to have cordons because one couldn't be absolutely sure  
7 that there was no risk?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Thank you. At some point during -- the message  
10 you've -- we've just seen, it's timed at 10.00, possibly  
11 a few minutes later, so you'd been on the scene by this  
12 stage for something like quarter of an hour or a little  
13 bit longer than that. At some point during this  
14 activity, Mr Sims and Mr Lazenby left the bus. Tell us  
15 what happened there.

16 A. Mr Lazenby, because of the communication issues around  
17 getting messages out on the radio, and it was quite busy  
18 anyway, the mobile phone network was shut down, and he  
19 took initiative and said "I'm going to run round to  
20 Force Headquarters and get the message about this bus  
21 out".

22 Q. Just pause there. Force Headquarters being the  
23 headquarters of the British Transport Police?

24 A. The headquarters of the British Transport Police, which  
25 was approximately, you know, 5 minutes round the corner

1 from this incident.

2 Q. It's in Tavistock Place?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. So we don't need to get the photo up, but thinking back  
5 to that photo showing the junction where you had reached  
6 on your way to the bus, if you turned right there, would  
7 one get to the road up there?

8 A. If you followed the bus and turn left, that would bring  
9 you into Tavistock, yes, exactly across.

10 Q. So approaching it from the other direction?

11 A. Yes, absolutely yes, turn right, yes.

12 Q. It's up that road, a distance of a few hundred metres,  
13 no more?

14 A. That's it.

15 Q. So you decided that they should -- that, in fact, both  
16 Mr Sims and Mr Lazenby should go there?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. For different reasons, I think.

19 A. Yes. I mean, there are a couple of reasons. One was to  
20 get the message across and the other was to get supplies  
21 or any sort of emergency supplies we might need on the  
22 scene. So Neville took that initiative, yes.

23 Q. Yes. We'll hear from them more about that. At around  
24 this time, I think it's also right to say that  
25 a Metropolitan Police inspector, a motorcycle officer,

1 arrived, a man called Inspector Perry, who we'll hear  
2 evidence from later today.  
3 A. That's correct.  
4 Q. Do you remember him arriving?  
5 A. I do.  
6 Q. I asked you some time ago about your function as the  
7 Silver Commander at the scene, that being the role that  
8 you assumed when you arrived. Is it right to say that,  
9 when Mr Perry arrived, he took over that function from  
10 you?  
11 A. That's correct.  
12 Q. You were the same rank, of course.  
13 A. Yes, that's right.  
14 Q. Was it because he was from the Metropolitan Police and  
15 this was inevitably going to become  
16 a Metropolitan Police scene that he took over in the way  
17 he did?  
18 A. Yes, I mean, that's right. We were dealing with it from  
19 our control room, which was British Transport Police.  
20 He had a Metropolitan Police radio and was able to  
21 assume that role via his control.  
22 Q. Yes. Could we look, perhaps, at one more document,  
23 please -- almost finished -- [BTP154-74]? So here we have  
24 a call timed at 10.22, so some time later.  
25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Do we take it, then, that when Inspector Perry arrived  
2 and took over the role of Silver Commander, you didn't  
3 leave, you stayed there for some time?

4 A. I stayed there for some time after, yes.

5 Q. Half an hour?

6 A. Probably less than that, I would imagine.

7 Q. In any event, you were still there at around 10.22 when  
8 this message was sent:

9 "Just a quick sit rep from Tavistock Square. Most  
10 of the people have been removed off the bus. The dead  
11 and dying have been removed into [that's presumably the  
12 British Medical Association] building."

13 You then say this:

14 "There's a briefcase on the bus which EXPO are going  
15 to check out and then the scene should be fairly clear."

16 This is something different from the microwave oven,  
17 is it?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. What do you remember about the briefcase?

20 A. I believe when the gentleman I referred to earlier with  
21 the olive skin and the dark hair was removed off the bus  
22 there was a black briefcase or attache case on the top  
23 of the bus which was a concern, again, in a similar  
24 fashion to the microwave oven.

25 Q. Would that not already have been checked by the sniffer

1 dogs when they went on earlier, or could you not be sure  
2 of that?

3 A. The dogs wouldn't have gone up to the top deck, because  
4 it was a mangled wreckage and it would have been very  
5 dangerous to go up there and run the dogs round it, so  
6 they would have cleared the bus from the ground level,  
7 I believe.

8 Q. I see. Now, it may be that we can ask others about  
9 this, but when you say that EXPO are going to check it  
10 out, do you know what happened? Did they, in fact, try  
11 to get the sniffer dogs to check that briefcase out or  
12 was a different means of securing that danger adopted?

13 A. Before I left the scene, myself and another BTP  
14 colleague had a brief conversation with an explosives  
15 officer from the Metropolitan Police and my colleague  
16 was -- had some expertise in BTP in dealing with sort of  
17 suspicious items, and we had a quick conversation and,  
18 from what I've been told, there was a controlled  
19 explosion on that item after I'd left the scene.

20 Q. We'll hear a little more about that in due course, but  
21 your understanding before you left was that that was  
22 something that was being considered to deal with this  
23 second issue?

24 A. Yes, it was.

25 Q. The briefcase.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Do I understand it, then, that shortly after you sent  
3 this message, you left the scene?

4 A. Shortly afterwards, yes.

5 Q. I think you went to Force Headquarters, the building  
6 just round the corner, yourself, at that point.

7 A. Yes, that's right.

8 Q. Did you go back to the scene at any stage after that,  
9 Inspector?

10 A. I didn't go back to the scene, no.

11 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Thank you, Inspector. Those are all  
12 the questions I have for you. There may be some other  
13 questions from my colleagues.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

15 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

16 MS GALLAGHER: Inspector, you've just been answering  
17 questions regarding the black case and concern about  
18 secondary devices. There's a reference in your notes  
19 which were made on the day, I believe -- the reference  
20 is [BTP67-12], if we have that available. If you could  
21 just turn it on its side, it's at the bottom, it's two  
22 lines up from the bottom. This is your handwriting,  
23 I think.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. There's a note saying:

1 "Black attache case under a body. Met EXPO not  
2 happy."

3 Then, on the right, there there's a reference to:  
4 "How could we check it, radar equipment" and so on?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Can I ask you about an entry underneath that, it says:  
7 "Concern for vehicles near [the] bus."

8 Was that a reference to there being a concern  
9 regarding secondary devices outside the bus, potentially  
10 in vehicles, or the vehicles being at risk?

11 A. I think it was concern with the vehicles being at risk.  
12 There was a number of emergency vehicles had pulled up  
13 right outside the bus.

14 Q. So that was, presumably, part of your same conversation  
15 with Met EXPO about secondary devices?

16 A. Yes, it was.

17 Q. Thank you. The one other matter which I just want to  
18 ask you about, Inspector, relates to the communications  
19 problems which you were describing a little earlier.  
20 You've described how Neville Lazenby took the initiative  
21 by running to Force Headquarters when communications  
22 were difficult. You've described those communication  
23 difficulties in both of your witness statements, the one  
24 that you gave on the day, on 7 July 2005, and also your  
25 second statement a few weeks later on 5 August 2005.

1 You've also described those problems in your notes. If  
2 we could go to that same document, [BTP67-8], please, and  
3 just turn it on its side. Halfway down, there's a note  
4 saying:

5 "Radio would not work. Met Neville [that's  
6 Neville Lazenby, presumably]. He couldn't fix my radio.  
7 He needed supplies, failed. Needed help."  
8 Then you refer to the engine of the bus still  
9 running.

10 Now, according to your notes and also your  
11 statement, we can see that this is before the Met EXPO  
12 dogs have arrived, before LAS and the London Fire  
13 Brigade have arrived, and before the motorcycle officer  
14 from the Met has arrived. So at that stage, who was  
15 actually on scene?

16 A. In terms of police?

17 Q. Yes.

18 A. There was obviously my two officers, Neville and  
19 Gary Sims, and there was another couple of officers,  
20 I believe, from the Metropolitan Police wearing high-vis  
21 or sort of half blues.

22 Q. So there weren't just the three of you, there was  
23 probably about five of you, I think?

24 A. I believe so, yes.

25 Q. I'm asking you because, in your first statement, when

1 you describe your thought process when Neville Lazenby  
2 offers to take the initiative and run to get supplies  
3 and to deal with the communications problems, you say  
4 this, you say:

5 "I said to PS Sims and Lazenby to go, as members of  
6 the public were assisting at the scene."

7 So it sounds from that as if you considered it was  
8 reasonable for them to leave, but only because of the  
9 assistance you were getting from members of the public,  
10 rather than assistance you had from other emergency  
11 services at the time. It sounds as if you were quite  
12 undermanned at that stage, but it was the public who  
13 were filling the gap, and that's what allowed you to say  
14 to PS Sims and Lazenby that they could go. Is that  
15 right?

16 A. The public -- I must say the public and the people from  
17 the British Medical Association building were excellent  
18 and they did certainly get in there and get stuck in and  
19 assist in any way they could, yes, so it was reassuring  
20 to see that happening.

21 Q. There's just one other matter which is also related. In  
22 both of your statements you refer to a conversation that  
23 you had with the police inspector motorcyclist. In your  
24 first statement given on the day, you say he swore at  
25 you for using your radio on the scene, and then, in your

1 second statement, you've described it in rather  
2 different terms. You say:  
3 "He approached me and I briefed him" and you make no  
4 reference to that.

5 But we know from your notebook, if we could go again  
6 to that -- it's [BTP67-11], please, just below the  
7 number 9 -- it looks as though you were told to stop  
8 using your f\*\*\*ing radio around the bus. Is that  
9 accurate?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. You then have a discussion about whether the bus has  
12 been checked, whether it's appropriate for you to use  
13 your radio. Do you recall that conversation?

14 A. Yes, I do.

15 Q. Can you tell us anything further about it beyond what it  
16 says in your note there?

17 A. I remember I had my back facing the police officer when  
18 he turned up, the Met inspector, and there was  
19 certainly -- he did swear at me and shout at me for  
20 using the radio at the scene, as protocol would suggest  
21 that you don't use a police radio within 15 metres of  
22 a scene, potential scene.

23 MS GALLAGHER: I've nothing further, Inspector, thank you  
24 very much.

25 A. Thank you.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?

2 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

3 MR SAUNDERS: Inspector Dermody, I only want to ask you  
4 about two matters, please. First of all, in the  
5 statements that you've made, you describe seeing those  
6 who were still on the bus and trapped believing they  
7 were on the upper deck.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. I think you described to Mr O'Connor when you were being  
10 asked that, because the rear of the upper deck had come  
11 down to about 6' 1", it wasn't easy to work out whether  
12 somebody was on the upper deck that had come down or the  
13 upper deck was, as it were, trapping the lower deck.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. I represent the family of Shyanu Parathasangary, who is  
16 the lady that you described as number 6. As I think  
17 Mr O'Connor has said, there's no doubt that she was on  
18 the lower deck. At the time that you assist the two  
19 ladies off the stairs, you've gone to the stairs, there  
20 are two ladies coming down, you've taken them off, and  
21 then you go alongside the nearside of the bus?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. May I just read to you the passage from your second  
24 statement -- the one dated 5 August, my Lady, page 3,  
25 halfway down, just after the officer has helpfully set

1 out that it's position number 6 he's now dealing with.  
2 You describe what we believe to be Shyanu as towards  
3 the rear of the bus, her head facing towards the front  
4 of the bus because her head is tilted back, as you've  
5 now described as in the CPR position. Her head was  
6 tilted right back and her eyes were wide open. From the  
7 family's point of view, that's how they've always  
8 understood it. You being the first on the scene,  
9 Shyanu's eyes were wide open.

10 Can I just confirm this as well, that at this stage  
11 you've just dealt with the fact that Mr Lazenby and  
12 Mr Sims are with you, and from the other direction, so  
13 from the Euston side, a number of Met officers had  
14 arrived. There's going to be reference later to various  
15 people, including a gentleman by the name of Mr Warman,  
16 who was medically qualified, so had come in an  
17 ambulance.

18 But at this stage, there was nobody of that  
19 description there, nobody in an ambulance uniform?

20 A. No.

21 Q. We know that the first ambulance, in fact, doesn't  
22 arrive on scene until 9.57. So you'd been there some  
23 minutes by that stage. Can you help us, Inspector, as  
24 to when it was you're first aware of somebody in  
25 ambulance uniform attending or you being aware of them

1 attending anyway?

2 A. Yes, okay. The first time I'm aware of an ambulance  
3 uniform was a fairly senior rank who I believe took  
4 Silver at the scene and that was around the time that  
5 I spoke to the explosives officer about the attache case  
6 on top of the bus, because the concern was there that  
7 the ambulances had parked right up near the back of the  
8 bus and there was a concern if another device went off.  
9 So that was the first time I'd seen a fairly senior,  
10 high ranking ambulance manager on scene.

11 Q. You see, we understand that Mr Warman was, in fact, the  
12 gentleman that closed the eyes of Shyanu Parathasangary,  
13 and what the family have always wanted to know is what  
14 sort of time that would have been. But clearly, when  
15 you see her, eyes are still open, it's in both your  
16 statements.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. The same will apply and we'll ask Mr Sims and  
19 Mr Lazenby, but you're not aware, in those immediate  
20 minutes up to 10.00, of any ambulance official being  
21 there? The difficulty I have, my Lady, is that  
22 Mr Warman has never made a statement and I'm grateful to  
23 Mr Smith for his efforts.

24 So you're not aware of anybody in those minutes --

25 A. I can certainly say that, within that timeframe, and

1 after that timeframe, when I was dealing with the  
2 microwave oven, I wasn't aware of anybody in uniform,  
3 either on that scene or assisting that lady.

4 MR SAUNDERS: Inspector, that's very helpful. Thank you  
5 very much for your help.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?

7 Questions by MS SHEFF

8 MS SHEFF: Inspector, when you first entered the bus, you've  
9 told us that was through the side door on the nearside,  
10 and you've also indicated to us the effect of the bus,  
11 as you saw it, with the bottom section dropping down to  
12 within 6-foot or so.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. You said you could see no passengers on the bottom of  
15 the bus. Does that mean that you could see no  
16 passengers alive or no passengers at all?

17 A. I wasn't aware of any passengers on what I call the  
18 bottom of the bus at that stage.

19 Q. Because I represent the family of Anat Rosenberg and she  
20 was found on the bottom of the bus and she died in that  
21 position. Now, from where you entered the bus, was  
22 there so much wreckage and debris that it actually  
23 obliterated your view of the bodies that were in that  
24 position?

25 A. I think that's the case, because I wasn't aware of any

1 bodies on the bottom of the bus at all.

2 Q. Because, had you seen them, of course, you would have  
3 directed your attention there rather than going  
4 upstairs?

5 A. Absolutely, it would have been more of a priority  
6 because, if there was somebody on the bottom of the bus  
7 when I walked in, then I certainly would have dealt with  
8 that issue.

9 Q. Did you look to the rear of the bus at all, or did you  
10 just look past the wreckage, as it were, and go straight  
11 upstairs?

12 A. I glanced in the bottom of the bus when I went in and  
13 I wasn't aware of any -- anybody.

14 Q. You didn't see anything recognisable?

15 A. No.

16 Q. I also represent the family of Giles Hart. We believe  
17 that he is the gentleman that you describe as your  
18 casualty 3. If we could just have your plan back up  
19 again, that's BTP -- thank you very much. Can you see  
20 where you've marked number 3?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. There's some confusion about where the body was in  
23 relation to a taxi that was at the scene and I think you  
24 may have described that taxi in one of your statements.  
25 I'd like to take you back to the -- if I can call it the

1 bird's eye view, that's photograph number INQ10345-1 [not for  
publication].

2 That's with you in the middle with the high-vis cap.

3 Can you see that taxi in the middle, towards the right  
4 of the picture?

5 A. Yes, I can.

6 Q. In front of that taxi there is -- we know it's a sort of  
7 silverish Golf vehicle?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Now, first of all, can I ask you this: when you came off  
10 the bus, did you then go straight to the -- round about  
11 where we see you actually on that picture, to assess the  
12 other casualties?

13 A. I initially went to the offside of the bus where that  
14 gentleman in the light suit is standing, and then I went  
15 round to the back of the bus, where you see me now, to  
16 assess.

17 Q. So are we talking a matter of a few minutes, then --

18 A. Absolutely, yes.

19 Q. -- before you're looking at the casualty, the body  
20 number 3?

21 In your notes, you describe that body as lying  
22 across the -- I'm sorry, if we could just keep that  
23 picture on, thank you -- lying across the road in line  
24 with the bus, facing away from the BMA.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. So have we got a picture actually of the body lying  
2 horizontally across our picture in relation to the  
3 vehicle, if the vehicles are coming down the picture and  
4 the body is lying across at right angles?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Thank you. But the head is facing towards the park,  
7 which is on the right --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- and the legs are facing towards the BMA building on  
10 the left?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Thank you. Now, if we could just go back to that taxi,  
13 where did you see the location of the body in relation  
14 to the taxi?

15 A. I don't know if I was even aware of the taxi at that  
16 stage.

17 Q. Right.

18 A. I was just very much aware of the body lying on the  
19 road. I don't think I was aware of vehicles in relation  
20 to that body.

21 Q. Could it have been that the body was between the two  
22 vehicles, the taxi and the silver vehicle in front of  
23 it, when you saw it?

24 A. It could have been, I don't remember, I'm sorry, I don't  
25 have any recollection.

1 Q. You said that you believed that that person was dead, he  
2 was face down.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. How were you able to assess that?

5 A. Just visually. Visually, I'd seen -- again, as part of  
6 the quick assessment round the scene, and that  
7 particular person looked to be dead.

8 Q. Is that because there was no movement and because of the  
9 extent of the injuries?

10 A. The extent of the injuries, yes.

11 Q. Nobody appeared to be assisting him at that time?

12 A. No.

13 MS SHEFF: Thank you very much, Inspector.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Does anyone else have any questions  
15 for the inspector? Mr Gibbs?

16 Questions by MR GIBBS

17 MR GIBBS: Inspector, could I just clear up one or two  
18 things? You and Mr Lazenby and Mr Sims had driven up  
19 Upper Woburn Place and seen the bomb go off, yes?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Then you go straight there and you do what you have  
22 described. Have I understood this right, that you  
23 decided with Mr Lazenby that he should go back to  
24 Force Headquarters round the corner because there was  
25 difficulty getting a report to the control room on the

1 radio and on the mobile telephone?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Then Mr Sims was sent to follow him, not far behind him,  
4 with a view to getting particular equipment that you  
5 thought might help?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. As for the other officers who were on the scene at the  
8 time -- we know that there were Metropolitan Police  
9 officers and we'll hear from them -- was there also  
10 a man, whom I think you've so far described as your  
11 colleague, who was an officer called Jones?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. Was he from a unit called the Special Response Unit?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. Are they specially trained in dealing with suspect  
16 packages?

17 A. They're specially trained to deal with unattended items  
18 or anything suspicious, yes.

19 Q. Was he the colleague of yours with whom you had the  
20 conversation later with the Metropolitan Police  
21 explosives officer?

22 A. Yes, that's right.

23 Q. Was he with you at the scene, in fact, pretty much  
24 throughout, Mr Jones?

25 A. He was.

1 Q. We can see that, I think, if we bring up on screen,  
2 please, [BTP151-64]. We've already looked at the radio  
3 message at 09.46.05 which is Mr Sims' message, but then  
4 at the bottom of the screen, 09.46.50 we have:  
5 "Alpha Oscar 90 [that is Mr Jones] I'm running from  
6 Russell Square junction of Upper Woburn Street,  
7 Tavistock Place", and he's 30 seconds away at that  
8 point.

9 Was he the officer with whom Mr Lazenby had been  
10 when you picked up Mr Lazenby?

11 A. I believed he was there at that scene, yes.

12 Q. The conversation that you had with the  
13 Metropolitan Police inspector about using the radio  
14 close to the bus, he was right, wasn't he? The protocol  
15 is that, in case it might interfere with some secondary  
16 device, one shouldn't use a radio within -- is it  
17 15 metres of a scene?

18 A. Yes, he was right.

19 Q. Did you formally hand the scene over to him or did  
20 you -- were you both there fulfilling your separate  
21 roles for a period of overlap?

22 A. I would say we were both there fulfilling our roles,  
23 yes.

24 Q. We've seen the message, the last situation report that  
25 you made. Did you leave the scene before the controlled

1 explosion --

2 A. Yes, I did.

3 Q. -- and join up again with Mr Sims and Mr Lazenby?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Were you deployed to other scenes for the rest of the  
6 day until about 9.00 or 9.30 that night?

7 A. Yes, that's correct.

8 Q. One last thing, in case it matters. One of the lawyers  
9 referred you to some handwritten notes and described  
10 them as your notes or your notebook. I think they're  
11 neither, aren't they? They're the notes made by  
12 somebody else who was interviewing you with a view to  
13 taking a statement from you?

14 A. Yes, I believe that's what they are.

15 MR GIBBS: Thank you.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for the  
17 inspector?

18 Those are all the questions we have for you. You  
19 were only at the scene because you used your initiative  
20 and, once you were there, when you realised the bus had  
21 exploded in front of you, to your horror, you went there  
22 promptly and courageously and, in my view, with  
23 commendable professionalism, so thank you for everything  
24 that you did.

25 A. Thank you, my Lady.

1 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: My Lady, that may be a convenient  
2 moment. Before you rise, my Lady, may I attempt to  
3 clarify a matter that I understand the press have  
4 raised?

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly.

6 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: The photograph INQ10345-1 [not for publication] that  
we've

7 looked at on more than one occasion this morning and  
8 yesterday, I believe the press have asked whether that  
9 photo will be on the public website.

10 My Lady, the position with that, if you will recall,  
11 is that that photograph was shown during the opening and  
12 the question as to whether that should be released  
13 publicly was raised at that point. The families and  
14 representatives of the press, Mr Vassell-Adams, made  
15 submissions on the question and you ruled that, because  
16 of the distressing nature of the contents of the  
17 photograph, it should not be placed on to the public  
18 website.

19 That, as we understand it, is the position as it  
20 stands and I hope that clarifies the position for the  
21 press.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm sure if Mr Vassell-Adams was  
23 here, he would ask me to ask those representing the  
24 bereaved families whether their objections still stand.  
25 Obviously things have changed over the weeks and months

1 since I made that decision. So again, I would ask those  
2 to check as to whether or not the objections to  
3 publishing that photograph still remain. As soon as  
4 I know the result of those consultations, I'll rule  
5 again.

6 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: My Lady, yes.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much. 11.35.

8 (11.20 am)

9 (A short break)

10 (11.35 am)

11 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: My Lady, may I invite you to call  
12 Neville Lazenby?

13 PC NEVILLE VINCENT LAZENBY (sworn)

14 Questions by MR ANDREW O'CONNOR

15 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Could you give your full name, please?

16 A. I'm Police Constable 3635, Neville Vincent Lazenby,  
17 British Transport Police.

18 Q. Constable, in 2005, you were serving with the British  
19 Transport Police?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. You were based, as I understand it, at  
22 Force Headquarters, which is the building that we've  
23 heard evidence about already this morning, in  
24 Tavistock Place, very close to Tavistock Square?

25 A. That's correct.

1 Q. On the morning of 7 July 2005, you were tasked,  
2 I believe, to go to a different police station, in fact  
3 a City of London Police police station in Wood Street,  
4 to act as a liaison point with the City of London  
5 Police?

6 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

7 Q. Was that in connection with the developing incidents of  
8 the morning?

9 A. Yes, I was tasked to go there by an  
10 Inspector Janet Doel. Obviously, there had been a lot  
11 of officers leave Force Headquarters to facilitate and  
12 deal with the incident at Russell Square. I was held  
13 back to assist Inspector Doel back there. It became  
14 apparent that there was no communication within the City  
15 of London and, hence, I was tasked to go to Wood Street  
16 station.

17 Q. We've heard from Inspector Dermody Wood Street is over  
18 in the Smithfield direction?

19 A. That's correct, sir, yes.

20 Q. You were tasked to go there. Were you told how you were  
21 supposed to get there?

22 A. I was just told to go there and I used my own devices.

23 Q. What were they, in the first instance at any rate?

24 A. As soon as I left Tavistock, I was obviously aware that  
25 there was a lot of congestion around that area because

1 of Russell Square. My intention was probably to  
2 commandeer a taxi, but at the end of the day, I made my  
3 own way on foot out on to the Upper Woburn Place, turned  
4 left and headed down towards Russell Square and started  
5 walking in that direction.

6 Q. We've heard that, as it happened, Inspector Dermody and  
7 Mr Sims were driving up Upper Woburn Place and you saw  
8 their vehicle?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. Did you identify it as a British Transport Police  
11 vehicle, or them particularly, or did you simply see the  
12 blue lights?

13 A. I just identified it as a police vehicle because it was  
14 obviously showing its blue lights and I could hear the  
15 two-tones going as well on the audible alarm.

16 Q. Your intention then was to commandeer that vehicle  
17 rather than a taxi?

18 A. Indeed, I just stood in the middle of the road and waved  
19 it down, I had no idea who was driving the vehicle.

20 Q. In fact, I believe you knew both Inspector Dermody and  
21 Mr Sims?

22 A. Yes, as soon as it drew level to me and they put the  
23 windows down, I identified the two concerned as  
24 Inspector Dermody and PC Gary Sims.

25 Q. When you explained your position, they agreed to take

1 you where you needed to go?

2 A. That's right, sir, yes.

3 Q. You've been in court all morning, I believe, and you  
4 heard Inspector Dermody give evidence. Is that right?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. I don't want to take you over the same ground as we've  
7 already covered with Inspector Dermody, unless, of  
8 course, you disagree with anything he said. You heard  
9 his evidence about where you were in the car, where  
10 you'd reached at the time that you saw or, rather, at  
11 the time that the bus exploded. You were in the back  
12 seat of the car, I think.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Did you have a view of the bus at the time it exploded?

15 A. I had a very good view of the incident because my view  
16 was unobstructed. The set of the vehicle was that I was  
17 sitting slightly higher and looking above and over  
18 PC Sims who was driving and Inspector Dermody.

19 Q. What do you remember seeing and experiencing when the  
20 bus exploded?

21 A. As we approached the traffic lights, I noticed the bus  
22 was coming towards us. The first thing I noticed was  
23 the bus -- literally, the top deck filling up with  
24 a white smoke, dark smoke. Then the roof just peeled  
25 open. There was a -- quite a significant signature

1 explosion and it was just like a party popper going off,  
2 a lot of debris coming out of the top, yes, and human  
3 remains, or a torso, being tossed out to the left-hand  
4 side and, yes, that was it, really.

5 Q. You say the left-hand side. Do you mean the left as you  
6 looked at it?

7 A. As I looked at it, yes.

8 Q. What was your immediate understanding of what had  
9 happened?

10 A. Well, obviously it was an explosion, probably caused by  
11 some sort of bomb, and then we started -- I started  
12 linking it in to what had actually gone on previously at  
13 the three other locations where devices had gone off.

14 Q. We've heard Inspector Dermody say that, immediately  
15 before the explosion on the bus, he was still very  
16 unclear as to what had happened earlier that morning.  
17 Was the position the same with you?

18 A. By the time I had left Force Headquarters, certainly  
19 I was aware that there were incidents, ongoing problems,  
20 as a result of detonations of bombs, so I had a really  
21 good idea of probably what was actually happening at  
22 those three locations.

23 Q. I see. We heard Inspector Dermody explain how,  
24 immediately after the explosion, PC Sims sent his  
25 message that we looked at, drove up across the junction

1 towards the bus, stopped, you all got out, and ran to  
2 the bus. That's as you remember it, is it?

3 A. Yes, indeed.

4 Q. We heard then Inspector Dermody describe how he got on  
5 to the bus and what he did. What did you do at that  
6 time?

7 A. As I approached the bus, certainly I was aware that  
8 there were a lot of people standing about. In  
9 particular, one individual, I think it was a woman, who  
10 was wearing a light blue shirt and a dark blue tank top  
11 vest, and she was standing by the railings adjacent to  
12 the bus and, when I looked at her, I could see that her  
13 face and the side of the hairline had actually sort of  
14 been scalped, there was obviously red tissue there.

15 I couldn't see sort of anything else, but it looked as  
16 if she'd been injured by the bomb going off.

17 I had no idea who she was or what she was doing  
18 there, but she was standing by the radio -- by the  
19 railings, sorry.

20 Q. One of the things you describe in your statement is your  
21 concern that the engine of the bus was still running and  
22 your attempts to switch it off.

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. You didn't actually go on to the bus, I think?

25 A. I did not enter the bus because Inspector Dermody had

1 gone on before. I was aware of the engine racing and  
2 certainly there was a nasty acrid smell at the scene.  
3 I thought the best thing we could do first of all is  
4 switch off the signature of the engine.

5 Q. You were looking for a cutoff switch that you could  
6 access from outside the bus?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Did you ever find one?

9 A. No, I didn't.

10 Q. So the engine simply carried on running?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. Did you then walk -- perhaps in the course of your  
13 search for a cutoff switch -- down the side of the bus?

14 A. While proceeding down, certainly as I approached the  
15 second set of doors on the right-hand side as I looked  
16 at it, I was met by two individuals who came off the  
17 bus.

18 One was a male person wearing what I think was  
19 a light blue or greyish suit carrying a brown briefcase,  
20 just stood there, he was covered in debris, human  
21 remains, I got my hand on to his arm and just got him  
22 off the bus as soon as I could, because I didn't realise  
23 which part of the bus he'd come from, and directed him  
24 to go in the direction of Tavistock Place.

25 Shortly after that, another individual came off the

1 bus, who was a female. She was wearing a light blue  
2 dress, short-sleeved, fair hair and she was quite  
3 hysterical, obviously didn't know what had happened,  
4 et cetera, probably in a state of shock. I put my arms  
5 around her, got her off the bus and, by this time, there  
6 were people turning up at the bus and, basically,  
7 this -- one individual took the person away from me and  
8 again walked away towards Tavistock Place.

9 Q. I see. In your witness statement that you made at the  
10 time, you describe seeing a number of things --

11 people -- still inside the bus --

12 A. Indeed, sir, yes.

13 Q. -- from your position just outside it. One of the  
14 things you describe seeing is a pair of legs wearing  
15 pinstriped trousers sticking up inside the bus.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Can you tell us a little more of your recollection of  
18 that?

19 A. Well, obviously, looking inside the bus, it was  
20 absolutely total carnage, there was a lot of twisted  
21 metal, human remains, and certainly that was quite  
22 a prominent feature. They were sort of pointing towards  
23 me. I think it was a pinstriped suit, and certainly, by  
24 the type of shoes and that, I presumed that was a male  
25 person, because that's all I had in view, because the

1 remainder of the torso disappeared into the wreckage.

2 Q. Do you recall what colour the trousers were, apart from  
3 being pinstriped?

4 A. Dark, dark grey.

5 Q. You say that you understood it obviously to be  
6 a gentleman's legs from the clothing and the shoes and  
7 so on. They disappeared into the wreckage. Was it  
8 really just the legs that you could see or could you  
9 possibly see any more?

10 A. That's all I could see, that's all I could distinguish,  
11 the legs protruding out through the wreckage.

12 Q. From what you say, it may well be that the answer to  
13 this question is "no", but did you have any way of  
14 telling whether the person to whom the legs belonged was  
15 coloured or white or black?

16 A. I couldn't tell you that.

17 Q. Did you reach a view or were you able to reach a view as  
18 to whether this person was alive or dead?

19 A. I was unable to, I couldn't.

20 Q. Did you see the legs move at all?

21 A. No movement on the legs whatsoever.

22 Q. But you simply weren't able to -- because you couldn't  
23 see enough of the body, you weren't able to tell whether  
24 he was alive or dead?

25 A. That's correct.

1 Q. You describe, in the witness statement that you made,  
2 seeing a hand moving in the wreckage.

3 A. Again, yes, I was aware of a hand movement. Again, it  
4 was under a mass of tangled wreckage and debris. All  
5 I got was the movement of the hand. I can't recall  
6 whether it was the left or right.

7 But certainly, that again, my view was completely  
8 obscured by the twisted, mangling mess on the actual  
9 floor of the bus.

10 Q. The part of your statement where you mention a hand  
11 follows on from the description of the two legs I've  
12 just been asking you about. Was there anything that  
13 made you connect the hand to the legs or --

14 A. Nothing at all, sir, no. Proximity. I couldn't really  
15 tell because it was really chaotic inside the bus.

16 Q. Was the hand close enough to the legs, perhaps, to be  
17 connected to them, or was it --

18 A. Again, I couldn't tell you.

19 Q. What colour was the skin on the hand?

20 A. The hand -- obviously, it was a white -- a white person.

21 Q. A white person's hand?

22 A. Certainly, but it was covered in soot, dirt and grime.

23 Q. You also describe in your witness statement the casualty  
24 who Inspector Dermody gave evidence about, the oriental  
25 man whose head was protruding from the side of the bus.

1 That individual we believe to be a man called Sam Ly.  
2 What was your impression of him, what did you see of  
3 him?

4 A. Certainly, when I drew level with him, his head was  
5 hanging out over the edge of the bus, and certainly  
6 not -- there was a lot of blood certainly coming from  
7 his mouth and other parts of his body. His body  
8 position seemed to be really twisted and pinned by some  
9 really heavy bits of wreckage caused by the explosion.

10 Q. Could you see that he was still alive?

11 A. He was -- there was movement on the head, his head moved  
12 from side to side very slowly, and every so often there  
13 would be moan.

14 Q. You describe him being pinned by wreckage. In essence,  
15 was it the top deck of the bus, parts of the top deck of  
16 the bus that had fallen down on --

17 A. I realise that now, yes.

18 Q. You mention in your statement that you made some effort  
19 to try and, yourself, lift the wreckage to free this  
20 gentleman.

21 A. That's right, I leant into the bus and tried to get the  
22 offending metal off him, but it was just wedged in solid  
23 and I couldn't budge it. To move that would have taken  
24 specialist equipment.

25 Q. To be clear, this is something that you attempted from

1 your position on the pavement. It wasn't --

2 A. Indeed, yes. I hadn't gone into the bus.

3 Q. In fact, I don't think you went into the bus at all?

4 A. No, sir, I did not.

5 Q. You also, I think, saw the gentleman who I asked

6 Inspector Dermody about who came out of the crowd and

7 held Sam Ly's head.

8 A. That's right, yes. He just appeared on my shoulder and

9 basically just said "I'll take care of that person", he

10 went forward and just held his head, and just held it

11 there.

12 Q. You also describe in your statement another casualty,

13 again someone who Inspector Dermody saw and who we've

14 asked him about. This was the lady sitting behind

15 Sam Ly. You describe her as an Afro-Caribbean lady.

16 You heard me say to Inspector Dermody in fact we

17 believe that to be Shyanu Parathasangary who was --

18 whose family came from Sri Lanka. That would be

19 consistent with your memory of that casualty, would it?

20 A. It would be, yes.

21 Q. What do you remember of her?

22 A. That she was sitting there. She was clothed. Her head

23 was back. Her eyes were wide open and certainly that

24 the mouth was open as well. From looking at her,

25 I couldn't see any sort of movement in another part of

1 the body, like the chest, to suggest that she was  
2 breathing.

3 Q. Was this a passing glance that you gave her, or did you  
4 study her --

5 A. All the time I'm doing a scene assessment and the idea,  
6 as an emergency responder, is to assess and report back  
7 as soon as possible what you've got. Certainly that  
8 would have been delayed by me by removing the walking --  
9 the individuals that were coming off the bus, and  
10 certainly, by doing the assessment, it took a bit of  
11 time.

12 Q. So you were able to look at her carefully and form what  
13 view you could as to her condition?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Your view was that she was, very sadly, dead?

16 A. There was no signs of life.

17 Q. We've heard from Inspector Dermody that you, in fact,  
18 went back to Force Headquarters from Tavistock Square.  
19 How, roughly speaking, long was it, after you arrived at  
20 the bus, that you went back to Force Headquarters?

21 A. I would say between three and four minutes. No longer  
22 than that.

23 Q. So really, simply enough time for you to walk round the  
24 bus, make the observations that I've been asking you  
25 about --

1 A. I didn't walk around the bus. My area of where I'd done  
2 my assessment from was on the bus, which is on the  
3 nearside onto the kerb. I never ventured beyond the  
4 back -- to the back of the bus or the other side.

5 Q. I perhaps overstated it, then. You approached along the  
6 pavement from where you parked the car. You walked  
7 along the side of the bus. We've heard, we've seen,  
8 Sam Ly, Shyanu Parathasangary. You got to the rear of  
9 the bus, but you never went any further than that?

10 A. No. At that point, Inspector Dermody come from behind  
11 the bus. That's when we were having problems getting  
12 the communications across.

13 Q. Was it your idea to go back to Force Headquarters or  
14 his?

15 A. Inspector Dermody handed me his radio because he was  
16 experiencing problems, so I had his radio, my radio, and  
17 there was so many active messages going across the air  
18 that we just couldn't cut in, obviously, with the three  
19 incidents that were ongoing, and certainly probably the  
20 responses to the actual incident at Tavistock, because  
21 obviously the explosion would have been heard, like,  
22 some distance away, but it was extremely difficult.

23 At that point, I went to my mobile phone, which is  
24 a BTP-issued telephone, and I got a number of -- a lot  
25 of numbers keyed into it from our control room, which is

1 the BX identification. I tried that and certainly at  
2 one stage I got an engaged tone. When I tried again the  
3 network no coverage sign came up on the actual screen.

4 Q. Just to be clear, as far as the radio is concerned,  
5 there is no question, as you understood it, that the  
6 radios were malfunctioning, it was simply the weight of  
7 traffic --

8 A. Just the weight of traffic, yes.

9 Q. -- preventing you making yourselves heard --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- and, in fact, a similar problem on the mobile  
12 telephone?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. So you decided that you would go back to  
15 Force Headquarters. Were you to carry a message from  
16 Inspector Dermody?

17 A. The message was basically to report what we'd seen, what  
18 resources we had on-site and what we required.

19 Certainly, from my point of view, when I left the  
20 scene, there was -- we were still looking for the  
21 specialist teams to come in there, like the paramedics  
22 and probably fire and rescue, who at the time had not  
23 appeared.

24 Q. So those were the matters that you were to convey back  
25 to Force Headquarters?

1 A. Yes, that's correct.

2 Q. How long did it take you to go back to  
3 Force Headquarters?

4 A. It took me about a minute, if that.

5 Q. You ran?

6 A. I ran.

7 Q. When you got there, did you convey the message that you  
8 had been sent to take?

9 A. Yes, when I arrived at the Force Headquarters, I noticed  
10 that the front door to the headquarters had been shut,  
11 so I had to bang on the door to get the security to let  
12 me in. I then ran upstairs on to the first floor,  
13 I heard some voices coming from one of the offices and  
14 I made my way straight there. When I went inside, there  
15 were a number of individuals in there, one of them being  
16 Chief Inspector Bob Kenwrick.

17 Q. You passed the message to him?

18 A. I passed on the message, telling him what -- told him  
19 I'd come from the incident on Tavistock Square, reported  
20 what we had, and that I needed to go back.

21 Q. And also made the request for the various extra  
22 equipment?

23 A. Indeed, I was looking at cordon tapes, any medical items  
24 that we might have available, and then take them back to  
25 the bus.

1 Q. In fact, you didn't go back to the bus?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Why not?

4 A. I was told that Force Headquarters had been put into  
5 lockdown, that we didn't know what the pattern was as  
6 regards the terrorist attacks and that  
7 Force Headquarters could, in fact, be the next target  
8 because of the proximity of where it is to both  
9 incidents, ie Russell Square and the number 30 bus, and  
10 the order was a direct one and I had no option but to  
11 obey it.

12 Q. What was your reaction to the order?

13 A. I was frustrated to say the least, but I do see the  
14 reasoning behind it, because, if I'd left there, having  
15 received that, and something had happened and I became  
16 a casualty ...

17 Q. You weren't able to go back to the bus?

18 A. I was not, no.

19 Q. But were those inside Force Headquarters able to action  
20 the information and the request that you had brought  
21 there?

22 A. By the time I got back to Force Headquarters, I was  
23 informed that -- obviously, they had been picking up  
24 messages on the radio, and that aid was on its way, that  
25 the response was starting to kick in and that the

1 resources that Inspector Dermody had requested or wanted  
2 were actually running to the scene.

3 Q. I see. I think it's right to say that you didn't, in  
4 fact, go back to the bus at all, at least on that day.

5 A. I went back to the bus. I think it was -- I can't  
6 remember the exact timeframe, but we had to go and  
7 collect the vehicle because we needed that vehicle back  
8 and that's the only time I returned to the scene.

9 Q. Yes. You went back to collect the vehicle, but simply  
10 for that reason?

11 A. For that reason alone.

12 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: I see. Thank you very much, Constable,  
13 those are all my questions. It may be that others have  
14 some for you.

15 A. Thank you.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

17 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

18 MS GALLAGHER: Constable, one very brief matter. You were  
19 asked earlier about the legs which you saw protruding  
20 from the wreckage in the pinstriped suit that you saw  
21 disappearing into the mangled wreckage of the bus. You  
22 said today for the first time that you thought that suit  
23 was dark, dark grey. In your statement, you've just  
24 described it as pinstriped. How sure are you that it  
25 was grey?

1 A. It's the colouration, it was a dark suit with a --  
2 I would assume a light-patterned pinstripe going through  
3 it.  
4 Q. But it could have been a dark navy with dust on it, for  
5 example?  
6 A. Indeed.  
7 MS GALLAGHER: Thank you. Nothing further.  
8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?  
9 Questions by MR SAUNDERS  
10 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Lazenby, can you help me with this: what  
11 time do you get back to Force Headquarters?  
12 A. It was three or four minutes after we turned up on to  
13 the actual scene. It was very short period of time  
14 I spent on the actual site of the bomb.  
15 Q. I think it's right that Inspector Dermody also turns up  
16 at headquarters later?  
17 A. Some time later on, sir, yes.  
18 Q. Can you help us as to what time that would have been?  
19 A. I would say -- again, this is going to be an estimate --  
20 anything between 12 to 15 minutes.  
21 Q. Post-explosion or post your arrival?  
22 A. I would say post-explosion.  
23 Q. He doesn't leave again?  
24 A. No, because basically, when he arrives back in, we --  
25 he's obviously reported back, I think, to

1 Superintendent Hilton, and then basically we meet.

2 MR SAUNDERS: Thank you very much indeed.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?

4 Questions by MS SHEFF

5 MS SHEFF: Mr Lazenby, when you were listening to the radio,  
6 when did you first hear about the explosions? About  
7 what time?

8 A. It was -- I booked on duty at 8.00 that morning,  
9 certainly the first reports were coming in, I would  
10 imagine, some time between 8.30, 9.00, where we're  
11 getting reports of power surges, and then, basically,  
12 once we found that we had casualties exiting from  
13 various locations, then I became aware through the radio  
14 that there was -- there was something serious going on,  
15 but an exact time, I just can't recall, because  
16 obviously things start to happen.

17 Q. This was the BTP force radio?

18 A. This is the BTP force radio, yes.

19 Q. Were you aware then of all three explosions that had  
20 gone off by the time you left?

21 A. I was aware that there were three incidents ongoing,  
22 because I left Force Headquarters at about 9.30, to  
23 carry out my duties at Wood Street station.

24 Q. Yes, I was going to ask you about that. Who gave you  
25 the order to go to Wood Street and what was the purpose?

1 A. It was Inspector Doel, and certainly there was a lot of  
2 communications problems as a result of the devices going  
3 off and we were unsure of what actually was happening in  
4 the City of London as regards the transport network and,  
5 basically, Inspector Doel decided that I should go down  
6 there, link in to the City of London Police network and  
7 report back, either by a landline telephone or by mobile  
8 phone, and tell him exactly what was happening, because  
9 we just didn't have quite a true clear picture of what  
10 was going on down there.

11 Q. So you were to be the liaison, were you, between City of  
12 London Police and BTP as to what was going on on the  
13 public transport system?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. Of course, you weren't able to do that and perform that  
16 task because you were sidetracked into helping out at  
17 Tavistock Square?

18 A. That's it, that's indeed the case.

19 Q. Did you ever fulfil that role after Tavistock Square?

20 A. No, I didn't. No, I didn't.

21 Q. Just finally this: you never actually went on to the bus  
22 at Tavistock Square. Is that because there was too much  
23 wreckage for you to get access?

24 A. Indeed. I was aware of the damage inside and that there  
25 were trapped people, and my concern was that, if I had

1 gone to the bus, into those particular areas, I could  
2 have stepped on somebody or caused somebody even more  
3 injury, so I decided to do my assessments from the  
4 pavement.

5 MS SHEFF: Yes. Thank you very much, Mr Lazenby.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Mr Gibbs?

7 Questions by MR GIBBS

8 MR GIBBS: Could I just clear up two timing matters, please,  
9 Mr Lazenby. We understand obviously you weren't looking  
10 at your watch continuously throughout this process. Do  
11 I understand you to have been, yourself, at the scene by  
12 the bus for about three or four minutes?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. When you next saw Mr Dermody, it was either at or near  
15 Force Headquarters after he had left the scene?

16 A. That's correct, yes.

17 Q. I think you said that might have been some 12 minutes  
18 later, but can I just remind us, please, of [BTP154-74]?  
19 We have a call, you see, from him at 10.22.35. You may  
20 remember this, we looked at it just about an hour ago.  
21 He's still there at the bus giving a situation report at  
22 that time, but he's left before the controlled  
23 explosion. I wonder whether it may have been nearer to  
24 10.30 or some time thereafter when you next saw him?

25 A. Yes, in hindsight, that would be correct.

1 MR GIBBS: Thank you.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Thank you very  
3 much. Those are all the questions we have for you.  
4 Thank you for what you did and what you were allowed to  
5 do, even if you weren't allowed to do any more. Thank  
6 you for trying to help.

7 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: My Lady, may I invite you now to call  
8 constable Gary Sims?

9 PC GARY PETER SIMS (sworn)

10 Questions by MR ANDREW O'CONNOR

11 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Could you give your full name, please?

12 A. I'm Police Constable 3400, Gary Peter Sims of the  
13 British Transport Police.

14 Q. Constable, in 2005, you were serving with the British  
15 Transport Police, and I believe you were based at the  
16 location in Hudson Place near Victoria, the same place  
17 as Inspector Dermody?

18 A. That's correct, yes.

19 Q. Your normal role, at that time, was a role involving  
20 coordinating PCSOs, police community support officers?

21 A. That's correct, yes.

22 Q. They were British Transport Police PCSOs, I take it?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. On the morning of 7 July 2005, we've heard

25 Inspector Dermody's evidence about how he became aware

1 of what was going on. I take it you've been in court  
2 this morning and heard his evidence also?  
3 A. Yes, I have, sir, yes.  
4 Q. So you heard him say that it was you who put your head  
5 round the door while he was on the phone and told him,  
6 to use the words he was using, that "bombs had been  
7 exploding". Is that what you remember saying?  
8 A. I remember saying there's been a bomb.  
9 Q. I see. So possibly only -- in fact, your memory is  
10 referring only to a single bomb rather than more than  
11 one?  
12 A. That's correct, yes.  
13 Q. But a bomb rather than a power surge or an explosion?  
14 A. Yes, because, by that time, there had been a message on  
15 the radio specifically stating that one of these  
16 incidents had been a bomb.  
17 Q. Do you recall which of the incidents had been described  
18 as having had a bomb explode?  
19 A. No, I can't, sorry.  
20 Q. In any event, that was the message that you gave to  
21 Inspector Dermody. Do you remember roughly what time it  
22 was?  
23 A. No, sorry.  
24 Q. You recall my questions to the inspector?  
25 A. Yes.

1 Q. He had said it was about 9.00. I was asking if it may  
2 have been a little later, say closer to 9.15 than 9.00.  
3 Would that be consistent with your memory of events?

4 A. It would be, yes, it's later than 9.00, but exactly what  
5 time I couldn't say.

6 Q. You heard his evidence that he took the decision to take  
7 a car, take you -- you, I believe, were a skilled,  
8 trained emergency response driver --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- and to go towards where the incidents were taking  
11 place and, in particular, a rendezvous point which he'd  
12 heard on the radio: namely, King's Cross station?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. So the two of you departed from Victoria in the unmarked  
15 police car with the lights and the sirens going?

16 A. Yes, that's correct.

17 Q. You have heard the evidence about meeting Mr Lazenby,  
18 picking him up, the decision to go to Smithfield and  
19 take him to the City of London Police police station.

20 Do you also recall being at that junction of  
21 Tavistock Place and Upper Woburn Place moments before  
22 the explosion took place?

23 A. Yes, I do, yes.

24 Q. Did you have a view of the bus at the time the explosion  
25 took place?

1 A. Yes, I did.

2 Q. What do you recall seeing?

3 A. We were -- because we were using the blue light and the  
4 siren, we were on the wrong side of the road in  
5 Upper Woburn Place, which puts us on the same side of  
6 the road as the bus, so the bus is coming towards us.  
7 As we approached the junction at Upper Woburn Place  
8 where you would turn right into Tavistock Place, just on  
9 that junction there is the point at which the explosion  
10 took place, and what that entailed, from my memory of  
11 it, is there was a very -- a very, very loud booming  
12 sound -- this is all instantaneous -- and, at the same  
13 time, there was a large cloud of debris, probably -- it  
14 was a very dark grey-white smoke cloud which went  
15 possibly 100 to 200 feet up in the air, and as that went  
16 up, as has been previously described, there was a lot of  
17 debris and that, there were unfortunately parts of  
18 people in that.

19 At the same time, the two sides come out, from the  
20 rear of the bus area they came out and curled towards  
21 us, and at that point then, the roof came off, or a part  
22 of the roof came off and that's come forward, gone very  
23 curly wurly, really, up in the air and that has then  
24 come down and landed in front of the bus on the driver's  
25 side, so on the -- to our left-hand side, but what would

1 be the right-hand side of the bus.

2 Q. I see.

3 A. As that landed, there was sort of -- the sound of that.

4 The blast wave shook the vehicle and, as we had the --

5 I think we had the fan on because it wasn't overly warm,

6 but the -- the smell of the explosion and the heat of

7 the explosion came into the vent, into the vehicle.

8 Q. We've seen the transcript of the radio call that you

9 I think made within seconds of seeing that explosion,

10 and, from the content of that call, it appears that you

11 were in no doubt as to what had caused the explosion on

12 the bus.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. You were convinced that it was a bomb?

15 A. It was a bomb, yes.

16 Q. We've heard the evidence that you -- the inspector

17 suggested that the car had stopped. Had it already

18 stopped? Were you waiting at the junction, or did you

19 stop because of the explosion?

20 A. No, that's correct, we stopped because of the explosion,

21 we -- I would have gone through a red light at caution,

22 obviously, because I wouldn't have gone through it at

23 speed, but we stopped because of what we'd seen -- well,

24 I stopped. I was driving obviously, so I stopped

25 because of what I'd seen.

1 Q. But almost immediately started again and drove up  
2 towards the bus?

3 A. That's correct, yes.

4 Q. Did you all three get out of the car at the same time?

5 A. No, the inspector and Neville left together and clearly,  
6 because I was driving, I was the last person out and  
7 I locked the vehicle and then went down after them.

8 Q. Presumably, you were only a few seconds behind them?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. We've heard the inspector's evidence about his movement  
11 on to the bus and helping to evacuate casualties and so  
12 on. Did you go on to the bus at this point?

13 A. No, I didn't, no.

14 Q. Did you, in fact, ever go on to the bus while you were  
15 there?

16 A. No, I didn't.

17 Q. Did you move down the side of the bus along the pavement  
18 in much the same way as Mr Lazenby has described?

19 A. Yes, only on the street -- only on the side that the  
20 British Medical Association building is on, because the  
21 gap between the bus and the vehicles which were on the  
22 correct side of the road -- so the vehicle is next to  
23 it, as has been described -- were already too full of  
24 debris, so I only went along the pavement side, I went  
25 to -- I did go to the rear of it to look around the back

1 of it, but I stayed on that pavement side where the  
2 British Medical Association building is.

3 Q. You record in your witness statement having seen the  
4 individual we now know to be called Sam Ly, the Oriental  
5 man whose head was protruding from the bus. What's your  
6 recollection of seeing him?

7 A. He was lying -- the top deck was -- where it had been  
8 concertinaed, it was quite low, so it was effectively at  
9 head height, 6-foot, around about that height, and he  
10 was between two other bodies, the feet of which were  
11 dangling over the edge of the bus, but he was --  
12 effectively, really from probably around about this area  
13 here, his upper chest area.

14 Q. You're showing your chest?

15 A. Yes, from his upper chest area he was dangling like this  
16 from what would have been the ground floor of the top  
17 deck.

18 Q. Sorry, you say the ground floor of the top deck?

19 A. Yes, well, it would have been the floor of the top deck,  
20 sorry.

21 Q. It may be that this doesn't matter very much, but we  
22 know from other evidence that Sam Ly, prior to the  
23 explosion, had, in fact, been sitting on the lower deck  
24 of the bus, but of course, is it right that he was  
25 sitting in that area of the rear of the bus where, in

1 effect, the upper deck had just collapsed on to the  
2 lower deck?

3 A. That's correct, yes.

4 Q. In a way, the two decks had become one?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Perhaps it was very difficult for someone in your  
7 situation really to make sense of where people had been  
8 prior to the explosion because of the concertina-ing, as  
9 you put it, of the metalwork.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. In any event, could you see that he was alive?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Did you see anyone assisting him or treating him?

14 A. Not at that point, no. But as the inspector was  
15 describing earlier on, there was a point at which  
16 a group of people who had been coming from the Euston  
17 area had just stopped. We hadn't put any cordons in,  
18 but they'd effectively stopped because they'd just come  
19 to a halt because of what we were dealing with, and one  
20 of those people -- the Governor got one of those people  
21 out of the crowd and said, "Can you hold this fellow's  
22 head up?", which is the person who has previously been  
23 described in the evidence already and the guy who's been  
24 shown in the photograph.

25 Q. Yes.

1 A. And he came out and did that and he held the head up or  
2 supported the head.

3 Q. Yes. You mentioned, I think, seeing some legs.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. You may have heard Constable Lazenby's evidence about  
6 the legs protruding from the wreckage.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Do you have any memory of a similar -- of seeing those  
9 legs?

10 A. Not -- no. Only in relation to where I've described the  
11 two pairs of legs either side of Mr Ly. Those are the  
12 only legs I remember, and I don't remember anything  
13 apart from that there were two pairs of legs.

14 Q. Do you remember whether they were clothed or not or --

15 A. Yes, they were clothed, and they had shoes, but I could  
16 literally only see the lower legs from -- probably from  
17 the knee down.

18 Q. I see, but they weren't, from what you say -- I mean,  
19 the reason why we're asking these questions is there was  
20 one particular gentleman called Anthony Fatayi-Williams,  
21 and there is a certain amount of evidence that his  
22 legs -- and he was wearing a dark blue, pinstriped  
23 suit -- were protruding at quite an angle up out of the  
24 wreckage. It doesn't sound to me as though that's what  
25 you're describing.

1 A. I don't remember that, no.

2 Q. I don't think you mention in your statement seeing the  
3 casualty who we know was called Shyanu Parathasangary,  
4 who was sitting just behind where Sam Ly was sitting,  
5 also with her head visible from the pavement. Do you  
6 recall that at all?

7 A. No, I don't, no.

8 Q. Can I ask you to look at a plan that you drew shortly  
9 after these events? It's [BTP415-2].

10 Constable, we're quite used to seeing  
11 two-dimensional plans, but here an attempt at least has  
12 been made to provide a three-dimensional image. But as  
13 with other plans, you've marked a number of different  
14 casualties with -- by letters.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. I want to ask you, if I may, not necessarily about all  
17 of them, but about casualty D.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. In your statement, you describe casualty D as being  
20 a lady, a female casualty, lying on the ground being  
21 assisted by a male, I think with her head in the lap of  
22 a male.

23 A. Yes, that's correct.

24 Q. Do you recall that person?

25 A. Yes, I do, yes.

1 Q. Tell us more about what you remember about her.

2 A. She was a white woman with shoulder-length, gingery hair  
3 and I think she was wearing a white sleeveless top and  
4 a long green skirt and that the -- it was the -- I can't  
5 remember which foot it was now, I know it's in my  
6 statement, but one of the feet was missing from the calf  
7 down.

8 Q. In fact, just going back, you describe in your statement  
9 her wearing a green top and a white skirt. But you  
10 remember her wearing a piece of green clothing at any  
11 rate?

12 A. That's correct, yes.

13 Q. To answer the query you raised in your statement, you  
14 describe her having a very serious injury to her right  
15 lower limb, in fact the right foot being missing.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Very serious injuries there. Was she lying with her  
18 back to you or with her front to you?

19 A. With her back to me, with her feet towards me, as is in  
20 the drawing, and with her head in the lap of the male.

21 Q. The person you're describing sounds as though it may  
22 well have been one of the casualties, who did survive  
23 the explosion briefly but very sadly thereafter died,  
24 called Miriam Hyman. She, in fact, wasn't a white lady,  
25 she did have a coloured skin. Is it possible that you

1 may have confused that part of your description of her?

2 A. Yes, definitely, just due to the nature of the event and  
3 the fact we were caught in it, it's perfectly reasonable  
4 that I've got that wrong.

5 Q. If it was her, again other evidence about her suggests  
6 that she wasn't in the road behind the bus but was,  
7 rather, over on the pavement, on the pavement that you  
8 would have been walking up and down, closer, in other  
9 words, to the BMA building than where you've marked this  
10 casualty on this plan. Do you think that's possible?  
11 Do you think you may have been mistaken about that or  
12 not?

13 A. Yes, it is, because where she's shown on the plan is  
14 where she was, so although it's at the rear of the bus,  
15 it is effectively closer towards the pavement, you're  
16 quite right. So it's --

17 Q. No one is criticising you, Constable. These events  
18 obviously all took place very quickly and it's difficult  
19 to get down, by way of a plan or anything else, exactly  
20 what you remember, but are you saying that it's quite  
21 possible that, in fact, this person was closer to the  
22 BMA building than to the rear of the bus?

23 A. It is possible, yes.

24 Q. Do you remember whether she was alive at this point or  
25 not?

1 A. She was alive.

2 Q. How did you know that?

3 A. She was moving. I don't remember any sound or any  
4 screaming from anybody at any time, but she was moving,  
5 and that, where she had her head in the lap of the male,  
6 she was alive.

7 Q. What do you remember about the man who was with her?

8 A. Initially, at the time, I thought it was just a -- it  
9 was a white male, quite a good build to him, in a white  
10 shirt and black trousers, and initially that's all  
11 I took in, but on reflection, at a later date, I thought  
12 he might have been a uniformed Metropolitan police  
13 officer, but only because of the nature of the shirt,  
14 I don't remember seeing epaulettes, but the style of the  
15 shirt led me to believe it was effectively a uniform  
16 shirt.

17 Q. I see. It's a white shirt and dark trousers?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Which would be consistent, perhaps, with a police  
20 officer who had taken his jacket off --

21 A. Correct, yes.

22 Q. -- but nothing like a jacket like you're wearing or  
23 a high visibility vest, nothing like that?

24 A. Not at all, no.

25 Q. I see. How long was -- this scene, the lady lying on

1 the ground and the man with her, how long did you have  
2 to view that?  
3 A. A matter of seconds, one or two seconds.  
4 Q. I see. Looking on your plan, there is one other person  
5 I wanted to ask you about. That's casualty F. You  
6 don't say very much about her in your statement. You  
7 describe that as being a female casualty.  
8 A. Yes.  
9 Q. You say she was lying on the floor.  
10 A. Mm.  
11 Q. You say that there was a Metropolitan police officer  
12 with her.  
13 A. Yes.  
14 Q. This person wearing a helmet and a yellow jacket.  
15 A. That's correct, yes.  
16 Q. Do you have any other memory of that particular  
17 casualty?  
18 A. There was someone performing CPR on her, what I would  
19 understand to be CPR with the chest compressions.  
20 Q. Yes.  
21 A. But that person was a white female in civilian clothing  
22 and I recall that as being up around the level crossing,  
23 roughly around about where you've seen in the  
24 photograph, around about that area.  
25 Q. Let's look at the photograph, if we may. You're quite

1 right, Constable, there was, of course, a level crossing  
2 there, and it may be that you -- this photograph would  
3 have been taken perhaps only a few minutes after what  
4 you're now describing, so it may be that you can  
5 identify the little scene that you had in mind or,  
6 alternatively, it may be that you can just identify the  
7 location that you have in mind.

8 A. Certainly that ties in with the -- here on the level  
9 crossing, that ties in with the casualty you've just  
10 asked me about. However, the earlier casualty that we  
11 were discussing would have been in my memory is  
12 effectively where you can see the blue sign on the lamp  
13 post, obviously come down to street level towards the  
14 pavement, would have been in that area there. That's  
15 where I remember her being.

16 Q. Where you're describing is close, is it not, to where we  
17 see a brown area near the wall?

18 A. Yes, it's further over than I remember it, but, yes.

19 Q. That was where the body of Miriam Hyman was lying and  
20 where she was treated.

21 We've brought up this photograph to ask you about  
22 the other casualty, casualty F.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. We see the level crossing. Is it somewhere in that area  
25 that you saw her being tended to by the police officer?

1 A. That's correct, that's the right place.

2 Q. On the pavement or on the level crossing itself?

3 A. In the roadway. Basically where that photograph puts

4 that casualty is where they were.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Where the -- it looks like a lady

6 with a striped top is?

7 A. That's correct, ma'am, yes.

8 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Now, where he heard the evidence about

9 Constable Lazenby going back to Force Headquarters.

10 I think it's right to say that you also went back to

11 Force Headquarters.

12 A. That's correct, yes.

13 Q. Did you go with him or shortly after him?

14 A. Shortly after.

15 Q. Let me ask you this: how long after you arrived at the

16 scene did you go back to Force Headquarters?

17 A. I couldn't put a time on it, but it felt like I was at

18 the scene a very short time, but I wouldn't be able to

19 give you an estimate, even in minutes.

20 Q. We heard Constable Lazenby saying he thought he was

21 probably at the scene only a matter of three or four

22 minutes. Does that help you or not?

23 A. I would think that to be correct.

24 Q. You were there for a short extra time, another minute or

25 so?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. I see. He went back specifically to take a message  
3 because there were problems getting in touch with  
4 Force Headquarters. Why was it that you went back  
5 there?

6 A. The -- I was sent back because we had no equipment, we  
7 had no rubber gloves. The force has what's -- what is  
8 effectively quite a large orange rucksack full of first  
9 aid-type equipment, we didn't have one of those, we  
10 didn't have cordon tape, and it was specifically for  
11 those type of things so that we could continue as we  
12 were, but it was also to, effectively -- because we knew  
13 there to be police officers there, or there should have  
14 been police officers there, because it's  
15 a Force Headquarters building, to bring more people with  
16 us, because at that point we really -- we just did not  
17 have enough resources to deal with what we had in front  
18 of us.

19 Q. We saw the message from Inspector Dermody after you'd  
20 gone, but probably not long after you'd gone, saying he  
21 did have enough officers. Can you reconcile those  
22 two --

23 A. I can. I'm not sure it's made clear in my statement,  
24 but there was a point very shortly after we'd arrived --  
25 I was in a yellow uniform jacket, although I was in

1 plainclothes -- the people that I told to get back in  
2 the building as I left the vehicle all disappeared as  
3 one and then they then came back out and one of them  
4 tapped me on the shoulder and said "Excuse me, Officer,  
5 I'm a doctor. Can I help?", and I said "Yes" and, at  
6 that point, that group of people basically starburst  
7 round me and went to wherever there were casualties who  
8 were clearly alive.

9 So my understanding, at least one of those people  
10 was a doctor. Obviously clearly the one that spoke to  
11 me, at least he was a doctor. Knowing now the nature of  
12 the building, it's -- it was a fairly safe assumption  
13 that more than one person in that group had some sort of  
14 medical knowledge.

15 Q. I can interrupt you there, we'll hear plenty of evidence  
16 that there were a large number of doctors who came out  
17 of the BMA building and assisted with treating the  
18 casualties in the road.

19 A. So I can't answer for the inspector why he said that,  
20 because I wasn't there, but I would assume, certainly at  
21 the point that I left, everybody who was clearly alive  
22 had somebody with them, albeit a doctor or a member of  
23 the public, and obviously I can't answer for the  
24 Governor.

25 Q. But at that time, you understood there to be a need for

1 further officers?

2 A. Police officers, yes, definitely.

3 Q. I see, I see. You went back to Force Headquarters?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Did you convey the message that you had been tasked  
6 with?

7 A. Yes, I did, yes.

8 Q. But I think you found, like Constable Lazenby, that,  
9 having gone into Force Headquarters, because of a rule  
10 that had been established, a lockdown, you weren't  
11 allowed to leave and go back to the scene?

12 A. That's correct, yes.

13 Q. You had intended to go back to the scene, had you?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. What was your reaction to that, that instruction?

16 A. Very frustrated, clearly, because it was ongoing. The  
17 scene was ongoing. The thought of secondary devices --  
18 now we're in a position where we know that was the last  
19 explosion. At that point, we didn't know that, we  
20 didn't know what was going on.

21 So whilst I wanted to get back certainly to assist  
22 Inspector Dermody and to carry on with what we'd been  
23 dealing with -- so there's a level of frustration around  
24 that -- at the same time, we didn't know exactly what  
25 was going on and we had to accept the fact that the

1 people telling us to stay had better knowledge of the  
2 overall situation than we did.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Did they? You knew that you wanted  
4 medical equipment at the scene, and you told them that  
5 at Force Headquarters.

6 A. Yes, in relation to that scene, yes, but as an overall  
7 picture of the four bombings, I don't know what the  
8 thought process was, I can't answer for them.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You don't have to. You had to obey  
10 your orders.

11 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: You did obey your orders?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. I understand -- did you, in fact, return to  
14 Tavistock Square at all that day?

15 A. I did, yes. The -- to collect the vehicle, as was said  
16 earlier, but not to go -- by the time I did go back, the  
17 inspector's message about it being dealt with or handed  
18 over to the Met and it being in hand had been passed on  
19 and I heard that.

20 Q. So you went back with Constable Lazenby to get the  
21 vehicle?

22 A. I can't remember going back with Constable Lazenby, no.  
23 I went back to get it and I ended up having to do -- to  
24 take the Assistant Chief Constable to Scotland Yard in  
25 it, so I know I went back to get it because I was

1 the driver, but I don't remember going back with  
2 PC Lazenby, no.

3 Q. But your return to the scene was limited to simply  
4 picking up the vehicle --

5 A. Yes, it was.

6 Q. -- and then going? Okay.

7 A. Yes.

8 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Thank you, Constable. Those are all  
9 the questions I have for you.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

11 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

12 MS GALLAGHER: Mr Sims, I represent the Hyman family, but  
13 I've no particular questions beyond those Mr O'Connor  
14 has asked about the particular casualties that you've  
15 described.

16 I do, however, want to just ask you a number of  
17 questions following on from the answer you've given to  
18 Mr O'Connor about considering that you needed further  
19 officers at the time and also obviously needing further  
20 equipment.

21 There's just two references that I want to take you  
22 to which were made much closer to the time. The first  
23 one is in a statement which you gave on 26 July 2005.

24 It's page 6, my Lady, for your reference.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

1 MS GALLAGHER: You describe, at that stage, an incident  
2 where you've stood on what you understand to be a piece  
3 of a human body.

4 A. That's correct, yes.

5 Q. At that stage, you say "Police mode began to kick in".

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. "I began thinking secondary devices, close the road, we  
8 can't cope, we need help and things like that were going  
9 through my mind".

10 A. That's correct, yes.

11 Q. Do you recall that thought process?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. So it's at that stage you began to think "We need more  
14 assistance"?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Similarly, on 9 July 2005 -- so only two days after the  
17 bombings -- you sent an email to a Gavin Hart. Do you  
18 recall that?

19 A. That's correct, yes.

20 Q. I'm not going to put it on screen, my Lady, but for your  
21 reference it's BTP58-1. I'm just going to read  
22 a particular paragraph from that to see if you recall  
23 this. You said:

24 "People started coming out of the BMA and they were  
25 brilliant. We started to get the wounded into the BMA.

1 I looked down and realised I was standing on what had  
2 been someone's torso. This galvanised me into thinking  
3 like a copper and, fearing a secondary device, I started  
4 trying to clear the road. We had no control and, as  
5 this was the last explosion, aid was slow in coming. If  
6 it had not been for the BMA staff's medical knowledge,  
7 more would have died on scene."

8 So that was your impression at the time, two days  
9 later?

10 A. That's correct, yes.

11 MS GALLAGHER: Thank you very much, Mr Sims, I've nothing  
12 further.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Yes, Mr Saunders?

14 Questions by MR SAUNDERS

15 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Sims, I just want your help, if I may. In  
16 your longer statement, 26 July, you refer to a casualty.  
17 Could we have back up, please, [BTP415-2]? You refer to  
18 the casualty as casualty A --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. -- and you describe that person as Chinese in  
21 appearance.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, that would sound as if it's the victim we know as  
24 Sam Ly.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. But then you come on to a deal with a separate casualty,  
2 casualty E.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. You were asked by Mr O'Connor, do you have any  
5 recollection -- and you will have heard both the  
6 officers who have given evidence this morning being  
7 asked by both of us about Shyanu Parathasangary, who was  
8 the Sri Lankan lady who was on the nearside of the bus  
9 in the rear-facing pair of seats, and you deal with  
10 seeing another person here as casualty E, so it's  
11 obviously not Sam Ly by description of what you said  
12 earlier.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. This person you refer to as clearly being dead --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- seated behind the middle set of doors on the pavement  
17 side of the bus.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. You weren't sure whether they were male or female --

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. -- although you thought they were white skin-coloured.

22 It sounds as if, if you've already been referring to

23 Sam Ly as casualty A, that E could, in fact, be

24 Shyanu Parathasangary. Do you think that's possible?

25 A. It is possible, yes.

1 Q. I don't want to go into too much detail, for your sake  
2 as well as everyone else, but we know that the two of  
3 them, although the seats backed on to each other, were  
4 within feet of each other when photographs were taken.  
5 So it sounds as if that's probably the scene you were  
6 observing.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Can I just then, on a separate matter -- because  
9 obviously those questions I ask because I represent that  
10 family, but I just have one other matter and that's to  
11 do with equipment.

12 Obviously you arrive and you and your two colleagues  
13 go straight into action with no equipment. You have no  
14 gloves, nothing at all available to you?

15 A. That's correct, yes.

16 Q. When the -- I'll use a neutral word. When the people  
17 come out of the BMA building, do they have any medical  
18 equipment?

19 A. No.

20 Q. Up until the time you leave the scene, have any medical  
21 ambulance, Fast Response Units, arrived, as far as  
22 you're aware?

23 A. No, not as far as I'm aware, no.

24 Q. That's all I'm asking you. Her Ladyship will hear  
25 evidence later as to when vehicles arrive. So you're

1 not aware of them. That's why, is it, you, at that  
2 stage, go off to the headquarters --  
3 A. Yes.  
4 Q. -- to look for equipment, because there is none?  
5 A. There's nothing there, yes, that's correct.  
6 Q. Her Ladyship has already heard some evidence that,  
7 because there were no stretchers, doors and tables were  
8 being used to carry people away from the scene of the  
9 explosion.  
10 A. That's correct, yes.  
11 MR SAUNDERS: Thank you very much indeed.  
12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions? Yes?  
13 Questions by MS SIMCOCK  
14 MS SIMCOCK: Very briefly, my Lady.  
15 Officer, just to help you with timing, in  
16 a statement that you gave on 26 July -- so much closer  
17 to the events in question -- you -- and it's at page 8,  
18 my Lady for your reference -- said this:  
19 "I would say that my whole involvement at the actual  
20 scene of the bus totalled approximately 10 minutes at  
21 the most."  
22 Does that sound about right to you now?  
23 A. It does. It sounds a little bit too long.  
24 MS SIMCOCK: Right, I'm very grateful, thank you.  
25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Has anybody else any questions? Yes,

1 Mr Gibbs?

2 Questions by MR GIBBS

3 MR GIBBS: Could I just clear up one matter, please,

4 Mr Sims? Back at Force Headquarters, the scene that met  
5 you, the main doors were closed, I think, weren't they?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Were there casualties perhaps from the Russell Square  
8 scene being dealt with in reception?

9 A. Yes, there were, there were people in there being  
10 treated.

11 Q. Were there some members of civilian staff within the BTP  
12 Force Headquarters there, but had most of the officers,  
13 apart from the very senior officers, in fact left the  
14 building to go to Russell Square and to wherever else  
15 they could help?

16 A. I can't answer that. I can only -- due to the layout of  
17 the building, it's not -- it's gone now, but it wasn't  
18 an open building, it was a long corridor with lots of  
19 offices off it, so I can only -- the people that I've  
20 named in my statement are the only people I know to have  
21 been there at the time. Who was or wasn't in the  
22 building outside of that, I don't know.

23 Q. We know from Mr Dermody's radio call timed at 09.53.07,  
24 to which we're adding a couple of minutes, that at the  
25 scene, he had, in his view, enough officers there then.

1 At the time that you left, had Mr Jones, the  
2 Specialist Response Unit officer, made himself known to  
3 you at the scene? Do you remember him?

4 A. I do remember him, yes. I passed him -- I didn't speak  
5 to him, but I passed him. He arrived on the scene and  
6 I recognised him because I've known him for years.

7 Q. We will see reference in the evidence to at least two  
8 other BTP officers, Constables White and  
9 Russell-Fenwick. Do you remember whether they were  
10 there when you left?

11 A. No, I don't remember that, no.

12 Q. You've already described a number of Metropolitan Police  
13 officers present at the time. How many Metropolitan  
14 Police officers are you conscious of having seen before  
15 you left the scene?

16 A. Three.

17 MR GIBBS: Thank you very much.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions for Mr Sims?

19 Thank you very much, Mr Sims. Thank you for trying  
20 to help and thank you for going to the scene so  
21 promptly.

22 A. Thank you.

23 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: My Lady, may I invite you to call  
24 Inspector Mark Perry.

25

1 INSPECTOR MARK PERRY (sworn)  
2 Questions by MR ANDREW O'CONNOR  
3 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Could you give your full name, please?  
4 A. I'm Inspector Mark Perry, Metropolitan Police, currently  
5 attached to Traffic Division.  
6 Q. Sorry, I didn't hear the last -- you're currently?  
7 A. Attached to Traffic Division.  
8 Q. If you could try to keep your voice up, inspector, the  
9 microphone in front of you doesn't actually amplify your  
10 voice.  
11 You're currently attached to the Traffic Division.  
12 I believe you were attached to the Traffic Division also  
13 in 2005?  
14 A. Yes, I was.  
15 Q. What were your duties then and, in particular,  
16 in July 2005?  
17 A. On the day in question, I was rostered late turn, but  
18 I had an early meeting, so I was in at Euston garage by  
19 about 8.00 in the morning.  
20 Q. What, on a normal day, would you have done on 7 July?  
21 A. Motorcycle patrol, 2.00 pm start.  
22 Q. 2.00 start? It follows that you weren't already out on  
23 patrol when the reports started coming in of incidents  
24 developing around London?  
25 A. That's correct, yes.

1 Q. Did you have a radio with you? Did you have one in your  
2 office? How was it that you became aware of what was  
3 starting to develop?

4 A. Both. I had a personal radio and there was one in the  
5 office that I was in.

6 Q. There came a time when you decided to get a motorcycle  
7 and go out on to the streets, obviously well before the  
8 time that you were due to go on patrol?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. What was it that caused you to take that decision?

11 A. Our control room was asking for officers to go, I think  
12 initially to Edgware Road, so I took the call.

13 Q. I see. So it was simply responding to a request for  
14 extra deployment?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. You got onto your motorcycle. Tell us something about  
17 the communications that you have while on the  
18 motorcycle. You have a radio, I assume, built into your  
19 helmet, is it?

20 A. We have speakers built into ear buds that fit into our  
21 ears that are individual moulds with a boom microphone  
22 and a coiled lead that then plugs into the motorcycle  
23 where the main radio is.

24 Q. Enabling you to use the radio as --

25 A. In helmet communications.

1 Q. -- you're moving along. If you do use the radio while  
2 you're moving, who is it that you have communication  
3 with?

4 A. The traffic and transport control room, which is  
5 Metrocom.

6 Q. That's a part of the Metropolitan Police Service?

7 A. It is, yes.

8 Q. But it is closely linked, as I understand it, with the  
9 civilian Transport for London, the bus company and so  
10 on?

11 A. If I recall correctly, Centrecom, which is the bus  
12 equivalent, and Metrocom, which is the  
13 Metropolitan Police side, are part of the same big  
14 control room, half of it is us and one half of it is LT.

15 Q. I see. Where did you go? You say you started from the  
16 Euston garage.

17 A. I was initially sent to Euston. On my way out of the  
18 garage, I was diverted to Aldgate where there was  
19 apparently another incident of similar size.

20 Q. So you made your way towards Aldgate, did you?

21 A. I tried to, but due to closures that were already in,  
22 I presumed for King's Cross, I ended up going south down  
23 Upper Woburn Place.

24 Q. Did you, in fact, go through Tavistock Square at that  
25 point?

1 A. I did, yes.

2 Q. This is before anything unusual was going on in  
3 Tavistock Square?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. I think you got as far as Russell Square, did you?

6 A. There was another closure again for yet another incident  
7 at Russell Square at that point.

8 Q. At that point, did you stop and talk to some other  
9 police officers?

10 A. I stopped, turned round initially, thinking to take  
11 a different route to Aldgate, and then I made some  
12 enquiries with the BTP officer who was on that closure  
13 as to what was happening from their perspective.

14 Q. Give us an idea of what sort of time it was when these  
15 events were taking place?

16 A. It would have been shortly before the comments on the  
17 CAD at 9.38. So 9.30, 9.35 perhaps.

18 Q. I see. I see. How long did you stay stationary at or  
19 near Russell Square talking to the BTP officers?

20 A. If I assume that I was there at -- stationary from about  
21 9.30, I stayed there until I saw the explosion.

22 Q. You say you saw the explosion, which, of course, was at  
23 or about 9.47. You weren't obviously, unlike  
24 Inspector Dermody and those with him, in a position  
25 to -- it wasn't in your direct line of sight?

1 A. I did actually see it. I was facing north at the  
2 junction --

3 Q. I see.

4 A. -- and at that time I had been in communications with  
5 Metrocom doing what we call basically brigading our  
6 resources, because it was clearly a major incident going  
7 on, and our first step would be brigade our resources in  
8 Central London and then deploy them to the cordons.  
9 I was actually looking north when it happened.

10 Q. It may be that I misunderstood what you said in the  
11 statement, but could you actually see the bus or was it  
12 simply the smoke and --

13 A. Just the smoke.

14 Q. I see.

15 A. I heard the explosion and I saw the cloud of smoke  
16 coming from the bus.

17 Q. Were you in any doubt at that point as to what had  
18 happened?

19 A. No, not at all.

20 Q. Could we have a look, please, at [INQ10121-1]?  
21 This, Inspector, is a CAD, which is, is it not,  
22 a printout of communications as they occurred  
23 contemporaneously?

24 A. Yes, it's a bit indistinct, I have a print, if I may use  
25 that.

1 Q. Can we enlarge, please, a sort of middle section? It's  
2 an entry at 09.48.13. There, yes. The call sign "0A",  
3 is that Oscar Alpha 1?  
4 A. Oscar Alpha 1.  
5 Q. Is that you?  
6 A. That is, or it was at the time.  
7 Q. It was at the time. I think this is the first call you  
8 made after the explosion. Do you have a memory of that?  
9 A. I suspect so, yes.  
10 Q. Perhaps, in fact, just for completeness, can we go back  
11 towards the top of the page, Inspector Perry, so you can  
12 correctly put this all into context?  
13 Let's go to the entry at 09.44, please. This,  
14 I think, is the first entry from you that we see on this  
15 CAD. This is before the explosion.  
16 A. This is one that was created by my first radio  
17 transmission saying that I suspected that it was  
18 a coordinated terrorist attack and we were to brigade  
19 resources and, at that point, our CAD room's  
20 understanding was still that it was a power surge.  
21 Q. I see.  
22 A. So I initially put that up on our main working channel  
23 and then the EX call signs I think are Special Escort  
24 Group people that were responding to my initial  
25 transmission, and the comment at 09.44 would be from the

1 control room.

2 Q. Just to be clear, this is you -- was it as a result of  
3 your discussions with the officers at Russell Square you  
4 forming an understanding that what was going on was --

5 A. I was highly suspicious before I got to Russell Square.  
6 The fact that there was yet another one at that location  
7 fairly confirmed it for me.

8 Q. I see. So you took the initiative, as it were, and sent  
9 a message which was responding to your understanding  
10 that what was going on --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- was not happenstance, but, rather, concerted attacks?

13 A. That's correct, yes.

14 Q. So when you say "All units to make way to Central  
15 London", that's intended to --

16 A. That would be all traffic OCU units, yes.

17 Q. I see.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So as far as you were aware, at 09.44  
19 your control room still understood that it was power  
20 surges going on?

21 A. Definitely, ma'am. We had a brief discussion over it,  
22 because, obviously, what I was asking for was outside  
23 the normal scope of our response to the incident as they  
24 understood it at the time.

25 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: As far as you were aware, the request

1 that all units should go into Central London --

2 brigading your resources, as you put it -- that's not

3 something that had already started to happen?

4 A. Certainly not on the traffic channel. The Met is a big

5 organisation and there are several working channels, but

6 certainly not on the one that I was on.

7 Q. This may be obvious, but it's only the traffic channel

8 that you would have had an awareness of at the time?

9 A. Yes, the in-helmet communications only allow one channel

10 at a time.

11 Q. We see, Inspector, another call from you made a minute

12 or so later at 09.45.39:

13 "All available units to TDC on standby."

14 Can you explain what that was intended to achieve?

15 A. TDC is the central traffic garage, which was very close

16 to where I was. It was where I was based, and I was

17 using that as a forward rendezvous point for our

18 resources to then deploy them -- effectively, my plan at

19 the time was to put one big traffic cordon round all

20 three incidents rather than three separate ones, and

21 just shut the whole area down.

22 Q. Was it your -- what you're describing is what one might

23 describe as a strategic decision, to put a cordon round

24 the three sites that you were then aware of:

25 Russell Square/King's Cross, Aldgate and Edgware Road.

1 Was that a decision that was for you to take on your  
2 motorcycle at Russell Square, or was it something that  
3 would more properly be decided at Command level?

4 A. This was the nature of the conversation that I was  
5 having with the control room. They quite rightly wanted  
6 to verify what I was saying and the reasons that I was  
7 saying it.

8 Q. I see. So would it be fair to say that these were  
9 suggestions you were making, rather than necessarily  
10 decisions that were there for to you take?

11 A. As far as I was concerned, it was a decision.

12 Q. As it turned out, things took a further turn within  
13 a minute or so of these calls that you had made?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. I think --

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Presumably -- forgive me -- there are  
17 all sorts of reasons why you need to swing into action  
18 to cordon off the sites. I mean, could you just sort of  
19 list them briefly and what are the reasons?

20 A. There is a major incident plan. The London Emergency  
21 Services Liaison Panel has a major incident plan which  
22 all the emergency services in London follow. One role  
23 within that is Bronze traffic, which would be the ground  
24 commander for traffic, and that would be the role that  
25 I would ordinarily expect to take on in a preplanned or

1 spontaneous major incident where I was deployed as part  
2 of traffic division.

3 So at that time, my thought processes were that this  
4 was a major incident. As the nearest inspector from  
5 traffic to it, my role would automatically be Bronze  
6 traffic and that was the role that I was thinking in at  
7 that time.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

9 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: We've become familiar with the idea of  
10 a Bronze officer being one who, as it were, has  
11 a responsibility for one particular scene -- so, for  
12 example, we have Bronze medics at each of the  
13 bombsites -- but do I understand that your description  
14 of your Bronze traffic role would be one that possibly  
15 would encompass all of the sites?

16 A. Bronze is either a sector, a geographical sector, or  
17 a defined role, and in case of Bronze traffic, it's  
18 clearly a defined role.

19 I doubted we would have three or four inspectors on  
20 for the different scenes that we'd got at the time, and  
21 also, for dealing with something as significant as what  
22 was going on on the day, which was quite unprecedented,  
23 you needed enough room to work to get the ambulances and  
24 the Fire Brigade in to get the casualties away, and it  
25 is always my preference to go slightly larger on an

1 incident and then scale it back when you don't need  
2 stuff, than to start off too small and then have to keep  
3 building it up.

4 So Edgware Road aside, everything was fairly  
5 concentrated within the area of King's Cross and  
6 Russell Square, and it made sense, rather than have two  
7 overlapping sets of closures, two overlapping  
8 perimeters, to make it one slightly larger perimeter  
9 encompassing both sites.

10 Q. You say Edgware Road aside, but my understanding of what  
11 you were saying earlier was you had indeed intended to  
12 have one cordon which included Edgware Road?

13 A. Indeed. I suspect, as time progressed, bearing in mind  
14 this was all, as you said, mainly sat on a motorbike at  
15 the side of the road, but as time progressed, we might  
16 have isolated the Edgware Road side of it, but  
17 everything else was very close together, and I think, or  
18 I thought at the time, that the easiest way to do it  
19 would be to shut the thing down, get a perimeter round,  
20 it, which would be a traffic cordon -- the traffic  
21 cordon is the outer of the cordons that you have at  
22 a major incident -- and clear everything away so that we  
23 could actually have room to work.

24 Q. That was your plan at 09.44 and 09.45 and, as you say,  
25 it was a developing plan at that point. Things changed

1 in the next minute or so. You saw the smoke, you heard  
2 the explosion.

3 Now, I think, we can, in the chronology, look at the  
4 entry at 09.48, which is you responding to what you have  
5 seen and heard.

6 A. Again, half of my transmission is missing, but obviously  
7 the first thing I said was that there had been another  
8 explosion and then moved on to that. Very hard, I would  
9 imagine, for the control room to keep up with the  
10 typing.

11 Q. But what were you adding here to the plan that had been  
12 forming a few minutes before? You say:

13 "All closures must be searched for secondary  
14 closures."

15 A. All closures would be searched for secondary devices.  
16 Again, just absolutely standard procedure for these  
17 things.

18 Q. You were still stationary at Russell Square --

19 A. I was.

20 Q. -- or at or near Russell Square station at that point?

21 Moving down one entry, we see a further message sent  
22 by you two or three minutes later. Again, it seems to  
23 be only partially recorded here, but I think we can get  
24 the sense of it:

25 "This explosion is on a bus. Speak to LTB ..."

1 That would be?

2 A. London Transport buses.

3 Q. "... and tell them to stop all buses from and to Central  
4 London."

5 A. From and to, yes. Obviously, with the bus exploding,  
6 I was next to a BTP officer and the BTP were in front of  
7 it when it happened, so almost immediately on their  
8 radio channels it came up that it was a bus that had  
9 exploded, and then, at that point, as we'd had several  
10 separate incidents on the Tube system and then another  
11 one which was clearly an explosion on a bus, it was my  
12 concern that there were other devices on other buses,  
13 and my directions to the control room were to speak to  
14 LTB and just get buses to stop, get everyone off, have  
15 a quick search for a bag, and then retire to their  
16 garage, because we couldn't risk the chance of another  
17 explosion on another bus.

18 Q. We will be hearing more evidence about this very  
19 delicate question as to at what stage during the course  
20 of events such as this steps are taken such as closing  
21 the Tube network, closing the buses, how wide an area  
22 should be closed off.

23 Of course, one of the issues is that, although  
24 following the explosions on the Underground the  
25 Underground system was closed down, the bus system

1 wasn't closed down at that point, and we'll hear  
2 evidence that one of the reasons for that was that the  
3 bus system is very much needed when the Underground  
4 system hasn't been closed down, which is where one sees  
5 the balance to be struck here.

6 A. I felt that it would be better to inconvenience 10,000  
7 people for a couple of hours travelling than have  
8 another bus explode with people on it.

9 Q. Again, was that a decision that you felt it was for to  
10 you take, as you have described it, with your Bronze  
11 traffic role or was it more of a recommendation that you  
12 were passing back to the command centre?

13 A. Again, we did have a discussion with the control room  
14 and I think the control room felt that it should be  
15 taken by someone of a higher rank and, in truth, they're  
16 probably right, but they weren't there and I was.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You used the word "discussion"  
18 a couple of times, Inspector. Do I take it you were  
19 making your point quite forcibly?

20 A. Yes, ma'am.

21 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Your views weren't changed during the  
22 course of the discussion, I take it?

23 A. No, not at all.

24 Q. The discussion, I assume, only lasted a short time.

25 A. Two or three minutes, I think.

1 Q. Was it after that discussion that you made your way to  
2 Tavistock Square itself?

3 A. As soon as I'd accomplished or achieved agreement to get  
4 the buses evacuated, yes.

5 Q. In fact, the suggestion in your statement is that you  
6 arrived at the scene of the explosion something maybe  
7 between 5 and 10 minutes after the explosion. Would  
8 that be about right, do you think?

9 A. That would be about right. There was this discussion  
10 with the control room for a few minutes, and I think  
11 I should say I fully understand why they would question  
12 my decisions, because I was probably punching above my  
13 weight, but after I'd done that, I then made my way to  
14 the bus, but there were other officers and PCSOs and  
15 traffic wardens and all sorts making their way there.  
16 So as I went up towards it, I was putting in closures  
17 and telling them to put total closures in at those  
18 points as I went.

19 So instead of just accelerating up to the scene,  
20 I did stop at each junction, where there were other  
21 members of the emergency services and put closures in.

22 Q. In other words, you weren't rushing to the scene with  
23 getting there and responding to that explosion as your  
24 first priority. You were still, as you describe it,  
25 undertaking your role as a traffic officer?

1 A. I think, up until that point, I was trying to do both,  
2 but sort of making it up as I go along, really, but  
3 I was trying to get the cordons in because you do need  
4 cordons to deal with any bomb scene, but also I was  
5 making my way to it.

6 Q. You got there, and we've heard that you met  
7 Inspector Dermody at the scene of the explosion, near  
8 the bus.

9 A. Yes, I did.

10 Q. We've heard some evidence about another discussion,  
11 perhaps, that you had with him about him using his radio  
12 near the --

13 A. I'm not entirely sure of the phraseology, but, yes,  
14 there was a discussion.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'll write down "discussion" again.

16 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: You heard me -- you were in court this  
17 morning, I recall, you were in court listening to  
18 Inspector Dermody's evidence?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. You heard him say that he had adopted the Silver role at  
21 the scene of the bus and he understood that he passed  
22 that Silver role to you when you arrived --

23 A. That's correct, yes.

24 Q. -- although it may be that, for a time, you were both  
25 there and working in parallel, as it were?

1 A. He used the phrase "all hands to the pump", which it  
2 was, but in truth, I became responsible for the scene  
3 until I was relieved by Mr Summers.  
4 Q. That's Superintendent Summers --  
5 A. That's correct.  
6 Q. -- who arrived at about 10.15?  
7 A. That's correct.  
8 Q. If it's right that you arrived at about 10 minutes after  
9 the explosion, you would have been -- the period in  
10 which you had control would be some 20 minutes or so?  
11 A. That would be about right, yes.  
12 Q. What were your main concerns when you arrived at the  
13 scene of the bus?  
14 A. I spoke to Mr Dermody and I also spoke to some  
15 colleagues from the Transport OCU who were there. One  
16 of the first things that was indicated to me was the  
17 microwave box which was on the luggage rack at the front  
18 of the bus. Clearly, given the obvious fact that  
19 there's already been one explosion that --  
20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Just before you go on to the  
21 microwave, I couldn't catch it, and nor, by the looks of  
22 it, could the transcriber. You spoke to colleagues from  
23 the transport ...?  
24 A. Transport OCU. They were called the Safer Transport  
25 Command, ma'am.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Then you said you were  
2 worried about the microwave box, yes?  
3 A. There were very few fire and ambulance resources at the  
4 scene at the time, and I had called for as many as were  
5 available to come, because clearly there were a great  
6 number of casualties.  
7 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Just pausing there for a moment, were  
8 there, in fact, any, first of all, fire resources there  
9 at the time you arrived?  
10 A. There was a turntable ladder, and I know that it was  
11 there because I parked my motorbike behind it.  
12 Q. I see.  
13 A. So there was a crew with a turntable ladder.  
14 Q. Could we have another look at the photograph, the  
15 photograph we've seen more than once this morning?  
16 I think we see the ladder appliance that you refer  
17 to over on the right-hand side?  
18 A. That's correct.  
19 Q. I think it's right to say that that arrived at 09 --  
20 that arrived at -- the timing we have for the arrival is  
21 approximately 09.52. So was that there when -- already  
22 there when you got there?  
23 A. That was there when I arrived, definitely.  
24 Q. Is that your bicycle in the middle of the road there?  
25 A. It's possible, I don't know if it can be blown up at

1 all.

2 Q. Certainly a bicycle, it may or may not be yours.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Did you park in the middle of the  
4 road?

5 A. That's me on it, ma'am.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right.

7 A. Looking at that, the two motorcycles that you see in the  
8 bottom of the screen by the pillar box, those are DPG  
9 motorbikes and they arrived at the same time as me.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: DPG?

11 A. DPG, Diplomatic Protection Group.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

13 A. They arrived at the same time as me, they had first aid  
14 kits and went directly to do first aid. They spoke to  
15 me at the time, as I was off my bike, roughly where you  
16 see it. It's next to impossible to tell, but I think  
17 one of the chaps I'm speaking to is the EXPO dog  
18 handler, and I'm fairly certain this photograph must  
19 have been taken when I was leaving, which would make it  
20 about 20 past, 25 past 10. Certainly the DPG solos  
21 arrived at the same time as me, grabbed a casualty and  
22 went into the BMA courtyard. So this is probably  
23 20 minutes further on, 25 minutes further on from when  
24 the bomb happened.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

1 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: So the fire appliance we see just next  
2 to you was there when you arrived?  
3 A. Mm-hmm.  
4 Q. Do you recall there being any other fire appliances  
5 there when you arrived?  
6 A. Not that I recall, no.  
7 Q. As far as ambulances are concerned, our understanding is  
8 the first ambulance to arrive arrived at 09.57. It's  
9 probably about the same time as you. Do you remember  
10 there being an ambulance there when you got there?  
11 A. About a minute after I got there, I think it wasn't an  
12 ambulance, it was an Astra, one of their paramedic cars,  
13 was the first one that I saw.  
14 Q. I see. Well, it may be that the information we have is  
15 that there was in fact an ambulance there for a few  
16 minutes and then a fast-response vehicle arrived shortly  
17 after that?  
18 A. It is possible.  
19 Q. That puts you arriving there about ten minutes or  
20 perhaps a little more --  
21 A. That would fit.  
22 Q. -- after the time of the bomb. You described being  
23 concerned about the microwave, the box, the microwave  
24 oven. Did you understand from Inspector Dermody that  
25 the sniffer dogs had already checked the bus and checked

1 the microwave oven?

2 A. The sniffer dogs checked it after I had arrived and  
3 after Mr Dermody had handed it over.

4 Q. I see, I see. Do you know whether anyone had summoned  
5 the sniffer dog officers or whether they just --

6 A. I called for the standard explosives officer response to  
7 a suspect device. I presume they would have either  
8 attended on their own initiative or responded to that,  
9 but they were there a few minutes after I'd called for  
10 EXPO for the microwave box.

11 Q. I see. We may -- there may be time for me to just show  
12 you this reference.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Could we come back to it this  
14 afternoon, Mr O'Connor?

15 MR ANDREW O'CONNOR: Certainly.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm afraid, yet again, I have  
17 meetings during the luncheon break. 2.05, please.

18 (1.00 pm)

19 (The short adjournment)

20