

1 (2.05 pm)

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?

3 MS SHEFF: May it please your Ladyship.

4 Mr Barr, before lunch, I was asking you about your
5 contact and communications with BTP, ie through the NCC
6 and the MICC contact and communication, and I think,
7 just before we adjourned, you were referring to a button
8 in the Gold room by which you can talk directly to the
9 British Transport Police duty officer.

10 Now, is this Gold room the shared room between the
11 two offices of the NCC and the MICC?

12 A. There is no shared room. The Gold room is the London
13 Underground rostered duty officer's room. British
14 Transport Police have their own setup and we are not
15 part of it.

16 Q. You see, we heard from Inspector Taylor, who worked in
17 the MICC, which he describes as the BTP Control room.
18 So we're talking about the same communications centre,
19 aren't we?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. He said that the location of the MICC puts it next to
22 the NCC, which is the control room for
23 London Underground, who would always have a duty manager
24 and staff on duty at any given time. Of course, that
25 was you at that time.

1 He says there was a direct link between their duty
2 manager and the MICC duty officer by intercom system,
3 and you say there was no such intercom system?

4 A. I don't know what you mean by "intercom". Each of the
5 two desks had a dedicated telephone line, so if the duty
6 manager wished to speak with the MICC duty inspector,
7 they would press the button as in making a phone call,
8 and then wait for the duty inspector to answer, and it
9 worked the other way round as well. So it wasn't an
10 intercom in the context of you press a button and they
11 would respond immediately, it was a telephone, and it
12 took its place in the queue for the rest of the people
13 who wished to speak to either of the duty managers.
14 Of course, you would recognise who the call was from
15 and you would give that the level of priority that was
16 necessary. But it wasn't an intercom in the context of
17 you would be able to press it and get immediate feedback
18 and so on.

19 Q. Yes, that's what I'm getting at. It's no better, in
20 terms of emergency coverage, than an ordinary telephone
21 call and, as you say, it has to wait until all the other
22 calls have been taken which might be given priority?

23 A. That's correct, except that you can identify the caller
24 in the context of you get a light that is illuminated
25 and you would know who it was from.

1 Q. Inspector Taylor appears to believe that this is a more
2 direct link, because he describes it as the same setup
3 that BTP have also with City of London Police and
4 New Scotland Yard where he says, with the push of
5 a button, you're directly through to the duty officer?

6 A. With the push of a button, you're directly through to
7 the duty officer, that's correct, but --

8 Q. On an ordinary telephone call?

9 A. -- on a telephone. There is a console with a series of
10 five or ten lights, and when British Transport Police
11 phones the NCC, then that gets recognised by the system.
12 But that's as much as it is. So it's a telephone
13 handset.

14 Q. He also says that there is a room between the two
15 command centres which was intended to be used in cases
16 of major incidents, and he says it's a shared room in
17 which, not only are communications shared, but there's
18 a sharing of a bank of screens showing live CCTV, and
19 both BTP and LU computer systems.

20 Are you aware of that room?

21 A. No, in the context of the way you're describing it, it's
22 not like that. There are -- there is
23 a London Underground Gold room. In the
24 London Underground Gold room, we have access to the CCTV
25 which is the same CCTV that the British Transport Police

1 have and, at that point in time, there was a British
2 Transport Police computer screen which
3 London Underground, for Data Protection Act, was not
4 allowed to operate. It had to be operated by a British
5 Transport Police officer.

6 Q. But do you have access to it?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Are you able to come in and use that shared room --

9 A. No.

10 Q. -- if there's a major incident?

11 A. Well, it's a London Underground room, so there is no
12 dedicated joint room, there is no such thing.

13 Q. So no shared screens and no shared use of communication
14 systems?

15 A. We have communal access to the same pictures and, if
16 a BTP officer is in the Gold room, then they will log in
17 and will tell London Underground what's on the screens
18 because, for Data Protection Act, we're not allowed to
19 interrogate it. There is a London Underground --

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry, I assume this is advice that's
21 come from some lawyer that you can't interrogate
22 a machine in a major incident because of the Data
23 Protection Act? I find that hard to believe, Mr Barr.

24 A. We have no -- well, that was -- it may be apocryphal.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm afraid I'm always being told by

1 people on the telephone, "The Data Protection Act says
2 this". It doesn't.

3 A. Thank you for that.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Can you at least check, if that is
5 advice you have been given?

6 A. We do not have access to that computer system, for
7 whatever reason.

8 MS SHEFF: What I'm trying to establish, then, is how you
9 would get information from your own transport police,
10 then? You seem to indicate that that is only through
11 direct face-to-face contact or normal telephone calls.

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. So any system which it was thought had been set up in
14 order to share resources in just such a major incident
15 as occurred on 7/7 was not, as far as you were
16 concerned, effective on that day?

17 A. I don't know what previous thought is. I can only tell
18 you how I operated it or how my team operated.

19 Q. What you did to operate it was to go and find Chief
20 Superintendent ...

21 A. Crowther.

22 Q. Chief Superintendent Crowther, I'm grateful, and consult
23 with him, although your purpose at that time was to
24 discuss evacuation procedures and safety of passengers?

25 A. That's correct.

1 Q. When you spoke to him, you said that he was actually on
2 his way down from his office, he hadn't been into the
3 MICC room yet himself, had he?

4 A. I met him in his office.

5 Q. Had he been made aware of what was going on, as far as
6 you knew?

7 A. I believe he was aware that there were -- there was
8 a series of disruptions on the Underground.

9 Q. Did you discuss bombs with him?

10 A. No, not at that point, no.

11 Q. Did you ask him what sort of disruptions these could
12 relate to?

13 A. Not at that point, no.

14 Q. Didn't you feel that that would assist you to plan for
15 how you would deal with the organisation of the
16 evacuation as well as all the other aspects of the
17 derailment and, eventually, the Code Amber?

18 A. Given the levels of information which we had about power
19 disruption, my concentration, at that point, was on
20 evacuation of somewhere in excess of possibly 10,000,
21 20,000, perhaps more, customers, based on information we
22 had within the first quarter of an hour that there was
23 a power failure.

24 Q. You see, Detective Superintendent Crowther, very shortly
25 after your conversation, which I think took place about

1 9.10, didn't it?

2 A. Around that time, yes.

3 Q. You see, very shortly afterwards, he received a report
4 that this was bomb damage, this is some time between
5 9.16 and 9.22, and as a result, he put S013, the
6 Anti-terrorist Branch, on notice.

7 Now, were you ever made privy to that information?

8 A. I can't recall having that level of information at that
9 point in time.

10 Q. Well, did you continue your liaison with Detective
11 Superintendent Crowther that you'd initiated at 9.10?

12 A. Yes, I did.

13 Q. When did you see him or speak to him again?

14 A. I spoke to him regularly all the way through, you know,
15 to get updates and to give him updates on what we were
16 doing.

17 Q. Did you receive that information from him that this was
18 bomb damage at Aldgate?

19 A. Not at that point in time.

20 Q. Did you ask him about the disruption and what
21 information he had?

22 A. I was dealing on an interchange of information with him.
23 We were looking at how to evacuate 20,000 plus
24 customers.

25 Q. Was that your sole area of concern at the time, the

1 evacuation, or were you more concerned as to general
2 safety issues which might have resulted from there being
3 bombs and possibly further danger to passengers?

4 A. Clearly, I was concerned with all of them.

5 Q. You see, there are several entries on the NCC log which
6 refer to suspicions that the incidents may have been
7 terrorism and you referred to that yourself in your
8 answers to questions from Mr Keith.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. You had your suspicions --

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. -- about that. You must, therefore, have wanted to get
13 a bigger and more accurate picture about those
14 suspicions, must you not?

15 A. Yes, it's a natural thing to do when you you're managing
16 incidents.

17 Q. In order to do so, did you liaise with any other
18 agencies; for example, the Met Police?

19 A. No, my interaction is with British Transport Police, not
20 with Metropolitan Police.

21 Q. What about the City of London Police, you knew there
22 were problems at Aldgate?

23 A. No, I -- my sole reaction -- interaction on that
24 occasion was with British Transport Police.

25 Q. You say your sole interaction was with them.

1 A. Apologies, with the police agencies.

2 Q. With the police agencies. But you weren't restricted
3 just to speaking to them, were you; you were able, as
4 a major transport agency, to liaise with any of the
5 emergency services, knowing that there was all sorts of
6 chaos and disruption on the Tube lines?

7 A. I could have liaised with them, yes.

8 Q. You, I think, were aware fairly early on that ambulances
9 were being requested.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Whether it was for a power surge purpose, or whatever
12 the reason, did you think, perhaps, that it might have
13 been helpful to liaise with the London Ambulance Service
14 to find out what they were managing at the scene and
15 what information had come to light through their
16 intervention?

17 A. Well, I was aware of the conversations that were
18 happening between the Network Control Centre operators,
19 duty managers, and London Ambulance Service and British
20 Transport -- apologies, and London Fire Brigade on what
21 was going on at that point in time.

22 So I was aware that there was communication for
23 that.

24 Q. What were they telling you? Were they telling you about
25 serious injuries, blast injuries, and fatalities at

1 three scenes?

2 A. I was never told about blast injuries, that never came
3 into the conversation. Eventually, as we got through
4 the incident, I was told about fatalities and I was told
5 about casualties, and that was one of the decisional
6 points where we got to the evacuation of the system.

7 Q. What was that point, then, when you were finally told
8 about injuries, blast injuries and fatalities?

9 A. Well, that resulted in the instruction to evacuate the
10 Underground at about -- I can't remember the exact time,
11 it's in my statement. I think it was about 9.40 or
12 thereabouts.

13 Q. 9.40 was the evacuation of the Underground.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. So from the bombs going off at 8.49 until almost an hour
16 later, you had no information at all about blast
17 injuries or fatalities on your network because --

18 A. No, that's not what I said. I had no corroborative
19 information.

20 Q. What sort of corroboration were you looking for?

21 A. No confirmation that this was the case. There were
22 reports of explosions and reports of casualties. I've
23 talked about previous incidents that we had. We had
24 reports of casualties when the train hit the tunnel wall
25 at Camden Town. We had reports of casualties when there

1 was a derailment at Chancery Lane.

2 Q. That was all very early on, wasn't it, when there was
3 the initial chaos and people not really knowing what was
4 going on. Within a relatively short period of time,
5 certainly shortly after 9.00, it was clear to certainly
6 the controllers in the BTP that this was very serious.
7 Why were you not in possession of that information and
8 why did you not make yourself in possession of that
9 information?

10 A. Well, clearly, it was a serious incident, and it was for
11 that reason that we issued a Code Amber in order to find
12 out exactly what the key issues were, to get our
13 customers out of places of risk, which is on trains, and
14 to give us a level of time in order to establish exactly
15 what the key conditions were.

16 Q. You see, according to you, the Code Amber was issued at
17 9 --

18 A. Between 9.14 and 9.18 or thereabouts.

19 Q. Well, that was considerably before you say you knew of
20 any of the casualties. So what was the purpose of you
21 issuing the Code Amber at that point?

22 A. To get somewhere round about 200,000 customers out of
23 risk.

24 Q. Out of risk of what?

25 A. Whatever the issues were. There were a large number of

1 trains that may have been stalled. If it was traction
2 current issues, then trains were stalled. At that time
3 in the morning, all of those trains were full.
4 Therefore, we needed to get the customers out of there,
5 and also to stop trains carrying in to London and
6 bringing more people into an area where they're going to
7 be queued up in trains.

8 Therefore, the objective was to make sure that our
9 customers, albeit inconvenienced by standing on station
10 platforms or, in some cases, because the platforms were
11 full, being evacuated, to make sure that those customers
12 were not being brought into an area where they were
13 going to be trapped on stalled trains.

14 Q. Doesn't it make a great deal of difference to your
15 strategic planning as to whether you're dealing with
16 a situation of, as you have just described, stalled
17 trains and passengers getting stuck on them or
18 a situation where there are bombs on trains, and isn't
19 it appropriate for you to find out what the actual
20 situation is before you plan for it?

21 A. Well, the situation, we were endeavouring to find out
22 exactly what the key issues were, and I'm afraid that
23 takes time.

24 Q. You see, you say in your 6 January statement of this
25 year at paragraph 54 -- that's on page 15, my Lady --

1 you say:

2 "I understand, of course, given the enormity of what
3 occurred on 7 July 2005, it may seem surprising after
4 the event that it was not clear to me and my colleagues
5 earlier what had happened. Whilst I understand this, it
6 is a view formed with the benefit of hindsight."
7 You then go on to set out the difficulties you had,
8 which, of course, one can barely overestimate with the
9 chaos that must have ensued as a result of the problems
10 on the Tubes and the time it takes for people to go into
11 tunnels and find out what's going on and report.
12 But what you say at the bottom of the page is that:
13 "It is unrealistic to expect initial reports to be
14 precise and accurate. By way of illustration, in the
15 first hour, the NCC did not receive any reports,
16 confirmed or otherwise, from the scenes or any other
17 sources that the incidents with which we were dealing
18 were caused by bombs."
19 You see, what I suggest to you, Mr Barr, is that you
20 would literally only have had to have gone next door to
21 the MICC to find out about Inspector Munn, a passenger
22 on the train at Aldgate, who himself had said that there
23 were bombs, that this was clearly a serious incident,
24 and that LAS were required straightaway, and you also
25 have two train drivers ringing in after their trains

1 have been bombed to tell their controllers that there
2 are bombs on the trains.

3 MR KEITH: I'm so sorry to rise to my feet. This is an
4 important area, and I don't think it's right to assert
5 that two drivers phoned in to report bombs on their
6 trains.

7 MS SHEFF: Well, Timothy Batkin -- sorry, explosion, an
8 explosion.

9 MR KEITH: Mr Batkin referred to a bomb on a train.
10 Mr Wright and Mr Nairn were able to communicate that
11 there was an explosion, but not bombs.

12 MS SHEFF: Yes, thank you for that.

13 What they described was a situation of some concern,
14 and you must accept, must you not, that it's a serious
15 problem, when you have no information for the first
16 hour, what's often called the "golden hour", after these
17 explosions took place from any source as to what these
18 incidents were?

19 A. No, I had no corroborated information. There were
20 a series -- a significant amount of information which
21 was apocryphal, which I had not got any corroborated
22 information. There were reports of a series of
23 explosions. At no point was I told that there was
24 a bomb.

25 Q. Isn't that owing to a failure of resources, perhaps, on

1 your part, in not putting in place the necessary phone
2 calls or communications to other agencies to find out
3 more information?

4 A. Well, I believe that if Mr Crowther had identified it as
5 a bomb, he would have told me immediately.

6 Q. But one assumes that if Mr Crowther is bringing in the
7 Anti-terrorist Branch, he certainly has very strong
8 suspicions that it is a bomb?

9 A. I can't make any comment about Mr Crowther's
10 assumptions.

11 Q. But those were never passed on to you?

12 A. I didn't know, at that point, that the
13 Anti-terrorist Squad had been brought in.

14 I have to say, I'm not sure what difference that
15 would have made to my decisional process.

16 Q. Isn't it the case that you were rather more certain at
17 the time, though, Mr Barr, that these were bombs that
18 were causing the damage to the underground system, as
19 you suggested in your statement nearer the time on
20 17 August 2005? Do you have that statement in front of
21 you?

22 A. Can you direct me to it, please?

23 Q. Yes, of course. It's page 3.

24 A. Sorry, I have three statements. Which one are you --

25 Q. 17 August 2005. It's our reference INQ7679, page 3?

1 A. Right, thank you.

2 Q. Five lines down.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. "At about 09.11 hours, it was confirmed that the
5 incidents at 08.50, 08.51 and 08.53 hours were
6 explosions on trains within the Underground network
7 believed to be the result of terrorist activity and that
8 there was a high likelihood of loss of life, serious
9 injury to passengers. At 09.19 hours I ordered
10 a Code Amber alert."
11 Why did you take that view in your statement
12 in August 2005 and, yet, some five and a half years
13 later, you now take the view that that was not
14 a confirmed piece of information rather just
15 a suspicion?

16 A. Well, at the time when I made the statement, I had no
17 access to the information which I have subsequently had.
18 When I made that statement, it was in retrospect, which
19 I think I've identified, and I therefore -- all I had --
20 and the time, 09.11, came from the fact that that was
21 the time when we were informed about the Piccadilly Line
22 incident and, therefore, given where we were, and having
23 reviewed the subsequent telephone conversations,
24 I believe that that statement is inaccurate, which
25 I have declared.

1 Q. But you see, at the time, you're using the word
2 "confirmed", "It was confirmed that the incidents were
3 terrorist activity". What gave that you impression at
4 the time? What was it that made you think it was
5 confirmed?

6 A. Purely hindsight, I think. And --

7 Q. There must have been something that gave you the
8 impression that somebody had confirmed it, had
9 corroborated it to your standards of requirement?

10 A. I believe it was purely the timing and the information
11 from the -- rather, from the Piccadilly Line about that,
12 that was all I can think about.

13 Q. What information from the Piccadilly Line?

14 A. Well, that there had been something that had happened on
15 the Piccadilly Line. The report from the
16 Piccadilly Line duty operations manager to the Network
17 Operations Centre, the Network Control Centre.

18 Q. What information had been passed on? What had they
19 said?

20 A. It's in the statement which Mr Fitzgerald had phoned
21 Darren McCluskey.

22 Q. That information was sufficient at the time to make you
23 feel that there was confirmation that all of those
24 incidents were terrorist-related?

25 A. No, that information led me to think, retrospectively,

1 some four weeks later, that that was the case.

2 Q. You see, that would tie in with a lot of the evidence
3 that we've heard from managers and officers of various
4 emergency services who took the view that, cumulatively,
5 because there were targets of three separate Tube
6 stations or Tube trains at around about the same time,
7 that it was likely, given the experience of these sorts
8 of terrorist activities, to have been a coordinated bomb
9 attack.

10 Was that the lines upon which you were thinking?

11 MR KEITH: I'm so sorry to rise to my feet again. I'm sure
12 I'll be corrected if I'm wrong, but I don't understand
13 any witness to have given a precise time on behalf of
14 any emergency service --

15 MS SHEFF: No, I'm not suggesting there was any time --

16 MR KEITH: That there came a point that they knew -- if you
17 would allow me to finish, please --

18 MS SHEFF: Of course.

19 MR KEITH: -- that there was a point at which it was
20 understood that there was a bomb or a terrorist attack.
21 I hold no brief for Transport for London or
22 London Underground Limited, but I think, in all
23 fairness, that sort of broad assertion must be
24 particularised with a time.

25 MS SHEFF: No, my Lady, what I'm suggesting is that many of

1 the rescuers who came to the scene, or other controllers
2 who were aware of the nature of the other bombs or heard
3 of other explosions, took a view that it was very
4 suspicious that there were three attacks at the same
5 time, and, therefore, when they heard that information,
6 took the view that it was likely to have been
7 terrorist-related. That's what I'm suggesting.

8 Was that your view at that time, that once you'd
9 heard about the three disruptions all around the same
10 time, you took the view that, cumulatively, it was
11 likely to be terrorist-related?

12 A. No, I took the view that, cumulatively, we had an awful
13 lot of trains with an awful lot of people stalled. At
14 that point, and having reviewed my subsequent
15 correspondence -- telephone calls, if that had been my
16 conclusion, I would have stated that. I didn't.

17 Q. An awful lot of trains stalled wouldn't have caused, as
18 you say here, a high likelihood of loss of life and
19 serious injury to passengers, would it?

20 A. No, as I've said, that statement was made in
21 retrospective view and was incorrect.

22 Q. But five years later, isn't your view even more
23 retrospective?

24 A. Well, I can only say that I've reviewed the telephone
25 calls.

1 Q. Wasn't it more likely to be more accurate at the time
2 when the events were still fresher in your mind?

3 A. I was referring to logs which -- all of our logs had
4 been taken. The only log which I had was a copy of the
5 NCC duty manager's -- a copy of it, and I took that
6 wrong and I was therefore incorrect in my assertion.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: When you sent out your Code Amber,
8 you said earlier to Mr Keith that it would be better if
9 the emergency services could be informed at the same
10 time as you send it out, so in other words, presumably,
11 "We've received reports of explosions and casualties and
12 thousands of passengers possibly trapped, have issued
13 a Code Amber".

14 A. Yes.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: That would, of course, have alerted
16 everybody to what you were doing and presumably also
17 alert them to the fact that they should keep you
18 informed of what they knew.

19 Is there such a system in place now that, if you
20 issue a Code Amber, the other emergency services would
21 be alerted at the same time?

22 A. There is no specific system in place, my Lady.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Has any thought been given to it?

24 A. Well, clearly, it's an issue which we are now looking
25 through, as a result, I guess, of this inquiry. I'm, in

1 fact, about to take up a new role which has that
2 specific operational interface with the fire, police and
3 ambulance as part of my duties.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You see, it sounds as if
5 London Underground weren't sufficiently in the loop for
6 the emergency services procedure, or is that unfair, do
7 you think?

8 A. No, I think that's fair.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So back in 2005, you think that would
10 be a fair comment?

11 A. I do.

12 MS SHEFF: Thank you, my Lady.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry to interrupt, Ms Sheff.

14 MS SHEFF: Not at all, my Lady.

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So not kept sufficiently in the loop
16 with the sharing of information, as it were, receiving
17 from and sending to, it's both -- it's a two-way thing,
18 is it not?

19 A. Yes, it is, my Lady. We were in close contact with
20 British Transport Police, but I think our focus was
21 primarily on the rescue of a very, very large number of
22 customers at that point.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: But now we know, with hindsight, what
24 it was, plainly it would have been better if there were
25 a system in place whereby you could, as it were, not

1 just be directed through one organisation because that
2 makes you heavily dependent just on the BTP, doesn't it?

3 A. Yes, it does.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

5 MS SHEFF: Yes, thank you.

6 So there was a problem with the information coming
7 in to the NCC and, as a result, or, in any event,
8 a problem with the information going out from NCC to its
9 staff?

10 A. In this sort of incident, there is always a priority
11 that you put on the messages. The information going out
12 would -- we would consider the line control staff and
13 the duty operations manager as the primary receptor of
14 our core information, and then on a -- I think probably
15 clearly British Transport Police also as a fundamental
16 receptor of that information. But then you get almost
17 like concentric circles of the need to send information
18 out.

19 I was aware that London Buses had been communicated
20 to, and indeed, with -- two or three minutes before
21 I issued the Code Amber, I had sent the message through
22 to CentreComm that we were doing that for, as yet,
23 reasons unspecified.

24 Q. That was your only communication with CentreComm, that
25 you were issuing a Code Amber?

1 A. That was my only direct communication. However, the
2 duty managers had been in fairly regular contact with
3 CentreComm giving them information as to the line
4 closures and what was happening.

5 Q. Did you tell CentreComm why you issued the Code Amber?

6 A. I said that we have to evacuate our customers and, to
7 the best of my recollection -- and I'm afraid it is like
8 that -- that we needed to get customers out. I did not
9 specify that it was terrorism because, at that point,
10 I had no confirmation of such.

11 Q. Did you discuss with them whether there was any danger
12 to the bus network?

13 A. That's -- that wasn't within my remit, so the answer is
14 "no".

15 Q. Did you, at that stage, think that there was any further
16 danger to the Tube system?

17 A. Which is exactly why we had issued the Code Amber, yes,
18 of course there must be a danger to the system, because
19 then we subsequently, having got all of our customers
20 out, post the clearance of the lines, I also issued
21 a Code Red because I became a bit worried in case people
22 started moving trains which had not been adequately
23 searched.

24 Having had all of our customers out, I then removed
25 all of the train operators from their cabs and then we

1 went through a significant search regime that took
2 a number of hours.

3 Q. Did anybody inform you of the comments made by
4 DCI Lawson, who was a British Transport Police officer,
5 who was of the view, and called MICC to that effect at
6 8.51, that there was a danger to the entire transport
7 network system?

8 A. When you have a power failure, there is always a danger
9 to the entire transport system because of the nature of
10 the number of people who are stalled and trapped on
11 trains. We have had previous history where we've had to
12 walk people along the track and, in this case, we
13 actually had to do that as well.

14 Q. Because he wasn't just an ordinary police officer at the
15 scene. He was actually -- he designated himself Silver
16 on scene for BTP at Aldgate, and he was responsible for
17 coordinating the response of the various organisations.
18 So ideally, it would have helped you, would it not,
19 to have known that he was on scene and he took the view
20 that there was a wider danger and, as a result, he in
21 fact closed Liverpool Street station.

22 A. Well, I had to have that information.

23 Q. Sorry, mainline station, I should be specific.

24 A. I had to have that information from British Transport
25 Police, because they would have to make the assessment

1 based on the information that their officer was giving
2 them.

3 Q. That was the decision that he took at 09.23, and at
4 09.30, it was further noted in the log that he thought
5 the transport system in London was under attack and he
6 ensured that that was communicated through to MICC, but
7 again, not information that you had access to?

8 A. Not definitive information, but by then we had already
9 started looking towards evacuating.

10 Q. If you'd known that earlier, would you have communicated
11 that on to CentreComm?

12 A. If I'd been given that information, I would have told
13 them why we were doing what we are doing. I'm not in
14 a position to make any statement about the threat
15 towards London buses.

16 Q. Would you have passed on the information that Silver BTP
17 at the scene thought that the whole of the
18 London Transport network was under attack? Wasn't that
19 information that they were entitled to and upon which
20 they might have acted?

21 A. Well, I would have transmitted that information if
22 British Transport Gold had asked me to do so, but my
23 information came through BTP Gold, in the same way as
24 there were numbers of Silvers at stations for
25 London Underground and I expected those people to

1 interface with their opposite number Silvers, I was
2 having the interface with Gold. I would not communicate
3 direct with a BTP Silver.

4 Q. With respect, Mr Barr, the question was: if you had that
5 information, would you have passed it on?

6 A. Hindsight always implies --

7 Q. Of course, we understand that.

8 A. So --

9 Q. That would have been useful information for London buses
10 to have?

11 A. It would have been useful information, but I'm not in
12 a position to make any technical comment about the
13 threat to London buses, nor would I.

14 Q. No, I'm not asking you about that, just about what
15 information you thought it worth sharing.

16 The communication then regarding Code Amber was the
17 only time that you had any direct contact with
18 CentreComms and you told them that the purpose of this
19 was simply to protect your passengers by evacuating them
20 safely?

21 A. Yes, but also that they should expect 200,000 people on
22 the streets of London.

23 Q. Right. You say that your duty managers were also giving
24 them information.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Was that specifically regards the evacuation or did you
2 know whether they gave any other information about
3 causes?

4 A. It was on a variety -- not about causes, no. It was on
5 a variety of key issues which were going on because, in
6 order to -- for our customers to use London buses, we
7 had to get a thing called ticket acceptance between us
8 so that a customer could go on to a London bus, show
9 their rail card and not have to pay a fare.

10 Q. Yes, and that was put into effect and the buses were
11 used for that purpose in order to move people around
12 from outside of the Tube stations and around or out of
13 central London.

14 Just a couple more matters. Can we have up on
15 screen, please, INQ10483?

16 Thank you very much. Can we have the entry at
17 09.32.37?

18 Earlier, in answer to questions from Mr Keith, you
19 said that your concern on the day was the rescue
20 operation and it was suggested to you that those
21 involved in that rescue operation didn't receive any
22 information from you, and you accepted in retrospect
23 that was right.

24 But wasn't there also some inaccurate information
25 that was being put out, because, at 09.32, when Morden

1 station contacted you requesting an update, you
2 explained that there were three explosions and that they
3 were not believed to be terrorist-related.

4 How were you able to say that at 09.32?

5 A. Well, that wasn't -- I didn't answer that telephone
6 call. That's from one of the duty managers.

7 Q. Where was he getting that information from?

8 A. On from the general situation reporting from around the
9 system.

10 Q. But you weren't suggesting, at that time, that it was
11 certainly not terrorist-related. At that time, your
12 suspicions were that it may well be terrorist-related
13 which were confirmed some, what, eight minutes later or
14 so?

15 A. Yes, but it's a case of, once you have got that
16 confirmation, I then give an instruction to evacuate the
17 Underground, which I did.

18 That particular telephone call I had no involvement
19 in.

20 Q. Was this the general party line, as it were, that there
21 was to be a calming of the network by telling people
22 that there was -- not only that there was no information
23 that it was terrorist-related, but that it was not
24 believed to be?

25 A. That's an individual operator who's giving a personal

1 opinion.

2 Q. So it's not come from any direction that you gave to
3 your operators on the system?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Thank you. Can I ask you also about the fact that there
6 was a great deal of media interest in what was going on
7 at the scenes and, as Mr Keith suggested, various
8 members of your staff were receiving information through
9 the media, through Sky TV specifically, which was giving
10 them more accurate information than they were getting
11 from NCC?

12 Did you view any of these television broadcasts, and
13 did you take a view as to what was going on as a result?

14 A. Yes, we have the availability of Sky Television. The
15 assumption or assertion that the television information
16 was more accurate than the information from NCC is
17 a retrospective assertion, because the information -- we
18 can only give out the information we have and we were
19 watching Sky Television as well, but before we give out
20 information about terrorist attacks and specific
21 details, we have to have corroborative statements.
22 There were no such corroborative statements at the time
23 when Sky Television was putting out that press
24 statement.

25 Q. We know from the CentreComms operations director,

1 Mike Weston, that in fact the CentreComms communications
2 room was heavily crowded because everyone was in there
3 watching Sky on television. Was it the same in the NCC
4 room?

5 A. Access to the NCC is controlled. There were a number of
6 very senior managers for the Underground, but part of
7 the role of myself is to ensure that the situation room
8 does not get out of handling ability, if you like, and
9 we had to fairly disrespectfully ask some extremely
10 senior managers to leave, and that was done.

11 Q. But if Sky TV were getting their information from people
12 on the scene and were disseminating that information on
13 TV, then again, wouldn't it have been appropriate for
14 you to find out through more direct means what was going
15 on triggered by what you were seeing on screen?

16 A. I believed, and still think, that, at the time, I was
17 getting adequate and correct information from British
18 Transport Police.

19 Q. But you just weren't getting that information, were you?

20 A. There was a constant flow of information from across the
21 system. None of them were indicative of bombs. There
22 were a number of statements about explosions which we
23 were following up, but, as I've explained earlier on
24 this morning, when you have a high capacity cable that
25 ruptures, it has a similarity with a bang and noise and

1 a flash, and that's what we thought we were dealing with
2 up until fairly sort of close to the point we made the
3 evacuation decision.

4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think that's not quite right, is
5 it? The information you were receiving was indicative
6 of bombs, but it was also indicative of other things you
7 say?

8 A. I apologise.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: "Consistent with" is perhaps a better
10 expression.

11 A. Yes.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It wasn't that the reports weren't
13 consistent with bombs, but you say they were consistent
14 with other things.

15 A. Yes.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: But you weren't in a position to
17 exclude bombs, were you?

18 A. Nor did we, my Lady.

19 MS SHEFF: Nor did you make any efforts to establish
20 yourself which it was?

21 A. I was in discussion with British Transport Police, and
22 that's the authority that I would discuss it with.

23 Q. So you were reliant on information coming to you from
24 them, is what you're saying, and from nobody else?

25 A. And from information that we could glean from the site.

1 Q. Finally this: you say in your statement that the
2 centralisation of emergency service calls through NCC
3 enables a collective and overall picture of incidents on
4 the network. That isn't actually what happened on
5 7 July at all, is it?

6 A. Within the first 30 minutes or so, because of the nature
7 of what was going on, we could have benefited from more
8 information. Once we got the Code Amber, and once we
9 got the system stabilised, then the levels of
10 information that were being gleaned by people in the
11 control room were extremely accurate.

12 Q. That was nearly an hour later.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. So you'd lost that golden hour.

15 A. Well, no, we hadn't, because at 09.20 or thereabouts, we
16 had evacuated people from an area of risk.

17 Q. But you must accept, mustn't you, that that
18 centralisation concept through the NCC to enable you to
19 get the overall picture just didn't work, did it, not in
20 the early stages, anyway?

21 A. In hindsight, it could have been better, I accept that.

22 MS SHEFF: Yes. I have no further questions, thank you.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Gallagher?

24 Questions by MS GALLAGHER

25 MS GALLAGHER: Mr Barr, in your statement to the police

1 in August 2005, you referred to having been employed by
2 London Underground in a variety of roles for the
3 previous 39 years, so back to the mid-1960s, is that
4 right?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. Your current role, the network coordination manager,
7 you'd been in post since 2002?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. So very experienced in that role and very experienced
10 more generally in London Underground?

11 A. I have a fair amount of experience, yes.

12 Q. Obviously that particular role, as we've heard, involves
13 responsibility for managing the emergency organisation
14 on the whole of the London Underground network,
15 including contingency and emergency planning, Command
16 and Control arrangements?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. Could I begin, against that background, by exploring, if
19 I may, your evidence earlier about the focus at the time
20 in 2005 being based on single-point attacks, based on
21 your previous experiences.

22 You referred to over 20-plus years of experience,
23 presumably referring to your experience in
24 London Underground since the mid-1960s?

25 A. Since I came into Command and Control, probably

1 mid-1970s.

2 Q. Mid-1970s. Presumably that was a reference to primarily
3 Republican terrorism related to Northern Ireland?

4 A. I'm not aware who the perpetrators were. I only deal
5 with the impacts.

6 Q. What you actually said in evidence was "singular attacks
7 because that's what our previous history had been, with
8 the exception of 1991", you mentioned the single
9 exception from 1991.

10 Could we just explore that, because even with
11 reference to Republican terrorism, Mr Barr, wasn't the
12 focus on singular, single-point attacks problematic?
13 Because, in that time that you've referred to, since the
14 early to mid-1970s, the 1991 incident wasn't one
15 exception which was unusual, and in fact there were
16 multiple examples of the Real IRA, the Provisional IRA
17 using, as a modus operandi, multiple sites and multiple
18 bombs.

19 Just to give some examples, indeed the first one was
20 actually on the Underground network on the public
21 transport network. In 1973, Mr Barr, there was an IRA
22 bombing of King's Cross, two different explosions,
23 50 minutes apart, one at King's Cross in the booking
24 hall, one 50 minutes later in the snack bar at Euston.
25 In 1974, there were bombings in Dublin and Monaghan,

1 two separate locations, within a short period of time
2 apart, and similarly, simultaneous blasts that year in
3 Birmingham, two separate sites, two separate pubs, and
4 again in Central London, in 1976, you've got multiple
5 explosions in the West End. 1982, you've got two
6 separate IRA bombs in Central London, in Hyde Park and
7 Regent's Park, under two hours apart, both of which
8 killed soldiers on ceremonial duty.

9 Even more recently, Mr Barr, in 1992, there was an
10 example of there being two IRA bombs in central
11 Manchester, one a car bomb in the commercial district
12 and the other near an Anglican cathedral.

13 So even against the backdrop of Republican bombings,
14 isn't it problematic to say, as you said in evidence
15 earlier, that our previous history was a history of
16 singular attacks?

17 A. Sorry, I was referring to London Underground. I have no
18 comment or knowledge of any other attacks because
19 I wasn't in a position to be aware of those. I can only
20 deal with the London Underground incidents.

21 Q. Well, Mr Barr, there's two points in respect of that.
22 Firstly, if by "our previous history" you mean
23 London Underground only, isn't that difficult, given
24 that you're responsible for managing the emergency
25 organisation on the part of the whole London Underground

1 network, and if the experience you're focusing on is the
2 experience of London Underground only, without looking
3 at the modus operandi of groups that pose a threat to
4 you, doesn't that inevitably mean that your approach is
5 going to be somewhat blinkered and you're going to miss
6 obvious risks?

7 I suggest there were obvious risks throughout that
8 period from the early 1970s, there were obvious risks,
9 even from traditional, Republican-based terrorism, in
10 respect of multiple sites. That's the first point.
11 The second point, Mr Barr, is even within
12 London Underground itself, you've got the 1991 incident,
13 but also the 1973 incident at King's Cross and Euston,
14 and neither of those things seem to have been factored
15 in when you say that your focus, in 2005, was on
16 singular attacks only.

17 A. Okay, may I respond?

18 Q. Of course.

19 A. The issues concerning the strategy as applied to
20 London Underground for security is not an area that I'm
21 involved in. We have a -- there's a team and there's
22 a number of people who deal specifically with an
23 organisation called Transec. They will make the
24 assessment of the threat risk and will inform the
25 network exactly what the issues are.

1 The ones in 1973, I was involved in incidents, I was
2 not involved in Command and Control at that point,
3 because I happen -- I was a breakdown engineer and was
4 responsible for rerailing trains. So, yes, in -- from
5 my time-space over 20 years, since I've been involved in
6 Command and Control, those issues are not encompassed.
7 But for the issue for the wider context of general
8 security, then that's not an area I'm cognisant with.

9 Q. Of course, and, Mr Barr, I certainly don't want to shoot
10 the messenger and we understand that you were
11 implementing a system which was in place.
12 You've told us in evidence earlier that towards the
13 back end, that's how you referred to it, of 2004/2005,
14 there was an intended shift in emphasis to look at how
15 to handle multisite explosions, and you accepted that,
16 tragically, it hadn't been implemented by the time of
17 7/7.

18 But by this stage, Mr Barr, this is almost six years
19 after 9/11 with multiple attack points in the US, and
20 it's also 16 months after the Madrid bombings
21 of March 2004 when a series of bombs exploded within
22 minutes of each other in a European capital on a public
23 transport system killing 191 people.

24 Was there no shift, if not on your part, Mr Barr, on
25 the part of those directing you, post 9/11 or, more

1 recently, post 11 March 2004 to focus on multiple
2 attacks and, in particular, following Madrid, the risk
3 of multiple attacks in a European capital on a public
4 transport system?

5 A. I'm not qualified to answer that question. I can only
6 tell you that, as a result of Atlantic Blue and one or
7 two previous exercises, we felt there was a need to
8 change the way that we managed it and we were in the
9 process of doing that.

10 Q. Mr Barr, I'll leave that there. You were asked earlier
11 about the hallmarks of a multipoint attack and how it
12 might manifest itself to the NCC. Your initial answer
13 was you'd expect to hear reports of devices. My learned
14 friend, Mr Keith, pressed you on other early indications
15 such as multiple reports of explosions, smoke in the
16 tunnel, various locations. You answered that those
17 symptoms weren't inconcurrent with other earlier
18 problems that you'd had that morning, and you gave
19 a similar answer to my Lady when you referred to the
20 high capacity kilovolt cable.

21 But, Mr Barr, you've also been taken by both
22 Mr Keith and Ms Sheff to a number of calls shortly after
23 9.00 am when there were multiple requests for ambulances
24 and a reference was made to Steve Gozka's call in
25 respect of Edgware Road in particular about something

1 going badly wrong and reference to a big incident, those
2 calls at 09.03, 09.06. So far earlier than the
3 Code Amber and certainly far earlier than the Code Red.
4 Isn't it right, Mr Barr, that, at this time,
5 reference was also made to a person being under a train?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And reference being made in a subsequent call to that
8 person having legs missing?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. So traumatic injuries?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. At that time, Mr Barr, weren't there also references to
13 walking wounded?

14 A. There were references to people coming off of trains
15 with -- covered in soot and with some blood on their
16 face, yes.

17 Q. For your reference, Mr Barr -- I know you have the
18 statement in front of you -- paragraph 49 of your
19 statement, if that assists -- did you consider those
20 reports of those traumatic injuries, an individual at
21 Edgware Road having their legs missing, and walking
22 wounded, to be consistent with the indication that power
23 failure had caused the problems?

24 A. That particular set of injuries is consistent with
25 someone having walked down a tunnel and lain across the

1 track. It is not at all unusual for people to have
2 limbs amputated by the wheels of the train, and, you
3 know, that was part of it.

4 Looking across -- if you have a train that hits the
5 tunnel wall, that is pretty traumatic in itself.

6 A train hitting the tunnel wall can cause damage where
7 the doors are disrupted, where the glass on the train
8 becomes damaged and will fracture and break, and that
9 will therefore mean that people may well have facial
10 injuries because of flying glass and that sort of thing.
11 So there are parallels in the context of the reports
12 that we were getting with a train hitting a tunnel wall
13 and/or with a person underneath the train.

14 Q. Certainly. A number of issues on that, Mr Barr. First
15 of all, the reference to the train hitting the tunnel
16 wall, that seems to come from the 8.59 call from
17 Steve Gozka. It's INQ10483-2. It's 08.59.17 when
18 Steve Gozka contacts NCC to inform them that it looks
19 like a train has hit the tunnel wall going towards the
20 Paid Street junction.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. But the difficulty, Mr Barr, is that it's in later calls
23 from Mr Gozka and others at Edgware Road when reference
24 is made to the person with the legs apparently missing,
25 and when reference is made to the walking wounded and,

1 in fact, Steve Gozka, the originator of the message
2 about the train having hit the wall, at that stage is
3 referring, as Mr Keith indicated earlier, to being very
4 concerned and convinced that it's terrorist-related.

5 So, in fact, the earlier reference -- the wrong
6 reference -- to the train having hit the tunnel wall
7 seems to persist, despite the later calls, some of which
8 are from the same person, from Steve Gozka, making clear
9 that his impression of the scene has very much changed?

10 A. Well, that's -- we have a -- in order to make
11 a situation assessment, you assess the various levels of
12 information that you get. I don't believe that Mr Gozka
13 actually said, "What I said earlier was wrong", all that
14 that did was become an additive to the levels of
15 information that we have.

16 Q. Mr Barr, as you've indicated in oral evidence now and as
17 you also say in paragraph 49, you didn't necessarily
18 think that those reports of injury, including walking
19 wounded, were that unusual, and you didn't think that
20 the traumatic injuries even would be that unusual, it
21 might be consistent with someone lying on the track or
22 a train hitting the wall. You say in paragraph 49 that
23 walking wounded could be, for example, when a large
24 number of passengers have struggled to get off trains.
25 Is that right?

1 A. That's correct. I wouldn't seek to minimise the levels
2 of consideration that we had to put into it, but
3 nonetheless, it was commensurate with that type of
4 damage.

5 Q. Isn't the difficulty, Mr Barr, this: even if all the
6 individual occurrences could be explained by reference
7 to routine occurrences, so the smoke being due to
8 a problem with the high capacity volt cable, the walking
9 wounded being due to crush when they're getting off the
10 train in a rush, serious injuries such as loss of limbs
11 being due to a train hitting the wall or someone
12 attempting to self-harm or commit suicide by lying down
13 in front of the track, isn't the problem the cumulative
14 impact of the information which you were receiving and,
15 instead of taking the cumulative impact of all of that
16 information, instead your mindset, Mr Barr, as is
17 evident from your evidence today, but also from your
18 statement, was to explain each of those separate things
19 happening at the same time in multiple locations by
20 reference to routine events?

21 A. I hardly call, with respect, a train hitting a tunnel
22 wall to be routine. It is a very, very serious
23 incident, and we were trying to make a situation report
24 on the overarching process that was going on by -- the
25 only way we could do it was glean the levels of

1 information which were coming through, and that's
2 exactly the way the information came through: at one
3 point, there was a power failure; at another point,
4 there was a report of a train hitting the tunnel wall
5 and so on.

6 And, as you build it up -- and any agency that's
7 involved in emergencies can only do that, they can only
8 make an assessment as the information comes through.

9 Q. But isn't the point, Mr Barr, of the NCC, and your role
10 in particular, that you're supposed to have an
11 understanding of when the whole is greater than the sum
12 of the parts and, rather than assuming that smoke in the
13 tunnel must be due to, albeit a serious, a one-off
14 individual incident in that particular location, and
15 that the traumatic limb injuries reported at
16 Edgware Road were due to something, coincidentally,
17 totally unrelated and that the walking wounded may be
18 due to, again, something, coincidentally, totally
19 unrelated, shouldn't you, at this time, have been taking
20 account of the cumulative impact of that material?

21 A. That's exactly what I was doing. I was assuming
22 nothing. I was making sure that we could build up
23 a corporate picture so that we could take effective
24 action for the 200,000 customers who were in our train
25 service.

1 Q. Just two more matters on this, Mr Barr. You were asked
2 earlier about what hallmarks you would look out for.
3 Your first answer was reports of devices. What are the
4 hallmarks you would now look out for in respect of
5 a multisite incident?

6 A. Well, given that this is the first time in the UK or,
7 indeed, Western Europe that we've had a suicide bomber,
8 then clearly that brings a new dimension to the
9 assessments that we have got to take, and, therefore,
10 the parameters that we consider have to be part of that.
11 And, again, I think the lesson is that we need to be
12 clear that we make a much more rapid assessment and
13 clearly I think I've acknowledged that we needed to be
14 faster and quicker in corroborating information with
15 emergency services. So I have always accepted that.

16 Q. Thank you very much, Mr Barr. Just one final point on
17 this issue.

18 In evidence earlier, you said it wasn't until the
19 nature of the incident was confirmed that the plan would
20 be implemented. Is that still your position?

21 A. Until we can actually get corroborative evidence that
22 something is going wrong, we -- to take definitive
23 action to evacuate the Underground is the actual
24 decision I'm talking about. At about 8.18, 8.20, we
25 took the decision to remove our customers --

1 Q. 9.18, 9.20?

2 A. I apologise, 9.18. We took the decision to remove our
3 customers from danger and to then give us time to make
4 an accurate assessment of what we were doing before we
5 took further action. The further action may have been,
6 as it was, to actually totally evacuate the Underground.

7 Q. That's the Code Red at about 09.46?

8 A. Well, it was evacuate, yes. The Code Red, which we
9 issued, was post the lines being cleared, because
10 Code Red says no trains move, and so on, or the possible
11 other decision was we start to run lines again and we
12 start to move our customers. But in the eventuality,
13 that didn't happen until the following morning.

14 Q. Could we just have INQ10483 back on screen, please, on
15 page 3? Just a few more references here. There is
16 09.20 at the bottom of the page, this is after the
17 Code Amber is declared. There's reference to
18 a conversation with NCC in which NCC inform that no one
19 is declaring a terrorist incident, and just over the
20 page, on page 4, there's reference at 09.20.19 to NCC
21 contacting a duty office manager who informs the NCC
22 that at Aldgate and Edgware Road they are desperately
23 waiting for the emergency services.

24 Were you aware of those calls?

25 A. No, because that was direct to the operators. I don't

1 know who the duty office manager is. We don't have any
2 such person.

3 Q. Then there's the reference which Ms Sheff took you to
4 later on about not being able to decide whether
5 terrorist-related or not believed to be
6 terrorist-related.

7 Just a couple of brief additional points, Mr Barr,
8 before I finish. It seems clear that the power surge
9 hypothesis persisted for quite some time, and that was
10 the primary diagnosis of what was going on.

11 According to some broadcasters, we've heard earlier
12 that some individuals felt frustrated by learning more
13 from media reports than they were from the NCC, but
14 according to one broadcaster who was broadcasting on
15 that day about the various blasts, they said that
16 National Grid had actually issued a statement saying
17 that they weren't power surges, the National Grid had
18 issued a statement denying that they were power surges
19 and saying that there was no exceptional activity.

20 That's a broadcast which occurred before the
21 Tavistock Square bomb.

22 Were you aware of any such statement from the
23 National Grid?

24 A. No, I wasn't, and that was not our experience within the
25 Underground. Clearly, we've talked about bulk supply

1 point failures and a variety of other failures. There
2 were surges. What the issue I believe now is, that what
3 actually caused those surges.

4 Q. Just one final matter, Mr Barr. We've dealt earlier
5 with communication difficulties with front line staff,
6 and my Lady asked you some questions about the emergency
7 services arriving and not necessarily meeting the right
8 person in the right place and getting the right
9 information.

10 Some of the evidence suggests, Mr Barr, that, in
11 fact, they were meeting front line staff, the emergency
12 services were meeting front line staff who had minimal
13 or often wrong information, and some witnesses assumed
14 that those front line staff, or low level staff, were
15 official simply because they were in orange tabards.
16 You will remember, my Lady, from King's Cross, that
17 evidence.

18 In fact those people, the evidence suggests, were
19 directing people to Euston to another station from
20 King's Cross at that time, and they simply didn't have
21 the information which you had or, indeed, information
22 which more senior managers at King's Cross had.

23 So in that context, Mr Barr, would you agree that
24 it's particularly important with inter-agency training
25 that front line staff are fully covered in that

1 inter-agency training, because often they will be the
2 people in fact greeting the emergency services when they
3 arrive, answering queries from the emergency services,
4 but also, importantly, directing members of the public
5 who have been evacuated as to how to go about their
6 journeys, and the last thing they want to be doing is
7 obviously placing those people in any form of danger or
8 giving them any form of incorrect information?

9 A. Well, there's a number of statements that you've made
10 there.

11 First of all, I would expect any front line staff --
12 and irrespective of the level that they are, they all
13 receive a level of training on how to convey emergency
14 services from the rendezvous point to the station
15 control room -- I would expect them to know how to do
16 that. I would not expect them to be giving and
17 receiving what is in fact very important information.
18 Their role is not necessarily to transmit information
19 unless they've been asked to do so. Their role is
20 conducting them to where the people who have that
21 information is, and you are absolutely right, the job of
22 those front line staff is to make sure that customers
23 receive information -- King's Cross, for example, where
24 are the nearest stations, how do you get to various
25 places, and so on. So I do expect staff to do that.

1 I believe that the level of training that we give
2 for our station staff is at a good level. I believe it
3 was at the time, but it has been augmented as a result
4 of some of the issues that have arisen.

5 MS GALLAGHER: Thank you very much, Mr Barr, I've nothing
6 further.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

8 Questions by MR COLTART

9 MR COLTART: Mr Barr, I, too, represent a number of the
10 families who lost loved ones on that day. In
11 particular, for these purposes, I represent the family
12 of Philip Russell, who died on the bus, and I know that
13 you've already previously completed a witness statement
14 dealing with some of the issues which Mr and Mrs Russell
15 had raised, but in short I am going to ask you a few
16 questions about that, if I may.

17 They had two major concerns. The first was whether,
18 on the basis of the available information, the system
19 might have been shut down earlier, and we've covered
20 that quite comprehensively already. The second was
21 whether it might have been possible for Philip to have
22 disembarked earlier on his journey than he did that day
23 because, if you recall, he was travelling on the
24 Underground initially from Oval, where he lived, to his
25 place of work at Moorgate, but because of what I will

1 describe as the topside power failures -- in other
2 words, lighting, escalators and lifts at some of the
3 stations along the way -- his train carried straight
4 through and he was deposited, with many others, at
5 Euston, from where he got on the bus.

6 Dealing with the first of those two issues, then,
7 and the basis of the available information and the
8 decisions which were taken, much of what I was going to
9 ask you has been dealt with. But could we have a look
10 at a document which we haven't yet considered, please?

11 That's TFL1000?

12 This was a document which was disclosed to us last
13 week. It's entitled at the top in small print there,
14 "Issues raised following 7 July. Modified by
15 Wayne Trevor, Resilience project team".

16 Was that a team that was specifically set up to look
17 at where improvements might be made for the future?

18 A. I'm not in a position to answer that because I don't
19 know.

20 Q. You don't know. All right. We'll get as far as we can
21 with this document with you and, if we need to ask
22 someone else about it, we will. But in any event, we
23 see from the main heading in bold "Issues raised
24 following 7 July from the health and safety conference
25 28/07/05 and the tier 1 meetings."

1 Did you attend that conference yourself?

2 A. I attend the conference, yes.

3 Q. Can you help us with what the tier 1 meetings were?

4 A. Yes, I can. There are -- as part of our health and
5 safety responsibilities, we have a series of different
6 representatives. Under the Act, we have to have health
7 and safety representatives. Tier 1 is the local level,
8 so people who are representatives of the workforce at
9 a local level, so there could be someone from
10 King's Cross station.

11 Q. I see.

12 A. Or it could be someone from Edgware Road or someone --
13 it's the sort of -- the common level where people can
14 raise issues.

15 Q. It may be that this document has been compiled as
16 a composition of what took place at those various
17 different meetings.

18 A. It's entirely possible.

19 Sitting above tier 1 there is the tier 2, which is
20 the pan-network committee level.

21 Q. Right, okay, thank you. We can see from the headings in
22 the index that it covers a number of issues which might
23 be relevant to matters in the inquest, but I'm only
24 going to ask you at present in relation to
25 communication.

1 Could we go to page 55, please, in the document? We
2 see there towards the bottom of that page a heading
3 "Communications" and avoiding as much of the jargon,
4 dare I say it, as we can, we can see that a potential
5 issue is raised about a cascade of operational messages
6 not being as effective as it might have been:
7 "Currently, stations will phone around each other to
8 pass on information. Station staff were not aware that
9 buses were terminating at zone 1."
10 Then:
11 "The existing procedures and systems were not as ...
12 robust as they could have been (for example, the line
13 controllers were swamped when means were available)."
14 I think you've told us something about this already.
15 Is this too many calls into NCC for the number of
16 operators who were available to take them?
17 A. Well, those particular calls were -- I believe, because
18 it's tier 1, they're not talking about NCC at all,
19 they're actually talking about the Line Control Centres.
20 Q. Oh, I see, so this might not be dealing with the office
21 where you were situated?
22 A. No.
23 Q. This might be some of your colleagues who were based
24 either, perhaps, at King's Cross or Edgware Road or
25 Aldgate or wherever?

1 A. For King's Cross or Edgware Road it would be based at
2 Baker Street where the line service control is, and for
3 the other lines in the same mode.

4 Q. I see. Just going down to the bottom of that page, to
5 see whether this is an issue which was a local issue or
6 whether it was something which you had difficulties with
7 yourself, do you see at point 2.6 there:

8 "Communication with police - is wrong information
9 being given out deliberately?"

10 Now, is that something which you were aware of? Did
11 you have any difficulties of that nature in the NCC?

12 A. No, and, indeed, I would have instructed -- were I to
13 have found that we were giving out wrong information,
14 that would have been corrected. We would not give out
15 wrong information. That is wrong and could lead to
16 people doing the wrong things.

17 Q. Through discussions with your colleagues, was this
18 a complaint, even if it had been made at local level
19 rather than with the NCC, that was ever brought to your
20 attention?

21 A. It wasn't brought to my particular attention.

22 Q. Do you recall ever having seen this document before?

23 A. No, I don't. I haven't seen it.

24 Q. In which case I suspect we're not going to make much
25 progress in asking you further questions about it.

1 Is the position this -- I'm not going to trawl back
2 through all the issues that have been canvassed with you
3 extensively today already, but just so we're clear about
4 this, if you had known earlier that you were dealing
5 with a terrorist incident rather than problems being
6 caused by exploding power cables or whatever it might
7 have been, would you have made the decision to close the
8 network immediately?

9 A. If I had to have received corroborative evidence and
10 definitive statements, then I think we would have closed
11 the network marginally earlier. I don't really believe
12 it could have been done much earlier, but there is
13 always the inevitable retrospective view that says "What
14 if", and I can assure you that I have thought through
15 that really very extensively.

16 Q. There was some discussion in the document we were just
17 looking at -- I'm not going to take you back to it --
18 about the usefulness of having both a Code Amber and
19 a Code Red and whether that was perhaps just the basis
20 for confusion, and whether it might be better to
21 amalgamate them into a single order for evacuation in
22 these circumstances. Is that something which is now
23 under contemplation?

24 A. No, it's not, because they were designed to do different
25 things. The Code Amber is to remove customers from

1 threat. The Code Red is designed to prevent trains from
2 moving into an area where they are equally under threat.
3 For example, if you have a train that's on fire, then
4 you want to stop a train coming in the other way which
5 is standing adjacent to it, and that has happened
6 elsewhere in the world. In Portugal, a place called
7 Daegu, that's exactly what did happen.

8 Similarly, Code Red is to stop a train going into an
9 area of further risk on its own. If we become aware
10 there's some sort of attack on a train, then we may well
11 want to stop trains from going there.

12 It is equally to be used to protect people on the
13 line. If we get trespassers who we want to prevent them
14 from having an incident, then we will stop trains from
15 running, not to protect London Underground, but to
16 actually prevent any incident or accident that might
17 happen to the trespassers.

18 Q. One of the complaints which was made by the staff in the
19 aftermath of the incident, the London Underground staff,
20 was a considerable amount of confusion as to what the
21 terminology meant, Code Amber and Code Red and so on.
22 Have steps been taken now to clarify for their purposes
23 what is meant by each of those terms?

24 A. It's part of the CPD training, the competency
25 management, because we've moved away from the

1 old-fashioned, "Here is an exam paper, sign it" and we
2 learnt that people have a habit of passing exams by
3 rote. So we now do that as part of our competency
4 checking.

5 Q. Thank you. Can I turn briefly then to deal with the
6 specific concern of the Russell family in relation to
7 the stations passing between Oval and Euston on that day
8 and, to summarise, is the position this: that following
9 the bulk supply point failure at Mansell Street, the
10 stations between Euston and Moorgate lost lighting, lift
11 and escalator power?

12 A. Yes, they lost 75 per cent of the available lighting.

13 Q. So they went on to the backup lighting system, but
14 I think it's right -- I'll be corrected by Ms Canby if
15 I'm wrong about this -- that, by 8.53, full lighting had
16 in fact been restored to those particular stations.
17 Now, it may be there was still an issue with the
18 lifts and the escalators. Are you in a position to
19 assist us with how long it took?

20 A. I think I may be able to do that. The lighting had been
21 reestablished, but what happens is that, when lifts and
22 escalators go out of service, and when staff then go to
23 evacuate customers, they have to be brought back into
24 the station.

25 There is a process and procedure which the staff

1 themselves have got to go to put the lifts and
2 escalators back into service. That can take up to 20,
3 25 minutes, and if you take a station, particularly as
4 big as Bank, there are somewhere around about 20-odd
5 sets of escalators, and they have got to be brought back
6 in.

7 Lifts -- there is a process for putting them back in
8 service. They have to have a whole series of issues
9 about checking the power supply, checking the
10 continuity, running the escalator or running the lift to
11 make sure it works. It is not a five-minute procedure.

12 Q. No, so if one were ever under the impression that this
13 is a question of pressing a button to restart an
14 escalator or restart a lift, it's not as straightforward
15 as that?

16 A. No, it's not.

17 Q. Can we just look at one document very briefly, please,
18 which is INQ8712-3?

19 This is part of the power supply log for the day, if
20 we enlarge the top half of the page, please, this is the
21 District Line we're dealing with:

22 "Incident caused loss of traction current supplies
23 from Whitechapel through to Embankment. Both roads and
24 signal supplies from Bow Road to Tower Hill. Supplies
25 restored by 09.02. Loss of Monument transformer room

1 supply (escalator feed). Restored at 08.53."

2 It may be that further enquiries have to be made in
3 relation to this, if you're not in a position to deal
4 with it today. But does that, or might that, suggest
5 that the escalators at least had been restored at
6 Monument by 08.53, or are you not in a position to --

7 A. Well, based on what I've just said. I can tell you
8 physically when it was restored, it's fairly
9 straightforward -- well, at this distance, I'm not sure.
10 I can tell you that the loss of feed to the escalator is
11 not automatically restarting when that feed comes back
12 in.

13 Q. Right.

14 A. There's a whole process that has to be employed. The
15 other key thing is, if we've lost compressed air plant,
16 then in the interim period when the compressed air was
17 not available, the air leakage would have happened.
18 When the power comes back on, the compressed air has got
19 to come back up.

20 So all of this is governed for safety, governed in
21 the context of there are compressor governors which, if
22 the pressure falls below a limit, then the pressure has
23 got to build back up to trigger that -- to operate that
24 governor again, in order to allow the system to be
25 tested in order to be run.

1 Q. So again, it's not an entirely straightforward
2 procedure?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Just finally this in relation to this particular topic,
5 as far as Mr and Mrs Russell are concerned.

6 It was obviously a significant step to run all the
7 trains through Euston that would have involved
8 depositing a large number of passengers at the same
9 statement at the same time or roughly the same time?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Was thought ever given to breaking that process up and
12 disembarking some passengers at least at some of the
13 stations along the way? Where there was some lighting,
14 they could have walked up the stairs or whatever it
15 might have been.

16 A. The problem we were left with was that because there was
17 only 25 per cent lighting, then if we had lost any other
18 circuits, then that station and the whole environ would
19 be in total darkness and that in itself was actually
20 quite dangerous.

21 We would normally have disembarked customers at
22 King's Cross, but because of the nature of what was
23 going on at King's Cross, Euston --

24 Q. That was impossible?

25 A. -- became the next level. If Euston had become

1 overcrowded, then we would have moved the trains with
2 the customers further forward from there. It's
3 a natural cascade that we do and we are, you know, very
4 careful, because what we won't do is we won't allow
5 station platforms to be overcrowded. We will intervene
6 and cause trains to carry on running to prevent that
7 overcrowding, and if you think, at that time of the
8 morning, we had trains that had probably between 900 and
9 a thousand people, or thereabouts, detraining all of
10 those people takes some time, and the staff were fully
11 engaged in that.

12 So that really is a process that does take some time
13 and some care.

14 Q. Mr Barr, thank you for dealing with that and, my Lady,
15 thank you for allowing me to explore that issue in
16 relation to the Russells. As one can understand, it
17 affects them greatly over the years.

18 Can I just deal finally, please, with some slightly
19 more general matters in relation to issues in the
20 inquest? Could we have a look, please, at TFL650?

21 This is the document we looked at briefly earlier.

22 It's the summary of the findings from the debrief
23 process which was undertaken by Mr Duncan and Mr Penney
24 and others. Just some aspects of it we haven't
25 considered so far. Page 5, please, middle of that page:

1 "There was some concern expressed about a mismatch
2 between trains and stations with regards to the levels
3 of understanding concerning procedures and terms used in
4 emergencies, and more fundamental concerns were
5 expressed regarding the actions of non-operational and
6 more senior managers.

7 "This potentially very useful resource is viewed as
8 not contributing positively at best or at worst
9 detracting from the efforts of others."

10 Can you recall now how that finding came about?

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: First of all, what does it mean, if
12 you do understand it? What does "This potentially very
13 useful resource is viewed as not contributing positively
14 at best or at worst detracting from the efforts of
15 others" mean?

16 A. I believe what that means is that managers who were
17 senior were going to control rooms and saying "Can you
18 give me an update, please?", rather than -- front line
19 staff felt that they should be donning high visibility
20 vests and going out and helping with evacuation or other
21 procedures. That's my interpretation of what that
22 means, ma'am.

23 I can -- sorry?

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I now understand, I think.

25 MR COLTART: I think we may be assisted if we move on to

1 page 6, please, at the top of the page:
2 "The Command and Control management role of the
3 staff when emergency services attend a major incident
4 needs to be clarified.
5 "The actions of train drivers if asked to
6 evacuate ... in a Code Amber ... needs defining.
7 "[A] further table-top training is required ..."
8 Under "Communications" -- well, we've looked at some
9 of this already:
10 "The way the NCC information was disseminated was
11 poor."
12 I think you've accepted that today. Under "External
13 communication:
14 "Metropolitan Police understanding of
15 London Underground recovery requirements varied from
16 good to extremely poor."
17 Is that recovery -- is this well after the event?
18 Is this recovery of stock or equipment or --
19 A. This is recovery of individual scenes --
20 Q. Right.
21 A. -- and related to the way that, when we got into the --
22 because this was done a number of --
23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: This is post --
24 A. This is part of the recovery protocol.
25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: This is not to do with the issue --

1 MR COLTART: In which case, we do not need to trouble the
2 court with that. There was:
3 "Significant staff resentment at [the] emergency
4 services."

5 Can you recall how or why that manifested itself?

6 A. Yes, I can. When there is an incident of this nature,
7 it is extremely common for the press spokesman on behalf
8 of the emergency services to appear on the television
9 and to make a statement, and most of those statements
10 were along the lines of, "It was a terrible time, and we
11 are extremely sorry for everyone who has been affected,
12 but what a really good job the fire, police and
13 ambulance did", and that is right and proper, so I'm
14 not -- I don't wish to say now -- I don't wish to demean
15 from that.

16 However, universally across the Underground, it was
17 our staff who were the first people who were on-site.
18 It was our staff who were magnificent in the way that
19 they actually dealt with things that they should never,
20 ever, have had to see, and there was a feeling that due
21 cognisance was not made to the efforts that our staff
22 had had to take, and indeed, subsequently, there was an
23 intervention by Tim O'Toole to say exactly that.

24 Q. I can put your mind at rest on this topic. We've heard
25 much evidence over the course of the last few months

1 about how superbly well individual members of your staff
2 performed on that day and, if there was insufficient
3 credit given to them at the time, I hope very much that
4 that's been corrected.

5 A. I do apologise, my Lady --

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: No, I understand, Mr Barr. It is
7 something that your staff felt strongly about --

8 A. Yes.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: -- and at the time, one can
10 understand after what they'd just been through.

11 MR COLTART: Finally, page 19, please, of this document.
12 The sort of bottom two-thirds of that page, perhaps
13 going from stretchers and so on:

14 "General statement was that there was not enough
15 emergency equipment."

16 There's talk about stretchers and carry sheets,
17 lights, there were not enough, tunnel lights were not
18 effective enough due to the amount of dust, and then
19 there were significant issues identified in relation to
20 the radios and the extent to which the radios were
21 working and there was the obvious observation that the
22 CONNECT's scope of works would need to be revisited.
23 This document itself was the summary, in fact the
24 product of 60 individual staff interviews which had been
25 conducted, wasn't it?

1 A. That's correct, and I have to say that its essence was
2 to relook at how Na100 worked. That was the essence of
3 it, and there has been implementation of most of the
4 issues that are raised in there.

5 Q. Is the position this, that although 60 individual
6 members of staff were interviewed, almost all of the
7 product of that work, if you like, the questionnaires
8 which were completed by those individual staff members
9 now can't be located?

10 A. That's correct. However, the net impact of their
11 comments has, and is relevant by -- is evident by the
12 document.

13 Q. By the summary which we've seen.

14 We did receive in the end, I think again last week,
15 a single questionnaire which had been recovered I think
16 through an electronic search and just for the sake of
17 completeness, it's at TFL1005.

18 Mr Keith is observing to me concerns about the
19 timetable which I can well understand.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: We have three witnesses scheduled for
21 today. I assume that somehow we've vastly gone over our
22 time intended for Mr Barr.

23 MR COLTART: Mr Keith is of the view, which I happily share,
24 that this is a document which, to the extent we need to
25 look at it at all, can be dealt with quite shortly

1 tomorrow through Mr Collins, and it's particularly
2 important to get another witness, I'm told, finished
3 today. In which case, I'm perfectly happy to leave it
4 there, as far as Mr Barr is concerned, and revisit this
5 tomorrow.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

7 Mr Morton, Mr Gibbs, are you going to have questions
8 for this witness?

9 MR GIBBS: I have three short matters I'm going to ask him
10 to clear up, please.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: And Mr Morton?

12 MR MORTON: Yes, my Lady, a handful of questions, no more
13 than about 10 or 15 minutes.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: We'll take a shorter break.

15 Mr Keith, I'm afraid that this is no criticism of
16 anybody but we're going to have to rethink the approach
17 to witnesses of this kind. I'm afraid spending --
18 I assume you thought by laying the groundwork this
19 morning we might be able to shorten matters, but we
20 can't afford, I'm afraid, within my timetable to spend
21 a day essentially on one witness.

22 MR KEITH: Indeed not.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So I will sit late to make sure that
24 Mr Dell's evidence is complete so he can make his
25 medical appointment.

1 MR KEITH: Thank you, my Lady.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: We'll take a shorter break. We'll
3 take ten minutes and come back at a quarter to.

4 MR KEITH: I'm afraid hope sprung eternal this morning.
5 Could I have my Lady's permission to speak to my learned
6 friends about ways in which we might be able to speed
7 things up a little?

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You not only have my permission, you
9 have my direction, because we cannot do this again, I'm
10 afraid.

11 MR KEITH: We cannot. Thank you, my Lady.

12 (3.35 pm)

13 (A short break)

14 (3.45 pm)

15 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Gibbs?

16 Questions by MR GIBBS

17 MR GIBBS: Mr Barr, could you just clarify three things for
18 me, please? The first is this: you were asked about
19 Inspector Munn, not, as he was described, a passenger on
20 the train at Aldgate, but a BTP officer who went to
21 Aldgate with some probationers and made a series of
22 reports from Aldgate.

23 The one that you were taken to is timed at 09.17 --
24 that actually means 09.19 -- and he gave his opinion
25 that this was bomb damage.

1 That information does not seem to have made its way
2 through to you. Is that right?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. By that time, you had, in fact, already called
5 Code Amber?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. The Ambulance Service we know had been on the scene for
8 some time. Do I understand this right:

9 London Underground staff and BTP officers had been
10 working side by side in the tunnel and on the bombed
11 carriage since shortly after the explosion, is that
12 right?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. BTP officers had made a series of CHALET reports back to
15 the control room, the BTP Control room, we know that,
16 and had London Underground staff made a series of
17 reports to the line controller and to the duty
18 operations manager in the same way?

19 A. Sorry?

20 Q. London Underground staff at Aldgate, in the same way
21 that BTP officers had reported to their control room,
22 had they made reports to the line controller and the
23 duty operations manager?

24 A. Not in the same context, because they don't have the
25 same portable communications system. BTP officers had

1 radio --

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. -- our staff do not, and any communication would have to
4 be made through the telephone system at Aldgate or at
5 Liverpool Street because the infrastructure damage was
6 such that the radio system was not working.

7 Q. Yes. As you understand it, had they made such reports
8 by telephone?

9 A. I'm not aware that they had, not in the context of
10 "I could see bomb damage". We were told that there were
11 casualties, there was requests for ambulances,
12 et cetera, but not in the context of -- of that.

13 Q. No. In the normal course of events, would reports which
14 were made to a line controller or to a duty operations
15 manager in an ideal world make their way through to
16 London Underground control room?

17 A. In the context of "I can see bomb damage", certainly.

18 Q. Now, you were supervising your control room and
19 Mr Crowther was supervising his control room. Certainly
20 Mr Gosden will tell us tomorrow what it was like in the
21 BTP Control room, this unprecedented avalanche of
22 information. Was it like that in yours?

23 A. It was exactly so. I think I mentioned earlier on today
24 the telephone system, which was composed of -- it
25 doesn't ring because, in the control room, it's not good

1 to do that. It was lights. All of the telephone
2 systems were incessant and as soon as you finished with
3 one call, you didn't even have time to put the call back
4 down, you immediately pressed the "receive" button or
5 a "shift over" button and it was incessant.

6 Q. But notwithstanding that, you and Mr Crowther were still
7 finding time periodically to speak to each other
8 face-to-face?

9 A. Yes, that's correct.

10 Q. You were asked about another room and I think -- could
11 you just clear this up for me: is there a separate room
12 off the London Underground control room which can be set
13 up, for instance, for planned incidents, as a joint room
14 including BTP input?

15 A. There is now, but there wasn't at the time.

16 Q. So, for instance, for the Notting Hill carnival, which
17 is expected on a particular day, one might set up that
18 room as a joint command room?

19 A. That's correct, and indeed we have done so for a number
20 of years, and whenever we have a major incident now, it
21 is -- it -- "automatic" is the wrong word. It is
22 essential, and always will happen, that a BTP officer
23 becomes part of the London Underground team.

24 They still have their own computer system, but
25 nonetheless, the relaying of information is immediate

1 and we've done it New Year's Eve, we do it on the
2 Notting Hill carnival, we are planning jointly to do it
3 for the weddings and the various other events that are
4 going to happen later this year and next year.

5 Q. That comes on to the next subject. One of the
6 advantages of that is that there is an NSPIS terminal
7 within that room?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. The NSPIS is, of course, we know, the BTP's equivalent
10 of CAD, which the Met and City of London use. You were
11 asked about access to police computers and, if what the
12 questioner meant was access to NSPIS, you don't have
13 access to the police computer system and the information
14 they are receiving from all their officers from minute
15 to minute, do you?

16 A. No, we don't. In order to -- for it to operate within
17 the control room, or the situation room as such, we have
18 to have an officer who is assigned for that purpose.

19 Q. But your Nimrod system I think works off the same
20 software, doesn't it?

21 A. It's essentially the same software. It's been modified,
22 but it's the same principle.

23 Q. But for obvious reasons, it's separate from the police
24 system?

25 A. That's correct.

1 Q. Could I ask you to go to one document, please? It's
2 TFL986-22, and it's entry 8.1.

3 This is the chief operating officer's review of
4 lessons learned and under "Roles and responsibilities",
5 one of the positive things which was identified was the
6 relationships between yourselves and the British
7 Transport Police. Would you endorse that?

8 A. Yes, I would, very much so.

9 MR GIBBS: My Lady, before I sit down, may I just correct
10 for the record one thing? Detective Chief Inspector
11 Lawson, who was described as being Silver at Aldgate, as
12 your Ladyship remembers, of course wasn't, and never
13 even went to Aldgate. He was at Liverpool Street.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Ms Boyd?

15 Questions by MS BOYD

16 MS BOYD: My Lady, just one very short point, please,
17 Mr Barr. So that there's no misunderstanding, you refer
18 in your statement, at paragraph 76, to the fact that
19 a split attendance was requested by NCC to Aldgate, but
20 in relation to King's Cross no split attendance was
21 requested?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. But no doubt you've had an opportunity to listen to the
24 audio recordings and you will be able to confirm that in
25 fact the call was to smoke in tunnel at King's Cross on

1 the eastbound Piccadilly Line?

2 A. Yes, that's correct.

3 Q. And you're aware that, so far as the London Fire Brigade
4 are concerned, that would trigger an automatic
5 predetermined split attendance?

6 A. Yes.

7 MS BOYD: Thank you.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Morton?

9 Questions by MR MORTON

10 MR MORTON: Thank you, my Lady. Mr Barr, just a handful of
11 topics for you, if I may.

12 Can I deal first with perhaps the most significant,
13 which I'll simply call "knowledge", if I may. You
14 understand that the nature of the questions that have
15 been put to you today by some of my learned friends are
16 to the effect really that you were a bit slow off the
17 mark, first of all, in appreciating what had occurred,
18 and then, secondly, a bit slow off the mark in
19 disseminating what had occurred.

20 Can I just ask you about that, please? You've been
21 taken by some of my learned friends to individual calls
22 and individual entries in some of the logs, but it's
23 plain, is it not, from what you've just said in answer
24 to my learned friend Mr Gibbs, that that doesn't present
25 a complete picture at all of the information that was

1 available to you?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. As you've just said, in fact you were faced with an
4 avalanche of information.

5 I think earlier on in the inquest hearings one of
6 the recordings was heard of an operator in the NCC who
7 said his phones were lighting up like Christmas trees?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. It may be now, in the light of the evidence you've just
10 given, that will be understood. What is the essence,
11 Mr Barr, of what you were trying to achieve? Is it to
12 form an accurate assessment of what in fact is
13 happening? It must be.

14 A. That was the really, really important facet, and it
15 would be easy to hypothesise, it would be easy to try
16 and guess. The penalties for getting it badly wrong
17 were fairly catastrophic for our customers.

18 Q. Yes. Having formed an accurate assessment, as you infer
19 by that answer, respond appropriately and disseminate
20 information to the right people?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. That doesn't just mean disseminating information
23 willy-nilly to all and sundry?

24 A. No.

25 Q. It was suggested to you that you failed to take account

1 of the cumulative effect of the information that was
2 coming in to the NCC, but rather instead focused on
3 individual items that were coming in. Is that fair?

4 A. No, the situation is exactly the reverse, that before we
5 came to -- or I came to an overarching conclusion, I had
6 to be in the position of having really, really accurate
7 information in order to make that dissemination
8 possible.

9 Q. Could I draw your attention, please, to paragraphs 50,
10 51 and 52 of your witness statement?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Is this accurate? At paragraph 50 you say:

13 "Accordingly, whilst it was clear that the
14 Underground was dealing with a number of very serious
15 and unusual incidents across the network, the initial
16 reports of walking wounded, of a train hitting the
17 tunnel wall and of a person under the train did not
18 cause me initially to think that we were dealing with an
19 act of aggression, although I was alert to the
20 possibility that the underlying calls could be
21 terrorist-related."

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. Then you go on to say:

24 "By the time the decision was taken to issue the
25 network Code Amber at around 09.13/09.15 we knew that we

1 were dealing with at least three very serious incidents
2 at Aldgate, Liverpool Street, Edgware Road,
3 Russell Square/King's Cross in addition to the
4 widespread power problems. At this time, the underlying
5 cause of the incidents and the extent to which they were
6 related, if at all, were still not known, although, as
7 identified above, I had an appreciation of the
8 possibility that the Underground may have been the
9 subject of a terrorist attack."

10 Is that accurate?

11 A. Yes, it is.

12 Q. Then you go over in paragraph 52 to say:

13 "Following the issue of network Code Amber at around
14 09.19, reports began to come into the NCC of very
15 serious and traumatic injuries such as missing limbs and
16 of possible fatalities. This was plainly not consistent
17 with the underlying cause being power-related. It
18 became clear to me that the likely underlying cause was
19 terrorist-related. As a consequence, at about 09.40,
20 the decision was taken to evacuate the entire network."

21 Is that accurate?

22 A. It's extremely accurate, yes.

23 Q. It was suggested to you by my learned friend Mr Keith
24 that there was a report at 09.30 to the NCC suggesting
25 that there had been a bomb. So far as we are able to

1 tell from the NCC logs, that is not correct. Were you
2 aware, at 09.30 or at about 09.30, of any reports of
3 bombs?

4 A. Not with those words specifically, no.

5 Q. Just to be clear, Mr Barr, from somebody in your
6 position in the NCC, experienced with dealing with all
7 sorts of events on the Underground on a day-to-day
8 basis, does report of an explosion equate to report of
9 a bomb?

10 A. No.

11 Q. One gets a sense, perhaps, of the danger of relying upon
12 and disseminating all information that comes to you.

13 You were asked specifically, Mr Barr, about
14 Nigel Kimber, the Metronet duty operations manager, and
15 it was suggested to you by implication that he had made
16 a report which you ought to have acted upon in some way
17 by disseminating more widely. Do you recall that
18 question?

19 A. Yes, I do.

20 Q. First of all, Mr Kimber, a Metronet duty operations
21 manager, were Metronet a contractor --

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. -- of London Underground --

24 A. Yes, they were.

25 Q. -- at the time? Did they have any dealings or any

1 responsibility for what was going on that morning in
2 relation to the events you were dealing with?

3 A. Their role is to attend and to assist the organisation.
4 They are engineering contractors and would only supply
5 an engineering resource.

6 Q. So no immediate concern with what was going on, whatever
7 precisely it was?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Could I ask you, please, to look at paragraph 56 of your
10 witness statement where you deal with this? Can we just
11 consider for a moment what it was that Mr Kimber was
12 telling you?

13 Do you see, about five lines down, you refer to the
14 NCC recording and you say:

15 "... during which I can be heard instructing
16 Nigel Kimber not to put out an internal message that
17 there had been explosions on two trains at Edgware Road
18 and Liverpool Street."

19 Of course he was wrong, wasn't he? There had been
20 no explosion on a train at Liverpool Street?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. Can you give some indication, perhaps, of what the
23 consequences might have been of giving that sort of
24 information, broadcast generally, of an inaccurate
25 location for an explosion?

1 A. It would have caused people perhaps to think there was
2 a fourth train, would have deployed resources which we
3 would otherwise need to be able to attend the areas that
4 they were going to, the Metronet DOMs had the
5 responsibility for deploying people, not
6 London Underground and, as such, there was a risk of the
7 dilution further of the very scarce resources that we
8 had.

9 Q. Can I move on to a different topic, please, which is
10 buses and other modes of transport? Did you have any
11 reason at all to think that London buses were at threat
12 of attack?

13 A. I had no indication whatsoever.

14 Q. Mr Barr, even in the calm surroundings of a courtroom,
15 it may sometimes be difficult to be spot on with
16 information, but it was suggested to you that Mr Lawson
17 who, as we've heard -- DCI Lawson, who was the Silver at
18 Liverpool Street, not at Aldgate, had said in evidence
19 that he had thought that the entire network should be
20 closed, the transport network should be closed, and you
21 were asked whether or not that information was drawn to
22 your attention.

23 In fact, we see from the transcript -- my Lady, for
24 my Lady's note, Day 16, page 161, lines 8 to 10 -- that
25 it was Ms Sheff that made that suggestion to the

1 witness, not the witness himself. So it's perhaps not
2 surprising that that information didn't find its way to
3 you.

4 But in any event, more generally, did you receive
5 information from any other source, whether it's BTP,
6 MPS, or any other source, to the effect that it was
7 thought by them that London Buses were under threat?

8 A. None whatsoever. There was no suggestion.

9 Q. Of course, one understands exactly why the focus has
10 been on London Buses in the light of what tragedy was to
11 occur, but similarly, did you give consideration to
12 notifying any other form of public transport of a threat
13 to them; for example, airports?

14 A. If I had had a clear indication that the transport
15 network was under attack, then of course I would have
16 done that.

17 Q. Yes, absolutely.

18 A. But I had no indication as such.

19 Q. We can all readily think of a long list of other people
20 who would have had to have been notified if there had
21 been any reason to.

22 Can I move on then, please, to a different topic,
23 which is a short point, but it's been raised and so
24 I must deal with it, which is the notification of the
25 address of the Circle, Hammersmith & City Line at

1 Edgware Road.

2 You were taken to a document that shows the address

3 as Chapel Street, NW1. To your certain knowledge, is

4 that the correct address?

5 A. That is the correct address.

6 Q. You were asked about how that information was conveyed

7 to the Fire Brigade. Could I ask you, please, to have

8 a look at INQ8515-3? We see there a transcript, I hope,

9 of the telephone call from the NCC to the Fire Brigade

10 and do you see it's the third little group down

11 beginning "Fire Brigade: Edgware Road LUL."

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Then LUL say:

14 "That's the Circle Hammersmith station,

15 Chapel Street NW1."

16 Yes?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Then the operator says:

19 "Hang on a minute.

20 "Okay.

21 "Okay, so is it at any particular tunnels at all.

22 "I don't know, actually. You'll be met and taken

23 hopefully.

24 "Okay and what, it's Edgware Road entrance?"

25 LUL repeats:

1 "Edgware Road, Circle Hammersmith, it's in
2 Chapel Street, NW1."
3 Yes? Then if you go right down to the bottom of the
4 page -- I'm not going to read it all -- there's
5 a reference to 73 Praed Street, again an indication as
6 to what can happen when inaccurate information is
7 provided. Then there's a discussion about
8 73 Praed Street, Fire Brigade:
9 "That's sort of between Paddington and Edgware Road,
10 isn't it?"
11 LUL:
12 "Right, I don't know whether that's the same place,
13 they will need to go to the ... station itself."
14 So there appears to be no uncertainty on part of the
15 NCC as to the location.
16 A. No.
17 Q. Similarly, King's Cross station. Is its address
18 Euston Road?
19 A. Yes, it is.
20 Q. Can I ask you quickly about rendezvous points at
21 stations? You've been asked something about those. Is
22 it right that they were introduced following
23 Sir Desmond Fennell's inquiry into the King's Cross
24 fire?
25 A. That's correct.

1 Q. We've seen some diagrams, I think, or examples of
2 rendezvous points. Could I ask you, please, to have
3 a look at COLP204-2?

4 This is a document entitled "Information for
5 emergency services personnel attending
6 London Underground incidents."

7 Is this a document you're familiar with?

8 A. Yes, I am.

9 Q. Can you just tell us briefly -- first of all, we can see
10 the date, version 4, June 2009. So this postdates the
11 events we're concerned with directly, but can you tell
12 us in a sentence or two what this document is and what
13 it's used for, please?

14 A. Well, it's intended and designed to assist emergency
15 services personnel who are turning up at stations. One
16 of the major problems we have is that, when emergency
17 services are summoned to a station, it may seem a bit
18 odd, but occasionally they get mixed up between
19 London Underground and National Rail and Docklands light
20 railway.

21 So this is intended -- this document is intended to
22 give them guidance about the key and specific issues
23 surrounding London Underground station.

24 Q. If we could go over, please, specifically to page 6, we
25 will see there an example of the signage and, seen like

1 that, everyone in court may actually be familiar with
2 having seen the LFB box at London Underground station.
3 That I think's a white box with red lettering, if I
4 recollect correctly?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. Quite prominently located. If you go over to the left
7 of that diagram, do you see a box of text that says:
8 "If the station is a sub-surface station" and so on,
9 then it refers to the material that will be kept in that
10 box?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. That includes a set of station plans?

13 A. Yes, that's correct.

14 Q. Those were in place, I think, in 2005?

15 A. Yes, they were.

16 Q. I think today, although, of course, not in 2005, the
17 Airwave radio system also operates from the point of the
18 RVP?

19 A. Yes, it does.

20 Q. Just while we're on this document, I think you've dealt
21 with it, but it may just help my Lady get a feel for the
22 detail of it, you've described the new coding system
23 which is used to ensure that there is no
24 misunderstanding as to locations. In the same
25 document -- I'm sorry, it's gone from the screen -- in

1 the same document, it was COLP204, if we could go to
2 page 19, please, simply for my Lady's note, do we see at
3 the bottom of that page an explanation of the coding
4 system, and then, in fact, we can see some very specific
5 examples of it at the bottom? Did you answer?
6 A. Sorry, I wasn't aware of the question.
7 Q. I think it's what's called a leading question.
8 A. I think the answer is "That's correct".
9 Q. So the answer is "yes"?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Thank you very much. Finally -- yes, Mr Gibbs has asked
12 you about the present position in the control room.
13 Finally, could you have a look, please, at another
14 British Transport Police document? Just bear with me
15 one second while I get the correct reference. BTP18-2,
16 and this is a document produced by the British Transport
17 Police setting out times by which individual Underground
18 lines were, in fact, evacuated.
19 Have you had a chance to look at that document
20 before now?
21 A. Yes, yes, I have.
22 Q. So far as you are able to say -- of course, you can't be
23 precise to the minute, but so far as you're able to say,
24 does that accord with your recollection?
25 A. Yes, it does.

1 Q. Just one point on that. We see that a number of the
2 times are very soon after or indeed at about the time
3 you gave the direction to evacuate. How can it be,
4 therefore, that there were lines that had completely
5 evacuated before or at about the time that command was
6 given?

7 A. Well, if you take, for example, the Waterloo & City
8 Line, it only has two stations, so issuing a Code Amber
9 automatically means that that's going to be evacuated.
10 The rest of them, if you have extremely busy trains
11 with, as I said earlier, up to a thousand people on the
12 train, you can't bring a train that's already full into
13 a platform that's already full. So it is quite normal
14 process for the station staff to actually ask the
15 customers to leave the station in order to make room for
16 the next evacuated train to come in, so that you don't
17 disgorge customers on to an already occupied platform,
18 and I believe that they had actually -- in order to do
19 that, they had started that.

20 If you go to the outer realms of some of the lines,
21 the numbers of people and the distances between trains
22 are much less and, therefore, the evacuation can be
23 achieved much quicker.

24 Q. Thank you. Then finally this: you were asked one or two
25 questions by some of my learned friends about the

1 National Grid. You were taken to one document, which we
2 don't need to look at, about what is to occur when
3 there's a failure of the National Grid and you were
4 asked about a comment apparently by somebody at the
5 National Grid that there was no power surge.

6 Did the National Grid have anything to do whatever
7 with the events that occurred on the morning
8 of July 2005?

9 A. No, National Grid had nothing to do with it.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: We're talking about different kinds
11 of power surges?

12 A. Yes.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You say you had local power surges
14 within your system?

15 A. Yes.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So we're not talking about the
17 National Grid, as I understand it?

18 A. No, no, we're not, my Lady. A National Grid power surge
19 is cataclysmic.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Oh, right.

21 MR MORTON: There's one final point, I'm reminded. I'm
22 sorry, I think it's my third final point, Mr Barr. I'm
23 reminded one final point.

24 My Lady is going to hear evidence from a witness
25 from the London Fire Brigade, who, as we understand it,

1 is going to give some evidence about the system that the
2 Fire Brigade operated, with a number of different
3 locations or addresses for Underground stations.
4 Did London Underground, do you know, have any input
5 into or play any part in the drawing up of that system
6 and the identifications --

7 A. No, we didn't. Not at all, to my knowledge.

8 MR MORTON: Thank you very much indeed.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right, those complete the questions
10 we have for you, Mr Barr, I'm sorry you've had to be in
11 the witness-box for the whole of the court day. If it's
12 any consolation, we're going to keep going, so it is up
13 to you whether you stay or not.

14 MS SHEFF: Can I just very briefly, my Lady, correct one
15 matter that my learned friend Mr Morton, I think it is,
16 mentioned, which goes back to the questioning of
17 DCI Lawson? I have the reference that he cited and, in
18 fact, what's put to DCI Lawson is that explosions were
19 reported at 09.30. I asked him if he thought the
20 transport network in London was under attack and he
21 said:

22 "I was aware of several bombings on the transport
23 network, yes, that is correct."

24 However, he goes on to say that the decision he took
25 to close Liverpool Street was in relation to what he was

1 responsible for, but he agreed that there was a risk to
2 the transport network in general and, because of what he
3 knew of the other bombs, he said "I took my decision in
4 relation to Liverpool Street station, yes".

5 So it does appear to be the case that he is
6 suggesting that he was aware of a risk to the transport
7 system. However, his decision was related to
8 Liverpool Street station. I hope that clarifies it,
9 my Lady.

10 MR MORTON: My Lady, I'm not going to take up the court's
11 time. When one sees the transcript, it's quite clear
12 that it was the questions that were making the
13 assertion; the answers were not agreeing with the
14 assertion that was being put.

15 The point the witness was making was quite clear.
16 He made his decisions in relation to Liverpool Street
17 and the reason I made the point was that Ms Sheff
18 suggested to this witness that DCI Lawson had taken the
19 view that the entire network was under attack.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. The perils of leading
21 questions. Thank you, Mr Barr.

22 MR KEITH: My Lady, I'm going to invite Mr Hay to call
23 Mr Dell.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Have we decided how we
25 are going to get through Mr Dell this evening?

1 MR HAY: We're going to manage to get through Mr Dell this
2 evening, my Lady.
3 MR ALAN DELL (sworn)
4 Questions by MR HAY
5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Sorry you've had to wait so long,
6 Mr Dell.
7 A. No problem.
8 MR HAY: Mr Dell, can you give your full name to the court,
9 please?
10 A. Alan Dell.
11 Q. Mr Dell, you provided a witness statement for the
12 purposes of these proceedings dated 4 November of last
13 year.
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. You are employed by London Buses Services Limited, is
16 that correct?
17 A. I am.
18 Q. Can I just deal very briefly with London Buses Services
19 Limited. It's a subsidiary of Transport for London?
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. What it does, as I understand it, it plans the routes,
22 it specifies service levels, it's responsible for the
23 bus stations and bus stops, security at those locations,
24 but it doesn't actually operate the buses. Is that
25 correct?

1 A. That's right. The buses are operated by private
2 companies.

3 Q. So the number 30 bus which was bombed on 7 July, that
4 was operated by Stagecoach London?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. Can we just deal with the bus network itself? I think
7 you tell us in your statement that in the fleet of buses
8 in London there are 8,500 buses?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. How many passengers are carried on a weekday?

11 A. It's in excess of about 6 and a half million passenger
12 journeys per day.

13 Q. During the rush hour, are you able to give us an
14 indication of how many passengers the bus service
15 carries?

16 A. In Central London, it's probably around the half
17 a million mark.

18 Q. I think most of us will know from experience that, where
19 there is a problem on the London Underground, the buses
20 step in to ferry the passengers from -- to carry on
21 their journey, they keep London moving. Would that be
22 fair?

23 A. That's right.

24 Q. Can I ask you about your particular responsibilities?

25 In July 2005, you were the network liaison manager. Can

1 you just explain what that was?

2 A. Well, that's my current role still. I'm responsible for
3 the reduction of crime and disorder and antisocial
4 behaviour on the London bus network. In 2002, London
5 Buses signed an agreement with the Metropolitan Police
6 and we work side by side to try to tackle those sort of
7 issues on the bus network.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think the transcript has got
9 "production", I think it should be "prevention"?

10 A. Prevention, yes. I would hope so.

11 MR HAY: How does that role differ from the role of the
12 network duty manager?

13 A. The network duty manager manages our control room, which
14 is CentreComm, which is London Buses Command and Control
15 complex. While you're managing that room -- it's
16 a joint control room. Since 2000 -- we've been looking
17 after the bus network since 1979, but in 2002, we merged
18 two control rooms, and we've got the police working
19 alongside TfL staff in a purpose-built room.

20 Q. Is the police element of that control room known as
21 MetroComm?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. So clearly you worked very closely with the police?

24 A. That's right, side by side.

25 Q. In managing the network, and side by side in managing

1 traffic, presumably you also work very closely with the
2 Network Control Centre of London Underground?

3 A. We do.

4 Q. I said "the police", I should have said the Metropolitan
5 Police Service, who you work very closely with. Is your
6 relationship less close with the British Transport
7 Police?

8 A. Yes we work very closely with the Metropolitan Police,
9 but, also, we do speak to City Police on a regular
10 basis, but not so much BTP.

11 Q. That's because British Transport Police are responsible
12 for policing the railways --

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. -- and, therefore, don't actually impede or interfere in
15 the role of the buses.

16 Before turning to the events of 7 July 2005, could
17 I just clarify one thing? Am I right in thinking that,
18 in July 2005, there was no policy or procedure in place
19 for the evacuation of the bus network or the suspension
20 of the bus network in London?

21 A. There is a major incident procedure in place.

22 Q. Is that to deal with suspending the bus network?

23 A. It's to deal with major incidents and catastrophic
24 incidents. When you take the bus network, the bus
25 network covers everything within the M25.

1 Q. So that --

2 A. We haven't had to do that at this --

3 Q. -- procedure was set out when you would need to evacuate

4 or suspend the buses --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- or was that procedure actually designed for, when

7 there were incidents elsewhere, you would actually use

8 the buses to ferry people, perhaps, out of Central

9 London?

10 A. Both, I guess.

11 Q. Prior to July 2005, from your knowledge and experience,

12 had there ever been a requirement to suspend the bus

13 network in London?

14 A. We've withdrawn bus services from certain streets in

15 London before.

16 Q. But not for, say, the whole of zone 1 or the whole of

17 London itself?

18 A. Not for the whole of London itself, no.

19 Q. Can I turn now to 7 July itself? You provided

20 a summarised time-line of CentreComm's electric log of

21 events.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Perhaps if we could have a look at that. Could we have

24 up on the screen, please, TFL977-11? On that particular

25 day, would I be right in thinking that the majority of

1 the information you received was either from the NCC or
2 from MetroComm, from the Metropolitan Police Service?
3 A. That's correct.
4 Q. We can see there, at 08.56, the first reference is to
5 Liverpool Street:
6 "Closures are likely after an explosion in the
7 ticket office in the mainline station."
8 And the reference there to CAD 2334. So that's
9 something that came from MetroComm, from the police?
10 A. That's correct.
11 Q. We can then see at 08.57 you receive a telephone call
12 from RPI Tadena. RPI, is that revenue --
13 A. He is a revenue protection inspector.
14 Q. I don't think we necessarily trouble ourselves with what
15 they do. But there, he or she is reporting an explosion
16 in a train tunnel at Edgware Road station.
17 We can then see, at 08.57, a report from the NCC.
18 So is this the first time that the NCC contacted
19 CentreComm in relation to events going on on the
20 Underground?
21 A. It wasn't the first -- it was the first time the NCC
22 contacted us in relation to the explosions. It wasn't
23 the first time that NCC called us that day to carry
24 ticket holders, because there had been problems on the
25 Underground earlier on in the morning, on the

1 Northern Line, and -- I believe it's on the

2 Piccadilly Line -- we'd been carrying ticket holders on
3 their behalf then.

4 Q. But in relation to the incidents which appear to have
5 happened, as far as the NCC were aware, at Edgware Road
6 and at Liverpool Street, that's where the request came
7 for blanket ticket holders?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. Does that mean that people travelling with
10 London Underground tickets can then use the bus service?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. At that point, what was your understanding of what had
13 happened on the Underground system?

14 A. There had been some sort of power supply problem causing
15 power surges which had resulted in some sort of
16 electrical explosion on the network.

17 Q. Where was that information coming from? Who was telling
18 you that?

19 A. My staff in the room were in communication with Network
20 Control Centre at London Underground and the information
21 was coming back from the guys in NCC.

22 Q. At what point did you decide to step in and take over
23 the running of the CentreComm, because that wasn't your
24 responsibility, was it, initially?

25 A. No, it wasn't my role on the day. I guess it was

1 shortly after 9.00, because we've got access to TfL
2 street cameras in our control room and it was pretty
3 obvious there was a lot of people outside stations, and
4 there was a lot of activity on the bus radio network.
5 Calls were coming in thick and fast. The gentleman that
6 was sitting in the chair -- we have a panel that cover
7 the network duty manager job. Basically, they're in the
8 stage where they're progressing through their managerial
9 training, and they're put in there on a weekly basis
10 just to get them to the required level.
11 The gentleman that was in the chair had only been
12 doing the job a few days and it wasn't really fair to
13 leave him to deal with what was going on. It was better
14 for me to have him answering the radio, get an extra
15 body on the radio desks, to try to deal with the volume
16 of calls that were coming in.
17 Q. So at that early stage, at around 9.00 or so, it was
18 clear to you that this was a significant incident on the
19 Underground, whatever that incident may be, and it was
20 necessary for you to step in and to try to keep London
21 moving?
22 A. I was concerned that there was a lot of people on the
23 street and we needed to move those people. Obviously,
24 there was a problem on the Underground, but I didn't
25 know what it was.

1 Q. We can see on the screen the final bullet point, that
2 one of the decisions you made was to telephone
3 Ken Maylin to make his way to the NCC to act as
4 a liaison person. From your perspective, it's obviously
5 therefore important to ensure that there was a free
6 flowing of information from the NCC to CentreComm.
7 Would that be fair?

8 A. Yes. My experience in running the control room at
9 CentreComm was that when you've got a big incident like
10 that, you tie up all your resources. I knew that the
11 Underground people would be busy and I had a guy sitting
12 over at London Streets Traffic Control Centre, I asked
13 him to go over to NCC and relay information for me.

14 Q. Do you know what time Mr Maylin arrived at the NCC?

15 A. I believe it was after 9.30. Although I've got an entry
16 on that log that says Ken was asked to go at 9.00, it
17 could be that it was about 10 minutes after 9.00 that he
18 actually got the message.

19 Q. Presumably, by 9.30, things had moved on considerably in
20 any event?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. What information were you receiving from the NCC over
23 that first 40 or so minutes after the bombs had been
24 detonated?

25 A. It was fairly consistent that there was a power supply

1 issue. There were explosions taking -- some sort of
2 explosions taking place. There was a suggestion that
3 a train had derailed at Edgware Road.

4 Q. In hindsight, do you think you received sufficiently
5 detailed information?

6 A. I believe so, because, at the time, London Underground
7 were dealing with an incident on their system which is
8 below ground, and they were managing that incident, and
9 they had no reason -- apart from the fact when --
10 obviously, when they closed the stations down and they
11 were disgorging all those people out on to the street,
12 then they needed to be speaking to us because we were
13 going to pick those people up and move them safely away.
14 But up until the point that they needed us to carry
15 their ticket holders, they had no reason to tell us that
16 they'd got a problem on the network.

17 Q. We've heard from Mr Barr today, and we've heard that he
18 hadn't excluded the possibility of it being a terrorist
19 incident. Would it have been helpful for you to have
20 that sort of information passed to you?

21 A. It would have been if he could have confirmed that it
22 was a terrorist incident.

23 Q. So only if it was corroborated information rather than
24 suspicion. Would that be fair?

25 A. If I'm managing the control room, he would say it's no

1 good, I can deal with fact.

2 Q. If the fact had been given to you by Mr Barr that there
3 had been a terrorist incident, would that have altered
4 anything which you'd done over the course of the day?

5 A. Possibly.

6 Q. Perhaps we'll return to that in a moment. You were also
7 receiving information from MetroComm. If we could have
8 back up on the screen TFL977-12, one of the things you
9 say in your witness statement at paragraph 14 was:

10 "During this period, both myself and other
11 CentreComm staff were in regular communications with
12 MetroComm and our joint control room. I was in constant
13 communication ..."

14 You mention a particular police officer and other
15 police officers, and you say you were seeking
16 confirmation for what was going on on the Underground
17 and also asking for information about road closures and
18 the like.

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. So it's clear from that that, first of all, you were
21 working very closely with the Metropolitan Police
22 Service, but the reason why you were doing so was to
23 keep the buses moving. Is that right?

24 A. It was to keep the buses moving and to try to glean more
25 information.

1 Q. We can see at 09.03 there's a reference to a telephone
2 call from MP:

3 "Liverpool Street London Underground station closed
4 due to an incident."

5 The reference there is to CAD number 2338. So it
6 appears that MetroComm were passing you information that
7 they were receiving from the CADs. Is that correct?

8 A. That's correct, yes.

9 Q. Can we have up on the screen, please, COLP18?

10 This is CAD 2338, so the same CAD. Can we turn to
11 page 4, please? Then at the bottom, 09.10.32, there's
12 a reference there from a City of London Policeman,
13 Policeman Neil Kemp, who reported at 09.10.32:

14 "This is a bomb in one carriage 100 yards into the
15 tunnel ..."

16 He's referring to Aldgate.

17 "... I have multiple casualties and poss fatal.

18 Need a police liaison officer here at the Aldgate end.

19 LAS also required as well as more police officers to
20 take witness statements."

21 Did anyone at MetroComm who had access to that CAD
22 at any point tell you that they'd received a report from
23 Aldgate at 9.10, that there had been a bomb in one of
24 the carriages?

25 A. No, they did not.

1 Q. Would you have expected them to have relayed that sort
2 of information to you?

3 A. Yes, I would.

4 Q. Why? What would be the purpose?

5 A. Well, if a bomb had gone off at Liverpool Street
6 station, that's a very busy transport interchange, we
7 have a bus station directly above Liverpool Street
8 station.

9 Q. So that's the sort of critical information which you
10 would expect to be passed to you?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. If you are working closely with the Metropolitan Police
13 Service who had access to this CAD, you would expect
14 them to relay that to you?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. On reflection, again with hindsight, do you feel that
17 MetroComm were passing you sufficient information?

18 A. I believe that MetroComm were in the same position as we
19 were. They had limited information but they gave us as
20 much information as they had. Obviously, I hadn't seen
21 this before.

22 Q. Can we go back to TFL977-12, please? Further down,
23 please, 09.45, we can see there the message received
24 from CentreComm to broadcast a fare suspension call on
25 the instruction of Alan Dell and that's at the point

1 that the Underground has been evacuated. Is that right?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. It goes on to say you received a telephone call from LAS

4 control, major incident called. The caller states there

5 are bombs at the following locations: Russell Square,

6 St Pancras, Liverpool Street, Aldgate East,

7 Praed Street, King's Cross, Chapel Street.

8 Is that the first time that any of the emergency

9 services told you that they declared a major incident?

10 A. I believe so. It's certainly the first time the word

11 "bomb" was used.

12 Q. In respect of -- we'll come back to the word "bomb", but

13 in respect of the major incident -- so you didn't know,

14 for example, that, at 9.00, Inspector Mingay of the

15 British Transport Police had declared a major incident

16 at King's Cross?

17 A. No, I didn't.

18 Q. You didn't know that, at 9.05, the London Fire Brigade

19 I believe it's Sub-Officer Clarke had declared a major

20 incident at Aldgate?

21 A. I didn't.

22 Q. And presumably you didn't know either, at 09.32, the

23 Metropolitan Police Service, Police Sergeant Brown, had

24 declared a major incident at Edgware Road?

25 A. No.

1 Q. The declaration of a major incident by the emergency
2 services presumably gives you an indication of the
3 severity of the incident they're dealing with. Would
4 that be fair?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. So had you known earlier on that these major incidents
7 had been declared, you would have known that this wasn't
8 a short-term issue, this was going to be a more
9 long-term, significant issue for you over the course of
10 that day?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. Again, I know it's difficult, but with hindsight, would
13 it have helped you, then, to know that these major
14 incidents had been declared by the emergency services?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. At paragraph 25 of the statement you sum up really the
17 position of the information you had and you say this:
18 "Prior to the explosion on the bus in
19 Tavistock Square, the dialogue and information coming to
20 CentreComm from the NCC emergency services and from our
21 bus drivers and operational staff at bus stations and on
22 the roads did not provide any indication that the events
23 which were unfolding on the Underground network
24 presented a risk to other transport systems or
25 specifically to London buses."

1 You go on to say that the first suggestion the
2 incidents on the Underground may have been bombs or
3 terrorist-related did not feed through to CentreComm
4 until about 9.53. I think we've seen actually there was
5 a reference at 09.45, and that was after the explosion
6 on board the number 30 bus:
7 "Furthermore, it was not known until later that the
8 explosions had been perpetrated by suicide bombers."
9 Would this be fair in respect of the information you
10 were receiving, the information you were receiving was
11 limited?
12 A. Yes, the -- at 09.45, that was -- that fare suspension
13 was in relation to the Underground have now closed down
14 their system, and the fare suspension was to try to move
15 people more efficiently. People were coming out of the
16 stations, they were in the street, into the road, we
17 just wanted to move them as quickly and as safely as
18 possible and the last thing you wanted to be doing was
19 messing about looking for people's tickets.
20 So we put an instruction out and told drivers just
21 to take as many passengers as they could and get them
22 away safely and as quickly as possible.
23 The word "bomb" wasn't mentioned at 09.45. The
24 first time the word "bomb" was mentioned to me
25 personally was at 09.53.

1 Q. So there was a -- despite -- if we can go back to
2 TFL977-12 --

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: That's how it appears to read,
4 Mr Hay. It reads that way, that it's the suspension of
5 the tickets at 09.45.

6 MR HAY: Sorry, yes, I didn't -- the two -- the other line,
7 there's a 09.53. I apologise. It goes on to say, after
8 09.53, telephone call from LAS.

9 But would this be fair in terms of the information
10 which you were receiving: the information you were
11 receiving was limited, but it was limited in the sense
12 of the information you needed mainly to keep the buses
13 running?

14 A. There was enough information to keep the buses running,
15 but obviously more information would have been better.

16 Q. We know, then, that matters obviously then changed and
17 the bomb was detonated on the number 30 bus and, as
18 a consequence of that, you took the decision that all
19 bus services should be withdrawn from zone 1.

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. You decided that a search should be made of all buses
22 and bus stations for unattended or suspicious items?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Mr Dell, as you know, one of the issues that my Lady is
25 enquiring into is whether a decision ought to have been

1 taken earlier to suspend the bus network, so I need to
2 ask you some direct questions about that, if that's
3 okay.

4 The first is this: who had the authority to suspend
5 the bus network in July 2005?

6 A. At the time of the incidents, I did.

7 Q. Could you be directed to do that by any of the emergency
8 services?

9 A. I could be advised to do it, but the end decision would
10 be mine.

11 Q. At any point prior to the explosion on the number 30
12 bus, did you have any reason to consider that the London
13 bus network was going to be the subject of an attack?

14 A. I did not.

15 Q. You go on to say in your witness statement, at
16 paragraph 27:

17 "With the benefit of hindsight, the obvious question
18 is: had I known before the explosion on the number 30
19 bus that there had been three explosions on different
20 Tube trains at different locations, would I have taken
21 action to suspend buses in Central London or more
22 widely? The answer to this question is no."

23 Can I ask the next obvious question: why not?

24 A. Because when there are problems on London Underground,
25 London Buses' primary role is to assist the Underground

1 when they're in trouble, and as Mr Barr has said earlier
2 on, there's approximately 200,000 people being pushed
3 out on to the streets.

4 All the indications, with hindsight, were that the
5 attacks were taking place on the Underground. We would
6 have put in place a procedure to check all the vehicles
7 as best as possible and obviously you've got all those
8 people in Central London that need to be moved, and
9 that's our role.

10 Q. What's the best way of moving all those people in
11 Central London?

12 A. As safely and as effectively as possible, in the case of
13 7/7, was on a bus.

14 Q. So had you suspended the bus network at an earlier
15 stage, you would have left, presumably, a very large
16 number of people stranded in Central London?

17 A. That's right, you would have left all the people
18 stranded.

19 Q. One of the things that you say you then did was to give
20 the instruction to search for unattended or suspicious
21 items.

22 Would it be fair to say that, in July 2005, it
23 certainly wasn't conceived of in your mind that there
24 could be the possibility of a suicide bomber?

25 A. That's correct.

1 Q. Can I ask, how long does it take to suspend the bus
2 network in zone 1?

3 A. It could have taken anything up to 90 minutes, depending
4 on where the vehicles were at the time. When the call
5 went out, the drivers were told to curtail their journey
6 at the next curtailment point along their line of route,
7 tell their passengers what was happening, turn the bus
8 round and take it back out of zone 1 in service. So
9 they would have been serving bus stops as they left
10 central London, because you had all these people in
11 London and you couldn't send the buses back out of
12 service and just leave the people behind at the bus
13 stop, so they would have come back in service.

14 Q. So the buses were still collecting people and taking
15 them out of zone 1?

16 A. That's correct, yes.

17 Q. That could have taken anything up to 90 minutes?

18 A. I believe so.

19 Q. We know from the CCTV footage that the last image of
20 Hasib Hussain was at 09.24 walking towards the
21 Gray's Inn Road. We don't actually know what time he
22 boarded the number 30 bus or, before that, the number 91
23 bus, but presumably then, even had you made the call
24 earlier to suspend the buses, it's still conceivable
25 that he could have boarded the number 91 or the

1 number 30 bus?

2 A. I believe so, yes.

3 Q. Following the events on 7 July, did you discuss with
4 Mike Weston, the operational director of London Buses,
5 who I believe is senior to you in the organisation, your
6 decision regarding when the buses were suspended?

7 A. I did.

8 Q. Did he agree or disagree with the decision you made on
9 the day?

10 A. He agreed.

11 Q. One final question from me. Other than 7 July 2005,
12 since then, have there been any other occasions upon
13 which the bus network has been suspended?

14 A. No.

15 Q. I was thinking of February 2009 when there was quite
16 heavy snow in Central London. Was that an occasion --

17 A. Some routes did return to their garage because roads
18 were unsafe to use because gritting lorries didn't go
19 out, but the whole London bus network wasn't suspended.

20 MR HAY: Thank you very much, Mr Dell. No more questions
21 from me, but there will be from others.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?

23 Questions by MS SHEFF

24 MS SHEFF: My Lady, I'm very grateful to Mr Hay who has, in
25 fact, covered the vast majority of the issues with which

1 the families are concerned in relation to the bus
2 network. I therefore only have a few matters.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

4 MS SHEFF: Mr Dell, in relation to the last questions that
5 you were asked, you said, in fact, that this was
6 virtually an unprecedented decision that you were taking
7 at the time to suspend the network, so you didn't have
8 any guidelines to follow.

9 A. I didn't suspend the network. I only withdrew the
10 service from a small section of London. That works out
11 about 10 per cent of the bus network.

12 Q. As opposed to stopping it in just a particular road.
13 Had there ever been an occasion where you've stopped
14 it on such a wide scale?

15 A. Not the whole of the central zone, no.

16 Q. So what guidelines were you following, then, in taking
17 that action?

18 A. We have a major incident procedure, depending on the
19 nature of the incident. On the day in question, there
20 had been four explosions at various locations in the
21 Central London area. The reason I took the decision to
22 withdraw the services from Central London was, because
23 of the road closures and the amount of the emergency
24 vehicles that were trying to get into and out of Central
25 London, traffic was at a virtual standstill.

1 My main default was to the staff who were driving
2 the buses, obviously the customers who were on those
3 vehicles. It gave us the opportunity to get the buses
4 out of Central London, make sure that our staff were
5 safe. It also gave us time to get some breathing space
6 to work out what we're going to do with the services,
7 because the rest of the London area was still being
8 served, and it also gave the emergency services on the
9 blue lights the ability to have a little bit more road
10 space to get to the people that needed the help.

11 Q. So although, initially, your concern was to move people
12 out of London by use of the buses, is it fair to say
13 that, by the time the bomb had gone off on the number 30
14 bus, your considerations were rather different and they
15 were now the security and safety of the bus network in
16 Central London?

17 A. No, well, 50/50. I was still concerned about those
18 people, because we'd still brought those people out in
19 the service and, in fact, we used some of their vehicles
20 to assist the London Ambulance Service to take walking
21 wounded to hospital.

22 Q. Yes. But by that time, once you'd realised the
23 actuality of the bomb going off on the bus, that made
24 you take the step of suspending the services, because
25 now there was a danger issue to the buses themselves?

1 A. That was one of the reasons. It wasn't the only reason.
2 The main reason for taking those buses out of that area
3 was to free up the Central London area for the emergency
4 services. We were already putting out the radio calls
5 to check every bus, we didn't only check buses in
6 Central London, we were checking buses in Croydon,
7 Ealing --

8 Q. This was for suspicious items?

9 A. For suspicious items, because nobody mentioned suicide
10 bomber to us. I believe the first time we saw that was
11 when we came out of the office at about 11.00 at night.

12 Q. In fact, it's fair to say on your time-line the
13 suspicious items reports were going on right throughout
14 the day.

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. In fact, even into the early evening, and even at 17.08,
17 you were getting a message claiming that there was
18 a bomb on a route 5 bus. So there were all sorts of
19 issues arising, even after the bomb had gone off on the
20 number 30 bus, which were potentially of risk to the bus
21 services?

22 A. That's the flip side of the coin. When you broadcast
23 the message asking drivers to beware of suspicious items
24 on their bus and they're searching their vehicles -- and
25 it may be quite innocent, as it turned out, lost

1 property -- we got numerous calls where people had left
2 their shopping, but because of what had happened earlier
3 on in the day, people were being very cautious.

4 Q. You even had an incident at 7.25 of a female passenger
5 threatening to blow the bus up, presumably nothing -- no
6 outcome of a serious nature resulted from that?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Your initial policy to assist the London Underground to
9 move their passengers along was, in fact, exactly what
10 the driver of the number 30 bus was doing at the time
11 because the majority of his passengers had already been
12 evacuated from the Tube system, hadn't they?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. In fact, the driver himself said that when he gave his
15 evidence and, by that stage, there was the no fare
16 policy, so he was ushering on people to ensure that
17 there wasn't congestion in the area.

18 The answer that you gave to Mr Hay concerning the
19 major incident, can I just ask you two questions about
20 that?

21 If you'd known that other emergency services had
22 declared major incidents you then would have realised it
23 was a more significant issue, and it would have helped
24 you to know that they had been declared. What would you
25 have done differently if you'd known, or is that hard to

1 say in hindsight?

2 A. Yes, it would have to be an on-the-day decision.

3 Obviously, if I'd known it was a major incident, we've
4 got a really good working relationship with the police
5 officers in the room. We've also got access to a lot of
6 senior police officers, and in the role that I sit in,
7 at the moment, I've got access to those police officers,
8 and if it was a case that a sergeant or an inspector
9 couldn't give me the information, I could have gone to
10 a commander and asked the question, but obviously
11 I wasn't aware of it at the time.

12 Q. Quite. That actually ties in with my second question
13 which would be: through what communication routes would
14 you have expected to have found that out?

15 A. Through the Sergeant that was controlling --

16 Q. Through MetroComm?

17 A. Through MetroComm, yes.

18 Q. If MetroComm knew it at the time when these major
19 incidents were being declared, they weren't
20 communicating that to you?

21 A. I don't believe they did, no.

22 Q. The document that you referred to about responding to
23 major catastrophic incidents, the version that we have
24 is January 2010. The 2005 version appears to have gone
25 missing. Can you say if there are any substantial

1 differences between the two?

2 A. Not without looking at the two documents together. They
3 will have been -- there would have been a revision, if
4 required, after 7/7, but I didn't do that, so I couldn't
5 tell you.

6 Q. Well, it may be too much to ask you to recall a document
7 from five and a half years ago which has now gone
8 missing. You can't say now what those differences were,
9 but clearly those would have been taken into account?

10 A. They would have been.

11 Q. We now have our Operation Bus Stop. That's a recent
12 development, isn't it, post-7/7 --

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. -- which was brought in in September 2007?

15 A. That's right.

16 Q. Again, was that in light of lessons learnt during the
17 7/7 bombings?

18 A. That was actually formed on what I did on the day. We
19 revamped that into Operation Bus Stop.

20 Q. What would you say was the main impact then of Operation
21 Bus Stop from lessons that you learned as a result?

22 A. I think it worked on the day, it certainly worked for
23 us. The important thing is to get the message out
24 quickly and in plain English to numerous amounts of bus
25 drivers out there.

1 A lot of our bus drivers, English isn't their first
2 language and it had to be something that they all could
3 understand quite easily. In 2005, we were using the old
4 fare zone numbers. I'm not quite sure whether you're
5 au fait with that. It was like a dartboard, so 1 is in
6 the middle, then 2 going outwards.

7 Q. The most important information in the middle, is it?

8 A. Well, Central London is in zone 1.

9 Q. I see.

10 A. Then, as you go out, sort of Earl's Court going out to
11 the west, you would be in zone 2.

12 Q. Right.

13 A. That's clearly indicated on the driver's fare chart, so
14 the easiest thing for a driver is the lightbulb moment,
15 "Yes, zones 1 and 2, I know, when I get to that
16 boundary, that's where I turn round".

17 Q. So that would have been in relation to curtailing
18 services?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. In other words, when you issued your suspension, they
21 would know exactly where to stop?

22 A. That's right.

23 Q. That was a new development as a result of Operation Bus
24 Stop, was it?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Did Operation Bus Stop recommend any rearrangement of
2 communication services between you and any of the other
3 organisations involved in 7/7?

4 A. We've -- I don't know about recommendations, but we've
5 since joined control rooms. We were already -- in 2002,
6 we were already alongside the Met Police, but in 2009,
7 we moved to another control room --

8 Q. You're now in Southwark, I believe?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. Is that, again, as a result of lessons learned, that you
11 moved in September 2009 so that you would now be able to
12 share information much more readily with MetroComm --

13 A. No, it's just how --

14 Q. -- with joint offices?

15 A. It's how TfL's control rooms have evolved. We now share
16 a control room with London Streets Traffic
17 Control Centre. They're the guys that look after all
18 the traffic, traffic lights, and MetroComm. So we've
19 got all the pieces of the jigsaw in the same control
20 room.

21 Q. So there's a clear communications implication from that
22 move, would you agree?

23 A. It was good before, but it's better now.

24 Q. It's better now, yes, and in fact, you now also have
25 a direct line, do you not, to the London Fire Brigade?

1 A. We do.

2 Q. But at 7/7 you also had a direct line to the London
3 Ambulance Service. Has that been maintained?

4 A. That's right.

5 Q. Was it through that direct line that you finally
6 received that message at 09.53 about the bombs at the
7 various locations?

8 A. It was.

9 Q. Just finally, can I show you a document concerning your
10 debrief? TFL990-2, please?

11 This was the debrief which you attended and
12 Mike Weston, your manager, also attended, and various
13 points were raised concerning what occurred on the day.
14 The first items being the actual communications
15 themselves, the telephones, mobile telephones were not
16 very reliable, others were.

17 Then if we could go to page 4 of that document,
18 CentreComm, CentreComm was felt to have worked well. Of
19 course, it was reliant upon information being fed into
20 it, but within that context, were you happy with the way
21 that it operated?

22 A. It worked extremely well, yes.

23 Q. One problem raised was that there were just too many
24 people in the room, though, because everybody was
25 watching Sky TV. Was that also being used as a source

1 of information for CentreComm operators?

2 A. That wasn't until mid-morning. Prior to that, I guess
3 when the news first broke, there was a bottom-line
4 message coming out on Sky News, but it was probably
5 after about 10.30, 11.00, before there was a crowd of
6 people round a TV screen, and they were subsequently
7 asked to leave and go and watch the TV somewhere else.

8 Q. Because they were cluttering up the room.

9 But, again, was it helpful, in that the media was
10 able to inform those who were, perhaps not isolated, but
11 retained in the CentreComm rooms and were not receiving
12 as much information as you now accept you would have
13 liked?

14 A. All information is useful, but you still have to confirm
15 the information, even if Sky are putting it on the TV.

16 Q. Yes, well, of course, you would have looked for
17 corroboration from agencies and organisations, emergency
18 services sources, rather than acting on reports in the
19 media?

20 A. Yes, but that was a lot later on in the proceedings,
21 unfortunately.

22 Q. Can I ask you about Ken Maylin? You sent him to NCC to
23 pass back information to you?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. Did he do that?

1 A. He didn't speak to me personally, but he did speak to
2 one of my colleagues.

3 Q. Was there anything of value that he passed on?

4 A. The information that was -- that came back was after
5 09.45 so --

6 Q. Was that because he arrived there too late?

7 A. By the time he got there, he didn't get there until --
8 I believe he got there some time after 9.35.

9 Q. So by then, you were already receiving other information
10 from other sources and fairly shortly after you were in
11 possession of the full facts and able to make decisions
12 that you did.

13 A. Yes.

14 MS SHEFF: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Dell. No further
15 questions.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Any other questions?

17 Thank you very much, Mr Dell. Those are all the
18 questions anybody has for you.

19 MR HAY: My Lady, may I just correct one thing? I believe
20 I suggested to Mr Dell that the bus was operated by
21 Stagecoach. I think it was actually operated by the
22 East London Bus Group or Company who are now owned by
23 Stagecoach. Mr Smith's eagle eye.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: We have a witness -- Mr Dunmore, has
25 he been here all day? Actually, Mr Dunmore, I think you

1 have been here throughout the proceedings anyway, in
2 which case I don't think maybe an apology is necessary,
3 although you've probably been waiting to give evidence
4 which in itself is sometimes anxiety-creating.
5 Are we going to be able to get through all the
6 witnesses who are lined up for tomorrow and Mr Dunmore?
7 MR KEITH: To a very great extent the areas traversed today
8 are repeated in the witness statements of Mr Dunmore and
9 Mr Collins, so I'm confident that we will recover
10 tomorrow any ground lost today.
11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you all very much.
12 (5.00 pm)
13 (The inquests adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)
14
15