

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005

Hearing transcripts - 8 February 2011 - Afternoon session

1 (2.00 pm)

2 MR HAY: Chief inspector, if we could turn now to the events
3 on 7 July itself and the communication systems, can we
4 start first with the above-ground radio system, Airwave?

5 Prior to the explosions, how many channels were
6 initially available on Airwave for British Transport
7 Police?

8 A. In Central London, we would have been operating on one,
9 at that point.

10 Q. Once the detonations occurred or the incidents appeared
11 to be unravelling on the Underground, did the number of
12 channels then increase?

13 A. Later on, they increased. Initially, they were -- above
14 ground, it was just on the single channel, channel 82
15 I think it was.

16 Q. We've heard from a number of witnesses about the
17 difficulty of radio communications generally and that's
18 because there was such a large amount of congestion and
19 traffic. Was that a problem faced by British Transport
20 Police?

21 A. Certainly radio traffic increased to an unprecedented
22 level in the early stages of the incidents, as you would
23 expect.

24 Q. Were there initially, then, insufficient channels to
25 deal with the number of calls which were coming through?

1 A. There were sufficient channels. We could have opened up
2 more channels, and did subsequently. The duty officer
3 in the control room has a judgment to make as to how
4 many channels he opens, because every channel you open,
5 you've got to put another operator behind it to listen
6 to it and manage it, and a second operator to back up
7 the first operator, and so, simultaneous with the radio
8 traffic, you've got incoming and outgoing telephony
9 requirements, so it's a fine judgment between the amount
10 of resources you deploy to radio channels and the amount
11 of resources you deploy to telephone traffic.
12 You also had to maintain the channel 2 channel as
13 well.

14 Q. So the number of radio channels which you can open is in
15 effect determined by the number of officers you can
16 deploy in the control room to manage those channels?

17 A. It certainly is, yes.

18 Q. You need two per channel?

19 A. One person can, in theory, manage it, but you really
20 need a second one, in those circumstances, to back them
21 up so that you can be recording and listening at the
22 same time. It's a very stressful job.

23 Q. Prior to the incidents occurring, how many radio
24 operators were there available in the MICC?

25 A. Four.

1 Q. Once the incident occurred, how many did you then need
2 to manage the amount of radio traffic?

3 A. A fifth one was added who was a backup to the -- what
4 would be known as position number 4.

5 Q. Did there come a point, though, even when, despite the
6 fact that you had five radio operators working, that
7 that still wasn't sufficient to deal with the amount of
8 congestion on the radio?

9 A. Yes, and there was a point where channel 84 was opened.

10 Q. What's channel 84?

11 A. Channel 84 is one of the spare channels that we had at
12 that time, and this was in the early phases of Airwave,
13 our radio structure is different now, but channel 84 was
14 effectively a spare channel. So it wasn't used
15 routinely for day-to-day traffic.

16 Q. What time was that open?

17 A. About 9.30.

18 Q. Did that in any way ease the congestion?

19 A. It certainly absorbed more traffic. Whether it eased
20 congestion or not I think is probably doubtful. More
21 people used it, and you had more radio traffic than
22 coming in to the control room.

23 Q. Was the fact that channel 84 was opened at about 9.30
24 communicated to the officers at the scenes?

25 A. It was repeatedly communicated that channel 84 was open,

1 yes.

2 Q. In your witness statement which you provided for these
3 proceedings, you talk about channel 84, and you said:

4 "It was designated for the bombings, but officers
5 tend to stick to using their usual channels so that
6 channel 84 did not play a significant part in the
7 response."

8 Is that still correct?

9 A. That's correct, yes. I mean, I've listened to the voice
10 recordings throughout that period and, although there
11 was a radio broadcast to switch to channel 84, people
12 who were active on channel 84 working with other
13 officers -- on 82, rather, who were working with other
14 officers on 82 were actually reluctant to switch, for
15 understandable reasons.

16 It's quite difficult to make those changes in the
17 immediate response phase of any incident. It's easier
18 to do once the initial response phase is over and you
19 can start to put those structures in place.

20 Q. It may be because I'm not technically proficient, but
21 you said they were reluctant to do so because it's
22 difficult to make the switch. How difficult is it? Do
23 you not simply just have to change a channel on the
24 handset?

25 A. No, sorry, it's not difficult to actually change the

1 channel. It's difficult to organise who you want to be
2 on which channel, because that takes up operator time to
3 do that. It takes communication time to actually do it.
4 So in the middle of the initial phases of an
5 incident, it's actually quite difficult to make those
6 changes because there isn't a lot of space on the
7 Airwave, there's a lot of urgent traffic coming in and
8 you're trying to interrupt that traffic to make -- to
9 tell people to change their channels and to restructure
10 things in the middle of that initial critical phase.

11 Q. What time did you arrive at the MICC?

12 A. Initially, I went to Tavistock Place to the Alpha Zulu
13 control room there, which was my duty for the day. I'd
14 finished duty at midnight before, I was responsible for
15 the G8 support for Scotland and I was returning to duty
16 at Tavistock Place. I was due on duty at 10.30,
17 I arrived there about 10.15.

18 Q. We heard evidence yesterday about the NCC and it was
19 described as effectively being an avalanche of calls
20 coming into the NCC. Presumably it was similar within
21 the MICC as well?

22 A. Most certainly. This was an unprecedented event, and
23 the demands on MICC increased enormously. Incoming
24 telephone traffic increased by at least 50 per cent.

25 Q. I'll come on to the telephone traffic. But in terms of

1 the amount of radio calls coming into the MICC, one of
2 the difficulties faced, we've discussed, was the number
3 of channels which was available. On top of that, not
4 only are people dealing with the incident itself, but
5 presumably they're also dealing with usual business
6 within the call centre.

7 A. Yes, this was happening. We were still dealing with
8 other incidents.

9 Q. Did you then take steps at a certain point to try to
10 ease that congestion by switching what the control rooms
11 were doing between the MICC and the incident room,
12 Alpha Zulu?

13 A. Yes, when I got to Tavistock Place to Alpha Zulu, I made
14 an assessment of what our communication needs were, and
15 then, in discussion with Chief Superintendent Crowther,
16 who was Silver Commander and at that point located at
17 MICC, my advice was that we switched the two roles.

18 As I mentioned, the title is a role rather than
19 a place, and so my plan was to switch Alpha Zulu to
20 55 Broadway where the event could be managed quite
21 separate from our business as usual and so the role of
22 MICC would be transferred to the facility at
23 Tavistock Place.

24 Q. What time did that occur?

25 A. It didn't take place until 11.30, from an operational

1 point of view, so the decision was made around about
2 10 -- between 10.15 and 10.30. I then went across to
3 MICC and I managed it from then, from there.
4 It's not an easy thing to do, to suddenly switch
5 control room functions, and I had to ensure that, at
6 Tavistock Place, I had sufficient resources in place,
7 and not only sufficient resources but the right
8 structure of resources, so I had to have a new duty
9 officer, a new duty inspector, in place, I had to have
10 a new sergeant in place.

11 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm sorry to interrupt, is this
12 switch that doesn't take place until 11.30 going to help
13 me, Mr Hay?

14 MR HAY: My Lady, we'll come on to what they've now done
15 subsequently to actually improve matters at the British
16 Transport Police, so that explanation of the length of
17 time may assist you to a certain degree to see
18 improvements which have subsequently been made.

19 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

20 MR HAY: Perhaps if you could simply answer this question:
21 by what time, in your assessment, were there
22 a sufficient number of radio channels open and
23 a sufficient number of radio operators to deal with the
24 congestion which was coming in related to the incidents?

25 A. Well, the first thing that was done was that the duty

1 officer in MICC, Inspector Young, requested Alpha Zulu
2 at Tavistock Place to listen in to radio channels and
3 support MICC in that role, and effectively relinquish
4 its role in Scotland at that point.

5 Q. What time did that happen?

6 A. That happened around about 9.30, it had happened by the
7 time I got to Alpha Zulu.

8 Q. Can we turn now to channel 2 and its effectiveness on
9 7 July? Was it fully operational prior to the bombings
10 occurring?

11 A. There was an ongoing fault on channel 2, but it was
12 operational, yes.

13 Q. When you say an ongoing fault, can you just explain what
14 you mean by that?

15 A. There had been a fault reported at Warren Street on the
16 system. It had been reported and engineers had been
17 assigned to it. It created interference for a short
18 period of time. I've listened to it. It occurred at
19 about 1.00 in the morning, of that morning, and again at
20 2.30 that morning. But it had been operational beyond
21 that point. It was operational up to 8.40.

22 Q. In your witness statement, which you've provided, you
23 explain that between 8.50 and about 9.23 channel 2
24 simply wasn't working at all. Is that correct?

25 A. It was just constant interference on it. There was --

1 it was unusable. But MICC continued to monitor it and,
2 indeed, every call that related -- that would normally
3 have gone out on channel 2 was put out on channel 2,
4 albeit nobody was able to respond. There was always the
5 chance that they could, and so the control room
6 continually used channel 2.

7 Q. From your statements, it appears that it's unclear as to
8 what actually caused that problem between 8.50 and 9.23.
9 It may or may not have been related to the bombings; is
10 that right?

11 A. It probably wasn't because, after 9.23, there were
12 certainly transmissions at Russell Square and there were
13 transmissions at King's Cross, and transmissions at
14 Aldgate. Our belief is -- and I've discussed this with
15 one of the engineers -- that the interference that was
16 taking place at Warren Street was triggered again by
17 a power surge as a result of the bombings, but it didn't
18 damage the channel 2 infrastructure, and the action that
19 was taken was that the communications equipment at
20 Warren Street was disabled and thereby channel 2 was
21 restored.

22 Q. But regardless of whatever the cause was, isn't the
23 important point that, effectively, for 35 minutes post
24 the explosions there was no channel 2 radio network
25 working underground for British Transport Police?

1 A. That's correct, it wasn't working.

2 Q. Once the problem at Warren Street had been rectified,
3 channel 2 was then available for use. Was that
4 communicated by the control room to British Transport
5 Police officers at the scenes?

6 A. There's no record of them specifically putting out
7 "Channel 2 is now operational", but they immediately --
8 or in fact, they never ceased communicating on
9 channel 2. So transmissions would have been coming
10 across on the officers' radios from the moment it became
11 live.

12 Q. I think you subsequently analysed the amount of radio
13 usage on channel 2, and is it right that it didn't
14 appear to be as high as you would have anticipated
15 post 9.25, once the problem had been rectified?

16 A. It wasn't as high as I would have anticipated, but
17 having given some thought to that, the explanation is
18 almost certainly that a lot of officers were working
19 back-to-back, so communicating underground between radio
20 sets within that confined location, and also, by that
21 time, a lot of the officers who were now underground --
22 at the underground locations were not necessarily L area
23 officers and so were not in possession of a channel 2
24 radio anyway.

25 Q. One of the things you say in your statement, though, is

1 this: you say because the control room didn't alert
2 officers to the fact that channel 2 was now working, it
3 may mean that some officers assumed it was not working
4 throughout the day. Is that right?

5 A. That is a possibility, yes.

6 Q. May we have up on screen, please, BTP28 [BTP28-1]?

7 This is a section from Chief Inspector Crowther's
8 log, and if we could just look at "Reason", we can see
9 the first sentence there:

10 "Underground radio comms have failed during this
11 incident."

12 Do you share that assessment?

13 A. For those 33 minutes, yes, they did fail.

14 Q. Can I ask you now specifically about channel 2 at
15 King's Cross in particular? Could we have up on the
16 screen, please, [BTP167-8]?

17 If we could focus on the second half of the page,
18 please, this is an extract from the BTP transcript from
19 Inspector Mingay. He's at King's Cross. We can see
20 there:

21 "I'm in the control room on the Underground, all
22 right? I want Serial 103.

23 "Controller: And what station?

24 "Inspector Mingay: King's Cross."

25 The controller says: [BTP167-9]

1 "King's Cross, okay.

2 "All right, so King's Cross station is being
3 evacuated so there will be knock-on effects right across
4 the area, I would imagine.

5 "Okay.

6 "Right, I have no radio comms [this is at 9.00] so
7 you can't contact me. I reported that channel 2's been
8 out days ago but nothing has been done."

9 Was there an existing problem at King's Cross in
10 relation to channel 2 prior to 7 July?

11 A. There was no reported fault at King's Cross prior to
12 that. There was a report -- a fault at Warren Street.

13 Now, that fault would be retransmitted to every other
14 location, so interference -- the way that channel 2

15 worked was that interference set up by a fault at

16 Warren Street would be retransmitted to the other

17 locations. So it would appear as interference or

18 a fault at King's Cross. But it was -- the

19 communications were working there. There were

20 transmissions at King's Cross on the channel 2 log at

21 07.40 that morning.

22 Q. As I understood your evidence earlier, the problem at
23 Warren Street had started at about 1.00 in the morning.

24 Sorry, if we could have that back up on the screen,

25 please?

1 Inspector Mingay -- we haven't heard from him, but
2 here he's saying that he, first of all, had reported
3 days ago that channel 2 had not been working, so this
4 appears to be something which is separate to the
5 Warren Street problem.

6 A. It might have been presented as a problem at
7 King's Cross because, as I say, a problem at
8 Warren Street would actually impact across the whole
9 network, the whole channel 2 network.

10 Although I said I heard it at 1.00 in the morning,
11 the interference, it possibly was present the day before
12 and was again -- relates to Warren Street. I can't be
13 100 per cent sure about that. I can be 100 per cent
14 sure that channel 2 was working at King's Cross at 07.40
15 on that morning, because I've heard the transmissions,
16 and Inspector Mingay is wrong in that respect.

17 It may -- it obviously wasn't working at the point
18 of that transcript, the time of that transcript, because
19 the explosions had occurred and channel 2 had gone down.

20 Q. But it seems quite clear, from what he's saying there,
21 that there has been an ongoing problem which simply
22 hadn't been rectified, but you're saying that he's wrong
23 about that, the problems at Warren Street, and channel 2
24 was still effectively working at King's Cross prior to
25 the bombings going off?

1 A. What I'm saying is the only fault that had been reported
2 to the suppliers, the maintainers, was at Warren Street,
3 and that successful transmissions had been made at
4 King's Cross that day and presumably the day before.

5 Q. When was the report of the fault at Warren Street made?

6 A. I believe it was on the 6th, but I'm not 100 per cent
7 sure. It was certainly within the previous 24 to
8 48 hours.

9 Q. Given that has a knock-on effect on underground
10 communications, for example, at King's Cross, one of the
11 busiest Underground stations, is it usual for it to take
12 24-48 hours for that problem to be rectified?

13 A. It's not usual. An engineer would come out or come into
14 MICC each day to actually check the fault log and we
15 rang faults on channel 2 into NCC. These were
16 London Underground engineers that maintained and
17 supported the channel 2 system, but faults were
18 corrected very quickly usually.

19 Q. Can I turn now to mobile phones? You mentioned earlier
20 that there was an increase in the use of telephone calls
21 coming in. Presumably, because officers were struggling
22 to use their radios because of the congestion, they
23 turned to using their mobile phones on the day.

24 A. There would have been an element of that. The increase
25 in telephone traffic would have come from numerous

1 sources. Yes, they would have come from our officers.

2 It would have been coming from rail staff across the
3 network, both mainline and overground. It would have
4 been coming from other emergency services and it would
5 have been coming in huge numbers from the world's press.

6 Q. In your witness statement, you say that the number of
7 abandoned telephone calls on the day was about
8 30 per cent, whereas on a usual, normal day, at the time
9 it was about 5 or 10 per cent. Can you just explain to
10 us what you mean by an "abandoned" call?

11 A. An abandoned call is a call that's not answered. So
12 somebody has hung up before the call is answered.

13 Q. So on the day itself, 30 per cent of calls were simply
14 unanswered presumably because of a lack of resources to
15 answer the phones?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. Looking back on the day as a whole in respect of the
18 communication difficulties, will it be fair to say this:
19 that the British Transport Police experienced
20 considerable communication difficulties, as did other
21 emergency service organisations?

22 A. We experienced difficulty in handling the volume of
23 traffic that was suddenly sent to us across all mediums.
24 The only communications problem that we had was with
25 channel 2, in terms of the technology. The rest was

1 about volume, pure and simply volume.

2 Q. Can I ask you now just briefly about the relationship
3 with the NCC?

4 We heard evidence yesterday from Mr Barr and he was
5 very complimentary about the working relationship
6 between the London Underground and the British Transport
7 Police, but he was taken to some specific radio
8 communications made by the British Transport Police
9 officer at the scene, Inspector Munn, to the MICC. If
10 we could just have those up on screen, please,
11 [INQ10426-6], and if we go into 09.06.45, this is
12 Inspector Munn:

13 "I'm at Aldgate station, confirm this is a train
14 accident. Declare a major incident. We have numerous
15 injured people at this station at this time."

16 If we could turn to page 7 [INQ10426-7], please, and then
17 09.11.05, again Inspector Munn:

18 "Yeah, BX urgent request for an ambulance to Aldgate
19 from paramedics and Fire Brigade on trains. There are
20 people on these trains who will die if they do not get
21 immediate care. We need ambulances to Aldgate urgently,
22 over."

23 Then to page 8 [INQ10426-8], please, and right at the foot,
24 09.17.11, again Inspector Munn:

25 "I'm with the train at Aldgate. Clear bomb damage

1 to one carriage. One carriage is decimated. The rest
2 of the carriage on the train is severely damaged and two
3 confirmed fatalities. Nine people very severely,
4 seriously injured and trapped in the train.

5 Fire Brigade are now with us, won't go trackside until
6 power's confirmed off and we're gonna need paramedics to
7 the train urgently."

8 When Mr Barr yesterday was taken through those
9 series of calls, he wasn't aware of them and he said
10 this, he said he "was not sure that we, the NCC and the
11 British Transport Police, shared adequately". Do you
12 agree with that assessment?

13 A. I think there's two answers to that. The normal working
14 relationship between the NCC and MICC is a very close
15 working relationship, a very successful relationship,
16 and today would have taken place many, many times and is
17 usually vested between the duty officer, the duty
18 inspector, or the duty sergeant in MICC and the duty
19 manager in NCC.

20 On that particular day, because of the unprecedented
21 amount of telephone traffic, both incoming and needs for
22 outgoing telephone traffic, I'm quite sure that NCC,
23 trying to contact us, well, it sometimes fell into that
24 30 per cent of abandoned calls. Likewise, we wouldn't
25 have been able to get through to them for exactly the

1 same reasons.

2 So in that respect, there isn't the volume of
3 outgoing telephone calls to NCC that I would ordinarily
4 have expected. But I understand why there wasn't.

5 There were alternatives in place. As Mr Barr said,
6 he was liaising face-to-face with a senior BTP officer
7 and the duty officer in the control room, probably
8 realising that he couldn't maintain his normal level of
9 communication, because the demands on him would have
10 been enormous at that time, he sent another inspector
11 into NCC to act as face-to-face communications between
12 NCC and MICC. That isn't what we normally do, but
13 that's what was done on the day.

14 Q. But do you agree that that sort of information,
15 reference in particular to bomb damage, should have been
16 shared with the NCC?

17 A. Certainly it should have been.

18 Q. If it wasn't shared, then you weren't sharing as
19 adequately or as well as you perhaps would have liked to
20 have done?

21 A. I don't know that it wasn't, but there is no record to
22 show that it was passed.

23 Q. I think the evidence we heard yesterday from Mr Barr was
24 that it wasn't. Can we turn now to the improvements
25 which have subsequently been made to the communications

1 system? We're going to hear from Chief Inspector Short
2 about Airwave, so I don't want to ask you about that.
3 What I wanted to ask you about were the changes which
4 had been made to the control room since 7 July 2005.
5 What changes have been made?

6 A. Very significant changes. These changes had been
7 planned before 7 July 2005, but they commenced in 2006
8 and were fully implemented by 2008.

9 What that effectively has done is close down
10 a number of small control room sites that we had around
11 our regional areas and focus Command and Control on two
12 sites, the existing site at 55 Broadway and a control
13 room, a large control room, in Birmingham. The control
14 room in London covers London and the south-east. The
15 control room in Birmingham covers the rest of the
16 country.

17 Added to that is a new facility, which we call the
18 First Contact Centre, that handles all of our
19 non-emergency telephone traffic, which is something in
20 the order of 70 per cent of telephone traffic and also
21 includes emails and texts and faxes, all means of
22 communication.

23 One of the problems of the old structure, and was
24 present on 7 July, was the fact that emergency telephone
25 traffic and non-emergency telephone traffic competed for

1 the same resources.

2 Q. By having the First Response Centre you can then
3 differentiate out which calls go where?

4 A. The First Contact Centre has -- only handles
5 non-emergency telephone traffic, albeit emergencies
6 arrive by that route. Their objective is to deal with
7 that call at the very first point of contact or pass it
8 to an appropriate person to action it. That could very
9 well be the control room.

10 What this actually means is that the control room is
11 now released from a large amount of telephone traffic
12 and other means of non-emergency communications which
13 allows them to actually spend more time on those
14 emergency calls, to make more outgoing calls to our
15 partners in the railway industry and other emergency
16 services, and that's been achieved, not by reducing
17 staff, but actually by increasing staff by about
18 a third. So we have a third more people in less sites
19 but a third more people in the Command and Control
20 function.

21 Q. In your witness statement, you explain how the attrition
22 rate for telephone calls which used to be between 5 to
23 10 per cent on a normal day is now down to 1 per cent?

24 A. It's 1 per cent and less on occasions.

25 Q. Can I go back to the issue which my Lady was asking me

1 about earlier, the switch from the MICC to the incident
2 control room and the process by which that took on
3 7 July and it took a period of time for that to be
4 organised?

5 Have the changes which have been made to the control
6 room sped up the process by which that can be done?

7 A. It certainly has. Today, I would expect the duty
8 officer in either of the control rooms, faced with the
9 circumstances that they were faced with on 7 July, to
10 speak to their colleagues, because we now have another
11 inspector, so we've duplicated the role of inspector in
12 the control rooms so there's one in Birmingham 24 hours
13 a day as well as one in London.

14 The London one, on 7 July, actually had -- also had
15 a force-wide responsibility and no longer has. They
16 would communicate with each other and the Birmingham
17 control room or the London, whichever, would be able to
18 take over all of the day-to-day routine, business as
19 usual traffic within a very few minutes thereby
20 releasing all the resources at the control room that
21 needed to concentrate on a specific incident or series
22 of incidents within minutes, without being burdened by
23 other traffic.

24 So what I effectively did at 11.30 could be put into
25 place within a very few minutes. It's not about moving

1 resources, it's merely about reconfiguring the
2 technology that they use. Where they're sitting is
3 irrelevant. It's just a matter of reconfiguration.

4 MR HAY: Chief Inspector Gosden, thank you very much.

5 I have no more questions for you, but others may.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

7 Questions by MR COLTART

8 MR COLTART: Chief Inspector, in answer to Mr Hay's question
9 a few minutes ago about difficulties with your
10 communications systems on the day, you explained that
11 the only technical difficulty had been with channel 2
12 but that you'd experienced capacity issues in relation
13 to some of your other systems. I'd just like to press
14 you a little, if I may, on what practical effect that
15 had on the day.

16 For that purpose, could we have a look, please, at
17 [BTP311-8]?

18 If we could enlarge the bottom two-thirds of the
19 page, please, this was a summary of some of the feedback
20 from your officers after the event and under the heading
21 "Inefficient/ineffective aspects" -- it should be said
22 immediately there are other parts of this document which
23 give positive feedback about things that went well on
24 the day --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. -- but just dealing with this part of it, there was
2 initial difficulty in deploying units to Edgware Road
3 due to the volume of radio traffic and MICC being told
4 it was a "one under".

5 There was difficulty in obtaining updates from
6 scenes as mobiles were not connecting and channel 84 was
7 being overused.

8 A dependence, as it's described, on mobile phones
9 that fell over.

10 Do you accept that in July 2005 the BTP was more
11 dependent on mobile phones than it should have been?

12 A. No, I don't accept that we were more dependent on mobile
13 phones. We had the technology capability to meet our
14 operational needs.

15 Because most people carried mobile telephones, there
16 is a tendency for police officers to use them on
17 occasions, and certainly on these -- on this occasion,
18 they did. We would prefer people to use their radio
19 than mobile telephones, but the mobile telephones
20 falling over weren't critical to the control room
21 operations. There was loss of mobile telephone
22 communication at other levels, but the control room
23 doesn't rely on mobile telephones. It relies on the
24 radios.

25 Q. Which is fine, isn't it, as long as the radios are

1 working?

2 A. I agree, yes, but the mobile telephones don't work
3 underground, which is the place where we lost channel 2.

4 Q. If we carry on through the list:

5 "Not all mobiles are access overload enabled.

6 "Training on Airwave - awareness of all channels?"

7 Was there a question mark over the knowledge of
8 those officers who were using the Airwave radios?

9 A. I think the first thing I should say is that these
10 comments -- some of these comments are from -- are the
11 comment of one individual officer rather than
12 a collective view of all officers.

13 Q. Yes.

14 A. As far as the Airwave radios are concerned, it would be
15 right to say that, yes, people's understanding of the
16 new technology at that point was not as comprehensive as
17 it would be now. Although we were using Airwave across
18 the whole of London, it was relatively new, and the
19 handsets were very new, very different to our previous
20 radios.

21 So some of the functionality that those radios can
22 deliver wasn't necessarily fully understood by all
23 officers, although they had all been trained in it. But
24 being trained in it and then actually using it sometimes
25 is a different thing.

1 Q. Two different things, yes. We understand:

2 "Airwave is a digital system currently acting on
3 analogue ..."

4 Without delving into unnecessary technical detail,
5 what was the difficulty between the two systems in that
6 sense, digital and analogue?

7 A. There wasn't actually a difficulty, because Airwave
8 worked well throughout. I can't actually explain in too
9 much detail the technology of it, but there was an
10 element of our Airwave infrastructure, at that point,
11 that was actually analogue, but it didn't affect the
12 performance of the -- of Airwave on the day, and it
13 didn't deliver an analogue type of transmission which
14 would perhaps have background noise in it.

15 So in terms of this, it's a bit meaningless, that
16 statement in there, to be honest.

17 There was some analogue infrastructure in place.

18 Q. Moving on:

19 "Difficulty communicating between locations re
20 resourcing and requirements.

21 "Failure of channel 2."

22 So that was identified by at least an officer, if
23 not some officers, as to a problem they experienced on
24 the day:

25 "Difficult for Silver to acquire updates from scenes

1 leaving them 'blind'.

2 "Commanders being inundated with calls from TOCs,
3 et cetera, due to problems contacting MICC."

4 Just trying to grapple with the terminology, what's
5 a TOC?

6 A. A train operating company. I think what's being
7 referred to there is that the train operating
8 companies -- so we're not talking about
9 London Underground; we're talking about mainline
10 operators --

11 Q. This is overground?

12 A. South-West Trains, South-Eastern Trains. And so, they
13 would have a senior contact within their area and they
14 were trying to make contact with MICC. They would fall
15 within the 30 per cent plus abandoned calls, perhaps,
16 and so they'd resorted to actually contacting their area
17 contact who might be a chief inspector,
18 a superintendent, or a chief superintendent.

19 Q. Thank you. There's concerns raised about the accuracy
20 with which messages are being conveyed, but perhaps we
21 don't need to get bogged down in that, concerns about AZ
22 which you've explained earlier, running the incident.

23 But then there are some observations in relation to the
24 Command structure which is one of the issues with which
25 we're concerned. Firstly, that the strategic command

1 centre was too remote, being located, as it was, at
2 Hendon.

3 Now, this a reference, isn't it, to the Gold
4 officers from New Scotland Yard for each of the
5 emergency services being moved to the SCC at Hendon
6 during the course of the incident?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. I think we may have to deal with this through others,
9 but were you aware that that caused difficulties for
10 a number of them, they felt as if they had been
11 disconnected from the incident whilst it took some time,
12 I think, physically to relocate them from
13 New Scotland Yard to Hendon?

14 A. I am certainly aware that it didn't work as well as was
15 expected or planned, but it really is a question for the
16 Metropolitan Police.

17 Q. Yes.

18 "From a tactical Silver perspective, the SCC [the
19 Strategic Command Centre] was not having an impact.
20 Only BTP Gold was recognised."

21 And:

22 "Unclear Command structure - people knew it was in
23 place but did not know what it was.

24 "Not clear what resources we actually had."

25 Then:

1 "[Operation] Benbow called as a Command structure
2 but not adhered to subsequently. It is ideal for
3 a preplanned/organised event but not so necessary for
4 a major incident."

5 Then just finally this, over the page [BTP311-9], if we could
6 go, please, the top half of that page deals with your
7 liaison with S013, which we don't need to concern
8 ourselves with, but further down that page, please,
9 towards the bottom, there's further reference to
10 communications.

11 This is recommendations for what might be achieved
12 in the future, and do we see there, about three-quarters
13 of the way down, that it was recommended a critical
14 review of telecoms, mobiles and radio communications,
15 and that, indeed, is what was subsequently put into
16 place. Is that right?

17 A. Yes, yes, it was.

18 MR COLTART: Thank you.

19 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing thank you, my Lady.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Sheff?

21 Questions by MS SHEFF

22 MS SHEFF: Did you hear the evidence of Mr Barr yesterday?

23 A. I did, yes.

24 Q. He was asked about the communications between MICC and
25 NCC and about the statement of Inspector Taylor that

1 there was meant to be a room between the two control
2 rooms which was used in an emergency. It doesn't appear
3 that that room was used on this occasion. Do you know
4 why?

5 A. There is a room between the MICC and NCC, but it belongs
6 to London Underground, and it is their -- I think they
7 call it their Gold room, their Gold suite.

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. Their situation room. So, yes, it was there, and on the
10 day, I know that it was already running because of the
11 earlier problems they'd had on the network, so
12 Inspector Taylor was right in saying that it was there,
13 and we did have our technology in there.

14 Q. But wasn't the purpose of it to ensure that information
15 was shared through the banks of computer screens so that
16 NCC had available to them the information that was
17 coming in to you, albeit that you are swamped with an
18 overload of it?

19 A. That is its purpose, and it had been used in that way
20 many times prior to 7 July, and it's been used in that
21 way many times since.

22 Q. But not on the day?

23 A. It wasn't used like that on the day. I wasn't there in
24 the first hour, but a bit like the radio channels, it's
25 a judgment for the duty officer in the control room to

1 make as to how he uses his resources.

2 Now, Inspector Young may have made the decision that
3 to take somebody out of MICC and put them in that middle
4 room, when there were other means of communication
5 taking part, was actually going to rob MICC of critical
6 communications capability; ie, somebody else monitoring
7 the radio or somebody else answering telephone calls.

8 Q. So the decision was for BTP to send somebody into the
9 NCC room, in effect?

10 A. It was an option open to the duty inspector and one that
11 was put in place subsequently.

12 Q. So that decision having not been taken, presumably
13 because there was so much chaos going on in NCC, at the
14 time you needed all the manpower you had?

15 A. Yes, it's about the manpower rather than chaos. It's
16 about using the resources in what you believe at the
17 time to be the most effective way. In hindsight, you
18 might look at it and say, "Perhaps I should have done
19 something a bit different".

20 Q. Of course. We all look at things in different ways in
21 hindsight. But of course, it didn't obviate the need
22 for there to be this communications system between the
23 two agencies, which effectively meant that it was
24 reliant on the face-to-face contact between the manager
25 and the officer in MICC?

1 A. That's correct, yes.

2 Q. If, as we've heard, the further information that was
3 coming in to MICC then, for whatever reason, wasn't
4 communicated on to Mr Barr himself, we can only assume
5 that that may have been overlooked by the officer whom
6 he was speaking to and whom he said he had regular
7 contact with, or that it was communicated to somebody
8 else and not sent on to Andrew Barr. But certainly
9 there was a breakdown of communication there.

10 A. I can't categorically say that that information wasn't
11 passed to somebody in NCC. All I can say is that there
12 is no record of that taking place either on our logs or
13 on our voice recordings.

14 Q. Yes, and do you have -- were there any protocols
15 concerning the exchange of information between MICC and
16 NCC at the time?

17 A. There were day-to-day protocols, largely those were
18 around trains stuck in tunnels --

19 Q. Right.

20 A. -- and persons under trains, that sort of thing. Our
21 communications with them was part of our day-to-day
22 business, our business as usual was working very, very
23 closely with them. Although we were next door, there
24 wasn't a lot of face-to-face. The duty officer in MICC
25 and the duty manager in NCC spoke across a telephone

1 line continually throughout the day when there were
2 incidents on the Underground.

3 Q. So it would be well within the mind of both of those
4 managing their own communication centre that they need
5 to filter in information and pass it on?

6 A. Absolutely, that would have been in the forefront of
7 their mind that they need to communicate with each
8 other.

9 Q. But in this case, it ended up with an informal
10 arrangement of simply Mr Barr going up to the room of
11 the officer running MICC at the time to see what was
12 going on and, unfortunately, not being given the full
13 picture?

14 A. In hindsight, I would like to have seen it done
15 differently, but putting myself in the position of
16 Inspector Young, he would have been overwhelmed with
17 other decisions, other communications, not only with NCC
18 but with Network Rail's equivalent and with other
19 emergency services as well as our own staff, and so he
20 probably took the judgment that sending Inspector Taylor
21 in there was going to be more effective than hanging on
22 the telephone waiting for NCC to answer the phone, and
23 maybe the NCC duty manager took -- made the same
24 judgment.

25 Q. Because it was just an ordinary telephone call, as we've

1 heard, and there was no priority for that telephone call
2 to be answered above and beyond any other calls that
3 were coming in to the centre at the time.

4 A. It was certainly a telephone line on our technology,
5 which is different to London Underground's, the NCC was
6 clearly identified and you touched the screen and it
7 rang the line. They knew it was us ringing. The same
8 happened in the other direction.

9 Whilst calls were normally taken in order of
10 priority -- so the priority set on particular lines --
11 the call from NCC during an active incident would
12 sometimes be taken directly by the duty officer or the
13 duty sergeant.

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. But if you're inundated with lots of other traffic and
16 it may be you're on another outgoing call or you're on
17 the radio, you still can't answer that. You can only do
18 one thing at once.

19 Q. Of course. How does it work now? Does your new system,
20 splitting emergency and non-emergency calls, mean that
21 you have more capacity for communicating with the
22 emergency services and NCC or is there now a dedicated
23 line between the two communication centres?

24 A. The communications are exactly the same in terms of we
25 press that screen and it rings NCC, and vice versa. The

1 big difference is the removal of non-emergency traffic
2 and removal of the national role of the duty officer in
3 MICC whereby he can now concentrate on London and
4 south-east matters exclusively and has no involvement in
5 the supervision or management of that initial
6 non-emergency call which they did before.

7 Q. That has effectively allowed communications to take
8 place between communication centres more effectively
9 because they're not bogged down by the other calls which
10 have overwhelmed the system in the past?

11 A. It's a much more effective way of operating, yes.

12 MS SHEFF: Thank you very much for that.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Gibbs?

14 Questions by MR GIBBS

15 MR GIBBS: Thank you. Six short points, please.

16 If we take the situation at 8.30 that morning --
17 and, please, would you avoid using words like "AZ" and
18 "MICC" and just talk about places and things that we all
19 understand? -- at 8.30 that morning, the business as
20 usual traffic -- and that means for the whole of the
21 south-east of England -- was coming into the control
22 room in Broadway, is that right?

23 A. That's right.

24 Q. The G8 traffic was coming into or was available to come
25 into the control room at Tavistock Place?

1 A. It was.

2 Q. When the bombing traffic began and grew and grew and
3 grew, it, as you've described, began to inundate, began
4 to overwhelm Broadway. Is that right?

5 A. It did, yes.

6 Q. That was plain to you by the time you got to
7 Tavistock Place?

8 A. Yes, it was very clear.

9 Q. So a decision was made between you and Mr Crowther -- if
10 we bring up [BTP27-1], please, we see the timing of its
11 recording at 10.40 -- for a relocation of the various
12 roles. Is that right?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. What happened was that the business as usual, the normal
15 traffic for the whole of the south-east of England, was
16 taken to Tavistock Place and the main control room at
17 Broadway was therefore freed up to deal solely with the
18 bombing traffic?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. In amongst the bombing traffic, you had not only the
21 radio and telephone messages from BTP officers, but
22 messages to and from other organisations. Is that
23 right?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. And traffic not just in relation to what we now know to

1 be the four scenes, but all the other scenes from which
2 reports were coming which looked like they might have
3 been connected, ten or eleven other scenes in London?

4 A. That's correct. I mean, the MICC during the initial
5 reports, as well as the four scenes, received identical
6 information, so from their perspective these were
7 further incidents from Old Street, from Moorgate, from
8 Victoria, from London Bridge, numerous places, Euston
9 was another location, where there were reports of
10 explosions or trains stranded in tunnels, reasons
11 unknown, and signs of smoke. All sorts of incidents at
12 those locations that the control room was having to
13 treat initially as yet another terrorist attack.

14 Q. On top of that, you've said that you were fielding calls
15 from the world's media. You've listened to all of the
16 telephone traffic, I think, and whilst trying to field
17 the calls from, for instance, King's Cross and Aldgate,
18 your controllers were answering questions from
19 newspapers and radio stations who were ringing up
20 demanding information.

21 A. They were, and of course we were still getting the
22 ordinary telephone call from somebody reporting the
23 theft of their luggage or damage to their motor vehicle.

24 Q. Now, because the murderers didn't advertise the fact
25 that this was the day on which they were going to

1 strike, you had a normal, just a normal, set of staff
2 there that day, didn't you?

3 A. I did, yes, it was -- they were operating at above our
4 minimum staffing level, but it was what we would expect
5 at that time of the day.

6 Q. Did you call in more radio controllers to get there as
7 soon as they could?

8 A. Yes, more staff were being called in from shortly after
9 9.00, but it was going to take them an hour, two hours,
10 to actually get in, because, like everybody else, they
11 had transport difficulties.

12 Q. You, for instance, had had to walk from the river to
13 Tavistock Place, hadn't you?

14 A. I did, yes.

15 Q. Next area, please, channel 2. You have tried to work
16 out, by consulting the engineers and looking back
17 through the records, exactly what the explanation for
18 the loss of channel 2 between 8.48 and 9.23 was,
19 I think.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. The coincidence of it having gone down at about 8.48 and
22 the time when we know the first bombs began to go off,
23 is that a coincidence, do you think, or must there be
24 a connection on some secondary or tertiary level between
25 the disturbances caused by the bombs and the loss of

1 channel 2?

2 A. I think there must be a connection because the timing is
3 so precise, but we do know that there was this fault and
4 the only conclusion that the engineer and myself could
5 come to was that a power surge or some electrical change
6 at that time as a result of the bombings and the
7 disruption to the power supply on the Underground
8 network triggered this known fault at Warren Street.

9 There can be no explanation, but we will probably never
10 know precisely.

11 Q. We have heard from officers who used it that there were
12 blind spots in some stations for channel 2 coverage --

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. -- and that the problem which you have seen at 1.00 in
15 the morning and 2.30 in the morning that day was an
16 intermittent problem.

17 A. It was intermittent. It lasted, on each occasion, for
18 about ten minutes and the interference sounded very
19 similar to the interference that I heard between 8.50
20 and 9.23.

21 Q. In any event, channel 2 is now no longer used, is it?

22 A. It's no longer used, no.

23 Q. Thirdly, please, there was one thing you said which it
24 may be that my Lady will be assisted with a bit further
25 help on, and that is your comment that it's difficult to

1 change channels in the early stages of a critical
2 incident like this. So we're imagining a police officer
3 being called to or rushing to, because he's heard it, an
4 explosion or an emergency call, and in the first few
5 minutes of his arriving there and going down into the
6 Tube or wherever he goes, would you say that it's
7 difficult at that time to get him to change channels?
8 A. It is difficult and it isn't necessarily desirable. We
9 had resources attending each of these scenes very, very
10 rapidly, and in large numbers. A lot of that was
11 because they were listening to the traffic on the
12 Central London channel and, therefore, even before the
13 MICC had called them up to attend, they were actually
14 saying, "We're on our way, we're on our way, we're on
15 our way".
16 So being on that single Central London channel had
17 its advantages in that first critical period in the
18 response phase to each one of the scenes, even the
19 scenes that actually weren't scenes, we actually got
20 people to them and were able to assess what was actually
21 going on, for example, at Euston, very, very quickly.
22 Some of that was because everybody was listening to
23 everything. The disadvantage, of course, is that that
24 channel becomes overloaded and it's not sustainable, but
25 in the initial phase I would argue that there are

1 advantages to it. There is also the option of opening
2 up more channels. It's a judgment you have to make
3 according to the circumstances you're faced with.

4 Q. You have told us that that judgment appears first to
5 have been made at about 9.30 to open up channel 84, and
6 we know that you have listened to the calls and there's
7 some channel 84 traffic as well as the usual channel 82
8 traffic, am I right?

9 A. That's correct, yes.

10 Q. But it was done more successfully later under your
11 guidance, wasn't it?

12 A. It was. Not because it was under my guidance, but
13 because it was at a point where it was easier to manage
14 what is actually quite a massive change in terms of
15 communicating it out to people, making sure you had the
16 right resources in the right places to actually support
17 that communications change.

18 Q. Thank you. One other short point on that. One way one
19 can do it is not to change the channel for those who are
20 running to the scenes, but to change the channel for
21 everybody else.

22 A. Which is effectively what we did at 11.30.

23 Q. Command channel, channel 85. Could we look, please, at
24 [BTP29-1]?

25 Mr Short, in due course, may be asked more questions

1 about this, the facility that now exists for this, but
2 at 11.14, we can see Mr Crowther, no doubt after
3 communication with you, issuing a directive that all
4 officers are aware that the Command channel at each
5 scene, and that the senior officer, the Bronze, at each
6 scene should be identified.

7 Were you involved in that decision?

8 A. Yes, it was me that did it.

9 Q. Why?

10 A. The purpose of channel 85 was -- the name really tells
11 you what it was. It was literally a Command channel for
12 commanders. The purpose was to ensure that MICC could
13 immediately get to commanders on the ground without
14 having to wait for space, without interfering with other
15 critical traffic, but perhaps more importantly, it was
16 to enable ground commanders to radio in situation
17 reports -- which is the reference to "sit reps" on
18 there -- in to MICC so there was a regular flow of
19 information from the scenes into MICC and, therefore,
20 being added to the logs so there was a comprehensive
21 record of what was occurring at each scene and what the
22 requirements were.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 The next area, please, is CAD. One of the things we
25 may be hearing questions about is the liaison between

1 the -- the passage of information between various
2 organisations in the early period of incidents like this
3 and the effective reviewable passing of such
4 information.

5 What role does CAD play in that, would you say?

6 A. In terms of policing London, it's critical. It joins up
7 the communications between BTP, the Metropolitan Police
8 and the City of London Police.

9 On this occasion, as soon as we received the first
10 report and created our first incident, which I think was
11 131, simultaneous to that we had created a CAD incident,
12 which was 2337, and that was passed into the
13 Metropolitan Police/City of London Police environment.

14 So they were aware of the incident almost instantly and
15 we were then updating their CAD incident with
16 information subsequent to that.

17 CAD 2338, which was mentioned yesterday by
18 Mr Barr -- not Mr Barr, by the gentleman from
19 CentreComm -- is a classic example where, CAD 2338,
20 there's an intervention on there by MICC to the
21 CentreComm CAD saying, "Please see CAD 2337", so that
22 they were then aware of the incident that we'd raised at
23 Liverpool Street and Aldgate.

24 Q. Who can see the CAD?

25 A. Any Metropolitan Police control room or user of CAD.

1 Q. Or the City of London Police?

2 A. Or the City of London Police.

3 Q. Or BTP?

4 A. Or BTP Control room, but it also includes the control
5 room at Tavistock Place.

6 Q. Are you involved in a project in Wales at the moment
7 which is investigating the possibility of making CAD
8 available in real-time to the London Fire Brigade and
9 the Ambulance Service?

10 A. One of my roles at the moment is integrating BTP's
11 Command and Control system with that of other police
12 forces and, eventually, other emergency services, which
13 would negate the need in the initial stages to actually
14 communicate by voice at all and you will export -- pass
15 your incident into their system so that they immediately
16 had all the information that we had on our logs which
17 enabled them to see what we were doing, what resources
18 we had there, and for anybody subsequently to review
19 that action.

20 Q. Why, on one view, is that better than a series of
21 telephone conversations or radio traffic?

22 A. It's better because it's lasting and viewable by many.
23 A radio or a telephone conversation is heard by -- can
24 be heard by one or it can be heard by many, but once
25 it's been had, it's passed. So if you've missed that

1 call, you've missed that radio transmission, you're not
2 necessarily going to hear it again, and you certainly
3 can't go back to it easily 15, 20 minutes subsequent to
4 that. But if you pass the actual incident with all the
5 information on it, it is there for all to see. Anybody
6 who can actually view incidents within their system can
7 actually see what BTP have added to their logs, and that
8 is reviewable at any point by anybody who's a user.
9 So in my view, it is a better way of communicating
10 in those initial stages of an incident -- any incident,
11 whether it be a major incident or routine incident.

12 Q. Thank you.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: How might that have worked on 7/7?

14 A. It is really what happened on 7/7, my Lady. It's -- the
15 difference with CAD is that what -- we'd have to double
16 key. So we have to take the information off our system
17 and type it on to the Metropolitan Police system. So
18 the information we had on our incidents was added to
19 Metropolitan Police, City of London Police CAD
20 incidents, or we created them in their system.
21 So we had to double key, but effectively, we were
22 passing the information we had into their environment
23 and they did the same back.

24 The advantage of this is there's no need to double
25 key. You just -- "export" it, is the term, so you send

1 it, a bit like sending an email to a recipient or to
2 many recipients, you just pass your incident into their
3 environment and it creates an incident in their
4 environment.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Where does it appear on their rolling
6 CAD system? Where does your message pop up?

7 A. If we were sending it new, it would create a new
8 incident in their environment, in their system. If we
9 were adding it to an existing link, it would just be the
10 next record on their log. BTP already operate like this
11 with two police forces and we've got eight other police
12 forces currently in test. It's a very effective way of
13 communicating.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: How far down the line are we
15 discussing it with other emergency services?

16 A. At the moment, we're only discussing it with police
17 forces, with the exception of in Wales, where there is
18 a programme in Wales led by the Welsh Assembly and the
19 Cabinet Office to integrate all the emergency services
20 and, indeed, some other agencies in due course.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: That's a programme just for Wales?

22 A. It's a programme just for Wales at this stage, but
23 I would imagine that, if successful, it will be rolled
24 out across England, Wales and Scotland. But the
25 technology already exists and is already being practised

1 by a number of police forces across England.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Does that mean that, if we had such
3 a fully integrated system, when one emergency service
4 declared a major incident, that could just pop up on
5 everybody else's log?

6 A. If you pass that information -- if you exported that
7 particular entry or the entry that contained that to
8 them, yes, my Lady.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Or when one officer phoned in to you
10 and said, "I've just seen a bus that's been blown up"
11 you could immediately export that information?

12 A. And they would see it immediately, yes.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

14 MR GIBBS: A different subject, please, could we have
15 [BTP28-1]?

16 This is a decision of Mr Crowther's at 10.53. You
17 were taken to it briefly and referred to the passage
18 which says "Underground radio comms have failed during
19 this incident". It goes on:

20 "The nature of the incident at Russell Square and
21 the deep facilities make it most important to achieve
22 a level of Underground comms."

23 The reason I go to it is this, the decision is that
24 the:

25 "Airwave communications vehicle is to be deployed to

1 facilitate radio communication below ground. Vehicle
2 escorted to Central London ..."

3 Now, we know it didn't get to Russell Square until
4 1.00 or thereabouts.

5 Did that work in this way, that if you can't get
6 a signal underground, one way to get it was to -- that's
7 an Airwave signal -- is to effectively drag an enormous
8 long Airwave aerial off the back of a vehicle and take
9 it down the stairs and pull it through onto the
10 platform, or as far as you can get it, and use that as
11 an aerial, meaning that anyone on Airwave with an
12 Airwave handset near that aerial can now use their
13 Airwave radios?

14 A. Effectively, that's what it did, yes.

15 Q. Is that a facility which still exists, do you know, or
16 shall we ask Mr Short about that?

17 A. Mr Short will be able to give you more detail, but
18 certainly it does still exist, yes.

19 Q. Then, finally, you were asked about some of the points
20 in the debrief and I think you were taken to it at
21 [BTP311-8], please. Could I just ask you -- they were
22 read out but your comments weren't necessarily taken on
23 all of them.

24 Can we go to -- we've asked about channel 84.

25 Second one:

1 "Difficulties in obtaining updates from scenes -
2 mobiles not connecting and channel 84 being overused."

3 Do you agree about that?

4 A. No, I definitely don't. It wasn't overused at all.

5 Q. The next one is:

6 "Dependence on mobile phones that 'fell over'", and
7 there's a reference to the ACCOLC there. Did that have
8 much relevance for BTP?

9 A. No, we did have some ACCOLC phones at that time, but
10 they were very, very few and would have had no impact on
11 that particular difficulty.

12 Q. We see that reflected in the next bullet point.

13 We've dealt with training on Airwave.

14 Could you go to:

15 "Difficult for Silver to acquire updates from scenes
16 leaving them 'blind'."

17 Do you remember someone saying that and what's your
18 view on that?

19 A. I suspect that that was several somebodies who said
20 that, because that was a fact. It was difficult for
21 Silver, who was Chief Superintendent Crowther, to
22 receive updates because getting the updates from the
23 scenes, which were underground and there was no
24 communication, were delayed, and so it was difficult to
25 get that in place.

1 Q. Was that the main reason why you set up channel 85?
2 A. It was.
3 MR GIBBS: Thank you very much, Mr Gosden.
4 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much, Mr Gosden.
5 I wish you luck with your CAD integration project.
6 A. Thank you, my Lady.
7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith?
8 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call Chief
9 Inspector Short, please.
10 CHIEF INSPECTOR PHILIP KENNETH SHORT (sworn)
11 Questions by MR KEITH
12 MR KEITH: Good afternoon, Chief Inspector. Could you give
13 us your full name, please?
14 A. It's Philip Kenneth Short.
15 Q. Chief inspector, you are, of course, a chief inspector
16 with the British Transport Police. The particular
17 relevancy of your position there for us is that you were
18 responsible for the introduction of Airwave across the
19 British Transport Police network which was completed in
20 2003.
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. But you also have been, in the past, seconded to the
23 National Policing Improvement Agency -- the acronym with
24 which my learned friend Mr Coltart struggled earlier --
25 A. That's correct.

1 Q. -- between 2007 and 2009, to assess the benefits of and
2 to assist in the introduction of the Airwave system, the
3 related Airwave system on the London Underground
4 network --

5 A. Indeed, yes.

6 Q. -- known as CONNECT, of which we heard earlier.
7 So you have experience on both sides of the
8 technological fence, so to speak?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. You very kindly prepared a statement for my Lady in
11 which you responded to certain questions posed of you by
12 the Inquest team. I'm going to try, perhaps at my
13 peril, to summarise the position and ask you whether you
14 agree.

15 Formerly, the British Transport Police used, as
16 we've just heard, an old system whereby above ground
17 they had something called the national police radio
18 network and below ground they used channel 2, as you've
19 just heard Chief Inspector Gosden describe?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. So below ground, channel 2 operated, but it had only
22 a single VHF channel and your statement describes, and
23 other documents describe, how it was owned and operated
24 and maintained by London Underground, and it had some
25 curious features, that because it relied upon base

1 stations all over the network, all fed into a single
2 channel back at Broadway, one officer speaking on it
3 could be heard by everybody else on the radio network
4 because it all fed into a single channel?

5 A. That's effectively correct, and it's what's called an
6 "all informed net", so if one person speaks, everyone
7 else hears that conversation.

8 Q. Some British Transport Police officers had access to it,
9 L area in particular?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Others didn't. And although before the King's Cross
12 fire and the Fennell report a process of installing
13 a new system had commenced below ground, it was
14 accelerated after the King's Cross fire and the Fennell
15 report in 1988. But until the new system came onstream,
16 if an officer below ground wanted to communicate to --
17 or rather if information given by an officer below
18 ground to the Control Centre was to be relayed round the
19 rest of the British Transport Police network, he or she
20 would have to make the call using channel 2 from below
21 ground to MICC and then MICC would have to rebroadcast
22 the information using the above-ground network?

23 A. That's what happened, yes.

24 Q. Of course, we know channel 2 didn't work in the tunnels
25 and, although London Underground had their own analogue

1 system below ground, it wasn't, in fact, interoperable
2 with BTP's channel 2 system below ground?

3 A. No, it was a separate system.

4 Q. The London Fire Brigade had its own separate analogue
5 system as well?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Above ground, British Transport Police had, after 2003,
8 Airwave, but the Metropolitan Police didn't have
9 Airwave, certainly at the time of July 2005, in full
10 operation, and so there was no inter-operability between
11 British Transport Police and Metropolitan Police above
12 ground?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. As we've just heard, the old system meant also that if
15 Airwave was to be used underground, you had to get
16 a mobile base station in to try to extend the scope of
17 the transmission below ground through a leaky feeder
18 cable in order to make it work?

19 A. Yes, that's correct.

20 Q. Now, British Transport Police, the Metropolitan Police,
21 City of London Police and other police forces and most,
22 if not all, of the emergency services are connected to
23 the new Airwave system, but unfortunately, below ground,
24 London Underground embarked on their own similar system,
25 CONNECT, as we've heard, which, although it shares some

1 similarities in terms of the technological basis upon
2 which it operates, is different in terms of frequency
3 and encryption and certain other infrastructure issues
4 and, therefore, can't be connected?

5 A. It's -- it basically shares the same radio standard, but
6 they are designed to be two separate systems.

7 Q. But the Airwave system and the CONNECT system both work
8 underground?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Both work in deep tunnels, both work in deep
11 substations --

12 A. They do.

13 Q. We heard earlier that there are, in terms of the
14 limitations on the system, few difficulties with the
15 London Underground CONNECT system in terms of the number
16 of talkgroups or conversations that can be carried
17 simultaneously on different channels within that system.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. But in relation to Airwave, there are some technical
20 limitations, are there not, because, firstly, due to the
21 way in which the system is configured the radio handsets
22 are recommended not to be used for telephone calls
23 because that can increase the number of users on the
24 system to such an extent that a queueing system has to
25 be introduced or the calls get blocked; is that right?

1 A. That was a decision made by the users, in fact, and it's
2 one of the ways to mitigate the limitations that exist
3 on the Underground.

4 Q. More importantly, for our purposes, there are
5 restrictions on the number of talkgroups or groups of
6 people who can speak simultaneously on the Airwave
7 system operated by the police and the emergency
8 services, because unlike in CONNECT, a fewer number of
9 Underground stations have the necessary number or degree
10 of -- the number of base stations to allow more than
11 three conversations to be carried simultaneously on that
12 Airwave system.

13 A. Yes, I think it's worth pointing out, first of all, the
14 positives in this, and the actual fact we get three --
15 the ability to have three simultaneous conversations is
16 three times more than we had in the previous system.

17 Q. It's a huge improvement?

18 A. It's a fantastic improvement.

19 Q. Forgive me, Inspector, I don't wish to play down the
20 enormous benefits. My Lady's heard a great deal of
21 evidence about how so much better the system is.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. But I just wanted you to clarify that there is
24 a difference in terms of the scope or the width of the
25 two respective systems.

1 A. Yes, having listened to the evidence earlier, it's clear
2 that the Underground CONNECT system has more capacity
3 than the emergency services' Airwave system.

4 Q. I think for these proceedings, yourself and your
5 colleagues prepared a briefing note that set out some of
6 the aspects of the Airwave system. Could we have
7 [BTP429-3], please?

8 The top half of the page makes plain the point that
9 you've just made, which is that the 1BR Airwave, the
10 underlined passage:

11 "The base radio Airwave masts provide three times
12 more capacity than the legacy systems previously used by
13 the British Transport Police."

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Then further down the page, the issue to which you've
16 just drawn your attention to the bottom of the page,
17 please, the one drawback with the Airwave system is
18 that, although the business case for the Airwave system
19 recommended that there should be 55 high priority
20 stations where at least two base radios should be
21 installed such as to permit seven simultaneous calls, in
22 reality, and in the event, only a handful of stations
23 got two base radios to allow that number of simultaneous
24 calls to take place?

25 A. That's correct.

1 Q. The vast majority have only one base radio where the
2 maximum simultaneous conversation is three, as you've
3 described?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Do we take it that there were fiscal or perhaps
6 technological reasons for the reality not quite meeting
7 the full intent of the business plan?

8 A. Yes, I think there was -- there were a number of factors
9 and I think the overlying one will be that there was
10 a wish and a desire to give the users exactly what they
11 wanted. In an ideal world, we'd have got the 55
12 priority stations with more capacity.

13 However, there were financial issues at that time.

14 There were very complex contractual issues or matters
15 going on between CONNECT and Airwave, and trying to
16 actually blend the two PFI contracts together, that was
17 extremely difficult and took a long time, and there was
18 also an urgency, an understandable urgency, to get some
19 form of Airwave working on the London Underground, and
20 I think then the decision was taken at a fairly high
21 level to push ahead with what we've got now and to
22 revisit the capacity issue later on.

23 Q. Because it is recognised that the system is a huge
24 improvement, on any view, with what went before?

25 A. That's absolutely right.

1 Q. The system has been updated, has it not, in terms of the
2 software upon which it operates, repeatedly, in fact,
3 since its introduction?

4 A. I believe, to the best of my knowledge, that whatever
5 software upgrades have been made above ground have also
6 been introduced below ground and that makes sure that
7 the two systems are compatible.

8 Q. So it's getting better?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. We've heard evidence of how it might be possible for an
11 Airwave emergency response vehicle to attend a scene if,
12 for example, the system runs out of capacity and has an
13 insufficient capacity to be able to deal with more than
14 three simultaneous talkgroups, but that takes a bit of
15 time, does it not? One couldn't expect to have an
16 Airwave emergency vehicle attend immediately at the
17 scene of an incident.

18 A. No, that's a point worth making, actually. The idea of
19 the emergency response vehicles isn't to attend -- even
20 to attend within the golden hour of an incident.

21 Q. It's much later?

22 A. Yes, it is indeed. They take time to deploy, they take
23 time to arrive at the scene, and even more time to set
24 up.

25 Q. This is recognised in the guidance snappily called the

1 "National Policing Improvement Agency Standard Operating
2 Guide on Multi-agency Airwave Inter-operability" that
3 recognises that these devices cannot be used in the
4 early part of any response to an incident?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. Your briefing paper records how there have been a number
7 of projects to try to improve matters, I think there's
8 a Project Mercury which investigated the efficacy of the
9 system, and your note also referred to an incident
10 called Paddington TE. Was that an incident which
11 involved use of Airwave and some lessons were learnt as
12 to its efficacy?

13 A. I'm not sure how much I can actually say about the
14 Paddington -- it's more an incident, but --

15 Q. Right, well, we'll leave it to your discretion. Perhaps
16 I can rephrase the question. Both table-top exercises
17 and real-life incidents have increased the understanding
18 of how the system can best be operated?

19 A. Yes, the Paddington incident was totally different and
20 wasn't a planned incident, and I -- I'll be led on what
21 more I can say about that, quite honestly.

22 Mercury was a preplanned table-top and real-life
23 exercise to test how robust the system was in
24 anticipation of the capacity issues.

25 Q. By and large, how robust has the system proved to be?

1 A. It worked as it would be expected to work. It's not
2 hard to imagine that, if pushed to overload, the system
3 will overload, and that's what was proven.

4 Q. Did the system overload in the system at Paddington?

5 A. That was a totally different type of incident.

6 Q. All right. I'm not privy to what the incident involved,
7 but it does appear from the briefing note that the
8 system was found in some regard perhaps to be wanting at
9 this particular incident?

10 A. That was more a resilience issue than anything else.

11 Q. All right. Just to put it in its context -- and perhaps
12 to give some -- to give a practical example -- if, in
13 the Underground, a group of covert Metropolitan Police
14 officers were carrying out surveillance and they were on
15 a talkgroup using Airwave, and in the same area there
16 were another group of, I don't know, armed police using
17 Airwave because they are after the same suspect, and
18 a group of British Transport Police, Metropolitan Police
19 and City of London Police police officers are all on
20 a third channel discussing the Command and Control of
21 the surveillance/armed operation that's going on, that
22 would be, on those particular facts, the limit on the
23 number of channels that could be simultaneously used?

24 A. Only if they were being used simultaneously.

25 Q. If they're simultaneously being used and they're below

1 ground?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. But there are one or two ways in which the system is
4 being improved, are there not? There is some sort of
5 queueing system in the system which means that calls
6 might not be lost, they may just be queued, and are
7 there further upgrades being installed for the purposes
8 of the Olympics, in particular a new phone called ETETRA
9 which has greater capacity than the current handset, or
10 have I confused all the issues?

11 A. There's probably two technical questions in there.
12 I think taking the first one -- well, let's take the
13 second one first, because the first one's actually gone.
14 The ETETRA and the 2012 issues have no effect on the
15 Underground, as far as I understand.

16 Q. It's just above ground?

17 A. It's above ground and primarily focused on the
18 Olympic Park area.

19 There aren't any improvements to the Underground
20 Airwave system planned for the Olympics at this stage.

21 Q. All right. Thank you for that. The first point?

22 A. Can you remind me of the first point, please?

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: The queueing system.

24 MR KEITH: I knew you were going to ask that.

25 A. The queueing system. In fact, I know the answer to

1 that.

2 The queueing system on the Underground is no
3 different to the queueing system above ground. If, for
4 example, there are five resources or five users on
5 a station trying to use the radio at the same time, only
6 three will be able to set the call up. The other two
7 will queue. But as soon as one of the other ones who is
8 using the radio finishes using it, the one who was first
9 in the queue will be able to set their call up. But
10 it's all done automatically by the system itself.

11 MR KEITH: So if users confine themselves to short, relevant
12 conversations on the radio, then the system should
13 accommodate them?

14 A. That's what it's all about, yes, absolutely.

15 Q. Finally this, I suppose the central point arising out of
16 the way in which the system is currently configured: is
17 it anticipated that the number of base radios at the
18 stations will be increased from 1 to 2 at any time in
19 the near future to allow a greater number of
20 simultaneous conversations or talkgroups to take place?

21 A. This is work that we've been trying to push forward for
22 quite a while now, but there is another focus on it just
23 at this moment in time and some papers have been done to
24 that effect, a business case has been prepared.

25 Q. So the matter is subject to review?

1 A. It is.

2 Q. And, for whatever reason, it's of particular import at
3 the moment?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. In the context of these proceedings, it would plainly be
6 desirable for such a process to continue because, as
7 things currently stand, the reality doesn't match the
8 anticipated and desired business plan?

9 A. No, the business case sets out a number of options.
10 Obviously, they range in cost, but as far as BTP are
11 concerned and our partner agencies, anything more we can
12 get will be really, really useful.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Can I go back to when you said the
14 system could overload? So we've got three different
15 groups all chatting at the same time. Supposing a major
16 incident occurs when these three groups are chatting, do
17 I take from what you're saying that, unless they're at
18 one of the high priority station areas, the emergency
19 message or call is going to have to wait until one of
20 the three groups gets off the phone, off the radio?

21 A. No, my Lady, there is a means to bypass that and each
22 radio's got an emergency button facility. So if an
23 officer attended a station or was sent to a station and
24 clearly wanted to declare a major incident but the
25 system was busy, he or she will push the emergency

1 button and that would effectively knock everyone else
2 off the radio.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So the non-emergency traffic would
4 know: get off the radio?

5 A. Yes.

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Right.

7 MR KEITH: There is one final aspect to this I wanted to
8 explore with you, Chief Inspector.

9 We understand -- we may be mistaken -- that the
10 London Fire Brigade, whilst using Airwave above ground,
11 don't use Airwave below ground, unlike the other
12 emergency services and the police forces, but continue
13 to use a variant of the old analogue system below ground
14 but not the same as the old London Underground system,
15 because there are some places -- the details of which
16 I don't intend to explore -- where Airwave doesn't work.
17 There have been some difficulties with particularly
18 large structures or buildings. Is that right?

19 A. I can only comment on the Underground, and clearly
20 London Fire Brigade are best placed to explain their
21 rationale for communications which are well-recorded.
22 I know on London Underground they do not use Airwave in
23 the Underground, they prefer to use what's called their
24 fireground communications.

25 Q. Their ...?

1 A. Fireground communications. It provides for a localised
2 way of working. The only areas I can understand that
3 Airwave wouldn't work, that their legacy system or their
4 fireground radio works, is in machine and equipment
5 rooms where clearly police officers don't need to go,
6 but firefighters may have every reason to go if there's
7 a fire in one of those areas.

8 Q. So plainly, I'm sure, for good reasons -- and there's no
9 reason to suspect otherwise -- there is a good cause why
10 the London Fire Brigade still remains reliance upon an
11 old analogue system and do not use Airwave underground?

12 A. Yes, it's -- I do not want to give the wrong impression
13 here. It's a nationally recognised system that the
14 Fire Brigade use and it meets their requirement.

15 MR KEITH: Thank you very much. I think you've helped
16 clarify a number of areas, Chief Inspector.

17 A. Thank you.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart, or shall we take a break?

19 MR COLTART: I'm going to be, I suspect, about 15 minutes,
20 so I'm in my Lady's hands.

21 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think we'll take a break.

22 (3.30 pm)

23 (A short break)

24 (3.45 pm)

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

1 Questions by MR COLTART

2 MR COLTART: Could we have [BTP428-1], please, up on the screen?

3 If we just enlarge the top half of the page, please,

4 Chief Inspector, this is a note, isn't it, that you

5 prepared for Operation Pendulum on 14 September last

6 year, and we see from the first paragraph that the

7 purpose of the report was to provide a report meeting

8 the brief set out by the Deputy Chief Constable --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- in relation to radio communication capability.

11 "The brief is to detail what [the] BTP did between

12 Fennell and 2005 - to show what improvements were made

13 and that there were two dedicated channels. It is to

14 include explanation about back-to-back radio and Airwave

15 communicating underground."

16 Now, there's really only one aspect to this report

17 which I wish to consider with you, but before I do that,

18 can I just deal with something which arose out of the

19 questions asked by Mr Keith?

20 The Airwave emergency response vehicles, it was

21 suggested to you, I think, by Mr Keith, that those

22 weren't for deployment within the so-called golden hour

23 immediately following on from an incident, and you

24 agreed with that and said, "Well, no, it all took

25 considerably longer than that by the time that they had

1 arrived and got set up and were operative and the rest
2 of it".

3 Can we just go through to the last page of this
4 report, please, at page 10 [BTP428-10]? In fact, the very last
5 paragraph, if we could highlight paragraph 10.5, please,
6 you've dealt with emergency response vehicles to an
7 extent earlier in your report, but you say:
8 "As stated above in paragraph 6.5 [the] vehicles
9 were deployed in 2005 to provide emergency coverage."
10 There's talk about a new contract and they are to be
11 deployed to Underground stations at police request
12 within a stated timescale:
13 "This facility is available to be deployed if the
14 Airwave network infrastructure within the Underground is
15 damaged to an extent that radio communications were no
16 longer viable. The service would not be available in
17 the initial stage of an incident but would be available
18 to start deployment at the first station within about an
19 hour."
20 Then, again, there's talk about a renewed contract.
21 So is it, in fact, the case that -- I mean, if it's not
22 within the golden hour, strictly speaking, it's going to
23 be pretty soon thereafter, that was the idea behind
24 these emergency vehicles?
25 A. The new contract actually sets out a number of different

1 timescales and one is the -- is the time to deploy from
2 the base where the vehicles are held, the second
3 timeframe is for arrival at the scene where they're
4 required, and the third timescale is time to set up, so
5 to actually get the equipment locked on.

6 I believe this hour, the times are contractual
7 times, but I'm sure the supplier would always seek to
8 better those times, if possible.

9 However, that time, I would not expect a vehicle to
10 be on the site of a station with equipment working
11 within an hour.

12 Q. We don't need to labour this point, but the wording
13 which you've put in your report is "but would be
14 available to start deployment", not arrive at the first
15 station, but to start deployment within about an hour.
16 Is that now incorrect?

17 A. No, I think "start deployment" is still reasonable if
18 the supplier got the vehicle to a station within an
19 hour, "start deployment" I would define as being to
20 start putting the equipment up, ready to deploy the
21 vehicle for operational means.

22 Q. In any event, can we agree this, that that's
23 a significantly shorter period of time than it did take
24 on 7 July, because I think the vehicles didn't arrive
25 until about 1.15 at King's Cross, is that right?

1 A. That, to my knowledge, is correct. There wasn't
2 a contract in place at that time. A lot of that was
3 done on the good will of the supplier, and in fact, once
4 the vehicles had arrived at the scene, they weren't able
5 to be deployed straightaway.

6 Q. Thank you. Can we turn, then, to deal with the one
7 issue, really, which I want to concentrate on, which is,
8 from the BTP perspective, why it took so long to get in
9 place the arrangements which are now finally in place
10 and which have obviously made significant improvements
11 to the communications system, and can we look in the
12 same document, please, at page 5 [BTP428-5]?

13 This is the report you prepared. You've summarised
14 already the improvements and upgrades which have been
15 implemented as a result of Fennell?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. I'm not going to trouble you with any of that.
18 You go on to deal, in this section, with the
19 implementation of what eventually became Airwave and its
20 deployment. I'm going to summarise wherever I can but
21 is the position this, as we see from that first
22 paragraph, that in the early 1990s, the Home Office
23 commissioned a review of police radio communications and
24 that that review led to a further study and eventually
25 the business case for the public safety radio

1 communications project, and it's that, isn't it, which
2 eventually became Airwave in due course?

3 A. That's correct, yes.

4 Q. So that's in the early 1990s, and then, as I say, I'm
5 going to summarise, and please correct me if any of this
6 chronology is inaccurate.

7 In 1998, the contract had been awarded to Quadrant,
8 which was a consortium headed up by BT?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. In January 2000, BT provided a quotation for what it was
11 going to cost in order to do it on the basis of their
12 recommendations?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. That offer was considered, but then rejected by the
15 British Transport Police on the basis it was going to be
16 too expensive?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. Matters then progressed, and if we could go over the
19 page, please, I'm just going to look at the following
20 section in a little more detail.

21 At the bottom of the page [BTP428-6], if we could enlarge that,
22 please:

23 "Following a great deal of work led by
24 London Underground and supported by BTP and the
25 Pan-London Group ..."

1 Which was the working group, wasn't it, which was
2 set up to help implement this project?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. "... the CONNECT project was successfully allocated
5 frequencies in the same band as Airwave. This was
6 a significant achievement and paved the way for future
7 development of the ALU (Airwave in London Underground)
8 solution."

9 Then you highlight what was done between March 2002
10 and April 2003. The main points to note, you say were
11 as follows: you, the BTP, commissioned a consultant to
12 assist you with the project. The BTP wrote to the
13 Metropolitan Police Service at chief officer level
14 highlighting the need for a shared approach to achieving
15 an Airwave solution on the Underground, and that was
16 essential, wasn't it, if you were to achieve
17 inter-operability between the two police forces?

18 A. That was essential, but there's another key reason for
19 that as well. We understood, just being a single force
20 asking for this, this went wider than British Transport
21 Police, this requirement, that if we had, for example,
22 the support of Metropolitan Police behind this
23 requirement, we'd have one more chance of central
24 funding. I think, by that time, we'd recognised that
25 Airwave on the Underground perhaps wasn't going to

1 happen without a considerable amount of central
2 Government funding, and that proved to be the case.
3 Q. So there were fiscal reasons why you needed the Met on
4 board in addition to the operational reasons?
5 A. And political reasons.
6 Q. And political reasons, yes:
7 "BTP issued a statement to PITO regarding the
8 force's preferred option for Underground
9 communications."
10 This was to have the use of Airwave.
11 If we can go over the page, please, to the top of
12 page 7 [BTP428-7]:
13 "In October 2002 [the] BTP wrote to the
14 London Underground stating that the force was more
15 positive about Airwave implementation ... but stressing
16 the importance of the force having a fallback plan in
17 case Airwave on the Underground failed to happen."
18 Can we assume that that was a proposition with which
19 the Underground agreed?
20 A. Yes, fully agreed, I mean, the Underground had fully
21 supported British Transport Police anyway, and still
22 were doing at that time, in supporting channel 2, but
23 this was a reference to the CONNECT project and, if
24 Airwave on London Underground hadn't have happened, BTP
25 would have sought a solution within the CONNECT project.

1 Q. Because it didn't really matter in the end, did it,
2 whatever name it had, whatever the project was called,
3 you needed to have that ability to communicate
4 underground?

5 A. We needed the ability to communicate underground, but we
6 were looking for seamless communications between above
7 and below ground at the same time.

8 Q. The next bullet point:

9 "In April 2003, the Chief Constable wrote to the
10 Minister of Transport highlighting concerns around lack
11 of progress in achieving Airwave on the Underground."
12 Now, where did the delays lie? What was the
13 problem, as far as you were concerned?

14 A. I think, recalling back to that time, I could only think
15 that the whole project needed a bit of a kick at that
16 time, and that perhaps some of the contractual issues
17 were holding things up.

18 Q. We know that, by 2003, there was a live exercise planned
19 all around the Underground and the threat of a terrorist
20 attack on the Underground, Operation Osiris -- I don't
21 know if you were in court earlier today when we explored
22 all of that?

23 A. I listened to that.

24 Q. The urgency of getting these new arrangements in place
25 couldn't be underestimated, could it?

1 A. I don't think it could, no.

2 Q. That led, directly or indirectly, to the formation of
3 the Airwave on London Underground Project Board which
4 was chaired by the Home Office and included
5 representatives from the various emergency services, and
6 in April 2004 there was a briefing for the Department of
7 Transport which dealt with the technical requirements of
8 what the eventual solution would be. If we go down to
9 5.7 --

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Wait a minute, do I take it that the
11 Chief Constable of BTP's letter did trigger some kind of
12 reaction, because it led to the setting up of the
13 project board, is that the kind of timescale we're
14 looking at?

15 A. I think at around about that time, I'm not 100 per cent
16 sure if the project board was still -- had already been
17 set up, but one of the actions at that time was not only
18 for BTP's Chief Constable to push this forward, but at
19 the same time for the Commissioner of Police, for the
20 Metropolitan Police and the City of London Police to do
21 likewise.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So the chief officers gave the whole
23 project a kick?

24 A. The chief officers made a collective effort to get
25 things moving, my Lady.

1 MR COLTART: Can I ask something arising out of my Lady's
2 observation?

3 Letters from chief constables don't just happen
4 overnight, as we all know. Is it fair to assume that
5 this was the product of a great deal of cajoling and
6 prodding at a more junior level before the
7 Chief Constable had become involved?

8 A. Yes, this would have been the likes of me being involved
9 in this and pushing things up to that level.

10 Q. Was it because you weren't making any progress -- and
11 please understand me, I don't mean any criticism of you
12 as far as this is concerned, I've no doubt you were
13 doing everything that you could -- but was it because of
14 that lack of progress that you felt compelled to
15 progress it to a more senior level?

16 A. Yes, I believe so, and that's how things are done, yes.

17 Q. Well, we see from 5.7, if we go back to the document,
18 that, in June 2004, a BTP update paper had come up with
19 a solution called CV196 Plus, which would give you
20 additional radio capacity:

21 "It was recorded that Airwave on the
22 London Underground would not be available until mid-2007
23 at the earliest, as it relied on sharing radiating
24 infrastructure with CONNECT and was therefore reliant on
25 CONNECT implementation timescales."

1 So that wasn't going to be available for another
2 three years from June 2004.

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. What measures were put in place at that point? We're
5 post Osiris, at this stage, where the difficulties of
6 the communication have been identified in the course of
7 that training exercise.

8 What measures were put in place to ensure a rapid
9 and effective emergency response or an interim solution
10 to the problems which confronted you?

11 A. It was indeed that, it was an interim solution.

12 Q. So that of itself was the interim solution, the project
13 that was going to come onstream in 2007?

14 A. No, not at all. The interim solution was the forerunner
15 of the emergency response vehicle capability.

16 Q. That was the one that arrived some four or five hours
17 after the incident had occurred at King's Cross?

18 A. That coupled with a number of other -- a number of other
19 things we could put into practice. It was using radios
20 in back-to-back mode.

21 Q. Let's just deal with the back-to-back mode, because all
22 that means is that, if two officers are in line of
23 sight, one with the other, they can use their radios, so
24 one officer could go down a tunnel, but as long as he's
25 in line of sight of another officer, they could

1 communicate with each other?

2 A. Generally line of sight, yes.

3 Q. Then that officer in turn could communicate with another

4 officer, if he was in line of sight?

5 A. Yes, there's no getting away from the fact messages

6 would need to be relayed between officers.

7 Q. Didn't you experiment with this and work out that it

8 would take six different officers, all in line of sight,

9 one with the other, to relay a radio message of that

10 kind from a tunnel up to the surface of one of the Tube

11 stations?

12 A. This was a particular -- yes, this was something we

13 practised at, I believe, Embankment station, going from

14 the lowest part of the station to the tunnel head wall,

15 to the entrance on the surface, yes, and I believe it

16 took six officers.

17 It is hardly ideal, but it's better than what we --

18 it was one of the things that we could implement and

19 implement straightaway.

20 Q. Just back to the document for a minute, if we may, the

21 next heading, if we go down to point 6 at the bottom of

22 that page:

23 "BTP's radio capability on 7 July."

24 Of course, by this stage, your officers have got

25 Airwave radios --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- albeit ones that work at surface level and, as you
3 say, these provided two-way communications with the
4 control room at 55 Broadway:

5 "As the Metropolitan Police Service and the City of
6 London Police had not migrated to Airwave at that time,
7 radio inter-operability between the forces was not
8 possible."

9 And:

10 "Airwave did not extend into section 12

11 London Underground stations."

12 What had happened to the Metropolitan Police and the
13 City of London Police such that you'd got Airwave but
14 they hadn't?

15 A. Clearly both those forces will have their opportunity to
16 explain the way they migrated to Airwave.

17 BTP is a very different force. Being a national
18 force, we've got officers throughout the country, and
19 our migration strategy to Airwave dictated that, as soon
20 as one of the geographical local forces had migrated to
21 Airwave, our officers in that region were issued with
22 radios.

23 So, for example, Lancashire were the first force to
24 go live, I believe in 2001. As soon as those
25 officers -- as soon as that force went live, our

1 officers in Preston and Lancaster were issued radios,
2 and that's vitally important for BTP, because our
3 officers need to interoperate with that force on a day
4 by day basis.

5 We merely followed that strategy in London. As soon
6 as the Airwave system was available in London, we issued
7 our officers with Airwave radios to take the benefit of
8 the far greater coverage and capacity it provided.

9 Q. You had been in correspondence with the
10 Metropolitan Police between March 2002 and April 2003,
11 as we've seen from earlier in your document,
12 highlighting the need for a shared approach to achieving
13 the Airwave solution.

14 Had it been your hope and ambition at the time of
15 that correspondence that you would all achieve this
16 together?

17 A. I think the Metropolitan Police -- and they will clearly
18 get a chance to put their case on this -- but they had
19 very, very different issues to address. I believe they
20 had a major Command and Control project ongoing at the
21 same time as Airwave and that all needed to knit
22 together. I think that dictated their migration
23 strategy to Airwave.

24 Q. Does it really come to this: that, despite all of the
25 hard work, committee meetings, papers which were

1 written, correspondence which was entered into, come
2 7 July 2005, you weren't able to communicate amongst
3 yourselves and you weren't able to communicate with
4 officers who were in the tunnel?

5 A. There were particular problems in the tunnel, but I like
6 to look now that the improvements that have actually
7 been made, if that were to happen now, we can
8 communicate into the tunnel and get those messages up
9 quicker.

10 Q. There's no doubt about that. The improvements are very
11 welcome and very significant. But isn't the position
12 this: that, if they had been in place, or at least some
13 sort of contingency for them had been in place, on
14 7 July 2005, the response would have been very
15 different?

16 A. I'm not sure I can fully agree with that. I mean,
17 I think in the first instances of a response, it is very
18 important that each individual force and emergency
19 service has its own clear lines of communication that
20 work and work well, and I'm not sure now how that would
21 change.

22 We have the ability and the option to work together
23 on shared channels, but how soon into an incident we
24 would actually agree or choose to do that, I'm not
25 really sure.

1 Q. But if your officers, who bravely and without any regard
2 for their personal safety, ran into the tunnels at
3 King's Cross and were the first people on the affected
4 bomb carriage, if they had been able to radio back up to
5 the surface immediately with what they found there, the
6 speed of the response would have been very different,
7 wouldn't it?

8 A. That's undoubtable. If Airwave was working on the
9 Underground at that time, the response would have been
10 far enhanced.

11 MR COLTART: Thank you.

12 MR SAUNDERS: Nothing, thank you, my Lady.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Boyd?

14 Questions by MS BOYD

15 MS BOYD: Yes, Inspector, as you said earlier, the London
16 Fire Brigade have retained their analogue handheld
17 radios for fireground operations.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. But the main scheme radio has been replaced by Airwave
20 and Airwave radios have been issued to all officers from
21 the rank of station manager upwards?

22 A. That's correct, yes.

23 Q. Of course, that means that fire crews attending a major
24 incident can communicate with each other, but the
25 disadvantage is they can't take part in any talkgroups

1 on Airwave, but of course, the Incident Commander who,
2 at a major incident, is likely to be a station manager
3 or a rank above that, will be able to communicate on the
4 talkgroups.

5 Now, with that in mind, can I ask you this: do you
6 agree with Chief Inspector Strother that the
7 inter-operability function of Airwave is really intended
8 for Incident Commanders rather than all officers?

9 Perhaps, before you answer, can I put his comment into
10 context and then you can --

11 A. That would be most helpful.

12 Q. -- answer it completely?

13 If we could have up on the screen [MPS9-15], please,
14 and it's paragraph 27.

15 So he says:

16 "Major incidents are managed through Command and
17 Control processes which are outlined in the [various
18 witness statements]."

19 He goes on:

20 "The strategy for managing the response to a major
21 incident is put in place by a Gold Commander with the
22 Silver Commander formulating the tactics to deliver the
23 strategy. The tactics are carried out by the officers
24 on the ground dealing with the incident. As stated
25 above, emergency responders from different organisations

1 communicate with each other either face-to-face at the
2 scene or via their control rooms. Although Airwave now
3 provides interoperable communications, these are
4 intended for Incident Commanders rather than all
5 officers. If all police officers and staff of the
6 emergency services were able to communicate directly
7 using a radio system, the Command and Control system
8 would be bypassed, resulting in the Gold and
9 Silver Commanders and their radio communicators in the
10 control room having no idea what the officers on the
11 ground are doing. They would not be able to understand
12 where points of need were and to deploy resources
13 accordingly. In addition, there would be such an excess
14 of messages to be communicated that the control room
15 staff would face significant difficulties coping with
16 the volume of communications."

17 Do you agree with his sentiments there?

18 A. On a personal note, I fully subscribe to that, and
19 I think it's further supported by the fact that Airwave
20 radios aren't compatible with the analogue radios used
21 on the fireground, so I don't think you could have that
22 level of inter-operability between police officers,
23 firefighters --

24 Q. No, but is the reality that on the incident ground, or
25 the fireground or the incident ground, call it what we

1 may, for instance, in the bombed carriage, for the most
2 part any talking between emergency services, fire crew
3 and ambulance paramedics would be face-to-face?

4 A. Undoubtedly, yes.

5 Q. If a fire crew wanted further resources, either for
6 themselves or because London Ambulance have said "We
7 need more stretchers", they can communicate that up
8 above to their Incident Commanders and then any
9 discussion between Incident Commanders can take place on
10 Airwave, if it needs to; for instance, between scenes,
11 so in other words one can see much more of a use for
12 talkgroups between King's Cross and Edgware Road between
13 the Incident Commanders?

14 A. Yes, I believe that's absolutely right, yes.

15 Q. So that the fact that the Fire Brigade have their own
16 handheld system, analogue system, which is different
17 from, obviously, Airwave, and not interoperable,
18 wouldn't actually matter at that level on the fireground
19 or on the scene itself?

20 A. No, no, it wouldn't, it would maintain clear and
21 understood lines of communication or Command and Control
22 and what you've just explained would provide
23 inter-operability or the means to work across the
24 agencies at the appropriate level.

25 MS BOYD: Thank you very much.

1 Questions by MR GIBBS

2 MR GIBBS: Mr Short, imagine I'm Inspector Mingay in the
3 bombed carriage, or I'm Inspector Munn in the bombed
4 carriage, only it's not then, it's now. I've now got my
5 Airwave radio and it's a digital radio?

6 A. It is.

7 Q. It works in the carriage, deep in the tunnel?

8 A. It does.

9 Q. It cuts out all background noise and so all the other
10 person can hear is my voice?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. There's no overtalking because, being a digital line, it
13 can only carry one transmission at once?

14 A. Yes, on that talkgroup, yes.

15 Q. If I can't get through because three other frequencies
16 are already transmitting, I can press the emergency
17 button and cut in?

18 A. Yes, you can.

19 Q. Therefore, I can say what it is that I've just come
20 across in the carriage?

21 A. Yes, you can.

22 Q. And everybody on my frequency, including my control
23 room, will hear what I'm saying?

24 A. Yes, they will.

25 Q. Secondly, on Airwave as it is now, the ability to move

1 groups of people within even one organisation on to
2 a separate channel is made much easier than it was?

3 A. It is, yes.

4 Q. So, for instance, it is possible to more easily
5 designate everyone responding at King's Cross go to
6 channel 7?

7 A. You could do that, yes.

8 Q. Or rather, everyone who isn't going to King's Cross move
9 to channel 8?

10 A. That's probably a preferred way of doing it.

11 Q. Thirdly, of perhaps greater significance for my Lady,
12 the ability to link organisations in what is called
13 talkgroups, but which really means putting together
14 members of people from different organisations all on to
15 one frequency, doesn't it?

16 A. It does, yes.

17 Q. Could you please have a look at [MPS9-91]? That is one
18 example of an interoperable voice communication. What
19 that means is you'll see the line drawn around the
20 Silver Command. There a frequency has been assigned to
21 the Silver Commanders of each organisation --

22 A. Yes, that's correct.

23 Q. -- enabling them, therefore, to speak to each other
24 without standing next door to each other?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. If one goes to the second option in this document at
2 page 93 [MPS9-93], please, of the same document, the lines -- the
3 circle has been drawn in a different place -- that's all
4 the Silvers and all the Bronzes --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- from four organisations, and if we go to page 95 [MPS9-95],
7 please, that's the Bronzes?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. So if we're at King's Cross, we could have the Bronze
10 Commanders either above or below ground from each of the
11 organisations speaking to each other, and in effect
12 creating a similar situation to the one which should
13 obtain if they were all standing in the same place and
14 speaking to each other?

15 A. That's the best way to consider it, I think. It's
16 the -- it will be for the type of use that would take
17 place face-to-face, if it were possible.

18 Q. Of course -- is this right -- if I'm on the Bronze
19 channel, the Bronze frequency, and I'm Bronze and I've
20 only got one radio, what I can't hear is what all of my
21 constables are saying to each other on the non-Bronze
22 frequency?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. So I've got to have two radios or I've got to have my
25 loggist beside me with the standard channel?

1 A. That's correct, and that's how it would be achieved.

2 Q. There are two, perhaps, principal limitations to this.

3 The first you've been taken to already, it's the

4 capacity limitation. Plenty of channels above ground

5 but only three for the emergency services below ground?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. In normal circumstances, even if there were five

8 different options below ground, providing they're not

9 all wanting to talk at exactly the same time, it should

10 be all right?

11 A. Generally that would be okay and could be -- that could

12 be taken okay, yes.

13 Q. Because one can wait for the other to stop speaking --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. -- and then use the channel that's come free?

16 A. Absolutely. It's the likelihood of all five needing to

17 speak at the same time. Probably very slim.

18 Q. In an extreme situation, perhaps the most extreme that

19 we've been talking about in these inquests, five

20 organisations all below ground, all trying to get on to

21 three channels, perceived to be, recognised to be,

22 a potential limitation in the capacity?

23 A. It is, yes.

24 Q. To mitigate that, is radio discipline significant?

25 A. Radio discipline is extremely important.

1 Q. Could we have [MPS9-83], please? That's why radio
2 communication training must follow the principles of
3 ABCD: accuracy, brevity, clarity and discipline?
4 A. Absolutely correct.
5 Q. The same as for normal life, perhaps.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And responders maintaining talkgroup discipline, keeping
8 only to those that have been assigned to them. What
9 that means is -- does it -- each organisation keeping to
10 its own frequency?
11 A. Yes, and each -- for example, at major events, BTP
12 officers will be told what channel they are to be on for
13 the duration of that event and only to change if they
14 are instructed to do so by the control room.
15 Q. Because otherwise, if they think "I can't get through on
16 this frequency", so they get on to their radio and start
17 looking for other frequencies, the danger there is, if
18 they're then transmitting on that, they may use up
19 a second of the three channels?
20 A. Absolutely, they've made the situation even worse.
21 Q. The second vulnerability, obviously if a bomb goes off,
22 it may damage parts of the physical structure of the
23 station?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. If it damages parts of the radio infrastructure of the

1 station -- and I mean the aerials or the wires that
2 connect to the aerials or the switches to which they
3 connect -- then that may affect the ability to use your
4 radio underground?

5 A. It may do, yes, to varying effects, yes.

6 Q. But if you're in the tunnel and the wire from
7 King's Cross has been blown out, may you still get
8 reception from the Russell Square end through the aerial
9 that's coming down that way down the tunnel?

10 A. Yes, you will. If the equipment is undamaged at
11 Russell Square, that will still push the signal through
12 the tunnel towards King's Cross.

13 Q. But obviously there will be a limit, it goes beyond
14 halfway, but there's a limit to where it will reach?

15 A. Yes, I mean the crossover point is generally halfway
16 along the tunnel, but there will be some spread of
17 coverage even past that point.

18 Q. Then finally this, Mr Gosden was asked a question about
19 one of Sir Desmond Fennell's recommendations, it's
20 recommendation 111 about linking up the Fire Brigade and
21 the British Transport Police radio.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. I think that you prepared the note to which you've been
24 taken, [BTP428-1]. I'm not going to ask that it come up
25 now, but you prepared that note in which you set out, as

1 you understand it, the history of the response to that
2 and, indeed, what came before Sir Desmond's report?

3 A. Yes, I have, yes.

4 Q. In particular, regarding recommendation 111, I think
5 your paragraph 4.1.7 at page 4 may address it. I shan't
6 go to the detail now.

7 A. Okay.

8 MR GIBBS: Thank you.

9 A. Thank you, sir.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much,
11 Chief Inspector Short. It looks like those are the all
12 the questions we have for you. It's not clear to me at
13 what level or with whom Project Airwave stalled, but
14 plainly you and BTP were keeping the pressure up.
15 Congratulations on that. It's a shame you weren't
16 listened to a bit earlier.

17 A. Thank you, my Lady.

18 MR KEITH: My Lady, Mr Hay will call, please, the next and
19 last witness for today, briefly.

20 MR HAY: My Lady, may I invite you to call Peter Hilton,
21 please.

22 MR PETER JOHN HILTON (sworn)

23 Questions by MR HAY

24 MR HAY: Can you give your full name to the court, please?

25 A. Yes, Peter John Hilton.

1 Q. Mr Hilton, in 2005, you were a Chief Superintendent with
2 the British Transport Police?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. You subsequently retired. Is that right?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. I want to ask you some very discrete questions about the
7 events on 7 July 2005 regarding Tavistock Square, and
8 can I just start by setting out summarising the position
9 as I understand it?

10 On that day, you had a specific role regarding the
11 G8 conference. Is that correct?

12 A. That is correct, sir.

13 Q. You were based at the British Transport Police
14 Force Headquarters in Tavistock Square?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. That's located, we understand, close to both
17 Russell Square Underground station and Tavistock Square?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. We've heard a considerable amount of evidence as to the
20 events which were going on on the Underground and the
21 uncertainty that created within Force Headquarters such
22 as the British Transport Police as to what was
23 occurring. But there obviously came a point when the
24 explosion occurred at Tavistock Square when things
25 changed within the BTP Force Headquarters. Would that

1 be fair?

2 A. Yes, I think that's a fair comment.

3 Q. Could you just describe what that explosion sounded like
4 and the reaction within the headquarters to it
5 occurring?

6 A. Yes, I can describe the reaction within my office
7 because those are the limits of my sort of sight at the
8 time. It was a stopping of the conversation. It was
9 a hearing and a feeling of a loud bang, very quickly
10 followed by what I perceived to be debris falling on the
11 rear of the building, on the rear garage roof,
12 a perception of mine, which I actually said out loud,
13 and there was no doubt in my mind what I had heard.

14 Q. In your mind, it was clear that it was a bomb?

15 A. Absolutely no doubt at all, sir.

16 Q. You had started a log already of events. May we have up
17 on the screen, please, BTP43? Then page 3 [BTP43-3], please.
18 We can see there second from the top 09.48:

19 "Decision: Chief Superintendent PH ..."

20 That's yourself, isn't it?

21 A. It is, sir, yes.

22 Q. You asked for the Force Headquarters building to be
23 secured. Why did you ask for that to be done?

24 A. Three reasons come to mind. I wanted to protect -- or
25 enhance the protection of the members of the public, the

1 casualties, we had already taken in the front door, to
2 enhance the protection of the staff in the building,
3 police and civilian support staff, and to ensure we
4 maintained the command and operational functions of that
5 building that we were vitally undertaking at the time.

6 Q. You mention casualties. Were those casualties who had
7 come from Russell Square?

8 A. I believe that to be the case now, yes.

9 Q. Then, looking further down the log, we can see at 09.50
10 it was confirmed that the Force Headquarters had been
11 secured.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. We heard evidence during the Tavistock Square scene
14 evidence from Officers Lazenby and Sims, both of whom
15 had been at Tavistock Square, made their way to the
16 Force Headquarters, Officer Lazenby referred to the fact
17 that he had to bang on the door to get in, and he wanted
18 to return to the scene with cordon tape and any medical
19 items but was prohibited from doing so.

20 PC Sims also returned to the headquarters, he wanted
21 to get what he referred to as a large orange rucksack
22 full of first aid equipment and cordons and the like and
23 also to return back to Tavistock Square with more
24 officers, but he was prohibited from doing so.

25 Why were they prohibited from doing so?

1 A. I have learnt since -- I wasn't aware of this encounter
2 at the time, I wasn't aware until more recently -- he
3 was simply instructed not to leave the building by
4 a middle ranking officer.

5 Q. Was that related to your decision to secure the
6 headquarters?

7 A. I don't know that to be the case, but it's a very
8 reasonable assumption, yes.

9 MR HAY: Thank you very much. Those are all the questions
10 I have for you. There may be some more.

11 A. Thank you.

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Gibbs?

13 Questions by MR GIBBS

14 MR GIBBS: Could we just have, please, on screen [BTP152-33]?
15 This was Mr Dermody's call, it must be about -- it
16 says 09.53. It must be about 09.55, so shortly after
17 you'd secured the building.

18 We remember that he says in the middle of the
19 page -- do you remember -- he had enough officers on the
20 scene, he's actually at the bus?

21 Do you remember, did you hear that radio call
22 yourself?

23 A. I cannot remember whether I heard it. I was monitoring
24 Airwave, as were many other officers within the building
25 at the time.

1 Q. The middle ranking officer who had learnt of your
2 "secure the building" order and who spoke to Mr Lazenby,
3 do you know whether he had heard that?

4 A. I would have a very high degree of confidence that Bob,
5 Bob Kendrick, Chief Inspector Kendrick, had an Airwave
6 radio on him, earpiece working, as part of my team, yes.

7 Q. The phrase I think that Mr Lazenby used was "locked
8 down". Is that a phrase that you used or have ever
9 heard used outside a prison context?

10 A. You're very precise in the question there. Outside of
11 a prison governor, the words of a prison governor, it's
12 not a police-y term, ma'am, that I would recognise at
13 all, "lock down". The words I definitely used were
14 "secure the building" as one secures one's house when
15 you go to bed at night.

16 MR GIBBS: Yes, thank you very much.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: But had you been aware that your
18 instructions had been interpreted as refusing to allow
19 officers to return with equipment, you might have wanted
20 to know about that, mightn't you, Mr Hilton?

21 A. I would have certainly taken a view on it, my Lady.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You would have let them go with the
23 equipment?

24 A. I think it depends on the information available to me at
25 the time.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Two officers come from the scene of
2 a bombed bus saying, "People are desperately injured,
3 please let us take back first aid equipment"?
4 A. I think my instincts are most definitely with you, ma'am
5 there, yes, I would.
6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.
7 MR HAY: My Lady, that completes the witnesses for today.
8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much, Mr Hilton.
9 Sorry to call you out of retirement.
10 A. Thank you.
11 MR KEITH: My Lady, there are three further statements to be
12 read, but perhaps, with my Lady's leave, we'll read
13 those tomorrow?
14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Certainly.
15 (4.28 pm)
16 (The inquests adjourned until 10.00 am the following day)
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