

Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005

Hearing transcripts - 10 February 2011 - Morning session

1 Thursday, 10 February 2011

2 (10.00 am)

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith?

4 MR KEITH: Good morning, my Lady, before I invite you to
5 call Assistant Commissioner Allison, I know the City of
6 London Police have some further information in relation
7 to the use of field telephones that may be of some
8 assistance to my learned friend Mr Coltart.

9 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Barton?

10 MS BARTON: My Lady, that is the case. We made enquiries
11 yesterday evening and the position is this: in 2005 and
12 now, City Police had five sets of field telephones.
13 Each set had a 200-metre cable. It is possible to
14 either purchase longer cables or to join cables
15 together. So in 2005 and now, the maximum cable length,
16 if joined together, would have been a thousand metres.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much.

18 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call
19 Assistant Commissioner Allison, please.

20 ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER CHRISTOPHER ALLISON (affirmed)

21 Questions by MR KEITH

22 A. Christopher Allison, Assistant Commissioner,
23 Metropolitan Police Service, my Lady.

24 MR KEITH: Assistant Commissioner, may I commence, please,
25 as I've done with the very senior members of other

1 organisations who have come to give evidence before
2 my Lady, by acknowledging through you, as Gold Commander
3 on the day of 7 July 2005, the professionalism and
4 endeavours of the individual members of your force, the
5 Metropolitan Police Service, who responded so well on
6 that day?

7 A. Sir, thank you. I know that those who responded on that
8 day will be very appreciative of those comments, so
9 thank you.

10 Q. Mr Allison, you were, in 2005, on that day, the London
11 Gold Commander, but may I just ask you, please, a little
12 more about your experience and the seniority of your
13 position?

14 At that time, you were a Commander, and you happened
15 to be the Borough Commander for the City of Westminster,
16 which is one of the London boroughs, of course, and one
17 of the Borough Commands within the greater London area
18 run by the Metropolitan Police?

19 A. That's correct, my Lady. It's one of 32 and it was the
20 largest, and it still is the largest of the 32 London
21 boroughs, which is why it was commanded by an officer of
22 my rank.

23 Q. Subsequently, you were promoted and you became
24 responsible for central operations within the
25 Metropolitan Police Service. Could you just describe in

1 essence what the role of central operations is?

2 A. Yes, we are responsible for major incidents, contingency
3 planning, public order policing across the whole of the
4 capital.

5 In addition, there are a number of specialist
6 uniform assets that were under my control, things like
7 the Territorial Support Group, the firearms team,
8 traffic patrol, so the specialist uniform officers who
9 were there to support borough officers across the
10 capital and, obviously, we had a major role in managing
11 any major public order incident or event that occurred.

12 Q. In the last 14 years, your statement records you've been
13 involved in a command role at some level and, latterly,
14 by way of oversight in relation to almost all the major
15 incidents and events that have taken place in London?

16 A. That's correct, my Lady. I joined the public order
17 cadre in 1996, and have done, at every level, things
18 like Notting Hill carnival. I was the Gold Commander at
19 Notting Hill carnival and other events like that.

20 Q. More recently, and pertinently to next year, have you
21 appointed as the national Olympics security coordinator
22 tasked with the burden of meeting any of the challenges
23 to which the Olympics and the Paralympic Games may give
24 rise?

25 A. That's correct, my Lady. I was given -- appointed in

1 that role in May 2008 and I actually moved full-time to
2 the national Olympic security coordinator role
3 in January of this year. My central operation
4 responsibilities have been handed to a new
5 Assistant Commissioner who has joined the Met.

6 Q. Your witness statement, Assistant Commissioner,
7 helpfully commences by addressing some of the aspects
8 concerning management of major incidents and,
9 unsurprisingly, you commence by addressing the Command
10 structure with which we are now very familiar, Gold,
11 Silver and Bronze.

12 The Gold, Silver and Bronze structure was obviously
13 in place during 7 July 2005?

14 A. It was, yes.

15 Q. Although aspects of the Command structure have altered,
16 perhaps brought about by changes in the communications
17 system operated by the Metropolitan Police and, in
18 particular, the introduction of the Airwave system, has
19 the basic tenet of that structure remained unaltered:
20 namely, the need for there to be a clear, strategic,
21 tactical and operational structure?

22 A. Yes, my Lady, it has remained exactly the same. In fact
23 the Gold, Silver, Bronze system has been in place ever
24 since I've known it and been a member of the Command
25 cadre in the Met. Gold clearly sets out the strategy.

1 The Silver Commander and the way in which we run it in
2 the Met -- and we're quite pure about this -- there is
3 only one Silver Commander who is responsible for setting
4 the tactical plan to meet the Gold strategy, and then we
5 have a range of Bronze commanders who deliver both
6 geographical responsibility and functional
7 responsibility, depending on the type of event that
8 we're dealing with.

9 In some, we may have none with geographical
10 responsibilities; in others, we may just have everybody
11 with geographical responsibility. It depends on the
12 event. But Gold, Silver, Bronze is the underpinning
13 Command protocol in London and actually, nationally,
14 ACPO advice was issued on it, I think last year.

15 Q. Following the events of 7 July, the Metropolitan Police
16 Service instituted a debrief process, and some aspects
17 of that debrief process were controlled and commanded by
18 Superintendent Gomm, whom, of course, you know, and
19 whose witness statement will be read later this morning.
20 The debriefing process revealed that, in general
21 terms, the strategic, tactical operation or Command
22 structure, the structure you described, worked well and
23 was a very important part of the police response on
24 7 July, but if there were to be criticism at all, it
25 would be that the clarity of that structure needed to be

1 communicated better, perhaps, to more junior officers
2 and to other organisations so that they knew who was, in
3 fact, performing each of those respective roles in the
4 course of a major incident. Would you agree with that?

5 A. I think it's helpful if people know who's in command,
6 sir, but I'm not necessarily sure that it makes
7 a complete deal of difference to the officer on the
8 front line about how they respond whether I'm in command
9 as the Gold Commander or Alec Robertson from the City of
10 London is in command as the Gold Commander. Their
11 primary role, which is about saving life and doing all
12 the things that we do as a police service, they will
13 still do it.

14 It does help if they understand there's a Command
15 structure and they know that there's one in place and
16 that they're getting directions from the top, but
17 exactly who it is, to be honest, I'm not sure whether
18 that makes a great deal of difference.

19 Q. Even if they don't need to know the name and the rank of
20 the person who occupies that particular post -- the role
21 of Gold, Silver or Bronze -- is it important that they
22 at least know the outlines of the Command structure?

23 There were some observations to the effect that
24 there was a multitude of structures in operation that
25 morning, people suspected or were concerned that there

1 was more than one Gold, more than one Silver, and they
2 weren't quite aware of the nature of the Command
3 structure. Was that a fair observation?

4 A. I'm not sure whether I would say it was a fair
5 observation, sir. Certainly, in some of the debrief
6 processes -- and I know that the Jonathan Crego report
7 has been put before the court.

8 Q. It has.

9 A. You know, there's talk of about a multitude of Golds.
10 That report was done after the 21/7 and 22/7
11 incidents --

12 Q. Indeed.

13 A. -- where I am aware there were challenges in the
14 organisation, because we had, in effect, crime scene
15 management being looked after by one
16 assistant commissioner, we had a manhunt for five
17 individuals being looked after by another
18 assistant commissioner and we had community engagement
19 being looked after by another assistant commissioner,
20 and there were some challenges about who was actually in
21 charge at that time.

22 This may sound hyperdefensive, but I believe, on
23 7 July, there was quite a bit of clarity around the
24 organisation, that I was acting as the Gold Commander
25 and we had squared that through my colleagues in other

1 emergency services and other police forces through the
2 Gold group.

3 Q. Assistant Commissioner, there's no need to be defensive
4 and, for my part, I haven't taken your observations as
5 being defensive at all. You are confident, are you not,
6 that the Command structure stood up to the pressures
7 placed on it that morning?

8 A. I am.

9 Q. It worked well?

10 A. I am, sir, yes.

11 Q. That is the heart of this point.

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. The second aspect to which you have drawn our attention
14 in the course of your witness statement is
15 Operation Benbow, of which mention has already been made
16 in the course of these proceedings.

17 That is, is it not, the operation between the
18 Metropolitan Police, City of London Police and British
19 Transport Police, which permits a unification of the
20 Command structures in the event of a pan-London
21 incident, so as to simplify that structure and to ensure
22 perhaps a more efficacious response to that incident?

23 A. Entirely correct, sir. It came out of a debrief of the
24 J18 Stop the City disorder on -- in 1999, which
25 highlighted that we had parallel Command structures, and

1 as a result of that, the recommendation was that in
2 future, for any major incident or event that was likely
3 to be pan-London, involving any or more of those police
4 services, we ought to have one Command structure, form
5 one Command and Control centre, and Benbow has stood the
6 test of time since then.

7 Q. As we will see a little later, Operation Benbow was
8 discussed between Chief Inspector Robertson of the City
9 of London Police and Superintendent Gomm of the
10 Metropolitan Police around 9.30, but it was a matter
11 that was formally debated by you, as Gold Commander, at
12 the Gold Coordinating Group meeting at 10.30 at the
13 Strategic Coordination Centre at Scotland Yard?

14 A. That's right, my Lady. I felt it was important at that
15 meeting just to have that decision ratified by the
16 senior members of all the organisations, and in the
17 presence of our colleagues from the other emergency
18 services, so that, once again, everybody understood
19 there was clarity of command.

20 Q. We take it from your description of a formal
21 ratification that your understanding was that, in
22 practice, it was already in operation, and it was just
23 a question of formalising the existing position?

24 A. Yes, that's exactly it, sir. Again, this is about
25 Command. Benbow is about the Command layers and who is

1 commanding; again, is that making a difference to the
2 officer on the ground, who, at that particular moment,
3 is saving life? They're still saving life while we set
4 the Command around them.

5 Q. You also refer to the protocol constituted by the London
6 Emergency Services Liaison Panel, LESLP, and have you
7 set out for us a brief history of the introduction of
8 that protocol and the representative nature of the
9 organisations that contribute to it?

10 A. I have done, my Lady, yes.

11 Q. In essence, is this right, it sets out the responses and
12 responsibilities of each of the emergency services at
13 a major incident in London and it's been subject to
14 review and, as my Lady's now heard, the eighth edition
15 is in the process of being drafted?

16 A. That's entirely correct, my Lady, yes.

17 Q. We have been treated to evidence concerning the role of
18 various other aspects of London's response to major
19 incidents, and you refer in that regard to the London
20 Resilience Team.

21 Is this the position: that the London Resilience
22 Team was established in June of 2002 after the events of
23 11 September 2001 to review London's capability to
24 provide a multi-agency response?

25 A. That's entirely correct. It was in recognition that

1 LESLP was designed to deal with what we had, up until
2 then, described as a major incident and had stood the
3 test of time, but obviously 9/11 had seen something far
4 greater than we'd ever seen anywhere else and there was
5 a recognition that we needed to make sure we were
6 preparing for that sort of eventuality.

7 Q. Was it generally thought that, whilst LESLP provided
8 a good overall structure for the various agencies in
9 London to respond to major incidents, much more detailed
10 planning was required and it was for the purposes of
11 drawing up the more detailed planning that the London
12 Resilience Forum came into being, so it took over the
13 detailed planning at chief officer level and the London
14 Resilience Team, which had made the recommendation,
15 continued, thereafter, to act as its Secretariat?

16 A. Entirely correct, and then, sitting underneath that,
17 my Lady, were a number of, in effect, Task and Finish
18 Groups looking at each of the individual plans, and the
19 importance of those groups was it actually had people
20 who were operationally experienced as part of them and
21 leading them so that we made sure that the plans, when
22 we developed them, were fit for purpose.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm sure it's my fault, Mr Allison,
24 but I'm still not quite following why LESLP couldn't
25 have been developed further, why you had to have all

1 these different structures and --

2 A. Well, LESLP had stood the test of time in London, and

3 forgive me, I'm not exactly sure, I know there are

4 similar procedures outside the capital, but I think

5 there was a recognition by Government that we needed to

6 create resilience fora across the country to make sure

7 we were doing appropriate planning across the country,

8 and London was tapped into this in the same way, and

9 it's felt that there was, under the Government Office of

10 London, the opportunity to create a permanent

11 Secretariat for a chief officer team to make sure that

12 we were doing the detailed planning.

13 LESLP, up until then, had been a -- you know, it's

14 an agreement between the various agencies, whereas this

15 was putting it on a more formal footing, more resources

16 being put into it, and I think we saw the value of that

17 in the fact that, on 7 July, we used a significant

18 number of the plans that had been developed at that

19 time.

20 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So what is now the relationship

21 between the major incident procedure manual and the

22 London strategic emergency plan? How does anybody know

23 when one kicks in and not the other?

24 A. Sorry, my Lady?

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: You said:

1 "The second protocol is the major incident procedure
2 manual from LESLP."

3 That's paragraph 10.

4 A. Yes, sorry, LESLP.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Paragraph 11:

6 "The third protocol is the London strategic
7 emergency plan, which comes from the London resilience
8 organisation."

9 A. Forgive me, my Lady. LESLP sets out what we do as
10 various organisations, so the role of the police
11 service, the role of the Fire Service and Ambulance
12 Service and others, how we will work together. It sets
13 it out in enough detail to give clear understanding for
14 people, but not in too much detail so it's so thick
15 nobody ever reads it. So it's an outline document which
16 we can all work from and we can understand, and forms
17 the broad framework for that joint agency working.
18 The work that comes out of the strategic plan for
19 London from the London Resilience Team is it gets into
20 more detailed work on: so what does the
21 Resilience Mortuary look like? Where would we place the
22 mortuary? What does the disaster fund -- how would we
23 run a disaster fund in London? So it actually goes into
24 more detail about individual plans that, in the light of
25 the 9/11 experience, it felt it was appropriate to have

1 done that planning, rather than to, you know, have to
2 deal with it on the day.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

4 MR KEITH: Were those steps taken by the London Resilience
5 Team and the London Resilience Forum replicated
6 subsequently in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, which
7 introduced similar bodies as you've suggested --

8 A. Across the country.

9 Q. -- across the whole country, and following the
10 introduction of that Act, the London Resilience Forum
11 was then renamed the London Regional Resilience Forum
12 because there were regional resilience fora all over the
13 country following the introduction of the Act, and it
14 was then that even more detailed planning was brought
15 into place and it was that body, latterly the London
16 Regional Resilience Forum, that created the strategic
17 emergency plan of which you've just spoken
18 in April 2005?

19 A. That is right, sir, yes.

20 Q. That plan, the strategic emergency plan, the much more
21 detailed protocol by comparison to LESLP, included in
22 it, did it not, a particular protocol called the Command
23 and Control protocol?

24 A. Yes, it did.

25 Q. But that protocol, although it was reduced into writing,

1 reflected, did it not, the basic command tenets -- Gold,
2 Silver, Bronze and the like -- which had been in
3 practical use by the Metropolitan Police for many years?

4 A. It did, my Lady, and not just in the
5 Metropolitan Police, also within the other emergency
6 services as set out in LESLP.

7 Q. Thank you very much. That's very clear. Turning to the
8 events of 7 July, we are aware, of course, that the G8
9 policing operation had commenced before 7 July. Did it
10 commence on Wednesday, 29 June and was it due to
11 conclude on Monday, 11 July?

12 A. It had done, my Lady, that's correct.

13 Q. In that operation, to deal with the G8 Summit, what role
14 were you, what role did you perform?

15 A. I was the Gold Commander for London, my Lady.
16 Nationally, a significant number of police officers had
17 been deployed to Scotland to assist our Scottish
18 colleagues, but there was a recognition in London that
19 there may be protests in London for those who may not
20 wish to go to Scotland. Also, there may be those who
21 may be on their way to Scotland that we either wanted
22 for previous offences or we could provide intelligence
23 packages on to our Scottish colleagues.

24 As an appropriate response, we put in place
25 a Command team, together with some resources, to deal

1 with anything that would happen during that particular
2 period, and that's over and above what normally is in
3 place in London during that particular time.

4 On any given day, we have a reserve capability, but
5 during this particular time, we felt it prudent to have
6 a bespoke policing operation, and I was the
7 Gold Commander for that.

8 Q. There are two features of the G8 operation that are
9 relevant to the events on 7 July, are there not?

10 One, as you've just observed, it provided for
11 a bespoke available cadre of police officers to attend
12 any incident, if such an incident were to occur -- and
13 of course, they did -- and, secondly, the institution of
14 the operation for G8 had required use of the
15 Special Operations Room, the GT call sign?

16 A. Actually, to run the operation that we're talking about,
17 sir, whenever we run a pan-London operation, we will
18 open GT up to do it. On a daily basis, the normal day
19 running is run by the now three command centres across
20 London. During then, it was the one information room on
21 the second floor, together with the various borough
22 control rooms.

23 But we opened GT up on the grounds that we were
24 running a bespoke policing operation, and it was there
25 to manage that bespoke policing operation, of which

1 I was the Gold and Roger Gomm was the Silver.

2 Q. So the police response was happily assisted by having
3 use of the GT room already in operation, and having
4 officers already available, for the purposes of G8,
5 ready to go?

6 A. Entirely correct, my Lady. GT, if you start it from
7 scratch, takes some time to open it up, and then for it
8 to take control. It was open and, whilst we do have
9 Commissioner's Reserve on duty on a daily basis,
10 a number of officers capable of being deployed to
11 incidents such as this, these were additional resources
12 on top of that Commissioner's Reserve, and I'm sure
13 you'll see notes of Commissioner's Reserve being
14 recalled and deployed, but these were officers on top of
15 that.

16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So far from the G8 hindering the
17 police response on 7 July, you'd say, in fact, the
18 arrangements made helped the response, so we can put
19 that one to one side?

20 A. Entirely correct, my Lady. We had additional resources
21 available for instantaneous deployment. It takes time
22 to mobilise resources across the organisation, as you
23 will understand. Initial responders can go, but on this
24 occasion, we had that reserve capability which was
25 immediately available for being deployed and was

1 deployed by Superintendent Gomm quite quickly to
2 Aldgate.

3 MR KEITH: In reality, whenever there is an incident, police
4 officers may not be tasked by their commanders, but
5 officers may overhear references to the incident over
6 the then Met radio, and so, other officers, of course,
7 attended instinctively and directly in any event, and
8 you would also have been able to call upon additional
9 forces or officers from the Borough Commands throughout
10 London, if you had required them to respond?

11 A. That's entirely correct. My Lady, officers will
12 initially be tasked there as a result of hearing the
13 call. Others, as you say, will respond. You know, I'm
14 in the privileged position of working with colleagues
15 who will run towards danger, whereas other people will
16 run away from it.

17 We can then mobilise the Territorial Support Group,
18 which are the Commissioner's Reserve and the area
19 reserve, and then we have the ability to call in things
20 called second wave and third wave, which is officers
21 from other boroughs that we mobilise to bring in
22 additional asset, if it's required, and again,
23 subsequent to the bus bomb in Tavistock Square, Roger
24 and I made the decision to call the red, which was the
25 second wave response, so that we had additional resource

1 to deal with what was required.

2 Q. That morning, your duty as Gold Commander of the London
3 response to the G8 Summit hadn't, in fact, required you
4 to be deployed all the time in the GT room. You were,
5 of course, Commander of the Westminster borough at the
6 same time.

7 What time, can you recall, did you first hear of
8 a major incident or something indicating a major
9 incident occurring in London?

10 A. My Lady, I was in my office. As you say, I didn't need
11 to be in GT the whole time for that operation. There
12 are those that you do need to be, but in this one, it
13 wasn't, we'd set the strategic direction.

14 At about 9.25, I received a call from the security
15 focus desk, which was a borough-based unit that looked
16 after the Government security zone that worked for me,
17 to say, you know, "Governor, there's some incidents
18 going on on the Tube, are you aware of them?"

19 I wasn't at that time. I put the phone down,
20 I said, "Thanks, I'll make some enquiries" and almost
21 immediately, Roger Gomm, the superintendent, the
22 Silver Commander, rang me and told me that something was
23 going on the Tube system and I said I'd make my way
24 straight over to GT.

25 Q. Was it almost immediately apparent that there had been

1 a major incident, or was that recognition of the
2 existence of a major incident something that had to
3 await your arrival in the Special Operations Room?
4 A. The work was ongoing, it's clear Roger, a very
5 experienced Silver and Gold public order cadre, was
6 managing the scene and was entirely competent and
7 capable for managing all of the activity there, but, as
8 the Gold, he informed me to get me over there, that was
9 my position at that particular time, and obviously, when
10 I arrived, I got a brief from him about what was going
11 on and I didn't detain him too long on the phone when he
12 said, "We've got lots of things going on across London
13 on the Tube". I said "Right, I'll be there now", and
14 I made my way as quickly as I could.

15 Q. So that we're entirely clear that there was a Command
16 structure in place from, in fact, 8.50, the position
17 then was this: that Superintendent Gomm had been in the
18 GT Special Operations Room throughout, including at the
19 time that the bombs, as we now know them to have been,
20 had detonated. He would also have had with him, would
21 he not, the day shift chief inspector for what was then
22 called the Central Command Complex, the whole
23 communication network, the system for the
24 Metropolitan Police, who I think was Chief
25 Inspector Sadowski whose statement we will have read

1 later today.

2 They then would have taken strategic and tactical
3 command from the word "go", but after a certain amount
4 of time, when they had put everything into place, taken
5 all the necessary steps to respond, the matter is then
6 elevated to you and you were invited to come to the room
7 at 9.30?

8 A. Yes, if it may help, my Lady, the initial response to
9 these sorts of incidents predominantly is dealt with by
10 borough to start with, because when the first calls come
11 in, there's an incident at a Tube station, we're not
12 entirely sure what that incident is. So the borough
13 will provide an appropriate response and, obviously, in
14 relation to the City, the City provided the first
15 response to the Aldgate, and clearly other boroughs
16 responded to the other scenes.

17 At that time, we weren't sure that we had three
18 scenes, because we had people coming out of different
19 Tube stations at different times, there were just
20 a number of scenes going on.

21 The role of chief inspector in the information room
22 is to have an oversight of everything that's going on
23 across the Met, and where it looks like there is
24 something that is bigger than a borough can cope with,
25 beyond their capability or capacity, or maybe linked or

1 maybe cross-border, they will, in effect, take control
2 of it. I think that's what happened in this case.
3 Peter Sadowski took control of those situations from the
4 DI9 pod and said, "Hang on, this is something bigger
5 than borough so I will have oversight of it as the chief
6 inspector", so in fact, jumping it up a rank.
7 Roger Gomm I think was in a meeting with a BTP
8 colleague at the time and was told about an incident on
9 the Tube, made his way down to GT and then liaised
10 straightaway with Peter Sadowski. They identified that,
11 actually, this was very large, and there was an
12 agreement that we would take this into SOR and we would
13 take the Command role for it, and I think it was
14 formally handed from the DI9 pod -- and I apologise for
15 the acronyms, but from that pod in the information room
16 to GT at about 9.40, 9.42.

17 Q. But the process of responding, by way of making officers
18 available, of trying to get hold of accurate information
19 and trying to assimilate it, had gone on throughout the
20 time from 8.50 onwards?

21 A. Entirely correct, sir. The first responders will have
22 gone to the scene and were still going to the scene.
23 This was about putting appropriate Command and Control
24 over the top.

25 Q. May I just explore with you, for a moment or two, what

1 is understood to be a major incident, because it's
2 a phrase that has plainly been used frequently in the
3 course of these proceedings, and may we look at the
4 strategic emergency plan of which I made reference
5 a moment or two ago, which was promulgated
6 in April 2005, shortly before July 2005, under the
7 systems that had been introduced after the Civil
8 Contingencies Act came into force?
9 It's INQ11045, and could we start at page 29 [INQ11045-29],
10 please?
11 The document shows the heading "Major Incident
12 Procedure" halfway down the page, and it appears from
13 this document that there are two sorts of emergencies:
14 sudden impact, and those which may take a time or
15 a certain amount of time to come to a head.
16 But there is a definition there of a major incident.
17 It's:
18 "... any emergency that requires the implementation
19 of special arrangements by one or all of the emergency
20 services and will generally include the involvement,
21 either directly, or indirectly, of a large number of
22 people."
23 We can see there Assistant Commissioner has set out
24 the sorts of characteristics which will generally typify
25 a major incident.

1 This was not categorised, was it, as what was then
2 termed a "catastrophic incident", although that is not
3 a phrase now in use, but it was then. Was it,
4 therefore, the position that, although extremely
5 serious, the response to the incident didn't, in fact,
6 engage the higher levels of Government and certain
7 responses that generally will accompany a response to
8 a catastrophic incident?

9 A. Entirely correct, sir. At the time we were first
10 dealing with it, yes, it was very serious, but it sat
11 within the definition of a major incident for us and, as
12 a result, you know, GT had -- was operating and running
13 it, we put in the central Command structure and we were
14 working closely with our other emergency service
15 colleagues who we invited into the Command and Control
16 suite as we would do.

17 Q. If we go over the page, please, to page 30 [INQ11045-30], we can see
18 there the definition of a catastrophic incident, which,
19 in order to be invoked or to be described as such, in
20 fact requires, or required then, a designation from the
21 Minister that such an incident was in play, but a little
22 further down, at paragraph 16, we can see there that one
23 of the key characteristics is the attendance, on
24 a pre-agreed basis, of certain specific key
25 organisations to a Strategic Coordination Centre.

1 My Lady is aware, of course, that on 7 July, you did
2 instigate the attendance of specific key organisations
3 to a Strategic Coordination Centre, firstly at
4 Scotland Yard, at 10.30 and then subsequently at Hendon.
5 Was this the position, therefore: that despite this
6 not being a catastrophic incident, you thought it wise
7 to arrange for the use of the Strategic Coordination
8 Centre to assist in the response?

9 A. Entirely correct, my Lady. We -- at the Gold group, we
10 debated this.

11 Clearly, at a Gold group, a Gold Commander wants the
12 key individuals from key organisations who can assist.
13 That just doesn't happen to be the among services, that
14 could be anybody, and it depends on the incident, about
15 who you would want there.

16 The debate at the Gold group was we weren't sure,
17 given that we'd had three incidents and then one
18 incident, what other incidents may take place. We were
19 not sure whether that may impact any of the central
20 buildings such as Scotland Yard, and it was felt a wise
21 and precautionary measure to invoke the SCC process and
22 for us to move elsewhere.

23 We all agreed that, and that's why the SCC was put
24 in place at Hendon and the first meeting was 2.00,
25 I recall.

1 Q. The Strategic Coordination Centre is described on
2 page 31 [INQ11045-31], as is the Gold Coordinating Group. At the
3 bottom of that page, please, paragraph 27, we can see
4 there that it's described as a location nominated by the
5 police Gold, and so it was Scotland Yard and then
6 subsequently Hendon, and at the bottom of the page, the
7 Gold Coordinating Group, is that the name for the group
8 of individuals who will attend at the Strategic
9 Coordination Centre?

10 A. Forgive me, sir, the -- what paragraph are you looking
11 at?

12 Q. Paragraph 29 refers to the Gold Coordinating Group.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Is that the generic term for the individuals who did
15 attend subsequently at, firstly, Scotland Yard and then
16 subsequently at Hendon?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Why is it that the Gold Commander from the
19 Metropolitan Police -- namely, yourself -- becomes chair
20 of the Gold Coordinating Group?

21 A. Doesn't have to be, sir. It could be any -- generally,
22 as set out in LESLP, it will be the police service that
23 take on the responsibility for coordinating the
24 activities of the other emergency services.

25 Clearly, I would never tell a colleague in the

1 Ambulance Service how to save life, or a member of the
2 Fire Service how to do their stuff, their activities.
3 But it's accepted that our role is to create an
4 environment in which the other emergency services can
5 operate, as well as assisting in saving lives and then
6 doing our primary responsibilities, which is
7 investigating, crime scene management, cordon,
8 et cetera.

9 So the primary role -- one of the primary roles of
10 the police service is to chair that coordinating group.
11 Depending on where the incident had started, it could
12 have easily been chaired by a Gold Commander from the
13 City. If we go back in time, I was a Bronze Commander
14 on an event which was pan-London which was commanded by
15 a City of London Assistant Commissioner, or a Commander,
16 in the City of London.

17 Q. It's generally envisaged, is it not, that because of the
18 wide range of roles carried out by the police, and in
19 particular their function of responding immediately and
20 first of all and in order to try to prepare the scene
21 and to assist the other emergency services, that they
22 will be expected to chair the Gold Coordinating Group?

23 A. Entirely correct.

24 Q. Whether it's the Met or City of London?

25 A. I've never been -- and I've been involved for many

1 years, I've never been involved in a Gold Coordinating
2 Group on a major incident that has not been chaired by
3 the police service. It's set out in LESLP and everybody
4 accepts it and understands it.

5 Q. Could we have [INQ11045-35], please, and rotate it? There
6 is a schematic diagram showing the Gold Coordinating
7 Group. If we can reflect on it for one moment, from the
8 top right-hand corner, it's all located within the
9 Strategic Coordination Centre, New Scotland Yard at
10 10.30, Hendon later, at 2.00.

11 We can see there the chair is described as the
12 police and, within the hatched area, we can see the
13 attendees comprise bodies such as London organisation,
14 LFB, LAS, local authorities, transport, utilities,
15 military and so on. There is an information flow from
16 the Gold Coordinating Group to COBR, the Cabinet Office
17 briefing room?

18 A. That's correct, my Lady, and the size of that shaded
19 area and the number of people in it, can vary, depending
20 on the type of incident that we're dealing with.

21 Q. So that was the structure that was then put in place
22 that morning. But even putting aside the Gold
23 structure, there was obviously a constant flow of
24 information to and from the Met and other agencies such
25 as City of London Police, British Transport Police, and

1 the emergency services.

2 In the course of these proceedings, my Lady has

3 heard witnesses describe, not just difficulties at the

4 scenes in trying to ascertain what exactly had

5 happened -- for example, by way of clarifying whether or

6 not the explosion had been created by bombs -- but also

7 in the difficulties of feeding all the various pieces of

8 information in from the scenes and the streets into the

9 Command structure, perhaps due to the sheer

10 proliferation of pieces of information.

11 In your experience -- and you have vast experience

12 in this area -- does it take time, even with the best

13 will in the world, and with the best-run structures, to

14 assimilate that information in order to be able to take

15 strategic or tactical views based upon it?

16 A. That's entirely correct, my Lady. If you imagine, the

17 first responders who turn up to any of these things are

18 dealing with a chaotic scene in front of them. They

19 will have had a call, they will know roughly what to

20 expect, but then they're faced with, you know, chaos in

21 front of them, and our job, as all the emergency

22 services and other colleagues, such as

23 London Underground, you know, staff from

24 London Underground, is to try to create some order out

25 of that chaos.

1 It takes some time to understand exactly what is
2 going on. Whilst we do brief our officers, you know,
3 the first officer on scene, we would want them to assess
4 the situation and pass the information back as best they
5 can, and they do, they can only assess exactly what they
6 see in front of them at that particular moment. This is
7 constantly changing, and there is always the desire of
8 any first responder, when they see people who need help,
9 people who are injured, to go and help those
10 individuals.

11 So it takes time in any major incident for us to get
12 clarity about exactly what we're dealing with, and
13 I think that's a reality; however good your Command
14 structure is, it just takes that time.

15 Q. One of the structures for the collection and
16 distribution of information, of which we've heard, is
17 the computer-aided dispatch record, CAD. The evidence
18 has shown that CAD is used, not, of course, just by the
19 Metropolitan Police, but also by City of London, and the
20 British Transport Police have access to that system
21 remotely by way of having sight of it and being able to
22 then relay through their own Command structures
23 information that they may see on CAD.

24 A. They have sight of it, and -- sorry, sir -- and they can
25 also input into it.

1 Q. And they can input information as well. That system
2 appears to work very well. It's not an issue addressed
3 in your statement, so this might be a little unfair, but
4 is there a case for extending the CAD system in some way
5 beyond its existing structure so as to allow that system
6 to incorporate information from other bodies such as
7 emergency services, and to allow, therefore, perhaps,
8 a better overall view of what information is being
9 collated on that very helpful central system?

10 A. It isn't my area of expertise, sir, but, you know, I've
11 been involved in it for many years and I would say the
12 system works well, as it does at the moment. City and
13 us, we have, you know, exactly the same system. That
14 liaison between BTP and ourselves -- clearly BTP, their
15 control room covers London and the south-east, so it is
16 not just the Metropolitan Police area, and, therefore,
17 you know, to suggest that they come on to exactly the
18 same system as us would be challenging for them and also
19 all the other forces they work with, and would provide
20 us with a whole load of information not for action.

21 Q. Extraneous information.

22 A. We have a good linkage with the London Ambulance Service
23 and the Fire Service, though not through the CAD. So at
24 the moment, from my dealings with it, it's worked well,
25 and certainly, as soon as we put in place a GT,

1 multi-agency GT capability, we mobilise liaison officers
2 from the other emergency services who work in our midst.

3 So --

4 Q. They come to the room?

5 A. They come to GT and liaison officers sit there and they
6 have "reach back" to their own systems and they can
7 directly feed anything in so that we do have all the
8 information that we need.

9 Q. Are you aware of any process by which this inter-agency
10 structure, operated in the GT room, whereby other
11 emergency services can have sight by being present in
12 the room of what's going on from the Metropolitan angle,
13 is open to any kind of review or development, is this an
14 issue that is kept under review by the
15 Metropolitan Police, do you know?

16 A. We would -- like any of these things, we would always
17 keep it under review, and if colleagues or somebody had
18 come up with a new system which actually we thought was
19 going to solve a problem that we'd identified, then
20 clearly we would look at it.

21 At the moment, I'm not aware of any specific
22 problems that have been identified which is causing us
23 to completely change our systems. Certainly they worked
24 well on that day for us.

25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Putting to one side how it worked for

1 you, as a service, and British Transport Police, which
2 is a national organisation, let's just focus on
3 Metropolitan Police, City of London Police, London
4 Ambulance Service, London Fire Brigade.

5 Do you know whether any thought -- I appreciate this
6 isn't your area, but just exploring a little further --
7 has been given to whether, if you had a system whereby
8 the London Ambulance Service could put into your CAD,
9 "Have been told bomb at Edgware Road. Have been asked
10 to send ten ambulances" or "We've declared major
11 incident at Edgware Road", might that not then mean that
12 you haven't got to wait for all the organisation liaison
13 officers to come to the control room, which is going to
14 take time?

15 A. My understanding, my Lady, is London Ambulance Service
16 already have that ability.

17 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: They can already input?

18 A. They can already -- there is an interface between our
19 two systems which enables us to pass messages to each
20 other with the London Ambulance Service, as I understand
21 it.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: So access to and input into?

23 A. We can pass messages to them about what we're dealing
24 with, what we need their assistance with, they can pass
25 messages to us through an interface, as I understand it,

1 my Lady.

2 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Do you know whether that was working
3 in 2005?

4 A. From the briefing I was given earlier on this week,
5 I believe that was in place then and is in place now,
6 for London Ambulance Service.

7 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: For London Ambulance Service. You
8 don't know about the Fire Brigade?

9 A. I know the Fire Service, at the moment, we rely on, for
10 the Fire Service, on -- it's a telephone conversation
11 between us, and so, the chief inspector and information
12 room and their equivalent control room.

13 I suppose what I would say, in all of these things,
14 is a recognition that we do do different jobs. We --
15 therefore, there is -- there's a danger sometimes of
16 information overload, and certainly on the days, you
17 know, the 7/7, the challenge about finding out what's
18 going on, is all of this information coming in.

19 The systems work quite well. When there's something
20 major for the Fire Service, they will ring us and we
21 will make sure we've got an appropriate response for
22 them, and certainly that electronic link that I believe
23 with LAS -- I'm pretty sure we have -- and certainly
24 I know we've got with BTP and the City of London works
25 well.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: As far as when any of the other
2 organisations declare a major incident is concerned, how
3 is that communicated to you, because plainly, as the
4 police force for London, you need to know of any major
5 incident on your patch, even if it's not necessarily
6 going to involve much police resource and it's going to
7 be more an Ambulance Service response, but how are you
8 alerted?

9 A. It would be done through one of those mechanisms, so
10 LAS, if they were at a scene that we weren't at, I'm
11 sure would pass it through that electronic gateway to
12 us, and if there were any issues, obviously the various
13 people who run our control rooms know each other quite
14 well, because they're regularly speaking to each other
15 and, as a result, they would ring each other.
16 The declaration of a major incident by one service,
17 you know, I'm aware that the Fire Service and the
18 Ambulance Service have pretty much a set response to the
19 declaration of a major incident. For the police
20 service, it's different, you know, there could be
21 a major incident where, actually, it's a big major
22 incident for the Fire Service, a very large fire, but
23 actually only requires few resource from us to put some
24 cordons round the outside. On the other hand, it may be
25 a major incident for us as well and we have to mobilise

1 more resource and, therefore, that's the time we put in
2 place the GT system.

3 For us, it does depend on what is required to
4 support our colleagues --

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I understand that, I understand that
6 what is a major incident for one organisation is not
7 necessarily a major incident for another, in terms of
8 deployment of their resources, but you, being
9 responsible for the capital, need to know, even if
10 you're not going to have to send many people, whether
11 there are major incidents going on on your patch.

12 A. Yes. Yes, and we would look to our colleagues to inform
13 us and certainly the liaison is good between us.

14 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Keith?

15 MR KEITH: Thank you, my Lady. Assistant Commissioner, to
16 use one example, as you rightly observe, the police may
17 not necessarily be required to attend an incident, it
18 all depends on the nature of the incident. But on the
19 morning of 7 July, it so happened that a sergeant in the
20 City of London Police -- Sergeant Kemp -- was able to
21 relay to the control room for City of London Police, and
22 it appeared on the CAD system, so it would have
23 appeared, of course, on your own CAD, that he had been
24 able to discover that the explosion was not a train
25 collision or some other form of derailment or something

1 of that order, but was, in fact, a bomb in the first
2 carriage of the Aldgate train.
3 That was at 9.10. Similarly, British Transport
4 Police received information, around about 9.15 or 9.20,
5 that there had been a bomb.
6 There is a general sense that that very important
7 piece of information -- which, of course, immediately
8 identified the incident as one concerning certainly --
9 probably terrorism as well as something that was likely
10 to engage the police at a very high level and require it
11 to produce extensive resources to deal with it -- wasn't
12 generally understood.
13 When you arrived, I think, in the GT room and you
14 were briefed by Superintendent Gomm, he may not even
15 have known, at that stage, what exactly had been relayed
16 by Sergeant Kemp who had actually been into the tunnel
17 at Aldgate and, although that was on the CAD system, so
18 it may have been brought to your attention, and it's
19 unrealistic for to you remember what exactly you were
20 told on that occasion, certainly the other emergency
21 services weren't aware of that very important point, not
22 least London Underground whose network it was.
23 Is it your experience that the system allows
24 important individual pieces of information -- such as
25 "It's a bomb" -- to filter through the overall

1 information structures to allow people in senior levels
2 of command to see instantly what the nature of the
3 incident is?

4 Putting it another way, there must be some danger of
5 very important pieces of information being filtered out
6 of the system by necessary virtue of the fact that, at
7 the very high levels, you cannot be expected to see
8 everything that is occurring at the bottom level?

9 A. No, sir, that's right. I am not sitting in front of
10 a computer screen reading every CAD message that comes
11 in. You know, the role is I will have a team of people
12 around who are passing and filtering pieces of
13 information.

14 I think the position we were in, certainly when
15 I turned up, you know, there had been initial reports --
16 and I'm aware the court's heard this -- about was this
17 a power surge to start with, or not, then there were
18 various people reporting various things that happened.
19 We didn't have confirmation of what it was. There were
20 various reports. But we regularly have reports of
21 something going off that then turns out to be something
22 else. We would regularly get a report of a bomb
23 explosion in a street and it turns out to be an
24 electricity substation has blown up and the metal
25 crate -- the metal thing across the top of it has come

1 off the -- off the pavement. So you get a range of
2 different reports coming in.
3 Certainly by the time I turned up, we were at the
4 stage where we were all looking at each other and I was
5 asking the questions, and others were. You know, "This
6 looks something more sinister than this, this is -- this
7 isn't consistent with what may have initially been said,
8 therefore" -- and of course, we have been doing training
9 exercises, we have been talking about this, we've been
10 training as a multi-agency group for some time for this.
11 So obviously it is within our mindset: is this the
12 terrorist attack on London that we never wanted to
13 happen?
14 But we didn't have confirmation at that particular
15 time.
16 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: A sergeant who has gone to the scene
17 and reports in that this was bomb, why isn't that
18 confirmation? We're not talking about a member of the
19 public. We're not talking about a rookie police officer
20 who has only been on the street for a week. We're
21 talking about a sergeant.
22 A. I accept, in relation to that, my Lady, you know,
23 there's -- we've got an expert who's been there, who's
24 taken a view and says that's a bomb.
25 Again, it's coming -- filtering through the system.

1 I'm not aware that we had exactly the same level of
2 information in relation to the other scenes at all.
3 But, you know, when we start to get what I would
4 describe as people who are more expert in those
5 particular scenarios, have been down there and seen it,
6 then that starts to add to the weight of this is what
7 we're dealing with.
8 But I suppose what I would say, my Lady, is, whether
9 this was a bomb -- whilst it was a bomb may make
10 a difference in the first two or three minutes to what
11 our emergency responders do, because our training is
12 just to make sure, step 1, 2, 3, think about -- once we
13 started to deal with it, whether it's a bomb or whether
14 it's a carriage derailment or whether it's a train
15 crash, our response is the same because we're going to
16 save people's lives.
17 So whether I was told that it was a bomb or whether
18 it was another form of major incident, the primary role
19 of the police service and the other emergency services
20 is still the same thing, which is to go there, initially
21 save lives, then discover what's exactly happened and
22 undertake an appropriate investigation.
23 And whilst it may be nice to know exactly what is
24 the root cause at the start, it doesn't actually stop
25 our people going and doing the things that they've been

1 trained to do and they naturally want to do, which is to
2 go and save people's lives.

3 MR KEITH: But in principle, Mr Allison, it is plainly
4 desirable that the senior command, in particular the
5 Gold Commander, does know that sort of vital piece of
6 information.

7 A. I fully accept that, sir.

8 Q. A power surge is a very long way from a bomb.

9 A. It is. Clearly we would like to have clarity about
10 exactly what we're dealing with, but until we get that
11 clarity, the response is generally we are still going to
12 send officers and staff from all the emergency services
13 to do what our job is, which is to save people's lives.

14 Q. A second aspect of the response on 7/7 concerns
15 London Underground, because they declared a Code Amber,
16 which meant that all the trains had to go to the nearest
17 available platform in order to try to release the
18 passengers from the Tube network and to ensure that the
19 numbers were reduced in the face of this incipient
20 emergency.

21 Subsequently, at around 9.40, they ordered an
22 evacuation of the entire network.

23 You arrived at the Special Operations Room around
24 about 9.30 having been told of the emergency by
25 Superintendent Gomm.

1 Do you recollect whether you had sufficient sight of
2 what the Underground network was doing? Was the
3 declaration of a Code Amber something that was brought
4 to your attention, do you recall, or was it, indeed,
5 a piece of information that you would have expected to
6 have been told?

7 It may be, because of the instinctive response of
8 police officers in the first few minutes, and perhaps
9 during the golden hour, that piece of information wasn't
10 as relevant as other pieces of information. But perhaps
11 you could help us on that.

12 A. I wasn't aware of being told of that particular piece of
13 information. My Lady, our focus was on what we were
14 dealing with at the time, which was a number of
15 different scenes and we weren't sure how many it was at
16 the moment.

17 Clearly, we worked closely with London Underground
18 Limited and there's great expertise there, and the fact
19 that, you know, Andy Barr was able to decamp the whole
20 of the London Underground system without recourse to
21 assistance from the emergency services by getting all
22 the trains into train stations was of great help to us.
23 Our biggest challenge potentially could have been,
24 while trying to deal with a number of different scenes,
25 then having to, in some way, all of us go and help with

1 people who were stuck in tunnels, because when that
2 happens, we inevitably get called to that as well and
3 that would have put a significant drain on us.

4 So great skill on behalf of London Underground
5 Limited to ensure that our resources could maintain
6 their focus on dealing with the scenes rather than
7 having to deal with something else.

8 Q. So it does appear, then, that that is a piece of
9 information or some aspect of the emergency that you
10 would expect to know of as Gold Commander?

11 A. It would be helpful, but in terms of my response and
12 what we're doing at the time, it is not mission
13 critical, sir.

14 Q. The Gold group meeting, which you chaired at 10.30, as
15 Gold, shows, in fact, that -- or rather you were told at
16 the meeting that London Underground had suspended all
17 services at 10.10. For my Lady's note, it's
18 INQ11045-94.

19 You will now be aware, of course, that that wasn't
20 quite right because there was a Code Amber at 9.14 and
21 the evacuation was ordered at 9.40.

22 You obviously know Mr Barr because of, no doubt,
23 your pan-London emergency planning. Were you a bit
24 surprised that there was no representative from
25 London Underground at that Gold meeting who might

1 perhaps have been able to correct that piece of
2 misinformation?

3 A. Yes, I was surprised. You know, there were, my Lady, 35
4 to 40 people in that -- in the suite, 281/282, which is
5 where we held the Gold meeting that morning. Certainly
6 I had asked my colleagues to ensure that we got
7 everybody we possibly could get to that Gold meeting.
8 The relevant agencies and people.

9 I was sure there was somebody there from Transport
10 for London -- forgive me, we don't have complete records
11 of exactly who attended -- and I suppose there were
12 people -- I don't know why there wasn't anybody there
13 from London Underground Limited. There was somebody
14 from there from British Transport Police, we were in the
15 room next to them, so I can't understand how the message
16 hadn't got through, and certainly I would have welcomed
17 them and wanted them there. But I've heard Andy Barr's
18 evidence, you know, that he didn't get invited or wasn't
19 aware of it, so ...

20 Q. The minutes, in fact, prepared by the Secretariat for
21 the Gold Coordinating Group, as well as the log prepared
22 by your own loggist, PS Forsyth, shows, in fact, that
23 there was a gentleman, Chris Edney, there from Transport
24 for London, but he, in fact, was concerned with
25 CentreComm, I think, and buses, rather than

1 London Underground Limited. So you're quite right,
2 there was no one there from London Underground Limited
3 itself.

4 Can I ask you about a third aspect, please, of the
5 response on the morning?

6 Some debate has taken place as to whether or not an
7 attack on the overground transport network might
8 reasonably have been anticipated following the
9 detonation of the bombs in the Underground. One of the
10 issues for my Lady is whether or not the decision should
11 have been taken after 8.50 to cease operations in the
12 central zone, at the very least, insofar as the buses
13 were concerned.

14 Is it the position that, as far as the
15 Metropolitan Police were concerned, there was neither
16 intelligence suggesting that attacks were going to take
17 place at all or, in any event, that, following what
18 turned out to be bomb explosions in the Underground,
19 there would be any attack at ground level or on a bus in
20 particular?

21 A. That's entirely correct, my Lady. One of the first
22 questions I asked when I got in to the Gold Suite, and
23 spoke to Roger Gomm, was "Was there any intelligence?",
24 and the answer was, "No, there wasn't any intelligence".
25 This was completely spontaneous, as far as we were

1 concerned as the responders on that day.

2 I think as everybody knows who lives and works in
3 London, the transport system is a very finely balanced
4 system and, when one part of it stops working, we rely
5 quite heavily on another part of it to move people
6 around.

7 There was no intelligence whatsoever that there was
8 going to be a further attack at that time and, given
9 that we know that, even if we had small elements of the
10 Tube system disrupted without a full evacuation of it,
11 we will have relied on the bus system to move those
12 people around.

13 We do this on a daily basis for other incidents that
14 occur, and so, as a result of that, there was no
15 justification in my mind whatsoever for suddenly saying,
16 "Well, let's call a halt to all public transport",
17 because we then were creating potentially other
18 challenges for ourselves with large numbers of people
19 displaced from a Tube system, creating other crowded
20 places elsewhere in the City, not able to get anywhere
21 where they needed to go to.

22 Q. Would it, in principle, in any event, have been
23 a decision for the Gold Coordinating Group, or could you
24 only have advised CentreComm that it was your collective
25 view that bus operation should cease?

1 A. Entirely correct, my Lady, it is the decision of the
2 operator about whether they operate their service or
3 not. But clearly, if I had any form of intelligence
4 that suggested something was about to happen, I would
5 immediately make contact with them and say, "I've got
6 some intelligence something's going to happen, I think
7 we ought to do something".

8 Whilst it's their decision, we would pass that
9 information. That morning, there was no intelligence.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Presumably, it's not just a question,
11 as you put it, of challenges when you've got a large
12 number of people on the streets of London with no means
13 of transport other than their own feet, you had the
14 potential for serious danger to those people.

15 A. Well, if we were doing it because we feared another
16 attack, my Lady, because people were all in one place,
17 all we were doing was potentially creating another
18 crowded place, which was on the street, where large
19 numbers of people would potentially be milling around,
20 you know, looking for the lone taxis that happened to be
21 around and, as a result, that in itself would create
22 a crowd.

23 So there were dangers. In any major incident, what
24 we want to do is try and get people away from it as
25 quickly as we possibly can to allow us to manage the

1 scene, allow people to go about their daily business.
2 Because, you know, there is a bit -- and this was
3 a tragic circumstance, I fully appreciate, but we still
4 have to try to make London operate, people still have to
5 go about their daily business as well. That's part and
6 parcel of our response. It's part and parcel of the
7 strategy that I put in place, which was about reassuring
8 London and then the return to the new normality.
9 So by cancelling or stopping the bus services, it
10 would have created further and additional problems for
11 us, when there was no, at that time, evidence, or even
12 a suggestion, about there was justification for doing
13 it.

14 Q. Even at 10.30, at the meeting of the strategic
15 coordination group, the group was awaiting or receiving
16 further details of the number of fatalities and the
17 number of injured at each of the sites. Is that right?

18 A. Entirely correct. Again, it is very challenging to get
19 exact information about what you've got at each of the
20 scenes, even an hour and a half after the first
21 incident. A number of people were putting reports in.
22 There is a danger that what you end up doing is putting
23 in double counts. So PC123 says "I've seen four
24 deceased people", and PC222 says "I've seen eight".
25 Well, we don't know if there are eight or four or

1 twelve, you know, there are big challenges in getting
2 the actual confirmed. So it does take time to get the
3 details.

4 Those were progressively coming through the three
5 agencies who were all reporting, and at that time, we
6 still weren't entirely sure that it was just four
7 scenes. I think that clarification probably I got at
8 about -- after the Gold group, probably about 11.15,
9 that sort of time, 11.30.

10 Q. There was still a debate as to whether or not there had
11 been another incident at Moorgate, was there not?

12 A. There was.

13 Q. My Lady has heard of the ghost train that was believed
14 to be in the tunnel between Aldgate East and Moorgate.
15 But that was still a possibility, even at the time of
16 the Gold meeting at 10.30?

17 A. Entirely true, sir, and in anything like this, as soon
18 as a major incident like this -- and especially if, you
19 know, you start having reports of explosions -- what we
20 find is everybody becomes extremely jumpy. So we end up
21 with large numbers of other reports being made to the
22 police service of something else having happened that we
23 have to respond to.

24 Thankfully, there weren't any other scenes, but, you
25 know, every bag left in a corner becomes a suspect

1 package, whereas, prior to that, it hasn't been, it goes
2 out of our psyche after a period of time.

3 Q. We can see that, can we not, from [INQ11045-68], please?

4 This is an extract from your loggist's notes made at the
5 time of the meeting, because we can see there that,
6 during the course of the meeting, or perhaps in the
7 run-up to the meeting, because these may have been
8 started just before the meeting, in relation to some
9 scenes you had received confirmation.

10 We can see there's a reference there to "confirmed",
11 insofar as Liverpool Street is concerned, and
12 Edgware Road, and reports are obviously still coming in
13 of large numbers of injured and possible fatalities,
14 whereas, by contrast, over the page [INQ11045-69], in relation to
15 Aldgate, City of London Police had been able to report,
16 in the middle of the page "Confirmed bomb at Aldgate".

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So that demonstrates, does it not,
19 Assistant Commissioner, how, in relation to some aspects
20 of the emergency, the information stream is a little bit
21 further ahead than in relation to others?

22 A. Entirely correct, my Lady.

23 Q. The meeting set out a strategy and was this a strategy
24 designed and advocated by you? Could we have
25 [INQ11045-95]? We can see it there at paragraph 3.1:

1 "To work with all emergency service partners to

2 preserve life and deal with casualties;

3 "Take steps to preserve evidence ...

4 "... reassure ... communities."

5 And:

6 "To return London to normality ..."

7 It might be asked -- perhaps you can help us with

8 this, Mr Allison -- why is this setting of such broad

9 strategic aims of benefit?

10 To the officers who are responding on the ground

11 with the emergency services, the responses are far more

12 instinctive, vital and humanitarian, perhaps. Why, in

13 general terms, is it necessary for a Gold Coordinating

14 Group to set such broad strategic aims?

15 A. I set them like this, so -- so if we imagine that

16 initial response is put in place by officers who, you

17 know, instinctively go and do their job, and when I say

18 "officers", you know, that's all three emergency

19 services, but following an event such as that, once

20 there is that initial chaos that we have to deal with,

21 and we create order out of that chaos -- and it sets it

22 out in the LESLP manual -- I describe it: we move from

23 crisis management into consequence management and then

24 consequence management into recovery. I think it's the

25 initial response and consolidation phase is how it's

1 said in LESLP.

2 The strategy is set to ensure that all agencies
3 understand the broadbrush of what we're trying to
4 achieve throughout the period. So there's a recognition
5 that, in the first stages, the first thing we're going
6 to be doing is saving people's lives and that probably
7 comes -- that does come above everything else.

8 If that means we have to lose a little bit of
9 evidence, but I've saved somebody's life, then I'm going
10 to save somebody's life. But it then sets out, in
11 effect, a broad strategic framework about what we are
12 doing.

13 Now, there are those who would advocate we should
14 write, you know, streams and streams about all of our
15 strategic intent, line by line by line, you know, many
16 pages about exactly what we're going to do, when and
17 where. The reality was -- and I think it's included in
18 the bundle, you see my original writing of this
19 strategy, I wrote this together with a tactical adviser
20 and with Roger Gomm and just penned out something very
21 quickly before the Gold Group that I felt that we could
22 all work to as the emergency services, keep it simple so
23 that everybody could understand it, it set out the broad
24 parameters of what we were trying to achieve, but then
25 gave it some longevity because there was a recognition

1 that this wasn't going to be done and dusted within two
2 hours.

3 Clearly, following the initial response, then there
4 was the investigation phase and then the return to
5 normality phase.

6 Q. So the strategic aims served to operate over the coming
7 days and, indeed, weeks --

8 A. They did.

9 Q. -- and months, in relation to the investigation?

10 A. They did, and they were constantly reviewed to make sure
11 they were still fit for purpose. So at each of the Gold
12 meetings that subsequently occurred, we would take
13 a look at them to make sure they were fit for purpose.

14 MR KEITH: I will draw the line there,
15 Assistant Commissioner, because although there were
16 a number of meetings thereafter, during the rest of the
17 day and in the days and weeks that followed, they bore
18 no relation to the immediate events insofar as the
19 deceased, who are at the heart of these proceedings, are
20 concerned. So those are all the questions I have for
21 you, thank you very much.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

23 Questions by MR COLTART

24 MR COLTART: Just one short topic, Assistant Commissioner,
25 if I may.

1 We know from the documents which have been disclosed
2 to us in these proceedings, and indeed which are in the
3 public domain, that on 1 and 2 July 2005,
4 Metropolitan Police officers from your
5 Anti-terrorist Branch conducted a table-top training
6 exercise which had at its core an attack on the
7 London Underground.

8 Were you aware of that or --

9 A. I am now aware of it, sir. It is one of the regular, as
10 I understand it, Hanover series of multi-agency
11 exercises, first pushed by Dave Veness, who was the
12 Assistant Commissioner in charge of anti-terrorism many
13 years ago, which gets major agencies together to discuss
14 how we would collectively respond and it's part of, in
15 the presentations I've given about 7/7, that extensive
16 training programme which I think stood us in extremely
17 good stead on 7 July. All the people responding knew
18 each other, trusted each other, there were plans in
19 place that we'd exercised and we knew whether they were
20 going to work or not.

21 When I sat in that Gold room, I wasn't asking people
22 to introduce themselves and where they were from to me.
23 They were people who were friends of mine from different
24 organisations. I'd worked with them, I'd trained with
25 them, I knew what they did, I trusted them, they trusted

1 me, we had a shared vision of what we had to achieve and
2 that Hanover exercise was one of those many events that
3 we put in place to try to develop that, in effect, team,
4 and, you know, what occurred, the response that was put
5 in place on 7 July, and I think, you know, the way in
6 which we managed to coordinate that response very
7 quickly, was not because of one individual or one
8 organisation, it was because a group of people from
9 a group of organisations recognised what their roles and
10 responsibilities were and came together to achieve it,
11 and the Hanover exercise, those were the things that
12 helped deliver that.

13 Q. Thank you for that. The exercise itself, as
14 I understand it, envisaged simultaneous bomb attacks on
15 trains, Waterloo, embankment and St James's Underground
16 stations.

17 Again, so there's absolute clarity about this, this
18 was nothing more than a coincidence, there was no
19 intelligence to suggest that attacks of that nature were
20 about to take place?

21 A. That's entirely correct, sir. In fact, what I've been
22 told is that the detective chief superintendent who
23 actually set the scenario, or asked for that scenario,
24 did it because he wanted to create a situation where his
25 detectives could not potentially get to work. So create

1 a scenario whereby what would happen then, if some key
2 people couldn't get to work to respond. So it was not
3 on the basis of any intelligence whatsoever.

4 Q. Thank you. But the short point really is this, isn't
5 it: that this was the second training exercise within
6 a period of two years that had had at its core an attack
7 on the Underground system?

8 My Lady's received evidence already about
9 Operation Osiris which took place in September 2003.

10 So is it safe for us to assume that, in 2005, the
11 possibility of an attack on the Underground was within
12 the very real contemplation of the Metropolitan Police
13 and the other police and emergency authorities?

14 A. Yes, sir, I mean, what I would say is our view was there
15 was a potential for an attack anywhere, and the
16 Underground was one of those places where they could
17 attack, and we'd done a number of exercises, looking at
18 a number of different possibilities, as we tried to hone
19 and prepare our response following the events of 9/11.

20 How could we make sure the capital was capable of
21 dealing with anything that was likely to be thrown at
22 it? This was one potential attack area, but clearly
23 there were other attack areas that individuals could
24 have used.

25 Q. Of course, and the attack could have come at an airport,

1 could have been in an office building, but the
2 Underground was perceived as being one of the realistic
3 possibilities as being the focus of an attack of that
4 nature?

5 A. It's one of the many possibilities, sadly, sir.

6 Q. Equally, it was envisaged that in the event of an attack
7 of that nature, the Metropolitan Police officers would
8 play their part in the subsequent operation?

9 A. Yes, clearly, sir, anything that happens in the capital
10 the Metropolitan Police will be -- we police the vast
11 majority of it, we work closely with our colleagues in
12 British Transport Police, and the City of London, and if
13 anything happened in their force areas, we're not going
14 to step back and say "Well, this is down to you". We'll
15 clearly -- you know, the police service works -- the
16 name on the bottom of the cap badge is the "police
17 service". Benbow has taught us to work together, our
18 cops, who will respond to anything, wherever it is.

19 Q. Exactly. So although there may be, in everyday life,
20 important jurisdictional differences between the
21 different branches of the police forces in London, in
22 the event of an incident like this, it's all hands to
23 the pump?

24 A. Entirely correct, my Lady.

25 MR COLTART: Thank you.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders?
2 Questions by MR SAUNDERS
3 MR SAUNDERS: Mr Allison, may I ask you to go back, please,
4 to an answer you gave to her Ladyship earlier this
5 morning. My Lady, it's at your page 39. You said this,
6 Mr Allison:
7 "Answer: What I suppose I would say, my Lady, is,
8 whether this was a bomb -- whilst it was a bomb may make
9 a difference in the first two or three minutes ..."
10 May I simply ask you to think on that answer? You
11 go on then to add to it. Her Ladyship has heard
12 evidence that, in respect of Tavistock Square, which of
13 course comes an hour later than the three initial
14 devices, what happens is that there is a real concern,
15 and an obvious concern, of secondary devices, and so
16 what happens is that cordons are put in place and some
17 people -- in fact, from the emergency services -- were
18 unable to cross the cordons. All right?
19 So does it not then, thinking of that point, affect
20 what happens, if there is a bomb, because the obvious
21 concern that your colleagues, your police officers will
22 have, is of secondary devices, and why it may be
23 necessary, in that particular situation, to, in fact,
24 have that information relayed to you and obviously back
25 through the Command structure?

1 A. What I would say, sir, is it doesn't need to come all
2 the way to me. I fully accept that the more information
3 anybody in command has, the better it is. But there are
4 some basic prompts that occur anyway for the officers on
5 the ground.

6 So this is about directing officers on the ground
7 about the things that they should think about or should
8 do. There are automatic prompts that come up on the CAD
9 system. If there is a report of a bomb or an explosion
10 or a device, there's an automatic prompt that comes up
11 which says things like "Think secondary devices", "Think
12 rendezvous points", and that's the role of the
13 communication officers who are talking with officers on
14 the front scene, to prompt them as appropriately.

15 So that doesn't necessarily need to come to me
16 because that activity is programmed into our systems, in
17 recognition that, in the first response, quite often
18 those in command are not there. Those who are first
19 responding are part of the normal day shift, who will go
20 to a scene of something and we need to put some
21 appropriate protection and warning around them, and one
22 of the ways we do it is through the CAD system.

23 Q. Hence why the questions you were asked earlier about, if
24 one experienced officer has information, ie confirmation
25 that there's a bomb, it's important that that is

1 disseminated to those who are at the scene?

2 A. Yes, it helps, but I suppose I would go back to the
3 position, sir, you know, our basic role in all of these
4 is to save lives, and that's what police officers will
5 do.

6 The view about thinking about secondary devices is:
7 yes, we need to think about it and, you know, take
8 a quick look, but clearly what we don't want to do is
9 that really stall our response, because our primary goal
10 is to do whatever we can to save people's lives.

11 MR SAUNDERS: Thank you very much, Mr Allison. Thank you,
12 my Lady.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Ms Boyd?

14 Questions by MS BOYD

15 MS BOYD: Assistant Commissioner, may I just ask you about
16 the communication between the London Fire Brigade and
17 the police to assist my Lady?

18 I don't know if we can have on screen LFB23, please.

19 This is the MOBIS report generated by the London
20 Fire Brigade in relation to the Aldgate incident, and if
21 we can go to page 2 [LFB23-2], first of all, we can see there,
22 bottom of the page, the initial call-out. In fact,
23 I think that was from the Met Police.

24 If we go to page 3 [LFB23-3], we can see a number of action
25 plans, and if we zoom in on 09.04.51, we can see "inform

1 City Police", in fact two entries above that "inform
2 police" at 09.03, and then, 09.04.51 "inform
3 City Police". Then 09.05.19 is the incoming message
4 from Sub-Officer Clarke who was on the scene and he
5 instigates a major incident procedure.

6 If we go over to page 4 [LFB23-4], and if we can look at the
7 entry at 09.11.05, "inform police ... police informed
8 MIP".

9 I think if we look at page 5 [LFB23-5], 09.15, there's
10 a further informative message from Sub-Officer Clarke as
11 to what he's found on the train, and then 09.24
12 following various other action plans and other people
13 informed, we've got "inform City Police".

14 So does that accord with your understanding of the
15 communication between the London Fire Brigade and the
16 police, that it's done by a number of calls from the
17 Brigade Control?

18 A. Forgive me, my Lady, this is the first time I've seen
19 this form. I'm not au fait with it, and certainly this
20 relates clearly to information going to my colleagues in
21 the City who were dealing with this --

22 Q. Indeed. I wasn't suggesting it was coming to you
23 personally.

24 A. I'm entirely -- if that's what they've said, they've
25 clearly passed those informations, they've got the same

1 CAD and the City Police have been updating the same CAD
2 with the information that's been provided to them. So
3 I'm not quite sure, my Lady, how I can assist further.

4 Q. No, I'm sorry, Assistant Commissioner, I was really
5 trying to assist her Ladyship.

6 It confirms what you told us, that there is a flow
7 of information from the London Fire Brigade to the
8 police. Sorry, I should have made it clear, I wasn't
9 suggesting it was all coming to you direct. I was
10 merely trying to assist the court and to demonstrate
11 that what you told us was correct, that the London Fire
12 Brigade don't have access to your CAD, but what they're
13 doing is -- there's a flow of information by telephone
14 calls between Brigade Control operators and the police,
15 whether it's the City Police or the Metropolitan Police.

16 A. Thank you, that's correct, my Lady, and as I say, that
17 CAD we have access to because it's the same system, the
18 City Police CAD system, and the Met Police's CAD system
19 is the same.

20 MS BOYD: Sorry for any misunderstanding, Commissioner,
21 thank you.

22 MR WATSON: My Lady, may I intrude on behalf of the London
23 Ambulance Service and ask you questions on the same
24 topic?

25 Questions by MR WATSON

1 MR WATSON: Firstly, may I ask you, Assistant Commissioner,
2 about the "now" situation. We've confirmed that the CAD
3 system that your force uses in conjunction, if I can
4 call it like that, with the City Police and the BTP,
5 that system is not integrated with the Ambulance
6 Service, for example?

7 A. As I understand it -- and again, my Lady, forgive me,
8 I'm not expert in the telecoms piece -- there is an
9 interface between the London Ambulance Service system
10 and the CAD system which allows us to pass messages to
11 each other, but that doesn't mean that we can read each
12 other's systems, but we can pass messages, as
13 I understand it.

14 Q. Thank you. Indeed, on a routine basis, you wouldn't
15 wish to review each other's logs, of course?

16 A. I think both organisations, my Lady, are busy enough, we
17 don't need to see what other people are dealing with.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Does this interface allow messages to
19 pop up on the CAD, or is it a separate --

20 A. As I understand it, it passes it through so it pops up
21 on the CAD and, when we pass something through, it pops
22 up on theirs.

23 MR WATSON: So when an incident arises, you can post or send
24 a message which will appear on their CAD system?

25 A. On -- as I understand it, my Lady, yes. We pass

1 something through and it pops up.

2 Q. In any event, just to digress a moment, one has now the
3 facility of Airwave direct communication anyway?

4 A. We do. So we've got the hailing channel and obviously
5 we've got in place the procedures at a Command level to
6 start sharing information.

7 But I think -- as I'm aware, the evidence was given
8 yesterday -- and this is a firm view of all of us in
9 command of all three organisations -- we do not want
10 a position where all of our first responders are working
11 on the same channel because that creates us all sorts of
12 problems.

13 Q. No.

14 A. We see great value in the Command being able to talk to
15 each other, and that's what we put in place, but it's
16 not a first responder issue.

17 Q. Coming back from that digression to Airwave, to the CAD
18 system, when the GT room is open today, then the LAS
19 representative will be invited in?

20 A. Exactly correct. If it's appropriate, there are some
21 events where we may not have an LAS representative.

22 Q. I'll come to that. But, now, that representative will
23 have their own dedicated desk, for want of a better
24 word, with the ability to see on screen, side by side
25 the police CAD system and, indeed, the LAS CAD system?

1 A. Yes, the -- when we invite colleagues in from the other
2 services, my Lady, they have access to our system in GT.
3 So they have "reach back" to their own system, they also
4 have access to the Met Ops system, which is the one that
5 we use for major incidents, which is beyond CAD, and
6 they can access and read what's there and input stuff on
7 to it.

8 Q. So although not integrated in the technical sense now,
9 once that representative takes up their position, that
10 individual can feed across, interchangeably --

11 A. Entirely correct.

12 Q. -- information?

13 A. A key part of our major incident practice is, when GT is
14 operating, we have liaison officers from appropriate
15 organisations in there so that we can make sure that we
16 are integrating our operations.

17 Q. All right. Now, can I change to, then, 2005, the
18 previous questions being the present position?

19 Going back to 2005, you've told my Lady that the GT
20 operations room was open, but open in order to monitor
21 a police operation to do with G8?

22 A. Yes, and at that time there will not have been other
23 liaison officers on duty in GT, my Lady, in the initial
24 stages.

25 Q. Thank you.

1 A. Clearly, that would have happened later.

2 Q. So you would confirm that, because that was a policing
3 operation rather than an incident, there wouldn't have
4 been an LAS representative there?

5 A. Not in the first place, my Lady, no.

6 Q. So that LAS representative would have been called for,
7 presumably, some time in the setting up of GT, then, for
8 the incident which you've told my Lady was at about
9 9.40?

10 A. Yes, in fact, probably earlier than that, my Lady. As
11 soon as we'd identified that we were going to mobilise
12 it for the incident, the message will have been put
13 around our various colleagues. We would have got
14 a message. It was John Pooley, a friend and colleague
15 from London Ambulance Service, who came. John will have
16 been told that we were going to run it as a Gold, and
17 John would have made sure the appropriate liaison
18 officers were mobilised.

19 Q. When the liaison officer or officers arrived, he or she
20 then, in 2005, would have had the same ability to view
21 the MPS, the Met Police CAD system as a liaison officer
22 from your ops room?

23 A. They would have been viewing the Met Ops system, sir,
24 but that's linked to the CAD system. People pass the
25 messages across.

1 Q. But the difference is, firstly, they wouldn't have been
2 able then to view the London Ambulance Service CAD
3 system directly from the ops room?

4 A. I'm not sure what LAS people can do from their ops room.

5 Q. Then, not now. Then.

6 A. Then. I'm not sure whether they were able to plug in
7 their own computer and do "reach back" or whether they
8 had -- forgive me, I don't know that.

9 Q. We'll deal with that later, but do you confirm that then
10 the means of communication back to Ambulance Control
11 would not have been by a direct posting of messages, CAD
12 to CAD, but would have relied upon the ordinary radio
13 and telephone systems?

14 A. I can't -- I'm not exactly sure how it happened,
15 my Lady, but I do know the whole purpose of having those
16 liaison officers there is to ensure that we've got that
17 liaison, so that liaison officer would act as the link.
18 The method by which they passed information to their
19 host organisation, forgive me, I'm not an expert on.

20 MR WATSON: So be it, that's as far as I can take it, thank
21 you.

22 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you, Mr Watson. Mr Hill?

23 Questions by MR HILL

24 MR HILL: Ultimately, Mr Allison, the London Command
25 structure -- Gold, Silver, Bronze -- of which you were

1 the pan-London Gold Commander is not -- and I ask this
2 with an eye to Mr Saunders' question -- ultimately
3 concerned with the very first response to the incidents
4 that occur around London and, indeed, occurred on the
5 day in question, is it?

6 A. No, that's entirely correct, my Lady. That initial
7 response gets put in place because, in the first stages
8 of any incident, we're not quite sure what we're dealing
9 with. As soon as we identify it is more serious than
10 a local borough can cope with, then we would like to --
11 we would endeavour to put a Command structure over the
12 top of it. But it's very rare that a Command structure
13 is sitting there, ready and available to go
14 instantaneously we have a major incident. It always
15 lags behind.

16 Q. Yes. That said, there is an escalation from borough
17 CAD-based communication to central communications, for
18 which the chief inspector was Mr Sadowski, and then to
19 GT in central ops, which is in place systemically, can
20 be invoked at speed and, as we saw, was invoked at
21 speed, that escalation through two stages, ultimately
22 arriving at you, as Gold for London, in the course of
23 the first hour after the Underground explosions.

24 A. That's correct, my Lady. Though the second escalation
25 again only happened as quickly as it did because we

1 happened to have a policing operation in place, GT open,
2 which meant we could in effect bolt it on to an existing
3 Command structure.

4 Q. Thank you. Now, as to CAD systems then, in July 2005,
5 can I just add one or two questions on the topic because
6 you've just been asked about it?

7 The way you expressed the level of access that the
8 London Ambulance Service had -- we find it for my Lady's
9 note in paragraph 18 of your statement, INQ11045.
10 At the end of that paragraph, your expression was
11 this:

12 "The LAS also has some access to the CAD system
13 which allows their members to pass requests for medical
14 assistance within CAD messages which have already been
15 created."

16 So that's the situation that was in force, nothing
17 to do with Airwave; that's use of the CAD by way of
18 pop-ups, as it was just described, on police CAD
19 messages?

20 A. That is as I understand it and as I have been briefed,
21 my Lady. As I say, I'm not an expert in it, but that's
22 what I'm told was in place in 2005.

23 Q. For my Lady's note, we have many examples of that, but
24 one that might be apposite -- I'm not going to suggest
25 Trial Director, because I don't suppose it's there, but

1 it's a document we saw when the evidence for
2 King's Cross was current, INQ10111 [INQ10111-1], which is
3 Metropolitan Police borough CAD number 2376, contains
4 incoming messages, or, I should say, communication
5 between the Metropolitan Police and the British
6 Transport Police at 09.00.37, and on the point you've
7 just been asked about this morning, a message from
8 London Ambulance Service at 09.17.01. Examples,
9 I suggest, of the use of this pop-up facility.
10 Oh, well, I'm extremely impressed by the gentleman
11 operating Trial Director that the document's there.
12 I wouldn't have dared ask. We do have in this CAD at
13 09.17.01, middle of the screen, on 7 July, a message
14 from the London Ambulance Service.
15 So this is a Metropolitan Police borough CAD and the
16 pop-up facility's been used, indicating, as you said at
17 paragraph 18 of your statement, that the London
18 Ambulance Service had then some facility in the CAD
19 system.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Right. Thank you. In your statement, just to stick for
22 a moment with CAD communications --
23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm sorry, Mr Hill.
24 MR HILL: I'm sorry?
25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I'm not sure that I'm receiving

1 consistent evidence. I'm not blaming Assistant
2 Commissioner Allison, because he's repeatedly said this
3 isn't his field.

4 MR HILL: No.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I think I've received answers that
6 indicate there was posting in 2005 and there wasn't
7 direct posting in 2005.

8 May I suggest that you leave Mr Allison out of this
9 and that somebody resolves the situation because,
10 otherwise, I'm just getting confused.

11 MR HILL: Yes, by all means. I only go there because --

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It was a hare I started running. I'd
13 quite like to know what the answer is, but I don't think
14 Mr Allison is the right person to ask.

15 MR HILL: I take it no further. That's the best suggestion
16 we can make building on the content of Mr Allison's own
17 statement.

18 Now, something else that touches on a different
19 topic, but in fact is CAD-related, is to be found at
20 paragraph 27 in your statement, and this concerns
21 communication, in fact using the CAD system in relation
22 to Underground services and the shutting of Underground
23 stations.

24 In your statement, you put it this way:

25 "I understand that the decision to evacuate

1 London Underground stations had been taken [had already
2 been taken] and this is confirmed in a CAD which states
3 at 09.28.45: 'Information from manager at Bakerloo Line
4 QE [Queen Elizabeth] Road. All Underground stations
5 being shut'."

6 So what you were recounting there is that your
7 Silver Commander, Superintendent Gomm, asked a message
8 should be sent to British Transport Police asking them
9 to consider closing London Transport stations, but in
10 fact, via incoming CAD messages, we've been able to
11 establish that at 09.28 there was information coming in
12 as to the shutting of those stations.

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. The INQ reference for my Lady's note is INQ10113. That
15 is all I'm going to ask about CADs.

16 Now, turning to Mr Coltart's questions in relation
17 to what I think you might call Command band seminars,
18 but which have been referred to as Hanover exercises
19 a few minutes ago, you've established that there was
20 absolutely no prior intelligence to suggest the
21 imminence of attacks in London, still less on the
22 Underground system, on 7 July 2005. But in fact,
23 Command band seminars had commenced as early as 1996
24 following the Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway
25 system, and it was part of the institutional thinking of

1 the Metropolitan Police to test its infrastructure and
2 to prepare in every means possible, and there were
3 a sequence of desktop exercises of which the ones
4 Mr Coltart referred to on 1 and 2 July was, as it were,
5 the most recent example.

6 A. That's entirely correct, my Lady. Actually, I started
7 going on some of those seminars in 1996 on my promotion
8 to chief inspector. The initial seminars were run by
9 Public Order Branch C011 by the Chief Superintendent
10 Mike Davies, and then, subsequently to the 9/11 attacks,
11 they were taken over by Specialist Operations, and we
12 ended up with, in effect, two sets of Command band
13 training.

14 There were ones that were looking at major incidents
15 generally in London delivered by C011 and there were the
16 Hanover weekends -- they were called the Hanover
17 weekends -- where we would go down on a Friday evening
18 and spend Friday evening, Saturday and Sunday, in the
19 initial stages, going through the scenarios,
20 multi-agency, looking at what we would do, and that
21 helped, as I say, to bring the team of people together
22 from different organisations that would respond.

23 Q. In fact, just to add one layer of detail to this, the
24 exercise, in the very early days of July 2005, was
25 directed at the reliance on the physical building of

1 New Scotland Yard by the Metropolitan Police, and an
2 exercise was conducted around the need for the use of
3 vehicles and other facilities, rendezvous points and the
4 like, to ensure that, in the case of a major incident,
5 officers were able to get to the scene to travel in to
6 London, if it were a Central London attack.

7 A. That's right, sir.

8 Q. Evidence was given about that exercise to the
9 Intelligence and Security Committee, and for my Lady's
10 note, the ISC report number 2, at paragraph 226,
11 recounts the fact that there was, by coincidence, this
12 2005 exercise.

13 In fact, there was a relevance to Scotland Yard, as
14 you've already told us, in the setting up of the
15 Strategic Command Centre, the SCC in Hendon, because of
16 the unknown question of whether Scotland Yard itself
17 might still come under attack or have come under attack
18 later on on the morning or afternoon of 7 July?

19 A. That's entirely correct, my Lady. Part of the rationale
20 and the decision-making at that Gold group was we didn't
21 know what was subsequently going to happen, and,
22 therefore, if there was going to be any further
23 disruption and potentially take out any buildings in
24 Central London or major access routes in Central London,
25 it was precautionary and sensible for us to create the

1 SCC at Hendon and move people up there.

2 Q. Can I just come, briefly and finally, to this? It's
3 been touched on but not in any detail through you. It's
4 the exercise known as Osiris 2, in 2003, which was an
5 Underground-based exercise on which the City of London
6 Police reported, and COLP183 is the document that we saw
7 on screen yesterday.

8 The charge that was being laid, Mr Allison -- I ask
9 you this as a very senior officer within the
10 Metropolitan Police -- is that nothing was done between
11 2003 and 2005 to implement a system of communication for
12 Metropolitan Police officers sub-surface, underground,
13 and the implication was that more should have been done.
14 Now, knowing, as you do, that
15 Chief Inspector Strother has given evidence about this,
16 knowing, also, as you do, that Commander Broadhurst
17 follows you and is an expert in many aspects of Command
18 and Control, but being an Assistant Commissioner
19 yourself, do you accept the charge that the
20 Metropolitan Police did nothing, in the sense of rolling
21 out and preparing to roll out what became the Airwave
22 communication system between 2003 and 2005?

23 A. No, sir, I don't accept that charge at all. Clearly, it
24 was an issue that was raised. We had a major programme
25 of change going on in the organisation, and, as you say,

1 Commander Broadhurst is an expert because he was the
2 senior user on the C3I project, but this was about
3 changing our Command and Control processes, moving from
4 32 boroughs into three Command and Control centres, and
5 at the same time changing the technology and the radio
6 system.

7 We knew that the new radio system coming along was
8 going to give us extra capabilities, it was part of the
9 national rollout, and, therefore, what we had in place
10 was a system coming, we had some work procedures, SOPs,
11 that I know were presented yesterday, that outlined how
12 we would work in the Underground system anyway, and
13 I suppose it's probably important to put this in
14 context, I know a search has been done recently and it
15 is comparable, I am told, to 2005, but on an average day
16 we have about 15,000 CAD messages, calls to deal with in
17 London, and on an average day, seven of them relate to
18 the Underground system, and not all of those are deep
19 Underground systems, some of them can be surface. So
20 it's not a great deal.

21 So we knew we had something coming, we had
22 a Standard Operating Procedure which enabled us still to
23 operate in and around those Tube systems. If we were to
24 try to put in any interim solution, that interim
25 solution had to apply across the organisation, we

1 couldn't just get it to one or two people because there
2 are a large number of Tube stations and anybody could be
3 called to them. So we would have to roll the whole
4 system out to the whole organisation, which would have
5 been a new radio system, which would have cost many
6 millions of pounds, would have required the same
7 development work as we were doing with Airwave.
8 So there wasn't an interim solution to put in, and
9 it was not appropriate for us to bring in Airwave any
10 earlier than it was already being rolled out because of
11 the major change programme.

12 MR HILL: Thank you. Yes, that's all I ask.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much,
14 Assistant Commissioner Allison. I think you are the
15 most senior Metropolitan Police Service officer from
16 whom I'm going to hear?

17 A. I believe so, my Lady.

18 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: In which case, may I echo Mr Keith's
19 comments praising the efforts of your officers who
20 responded. Many of them have not been required to give
21 evidence, and I haven't, therefore, been able to thank
22 them personally, so may I, through you, express my
23 gratitude?

24 May I also express my gratitude on behalf of all of
25 us for the significant amount of resources the

1 Metropolitan Police has dedicated to assisting this
2 investigation? I know that Mr Hill has received
3 considerable assistance from a large number of your
4 officers, and I know that it must have impacted upon the
5 Metropolitan Police Service. All I can say is that I am
6 sure we are all extremely grateful to you.

7 A. Thank you, my Lady.

8 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you. Break.

9 (11.38 am)

10 (A short break)

11 (11.53 am)

12 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

13 MR COLTART: My Lady, just before the next witness is
14 called, can I just clarify something with the court?

15 It's a matter which Mr Hill and I have discussed over
16 the course of the break.

17 Mr Hill suggested to the last witness that the
18 charge, as he describes it, that was laid at the door of
19 Chief Inspector Strother yesterday was that nothing was
20 done by the Metropolitan Police between 2003 and 2005 to
21 implement a system of underground communication and that
22 more should have been done, but my recollection, I must
23 say, of the way in which I dealt with this through the
24 chief inspector was that, following the pulling of the
25 plug, in June 2004, by the contractor who was supposed

1 to be putting in place those systems for the
2 Metropolitan Police, it was at that stage that the
3 Metropolitan Police ought, perhaps, to have sought
4 a "quick win" or interim solution or however one
5 describes it, and it wasn't suggested to him that there
6 was nothing being done at all by the Metropolitan Police
7 during the course of that two-year period.
8 I only raise it now so that we don't have to get
9 bogged down in this issue further with additional
10 witnesses. It's been traversed in some detail already.
11 But I thought it important that the record be put
12 straight.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Well, you began by introducing the
14 subject 2003 to 2005. Mr Strother then said he only
15 came on the scene in 2004 and the contract was in place
16 until June 2004. You then, as it were, went down the
17 path of: very well, if the plug was pulled on the
18 contract in June 2004, it was clear it was going to take
19 some time to introduce the facility, what do you know of
20 what happened in the meantime? And he said "I don't
21 know", yes?

22 MR COLTART: Yes, thank you.

23 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

24 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite you to call
25 Commander Broadhurst, please?

1 COMMANDER ROBERT BROADHURST (sworn)

2 Questions by MR KEITH

3 A. Robert Broadhurst, Commander, Metropolitan Police
4 Service.

5 MR KEITH: Commander, you have many years' experience in the
6 Metropolitan Police Service at senior levels. You were
7 appointed to the role of Borough Commander of Sutton
8 police borough in March 1997. Is that right?

9 A. That's correct, my Lady.

10 Q. Then, in January 2002, did you become the link Commander
11 for south-east London?

12 A. That's correct, my Lady. I had responsibility for the
13 eight boroughs of south-east London.

14 Q. Then, in July 2006, so after the events in question,
15 were you appointed Commander for Public Order and
16 Pan-London Operational Support?

17 A. I was indeed, my Lady, and the responsibilities there
18 were not just public order and all events policing, but
19 pertinent to this court, I oversee the emergency
20 planning and emergency response side of the
21 Metropolitan Police.

22 Q. Is part of your function to ensure that, at all times,
23 the emergency response systems, which the
24 Metropolitan Police operate, do what they're expected to
25 do -- in other words, are effective?

1 A. I have responsibility, my Lady, for the wider processes
2 and the police response to that. I don't have the
3 specific responsibility for the IT systems, CAD,
4 Airwave, et cetera. That sits with my colleagues in
5 another department. But the policing response, the
6 Command and Control structures, the processes, and the
7 responses you've been talking about, yes, they do sit
8 under me.

9 Q. Assistant Commissioner Allison has pointed the finger of
10 Command responsibility at you, Commander, by describing
11 you as expert in this area, so I'm going to ask you, if
12 I may, to help us a little bit with, firstly, the
13 overall changes that were wrought to the communications
14 system operated by the Metropolitan Police between 2005
15 and now.

16 We know, of course, that in July 2005,
17 Borough Commands -- in particular, including your own or
18 those for which you had responsibility as link
19 Commander -- operated their own radio systems or
20 communication systems, and Scotland Yard also had its
21 own systems, and that there was a process whereby
22 matters could be elevated above Borough Command to
23 Scotland Yard if the exigencies of the situation
24 demanded it?

25 A. That's correct, my Lady.

1 Q. What is the position now insofar as the location and the
2 number of communication systems?

3 A. The situation now -- in 2005 we were in a state of flux,
4 a state of changing from having 32 boroughs each with
5 their own control room, each autonomous in that sense
6 and, as you say, working through to New Scotland Yard.
7 Changing that to three Command and Control systems, or
8 centres, rather, based at Lambeth, Bow and Hendon and,
9 as you've probably heard, during 2005, six boroughs, two
10 at each of those three centres, were then operating
11 under the new process.

12 What essentially we were doing was a large scale
13 change process of going from 32 to 3, very much a people
14 process, because some of the staff, who worked at
15 a borough or local environment, had to move to one of
16 the new three centres. Clearly, along with that, some
17 of the process changed, and alongside that, but
18 a separate part of it, was also the introduction of
19 Airwave.

20 So the rolled introduction of Airwave married up to
21 the change from a borough control room going through to
22 a central control room, and, for a number of years,
23 between 2005 until, I think, early 2008, some boroughs
24 were carrying the two radio systems in parallel, until
25 now, of course, we are now all under the Airwave system,

1 running from those three centres, three Command and
2 Control centres, and then a separate system, should we
3 need to put it into place, for major incidents or
4 events.

5 Q. Assistant Commissioner Allison has spoken of the reality
6 of the position, how, in the immediate aftermath of an
7 incident, the primary focus is on assimilating
8 information, trying to save lives, if lives are at risk,
9 trying to find out what has happened, before the Command
10 structure can become fully engaged, because it needs
11 a confirmed or clear picture of what the position on the
12 ground is.

13 A. That's absolutely correct. There will always be
14 a Command structure. Initially, with the first
15 responder, it may well be the local inspector who takes
16 the role of Silver. The chief inspector back at the
17 information room will have overall sight of that. We
18 have oncall arrangements then, as we begin to cascade it
19 above that, if a borough says we can't cope or the chief
20 inspector says we can't cope. We then bring in an
21 oncall senior officer who will take the position of
22 Gold. He or she will make a decision, "Can we manage
23 this from the command centre or do I need to open the
24 Special Operations Room?"
25 If we do need to open the Special Operations Room,

1 it probably takes a minimum of an hour to start to get
2 that set up.

3 Q. On the morning of 7 July, as we've heard, because of the
4 policing operations surrounding G8 so far as the
5 Metropolitan Police were concerned, the GT
6 Special Operations Room was already up and running --

7 A. Indeed.

8 Q. -- and so there was a seamless transfer to the
9 communications and the decisions required for the
10 purposes of responding to 7 July.

11 If the GT room, the Special Operations Room, had not
12 been manned, already manned, do we take it, then, there
13 would have been quite a bit of time elapsing before it
14 would have been fully staffed and before it could have
15 fully responded to the information then coming in?

16 A. I think our experience, my Lady, is that's at least an
17 hour. Essentially, you're dealing with an empty control
18 room. You have to find the staff to come in, start the
19 systems up, start to get the systems running, start to
20 make the connections, open up various radio channels,
21 and then start to switch officers on the ground who have
22 been working on their local borough radio channels,
23 which may, as we've already heard, be more than one,
24 possibly half a dozen or more. To get those on to
25 Commander channel systems, we then need to start to

1 bring in additional Commanders, so that the
2 Gold Commander -- we were lucky on the day that
3 Mr Allison, as we've heard, was there, but if he wasn't,
4 it would have to be the oncall ACPO.

5 Now, that individual could be at home, could be at
6 a meeting somewhere. He or she has to come to the
7 control room to start to take control. We'd set
8 a strategy, as you've heard, and then ask for Command
9 team members to be put into the various places, all of
10 whom will be doing other things at the time, have to
11 extricate themselves from that job, take themselves to
12 a new location, be briefed up on what's happening, and
13 then work out exactly what it is that they're required
14 to do, working to that overall strategy.

15 Q. As it happened, Commander, it does appear that, in the
16 first 40 or 50 minutes after the explosions first
17 occurred at 8.50, there was very little that the Command
18 structure that was subsequently put in place, or was
19 forming, needed to do by way of giving specific
20 direction to officers on the ground and, of course, it
21 perhaps would not be expected to do so because it is
22 a strategic and tactical level of command.

23 But if the events of 7 July had required specific
24 strategic decisions to be taken that might have affected
25 the response of officers on the ground, how would that

1 Command structure have operated if the
2 Special Operations Room had not already been manned?
3 Because it seems from what you say that, during that
4 first hour or so, whilst the Command officers are being
5 assembled and the communications structures are being
6 moved to the GT call sign, there will be no effective
7 means of disseminating orders from the Command structure
8 or of receiving in one place information from the
9 ground?

10 A. It would happen, my Lady. What would happen is the
11 oncall senior officer -- an ACPO officer -- when he or
12 she is appraised of the incident, clearly would start
13 travelling, now to Lambeth and, in those days, to
14 Hendon. They would surround themselves with able staff,
15 a staff officer, maybe a tactical adviser.
16 Having been appraised from the chief inspector of
17 what the incident was, they'd be thinking ahead, they'd
18 be thinking, "Okay, what do we need to do?", they'd be
19 giving directions over the phone to the control room,
20 they may even be drafting out that initial strategy
21 then. If there isn't already a Silver appointed, they
22 may well say to the chief inspector -- and I've done
23 this myself many times -- "You remain as Silver, you've
24 got a tactical plan going, these are the three or four
25 key issues I want you to think of, ie a strategy, save

1 life, preserve evidence," whatever the occasion we're
2 dealing with. So that framework is set by that officer.
3 They're having to think quickly, they're having to
4 think on the hoof, as it were. They're making notes as
5 they go. Maybe as they're driving in from home, maybe
6 as they're driving in from their meeting. But that
7 structure starts to take place. I'm confident that our
8 training is that actually, on the ground, the first
9 responders, and their Command structure, through their
10 inspectors, and possibly even reaching back to their
11 senior officers on borough, will already be thinking
12 along the same lines.

13 What we do, as Mr Allison has already said, we just
14 try to put a bit more order around that position that's
15 already started. We're not of starting from scratch.
16 That starts from the minute we get that phone call in
17 and our training, if you like, allows us to build those
18 layers on top of each other, until we get through that
19 first chaotic hour, or maybe more, depending on the
20 nature of the incident, and then we can start to control
21 things in a more calm fashion, perhaps.

22 Q. Plainly, the commanding officers now have the benefit of
23 Airwave as well.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. So there is a more efficient, Metropolitan-wide system

1 for getting information to the senior Commanders and for
2 getting orders back out?

3 A. There is indeed.

4 Q. Has there also been a simplification, insofar as the
5 assembly or the transfer of the communication functions
6 from the boroughs and, at Scotland Yard, to the three
7 central communication Command centres that you have at
8 Hendon, Lambeth and Bow means that if a Strategic
9 Co-ordination Centre meeting -- a Gold Coordinating Group
10 meeting -- is ordered, it will take place, perhaps, at
11 Hendon or Lambeth, very close to, if not in or adjacent
12 to, the existing Metropolitan communications centre?

13 A. It would happen, first of all, now, at Lambeth. That's
14 where we would open up our prime Special Operations
15 Room. The chief inspector running the day-to-day
16 business is in that same building. In essence, that is
17 not a huge issue. We could place that first meeting
18 anywhere. But initially, the Gold Commander would go to
19 the Special Operations Room. He or she would then start
20 to assemble senior officers from other agencies, other
21 organisations, into that same room, and then we would
22 form that first Gold group. It might be relatively
23 small in number; it will grow, obviously, as time goes
24 on.

25 But, yes, we would locate that now, certainly at

1 Lambeth, alongside the chief inspector who would be
2 upstairs.

3 Q. Turning now to the relatively more detailed issue of the
4 interface between the Metropolitan Police Service and
5 the emergency services. You heard my Lady's question in
6 relation to the interface between the London Ambulance
7 Service and the Metropolitan Police Service as far as
8 the CAD system is concerned.

9 Is the position this: as we've seen, it is possible
10 for a police officer attending a scene to make a request
11 to the London Ambulance Service for medical response,
12 for medical assistance and for the Metropolitan Police,
13 City of London Police, British Transport Police CAD
14 system to reflect that request on the face of its own
15 system?

16 A. Indeed, absolutely.

17 Q. When the request is made, it will also appear, of
18 course, on the system of the recipient, the London
19 Ambulance Service, and appear on their Central Ambulance
20 Control data system?

21 A. That's correct, my Lady.

22 Q. So anybody reading either of those two data systems will
23 see that a request has been made and a request for
24 assistance has been received?

25 A. That's correct, my Lady.

1 Q. But to what extent currently can either system or either
2 organisation put messages on the other system's data
3 system, over and above fairly straightforward requests
4 for direct assistance; for example, a message reflecting
5 a tactical debate as to how many ambulances should be
6 sent to any given scene?

7 A. I think the system is limited. It was introduced and
8 should be used only for the police service to send
9 a request for an ambulance rather than having the
10 officer having to radio in the police control, the
11 police control ringing the Ambulance Service, in
12 a circuitous route.

13 We brought it in to quicken the ambulance response
14 to accidents and vice versa. It is a simple messaging
15 system. There are dangers if we start to use it over
16 and above that, I think important messages would get
17 lost. It's essential that we have somebody from the
18 Ambulance Service alongside us, which is why we now
19 always bring them in along with Fire Brigade colleagues
20 who have that bigger picture of ambulance dispositions,
21 of their ability to manage larger incidents. For
22 instance, you know, we had them on New Year's Eve and
23 actually, New Year's Eve it's the Ambulance Service who
24 are probably the busiest of all the organisations, and
25 we are certainly struggling then.

1 I think there are dangers, if we just use that CAD
2 messaging system, that we will not see those bigger
3 pictures or those Command decisions that the Ambulance
4 Service needs to make and then the Ambulance Service
5 liaison officer telling the Gold Commander about what
6 they can and cannot realistically do.

7 I don't think a CAD system would actually help us in
8 that instance. The CAD is really just the dispatching
9 messaging system, it's not a Command and Control system
10 in that sense.

11 Q. We heard evidence earlier this week from a witness who
12 was describing a project which was investigating the
13 interface on a national basis between police forces and
14 emergency services.

15 Are you aware of the Metropolitan Police
16 contributing to that project or debate?

17 A. Not specifically to that particular debate on CAD, no.

18 Q. But is the issue of how the emergency services liaise
19 with the Metropolitan Police both at operational
20 level -- a message for assistance -- or at tactical
21 level, meaning "How do we respond?", or as a matter of
22 ongoing discussion and debate between you?

23 A. It's always a matter of ongoing discussion and debate,
24 and issues that will come out of this will no doubt help
25 us with that debate. But I think we must separate a CAD

1 dispatching system which deals incident by incident and
2 assists a relatively small number of officers from all
3 the organisations dealing with a specific incident away
4 from the larger Command and Control incidents, and
5 I think certainly since -- in pre-2005, but enhanced
6 since, the way that the various organisations now talk
7 to each other and work with each other on major
8 incidents or events has improved immeasurably.
9 Now, within the Metropolitan Police, I have plans to
10 change some of our operating systems and support
11 structures in terms of policing events, which would then
12 come into play for a future major incident. We're a few
13 months to putting that in now.
14 It's not a CAD system, but you heard it referred to
15 earlier on as the Met Ops system. It's the system we
16 would use in the Special Operations Room, where all
17 colleagues could see how wider aspects of the event or
18 incident you were dealing with unfold, rather than a CAD
19 incident, which is really just a specific related to,
20 you know, the management of the event on the ground.
21 Q. So it's more information contained on the Met Ops
22 commuter system --
23 A. Indeed.
24 Q. -- which allows a reader of that system, looking at
25 a console, to see more, perhaps, of the overall tactical

1 position than just simple bullet messages coming in from
2 individual officers?

3 A. Absolutely, and again, some of the learning, as we have
4 seen in the events of 2005, and the learning from that,
5 and others, has helped us to shape, that is, and we hope
6 to have that in in the next two or three months.

7 Q. You've spoken of the constant steps to ensure that
8 liaison with the emergency services and the
9 Metropolitan Police is kept as up to date and as
10 efficient as possible.

11 As part of that process, have there been for many
12 years, as some witnesses have reported, a whole series
13 of crisis management meetings, of training sessions,
14 table-top exercises and courses for senior commanders in
15 the Metropolitan Police?

16 A. There have indeed, my Lady.

17 Q. Have you set out in your witness statement -- for
18 my Lady's note, page 15 -- a broad outline of the sorts
19 of crisis management courses and spontaneous disorder
20 courses that have been held over the last few years?

21 A. I have, my Lady, yes.

22 Q. At paragraph 43, you record how there have, in fact,
23 been numerous local single-agency and small scale
24 contingency exercises in London as well as a much
25 broader series of strategic inter-agency exercises?

1 A. That's correct, my Lady. We are constantly running
2 exercises at the local level and at the pan-London
3 level. Those will take different forms.
4 You've heard of the Hanover series, you've heard of
5 some of the major incident training that we do. Things
6 like Osiris were a live incident. It's obviously very
7 expensive and challenging to put operations on the
8 street with live people, but we do do it. But all of
9 those are all designed, certainly for the senior
10 officers involved, to actually give them the confidence
11 and the ability to deal with major incidents like, you
12 know, 7/7 and others, although you can never replicate
13 exactly what's going to happen, but the more you immerse
14 yourself in training, the more confident, the more able
15 and the more knowledgeable you are when you have to
16 actually think on your feet, as Mr Allison was having to
17 do, thinking very, very quickly about a multitude of
18 things, it just gives you the confidence.
19 What it had also done -- and I think this was
20 extremely important in 2005 -- it enables us to work
21 with our colleagues from the various other agencies, not
22 just blue light agencies now, but more and more local
23 authorities, utilities, telecoms agencies, and certainly
24 the more we work with them, the more we understand their
25 ways of working in their organisations, I think the

1 better collective we are, so that, when we walk into
2 a crisis situation and we open up that Gold Suite, we're
3 looking around -- as Mr Allison said, I think, on more
4 than one occasion, we're looking at people we know,
5 people we trust, people we recognise and we work I think
6 much --

7 Q. People with whom you've worked in the past?

8 A. Absolutely, sir.

9 Q. In general terms, has there been an acceleration since
10 2005, either in the substance, the length of the
11 courses, or in their number by comparison to before?

12 A. I'm not sure I'd say there's been an acceleration,
13 there's certainly been a change of focus on them.

14 In fact, some of them, I'm glad to say, are now
15 actually shorter, more focused on what they do rather
16 than taking up whole weekends.

17 But certainly -- we've heard about the London
18 Resilience Team -- I think we now have better
19 structures. LESLP has long been there. I look at LESLP
20 as the operational arm, the London Resilience Team set
21 the plans. There's much more interface now between
22 a wider group of communities. That I think's the
23 important part.

24 LESLP was limited, initially, to the blue light
25 services, we then began to add Coast Guard, Port of

1 London Authority, military, et cetera, but if you look
2 at the landscape now in London and nationally with the
3 Civil Contingencies Act, the landscape is full with
4 wider players, through health, through utility, through
5 telecoms, and, of course, depending on the incident
6 you're dealing with, different agencies may come into
7 play, but I think we have a greater understanding of
8 everything that we deal with.

9 But we mustn't be complacent. We need to continue
10 building on this, and that's part of my role, to make
11 sure that we constantly learn lessons and constantly
12 move on.

13 Q. At the same time, are bodies such as formerly the London
14 Resilience Forum, but now the London Regional Resilience
15 Forum, more detailed by comparison to the original LESLP
16 plan, insofar as because they are drafted, designed and
17 actioned at chief officer level and below, on the part
18 of each of the individual bodies --

19 A. Indeed.

20 Q. -- they get down into the detail and the guts of how
21 responses should be formulated far better than the
22 original, much more conceptual plans?

23 A. They do, and I think, again, they are plans for London,
24 whereas, in the past, we may just have had a plan for
25 the Metropolitan Police or the London Fire Brigade, the

1 London Resilience plans are drawn up by -- jointly -- as
2 you say, overseen by senior officers, but actually drawn
3 up by staff who understand the issues, but drawn up for
4 the response to London as a whole, in which each of the
5 agencies would play its part.

6 So I think we're seeing a more rounded picture of
7 a response to any major incident in London.

8 MR KEITH: Commander, thank you very much. Those are all
9 the questions that I have for you.

10 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Can I just ask you one question,
11 Commander?

12 A. My Lady.

13 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: It may be you can't answer it.

14 I don't know if you've heard that there's been some
15 comment about whether or not the London Underground
16 rescue vehicles should be allowed to have a blue light
17 to charge through the streets of London in an emergency.
18 It sounds as if some police officers or police forces
19 aren't very keen on the idea.

20 Do you know what the present position is, as far as
21 that's concerned, it having been a recommendation in the
22 past?

23 A. My understanding is they still do not have authority to
24 drive on the emergency equipment blue lights and
25 two-tone horns. They do have, certainly within London,

1 the exemption to drive in bus lanes and not pay the
2 congestion charge during emergency time.
3 My understanding -- and forgive me, I am not in the
4 detail of this -- there would be a concern about a small
5 group of officers out with the emergency services
6 driving on blue lights and two-tones, because it's
7 a very dangerous occupation in its own right, and of
8 course, if you grant that to one small group of people
9 outside the blue light services, where do you then take
10 it? And even within the blue light services, we are all
11 very, very strict about safer driving and, as we know,
12 unfortunately, there are accidents involving police
13 vehicles and others.

14 So I think whilst we understand the need --
15 certainly, on this occasion, it would have helped
16 a bit -- I think we step back and look at the wider
17 picture: actually, the fewer vehicles whizzing round
18 London, or anywhere else, on blue lights, the better for
19 all of us.

20 Those issues would have been balanced up and I think
21 what we've ended up with is a sensible compromise that
22 should assist us without putting too many other people
23 at further risk.

24 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

25 MR KEITH: Thank you, my Lady.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Coltart?

2 MR COLTART: No, thank you.

3 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Saunders.

4 MR SAUNDERS: No, thank you.

5 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Mr Hill.

6 Questions by MR HILL

7 MR HILL: Just on my Lady's question, can I just ask --

8 I don't want to go beyond the realms of your own

9 knowledge and experience, but would it be right to say

10 that the question of authorisation for blue lighting is

11 not actually in the gift of the Metropolitan Police;

12 it's something about which the Metropolitan Police, who

13 are authorised for blue light services will no doubt be

14 consulted and over which you'd be consulted, but it's

15 a matter as much for Government and other bodies as to

16 the ultimate authorisation?

17 A. I would imagine that is true, my Lady. It would almost

18 certainly be a ministerial level decision by whichever

19 Government department was responsible, but they would

20 look to, certainly, ACPO and certainly ACPO roads

21 policing for a view on it, and my understanding is the

22 view given was as I've articulated, but we wouldn't be

23 the ultimate decision-maker and I'm sure they would

24 refer to other bodies as well.

25 MR HILL: Yes, thank you.

1 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Those are all the questions we have
2 for you, Commander Broadhurst. Thank you very much
3 indeed.

4 MR KEITH: My Lady, may I invite Mr Hay to read the two
5 remaining statements from today's list?

6 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you.

7 MR HAY: My Lady, the first statement is that of
8 Superintendent Roger Gomm, dated 7 October 2010, which
9 has the usual declaration of truth.

10 Statement of SUPERINTENDENT ROGER GOMM read

11 "My name is Roger Gomm and I am a superintendent in
12 the Metropolitan Police Service's Central Operations
13 Public Order Command. This unit is responsible for
14 ensuring the Metropolitan Police Service has the
15 capability to effectively respond to and manage
16 spontaneous and preplanned events and incidents in
17 London.

18 "On 7 July 2005, I was the MPS Silver London
19 commander."

20 My Lady, Superintendent Gomm then goes on to set out
21 his 32 years' worth of policing experience and that
22 includes being Gold Commander at Prime Minister
23 Questions, the London marathon, being a Silver Commander
24 on New Year's Eve celebrations and the London marathon,
25 and has also resulted in him being awarded the Queen's

1 police medal:
2 "G8 Summit in 2005.
3 "Between 6 July and 8 July 2005, the 31st G8 Summit
4 was held at Gleneagles Hotel, Scotland. This was
5 a significant international event hosted by the then
6 Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and attended by the leaders
7 of some of the world's richest, industrialised
8 countries.
9 "When the Scottish police forces were faced with
10 policing the G8 Summit, they approached the MPS Public
11 Order Branch for a broad spectrum of assistance and
12 advice. This included assistance with the planning
13 phase and also the provision of resources.
14 "During the G8 Summit, approximately 900 MPS
15 officers travel from London to Scotland to support the
16 policing operation. MPS officers were deployed to
17 Scotland to manage the risk of public disorder. There
18 was evidence that some protesters sought to disrupt the
19 conference, including damages to the fences at
20 Gleneagles, to reach the site of the conference.
21 "Historically, G8 summits have attracted vociferous
22 protests requiring significant police presence. In the
23 run-up to the G8 Summit at Gleneagles, there were
24 a large number of protests and marches, some of which
25 were becoming increasingly violent. While it was

1 assessed that the focus of the protests would be on the
2 actual Summit itself, it was felt that there may be some
3 protest or activity in London. Consequently, a policing
4 operation was put in place utilising eight police
5 support units made up of eight Serials for deployment in
6 Central London.

7 "The operation was planned to run from Wednesday,
8 29 June 2005, until Saturday, 9 July 2005. The presence
9 of these Aid Serials meant that more officers than usual
10 were deployed to Central London during the period of the
11 operation.

12 "As detailed in the statement of Assistant
13 Commissioner Chris Allison, there was already in
14 operation a Command structure in place to manage any
15 disorder caused by the G8 protests in Central London at
16 the time of the London bombings. During the period of
17 the operation from 29 June to 9 July 2005, I performed
18 the role of Silver London Commander in support of then
19 Commander, now Assistant Commissioner Allison, who was
20 designated Gold Commander. Also, the Special Operations
21 Room, also referred to as GT, was already in operation
22 to receive telephone calls about incidents associated
23 with the G8 Summit.

24 "999 emergency calls would normally be dealt with by
25 various police boroughs receiving the calls and dealing

1 with them via the computer-aided dispatch system.
2 However, given the anticipated scale of incidents
3 related to the G8 Summit, the Special Operations Room
4 had taken over this role.
5 "My role as Silver London Commander on 7 July 2005.
6 "In preparing the statement, I referred to a public
7 order log that was completed by Inspector
8 Guy Huddleston. On 7 July 2005, Inspector Huddleston
9 acted as my loggist and recorded my decisions and
10 actions. The log commences at 09.40, although, because
11 of the initial intensity of activity, it was not
12 possible to record all of the actions taken in those
13 early moments. There are, therefore, various actions
14 that I carried out before this time. However, I state
15 below that the actions that I recall taking where they
16 are not recorded in my decision log.
17 "Otherwise, I have read the log and confirm that
18 this is an accurate record of the records and decisions
19 I took on 7 July 2005.
20 "At approximately 8.50, on 7 July 2005, while in
21 a meeting at which a BTP officer was present, he
22 informed me of an incident on the London Underground
23 network. I immediately attended the Special Operations
24 Room at New Scotland Yard where I was briefed by the
25 incident chief inspector, Chief Inspector

1 Peter Sadowski, who, at the time, was then the officer
2 in charge of the information room.
3 "We began to realise that these apparently separate
4 incidents may be linked and we were quickly going beyond
5 the capability of the information room to manage. In
6 keeping with the agreed protocols, it would be the
7 responsibility of the Gold and Silver London Commanders
8 to manage such events. As a result, I began to make
9 urgent preparations to take tactical command of these
10 incidents, basing myself within the SOR.
11 "At 09.07, I instructed the police support units
12 under my command were made available to assist at an
13 incident reported at Liverpool Street station. At
14 approximately 09.25, I remember speaking to
15 Mr Andrew Barr, the controller at London Underground, by
16 telephone, who informed me that these incidents were not
17 related to any form of power failure or power surge."
18 My Lady, pausing there, Mr Barr's statement records
19 that this conversation was closer to 09.40. The
20 reference is TFL938-15:
21 "It was around this time that I decided to deal with
22 them as linked incidents, possibly of terrorist origin.
23 Mr Barr also informed me that the Underground network
24 was being evacuated."
25 My Lady, that again supports the more likely timing

1 of 09.40:
2 "At about 09.30, in the telephone conversations with
3 Assistant Chief Constable Trotter, now Chief Constable
4 of the British Transport Police, and Chief
5 Superintendent Alec Robertson of the City of London
6 Police, I declared the incidents would be managed which
7 the protocols of Operation Benbow. This is a single
8 Command and Control structure for the resources of all
9 three forces deployed to the incidents. This was due to
10 the fact that the incidents appeared to have occurred
11 within the transport system, which was a responsibility
12 of British Transport Police and within the City of
13 London Policing area. At approximately 09.40,
14 Commander Allison attended the SOR and I briefed him on
15 the incidents.
16 "At this time, it was thought that there were 7 to 9
17 different incidents on the Underground network to which
18 the emergency services were responding. Due to the
19 nature of the incidents and the fragmented way in which
20 the reports were coming in, the situation was far from
21 clear. The initial policing response had been provided
22 from local borough policing to what were, at that time,
23 individual calls for assistance. I recall that, at that
24 time, there was speculation that the incidents were
25 related to some form of electrical or power failure.

1 "My decision log states, at 09.40, that, due to the
2 severity and extent of this incident, all preplanned,
3 small policing operations under command of C011 have
4 been suspended. Resources are stretched and all ET PSUs
5 sent to the incident.

6 "This entry refers to my decision to make an all on
7 duty resources available to assist in the responses to
8 the incidents on the Underground.

9 "At about 09.45, I recall that the SOR formally took
10 control of all the radio communications and
11 computer-aided dispatch records for the MPS and the City
12 of London Police related to these incidents.

13 "At 09.50, an SOR radio operator informed me of
14 another serious incident on a London Transport double
15 decker bus in Tavistock Square. After a short period of
16 time, this was visible on the CCTV monitors in the
17 Special Operations Room.

18 "I directed that an officer of minimum rank of chief
19 inspector attend the scene of each incident and take
20 command, implementing the major incident plan as defined
21 by the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel.

22 "These officers were nominated as Bronze Aldgate,
23 Bronze Edgware Road, Bronze King's Cross and Bronze
24 Tavistock Square.

25 "At 09.55 I directed the MPS mobilisation plan be

1 invoked. This meant that the total number of all police
2 officers on duty across the Metropolitan Police Service
3 and their skill profiles were collated and the
4 information passed to me and my staff for possible
5 redeployment.

6 "The log also records at this time that I did not
7 require off-duty officers to be recalled.

8 "My decision log shows that, at 10.13, I was
9 informed that a Gold group meeting was to take place at
10 10.30. I duly attended the Gold group meeting at
11 New Scotland Yard, which was chaired by
12 Commander Allison. Also in attendance were
13 representatives of the City of London Police, the
14 British Transport Police, the London Fire Brigade, the
15 London Ambulance Service and the local authority
16 personnel.

17 "A Gold group meeting is intended to enhance the
18 quality of the police response to a major incident and
19 involves appropriately skilled officers from the
20 Metropolitan Police Service and from partner
21 organisations advising upon and guiding the management
22 of an incident.

23 "At this Gold group meeting, Commander Allison set
24 out the following strategy, which he and I had
25 previously discussed from dealing with these incidents."

1 My Lady, that is the strategy which was on
2 Trial Director earlier:
3 "As a Silver Commander, it was my responsibility to
4 develop, deliver and coordinate a tactical plan to
5 achieve the strategy sent by Commander Allison. To do
6 this, I had full authority and complete discretion to
7 make decisions and give directions as I considered
8 necessary.
9 "I was required to inform Commander Allison of my
10 actions on a regular basis, but would only refer Command
11 decisions to him which were either beyond my remit or
12 had implications to all the responder agencies or the
13 wider London strategic partnership.
14 "Liaison was formally undertaken through the Gold
15 group meeting, which Commander Allison held with his
16 Gold counterparts from other emergency services and
17 partner agencies. An example of this was at 10.13, when
18 I received information that the mobile telephone network
19 was beginning to fail. I received a request to
20 implement the access overload control procedure to limit
21 the access to the mobile networks by the general public
22 preserving capability for emergency response purposes.
23 This was not a decision I felt able to take and
24 I referred the request to the Gold group meeting to be
25 held at 10.30. The Gold group meeting discussed the

1 request and agreed not to implement the procedure.

2 "As London Silver, I assumed responsibility for the
3 police response to the incidents and had full control of
4 all police resources engaged with them. As part of my
5 role, I gathered a team of highly qualified experienced
6 officers whom I could call upon for advice and guidance
7 as the incidents unfolded.

8 "In the first phase of the response, my main aim was
9 to establish exactly what I was dealing with and the
10 total number of incidents. This is recorded in my log
11 entry at 09.55.

12 "Also in that entry, my direction that specialist
13 body recovery and family liaison officers were
14 identified to ensure that they were not deployed to
15 other tasks was recorded.

16 "Anticipating a large number of casualties, I sought
17 informations about the hospitals that would be used and
18 directed traffic patrol officers to be deployed to
19 ensure access and egress to these locations. I then
20 took steps to establish a clear Command structure for
21 the initial response, develop clear lines of
22 communication and ensure that there were sufficient
23 resources to meet the demands being made with the police
24 service.

25 "This response was based on the major incident

1 procedure, as explained in the sixth edition of the
2 major incident manual which was in force in 2005.
3 "At 11.23, my decision log records that a Security
4 Review Committee meeting had taken place. It also
5 states 'Aldgate and bus confirmed suicide bomber'. I do
6 not recall attending this meeting or the person who told
7 me that suicide bombers were involved in the Aldgate and
8 Tavistock Square suicide bombings. Nonetheless, the log
9 shows that by 11.23 I was aware of this information.
10 "By 11.40, it had been confirmed to me that we were
11 dealing with four definite sites at Russell
12 Square/King's Cross, Moorgate/Aldgate, Edgware Road and
13 Tavistock Place.
14 "At this time, I was informed there were seven
15 deceased at Aldgate and Edgware Road and two deceased at
16 Tavistock Square. I received further such information
17 throughout the course of the day."
18 My Lady, Superintendent Gomm then goes on to set out
19 the Silver meetings held at 12.30, 3.00 and at 5.30 pm.
20 He continued in the role of Silver throughout the
21 day until 6.55 that evening.
22 My Lady, the next statement is that of
23 Peter Sadowski dated 14 October 2010.
24 My Lady, he, too, sets out his personal professional
25 history and his experiences, before turning to deal with

1 the Central Command Complex.
2 Statement of MR PETER SADOWSKI read
3 "The Central Command Complex (also referred to as
4 the information room) is based at New Scotland Yard.
5 Paragraph 20 of Commander Broadhurst's statement dated
6 20 September 2010 explains the purpose of the
7 information room. The officers who staff the
8 information room would monitor incidents which had the
9 capacity to escalate. If an incident did escalate,
10 I would take command of the incident, meaning that
11 I would arrange for the deployment of resources to the
12 incident.
13 "My role on 7 July 2005.
14 "On 7 July 2005, I was on duty at New Scotland Yard
15 as day shift chief inspector in charge of Central
16 Command Complex.
17 "As the events that day unfolded, I made a record of
18 my actions and decisions. Some of these were recorded
19 on the computer-aided dispatch system either directly by
20 me but more often by members of my staff at my direct
21 instruction. The CAD messages relevant to my statement
22 are referred to below.
23 "I also made extensive use of standard MPS decision
24 log booklets. These forms are completed by officers
25 assisting me under my direct instruction and in my

1 presence. They were checked and signed by me as an
2 accurate record of what I had done and why.
3 "I have been informed that these original notes
4 cannot be found. As detailed in paragraph 26 of
5 Commander Broadhurst's statement dated
6 20 September 2010, the Central Communications Complex at
7 New Scotland Yard had been replaced by the new Central
8 Communication Command Centres at Lambeth, Hendon and
9 Bow. The transfer to the three centres was completed on
10 7 April 2007. I believe that the decision logs that
11 I completed on 7 July 2005 were stored at
12 New Scotland Yard and should subsequently have been
13 archived at one of the three new centres. I have been
14 informed, however, that my former colleagues have
15 searched the three centres but have not been able to
16 locate my decision logs. Consequently, this statement
17 is made with reference to the original CAD messages and
18 my recollection of the events.
19 "At 8.51, a radio message from a City of London
20 Police officer was received saying that there appeared
21 to be some type of explosion within the vicinity of the
22 Great Eastern Hotel. This was recorded on CAD message
23 number 2334.
24 "At 08.56, CAD message number 2376 shows that
25 another radio message was received from officers

1 monitoring CCTV at King's Cross railway station. They
2 reported that the station appeared to be evacuated but
3 they did not know why.

4 "At 09.04, a telephone call was received from the
5 London Fire Brigade informing the police of their
6 attendance at Praed Street W2 following reports of an
7 explosion. This was recorded on CAD message
8 number 2430.

9 "By this time, senior police officers and other
10 branches of the MPS were seeking information from the
11 information room about what was happening. I recall
12 Deputy Assistant Commissioner Roy McPherson and Chief
13 Superintendent Steven McDonald came to the information
14 room to listen to the telephone calls coming in to have
15 a better idea of the incidents that were being reported.

16 "At 09.13, information was received from the British
17 Transport Police that a person was believed to be under
18 a train at Edgware Road station. I believe that this
19 information came in from the BTP's equivalent of the
20 MPS's information room to one of my staff officers.
21 Local MPS officers provided an update almost immediately
22 to the effect that some kind of explosion had occurred
23 although London Underground staff were unsure of the
24 cause. There were reports of some casualties. This was
25 recorded on CAD message 2495.

1 "At the time of receipt of these messages, the
2 responsibility for managing these apparently separate
3 incidents was that of the local control rooms. My staff
4 assisted by managing the deployment of additional
5 resources, particularly to traffic cordons, so that
6 areas around the incidents were made sterile. This
7 would enable emergency responders to assist the
8 casualties and for the crime scenes to be preserved.

9 "At the time, the officers acting in a supervisory
10 capacity in the information room were monitoring all
11 communications with a view to identifying whether the
12 response was likely to become beyond the capacity and
13 capability of the local control rooms. If this
14 occurred, established protocol dictated that I would
15 take command of the incident from the information room.

16 "My recollection is that I placed each of the three
17 incidents at Aldgate, Edgware Road and King's Cross into
18 'Command support' as it was apparent that each of these
19 incidents were beyond the capacity of the local borough
20 control room. The incidents appeared to be major
21 incidents because of the number of casualties and the
22 fact that multiple sites were involved.

23 "I believe I began the process of placing the
24 incidents into Command support from about 9.15. By
25 placing the incidents into Command support, the

1 information room took over the handling of all 999
2 emergency calls from the MPS and City of London Police.
3 "At that point, I was physically behind the Command
4 support positions (ie officers sitting at computer
5 terminals dealing with enquiries via the CAD system),
6 doing my best to coordinate resources and our responses.
7 "I know that there was an early request made to me
8 at about 09.12 to consider opening the Casualty Bureau.
9 Although I had the authority to do so, I referred the
10 request to my Chief Superintendent, Steve McDonald.
11 This is because I knew that he would arrange a Gold
12 group meeting whereby the issue of the Casualty Bureau
13 would be discussed.
14 "At the same time, I began consultation with
15 Superintendent Roger Gomm, who was the Silver London
16 Commander and had command of several police support
17 units and the Special Operations Room. We were
18 consulting about whether GT should be opened to manage
19 the incidents.
20 "The volume of telephone calls and radio traffic was
21 growing dramatically. The information room was
22 receiving calls about various incidents connected to the
23 London bombings from the public via the 999 system, from
24 police officers' radios and from partner agencies such
25 as the Ambulance Service.

1 "In addition to this, we were also dealing with
2 telephone calls about the incidents that were
3 unconnected to the London bombings such as burglaries.
4 It became apparent to me that the bombings which
5 occurred at different locations and had resulted in
6 multiple casualties were exceptional events which would
7 require considerable time and resources to manage. The
8 volume of calls into the information room would
9 inevitably continue to escalate and would be beyond the
10 capacity of my staff to deal with. As a result, myself
11 and Superintendent Gomm agreed that he would take
12 command of the situation and we both coordinated the
13 transfer of all the incidents to GT.
14 "At 09.42, GT formally took over the responsibility
15 for the Command and Control of the incidents."
16 MR KEITH: My Lady, that concludes the evidence in relation
17 to Command and Control insofar as the
18 Metropolitan Police, British Transport Police, City of
19 London Police are concerned. We'll be returning to this
20 topic, of course, in two or so weeks' time with HEMS,
21 LAS and LFB. My Lady will, of course, also be hearing
22 from Acting Detective Inspector Sparks in relation to
23 background on Monday, and Detective Chief Superintendent
24 McKenna on the very last day of the evidence.
25 LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: Thank you very much.

1 (12.40 pm)
2 (The inquests adjourned until 10.30 am on Monday,
3 14 February 2011)
4